EN BANC[G.R. No. 32636. March 17, 1930.]In the matter of the Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. A. W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant, vs. ANNIE COUSINS HIX, oppositor-appellee.C. A. Sobral, for appellant.Harvey & O'Brien and Gibbs & McDonough, for appellee.SYLLABUS1.WILLS; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTION 781, AS AMENDED, APPLIED; RIGHT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR TO APPEAL FROM DISALLOWANCE OF A WILL. The special administrator of an estate is a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," within the meaning of section 781, as amended, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and so may be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of a will.2.ID.; ID.; CONFLICT OF LAWS; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTIONS 300 AND 301, APPLIED. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. The requirements of sections 300 and 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be met.3.ID.; ID.; ID.; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTION 633, APPLIED. The due execution of a will alleged to have been executed in another jurisdiction must be established. Where the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it is the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means.4.ID.; ID.; ID.; DOMICILE. Where it is desired to establish the execution of a will in another jurisdiction, it is necessary to prove that the testator had his domicile in that jurisdiction and not in the Philippine Islands.5.ID.; ID.; ID.; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTIONS 637, 638, AND 639, APPLIED. Where it is desired to prove the probate of a will in another jurisdiction and the appointment in that jurisdiction of an administrator for the estate of the deceased, the moving party must comply with the provisions of sections 637, 638, and 639 of the Code of Civil Procedure by requesting a hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in another jurisdiction.D E C I S I O NMALCOLM, J p:The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee contends that the appellant as a mere special administrator is not authorized to carry on this appeal. We think, however, that the appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of the will (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925], 47 Phil., 780).It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy of section 3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract was taken was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, or that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then be the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633).It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not in the Philippine Islands. The only evidence introduced to establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the alleged will and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings originally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands.While the appeal was pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented an unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper writing purporting to be the last will and testament of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased, was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph County, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L. Madden, the subscribing witnesses thereto, and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown by another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph County, West Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with the provisions of sections 637, 638, and 639 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded Edward Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of West Virginia. The present proceedings do not call for any specific pronouncements on the validity or invalidity of this alleged divorce.For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.EN BANC[G.R. No. L-20234. December 23, 1964.]PAULA DE LA CERNA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. MANUELA REBACA POTOT, ET AL., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.Philip M. Alo and Crispin M. Menchavez for petitioners.Nicolas Jumapao for respondents.SYLLABUS1.JUDGMENTS; PROBATE COURTS; ERROR OF LAW DOES NOT AFFECT JURISDICTION OF NOR CONCLUSIVE EFFECT OF DECISION. An error of law committed in admitting a joint will to probate does not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court nor the conclusive effect of its final decision.2.ID.; ID.; PROBATE DECREE OF JOINT WILL AFFECTS ONLY SHARE OF DECEASED SPOUSE. A final probate decree of a joint will of husband and wife affects only the share of the deceased spouse and cannot include the disposition of the share of the surviving spouse. The validity of said joint will, in so far as the estate of the latter spouse is concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo.3.WILLS; EFFECT OF VALIDITY OF JOINT WILL AS TO SHARE OF WIFE WHO DIES LATER THAN THE HUSBAND. Where a husband and wife executed a join will and upon the death of the husband, said will was admitted to probate by a final decree of the court although erroneous, and the wife dies later, it is held that said first decree of probate affects only the estate of the husband but cannot affect the estate of the wife, considering that a joint will is a separate will of each testator, and a joint will being prohibited by law, the estate of the wife should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and not to the testamentary heirs, unless some other valid will is shown to exist in favor of the latter or unless the testamentary heir is the only heir intestate of said wife.D E C I S I O NREYES, J.B.L., J p:Appeal by Paula de la Cerna and others from a decision of the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division (C.A.-G.R. No. 23763-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. Case No. R-3819) and ordering the dismissal of an action for partition.The factual background appears in the following portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals (Petition, Annex A, pp 2-4):"It appears that on May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Cerna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament in the local dialect whereby they willed that 'our two parcels of land acquired during our marriage together with all improvements thereon shall be given to Manuela Rebaca, our niece, whom we have nurtured since childhood, because God did not give us any child in our union, Manuela Rebaca being married to Nicolas Potot', and that 'while each of the testator is yet living, he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the two lands aforementioned', the said two parcels of land being covered by Tax No. 4676 and Tax No. 6677, both situated in sitio Bucao, barrio Lugo, municipality of Borbon, province of Cebu. Bernabe de la Cerna died on August 30, 1939, and the aforesaid will was submitted to probate by said Gervasia and Manuela before the Court of First Instance of Cebu which, after due publication as required by law and there being no opposition, heard the evidence, and, by Order of October 31, 1939, in Special Proceedings No. 499, 'declara legalizado el documento Exhibito A como el testamento y ultima voluntad del finado Bernabe de la Cerna con derecho por parte de su viuda superstite Gervasia Rebaca y otra testadora al proprio tiempo segun el Exhibito A de gozar de los frutos de los terrenos descritos en dicho documento; y habido consideracion de la cuantia de dichos bienes, se derecta la distribucion sumaria de los mismos en favor de la legataria universal Manuela Rebaca de Potot previa prestacion por parte de la misma de una fianza en la suma de P500.00 para responder de cualesquiera reclamaciones que se presentare contra los bienes del finado Bernabe de la Cerna dentro de los aos desde esta fecha.' (Act. Esp. 499, Testamentaria Finado Bernabe de la Cerna). Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca on October 14, 1952, another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed on November 6, 1952, being Special Proceedings No. 1016-R of the same Court of First Instance of Cebu, but for failure of the petitioner, Manuela R. Potot, and her attorney, Manuel Potot to appear, for the hearing of said petition, the case was dismissed on March 30, 1954 (Spec. Proc. No. 1016-R, In the matter of the Probate of the Will of Gervasia Rebaca)."The Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and void, for being executed contrary to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code (Art. 669, Civil Code of 1889 and Art. 818, Civil Code of the Philippines); but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals reversed, on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the testament. Further, the Court of Appeals declared that:". . . It is true the law (Art. 669, old Civil Code; Art. 818, new Civil Code) prohibits the making of a will jointly by two or more persons either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person. However, this form of will has long been sanctioned by use, and the same has continued to be used; and when, as in the present case, one such joint last will and testament has been admitted to probate by final order of a Court of competent jurisdiction, there seems to be no alternative except to give effect to the provisions thereof that are not contrary to law, as was done in the case of Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267, wherein our Supreme Court gave effect to the provisions of the joint will therein mentioned, saying 'assuming that the joint will in question is valid'."Whence this appeal by the heirs intestate of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna.The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of First Instance of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will and testament, despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators, reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). The error thus committed by the probate court was an error of law, that should have been corrected by appeal, but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the conclusive effect of its final decision, however erroneous. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156); and public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium (Dy Cay vs. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521, and other cases cited in 2 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 1963 Ed., p. 322).Petitioners, as heirs and successors of the late Bernabe de la Cerna, are concluded by the 1939 decree admitting his will to probate. The contention that being void the will cannot be validated, overlooks that the ultimate decision on whether an act is valid or void rests with the courts, and here they have spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939. On this count, the dismissal of their action for partition was correct.But the Court of Appeals should have taken into account also, to avoid future misunderstanding, that the probate decree in 1939 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in issue. Be it remembered that prior to the Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime.It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. Thus regarded, the holding of the Court of First Instance of Cebu that the joint will is one prohibited by law was correct as to the participation of the deceased Gervasia Rebaca in the properties in question, for the reasons extensively discussed in our decision in Bilbao vs. Bilbao, 87 Phil. 144, that explained the previous holding in Macrohon vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil., 267.Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.It is unnecessary to emphasize that the fact that joint wills should be in common usage could not make them valid when our Civil Codes consistently invalidated them, because laws are only repealed by other subsequent laws, and no usage to the contrary may prevail against their observance (Art. 5, Civ. Code of 1889; Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950).WITH THE FOREGOING MODIFICATION, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23763-R is affirmed. No costs.Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.EN BANC[G.R. No. L-4963. January 29, 1953.]MARIA USON, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIA DEL ROSARIO, CONCEPCION NEBREDA, CONRADO NEBREDA, DOMINADOR NEBREDA, and FAUSTINO NEBREDA, Jr., defendants-appellants.Priscilo Evangelista for appellee.Brigido G. Estrada for appellant.SYLLABUS1.DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; HUSBAND AND WIFE; RIGHTS OF LAWFUL WIFE AS AFFECTED BY THE NEW CIVIL CODE. The right of ownership of the lawful wife of a decedent who had died before the new Civil Code took effect became vested in her upon his death, and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights of succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Art. 657, old Civil Code; Ilustre vs. Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased can not be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of the lawful wife over the lands in dispute. While article 2253 of the new Civil Code provides that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, yet this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin.2.ID.; ID.; RENUNCIATION OF INHERITANCE MADE BY LAWFUL WIFE; FUTURE INHERITANCE, NOT SUBJECT TO CONTRACT. Although the lawful wife has expressly renounced her right to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death, such renunciation cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 6th ed., 123; Osorio vs. Osorio, et al., 41 Phil., 531).3.ID.; ID.; DONATIONS BY DECEASED; ESSENTIAL FORMALITIES OF DONATION. Assignments, if any, made by the deceased of real property for which there was no material consideration, should be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Art. 633, old Civil Code). Assignments or donations which lack this essential formality have no valid effect.D E C I S I O NBAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:This is an action for the recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in the municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four children named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador, and Faustino, surnamed Nebreda, who are all of minor age, before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common- law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that on February 21, 1931, Maria Uson and her husband, the late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon his death (Exhibit 1).After trial, at which both parties presented their respective evidence, the court rendered decision ordering the defendants to restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of the lands in dispute without special pronouncement as to costs. Defendants interposed the present appeal.There is no dispute that Maria Uson, plaintiff-appellee, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, one of the defendants-appellants, was merely a common-law wife of the late Faustino Nebreda with whom she had four illegitimate children, her now co-defendants. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Article 657, old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into on February 21, 1931, cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced (1 Manresa, 123, sixth edition; Tolentino on Civil Code, p. 12; Osorio vs. Osorio and Ynchausti Steamship Co., 41 Phil., 531).But defendants contend that, while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of natural children and are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (Article 2264 and article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).There is no merit in this claim. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin. Thus, said article provides that "if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin." As already stated in the early part of this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

As regards the claim that Maria Uson, while her deceased husband was lying in state, in a gesture of pity or compassion, agreed to assign the lands in question to the minor children for the reason that they were acquired while the deceased was living with their mother and Maria Uson wanted to assuage somewhat the wrong she has done to them, this much can be said; apart from the fact that this claim is disputed, we are of the opinion that said assignment, if any, partakes of the nature of a donation of real property, inasmuch as it involves no material consideration, and in order that it may be valid it shall be made in a public document and must be accepted either in the same document or in a separate one (Article 633, old Civil Code). Inasmuch as this essential formality has not been followed, it results that the alleged assignment or donation has no valid effect.Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without costs.Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. L-28040. August 18, 1972.]TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee, JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, appellees, vs. TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, appellant.[G.R. No. L-28568.]TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA, special Administratrix appellee, vs. JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant.[G.R. No. L-28611.]TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the late Francisco de Borja, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late Josefa Tangco, defendant-appellant.Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for administrator-appellee.Quiogue & Quiogue for appellee Matilde de Borja.Andres Matias for appellee Cayetano de Borja.Sevilla & Aquino for appellant.Sevilla & Aquino for special administratrix-appellee.Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir for oppositor-appellant.Sevilla & Aquino for plaintiff-appellee.Pelaez, Jalandoni & Jamir and David Guevara for defendant-appellant.SYLLABUS1.CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; HEREDITARY SHARE IN ESTATE VESTS FROM THE MOMENT OF DEATH OF DECEDENT; SHARE IMMEDIATELY DISPOSABLE. The hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of the causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777, [3], and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. The effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir, but the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction.2.ID.; ID.: PRESENTATION OF WILL FOR PROBATE NOT NEEDED IN CONVEYANCE BY HEIR OF HER SHARE. The doctrine enunciated in Guevara vs. Guevara (74 Phil. 749) which states that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will is against the law and public policy, is not applicable to the cases at bar where there was no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco De Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will, the clear object of the compromise contract between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja being merely the conveyance by the latter of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.3.ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPROMISE CONTRACT BINDING ON PARTIES EVEN IF WITHOUT PROBATE COURT APPROVAL. Since the compromise contract was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja," it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the court to enter into the same.4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EXTRAJUDICIAL COMPROMISE AND ONE APPROVED BY THE COURT. The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings.5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID., EFFECT OF CONTRACT ON PERSON NOT PARTY THERETO, INSTANT CASE. The resolutory period of 60 days, allegedly intended to limit the effectiveness of the compromise agreement between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja, but which was embodied in another agreement between Ongsingco and the brothers and sisters of De Borja, does not have any validity as far as De Borja is concerned since De Borja was not a party to the second agreement.6.ID.; ID.; SUCCESSIONAL INTEREST OF COMPULSORY HEIR EXISTS INDEPENDENT OF WILL OF TESTATOR, OR PROBATE THEREOF. The prerequisite of a previous probate of a will established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja who, as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was his compulsory heir under articles 995 et. seq. of the present Civil Code and, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist even if such will were not probated at all.7.ID.; ID.; HEREDITARY SHARE CAN BE SOLD TO A CO-HEIR. The owner of the undivided hereditary share could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever such owner chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code: "Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor." If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden.8.ID.: CONTRACTS; INABILITY TO REACH NOVATORY ACCORD DOES NOT INVALIDATE ORIGINALLY VALID CONTRACT. The inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original compromise agreement entered into by the parties and justifies the act of one of the parties in finally seeking a court order for its approval and enforcement.9.ID., PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY; PRESUMPTION OF CONJUGAL CHARACTER OF PROPERTY CONFIRMED IN INSTANT CASE. The legal presumption in favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda de Jalajala concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, cannot be rebutted by testimony which is plain hearsay having a clearly discernible ring of artificiality and a statement which is plainly self-serving and which is not admissible in the absence of cross-examination. Such legal presumption has actually been confirmed by the clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the declarants Francisco de Borja and his executor-widow Tasiana Ongsingco consisting of solemn admissions by the former in the Reamended Inventory and Reamended Accounting in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the CFI of Rizal and the latter's inventory submitted in court listing the Jalajala property as "Conjugal properties of the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco."10.SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES; FLUCTUATION IN VALUE OF CURRENCY DOES NOT WARRANT REVALUATION OF PROPERTIES OF ESTATE. The decision that "estates, would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties of the estate," is particularly apposite in the present case where Tasiana Ongsingco pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her unfavorably because, while the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the value of the Jalajala property has increased. The fact is that her delay in receiving the payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreement she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel.D E C I S I O NREYES, J.B.L., J p:Of these case, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana Ongsico Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of the testate estate of Francisco de Borja, 1 from the approval of a compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. In its Special Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled, "Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator."Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the disapproval of the same compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its Special Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja, Special Administratrix".And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda Jalajala Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid compromise agreement, as the separate and exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the community with his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is under administration in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. R-7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Jose Tangco While a widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to Francisco was questioned in said proceeding.The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963, 2 by and between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton, Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:"A G R E E M E N TTHIS AGREEMENT made and entered into by and betweenThe heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,A N DThe heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton, Jr.W I T N E S S E T HTHAT it is the mutual desire of all the parties herein to terminate and settle, with finality, the various court litigations, controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc., between them in connection with the administration, settlement, partition, adjudication and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja.THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed voluntarily and without any reservations to enter into and execute this agreement under the following terms and conditions:1.That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal, presently under administration in the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (SP. Proc. No. 7866, Rizal), more specifically described as follows:'Linda al Norte con el Rio Puwang que la separa de la jurisdiccion del Municipio de Pililla de la Provincia de Rizal, y con el pico del Monte Zambrano; al Oeste con la Laguna de Bay; por el Sur con los herederos de Marcelo de Borja; y por el Este con los terrenos de la Familia Maronilla'with a segregated area of approximately 1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per square meter.2.That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000) Philippine Currency, in cash, which represent P200,000 as his share in the payment and P600,000 as pro-rata shares of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano, and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and this shall be considered as full and complete payment and settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal, respectively, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise. The funds for this payment shall be taken from and shall depend upon the receipt of full payment of the proceeds of the sale of Jalajala, 'Poblacion.'3.That Tasiana Ongsinco Vda. de de Borja hereby assumes payment of that particular obligation incurred by the late Francisco de Borja in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now Development Bank of the Philippines, amounting to approximately P30,000.00 and also assumes payment of her 1/5 share of the Estate and Inheritance taxes on the Estate of the late Francisco de Borja or the sum of P3,500.00, more or less, which shall be deducted by the buyer of Jalajala, 'Poblacion' from the payment to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja under paragraph 2 of this Agreement and paid directly to the Development Bank of the Philippines and the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.4.Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala 'Poblacion' is hereby authorized to pay directly Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja the balance of the payment due her under paragraph 2 of this Agreement (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in the name of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, corresponding certified checks/treasury warrant, who, in turn, will issue the corresponding receipt to Jose de Borja.5.In consideration of above payment to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for themselves and for their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns, hereby forever mutually renounce, withdraw, waive, remise, release and discharge any and all manner of action or actions, cause or causes of action, suits, debts, sum or sums of money, accounts, damages, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or in equity, which they ever had, or now have or may have against each other, more specifically Sp. Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No 832-Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 3033, CFI-Nueva Ecija and Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as the case filed against Manuel Quijal for perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, the intention being to completely, absolutely and finally release each other, their heirs, successors, and assigns, from any and all liability, arising wholly or partially, directly or indirectly, from the administration, settlement, and distribution of the assets as well as liabilities of the estates of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and specifically renounce absolutely her rights as heir over any hereditary share in the estate of Francisco de Borja.6.That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, upon receipt of the payment under paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and documents belonging to Francisco de Borja which are in her possession and said heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn the corresponding receipt thereof.7.That this agreement shall take effect only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the properties mentioned under paragraph 1 of this agreement and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale of the Jalajala property 'Poblacion', otherwise, the non-fulfillment of the said sale will render this instrument NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 12th of October, 1963."On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the agreement of 12 October 1963 to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again, on 8 August 1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.The genuineness and due execution of the compromise agreement of 12 October 1963 is not disputed, but its validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the decedent left no will and no debts, and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial and legal representatives . . ." The will of Francisco de Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the parties have already divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the will is a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless.The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from an examination of the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco "shall be considered as full complete payment settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, . . . and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise."This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case is not applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) 3 there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. 4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament, and would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the point:Art. 2037.A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that while the agreement Annex A expressed no definite period for its performance, the same was intended to have a resolutory period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In support of such contention, it is averred that such a limit was expressly stipulated in an agreement in similar terms entered into by said Ongsingco with the brothers and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit, Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all surnamed de Borja, except that the consideration was fixed at P600,000 (Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-28040, pp. 39-46) and which contained the following clause:"III.That this agreement shall take effect only upon the consummation of the sale of the property mentioned herein and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the proceeds of the sale by the herein owner heirs-children of Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no sale of the said property mentioned herein is consummated, or the non-receipt of the purchase price thereof by the said owners within the period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof, this agreement will become null and void and of no further effect."Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Jose de Borja was not a party to this particular contract (Annex 1), and that the same appears not to have been finalized, since it bears no date, the day being left blank "this day of October 1963"; and while signed by the parties, it was not notarized, although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a proposed notarial ratification clause. Furthermore, the compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in its par. 2 heretofore transcribed that of the total consideration of P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000 represent the "pro rata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde, all surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the consideration of P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is proof that the duly notarized contract entered into with Jose de Borja under date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to absorb and supersede the separate unformalized agreement with the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1) not being repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise with Jose de Borja. It is moreover manifest that the stipulation that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's coheirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper and ineffective, since the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that was to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for her share formed part of the estate of Francisco de Borja and could not be sold until authorized by the Probate Court. The Court of First Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted from the finality of the order now under appeal, for the carrying out by the parties of the terms of the contract.This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share she owned from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:Art. 1088.Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale of the vendor."If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden.Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it amounts to a compromise as to her status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point is without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex "A") describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her civil status. There is nothing in the text of the agreement that would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the cession of her hereditary rights.It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in its order of 21 September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended Record on Appeal in L-28568, page 157), that the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its order of 21 September 1964, had declared that "no amicable settlement had been arrived at by the parties", and that Jose de Borja himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the proposed amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement referred to in the order and motion above-mentioned was the compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had been formally signed and executed by the parties and duly notarized. What the record discloses is that some time after its formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back out from the compromise agreement, pleading various reasons restated in the opposition to the Court's approval of Annex "A" (Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was invalid because of the lapse of the allegedly intended resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not preceded by the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as required by this Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status as wife and widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in view of the widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to reach a new settlement or novatory agreement before seeking judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter step might ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final remedy. That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant Ongsingco in G.R. No. L-28040; and it is more than probable that the order of 21 September 1964 and the motion of 17 June 1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a more satisfactory compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory accord can not invalidate the original compromise (Annex "A") and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court order for its approval and enforcement from the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described, decreed that the agreement be ultimately performed within 120 days from the finality of the order, now under appeal.We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in accordance with law, and, therefore, its order should be upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija should be, and is, reversed.In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in the appeal has affected her unfavorably, in that while the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the value of the Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in receiving the payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreement (Annex "A") she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney Panaguiton. And as to the devaluation de facto of our currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30 June 1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of currency and properties of the estate", is particularly opposite in the present case.Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion), concededly acquired by Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the husband's private property (as contended by his second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it forms part of the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco The Court of First Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was adequate evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of its conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil Code.We are of the opinion that this question as between Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has become moot and academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court in the two preceding cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share in the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the sum of P800,000 with the accompanying reciprocal quit-claims between the parties. But as the question may affect the rights of possible creditors and legatees, its resolution is still imperative.It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363 hectares, had been originally acquired jointly by Francisco de Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja, and their title thereto was duly registered in their names as co-owners in Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently, in 1931, the Hacienda was partitioned among the co-owners: the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper (Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de Borja (V. De Borja vs. De Borja, 101 Phil. 911, 932).The lot allotted to Francisco was described as "Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion, jalajala: N. Puang Rier; E. Hermogena Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja, O. Laguna de Bay; containing an area of 13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed at P297,410." (Record on Appeal, pages 7 and 105)On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first wife), seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared exclusive private property of Francisco, while in his answer defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was conjugal property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco), conformably to the presumption established by Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article 1407 of the Civil Code of 1889), to the effect that:"Art. 160.All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages, compensatory, moral and exemplary, as well as for attorney's fees.After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco de Borja, and his Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then appealed to this Court.The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the character of the Hacienda in question as owned by the conjugal partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended Inventory that, as executor of the estate of his deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended Accounting of the same date, also filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein an inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties of the Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more, Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an inventory wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they are plain admissions against interest made by both Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal community, the Court below declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not conjugal property, but the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It did so on the strength of the following evidences: (a) the sworn statement by Francisco de Borja on 6 August 1951 (Exhibit "F") that "He tomado posesion del pedazo de terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4 parte, 337 hectareas) adjunto a mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal)."and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Borja, that the entire Hacienda had been bought at a foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was contributed by Bernardo de Borja and P15,000.00 by Marcelo de Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent demand from the provincial treasurer for realty taxes in the sum of P17,000, Marcelo told his brother Bernardo that Francisco (son of Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's assent to the proposal, Marcelo issued a check for P17,000.00 to pay the back taxes and said that the amount would represent Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The witness further testified that "Marcelo de Borja said that money was entrusted to him by Francisco de Borja when he was still a bachelor and which he derived from his business transactions." (Hearing, 2 February 1965, t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied)The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement overweighed the admissions in the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de Borja, since probate courts can not finally determine questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that the testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja acquired his share of the original Hacienda with his own private funds, for which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to Article L-1396 (4) of the Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148 (4) of the Civil Code of the Philippines."The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:xxx xxx xxx"(4)That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband."We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In the first place, witness Gregorio de Borja's testimony as to the source of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain hearsay, hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he was merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja had told him (Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the statement, since both Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the statement itself is improbable, since there was no need or occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio how and when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted to Marcelo. A ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this portion of Gregorio's testimony.As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted portion thereof (ante, page 14) does not clearly demonstrate that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala, Rizal)" refers precisely to the Hacienda in question. The inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there were two real properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of 72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600, and a much bigger one of 1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion). To which of these lands did the affidavit of Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In addition, Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal y exclusivo" is plainly self-serving, and not admissible in the absence of cross examination.It may be true that the inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7") are not conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in question; but as already noted, they are clear admissions against the pecuniary interest of the declarants, Francisco de Borja and his executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and as such of much greater probative weight than the self-serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the legal presumption in favor of the conjugal character of the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not been rebutted but actually confirmed by proof. Hence, the appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court that claims for damages should be ventilated in the corresponding special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased, the same requires no pronouncement from this Court.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Case No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3) cases.Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.Fernando, J., did not take part.FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. L-41715. June 18, 1976.]ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the minors, petitioners, vs. LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court First Instance of Abra, respondents.Federico Paredes for petitioners.Demetrio V. Pre for private respondents.SYNOPSISOn March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena instituted a civil action to quiet title over certain parcels of land. About three months later, Fortunata Barcena died and defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. Counsels for plaintiff asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, but the court dismissed the case and refused to reconsider. Hence this petition for review.The Supreme Court reversed the respondent court, set aside the order of dismissal and the orders denying the motion for reconsideration, and directed the respondent court to allow the substitution of the minor children and to appoint a qualified person as guardian ad litem for them.SYLLABUS1.CIVIL PROCEDURES; DEATH OF A PARTY; SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES. While it is true that a a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. Where plaintiff was still alive when the complaint was filed, the Court acquires jurisdiction over the person. If thereafter she dies, Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, prescribes the procedures whereby a party who dies during the pendency of the proceedings can be substituted; and where proper substitution of parties had been asked for, it is grave error for the court to dismiss the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue.2.CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; RIGHTS TO SUCCESSION TRANSMITTED FROM THE MOMENT OF DEATH OF DECEDENT. From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of right thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor where the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right to be pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings.3.ID.; ID.; ID.; HEIRS BECOME PARTIES IN INTEREST. The death of the plaintiff during the pendency of an action to quiet title of a parcel of land did not extinguish her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is therefore, no reason for the Court not to follow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.4.CIVIL PROCEDURE; ACTIONS; SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS. The question as to whether an action survives or not defends on the nature of the action and the damaged sued for. In causes of action which survive the wrong complained, of affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTION TO QUIET TITLE. An action to quiet title over a parcel of land affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore, is one that survives even after plaintiff's death. It is therefore, the duty of the trial. Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for said deceased, pursuant to Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.6.ID.; ID.; ID.; REFUSAL OF COURT TO ALLOW SUBSTITUTION ON THE GROUND THAT THE HEIRS WERE STILL MINORS IS A GRAVE ERROR. Where, upon the death of the plaintiff in an action to quiet title, counsel has not only asked that the minor children be substituted for her but also suggested that the uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for them because their father is busy earning a living for the family; it is grave error for the respondent court to refuse the request for substitution on the ground that the children were still minors and cannot sue, because it ought to know that Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, directs the Court to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor.D E C I S I O NMARTIN, J p:This is a petition for review 1 of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Abra in Civil Case No. 856, entitled Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon Barcena, et al., denying the motions for reconsideration of its order dismissing the complaint in the aforementioned case. cdllOn March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in Abra.On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in order to include certain allegations therein. The motion to amend the complaint was granted and on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint.On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975. In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue. LLjurOn August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing the complaint and on August 23, 1975, he moved to set aside the order of the dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. 2 On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the plaintiff for lack of merit. On September 1, 1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for the deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint claiming that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court but the same was denied.Hence, this petition for review.The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 and its orders denying the motion for reconsideration of said order of dismissal. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies . . . it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death . . . and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representatives." This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of parties in the case. The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. 3 The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. 4 The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. 5 When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be granted . . ." The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. 6 In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. 7 Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint. This should not have been done for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court did not have to bother ordering the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased because her counsel has not only asked that the minor children be substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for them because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family. But the respondent Court refused the request for substitution on the ground that the children were still minors and cannot sue in court. This is another grave error because the respondent Court ought to have known that under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the counsel for the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as guardian ad litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the Rules of Court dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case. prLLIN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 of the Court of First Instance of Abra and the motions for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of said complaint are set aside and the respondent Court is hereby directed to allow the substitution of the minor children, who are the petitioners therein for the deceased plaintiff and to appoint a qualified person as guardian ad litem for them. Without pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED."Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 173292. September 1, 2010.]MEMORACION Z. CRUZ, represented by EDGARDO Z. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. OSWALDO Z. CRUZ, respondent.DECISIONCARPIO, J p:The CaseThis is a petition for review 1 of the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision 2 dated 20 December 2005 and Resolution dated 21 June 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80355. The CA affirmed with modification the Order 3 dated 2 June 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 30, Manila (RTC). ECaScDThe Antecedent FactsThe undisputed facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:On October 18, 1993, Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court in Manila a Complaint against her son, defendant-appellee Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for "Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages."Memoracion claimed that during her union with her common-law husband (deceased) Architect Guido M. Cruz, she acquired a parcel of land located at Tabora corner Limay Streets, Bo. Obrero, Tondo Manila; that the said lot was registered in her name under TCT No. 63467 at the Register of Deeds of Manila; that sometime in July 1992, she discovered that the title to the said property was transferred by appellee and the latter's wife in their names in August 1991 under TCT No. 0-199377 by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated February 12, 1973; that the said deed was executed through fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and simulation, hence, null and void; that she, with the help of her husband's relatives, asked appellee to settle the problem; that despite repeated pleas and demands, appellee refused to reconvey to her the said property; that she filed a complaint against appellee before the office of the Barangay having jurisdiction over the subject property; and that since the matter was unsettled, the barangay . . . issued . . . a certification to file [an] action in court, now the subject of controversy. SaDICEAfter Memoracion . . . finished presenting her evidence in chief, she died on October 30, 1996. Through a Manifestation, Memoracion's counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court on January 13, 1997 of the fact of such death, evidenced by a certificate thereof.For his part, appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the plaintiff's reconveyance action is a personal action which does not survive a party's death, pursuant to Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, and (2) to allow the case to continue would result in legal absurdity whereby one heir is representing the defendant [and is a] co-plaintiff in this case.On June 2, 1997, the trial court issued the appealed Order in a disposition that reads:"Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, this case is ordered dismissed without prejudice to the prosecution thereof in the proper estate proceedings."On October 17, 1997, Memoracion's son-heir, Edgardo Z. Cruz, manifested to the trial court that he is retaining the services of Atty. Neri for the plaintiff. Simultaneously, Atty. Neri filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the June 2, 1997 Order. However, the said motion was subsequently denied by Acting Presiding Judge Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla [on October 31, 2000]. STHAaDThereafter, Edgardo Cruz, as an heir of Memoracion Cruz, filed a notice of appeal in behalf of the deceased plaintiff, signed by Atty. Neri, but the appeal was dismissed by Judge Mindaro-Grulla, [stating that] the proper remedy being certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On appellant's motion for reconsideration, Judge Lucia Pena Purugganan granted the same, stating that the remedy under the circumstances is ordinary appeal. 4 The Court of Appeals' RulingPetitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz, represented by Edgardo Z. Cruz, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. On 20 December 2005, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the RTC decision. We quote the dispositive portion of the CA's decision below.WHEREFORE, the appealed Order is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION. The trial court's directive as to the prosecution of the action in the proper estate proceedings is DELETED.SO ORDERED. 5 Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution of 21 June 2006. 6 ACSaHcHence, this appeal.The IssuesThe issues for resolution in this case are:1.Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Memoracion Z. Cruz's Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages is a purely personal action which did not survive her death; and2.Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming with modification the RTC Order dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance and Damages.The Court's RulingWe find the appeal meritorious.The Petition for Annulment of Sale, Reconveyanceand Damages survived the death of petitioner The criterion for determining whether an action survives the death of a petitioner was elucidated in Bonilla v. Barcena, 7 to wit: AIaHESThe question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. 8 If the case affects primarily and principally property and property rights, then it survives the death of the plaintiff or petitioner. In Sumaljag v. Literato, 9 we held that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one relating to property and property rights, and therefore, survives the death of the petitioner. Accordingly, the instant case for annulment of sale of real property merits survival despite the death of petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.The CA erred in affirming RTC's dismissal of thePetition for Annulment of Deed of Sale,Reconveyance and DamagesWhen a party dies during the pendency of a case, Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily applies, viz.:Sec. 16.Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. TCIHSaThe heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.The foregoing section is a revision of Section 17, Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court:SEC. 17.Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. EHCcITIf the action survives despite death of a party, it is the duty of the deceased's counsel to inform the court of such death, and to give the names and addresses of the deceased's legal representatives. The deceased may be substituted by his heirs in the pending action. As explained in Bonilla:. . . Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."