Victor David Hanson, in his book Carnage and Culture, examines battles from Salamis

to Tet offensive and explains why the armies of the West have been the most deadly and

effective fighting forces in the world. He looks beyond popular explanations and states that it is

Western culture and values that produced better-quality arms and soldiers. Hanson is a military

historian and a professor of classics at California State University, Fresno. In Carnage and

Culture, Hanson makes a logical, well-supported, but somewhat flawed argument for his claim.

The reason for this is that not all parts of his claim fit exactly the way Hanson seems to want it to

fit. There appear to be many exceptions to his theory, and his critiques often point to those

exceptions to disprove his whole theory.

In Carnage and Culture, Hanson claims that the West always wins because of their

culture and the way they fight. Hanson calls this culture of the West the “Western Way of

War”—with some of the characteristics being freedom, individualism, civic militarism, superior

weapons, organization, discipline, morale, initiative, flexibility, and command.1 Hanson seems to

think this way because it is the same way that the Romans and the Greeks fought since they

existed. In Hanson’s mind, the term “Western” means “the culture of classical antiquity that

arose in Greece and Rome; spread to western and northern Europe; then….expanded to the

Americas, Australia, and areas of Asia and Africa…”2 He uses nine landmark battles to support

his claim. The battles he uses are the battle of Salamis, Gaugamela, Cannae, Poitiers,

Tenochtitlán, Lepanto, Rorke’s Drift, Midway, and Tet. In all of the aforementioned battles,

Western nations used shock warfare to demolish their enemies and subject these enemy nations

to their will.

1 Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (New York: Anchor Books, 2001), 21. 2 Hanson, Preface to Carnage and Culture, XV.

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In his book Carnage and Culture, Victor Davis Hanson seems to be trying to answer the

following question, what is the relationship between the culture of a nation and the outcome?

The reason for this question is that he seems to feel that the most prominent writers of war, such

as Thucydides, relate tactics with blood and strategy with corpse. He uses a number of battles to

answer his question gathering the information from primary sources, secondary books, articles,

and correspondences with other scholars.

There are a few assumptions that Hanson makes while proving answer to his driving

question. One thing Hanson assumes is that all Western nations are driven by the idea of

freedom. In his chapter on the battle of Salamis, after comparing the Greeks’ freedom to the

Persians being under the control of a king, Hanson says, “These were not alternative approaches

to state rule, but fundamental differences in the idea of personal freedom that would help

determine who would live and who would die at Salamis.”3 This idea ignores the fact that not all

Western nations were free men and seems to point to the fact that under a king’s rule you are not

free, which idea is not completely true. Hanson also seems to assume that the West always wins

when it is the West verses the Non-West. This assumption is clearly false since there were many

instances were Non-Western nations beat Western nations, one being the battle of Poitiers where

the Muslims beat the Franks. Hanson overcomes this weakness by saying it still show continuity

to the Western Way. In addition, Hanson seems to be biased towards that fact that the culture of

the nation determines the outcome of a battle. This idea creates the problem of completely

ignoring the fact that there may be other reasons for victory besides the culture. When Hanson

runs into a battle that the West lost he completely ignores why they lost and instead makes the

battle work with his thesis.

3 Victor Davis Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power (New York: Anchor Books, 2001), 34-35.

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Victor Davis Hanson presents a number of concepts in order to answer his question.

Some of these concepts include the ideas of decisive battle, freedom, discipline, and capitalism.

These ideas he presents to help to clarify his answer to the question, but assumes that all Western

battles have them--which assumption is not necessarily true. He makes the conclusion that

culture causes the west to win. Another conclusion that he makes is that the primary driving

force for Western nations is freedom. Both the conclusions are based off his assumption that the

Western Way of War fits perfectly with all western battles and makes the West win. This

assumption clearly if flawed. Because Hanson makes this assumption, when he encounters a

battle where the West does not win, he seems to sweep it under the rug with no explanation as to

why the west lost.

Hanson clearly states his meaning including his meaning of the word “Western” And he

supports his claim with relevant material. He is accurate to a point, but there are many flaws in

his claim as mentioned earlier. Hanson takes the reader into great depths when answering his

question and tackles many views from opposing sides and clearly says what is wrong with there

views. Overall, Hanson’s argument is consistent, but there are a few points when he seems to just

sweep a contradiction under the rug without really trying to explain it. His view seems to be a

more one-sided approach to the subject with the idea that the Western Way of War causes the

west to win and does not bring up any other ideas. Over all Carnage and Culture is a significant

book in that it takes the reader to a completely new level of understanding, but due to its one-

sidedness, it is not a book to rely upon without referencing other books dealing with the same

topic.

John Lynn, in his book Battle, analyzes and compares Carnage and Culture to his own

theories. Lynn gives credit to Hanson for his renowned work, and he recognizes that Hanson’s

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work spurs thought about how to re-examine what is distinct about Western warfare.4 None-the-

less, Lynn questions and criticizes many of Hanson’s assumptions calling his work ”highly

controversial”—beginning with Hanson’s assertion that the Greeks were compelled by a sense of

liberty rather than the protection of their agricultural livelihood.5 Lynn only points out this

disagreement, citing that Hanson believes that grape vines and olive trees required little

protection, and the armies would be at home during the harvest rather than attacking another’s

crops.6 Lynn’s main argument stem’s from Hanson’s theory on what actually did drive the

Hoptic warriors. Hanson argues that the Greek sense of liberty compelled them fight and fight

valiantly. Rights to own land, freedom of speech, freedom to act, the right to vote, and freedom

of religion all create a culture of battling bravely. Lynn claims this more fantasy than fact.7

Lynn’s primary objection to Hanson’s theory is that there are many gaps in the Western

domination of war over the last 2500 years.8 Lynn also seems to object to the assertion that shock

warfare is natural result of the aforementioned liberties, and that the West’s economic system has

contributed to advancing and supporting imperialistic domination of the world.9 Lynn cites

Edward Rothstein’s argument that the world celebrates west “for its democratic vision of human

liberty” and condemns it “for militarism and imperialism”.10 Lynn feels that Hanson’s claim that

these two qualities are inseparable is questionable at best. The cause and effect evidence that

Hanson presents may be wrong, but the evidence does seem powerful. Regarding the gaps in the

West’s dominance, Lynn feels that Carnage and Culture admits there are gaps—yet still claims

4John A. Lynn, “Written in Blood: The Classical Greek Drama of Battle and the Western Way of War,” in Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003), 3 and 13. 5John A. Lynn, “Written in Blood: The Classical Greek Drama of Battle and the Western Way of War,” in Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003), 4. 6 Lynn, “Written in Blood,” in Battle, 3-4. 7 Ibid., 25. 8 Lynn, “Written in Blood,” in Battle, 13. 9 Ibid., 13-14, and 20.10 Ibid., 16.

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continuity.11 This implication is true, and clearly, Hanson recognizes that gaps occur, but he

rationalizes that gaps are mainly due to the erosions of the freedoms cited. Expecting no gaps at

all—on Lynn’s part—seems somewhat unreasonable. In the sum total of western history,

Hanson’s claim is true, and Hanson admits that theory does not always prove out during some

periods.

Next, Lynn criticizes Hanson’s declaration that seeking out the enemy and engaging in

shock action without deception is a continued Western war culture. He seems to have a point

here. Even Hanson points out how many armies, such as Cortez’s, used every tactic available to

conquer the enemy. There is no question that Western armies use every trick possible to hide true

battle plans in modern warfare. The element of surprise is surely a weapon that must be used.

When your enemy’s greatest defense weapons are swords and pikes, there is little need to hide

attack plans, but as warfare advanced technologically, the element of surprise became more

critical. However, decimating the enemy in open shock battle is most often required to conquer

another nation. Even this concept of the continuous use of shock tactics is dismissed by Lynn—

he cites several quotations in-the-which Western military leaders express the opposite. Again,

here Lynn’s argument is partly unreasonable—there will always be exceptions to the rule. If

possible and advantageous, in modern western warfare, strategy is used to surprise the enemy

followed by shock attack.

Lynn also feels that discipline and drill of troops is not only Western attribute of military

training.12 Of course, other non-Western nations drill discipline into their troops. Hanson’s claim

centers on the fact that Western armies better maintain that discipline on the battlefield. The

reason for the West’s better battlefield discipline relates back to their culture. If you know that

11 Ibid., 17.12 John A. Lynn, “Written in Blood: The Classical Greek Drama of Battle and the Western Way of War,” in Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003), 19.

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your leaders are scrutinized, if you feel you are fighting for your own liberties, if you know there

was broad input into the battle plan—of course you are going to do your part with unwavering

loyalty. So, yes, other nations drill discipline into there ranks, but the West does a much better

job of maintaining it on the battlefield—even when they fight each other.

Finally, Lynn claims that western tactics have worked flawlessly in some parts of the

world, such as the Americas. However, they have not fared quite so well in southern Asia. This

may appear to be true, but Western sentiment against imperialism has changed how wars are

fought—rather than any special case in Asia. Russia might be a better example of the failure of

Western military might than southern Asia.

In all, reading Lynn’s critique is thought provoking, but does nothing to discredit

Hanson’s basic assumptions.

Another battle that holds ground to at Hanson’s claim is the battle of Antioch during the

First Crusade, which lasted from October 20, 1097 to Jun 2, 1098.13 The battle was between the

Crusaders, who wanted to spread Christianity, and the Turks who had taken over much of the

former Christian cities, one being the city of Antioch. Obviously, in this case, the Crusaders had

religious freedom as motivator--why else would they leave their far away homelands to free a

city whose only tie to them is their religion. On the other hand, democracy, homeland protection,

and family had no part in their motivation. The Crusaders began the siege by camping right in

front of Antioch as the fearful Turks stayed in the city fearing to come out. Gesta says this about

the beginning of the siege “In marvelous fashion we besieged three gates of the city, since on the

other side there was no place from which to besiege (them), for a very steep mountain

13 Robert the Monk, Robert the Monk’s History of the First Crusade: Historia Iherosolimitana, Translated by Carol Sweetenham (Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 121 and147. Thomas Asbridge says that the siege began on October 20. Thomas Asbridge, “Before the Walls of Antioch,” in The First Crusade: A New History, The Roots and Conflict Between Christianity and Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 162.

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constrained us.”14 The Turks used the Armenians and the Syrians who were within the city as

spies. The Armenians and Syrians came out by night, leaving there wives and children within the

walls of the city, and then came back into the city by day and told the Turks what they saw.

Gesta made this conclusion about the strategy of the Turks “Indeed, they craftily investigated our

condition and strength and reported everything to those excommunicate who were shut up in the

city.”15 The Turks would open there gates at night and shoot arrows at the Crusaders, while

staying within their well-fortified city. Robert the Monk shows the feelings the Crusaders had

towards the Turks when he says “… [Antioch] was full of defenders who could have fought

alongside our men on the battlefield if they had not been enemies of the name of Christ.” 16 This

driving force to purge the city of all non-believers was the ultimate cause for their victories

during the Crusades. Before the battle, both sides waited to attack waiting for reinforcements.

The Crusaders feared the cities defenses, despite some who believed that God would protect

them, while Yanghi-Siyan of the Turks feared he had not enough men to protect the city. Turks

who were in the castle of Harim, which castle the Crusaders eventually took over, ambushed the

Crusaders. Then Bohemond of the Crusaders struck a deal with a jealous captain of the Turks

named Firouz who sold Antioch to Bohemond and his men, which deal Bohemond kept secret

from his men.17 The Crusaders fought the Turks by making it so that they could neither flight nor

flee. There were times when the Turks seemed to push back the Crusaders but Bohemond waved

the banner of the Crusaders giving them courage and causing the Turks to flee. Finally, through

14 Augustus C. Krey, “From Nicaea to Antioch,” The First Crusade: The Accounts of Eye-Witnesses and Participants (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1921), 125.15 Augustus C. Krey, “From Nicaea to Antioch,” The First Crusade: The Accounts of Eye-Witnesses and Participants (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1921), 126. Robert the Monk agrees with Gesta the strategy “a cunning strategem on their part…” Robert the Monk, Robert the Monk’s History of the First Crusade: Historia Iherosolimitana, Translated by Carol Sweetenham (Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 121. 16 Robert the Monk, Robert the Monk’s History of the First Crusade: Historia Iherosolimitana, Translated by Carol Sweetenham (Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 121. 17 Steven Runciman, “Before the Walls of Antioch,” in A History of the First Crusades: Volume 1, The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 231 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

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the treachery of Pyrrus the Turks and Firouz a captain of the Turks, the Crusaders were able to

seize Antioch slaying all who were within. Part of the reason for their victory is summed up by

the words of Robert the Monk when he said, “Those who know something about war are well

aware that foot soldiers kill more effectively than cavalry.”18

The siege of Antioch clearly proves that Hanson’s claim is not far from the truth. Indeed

the siege of Antioch shows that the freedom and religion along with superior weaponry are the

forces that drive the West to win the battles they fight. The cause of freedom is often a great

motivator to be victorious. With the correct motivation, nations and their military will create

technology, develop skills, and fight for the cause they cherish. The Crusader’s Franks made

swords and their foot soldiers were no match against the cavalry of the Turks and their poisoned

arrows. The Crusaders slaughtered the Turks with there swords “like the harvester with his

scythe in the meadow grass or corn.”19 It shows that western weaponry is more superior to non-

western weaponry. In speaking of the Franks and their swords, Robert the Monk says, “What

should the Franks do other than engage hand to hand with the sword?”20 Even though the Turks

captured Antioch again, the Crusaders, driven by their religion, defeated the Turks and took back

Antioch. However, the Crusaders were not freemen because the government they lived under

(they were under a king), but they were, in a way, freemen in terms of there religion since it was

ultimately their faith in their religion that made them free. That sense of freedom along with

western weaponry is what caused the Crusaders to defeat the Turks and, later on, the Turks to

defeat the Crusaders. Liberty, freedom of religion, homeland protection and democracies are the

ultimate motivation to fight valiantly. Those same qualities, by Hanson’s argument, also create

18 Robert the Monk, Robert the Monk’s History of the First Crusade: Historia Iherosolimitana, Translated by Carol Sweetenham (Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 125.19 Robert the Monk, Robert the Monk’s History of the First Crusade: Historia Iherosolimitana, Translated by Carol Sweetenham (Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 132.20 Ibid., 130

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the very best war machine. A natural result is the subjection of other nations, and imperialism,

and this is where many factions of society have he biggest problem. In general, Hanson’s theory

holds true, and there are examples of exceptions. [2543]

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Bibliography

Asbridge, Thomas “Before the Walls of Antioch.” In The First Crusade: A New History, The Roots and Conflict Between Christianity and Islam, 153-187. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Hanson, Victor Davis. Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power. New York: Anchor Books, 2001.

Krey, Augustus C. “From Nicaea to Antioch.” The First Crusade: The Accounts of Eye-Witnesses and Participants, 112-162. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1921.

Lynn, John A. “Written in Blood: The Classical Greek Drama of Battle and the Western Way of War.” In Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, 1-27. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2003.

Peters, Edward, ed. “The Siege of Antioch.” The First Crusade: The Chronicles of Fulcher of Charters and Other Source Materials, 152-194. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971.

Robert, the Monk. Robert the Monk’s History of the First Crusade: Historia Iherosolimitana. Translated by Carol Sweetenham. Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005.

Runciman, Steven. “Before the Walls of Antioch.” In A History of the First Crusades: Volume 1, The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 213-235. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

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