“What We’re Trying To Do Is Establish Democracy”

Censorship & South Africa’s Foreign Relations During Apartheid

Arno Rosenfeld

Keystone Project Research Paper

5/29/2012

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From the 1940’s until the early 1990’s the Republic of South Africa was ruled by

a minority government of whites who oversaw a systemic disenfranchisement and

oppression of the black African majority under a system known as Apartheid, or

separation. The South African society and economy were based on the exclusion of non-

whites from mainstream society and the availability of cheap labor. The government,

controlled for the entire length of Apartheid by the Afrikaner-nationalist National Party,

was dedicated to preserving the system of white rule indefinitely. Beginning in the 1980’s

the seams of the system became strained as unrest in the black townships increased and

the international community began bearing down, causing South Africa to become

increasingly isolated. The government, long self-conscious about their perception

internationally, became even more so. The government was faced with a vexing paradox.

If they wanted to maintain international legitimacy they had to allow the semblance of a

free press. But as unrest increased, and the government reacted with harsh tactics, the

information the press was able to access and transmit was causing South Africa to lose

international legitimacy. The degree to which a free press helped the country’s image

versus how much it hurt was not an entirely new issue. But in the mid-1980’s the

government decided that the current level of press freedom did more harm than good, and

increased censorship and media restrictions severely.

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History of Afrikaners in South Africa

Map of the British Cape Colony in 1906. Note the location of the Boer Republics in the

eastern part of the land.1

After being settled by traders starting around 1650, what is now South Africa was

passed from one European power to another before being colonized by the British Empire

in 1795. Afrikaners, the ethnic group that ruled the country during Apartheid, are

descended from Dutch, French and German settlers who arrived in the land from 1652-

1795. The Afrikaners grew out of settlers who began to indentify as more African than

1 "Cape Colony Map 1906." Probert Encyclopedia.

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European. The Afrikaners, or Boers as some Afrikaner farmers were known, were

members of the conservative Dutch Calvinist Church. In the 1830’s and 1840’s the

British began to assert more rigid control over their colony, leading thousands of

Afrikaners to move north and form the “Boer republics” of The Northern Cape, Natal,

Orange Free State and Transvaal. These states were autonomous and free from British

colonial rule, and the mass migration to them by the Afrikaners, known as the Great Trek,

helped to reinforce a sense of an Afrikaner identity distinct from their previous ethnicities

and nationalities.

The migration away from British rule was about more than just a quest for

religious freedom: it was a quest for cultural freedom. For the Afrikaners, cultural

freedom meant the ability to enforce more discriminatory racial laws. Under British rule,

“Coloreds,” as non-whites were known, had far less rights than whites. However, they

were still able to access the legal system, and in theory to sue their white bosses. This

upset the Afrikaners to the point of minor rebellion against the British in 1815.2 The

British also embarked on a policy of Anglicization, seeking to create Britons out of the

Dutch settlers through such actions as imposing English as the official language in

schools and civic affairs.3 In addition to the cultural clashes, the Afrikaners and British

faced off in multiple, lengthy military conflicts over territorial rights. All these things led

the Afrikaners to become increasingly alienated from Western Europe. The Western

2 The Rebellion of Slachter’s Neck occurred when a Afrikaner farmer was ordered to appear in court over repeated claims of mistreating his black workers. The farmer went on the run and was hunted down and killed by British troops. A group of fellow Afrikaner farmers swore revenge and attacked British forces before they were hunted down and killed or arrested. By some, the event was considered a seminal event in motivating Afrikaners to go on the Great Trek. "Slachter's Nek Rebellion." Somerset East. N.p., n.d. Web. 2012. <http://www.somerseteasttourism.co.za/index.php?page_name=more&menu_id=1&submenu_id=26>.3 Graham McPhee and Prem Podder, eds. Empire and After: Englishness in Postcolonial Perspective, 2nd ed, (London: Berghan Books, 2007): 60.

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Europe of the 1650’s, when many of the settlers arrived in South Africa, bore little

resemblance to Europe two-hundred years later. Religion had taken a backseat to

nationalism as the central political focus of nations, Britain had overtaken the

Netherlands as the primary military power, and the age of enlightenment—which flew in

the face of the traditional religious beliefs of the Afrikaners—had taken hold.4 The

expulsion of the Dutch East India Company by the British in 1795 severed the single,

tenuous tie that the Afrikaners maintained to their original homelands.5 When the Great

Trek was complete, and the Afrikaner farmers were living on the frontier, the distance

between them and Western Europeans became even greater. In fact, they were now living

in an almost identical manner to the native Africans of the area, the Xhosa.6 The

similarities between the two peoples became so strong, that as Donald Denoon writes in

Southern Africa Since 1800, “only race remained as a reliable distinction between the two

communities.”

History of Afrikaner Government

In reality, the Boer republics of the nineteenth-century were patriarchal societies

based heavily on ancestral lineage and family clans.7 But they aspired to be something

more. The earliest organized Afrikaner government shows the roots of the legalistic, yet

immoral, system of Apartheid that was to take place in later years. The constitution of the

4 Donald Denoon, Balam Nyeko, and J.B. Webster., Southern Africa Since 1800, (New York: Praeger, 1972): 43.5 George McCall Theal, History of South Africa Under the Administration of the Dutch East India Company (1652-1795). Vol. 2. (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1897): 271-315.6 Andrew Manson, "The Hurutshe and the Formation of the Transvaal State, 1835-1875." The International Journal of African Historical Studies 25.1 (1992): 85-98.7 Elsie Cloete, "Afrikaner Identity: Culture, Tradition and Gender," Agenda 14 (1992): 42-56.

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Orange Free State, one of the four Boer republics, ratified in 1854, was modeled on the

United States Constitution, with one caveat—it only granted rights to white citizens.89

The Greek-model of democracy was practiced in many of the republics through the

volksraad, or the people’s assembly. The assemblies, though not always successful, were

envisioned as a congress for the republics. Though often rigged, elections were held

every four years for the republic presidents. So we see that from an early point, trappings

of democracy masked what were otherwise non-democratic forms of governance.10

The republics suffered in abject poverty, a stark contrast from the British Cape

province on the coast, which was began benefitting from the mining-boom of the

1870’s.11 The Boer republics were also outpaced financially by neighboring African

nations like the Zulu, Gaza, Ndebele and Xhona. These nations produced were essentially

self-sufficient, and produced goods they were able to trade with Europeans for weapons

and certain metals.12 In contrast, Denoon writes, the Boer republics, “were attempting to

run European-style government without European-style resources.”13

In order to do this, the Afrikaners relied on coercing other races to support their

economy. During the 1860’s, the economies of the Boer republics were so weak that their

farms could not pay attractive wages to whites, or even to the local Africans who were

generally willing to work for less money.14 To solve this problem, the Boer governments

8 Denoon, Nyeko, and Webster, Southern Africa, 52.9 Roger B. Beck, The History of South Africa, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000): 73-75.10 Denoon, Nyeko, and Webster, Southern Africa, 54.11 Leonard Guelke, "Frontier Settlement in Early Dutch South Africa." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 66.1 Mar. (1976): 25-42.12 Charles Ballard, "The Role of Trade and Hunter-Traders in the Political Economy of Natal and Zululand, 1824- 1880." African Economic History 10 (1981): 3-21.13 Denoon, Nyeko, and Webster, Southern Africa.14 Denoon, Nyeko, and Webster, Southern Africa, 60.

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brought indentured workers from India who had to work on the farms for long periods of

time for menial pay. It was only in this way—on the backs of imported foreigners—that

the republics were able to support an economy.15

The British colonial government first allowed elections to take place in 1906 and

though the British outnumbered the Afrikaners, British infighting was so great that they

split their vote and the Afrikaners took control of the government.16

In 1910, the Union of South Africa was born as a dominion of the British Empire.

This Union followed the end of the Second Boer War, fought between Afrikaners and the

British. Despite the serious infighting among white groups, the whites were unified by

what Denoon called, “the assumption that Africans must not be given arms or rights.”

From 1890-1910 there were no less than ten major conflicts between the whites and

Africans. Whites, despite their internal conflicts, concluded that a united front was the

best way to head off threats from the Africans.17

Modern South Africa

The next major date in South African history, especially as it relates to apartheid,

came in 1948, when a landmark election was held in South Africa. The conservative

National Party, which played off of whites’ fears of blacks’ political ambitions and

promised a system of strict racial separation, unseated the comparably liberal United

Party, which had held power since 1933. The issues at hand in the election were two-fold.

15 Denoon, Nyeko, and Webster, Southern Africa, 64. Many of the Indians stayed in South Africa following the completion of the contracts and became successful merchants and an integral part of the economy, ironically surpassing even the Afrikaners who ostensibly controlled the republics16 Denoon, Nyeko, and Webster, Southern Africa, 107.17 Denoon, Nyeko, and Webster, Southern Africa, 100.

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First, how closely to maintain ties with England. Second, whether to embrace

“apartheid,” the formalized concept of racial discrimination that had been taking place in

the land for at least 100 years. On the side of close ties to England and some minority-

rights was the United Party, mainly backed by the English speakers. On the side of

independence and apartheid was the National Party, backed by the Afrikaners. The

United Party was expected to maintain power, as it had in previous elections. However,

due to superior organization and a more energized campaign, the National Party won the

election and easily maintained power until the fall of Apartheid in 1994.18

The National Party of 1948 was a product of several political parties’ merger. Its

roots lay in J.B.M. Hertzog’s National Party founded in 1914 to halt the Anglicization of

the Afrikaners. Hertzog’s party came to power in 1924 on a platform of independence

from Britain and a stronger color barrier between whites and blacks in society.19 By

World War II the National Party had formed a coalition with their United Party

opposition, and Hertzog split from his party to form the Afrikaner Party in 1941. Shortly

after taking power in the 1948 election, the National Party consolidated, absorbing the

Afrikaner Party and passing legislation that formed the foundation of Apartheid, ensuring

the minority of whites would control South Africa’s government, economy and society.20

Coming of age at the start of the Cold War, the National Party staked itself firmly in the

capitalist camp. This tied it strategically to the Western world and allowed it to use

fighting communism as an excuse to crush dissent. Religion was also a fundamental part

18 Denoon, Nyeko, and Webster, Southern Africa, 127.19 "National Party (NP)." Encyclopaedia Britannica. n.d. Web.

The Union of South Africa was a dominion of the British Empire until 1961. Post-1931 the country became mostly autonomous, being able to pass its own legislation, etc. However, lingering resentment over the treatment of Afrikaners at the hands of the British during the Boer Wars made full independence from the crown a priority of all Afrikaner governments until 1961.20 "National Party (NP)." Encyclopaedia Britannica. n.d. Web.

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of the party’s platform, having passed a resolution in 1941 calling for, among other

things, “a free independent republic, based on a Christian-National foundation.” Both

communism and a moral code embedded in the conservative form of Christianity

practiced by Afrikaners were used as excuses to clamp down on freedom of expression,

and specifically as relevant to this paper, censor journalism.21

Democracy is commonly understood as a system of governance in which all the

people of a country collectively determine who will lead them. Despite that from this

understanding South Africa under apartheid was not democratic, the National Party

always viewed itself as a legitimate Western government. Hendrik Verwoerd, who

became Prime Minister in 1958, described Apartheid as a “policy of good

neighborliness” while on a trip to England. South Africa’s government was earnest in its

beliefs. Though authoritarian tendencies were very prevalent and dissidents, even white

dissidents, were frequently jailed and opposition suppressed, the government wanted to

maintain a regular democratic society for whites.

International Condemnation

International criticism of the South African government and its racist policies

began immediately following the 1948 elections. As colonialism waned and Afro-Asian

countries gained independence, opprobrium for Apartheid was swift in the international

arena. The South African government knew they had no chance of winning over

countries with majority black populations but they were worried about criticism from the

West. Initially, the National Party was convinced that criticism from Western nations was

21 James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).

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not based on the facts of Apartheid.22 They thought any outside criticism was the result of

communist propaganda coupled with Western countries’ desire to make friends with the

newly independent former European colonies in Africa, the Middle East and Asia that

were particularly outraged at South Africa’s treatment of blacks.23 Nonetheless,

international criticism bothered the government to no end. A report done ten years after

the National Party came to power determined that international news coverage of South

Africa was overwhelmingly critical. The report said only 11% of international coverage

of South Africa was unbiased, while 75% was negative.24

The government had taken action to prevent criticism of the government shortly

after coming to power, and following the report they redoubled their efforts to preserve

their international reputation.25 The Suppression of Communist Act of 1950 was passed

just two years after the National Party came to power. The act banned organizations that

promoted communism, but it cast a wide net. Communism was defined as, that “which

aims at bringing about any political, industrial, social or economic change within the

Union by the promotion of disturbances or disorders, by unlawful acts or omissions of the

threat of such acts or omissions or by means which include the promotion of disturbances

or disorders, or such acts or omissions or threats.”26 The law meant that any call for

changes to the core of apartheid could be labeled as communism and suppressed. The act

was used to suppress all sorts of unions, political organizations and public figures

speaking out against Apartheid and fueling the international media’s criticism of the

government. In addition to quelling criticism inside South Africa, since most of the 22 Barber, Foreign Policy, 53.23 Barber, Foreign Policy, 53-54.24 Barber, Foreign Policy, 53.25 Barber, Foreign Policy, 54.26 D.S.K. Culhane, "No Easy Talk: South Africa and the Suppression of Political Speech," Fordham International Law Journal 17, no. 4 (1993): 303.

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Western world was fighting against communism in the Cold War, the country could

present the fight against anti-Apartheid forces as one against communism rather civil

rights.27

Another censorship tactic the government used from early on was a quirk of

South Africa’s friendly form of suppressing activists and dissent. People could be

banned, meaning they couldn’t be quoted in the press and they couldn’t meet with

multiple people at any one time.28 It was essentially a form of silencing them, a form of

house arrest, that stopped short of throwing the person into prison or killing them. But

organizations could also be banned, rendering that organization off-limits for coverage.

In this way, South Africa could silence critics without throwing them in jail like

totalitarian regimes did, and could stay on Western countries’ good side.

South Africa and the Western World

South Africa hoped the Western world would accept South Africa as an ally in the

fight against communism.29 This did not altogether succeed, and the government came to

realize that it actually was Apartheid, not a misunderstanding caused by communists, that

was causing them to become a pariah state. But even after that realization, which had

cemented by they did not give up trying to cultivate relationships with foreign

countries.30 South Africa focused almost exclusively on cultivating relationships with

27 Barber, Foreign Policy, 54.28 Censorship and Apartheid in South Africa. (New York: Freedom to Write Committee PEN American Center, 1981).

29 Barber, Foreign Policy, 55.30 Barber, Foreign Policy, 56.

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Western countries, a trend that only accelerated as the years went by and the international

community at large became more hostile. In 1948, South Africa had embassies in four

non-Western states and eleven Western ones. By 1965, they had just two embassies in

non-Western states while increasing those in Western states to sixteen.31 Under Prime

Minister John Voerster, South Africa attempted to decrease their international isolation in

order to ensure stability and the security.32 Voerster did this specifically by reaching out

to Latin American countries which were eager for new trading partners and, given their

own splotchy human rights records and geographic distance from South Africa, less

concerned about Apartheid. The attempt at diplomacy was quite effective, and Latin

America was the only non-Western part of the world where South Africa increased its

diplomatic missions between 1965-1979.

But if Voerster, who served from 1966-1978, tried to put a friendly face on an

immoral system, his successor had no such intentions. P.W. Botha, known as Die Groot

Krokodil, or the big alligator, took over in 1978, serving until 1988 (later as president).

Botha circled the wagons to fend off the threat of “communism.” This meant shifting the

focus primarily from international legitimacy and shifting to maintaining close, or close

enough, ties solely with Western countries.33 There should be no question that the

apartheid-era governments were fighting desperately for international approval, though

they mostly failed at this effort. As A.J Christopher writes in “The Pattern of Diplomatic

Sanctions against South Africa 1948-1994,” “The major breakthrough in international

acceptance which had been so assiduously sought during the apartheid era came with the

31 A.J Christopher, "The Pattern of Diplomatic Sanctions against South Africa 1948-1994." GeoJournal 34.4 Dec. (1994): 441.32 Christopher, “Diplomatic Sanctions,” 441.33 Christopher, “Diplomatic Sanctions,” 441.

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inauguration of President Nelson Mandela…” But despite the failure of South Africa’s

foreign policy at achieving international legitimacy pre-Mandela, the self-consciousness

that these efforts nonetheless put on the government made for more press freedom than

one would otherwise expect from an undemocratic regime.

Partial Freedom

Censorship was rampant during Apartheid, and not only was the information

received by South African citizens restricted, but so was much of the information

broadcast by international media. But through all this censorship—a hallmark of most

oppressive regimes—one fact stands out: right up until the fall of Apartheid in 1994,

despite all the crackdowns, all the suspensions of newspapers, jailing of editors and

emergency declarations, “subversive” news continued to be published. Reporters Without

Borders, an organization that fights for press freedom across the world and releases a

“Press Freedom Index” annually, has said that “absolute dictatorships that permit no civil

liberties,” are where the worst restrictions on press freedom occur. South Africa was

never such a thing. South Africa during Apartheid was essentially split into two

countries. White South Africa and black South Africa. Black South Africa was a

totalitarian state mostly bereft of civil liberties. This entirely anti-democratic part of

South Africa existed in stark contrast to white South Africa, which was quasi-democratic

and attempted to walk a fine line between maintaining the undemocratic, racist and

authoritarian system of Apartheid, and maintaining the trappings of a conventional

Western democracy. Often this was not such a difficult thing to do. Since the majority of

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whites supported Apartheid, free elections could be held, for whites, with the National

Party easily remaining in power. The government could pass various laws

“democratically,” that while undemocratically oppressed a portion of the population

(non-whites), were supported by the electorate and progressed through parliament and the

legislative system according to established democratic norms. There was consistently a

strong opposition in the government, voted in by liberal whites, that spoke eloquently

against Apartheid and was a thorn in the side of the National Party—while still being

unable to take down Apartheid. There was an independent judiciary that occasionally

struck down elements of Apartheid. There was vibrant intellectual debate in universities

and professors who spoke out against the government were not carted off to gulags as in

Soviet Russia. All these elements of democracy were important to the whites in power

because they viewed their country as part of the advanced Western nations. And as stated

above, this mode of whites-only democracy worked, because most whites tacitly or

overtly agreed to this system.

The place where this attempt at white-democracy faltered was with freedom of

expression, especially the media. Throughout Apartheid, literature and the press were

censored. But it was near impossible to completely and unilaterally shut down

newspapers, or turn away television cameras, while maintaining the appearance of

democracy. Thus South Africa had a living, breathing, civil society. Its breathing was

labored and the government would occasionally come and break its legs, but the story of

press censorship tells one much about the motives of the South African Apartheid regime.

South Africa’s history, through the Afrikaner lens, is one of whites forming a

proud and advanced civilization on a dark continent. While this was the claim of many a

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colonial power, the Afrikaners in South Africa were different. They did not view

themselves as European, and therefore South Africa was not supposed to be an extension

of their European homeland. South Africa was certainly colonized by the British, but

many of the blacks who eventually came to make up the majority of white-ruled South

Africa were no more indigenous to the land than the Afrikaners. Most of white South had

deceived themselves into believing that they were, more than anything, misunderstood

rather than racist or undemocratic. This deception mandated that white society function

similarly to Western democracies. Whites could deceive themselves by staying away

from the black townships and not asking too many questions about Apartheid. But if their

daily lives did not resemble that of their Western counterparts, they would not be able to

ignore it. So because their population demanded it, and because they needed to show a

good face to the international, especially Western, community, South Africa maintained a

parliament, an independent judiciary and some sort of a free press.

The South African government worked to keep their public ignorant of the

censorship that existed and consistently said that it had a free press. South Africa not only

told its own population that it had a free press, but it told this to the world.34 In fact, the

editor of the Weekly Mail, a prominent anti-Apartheid newspaper, said that the newspaper

knew it could get away with publishing more provocative material if sanctions against

South Africa were about to come before the United States Congress. The South African

government was loath to censor during those times and risk angering their America ally.35

So the Apartheid regime realized they had to allow some freedom of the press in order to

protect their international legitimacy. However, there was no question that it was the

34 Bryan Trabold, ""Hiding Our Snickers": "Weekly Mail" Journalists' Indirect Resistance in Apartheid South Africa." College English 68.4 Mar. (2006): 399.35 Trabold, “Snickers,” 401.

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press, especially the international press, that was mobilizing the world to act against

Apartheid—and through that, against the South African government.36 The South African

government was thus caught in a vexing paradox: crackdown on the press and lose

international legitimacy for being undemocratic, or allow the press to expose the brutal

tactics being used to suppress opposition to Apartheid and lose international legitimacy

for that.

Censorship during Apartheid was ever present, but it increased and decreased

depending on the situation in the black townships. The more protests and subsequent

crackdowns, the more censorship. The mid-eighties saw greater restrictions than ever

before. The eighties were a time of great civil unrest in South Africa as international

pressure and domestic issues emboldened blacks in townships to rise against the

government, and the crackdowns on uprisings fueled more international condemnation.

The government decided the need to stop the world from seeing what was going on inside

South Africa was worth taking flack for impinging on press freedom.

The notion that South Africa under Apartheid had “one hundred censorship laws”

is oft-cited.37 How this number is reached depends on what you consider censorship, how

you count laws and revisions of laws, and other variables, but the concept is sound: South

Africa had a laundry list of laws severely restricting press freedom. A list drawn from a

one produced by the Johannesburg Star and published in 1980 is available at the end of

the paper.38 Such an extensive set of detailed legislation restricting the press in a country

is rare. In most countries with a restricted press, the restrictions aren’t passed in

36 Maria Karagianis, "The Rand Daily Mail Closes Its Doors: A Journalist Looks Back on Her Tenure at South Africa's Leading White Liberal Newspaper." Boston Globe Magazine, May 5, 1985, 12.37 Trabold, “Snickers,” 382.38 Censorship and Apartheid.

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parliament. Rather, they’re executed arbitrarily by government thugs or other pressure

groups. South Africa wanted to maintain rule of law, both because their citizenry

expected it, and so they could show the world that South Africa was a modern, civilized

country. Individually, most of the censorship laws are justifiable on their face. The

government could tell the Western world, which tended to demand freedom of expression

as a prerequisite to friendship, that the press was free to publish as long as it stayed

within the law. In reality, the laws were vague and meant to encourage self-censorship.

One editor described editing a South African newspaper in 1980 as “walking through a

minefield blindfolded.”39

Censorship in the Eighties

It was on top of these laws that multiple states of emergency were declared by

Pretoria during the 1980’s, as rioting in the townships increased. During these states of

emergency, the executive branch of the government was able to act without

parliamentary approval against the media. While the emergency regulations were

effective in their basic goal of stopping coverage of the unrest, the South African

government gave up much legitimacy in the eyes of the world to enact them. David

Dison, the lead in-house attorney for the Weekly Mail, the flagship white anti-Apartheid

newspaper of eighties, explained that prior to the state of emergency, the Apartheid

government “had the kind of trappings of a legitimate regime. There was law and

legalism, there was defamation, there were statutes. Okay, there were statutes about

39 Censorship and Apartheid, 22.

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communism and promoting unlawful organizations and that kind of thing, but it was very

difficult for them to censor information per se.” All that changed in 1984.

As the eighties progressed more restrictions were put on the press. Beginning in

1985 and stretching through the end of the decade, the government employed new means

of restricting the press. After months of protest in the black townships, the first state of

emergency was declared in June, 1984. One of the most important regulations passed

under emergency law was the ban on publishing “subversive statements.” The broad

description of what made for a “subversive statement” included everything from

encouraging the public to dodge compulsory military service, to encouraging workers to

strike, to encouraging people to boycott a business.40 However, the regulation wasn’t

imposed solely on the newspaper’s editorial voice. Newspapers were banned from

publishing about anyone advocating for these things, essentially halting coverage of the

anti-Apartheid movement within the country, and since the new regulations applied to the

foreign press as well, in the world at large.

In December, 1986, the Newspapers Press Union, which included South Africa’s

four major newspaper chains, was pressured by the government to apply more self-

censorship when it came to criticism of the government. A statement was released by the

organization through the prime minister’s office read in part, “The press union fully

realizes that South Africa is being subjected to a many-pronged but well-coordinated

revolutionary onslaught. We accept the need to do everything in our power to avoid

giving support and encouragement to those seeking revolutionary change by overt as well

as covert means.”41 This came after South Africa’s largest media outlets set up their own

40 Trabold, “Snickers,” 387.41 Michael Parks, "Pretoria Moving Toward Stricter Curbs on the Press," Los Angeles Times, December 7, 1986.

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“Media Council” in 1983 under pressure from the government, to impose censure upon

their own members who violated the censorships laws.42

This willingness to go along with government demands did not appease Prime

Minister Botha. In late January, 1986, the South African police were given sweeping

permission to censor all media.43 This control came on top of laws already on the books

that restricted reporting on “subversive statements,” security force actions, the treatment

of political detainees and boycotts or peaceful protests. When it came to security force

actions, reporters were specifically prohibited from covering any political disturbances in

person, they could only report on them using information provided by the government.44

The restrictions on the press did not stop with granting the police censorship power, and

1986 would be just the beginning of the Botha administration’s crackdown on the press.

In addition to the new police powers and the restrictions on reporting on security actions,

in August, 1987 Home Affairs Minister Stoffel Botha was granted the ability to close any

newspaper believed to be fanning revolution for up to three months.45 In June, 1988, the

government went even further, making it illegal to quote members of restricted anti-

apartheid organizations or their spokesmen. At the same time the new restrictions were

announced, the state of emergency was extended by Prime Minister Botha. While

censorship had been severe pre-1988, there had often been ways to get around it. But

following this second declaration of national emergency, the government began shutting

newspapers left and right. The first newspaper to go was The New Nation, a Catholic

42 Parks, "Stricter Curbs.”43 Michael Parks, "South Africa Police Given Most Sweeping Press Controls Yet," Los Angeles Times, January 30, 1987.44 Parks, "Sweeping Press Controls.”45 Adrian Croft, "Threats of Censorship Bode Ill for South Africa's Anti-Apartheid Press," Los Angeles Times 10 Jan. 1988.

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Church-funded publication accused of fermenting revolution. The New Nation, which had

a circulation of about 35,000 and was widely considered the most genuine voice of South

Africa’s blacks, became the first newspaper closed by the government since 1977.46 The

Weekly Mail was closed for a month by the government in November, 1988.47 In early

1989, the government threatened four more publications with closure: Work in Progress,

a leftist monthly magazine known for its sharp political analysis; Grassroots, a

newspaper popular in the mixed-race townships outside Cape Town; New Era, a monthly

publication of the arts department at the University of Cape Town; and Al Qalam, an anti-

Apartheid Muslim weekly.48

What accounted for this rapid increase in censorship? South Africa, as previously

stated, wanted to maintain close ties with Western nations. Part of appealing to Western

countries was having a free press. International media reported from South Africa, and

for most of its history South Africa had had a vibrant, albeit somewhat restricted, press.

The government was always asking if what the newspapers reported hurt the country

more than getting rid of them would. In general the government decided to let the

newspapers publish some critical stories and editorials, just not too many. But in 1984 a

new constitution was passed by the Botha government giving political rights to Coloreds

(mixed-race individuals) and Indians. It was couched as a reform of Apartheid by the

government, but many saw it as an entrenchment of Apartheid. Blacks were especially

angered at still being excluded from theses “reforms” and in September, the Vaal

46 John D Battersby, "South Africa, Invoking Curbs, Shuts Black Paper," The New York Time, March, 1988.47 Christopher Wren, "Pretoria Bars Major Opposition Newspaper for Month," The New York Times, November 2, 1988.48 John D. Battersby, "South Africa Moves to Curb 3 More Journals," The New York Times, January 12, 1989. ProQuest.

Rosenfeld 21

Triangle Riots began.49 Riots in Cape Town and elsewhere in South Africa broke out as

well. The government cracked down with police and military forces. Tens of black

protesters were killed and hundreds arrested.50 The riots marked the beginning of a new

period of unrest in South Africa, one much larger than any previous. The Botha

administration decided that cracking down on the unrest was more important than

maintaining a democratic image and decided to impose the states of emergency.

Following emergency law being enacted the regulation prohibiting coverage of “security

force action” was passed. Prior to this regulation, the images of white officers savagely

beating back black protesters were working to destroy the credibility of the Apartheid

regime. The regulation was effective and coverage of the unrest was essentially stopped.51

Despite the censorship and crackdowns on the press detailed above, newspapers

like the Weekly Mail and The Rand Daily Mail were able to publish material the

government found objectionable. The Rand Daily Mail was the most liberal of the

mainstream newspapers in South Africa during Apartheid. Published out of

Johannesburg, it was the voice of South Africa’s English, who were significantly more

liberal and opposed to Apartheid than the Afrikaners. Until its demise in 1985, the

newspaper would editorialize against Apartheid policies, conduct investigative reporting

and expose various government wrong-doing. In that sense, it was a newspaper in the

mold of what one would expect in a healthy democracy. Simultaneously, the government

council assigned to monitor the press was constantly harassing reporters and editors at the

paper in a very undemocratic manner. Phones were bugged, the staff was convinced that

49 The Vaal Triangle was an area 40 miles outside of Johannesburg where white towns and black towns met.50 Alan Cowell, "14 Die in Riots in Black Areas of South Africa," The New York Times, September 4, 1984.51 Trabold, "Snickers,” 386.

Rosenfeld 22

South African police had infiltrated the paper to spy, and self-censorship was a routine

practice. A thick book given to all reporters told what they could and couldn’t publish.

For example, they couldn’t publish anything about military affairs without the explicit

approval of the military. They also couldn’t cover anything that had been banned by the

government. The list of banned people, organizations, books, magazines and journals was

so rapidly expanding that it was inevitable that some reporter at some point would slip up

and be forced to defend themselves in front of the government press council. This

contributed to rampant self-censorship—declining to question the government’s repeated

assertions that “communists” and “foreign interests” were behind every township

uprising, for example—and hampered the newspaper’s operation since its editors were

constantly preparing to testify before the press council. For all its courage and defiance of

implicit government demands not to criticize the government, the Daily Mail had its

flaws. A former reporter, reflecting on her years at the paper in an article for Boston

Globe Magazine, wrote, “Not once while I was there did the Mail call for true democracy

in South Africa.” The paper had black reporters and employees, but it had segregated

bathrooms and dining facilities. It held promotional events in whites-only areas of

Johannesburg and most white employees of the paper lived comfortably in whites-only

suburbs with black servants. All this at the most liberal, widely-read, newspaper in South

Africa. But for all these flaws, which are not without qualification, the former reporter

added in the article that if the newspaper had called for outright democracy “the

newspaper would have immediately been shut down and everyone arrested,” it still did

much of what a newspaper is supposed to do in a democratic society. It did an expose on

the treatment of black prisoners by the government (leading to a banning of the coverage

Rosenfeld 23

of prisons) and exposed improper actions of the Voerster administration, leading to the

end of his time as Prime Minister. While they weren’t able to criticize Apartheid as

forcefully as a truly free newspaper could have, former reporter John Matisson put it well

when he said, “While the Mail was alive, you really could not argue that South Africans

did not know the truth—they were getting it with their breakfast.”52

The Fall of Free Apartheid-Era Media

It may be the downfall of the Daily Mail that shows another reality of how the

South African press was suppressed during Apartheid. The Daily Mail, which had a

readership of nearly two-thirds black, and a respectable circulation of 115,000, shut down

in 1985 after having lost millions of dollars over the several preceding years.53 Beginning

in the 1970’s and accelerating into the 1980’s, unrest in black townships grew

tremendously. The government started employing police state tactics to suppress the

unrest, leading to the heart-rending images that turned the world against South Africa.

But as the world turned against South Africa, white South Africans united. The center-

left disappeared in the country as whites became more conservative. As they became

more conservative they no longer wanted to read the Daily Mail’s criticism of the

government. They were scared and wanted reassurance that their way of life was stable

and morally sound, not condemnation and calls for empowerment of the blacks. Whites

began cancelling their subscriptions to the Daily Mail just as the states of emergency

began, and the government became more harsh. So it was that the leading voice of liberal

52 Karagianis, "The Rand Daily Mail," 12.53 "South Africa's Rand Daily Mail to cease publication," Houston Chronicle, March 16, 1985.

Rosenfeld 24

South Africa was shut down due to lack of popular demand. This reality ties back to how

the National Party was able to continue being fairly elected by the whites-only electorate:

they were what the people wanted. White South Africans may have wanted a free press in

principle. But in reality, they did not want to read about the terrible things their

government was doing. The government only had to do so much censoring: by the mid-

1980’s white South Africa simply would not support a high-circulation liberal press.

Outside the mainstream press, there were many small-circulation publications

catering to the small group of left-wing whites and to readers in the black townships.

These publications, especially those in the townships, probably provided the government

with the most worry. The Daily Mail kept an informed citizenry, and consistently put

pressure on the government, but it never aimed to ferment revolution. In contrast, many

of the anti-Apartheid publications in townships were doing just that. While the editors of

the Daily Mail were against Apartheid, they were comfortable with the status quo. They

were waited on by black servants at their homes in tony Johannesburg suburbs and it is

unclear that they truly wished for black-majority rule. In contrast, newspapers put out by

avowed anti-Apartheid activists, though they may have been technically prevented from

calling for outright democracy, certainly wished for it at heart. They were also willing, in

a way that mainstream papers were not, of fueling the anger of the thousands of blacks in

the townships who were increasingly rebelling against the government and its security

forces. Indeed, the newspapers catering to black township residents were, in the words of

Aggrey Klaaste, editor of the largest-circulation black daily, the Sowetan, a primary way

of voicing their anger. “For black people, papers like ours are the only kind of avenue

where they can vent some of their deeply held feelings, and now it’s going to be

Rosenfeld 25

stopped,” he told the Los Angeles Times in 1988.54 While Klaaste believed that shutting

down the alternative press would cap a release valve for black anger, the government

seemed convinced that it was in fact fueling that anger, and moved to crackdown on the

press in earnest. Still operating through formal, legalistic measures, throughout the late

1980’s the government, empowered by the state of emergency declared in 1986, issued

numerous warnings and shut down or suspended many anti-Apartheid newspapers.

Part of the transformation during the mid-1980’s in terms of censorship can be

seen in the way the international media was treated. While the government could suspend

South African newspapers and in extreme cases jail their staff, they had no such power

over the international media. Though scared by the unrest in their country, the South

African government was not going to attack foreign journalists, and had long left them

alone to do their reporting. However, it was the international media that was causing the

most consternation for the Apartheid government. As discussed, the white citizenry at

large had little interest in reading about the ills of Apartheid, and while the “subversive”

newspapers on the political left and right might ferment revolution within the country,

they were certainly not galvanizing foreign nations to pass sanctions against South

Africa. It was newspapers like The New York Times, Los Angeles Times and Washington

Post, and broadcasters such as the BBC, ABC, CBS and NBC that bothered the

government the most. As part of the general crackdown on the media that began in 1984,

the Botha administration began passing regulations that effected international media as

well, in a last-ditch effort to restrict images and descriptions of the harsh crackdown.

Television stations were banned from broadcasting live. No reporting on security actions

54 Adrian Croft, "Threats of Censorship Bode Ill for South Africa's Anti-Apartheid Press," Los Angeles Times, January 10. 1988.

Rosenfeld 26

was allowed unless it was based on information released by the South African Bureau for

Information.55 The New York Times published a description of the restrictions at the end

of one 1987 article about censorship: “Editor’s Note: South African press restrictions

now prohibit journalists from transmitting dispatches on any security actions, protests,

detentions or ‘subversive statements’ without clearance by Government censors.”56 The

Times apparently failed to meet this standard and their primary correspondent in South

Africa was expelled from the country without any formal explanation in early 1987.57

Conclusion

It is hard to gauge the effectiveness of the government’s mid-decade crackdown

on the media, domestic and international. Apartheid was on its last legs by the early

nineties and had fallen entirely by 1994. Would this have happened faster if the media

had not been so restricted for the last few years of Apartheid? Would it have happened

slower had they been banned from covering any of the crackdown? Indeed, heavy

coverage in 1984 helped turn the world squarely against South Africa, so perhaps the

restrictions were too late. But that ignores the central question of which was more likely

to hasten white-ruled South Africa’s demise: elimination of freedom of expression, or

freedom of expression? In a farewell piece to South Africa published just weeks after his

expulsion from the country, the Times journalist Alan Cowell wrote of the mid-eighties

media restrictions imposed by the government, “In ruling by emergency decree and

55 Peter J. Boyer, "Networks Cite Pressure for Self-Censorship," The New York Times, June 18, 1986.56 Alan Cowell, "Cabinet Official Defines Apartheid Law," The New York Times, January 5, 1987.57 Alan Cowell, "A Farewell to South Africa," The New York Times Magazine, January 25, 1987.

Rosenfeld 27

stifling any legitimate expression, the Government has acknowledged that its authority

can be perpetuated only by force of arms, and has, therefore, tacitly acknowledged it to

be illegitimate.” Therein, I think, lies the answer to South Africa’s paradox. So long as

they let themselves be covered by the media, the world would let them explain their

moral sins away. As long as the facts were laid out for the world to see, they could have

their day in court. But once they resorted to hiding behind censorship, they weren’t left a

leg to stand on, and then it was simply a matter of time before it all came crashing down.

Rosenfeld 28

Appendix

Censorship Laws During Apartheid

Electoral Consolidation Act (1946): Every report, letter, article, bill, placard, poster, pamphlet, circular, cartoon or other printed matter which is intended or likely to affect the result of an election or by-election to the House of Assembly or provincial council must bear the name and address of the person who has written or produced it.

Commissions Act (1947): This provided for regulations that can place wide-ranging curbs on press coverage of the work of commissions. Prevented the media from attending sittings of commissions or accessing the records of commissions and laid out penalties for the publication of information regarding commission doings.

Righteous Assemblies and Suppression of Communism Act No. 15; later called the Internal Security Act (1950): A passed shortly after the National Party came to power. There was some legitimate cause for the country to worry about communist influence as the Communist Party of South Africa was an active political organization and there were various public figures advocating for communism. However, the majority of white South Africa were religiously conservative and unlikely to be swayed by the influence of fringe communists. The law allowed the government to ban organizations—like the CPSA—and public figures that supported or promoted communist from operating or seeking public office. Furthermore, it allowed the banning of publications that promoted “communism.” However, the definition of communist was so wide as to include any call for what could be considered radical change. Thus, in later years, the act was used to suppress groups calling for an end to Apartheid—certainly a radical change.

Radio Act (1952): Made it an offence to publish a radio communication which a person is not authorized to receive. This meant that unlike in Western countries, where many newspapers monitor ambulance, fire department and police radio signals, South African media was prohibited from doing so.

Criminal Law Amendment Act (1953): Newspapers were banned from editorially supporting campaigns against laws wherein the campaign violated the law. Therefore, if a person gave a speech in support of overturning that law, and a court later found the speech subversive and in violation of the law, a newspaper that had supported the campaign could be held liable.

Criminal Procedure Act (1955): Journalists were required to turn over their sources if asked to do so by a court, and were jailed if they refused.

Official Secrets Act (1956): Made it an offence to communicate anything relating to munitions of war or any military, police or security matter to any persons or for any purse prejudicial to the safety of the interests of South Africa. This meant any newspaper publishing confidential information that could conceivably be used by

Rosenfeld 29

an enemy of the state was in violation of the law. Law also permitted court proceedings to take place behind closed doors.

Defence Act (1957): Prohibited coverage of military or naval action without the express given consent of the Minster of Defense or other authorized individual. Also prohibited, “the publication, without permission, of any statement, comment or rumour relating to any member of the SA Defence Force or any force of a foreign country, calculated to prejudice or embarrass the Government in its foreign relations or to alarm or depress members of the public.

The Prison Act (1959 & 1965): Following an expose on treatment of black prisoners by the Rand Daily Mail, this act was passed putting such a heavy burden of proof on publications when writing about prison conditions that reporting on the subject was nearly completely stopped.

Hotels Act (1965): Prohibited newspapers from knowingly publish false information about a hotel.

Atomic Energy Act (1967): Prohibited newspapers from publishing information about the South African nuclear program.

Terrorism Act (1967): Stories, letters to the editor, advertisements, columns and leading articles could not contain matter which aided, advised or encouraged people to commit terrorism, as defined by the Act.

Gathering and Demonstrations Act (1973): Prohibited publishing information about an event banned by the government under the Act.

The Publications Act (1974): Established a censorship board which reviewed books, magazines and newspapers and determined what was fit for print.

Petroleum Products Amendment Act (1978): Prohibited publishing without permission any information related to the petroleum industry in South Africa.

Electoral Act (1979): Prohibited conducting opinion polls after nomination day in an election to the House of Assembly or a provincial council or the publishing after nomination day of the results of any opinion poll conducted beforehand.

Police Amendment Act (1979): Prohibited publishing falls information about the police without reasonable grounds for believing it was true. The burden of proof was put on the publisher of information.

Rosenfeld 30

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