Husserl Studies 1:157-178 (1984)

9 1984 Martinus Ni jhof f Publishers, The Hague. Printed in the Netherland~

H u s s e r l, H e i d e g g e r a n d

t h e q u e s t i o n o f a h e r m e n e u t i c p h e n o m e n o l o g y

JOHN D CAPUTO

Villanova University

I n w 7 c o f B e i n g a n d T i m e H e i de g g er w r it es , T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f

Dase in i s a h e r m e n e u t i c i n t h e p r i m o r d i a l s i g n i f i c a t i o n o f t h i s w o r d ,

w h e r e i t d e s i g n a t e s t h is b u s i n e s s o f i n t e r p r e t i n g ( S Z , w 7 c , 3 7 / 6 2 ) . I

Y e t j u s t a f e w l in e s e a r li e r i n t h e s a m e s e c t i o n H e i d e g g e r h a d w r i t t e n

t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f a d e s cr i p ti v e p h e n o m e n o l o g y is a t b o t t o m

t a u t o l o g i c a l ( S Z , w 7 c , 3 5 / 5 9 ) . B u t i f p h e n o m e n o l o g y i s i n h e r e n t l y

d e s c r i p t i v e , h o w c a n i t b e a t t h e s a m e t i m e i n t e r p r e t i v e ? P h e n o m e n o l -

o g y d e al s w i t h w h a t i s g i v en , w h i l e h e r m e n e u t i c s m e a n s t a k i n g s o m e -

th ing as , c o n s t r u i n g i t, g i vi n g i t a r e n d e r i n g . M o r e o v e r , p h e n o m e n o l -

o g y h a s t o d o w i t h t h e t h i n g s t h e m s e l v es , die Sachen se lbs t , n o t w i t h

p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i e s , 2 w h i l e h e r m e n e u t i c s h a s t o d o

w i t h t e x t s , w i t h w r i t i n g s . O n e c a n a t l e a s t i m a g i n e h o w D e r r i d a ' s

f a m o u s m o t t o , i l n ' y a pa s d e h or s t e x t e , m i g h t h a v e e m e r g e d f r o m

h e r m e n e u t i c s , b u t o n e c a n n e v e r i m a g i n e i t a r is i n g i n a H u s s e r l i a n

f r a m e w o r k .

H o w t h e n c a n p h e n o m e n o l o g y ta k e a h e r m e n e u t i c t u r n ? I s h e r m e n -

e u t i c p h e n o m e n o l o g y an a b e r r a t io n , a c o m m i n g l i n g o f a f o r e ig n su b -

s t a n c e in t h e o r g a n is m o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y ? O r d o e s it r e p r e s e n t a n

e x t e n si o n o f s o m e t h i n g e s s en t ia l i n t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l m e t h o d ? P u t

i n h is t o ri c a l t e r m s , h o w is i t p o s s ib l e t o m o v e fr o m t h e p u r e p h e n o m -

e n o l o g y o f H u s s e r l ' s Ideas I t o t h e h e r m e n e u t i c p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f

B e i n g a n d T i m e ? T h a t is t h e q u e s t i o n I w a n t t o p o s e i n th i s p a p e r , a n d

t h e a r g u m e n t I w i l l m a k e i s t h a t t h e r e is a l r e a d y a d i s ti n c t i v e l y h e r m e n -

e u t i c e l e m e n t i n p u r e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l i n v e s ti g a t io n ( e v e n a s I w o u l d

w a n t t o i n si s t t h a t t h e r e m u s t b e a d is t i n c ti v e l y p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l

e l e m e n t i n a ll h e r m e n e u t i c s , l e st i t f al l p r e y t o t h e t e x t u a l is m o f D e r r i d a

a n d t h e d e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t c r it ic s i n F r e n c h a n d A m e r i c a n li t e ra r y

 

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criticism.) I want to show that Heidegger's phen omen olog y results from

an appropriation of a hermeneutic element which is already at work in

Husserl himself. If eing and Time practices a hermeneutic phenom-

enology, this is because Heidegger has acted u pon certain suggestions of

Husserl, exploited certain resources in Hussefl's own method, moved

phenomenology in a direction which Husserl himself made possible. If

the phenomenology of Heidegger is explicitly hermeneutic, Husserl's

phen omen olog y is already in an impo rtan t sense a prot o-her meneu t-

ics.

It wo uld be well at this point to say what hermene utics means, for

like so many words whose day has come, which enjoy such currency

and wide circulation, herm eneu tics is in danger of meaning almost

anything. For the purposes of the present study, I.take the word to

refer to the theory of the fore-structures, and to the notion that the

understa nding of an enti ty is possible only insofar as it is made possible

by a certain prior projection of the range or field of meaning to which

the entity belongs. Hermeneutics thus turns on the famous hermeneutic

circle: if we do not already stand in certain prior understanding of the

thing to be understood, then understanding is disoriented, cut adrift

and hence rendered impossible. Hence my tactic here is to take the

Heideggerian sense of hermeneutics as the orthodox notion and then to

see to what extent it is both prepared for by, and hence in the debt of,

Husserl's phenomenology.

Now there is no little paradox in such an inquiry. For Heidegger's

hermeneutic ph enomenolo gy is common ly set in opposition to

Husserl's pure phenomenology. Husserl, it is usually pointed out,

wanted phen omen olog y to be a presuppositionless science, while

Heidegger said that it is not at all a question of getting rid of our

presuppositions but rather of finding the right ones, the ones which

illuminate the things themselves. It is not a question of getting out of

the circle, but of getting into it in the right way. I want to argue that

this is far too facile a way to differentiate Heidegger and Husserl. The

fact of the mat ter is that the fore-structure of the understanding, which

belongs to the essence of Heidegger's hermeneutical method, plays a

central role in Hussefl as well. I want to show that Husserl depended

upon such a notion at every critical jun ctu re in his account of percep-

tion, that it is a centerpiece of his phen omen olog y to which he devoted

numerous and typically painstaking analyses. In the conclusion of

the paper I will address the question of the real difference betwee n

 

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Heidegger and Husserl and of t he validity of the com mon wisdom ab out

the place of presuppositions in their respective phenomenologies.

I will carry out this understanding as follows. (1) I will take m y po int

of departure from Husserl's discussion of expli catio n (Auslegung) in

the

Cartesian Meditations

in order to show that it bears an important

relationship to Heidegger's use of the same word in Being and T ime;

(2) I will then turn to a question of the anticipat ory prede linea tion

(Vorze ichnung) which Husserl treats in Ideas L (3) Next I take up

Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology in Being and T ime and its

relationship to these elements in Husserl's work. (4) And then in con-

clusion I return to the question of presuppositionlessness and address

the question of the true divide between the Husserlian and Heidegger-

ian programs.

1. The me ningof

Aus legung

in the

Cartesian Meditations

If often goes unnoticed that the word which Dorion Calms translated as

expli catio n in his English version of Cartesian Meditations, and which

Macquarrie and Robinson rende r as int erpre tat ion in their translation

of Being and T ime , is in both cases Auslegung. While each of these

translations seems to me contextually fair, this should not obscure the

convergence of the Husserlian and Heideggerian vocabulary at this

point.

Husserl introduces the word into the

Cartesian Meditation

in w 20 in

a discussion of intenti onal analysis, which is to be distinguished from

analysis in t he usual sense as follows:

It becomes evident that, as intentional, the analysis of conscious-

ness is totally different from analysis in t he usual and nat ura l

sense. Conscious life, as we said once before, is not just a whole

made up of data of consciousness and therefore analyzable

(in an extremely broad sense, divisible) merely into its self-suffi-

cient a nd non-self-sufficiente lemen t s . . . (CM, w 20, 83/46 ) 3

Conscious life is not made up of atomic data which can be separated

its own, which Hussefl identifies as the law of the implicit and the

explicit. The passage continues:

 

1 6 0

9 . . b u t

e v e r y w h e r e i t s p e c u l i a r a t t a i n m e n t ( as i n t e n t i o n a l ) is a n

u n c o v e r i n g o f t h e potent ial i t ies impl ic i t i n a c t u a l i t i e s o f c o n -

s c io u s n e ss - a n u n c o v e r i n g t h a t b r in g s a b o u t , o n t h e n o e m a t i c

s id e , a n e x p l i c a t i o n o r u n f o l d i n g (Auslegung), a b e c o m i n g

d i s t i n c t a n d p e r h a p s a c l e a r in g (Kl?irung) a n d , c o r r e l at i v e l y , a n

e x p l i c a t i o n o f t h e p o t e n t i a l i n t e n t i o n a l p r o c e s s es t h e m s e l v e s.

I n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t a c o m p o s i t e o f s m a ll e r, a n d is o l a ta b l e

a c t u a l i t i e s , b u t r a t h e r a n i n t e r p l a y b e t w e e n a f o c a l a c t u a l i t y a n d a

r i n g o f p o t e n t i a l i t y , a r i n g o f i m p l i c i t s t r u c t u r e s s u r r o u n d i n g w h a t i s

t h e m a t i c a n d e x p l ic i t. T h e i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t is n o t a m e r e l y p r e s e n t

a c t u a l i ty - H e i d e g g e r w o u l d s a y, n o t m e r e l y s o m e t h i n g vorhanden -

r a t h e r i t i s m o r e t h a n i t a c t u al l y ap p e a r s t o b e . T h a t m e a n s t h a t t h e

t a s k o f a n a l y z in g , w h i c h m u s t b e t a i lo r e d t o t h e u n i q u e m o d e o f b e i n g

o f t h e i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t, m u s t c o n s i s t n o t o n l y i n a t t e n d i n g t o t h e

f o c a l o b j e c t b u t j u s t a s i m p o r t a n t l y i n u n f o l d i n g th e s e i m p l i c it st ru c -

t u r es , i n l a y in g o u t o r s e t ti n g fo r t h t h e m u t e d c o m p o n e n t s o f in t e n t i o n -

a l l if e w h i c h n o n e t h e l e s s b e l o n g in t e g r a l l y t o it s m a k e - u p . A n d t h a t i s

t h e p r e c i s e f o r c e o f t h e w o r d Auslegung: t o l a y o u t , t o s e t f o r t h , s o m e -

w h a t i n t h e m a n n e r o f t h e L a t i n ex-ponere. C a i r n ' s e x p l i c a t e c a p t u r e s

t h e L a t i n explicare, explicatus: t o u n - f o l d , t o l a y o u t , t h e p l i e s o r f o l d s

w h i c h a r e f o l d e d t o g e t h e r i n t h e expl icandum. T h e w o r k o f p h e n o m -

e n o l o g i ca l r e fl e c t i o n t h e n i s t o m a k e t h e i m p l i c i t e x p l ic i t , t o s h o w t h e

d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e t h e m a t i c o b j e ct u p o n t h e p r e t h e m a t i c a n d i m p li c it

c o m p o n e n t s . I n t h i s se n se , p h e n o m e n o l o g y is a n ars explicandi.

T h i s n o t i o n t h a t t h e i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t i s a l w a y s m o r e t h a n i t f ir s t

p r e s e n t s i t s e l f t o b e c a s t s a n in t e r e s t i n g l i g h t o n t h e p r i n c i p l e o f p r i n -

c i p l e s (Ideas L w 2 4 ) . F o r t o a c c e p t a t h i n g j u s t a s it p r e s e n t s it s e l f t o

b e a n d n o t o t h e r w i s e h a s n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h a s h o r t s i g h t e d a n d n a r r o w

e m p i r i c i s m w h i c h c o n s t r i c t s e x p e r i e n c e i n t o a b b r e v i a te d a t o m s o f e x -

p e r i en c e . T h e p r i n c i p le o f p r i n c ip l e s m u s t a l w a y s b e q u a l i fi e d b y

H u s s e r l ' s o b s e r v a t i o n i n t h e Analysis o f Passive Synthesis a b o u t t h e

p r e t e n t i o n s o f p e r c e p t i o n :

A n d s i n c e p r e c e p t i o n s t i l l p r e t e n d s t o g i v e t h e o b j e c t i n p e r s o n

(leibhaft), i t c o n t i n u a l l y p r e t e n d s i n f a c t m o r e t h a n i t c a n d o i n

a c c o r d a n c e w i t h i t s o w n e s s e n c e . ( H u a X I , 1 1 )

T h e i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t a l w a y s c o n t a i n s a plus ultra, s o m e t h i n g m o r e ,

 

161

which it is the task o f phenomenol ogical reflection to unfol d and

elaborate:

Intentional analysis is guided by the fundamental cognition that,

as a consciousness, every cogito is indeed (in the broadest sense) a

meaning of its meant (Meinung seines Gemeinten), but that, as a

consciousness at any moment, this something meant (dieses Ge-

meinte) is more - somethin g mean t with something more - than

what is mean t at that mome nt expli citly . In our exam_pie, each

phase of percep tion was a mere side of th e object, as what was

perceptual ly meant. This intended-beyond-itself, which is implicit

in any consciousness, must be considered an essential moment of

it. (CM, 20, 84/46)

Whence the Derridean decons tructi on of Husserl's phenomenol ogy

misconstrues what the phenome nological met hod demands of itself. It

does not identify the perceptual object with pure presence, nor does it

expect that percept ion can deliver it. Rather it insists all along that t he

intentional object is girded about with a ring of potential and implicit

structures which it is up to ph enomenolog ical analysis to unpack.

Husserl of course has in mind his well known doctrine of the inner

and outer horizons which show the contextualized make-up of per-

ception and of intentional experience generally.4 Husserl never

regarded percept ion as a simple matt er of looking on as if intuit ion

(An-schauung) were merely a blank stare. On the contrary, from the

Logical lnvesn gations on, he held that Anschauung is Auffassung: s that

intuititing is construing, apprehending, even interpreting. To be able to

perceive something demands of the perceiver that he know how to take

the perceptual object, know how to contextualize and situate it, so that

it can appear as the kind of t hing which it is. If we are not alert to the

fringe of potential and implicit components in the intentional object,

our perception of it will simply break down. That is the point of

Husserl's often repeated example of the Abschattungen, adumbra-

tions (which literally means fore-shadowing ). The perceptual object

is not directly perceived, but rather ap-perceived along with its co-given,

mediately presented fringe of inner and outer horizons. Were we not

alert to the potenti al factors in what is directly presented, the per-

ceptual object wou ld be reduce d to a facade and the enc oun ter with its

othe r sides would be a dis-continuous and indeed surprising addition to

 

162

a fragmentary experience. Perceptual experience thus depends upon

having a grasp of these potential factors, for these alone allows us to

construe the object rightly, in a manner which befits its appearance.

Intenti onal analysis consists in the ha rd work o f setting forth, of setting

out aus-legen), these potential factors, factors which, as Heidegger

often points out, are all the more difficult to seize precisely because

the y are implicit.

Thus it begins to become clear that if Husserl subscribed to the idea

of presuppositionless science, that this has nothing to do with his idea

of perception, and nothing to do with the my th o f uninterpreted bits of

intentional data which are independent of the horizons and potentiali-

ties which structure and condition their appearance.

Now the make-up of these horizons merits further consideration. F or

the horizontal potentialities are not wholly indeterminate, or merely

abse nt to use the language of the day, but rather, as Husserl puts it

predelineated vorgezeichnet): The horizons are predelineated

potentia liti es (CM, w 19, 82/45). Husserl's choice of words here is

telling. Vor-zeichnen means to sketch something out beforehand, to

trace it lightly out in advance, as in a drawing, say, where the focal

object is done in detailed and heavy strokes while the background is

simply traced in lightly. The background-horizon is neither there nor

not there, neither present nor absent, but rather something adumbrated

or fore-shadowed. Hence in Derridean terms it is a trace but a trace

which, pace Derrida, prepares us for the presentation of what is on the

margin. Whence the words Vorzeichnung and Abschattung are im-

portantly akin and akin precisely inasmuch as both indicate a certain

fore-structure, referring as they do to a fore-sketching, fore-shadowing

or preliminary tracing ou t. Husserl also uses the

Vor-deutung in

another

text, which Cairns recom mend s be translated as prelimina ry indica-

tion, but which o f course can also have the sense of preliminary inter-

pretation. In Erste Philosophie Husserl refers to the outer horizon as a

sphere of Vordeutung, which refers us to nearby or coexistent entities,

all of which belong to a realm of possible experience (Hua VIII, 149).

These are pregnant and suggestive words for the present study inas-

much as they open up the question of the fore-structure of intentional

consciousness in Husserlian phenomenology. The cogitatum is possible

only inasmuch as it has been anticipated in advance, only insofar as an

adequat e preparat ion has been made for it. There is an intrinsically anti-

cipatory structure to intentional life. Consciousness does not pass from

one intent ional object to anot her as throug h a series of discrete objects,

 

1 6 3

b u t r a t h e r i t m o v e s a h e a d a n t i c i p a to r i l y i n t o o b j e c t s w h o s e a p p e a r a n c e

h a s b e e n a n n o u n c e d i n a d v a n c e . T h e f o r w a r d p r o g r e ss o f c o n s c i o u s n es s

i s a c c o r d i n g l y n o t a m a t t e r o f e n t e r i n g a w h o l l y n e w w o r l d , b u t r a t h e r

o f f 'f i ling in ( E r f f i l l u n g ) a p r e d e l i n e a t e d s k e t c h . 6

I t i s l i k e w i s e cl e a r t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e f o r e - s t r u c t u r e f o r H u s s e r l i s t h e

t e m p o r a l s t r u c t u r e o f p r o - t e n t i o n , th e t h r u s t o f c o n s c io u s n e s s b y w h i c h

i t t e n d s f o r t h i n t o w h a t l i es i m m e d i a t e l y ah e a d in t h e c o n c a t e n a t i o n o f

e x p e r ie n c e . B u t i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o s ee t h a t w h a t i s p r o t e n d e d b e l o n g s to

t h e i m m e d i a t e a n d p r e s e n t s t r u c t u r e o f e x p e ri e n c e , t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e ss ,

i n o t h e r w o r d s , i s a l r e ad y s t r e t c h e d o u t a n t i c i p a to r i l y i n t o t h e f u t u r e .

O t h e r w i s e H u s s e r l 's e n t i r e a n a ly s i s w o u l d b e f r u s t r a t e d a n d t h e r o l e o f

t h e h o r i z o n a l l y p r e d e l i n e a t e d i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f p r e s e n t e x p e r i e n c e

u n d e r m i n e d . H u s s e r l ' s p o i n t i s t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l l i f e d o e s n o t c o n s i s t o f

a t o m i c , m e r e l y p r e s e n t a c t u a l i t i e s , b u t i s p r e c i s e l y m a d e p o s s i b l e b y

t h e f r i n ge o f h o r iz o n a l p o t e n t i a l it i e s , b o t h i n n e r a n d o u t e r , b o t h

r e t a i n e d a n d p r o t e n d e d , w h i c h b e l o n g t o i ts i n t eg r a l s t ru c t u r e .

2 . T h e d o c t r i n e o f ' p r e d e l i n e a t io n i n I d e a s I

I h a v e t h u s f a r s i n g l e d o u t f o r e m p h a s i s t w o n o t i o n s i n H u s s e f l ' s l a t e r

w o r k w h i c h , I w i s h t o a r g u e , a r e e s s e n ti a l i n g r e d i e n t s i n t h e l a t e r d ev e l -

o p m e n t o f a h e r m e n e u t i c p h e n o m e n o l o g y , vi z., t h e n o t i o n o f i n te n t i o n -

a l e x p l i c a t io n o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d o f p r o j e c ti v e p r e d e l i n e a t io n o n t h e

o t h e r . N o w i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e s e a r e c o r r e l a t i v e n o t i o n s . P r o j e c t i v e p r e -

d e l i n e a t i o n i s t h e a c t u a l , p r e r e f l e c t i v e w o r k o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , i n a c tu

e x e r c i t o .

I t i s t h e r u l e w h i c h t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s f o l l o w s in i ts

a n o n y m o u s l i fe o f c o n s t i t u t i n g o b j e c ts . T h e n o t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l e x -

p l i c a ti o n , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , r e f er s t o t h e a c t o f r e fl e c t i o n w h i c h s e ts

a b o u t u n f o l d i n g a n d r e n d e r i n g e x p l i c i t t h e m u t e d a n d p o t e n t i a l s t r u c -

t u r e s w h i c h a r e e f f e c ti v e w h e n e v e r a n y o b j e c t b e c o m e s fo c a l a n d

t h e m a t i c , r a i s i n g t h e s e s t r u c t u r e s u p t o t h e l e v e l o f r e f l e c ti v e c l a r i t y ,

i n a c t u s i g n i f i c a t o .

P r o j e c t i o n a n d e x p l i c a t i o n t h u s a r e r e l a t e d a s t h e

p r e r ef l e c ti v e a n d t h e r e fl e c ti v e , t h e a n o n y m o u s a n d t h e e x p l i c i t, t h e

c o n s t i t u t i v e a n d t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e . E x p l i c a t i o n w a n t s t o r e t r a c e t h e

s t e p s o f p r o j e c t i v e p r e d e l i n e a t i o n , e v e n a s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l r e d u c t i o n

r e t ra c e s t h e s t e p s o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s t i t u t i o n .

I w a n t n o w t o p u r s u e f u r t h e r t h e t h e o r y o f p r o j e c t iv e p r e d e l in e a -

 

1 6 4

t i o n b y f o l l o w i n g H u s s e d ' s c e l e b ra t e d d is c u s s io n o f t h e d e s tr u c t i b i li t y

o f t h e w o r d i n w w 47 - 49 o f Ideas I, f o r t h i s t e x t t h r o w s i m p o r t a n t

l i g h t u p o n H u s s e r l' s vi ew s . O n e s h o u l d h o w e v e r d i sp e l a t o n c e t h e u n -

f o r t u n a t e a n d m i s l e a d i n g C a r t e s i a n o v e r t o n e s o f th i s p a s s ag e . F o r i t is

n o t H u s s e rl 's i n t e n t i o n t o s h o w t h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s e n j o y s a p r i vi l eg e d

m e t a p h y s i c a l a u t o n o m y s u c h t h a t , w e r e t h e p h y s i c al w o r l d a n n ih i l i at e d ,

i t w o u l d c o n t i n u e t o e x is t. 7 O n t h e c o n t r a r y , H u s s e r l' s in t e n t i o n s ar e

e n t i r e ly e p i s t e m i c . H e i s b e n t u p o n m a k i n g a p o i n t a b o u t t h e n a t u r e o f

c o n s t i t u t i o n , a p o i n t w h i c h , i t s e e m s t o m e , d e v e l o p s f u r t h e r h i s in s i g h t

t h a t t h e p r o j e c t i v e p r e d e l i n e a t i o n o r a n t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e i n t e n t i o n a l o b-

j e c t i s a n e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n o f t h e p o s s i b i l it y o f i t s a p p e a r a n c e . A n d

h a v i n g e s t a b li s h e d t h a t p o i n t , i t w i ll n o t b e d i f f i cu l t to s h o w t h e d e p e n -

d e n c e o f H e i d e g g e r ' s a n a l y s i s o f Verstehen a n d Auslegung in Being and

Time u p o n H u s s e r l ' s t h e o r i e s .

T h e p i v o t a l t e r m i n th i s d is c u s s io n is m o t i v a t i o n . H u s s e rl w a n t s t o

s h o w t h a t a n o b j e c t i s n e v e r s o m e t h i n g in i ts e lf , w i t h o u t r e l at i o n s h i p t o

c o n s c i o u s n e ss , b u t a l w a ys t h e c o r r e la t e o f t h e c o n s c i o u s a c ts i n w h i c h i t

i s b u i l t u p o r c o n s t i t u t e d . B u t a n o b j e c t is c o n s t i t u t e d o n l y i n a s m u c h a s

c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s m o t i v a t e d t o c o n s t i t u t e i t, t h a t i s, m o v e d b y r e g u l ar

c o n c a t e n a t i o n s o f e x p e r i e n c e s t o p i c k o u t p a r t i c u l a r f o r m a t i o n s w h i c h

i t e n d o w s w i t h o b j e c t i v i t y . T h e w a l k i n g s t i c k t a k e s s h a p e i n o u r e x -

p e r i e n c e o n l y b e c a u s e o f t h e d e p e n d a b i l i t y o f i ts p r o p e rt i e s , it s l o n g ,

t h i n , h a r d a n d s u p p o r t i v e s u b s t a n ce . W e r e i t n o w h a r d a n d n o w s o f t ,

n o w l o n g a n d n o w s h o rt , w e re it s u d d e n l y to b e c o m e t o o h o t t o h o l d ,

o r s u d d e n l y t o d r a in i n to a p o o l o f b o i l in g l i q u id , t h e n i t w o u l d n e v e r

b e c o n s t i t u t e d ; t h e r e w o u l d r e m a i n o n l y a c h a o s o f se n s a t io n s o v e r

w h i c h c o n s c i o u s n e s s w o u l d b e l e f t to e x e r t a n u n e a s y r u le . A n o b j e c t i s

c o n s t i t u t e d o n l y i n a s m u c h a s c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s m o t i v a t e d t o c o n s t i t u t e

i t b y t h e u n i t y a n d t h e s t a b i l i t y o f it s s en s e .

T h i s d i s c u s s i o n l e a d s H u s s e r l t o m a k e a n i n t e r e s t i n g d i s t i n c t i o n i n

w 4 8 b e t w e e n t w o s p e ci e s o f p o s s i b i li t y . T h e w o r l d o f a c t u al i ti e s i s t h e

w o r l d f o r w h i c h c o n s c i o u s n es s h a s b e e n p r o v i d e d a c t u a l c o n c a t e n a t i o n s

o f e x p e r i e n c e s o r a c t u a l m o t i v a t i o n . I t is t h e w o r l d w h i c h h a s a ct u a l ly

t a k e n s h a p e i n e x p e r i e n c e . P o s s i b i li t y , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , r e f e r s t o t h e

s p h e r e o f t h i n g s w h o s e p o s s i b il i ty h a s b e e n o p e n e d u p b y t h e a c tu a l

c o n c a t e n a t i o n s o f e x p e ri e n c e s. A n d t h a t m e a n s t h a t t h e p o s s ib l e i n t h e

p r i m a r y s e n s e m e a n s t h e e x p e r i e n c e a b l e erfahrbar), w h i c h i s t o b e d i s -

t i n g u i s h e d f r o m m e r e l y e m p t y , l o g ic a l p o s s ib i l it y : 8

 

165

Exper i encea b lenes s never mean s a mere l og i ca l pos s ib i l i t y , but

rather a possibility m o t i v a t e d i n the concatenations of experience.

This conc atena tion itself is, throug h and through, one of motiva-

tion , always taking into itself new motivations and recasting

those already formed. ( l deas L w 47, 89/106-107)

And motivations are more o r less det erminate, are possessed of greater

or lesser definition, precisely in proportion to the extent to which

consciousness has been moved to form them. Some possibilities are

extremely close, while others may be quite remote, like the possibility

of a roc k at the bot tom of t he sea which no eyes have yet seen or con-

stituted. Such a thing, Husserl would point out, has been only roughly

pre-figured and predelineated by the actual experience which we have

had up to now. But it is clear that Husserl is not here flirting with some

kind of metaphysical idealism, which would deny the natural being of

the rock on the grounds that it has not been constituted. On the con-

trary, it is only because we are presently able to project the horizon

within which such an entity could make an appearance that it is indeed

a real and not merely an em pty possibility.

...anything whatever which exists in reality but it not yet actually

experienced can become given and this means that the thing in

question belongs to the undetermi ned but d e t e r m i n a b l e horizon of

my experiential actuality at the particular time. ( Ideas L w 47, 89/

107)

The possible ob ject in the primar y sense of possible is the object whose

appearance has been prepared for or cons true d in advance ( im voraus

au fge fa s s t , CM, w 19, 83/45) of its appearance. It is no t an e/np ty,

merely logical possibility but a concrete, motivated possibility, one

which has been predelineated with respect to what Husserl calls its

essential type (Wesens t ypus , I deas I , w 47, 90/107).. This predelin-

eared type is the phenomenological a priori which renders future ex-

perience possible, and inde ed which renders present experience possible

inasmuch as it too was prepared for on the basis of a prior experience.

This is no Kantian a priori, however, for it is an a priori which has been

drawn from or motivated by experience, and which is subject to on-

going temporal revisions, as former present horizons are f'flled or

frustrated and new ones opened up.

 

166

Such concrete, predelineated possibilities are then entirely different

in kind from the merely empty, logical possibility of, say, a world

which would be entirely different than ours, which would be possible

only in the sense that it involves no formal contradiction. For it is im-

possible to say anything more about such a world, for which we have

no projective interpretation, no motivated predelineation. It is interest-

ing to see, then, t hat Husserl in fact holds to something like a fusion

of horizons theory. He insists that if the notion of something oth er

anot her form of life, say., or anoth er world - is to make an y sense, it

must be possible in principle to locate such a thing somewhere on the

outer horizonal limits of actual experience. He writes:

...what is cognizable by one Ego must, of essential necess ity, be

cognizable by any Ego. Even though it is not in fac t the case that

each stands, or can stand, in a relationship of emp at hy, of

mutual understanding with every other, as, e.g., not having such

relationship to mental lives living on the planets of the remotest

stars, nevertheless there exist, eidetically regarded, essential possi-

bi l i t ies of e f fect ing a mutual understanding and therefore possi-

bilities also that the worlds of experience separated in fact becom e

joined by concatenations of actual experience to make up the one

intersubjective world... Ideas L w 48, 90/108)

There must be a certain poin t of assimilability, tha t is, of a predelinea-

tion which, in however an inadequate way, prepares us to understand a

novel experience, after which, of course we would then be in a position

to revise our subesequent expectations. Whence a dialogue with an

extra-terrestial consciousness must be prepared for by actual experi-

ence, that is, by assimilating the objects of its experience to the hori-

zons which are familiar to us, while at the same time revising these hori-

zons on the basis of the novelities of the other experience. Thus gradu-

ally, by a back and forth movement between assimilation and revision,

carried ou t on bot h sides of th e dialogue, a chain of experiences would

be constituted which would link one experience with the other within

the u nit y o f a single world.

And that makes non-sense, or what Husserl here calls quite precisely

material counter-sense sachlicher Widersinn), out of the hypothesis

of a world of experi ence which is entirely hetero geneou s to ours. Such

a world is not a formal absurdity Unsinn) , the way a square circle is a

 

167

c o n t r a d i c t o r y n o t i o n , b u t i t i s a m a t e r i a l c o u n t e r - s e n se i n a s m u c h a s i t

m a k e s n o r e a l , m a t e r i a l , s u b s t a n t i v e s e n se . O u r p o w e r s o f p r o j e c t i v e

t h o u g h t , o f h o r i z o n a l p r e d e l i n e a t i o n , b r e a k d o w n b e f o r e i t a n d w e f 'm d

o u r se l v es c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a m e r e l y t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o b j e c t - X , a s

K a n t p u t i t, a n o b j e c t t o w h i c h w e c a n g iv e n o p o s s ib l e s h a p e , w h i c h w e

c a n n o t p r e f ig u r e , tr a c e o r s k e tc h o u t b e f o r e h a n d in e v e n t h e r e m o t e s t

w a y , b y m e a n s o f e v e n t h e l i g h t e s t t ra c e s :

W h e n t h a t i s t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t , t h e f o r m a l - l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i ty o f

r e a l i ti e s o u t s i d e t h e w o r l d , t h e one s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l w o r l d , w h i c h

is f i x e d b y o u r a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e , m a t e r i a l l y p r o v es t o b e a c o u n -

t e r s e n se . I f t h e r e a r e a n y w o r l d s , a n y r e a l p h y s i c a l t h i n g s w h a t e v e r ,

t h e n t h e e x p e r i e n c e d m o t i v a t i o n s c o n s t it u t in g t h e m m u s t b e able

t o e x t e n d i n t o m y e x p e r i e n c e a n d i n t o t h a t o f e a c h E g o i n t h e

g e n e r a l m a n n e r c h a r a c t e r i z e d a b ov e . Ideas 1, w 4 8 , 9 0 - 9 1 / 1 0 8 -

1 0 9 )

H u s s e rl a l so l in k s h is t h e o r y o f p r e o b j e c t i v e p r e d e l i n e a t i o n a n d o f

e x p l i c a t i v e a n a l y s is t o a t h e o r y o f a c t u a l a n d p o t e n t i a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s .

I n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t a w h o l e c o m p o s e d o f a c tu a l it i e s, b u t a

c o m p o s i t e o f t h e a c t u a l a n d t h e p o t e n t i a l , t h a t i s, t h e f o c a l a n d th e

h o r i z o n a l . W h i le c o n s c i o u s n e s s is a c t u a l l y t u r n e d t o w a r d s zugewende t )

a n o b j e c t , t h e r e r e m a i n s a w h o l e f i el d o f p o t e n t i a l o r in a c t u a l inak-

tuell) c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h a t i s , o f w h a t i s p o t e n t i a l l y o r i m p l i c i t l y i n -

t e n d e d . A c t u a l i n t e n t i o n s a r e s u r r o u n d e d b y a h a l o o f p o t e n t i a l o n es .

T h e a c t u al , w a k i n g e g o is e n s c o n c e d b y a h o s t o f p o t e n t i a l i n t e h t i o n a l-

i t i e s ldeas I, w 3 5 ) . F o r t h e r e a r e a l w a y s li n es r e a c h i n g o u t f r o m t h e

t h e m a t i c o b j e c t t o t h e f i e l d t o w h i c h i t b e l o n g s , e v e n a s t h e r e a r e , o n

t h e s id e o f t h e s u b j ec t , a c t s t o w h i c h t h e e g o c a n s w i t c h i n o r d e r t o

a c t i v a t e t h e s e p o s si b il i ti e s . T h e e g o c a n a l w a y s a l t e r t h e r a y o f m e n t a l

a t t e n ti v e n e s s , t h e b e a m o f in t e n t i o n a l r e g a r d Blickstrahl, lde as I, w 9 2 ,

1 8 9 / 2 2 2 ) , a w a y f r o m t h e o b j e c t a n d t o w a r d s t h e h o r i z o n , e v e n a s i t ca n

a l te r i ts o w n m o d a l i t y f r o m p e r c e p t i o n t o m e m o r y o r im a g i n a ti o n . I t

c a n b u r y i t s e l f in a m a t t e r o f u r g e n t c o n c e r n o r d i se n g a g e i t s e l f r e f le c -

t i v e l y f r o m i t in o r d e r t o s u r v e y i ts p r o p e r t i e s ( w 5 0 ) .

I n w 1 15 H u s s e r l e x p a n d s t h e n o t i o n o f a n a c t t o i n c l u d e a d i s t in c -

t i o n b e t w e e n a c t s w h i c h a r e a c t u a l l y c a r r i e d o u t vo ll zogener A k t ) and

a c t s w h i c h ar e m e r e l y s t i r r in g Aktregung) . The c o g i t o i n th e p r o p e r

s e n s e i s e x p l ic i t i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , t h a t i n w h i c h t h e e g o a c t u a l l y l iv e s, b u t

 

1 6 8

t h i s is t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a c t s w h i c h a r e a l iv e b e f o r e w e k n o w i t :

E . g . a b e l i e f , a n a c t u a l b e l i e f , i s a r o u s e d regt sich); w e a l r e a d y

b e li e ve b e f o r e w e k n o w i t. S i m i la r ly , u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,

p o s i t i n g o f l i k i n g s o r d i s l i k i n g s , d e s i r i n g s , e v e n r e s o l v e s , a re a l r e a d y

a li ve b e f o r e w e l i v e i n t h e m , b e f o r e w e e f f ec t t h e c o g i t o p r o p e r ,

b e f o r e t h e E g o i s a c t iv a t e d j u d g i n g l y , l i k i n g l y , d e s i ri n g l y , w i ll i n g ly .

ldeasL w 1 1 5 , 2 3 6 / 2 7 3 )

T h e c o g i t o i n t h e p r o p e r s e n se i s t h e e x p l i ci t i n t e n t i o n a l i t y o f w a k e f u l

c o n s c i o u s n es s , b u t t h e n o t i o n o f c o n s c i o u s a c t m u s t b e b r o a d e n o u g h t o

i n c l u d e n o n - e x p l i c i t , p r e - t h e m a t i c a c t s . A n d t h a t o f c o u r s e i s a s i g n i f i -

c a n t e x p a n s i o n o f t h e t e r m , f o r i t c o n f i rm s w h a t w e h a v e a ll a lo n g b e e n

a r g u i n g , t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e o f p r i n c i p l e s h a s n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h r e s t r i ct -

i n g o u r s el v e s t o t h e m o m e n t a r y , t h e a c t u a l, t h e p r e s e n t. R a t h e r i t e n-

j o i n s u s t o u n d e r s t a n d b o t h o b j e c t a n d a c t i n t h e b r o a d e s t s e n se , a n d

h e n c e t o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e p o t e n t i a l, i m p l i c i t a n d t a c i t s tr u c t u r e s

w h i c h a r e a t w o r k i n c o n s c i o u s l if e . W e a l r e a d y l iv e i n c e r t a i n b e l i e f s ,

w e a r e a l r e a d y c o g n i z a n t o f c e r t a in o b j e c t s , l o n g b e f o r e t h e y a r e p i c k e d

o u t b y t h e s e a rc h i n g r a y o f a t te n t i v e re g a rd . A n d t h a t m e a n s t h a t t h e

w o r k o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y f o r H u s se r l i s e s s en t ia l ly a t a s k of Auslegung,

o f l a y i n g - o u t a n d u n f o l d i n g , t h e i m p l i c i t d i m e n s i o n s w h i c h m a k e e x -

p l i c i t i n t e n t i o n a l i t y p o s s i b l e .

3 . H e i d e g g e r 's h e r m e n e u t i c a l

ph nom nology

I w a n t n o w t o s h o w t h a t H e i d e ~ e r ' s h e r m e n e u t i c p h e n o m e n o l o g y

t u r n s u p o n H u s s e r l' s d i s c o v e ry o f th e s p h e r e o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l f o re -

s t r u c t u r e s . H u s s e r l 's n o t i o n o f a p r e d e l i n e a t e d h o r i z o n i s o f d e c i si v e i m -

p o r t a n c e t o H e i d e g g e r' s n o t i o n o f p r o j e c t iv e u n d e r s t a n d i n g

entwerfen-

des Verstehen); t h e H u s s e r l i a n Vorzeichnung m a k e s t h e H e i d e g g e r i a n

Vorstruktur

p o s s ib l e. H e r m e n e u t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

Auslegung)

h a s a

p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e i n i n t e n t i o n a l e x p l ic a t i o n Auslegung). H e n c e w e

w a n t t o s h o w t h a t H u s s e rl 's p h e n o m e n o l o g y is a t b o t t o m a l r e a d y a

p r o t o - h e r m e n e u t i c s , a l r ea d y a p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s w h i c h

i n f ' f l t r a t e a n d c o n d i t i o n t h e m a t i c a c t s . A n d t h a t i s a t l e a s t a s u r p r i s i n g

t h i n g t o s a y o f t h i s p h i l o s o p h e r o f p r e s u p p o s i ti o n l e s sn e s s , a n d u n d e r -

l in e s t h e q u e s t i o n w h i c h w e r a is e d a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t hi s s t u d y

 

1 6 9

a b o u t t h e t r u e li n e o f s e p a r at i o n b e t w e e n H e i d e g g e r a n d H u s s e rl - t o

w h i c h w e w i l l r e t u r n i n t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h i s es s a y .

H e i de g g er 's e m p l o y m e n t o f a h e r m e n e u t i c p h e n o m e n o l o g y i n

Being and Time w e n t h a n d in h a n d w i t h t h e e x i s t en t i a l m a k e - u p o f

t h e b e i n g w h i c h h e c a l l e d D a s e i n . H e m a k e s t h i s p l a i n i n t h e h i g h l y

s i g n if i ca n t m e t h o d o l o g i c a l r ef l e c ti o n s c o n t a i n e d i n w 6 3 . H e r m e n e u t i c

p h e n o m e n o l o g y , h e w r i t e s t h e r e , m u s t h a v e t h e c h a r a c t e r o f a p r o j e c -

t i o n o f t h e p r i m o r d i a l B e i n g o f D a s e i n w h i c h c u t s t h r o u g h t h e c o n c e al -

m e n t s u n d e r w h i c h D a s e i n 's B e i ng i s b u r i e d b y t h e p u b l i c i n t e rp r e t a -

t i o n o f D a s e i n . A n d t h i s p r o j e c t i o n , h e sa y s , i s n e c e s s a r i ly o f a v i o l e n t

c h a r a c t e r :

D a s e i n ' s

kind of Being

t h u s

demands

t h a t a n y o n t o l o g i c a l I n t e r -

p r e t a t i o n w h i c h s e ts it s e l f t h e g o a l o f e x h i b it i n g t h e p h e n o m e n a i n

t h e i r p r i m o r d i a l i t y ,

should capture the Being of this entity, in

spite of this entity s own tendency to cover things up. E x i s t e n t i a l

a n a ly s i s, t h e r e f o r e , c o n s t a n t l y h a s t h e c h a r a c t e r o f d o i n g v i o l e n c e

(Gewaltsamkeit), w h e t h e r t o t h e c l a im s o f t h e e v e r y d a y i n t e r p r e t a -

t i o n , o r t o i t s c o m p l a c e n c y a n d i t s t r a n q u i l l i z e d o b v i o u s n e s s . W h i le

i n d e e d t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s s p e c i a l ly d is t i n c t i v e o f t h e o n t o l o g y o f

D a s ei n , it b e l o n g s t o a n y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , b e c a u s e t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g

w h i c h d e v e l o p s in I n t e r p r e t a t i o n h a s t h e s t r u c t u r e o f a p r o j e c t i o n .

( SZ , w 6 3 , 3 1 1 - 1 2 / 5 9 )

F o r H e id e g ge r h e r m e n e u t i c p r o j e c t io n is t h e c o u n t e r - m o v e m e n t o f

e x i s t e n t i a l f a ll e n n e s s. D a s e i n t e n d s , b y t h e n a t u r a l m o m e n t u m o f f al l en -

h e s s , t o d r i f t o u t s i d e o f a p r o p e r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d t o i n t e r p r e t it -

s e l f i n t h e l i g ht o f t h e p u b l i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I t t e n d s t o c o n s t r u e it s

o b v i o u s n e ss o f w h a t t h e y s a y. T h e t a s k o f h e r m e n e u t i c s , a s H e i d e g g e r

s e es i t , i s t o c o u n t e r t h i s e x i s t e n t i a l d r if t , t o r e v e rs e t h i s m o v e m e n t , a n d

h e n c e t o b r e a k t h e h o l d o f f al l en n e s s:

T h e l a y in g - b ar e o f D a s e i n' s p r im o r d i a l b e i n g m u s t r a t h e r b e

wrested f r o m D a s e in b y f o l lo w i n g t h e opposite course f r o m t h a t

t a k e n b y t h e f a ll in g o n t ic o - o n t o l o g i c a l t e n d e n c y o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .

( SZ , w 6 3 , 3 1 1 / 3 5 9 )

T h u s w e s ee h o w H e i d e g g e r h a s e n li s t e d a fu n d a m e n t a l l y H u s s e r li a n

 

1 7 0

n o t i o n , t h a t t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g i s t o k n o w h o w t o p r o j e c t i t i n

t h e f i g h t t e r m s , i n t h e s e r v ic e o f a n e x i s t e n t i a l a n d K i e r k e g a a r d i a n p r o -

g r a m : t o r e v e r s e t h e m o v e m e n t o f f a ll e n n e ss a n d t o r e c o v e r D a s e i n in i ts

a u t h e n t i c B e in g . L e t u s in v e s ti g a te n o w j u s t h o w t h e n o t i o n o f p r o j e c -

t i o n a n d f o r e - s t r u c t u r e f u n c t i o n i n Being and Time. T h e n w e w i l l b e i n

a p o s i t i o n t o c o n t r a s t t h e H e i d e g g e r i a n a n d H u s s e r l i a n n o t i o n s .

P r o j e c t i o n ( E n t w u r f ) i s t h e f u n d a m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e o f u n d e r s t a n d -

ing ( Verstehen ) in B eing an d Time: t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g i s t o p r o -

j e c t i t a r i g h t , t h a t i s, i n t e r m s o f t h e h o r i z o n w h i c h is a p p r o p r i a t e t o i t.

W h e n c e t h e H u s s e r li a n n o t i o n o f h o r i z o n is e q u i v a le n t f o r H e i d e g g e r

t o t h e B e i ng , o r m o d e o f B e in g (Seinsart), o f t h e e n t i ty . B y m e a n s o f

i t s p r o j e c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g D a s e i n is a b l e t o c a s t a b e i n g i n a c e r t a i n

l i g h t, t o s i t u a t e it w i t h i n a s u i ta b l e f r a m e w o r k . T h e E n g l i sh c a s t

s e e m s t o m e t h e r i g h t w o r d h e r e , f o r i t o p e r a t e s w i t h i n t h e r u l e o f t h e

s a m e m e t a p h o r : t o t h r o w o r th u r s t a t h i n g i n t o a c e r t a i n h o r i z o n a l

f r a m e w o r k (wer fen = c a s t, h u r l ) . T h e f i r s t t a s k o f Being and T ime t h e n

i s t o m a k e t h e r i g h t p r o j e c t i v e m o v e w i t h r e s p e c t t o D a s e i n , t o c a s t

D a s e i n i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e t e r m s , t o p r o j e c t th i s b e i n g u p o n t h e B e i n g

w h i c h l e t s i t b e w h a t i t is . B u t t h i s ra i s es t h e f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n a s t o h o w

w e a r e t o s e t tl e u p o n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e p r o j e c t io n . H e i d e g g e r h i m s e l f

p o s e s t h i s p r o b l e m w i t h a l l d e s i r a b l e c l a r i ty :

W h e r e a r e o n t o l o g i c a l p r o j e c t s t o g e t t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e i r f in d -

i n gs a re p h e n o m e n a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e ? O n t o l o g i c a l I n t e r p r e t a t i o n

p r o j e c t s t h e e n t i t y p r e s e n t e d t o i t u p o n t h e B e in g w h i c h is t h a t

e n t i t y ' s o w n , s o a s t o c o n c e p t u a l i z e i t w i t h r e g a r d t o i ts s t r u c tu r e .

W h e r e a r e t h e s i g n p o s ts t o d i r e c t t h e p r o j e c t i o n , s o t h a t B e i n g w i l l

b e r e a c h e d a t al l? ( S Z , w 6 3 , 3 1 2 / 3 5 9 )

B y w h a t i s o n t o l o g i c a l p r o j e c t i o n guided and regulated ( i b i d . ) ? H o w

a r e w e t o k n o w w h e n w e h a v e se i z ed a n e n t i t y i n it s p r im o r d i a l i t y ?

T h e a n s w e r t o t h i s q u e s t i o n i s d i s c o n c e r t i n g i n i ts s i m p l i c i t y ; w e a r e

all along p o s s e ss e d o f t h e a p p r o p r i a t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f D a s e i n ; th i s is

s o m e t h i n g w h i c h w e a l r e a d y u n d e r s t a n d , e v e n i f w e h a v e n e v e r c o n-

c e i v e d i t a n d p u t i t i n t o w o r d s . H e n c e i t is a t t h i s c r u c i a l j u n c t u r e t h a t

H e i d e g g e r i n v o k e s t h e d y n a m i c s o f t h e h e r m e n e u t i c c ir c le , w h i c h m e a n s

t h a t h e w i ll i n a c e r t a i n s en s e p r e s u p p o s e t h a t w h i c h is t o b e d e m o n -

s t r a t e d b y t h e h e r m e n e u t i c a n a l y s i s . A n d i t is a t t h i s p o i n t a l s o, I w a n t

t o i n s is t, t h a t h i s h e r m e n e u t i c a l c i rc l e t a k e o n a p r o f o u n d l y H u s s e r li a n

 

171

s e n s e . H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t i s t h a t w e c a n a c h i e v e p r i m o r d i a l i t y o n l y i f

w e a re a l re a d y p o s s e s s e d o f a p r i m o r d i a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H e n c e t h e t a s k

o f h is h e r m e n e u t i c p h e n o m e n o l o g y is n o t t o p r o p o s e s o m e t h i n g n e w

b u t t o e x p l i c a t e , b r i n g t o t h e s u r f a c e , o r l a y o u t aus-legen) a n u n d e r -

s t a n d i n g w i t h w h i c h w e a r e a l r e a d y e q u i p p e d . W e a l w a y s a n d a l r e a d y

m o v e a b o u t w i t h i n a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e B e i ng o f D a s e in , a n d i n d e e d

o f B e i n g a t l a r g e SZ, w 2 , 5 / 2 5 ) , a n d t h e t a s k o f h e m e n e u t i c p h e n o m -

e n o l o g y i s t o r a is e t h i s p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g u p t o t h e l e v e l o f a n o n t o l o g i -

c a l c o n c e p t . H e n c e Being and Time o p e n s w i t h a c r u c i a l d e c i s i o n : t o

p r o j e c t D a s e in u p o n t h e h o r i z o n o f e x i s t e n c e ( S Z , w 4 , 1 2 /3 2 - 3 3 ) ,

w h i c h is fo r H e i d e g g er n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n m a k i n g a n e x p l i c i t c o n c e p t o f

a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n w h i c h w e a ll a l re a d y s u b s is t . T h e c i r c u l a r i ty o f t h e

h e r m e n e u t i c c i r c l e is i n n o c e n t o f a n y f o r m a l fa l l ac y , f o r i t r e f e r s t o t h e

m o v e m e n t f r o m a n i m p l i c i t u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o a n e x p l i c i t c o n c e p t . A l l

t h e d i l e m m a s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e h e r m e n e u t i c c i rc l e a re s o l v ed i n p r i n-

c i p le b y r e c o g n i z i n g t h e r o l e o f t h i s s i m p l e , a n d q u i t e H u s s e r l i a n s tr a t e -

g y , v iz . o f t h e l o g i c o f i m p l i c i t a n d e x p l i c i t. I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t o m e t h a t

t h i s s am e p o i n t h a s b e e n n o t i c e d b y J a c q u e s D e r ri d a , a l t h o u g h f o r

r e a so n s o f h i s o w n ( m i s g u i d e d o n e s in m y o p i n i o n ) , h e t a k e s t h i s t o b e a

c r i ti c i s m o f b o t h H e i d e g g e r a n d H u s s e r l :

. . . t h e p r o c e s s o f d i s e n g a g i n g o r o f e l a b o r a t i n g t h e q u e s t i o n o f

B e i n g , a s a q u e s t i o n o f t h e meaning o f B e i n g , i s d e f i n e d a s a

making expl ic i t o r a s a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t m a k e s e x p l i c i t . T h e

r e a d in g o f t h e t e x t D a s e in i s a h e r m e n e u t i c s o f u n v e i l in g o r o f d e-

v e l o p m e n t ( s e e s e c. 7 ). I f o n e l o o k s c l o s e l y , i t is t h e p h e n o m e n o l o =

g ic al o p p o s i t i o n i m p l i c i t / e x p l i c i t t h a t p e r m i t s H e i d e ig g e r t o

r e j e c t t h e o b j e c t i o n o f t h e v i c i o u s c i rc l e, t h e c i rc l e t h a t c o n s i s t s o f

t i o n o f B e i n g o n t h e b a si s o f t h is o n t o l o g i c a l p r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n

( p . 2 7 ) . T h i s s t y l e o f a r e a d i n g w h i c h m a k e s e x p l i c i t , p r a c ti c e s a

c o n t i n u a l b r i n g i n g t o l i g h t , s o m e t h i n g w h i c h r e s e m b l e s , a t l e a st , a

c o m i n g i n t o c o n s c i o u sn e s s , w i t h o u t b r e a k , d i s p l a c e m e n t o r c h a n g e

o f t e r r a in . 9

T h e h e r m e n e u t i c s t r a t e g y o f Being and Time i s t o t a p i n t o t h e o p e r a -

t i v e , p r e - t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n w h i c h w e a l r e a d y l i v e . T h a t t a p -

p i n g t a k e s t h e f o r m o f a n a n t i c i p a t o r y p r o j e c t i o n o f D a s e i n 's B e i n g ( a n d

o f B e i n g i n g e n e r a l) w h i c h r e s e m b l e s n o t h i n g s o m u c h a s H u s s e rl 's

 

1 7 2

n o t i o n o f V o r z e i c h n u n g , w h i l e t h e t a s k o f l a y i n g t hi s o u t i n a n e x p l i c i t

o n t o l o g y re s e m b l e s n o t h in g s o m u c h a s H u s s e r l 's e x p l i c a t i v e a n a ly s is .

H e i d e g g e r o f c o u r s e i s a w a r e t h a t . . . w e h a v e n o f i g h t t o r e s o r t t o

d o g m a t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n s a n d t o a p p l y j u s t a n y i d e a o f B e i n g a n d ac t u a l-

i t y t o t h is e n t i t y , n o m a t t e r h o w ' s e lf - e v id e n t ' t h a t i d e a m a y b e . . . i n i t-

s e l f a n d f r o m i t s e lf . ( S Z , w 5, 1 6 / 3 7 ) T h a t is w h y h e h a s r e c o u r s e t o

t h e h e r m e n e u t i c f o r e - s t ru c t u r e s - f o r e- h a v in g Vor -habe ) , f o r e - s i g h t

Vor - s i ch t ) a n d f o r e - c o n c e p t i o n Vor-gr i f f ) - w h i c h t o g e t h e r m a k e u p

t h e h e r m e n e u t i c s i t u a t i o n ( w 4 5 , 2 3 2 / 2 8 7 5 ) . T h is t h r e e - f o l d f o r e-

s t r u c t u r e is i n t r o d u c e d a s a w a y o f s e c u ri n g o u r h e r m e n e u t i c a l b e a r in g s ,

o f s e e in g t o i t t h a t o u r p r o j e c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s n o t c a p r i c i o u s a n d

f r e e - f l o a t in g . I f t h e h e r m e n e u t i c s i t u a t i o n i s s e c u r e d , w e c a n b e a s s u r e d

t h a t w e h a v e t h e e n t i t y a s a w h o l e i n o u r g r a s p ( f o r e - h a v i n g ) , t h a t w e

h a v e s i g h te d i t c o r r e c t ly a s t o i t s m o d e o f B e in g Seinsar t , f o r e - s i g h t ) ,

a n d t h a t w e h a v e a s u i t a b ly a r t ic u l a t e t a b l e o f c a t e g o r ie s o r c o n c e p t u a l

f r a m e w o r k w i t h i n w h i c h t o c o n d u c t o u r d i s c o u r s e ( f o r e - c o n c e p t i o n ) .

A s a u n i t t h e s e t h r e e s e e m t o m e t o a m o u n t t o a s p e ll in g o u t a n d d e t ai l-

i n g o f w h a t H u s s e f l c a ll e d t h e V o r z e i c h n u n g w h i c h b r i n g s a n e n t i t y i n t o

v i e w , o r o f t h e h o r i z o n w i t h i n w h i c h i t a p p e a rs . A n d l i k e H u s s e rl

H e i d e g g e r r e g a rd s t h e f o r e - s t ru c t u r e s a s re v i sa b l e - t h e y m a y b e e i t h e r

f i n a l o r p r o v i s i o n vorbeha l t l i ch ) ( S Z , w 3 2 , 1 5 0 / 1 9 1 ) s o t h a t i n H e i d e g -

g e r, H u s s e r l a n d G a d a m e r t h e r e is a c e r t a in b a c k a n d f o r t h m o v e m e n t

b e t w e e n w h a t H e i d e g g e r ca ll s u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n u n t i l

t h e r i g h t f i t f o r t h e f o r e - s t r u c t u r e s i s f o u n d , o r u n t i l t h e V o r z e i c h n u n g

i s a p p r o p r i a t e l y s k e t c h e d .

B u t i f H e i d e g g e r w a n t s t o a v o i d t h e w a n t o n p o s i t i n g o f j u s t a n y p r o -

j e c t i v e f r a m e w o r k a t a ll , h e a l s o w a n t s t o i n s is t t h a t t h e f o r e - s t r u c t u r e s

a r e n o t m e r e l y s o m e t h i n g t o b e t o l e r a t e d , u n a v o i d a b l e l im i t a t i o n s

w h i c h i d e a ll y w e w o u l d d o w i t h o u t . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e f o r e -s t ru c -

t u r e s a r e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y r e q u i s i te , l a c k in g w h i c h w e w o u l d f a c e

t h e s i t u a t io n w h i c h H u s s e r l d e s c r ib e s i n Ideas I a s a m a t e r i a l c o u n t e r -

s e n se , t h a t i s, a n e n t i t y f o r w h i c h w e h a ve n o p r e p a r a t o r y p r e d e l in e a -

t i o n a n d h e n c e , a b o u t w h i c h w e w o u l d l a c k e v e n so m u c h a s a c l u e. T h e

i s s u e is h a r d l y t h e n t o c l e a r a w a y a ll t h e f o r e - s t r u c t u r e s a n d t o s e c u r e

o b j e c t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s le s s n e s s , b u t r a t h e r t o s e e t o i t t h a t o u r p ro -

j e c t i v e f o r e - s t r u c t u r e s a r e f i t t e d a n d s u i t e d t o g a i n u s a c c e s s t o t h e

t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s :

W h a t i s d ec i s iv e is n o t t o g e t o u t o f t h e c i rc l e b u t t o c o m e i n t o it

 

173

in the right way ... In th e circle is hidden a positive possibility of

the most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we genuinely

take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we

have unde rstoo d that our fin'st, last and constan t task is never to

allow our fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception to be pre-

sented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to

make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-

structures in terms of the things themselves. (SZ, w 32, 153/195)

By the time Heidegger reaches w 63 in

Being and T ime

the full

hermeneutic situation for the interpretation of Dasein has been secured.

We have Dasein as a tot ali ty - from birth to deat h - in our grasp (fore-

having). We have gained access to Dasein in its authenticity, and so we

have both an adequate guiding concept of Dasein (fore-sight) and a

table of existentialia with which to articulate that concept (fore-

conception ). Hence Heidegger is prepared to argue in w 65 t hat the

Being of Dasein is temporarity. At that point the main argument of the

existential analytic is consummated and the hermeneutic strategy of

Being and T ime validated. At that point he can claim that the projec-

tion of the Being of Dasein in terms of existence has met with success

and t hat he has been able to let Dasein put itself int o words for the

very first tim e (SZ, w 63, 314/362). At this poin t we ought to be able

to recognize ourselves in the a ccoun t which has been given of Dasein in

Being and T ime . The

work of phenomenological interpretation

Ausle-

flung), of laying out an understand ing in which we already stand by way

of projecting the Being of Dasein in the appropriate way, is brought

to a close.

4 H e i d e g g e r a n d H u s s e r l

Let us now return to the question of the relationship between Husserrs

pure an d Heidegger's hermen eutic phenomenology. It should be

obvious that it is too facile to say that Husserl's is a phenomenology

with out presupposi tions while Heidegger's is a phe nome nol ogy in

search of the right presuppositions. For whatever truth there is to this

familiar claim, it is perfe ctly clear that Husserl's theo ry o f intentional-

it3' turns on a theory of anticipatory predelineation. Far from differing

on this point, Heideggerian and Husserlian phenomenology are in fact

 

1 7 4

i n a g r e e m e n t t h a t p e r c e p t i o n o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g m u s t a lw a y s b e g u i d e d

b e f o r e h a n d b y a p r e p a r a t o r y g r a sp o f w h a t i s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d , f a il in g

w h i c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s l e f t d i s o r i e n t e d a n d c u t a d r i f t , u n a b l e t o s e i z e

t h e m a t t e r a t h a n d . W e re c o n s c i o u s n e s s u n a b l e t o s k e t c h o u t b e f o r e -

h a n d t h e m a i n l i n es o f w h a t i s t o b e p e r c ei v e d , t h e n p e r c e p t i o n w o u l d

b r e a k d o w n a n d i t w o u l d b e le f t w i t h a c h a o s o f u n i n t e r p r e ta b l e , u n -

i n t e n d e d h y l e t i c d a t a . W e r e D a s e i n n o t e q u i p p e d w i t h a p r o j e c t i v e

u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e e n t i t y t o b e i n t e r p r e t a t e d , i t t o o w o u l d b e l e f t

a d r if t a n d w o u l d n e e d t o h a v e re c o u rs e t o t h e m o s t c o m m o n p l a c e a n d

p u b l i c l y a v a i la b le f r a m e w o r k o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , l e st i t u n d e r s t a n d

n o t h i n g a t a ll . T h a t is w h y H u s s er l t o o c a n m a k e h i s o w n t h e f o l l o w i n g

t e x t f r o m Being and Time i f w e r e a d p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s i n t h e s e n se o f

a n t i c i p a t o r y p r e d e l i n e a t i o n :

P h i l o s o p h y w i l l n e v e r se e k t o d e n y i t s p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s b u t n e i t h e r

m a y i t s i m p l y a d m i t t h e m . I t c o n c e i v e s t h e m , a n d it u n f o l d s w i t h

m o r e a n d m o r e p e n e t r a t i o n b o t h t h e p r e s u p p o s i ti o n s t h e m s e lv e s

a n d t h a t f o r w h i c h t h e y a r e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . ( S Z , w 6 2 , 3 1 0 / 3 5 8 )

A n d t h a t t o o is w h y t h e w o r k o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y f o r b o t h H u s s er l

a n d H e i d e g g e r i s e x p l i c a t i v e : u n f o l d i n g , e x p l i c a t i n g , l a y i n g o u t t h e i m -

p l i c it h o r i z o n s w h i c h m a k e e x p l i c i t e x p e r i e n c e p o s s ib l e . P h e n o m e n o l -

o g y f o r b o t h i s t h e subtilitas explicandi. F o r b o t h p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l

w o r k l ie s in u n f o l d i n g t h e h o r i z o n s w i t h i n w h i c h e n ti t ie s o r o b j e c t

a p p e a r . D e r r i d a w a s q u i t e r i g h t t o s a y t h a t i n H u s s e r l a n d H e i d e g g e r

e v e r y t h i n g t u r n s o n t h e l o g ic o f i m p l i c it a n d e x p l i ci t , w h i c h is w h y

t h e r e i s n o t h i n g v i c i o u s i n t h e c i rc u l ar l o g ic o f p h e n o m e n o l o g y .

B u t i f a l l t h i s is s o, t h e n h o w a r e w e t o d r a w t h e l i n es o f d i f f e r e n c e

b e t w e e n H u s s e rl a n d H e i d e g g e r, a n d w h a t h a s b e c o m e o f H u s s e r l' s

r e p e a t e d i n s i st e n c e o n p r e s u p p o s i ti o n l e s s n e ss ? I f u p t o n o w I h av e

a r g u e d a g a i n s t t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i t i s b e c a u s e I t a k e i t t o b e , as i t st a n d s ,

t o o f a c il e a n d g l o b a l a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n . I a m p r e p a r e d t o r e i n s t a t e i t ,

h o w e v e r , i n a m o r e r e s t r i c t e d a n d q u a l i f i e d s e n s e.

F o r i n H e i d e g g e r t h e p r o j e c t i v e c h a r a c te r o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s it -

s e lf r o o t e d i n t h e m o r e p r o f o u n d o n t o l o g i c a l m a k e - u p o f D a se i n ; i t

r e f l e c t s t h e B e i n g o f D a s e i n a s c a r e , e x i s t e n c e a n d t e m p o r a l i t y ( a n

o n t o l o g y w h i c h , d e s p i t e t h e p r o t e s t s o f t h e H e i d eg g e r ia n s t o t h e c o n -

t r a r y , H e i d e g g e r la r g e ly i n h e r i t e d f r o m K i e r k e g a a r d ) . W h e n c e t h e

h e r m e n e u t i c c i r c l e w a s it s e l f r o o t e d i n t h e B e i n g o f D a s e i n a s c a r e :

 

175

What common sense wishes to eliminate in avoiding the circle, on

the supposition that it is measuring up to the loftiest rigour of

scientific investigation, is nothing less than the basic structure of

care. Because it is primordially constituted by care, any Dasein is

already ahead o f itself. As being, it has in every case already pro-

ject ed itself upo n def'mite possibilities of its existence; and in such

existential projections has, in a pre-ontological manner, also pro-

jected something like existence and Being. Like a l l research the

research which wants to develop and conceptualize that kind of

Being which belongs to existence is itself a kind of Being which

disclosive Dasein possesses; can such research be denied this pro-

ject ing which is essential to Dasein? (SZ, w 63, 31 5/3 63)

The projective character of understandin g for Heidegger is a function o f

the Being of Dasein as a project. The understandin g of Dasein proceeds

by way of a projective predelineation because the Being of Dasein is

being-ahead-of-itself. We said above that Heidegger's conception of

hermeneutics went hand in hand with an ontology of Dasein as exis-

tence. And we pointed out that for Heidegger hermeneutics was the

counter-part, the reverse movement, of an existential drift towards

fallenness, and hence that for Heidegger herme neut ic projectio n always

required a certain violence, that is, an effort to resist the drift and pull

of the common place presuppositions o f average everydayness.

Now because the phenomenological structure of projection is situ-

ated within the ontological structure of care, it follows first of all that

the very notion of presuppositionlessness is an ontological paradox for

Heidegger. To acquire presuppositionlessness Dasein would p er i m-

poss ib i le have to undergo a change in Being so that it would no longer

be Dasein but something else which is neither futural nor projective.

It furthermore follows, according to the basic meaning of care, that

Dasein is thrust or t hrown into its presuppositions, for care is thrown as

well as projective, factical as well as existential. Hence Dasein always

moves about within a certain historically situated, factical understand-

ing, or rather pre-understanding, from which it neither can nor wants

to extricate itself. And that is the point of departure for Gadamer's

extension of B e i n g a n d T i m e i n the direction of a philosophical

In the case of Husserl, however, this Kierkegaardian existential

ontology of care is nowhere to be found. Husserl makes no effort to

 

176

root the analysis of predelineation in an ontological subsoil. It is his

intention that the theory of Vorzeichnung indeed the entirety of

phenomenological theory, be ontologically innocent and unencumb ered

with ontological presuppositions. Phenome nolo gy ought to have a more

straightforward descriptive sense; it ought to arise only from the

laborious work of phenomenological reflection and have no part in a

larger ontological program. Husserl thinks that the reflective life of the

phenomenological ego can make its way without ontological guidance,

and hence that the discovery of intentional predelineation is not itself

ontologically predelineated but is ontologically neutral.

Now at last the issue between Heidegger and Husserl is out in the

open. It has to do with the question of ontological presuppositions, not

with t he co ncret e life of the worldly ego (=Being-in-the-world). I do n ot

see that there is any serious difference between Heidegger and Husserl

on the question of the projectiveness of intentional life, of its depen-

dence upon anticipatory structures in order to make its way around the

world. The real issue arises on the level of wheth er or not this phenom -

enological accou nt harbors within it an ontological view. And of course

Husserl contends that it need not and does not.

But Heidegger questions whether in fact Husserl succeeds in this, or

whether the commitment to ontological presuppositionlessness does

not itself conceal within it a certain on tology, a certain way of under-

standing the Being of consciousness, the Sein of Bewusstsein. Heideg-

ger thinks that at this point Husserl wants to walk on water. He thinks

that every attempt to proceed without ontological bias ends up being

subverted from behind by an ontological presupposition which is at

work on it behind its back. Thus for Heidegger the veryattempt to pro-

ceed without ontological guidance is itself inspired by a certain ontol-~

ogy, viz., a Cartesian ontology which supposes the separability of

reflective consciousness from concr ete f trst-order experience which is

embe dded in language, historical traditio n and cult ure. Husserl does not

deny - in fact he clearly explicates the fact - that first-order intent ion-

al acts are inhabited by a ring of presuppositions which make them

possible. Tha t is his express teaching. His difference with Heidegger has

to do with the capacity of consciousness to effect a second-order,

reflective extrication from such conditioned and predelineated under-

standing. Husserl wants to hold t hat reflec tive consciousness is con-

ducted under conditions which he precisely denies of ftrst-order ex-

perience. Husserl clings to the ideal that the reflective ego enjoys a

 

177

mode of inten tiona l life - free from potential, implicit, horizonal and

predeli neatory factors - which he otherwise insists belong to the very

make-up of intentional life at large. For Heidegger this is an incon-

sistency which arises from Husserl's ontological presuppositions, that is,

from his a cc e p ta n ce of the possibility of pure reflection, of the ideal of

transcendenta l consciousness, of the separability of reflecting con-

sciousness from first-order experience. That conviction is laden with

ontological deposits and belongs to the meainstream of Western meta-

physics from Plato to Hegel.

The point which the Heideggerian would make here can also be put

as follows. Whenever Husserl undertook to describe the c o n c r e t e func-

tioning of intentional life, he invariably resorted to a hermeneutic

schema; whenever he a c t u a l l y p r ac t i c e d the phenomenological method,

he ascribed to consciousness a hermeneutic, contextualized composi-

tion. The life of the living ego was for him always ringed about by a

border of horizonal structures, always temporally situated within a

stream of protended and retained moments, laced with potential and

implicit structures, all of which make it possible to int erpr et auf-

f a s s e n ) the intenti onal object. The notio n of a presuppositionless grasp-

ing of the intentional object, of grasping it without the support of these

horizonal structures, is unhea rd o f on this level. The idea of presupposi-

tionlessness arises only when Husserl wants to characterize the nature

of phenomenology as a sc ience . At this point he has recourse to the in-

herited idea of a Cartesian science, of an absolutely presuppositionless

beginning. This ideal does not arise from his concre te phenomeno logical

inquiry. Rather it is invoked as a way of settling the ongoing debate

about psychologism, naturalism and historicism. But from the Heideg-

gerian point of view this Cartesian ideal has no phenomenological

credentials. For the Heideggerian, phen omen olo gy not only has a

hermeneutic compon ent; it is i nh e r en t l y hermeneutic, whereas the goal

of presuppositionlessness is a Cartesian import, a residue of the m ode rn

metaphysical tradition which from Descartes on is focussed on the

debate over the idea of tran scendental consciousness.

And so it seems to me that one does in the e n d come back to the

opposi tion of Husserl's presuppositionless pheno meno log y with Heideg-

ger's hermeneutic phenomenology. But one should not begin there.

Rather one should first examine the extensive preparations which are

made in Husserl's epoch-making investigations in Ideas I which opened

up the horizon within which hermeneutic phenomen ology appeared a

little over a decade later.

 

  78

N O T E S

1 . S Z = M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r , Se in und Ze i t 1 0 . A u f l . ( T i i b i n g e n : N i e m e y e r , 1 9 6 3 ) . T h e p a g e

n u m b e r s f o l l o w i n g t h e s l a s h a r e t o t h e E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n Be ing and T ime t r a n s . J o h n

M a c q u a r r i e a n d E d w a r d R o b i n s o n ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r & R o w , 1 9 6 2 ) .

2 . E d m u n d H u s s e rl , Phi lo sophy a s a S t r i c t Sc i ence i n Phenomeno logy and the Cr i s i s o f

Ph i lo sophy t r a n s . Q . L a u e r ( N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r T o r c h b o o k s , 1 9 6 5 ) , p . 1 4 6 .

3 . C M = E d m u n d H u s s e r l , Cartesianische Meditationen in H u a I ; t h e p a g e n u m b e r s f o l l o w i n g

t h e s l as h a re t o t h e E n g l i s h t ra n s l a t i o n : Cartesian M edi tat ions t r a n s . D o r i o n C a i r n s ( T h e

H a g u e : N i j h o f f , 1 9 6 0 ) .

4 . T h i s p o i n t i s m a d e i n S . S t e p h e n H i l m y , T h e S c o p e o f H u s s e r l ' s N o t i o n o f H o r i z o n , T h e

M o d e r n S c h o o l m a n L I X ( N o v e m b e r , 1 9 8 1 ) , p p . 2 1 - 4 8 , t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f h o r i z o n a p pl i e s

n o t o n l y t o p e r c e p t i o n b u t t o i n t e n t i o n a l l if e in g e ne r a l . F o r f u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t io n s i n t o t h e

n o t i o n o f h o r i z o n , se e : H e l m u t K u h n , T h e P h e n o m e n o l o g i e a l C o n c e p t o f ' H o r i z o n ' , i n

M a r v i n F a b e r , e d . , Phi lo sophica l Essays i n Me mor y o f Edm und Husser l ( C a m b r i d g e :

H a r v a r d U n i v . P r e ss , 1 9 4 0 ) , p p . 1 0 6 - 1 2 3 ; C o r n e l i u s v a n P e u r s e n , T h e H o r i z o n , i n F .

E l l i s t o n a n d P . M c C o r m i c k , e d s . , Husserl: E xpos i t ions and Appraisals ( S o u t h B e n d : N o t r e

D a m e : U n i v e r s i t y P r e ss , 1 9 7 7 ), p p . 1 8 2 - 2 0 1 ; H e n r y P i e t e rs m a , T h e C o n c e p t o f H o r i z o n ,

Ana lecta Husserl iana I I ( 1 9 7 2 ) , p p . 2 7 8 - 2 8 2 .

5 . P a u l R i c o e ur h a s p o i n t e d t o Auf fa s sung in t h e Logical Invest igat ions a s a h e r m e n e u t i c

e l e m e n t i n H u s s e r l i a n p h e n o m e n o l o g y ; h e a l s o di s c u ss e s t h e n o t i o n o f Aus l egung b u t w i t h

r e s u l t s w h i c h d i f f e r c o n s i d e r a b l y f r o m o u r s . R i c oe u r d o es n o t d i s cu s s t h e c e n t r a l r o le o f

Forze i chnung . See h i s P h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d H e r m e n e u t ic s , i n J o h n T h o m p s o n , e d . &

t r a n s . , Hermeneu t i c s and the Human Sc i ences ( C a m b r i d g e : U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 8 1 ) , O r .

1 0 1 - 2 2 8 .

6 . H u s s e r l i n s i s t s t h a t t h i s p r o c e s s of Erf i i l lung i s n e v e r f i n i s h e d :

T h i s s e n s e , t h e cog i ta tum qua cog i ta tum i s n e v e r p r e s e n t t o a c t u a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s a s a

f i n i s h e d d a t u m ; i t b e c o m e s c l a r i f i e d o n l y t h r o u g h e x p l i c a t i o n o f t h e g i v e n h o r i z o n

a n d t h e n e w h o r i z o n s c o n t i n u a l l y a w a k e n e d . ( C M , w 1 9 , 8 2 - 8 3 / 4 5 )

7 . R i c o eu r m a k e s t h i s p o i n t q u i t e w e l l i n h is c o m m e n t a r y o n H u s s e r l' s Ideas 1 . See t h e t r a n s -

l a t o r ' s n o t e s t o w w 4 7 - 9 i n Id l e s d i r ec t r i ce s pour une ph~nomeno log ie ( P a r i s : G a l l i m a r d ,

1 9 5 0 ) .

8 . A l l r e f e r e n c e s t o l d e a s l a r e t o H u a I I I / 1 . T h e p a g e c i t a t i o n s a r e t o t h e m a r g i n a l p a g i n a t i o n

o f t h e 1 9 1 3 e d i t i o n , p r e s e r v e d i n t h e H u s s e r l i a na e d i t i o n s , a n d t h e n , f o l l o w i n g t h e s l a s h , t o

t h e E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n : Ideas Per ta in ing to a Pure Pheno meno log y and to a Phenomeno lo -

gical Phi losophy F i r s t B o o k , Genera l In t roduc t ion to Pure Phenom eno logy t r a n s . F r e d

K e r s t e n ( T h e H a g u e : N i j h o f f , 1 9 8 2 ) .

9 . J a c q u e s D e r r i d a , Margins o f P h i lo sophy t r a n s . A l a n B a s s ( C h i c a g o : U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s ,

1 9 8 2 ) , p . 1 2 6 .

1 0 . H a n s - G e o r g G a d a m e r , Wahrhei t und Metho de. GrundzF4ge einer phi losoph ischen Her-

m e n e u t i k 4 . A u f l . ( T i i b i n g e n : M o l ar , 1 9 7 5 ) , e s p e c i a l l y p p . 2 4 0 - 2 5 6 .