capital investments valuation project (1)

118
1 Analyst Disclaimer: All recommendations, opinions, and presentations of financial data within this report is based off the research of Kevin Schmeits, Logan Swartz, and William Haass. Although the analysts have thoroughly and meticulously applied their knowledge to the report, they do not hold any certifications within the financial services industry and therefore have little credibility. It should also be noted that the analyst have no relation to AB InBev or its affiliates.

Upload: logan-swartz

Post on 13-Apr-2017

29 views

Category:

Documents


4 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

1

Analyst Disclaimer:

All recommendations, opinions, and presentations of financial data within this report is

based off the research of Kevin Schmeits, Logan Swartz, and William Haass. Although the

analysts have thoroughly and meticulously applied their knowledge to the report, they do not

hold any certifications within the financial services industry and therefore have little credibility. It

should also be noted that the analyst have no relation to AB InBev or its affiliates.

Page 2: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

2

Table of Contents

Topic Page #

Company and Industry

Executive Summary 10

Business Description 11

Company History

Origins & Acquisitions 12

Lawsuits 13

New Products & Innovation 13

Events Impacting Firm Value 14

SAB Miller Acquisition 14

Products & Competition

Major Products 15

Competitors 19

Competition 20

Market Cap V Competitors 21

Corporate Control

Management 22

Executive Compensation 29

Board of Directors 32

Institutional Share Ownership 34

Looking Forward

Sales & Earnings Estimates 36

Analyst Recommendations 38

Forecasting 39

Page 3: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

3

Topic Page #

Historical Financial Analysis Executive Summary 42

Stock Price Performance

Price V. Competitors 43

Absolute Performance 44

Financial Performance

Growth Performance 45

Financial Performance Metrics 48

DuPont Analysis 50

Altman Z-Score Analysis 53

Page 4: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

4

Topic Page #

Capital Structure Analysis

Executive Summary 56

Cost of Debt & Equity 57

Capital Stack 59

Debt Ratios 60

Beta Calculations 61

Distribution to Shareholders 62

Page 5: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

5

Topic Page #

Financial Statement Forecasts

Executive Summary 65

Pro Forma Parameters and Assumptions 66

Projected Fade Rate Graph Analysis 67

Historical and Pro Forma Ratios

Efficiency Ratios 75

Leverage Ratios 77

Coverage Ratios 78

Profitability Ratios 79

Pro Forma DuPont Analysis 80

Pro Forma Altman Z-Score 80

Page 6: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

6

Topic Page #

Cash Flow Valuation

Executive Summary of Cash Flow Valuation 83

Entity Value 84

Alternative Present Value (APV) 85

Modified Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) 87

Analysis of Cash Flow Valuation 90

Page 7: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

7

Topic Page #

Multiples Valuation Analysis

Executive Summary of Multiples Valuation Analysis 93

Relative Multiples Valuation Analysis 94

Relative Multiples Analysis vs. Comparable Companies 95

Relative Multiples Analysis vs. Comparable Index’s 96

AB InBev Intrinsic Price Calculations 96

In-depth Multiples Analysis 97

Market & Industry Multiple Analysis 100

Page 8: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

8

Topic Page #

Valuation Summary & Conclusion

Introduction to Summary 103

Cash Flow Methods 103

Summary & Analysis of Cash Flow Valuation 104

Summary of Multiple Analysis 105

Final Conclusion 106

Additional Sections

Appendix & Excel Sheets 108

Bibliography 117

Page 9: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

9

Company & Industry

Page 10: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

10

Table of Contents

Company and Industry

Topic Page #

Executive Summary 10

Business Description 11

Company History

Origins & Acquisitions 12

Lawsuits 13

New Products & Innovation 13

Events Impacting Firm Value 14

SAB Miller Acquisition 14

Products & Competition

Major Products 15

Competitors 19

Competition 20

Market Cap V Competitors 21

Corporate Control

Management 22

Executive Compensation 29

Board of Directors 32

Institutional Share Ownership 34

Looking Forward

Sales & Earnings Estimates 36

Analyst Recommendations 38

Forecasting 39

Page 11: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

11

AB InBev’s actual EPS has underperformed against the estimated EPS in 4 out of the last 5 quarters.

As a result of AB InBev consistently underperforming the EPS, industry experts predicted a significant decrease in the stock price. AB InBev surprised investors when it maintained optimism about the company and kept the stock price high.

Executive Summary of Company and Industry

AB InBev has 3 different brand categories; Global brands, International brands and Local brands. Each category consists of beers that has similar marketing and distribution strategies. AB InBev’s global market share based on volume is 20.8%. After the acquisition of SABMiller is finalized, AB InBev’s market share will be over 30% of the global beer market.

The market cap of AB InBev is $203.8 billion while Heineken, another leader in the world beer market, has a market cap of only $49.52 billion.

Analysts currently project that

earnings will improve in upcoming

years, despite falling short in 4 of

the last 5 quarters. AB InBev

plans to grow internally by

improving marketing, beating

market trends, and signing

contracts with major

organizations.

The acquisition of SABMiller is

part of the external growth

strategy.

Page 12: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

12

Business Description

Anheuser-Busch InBev (NYSE: BUD; Euronext: ABI; JSE: ANB; MEXBOL: ABI) is the

leading global brewer and one of the world’s top five consumer product companies.

Operating across 26 countries and employing more than 150,000 people, AB InBev

takes advantage of its size to strive for excellence and grow business year after year.

With an expansive portfolio consisting of over 200 beer brands, AB InBev oversees 19

“billion-dollar” brands, 7 of which are considered part of the top 10 most valuable beer

brands in the world. As a result of the aforementioned statistics, AB InBev is perfectly

aligned with their mission statement to be the “Best beer company bringing people

together for a better world.”

In AB InBev’s 2015 annual report to shareholders, the firm made it abundantly clear that

it intends to be an enduring company, spearheading the industry, for the next 100 years.

A strong indicator of the firm taking steps to stand the test of time was provided with the

delivery of strong organic growth in both top-line and EBITDA in 2015. With a 45%

share of US markets, AB InBev accounts for more sales than craft and imported beers

combined. In an effort to drive year-over-year growth, AB InBev conducts extensive

research to develop a better understanding of consumers’ needs and the occasions

when they enjoy beer and other alcohol beverages. With a brand portfolio as expansive

as AB InBev’s, the company organizes its beer brands into three categories; Global

brands, International brands, and Local Champion brands. The Global brands category

consists of AB InBev’s core brands Budweiser, Corona, and Stella Artois. A tier below

Global brands is the International brands, which focuses on Beck’s, Hoegaarden, and

Leffe. Finally, the Local Champion category consists of approximately 200 brands

boasting names like Michelob, Brahma, Skol, and Modelo.

Growing AB InBev’s global brands has involved leveraging the strength of core brands

Budweiser, Stella Artois, and Corona to form strong connections with consumers

worldwide. For example, Budweiser has sponsored a wide range of diverse events such

as Chinese New Year celebrations and the Made in America music festival. Although a

global brand, AB InBev identified the following regions as their top performing markets;

USA, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Belgium, Germany, UK, China, South Korea.

In these core markets, AB InBev identified sports as a major contributor to revenue and

partnered up with the NFL, NHL, NBA China, and amateur soccer leagues in Brazil and

UK. Despite AB InBev’s strong foundation in these markets, the firm still receives about

two-thirds of volume and over half of revenue and EBITDA from faster-growing

developing markets.

AB InBev drives sustainable growth and remains the leading global brewer due to their

ability to align their marketing, product development, sales and other brand-building

efforts with the main occasions for purchasing and consuming.

Page 13: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

13

Origins & Acquisitions

Anheuser-Busch InBev has roots in the brewing industry dating back more than 600

years at the Den Hoorn brewery in Leuven, Belgium. Once the firm helped pioneer the

Anheuser & Co brewery in St. Louis, Missouri in 1852, it solidified itself as a dominant

force in the industry. 164 years later and the brand is more prevalent than other. In

September 2016, AB InBev acquired competitor SABMiller for $107 billion. The

acquisition will expand AB InBev’s already prominent portfolio of complementary global

and local brands as well as strengthen their position in emerging regions with strong

growth prospects. AB InBev views the acquisition of SABMiller as an opportunity to

become the first true global brewer, a title that will create substantial growth

opportunities and create value to benefit all stakeholders.

Major acquisitions aside, AB InBev has been quietly acquiring smaller brands with

significant growth potential. Since 2011, AB InBev has acquired nine craft brewers and

most recently purchased Boathouse Beverage LLC, which marked AB InBev’s

expansion into carbonated-water alcohol industry. By acquiring Boathouse Beverage

LLC, AB InBev is positioning themselves to become a leader in flavored malt

beverages, a beverage category that increased sales 21% in 3 years.

Page 14: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

14

Lawsuits

When AB InBev was in the process of acquiring SABMiller, a lawsuit consisting of 23

plaintiffs occurred. Plaintiffs claimed the merger, which they considered a monopoly,

would result in loss or damage in the form of higher beer prices and lower quality beer.

When the Department of Justice approved the acquisition, the lawsuit lost all merit.

However, the Department of Justice did restrict AB InBev’s ability to sell beers such as

Miller Lite and Miller High Life in the US. AB InBev has also recently fought and lost

lawsuits that claimed the brand misleads drinkers into paying a premium for beer that

appears to be brewed in Europe, when in reality, the beer is brewed in St. Louis with

Missouri water. AB InBev’s Beck’s brand was the product disputed in the original case,

now the company is dealing with the same issue with their Leuven beer.

New Products & Innovation

With the rise of craft beer in the United States, AB InBev has taken several steps to

compete. Shock Top has received significant funding to satisfy the niche market, and in

2015 Shock Top’s Honeycrisp Apple Wheat and Chocolate Wheat hit shelves across

the US. In addition to Shock Top, AB InBev launched a second round of Project 12, a

competition where 12 U.S. brew-masters compete to create a new beer recipe inspired

by classic Budweiser quality but with a unique flavor profile. In China, AB InBev focused

its efforts on beer that complements specific cuisines. Harbin Cooling is a beer brewed

with essences of chrysanthemum and honeysuckle. The recipe allows the beer to be

paired with spicy foods and acts as a natural combatant to the heat of Chinese cuisine.

In addition to the Chinese addition of Harbin Cooling, AB InBev launched Budweiser

Supreme, a super-premium beer brewed for consumption in fine restaurants.

AB InBev has utilized its brands Budweiser and Bud Light Platinum to introduce

aluminum bottles. Aluminum bottles are the future packaging of beer for multiple

reasons. The bottles help beer get cold faster and stay colder longer, without sacrificing

the freshness or taste of the beer. Aluminum bottles also have the capability of twist-off

caps for opening convenience, as well as the ability to re-seal the beverage. As far as

features that benefit shareholders, aluminum is more cost-efficient to ship than glass.

Currently Budweiser and Bud Light Platinum are the only beers that offer aluminum

bottles, however AB InBev hopes to expand the packaging to a wide array of beers over

the next 5 years.

Page 15: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

15

Events Impacting Firm Value

In 2015, AB InBev paid $1.4 billion to ensure that Bud Light will remain the NFL’s official

beer until 2022. The landmark deal was an extension of AB InBev’s original contract

with the NFL that was made in 2011 and cost the firm $1.2 billion. Stakeholders viewed

AB InBev significant reinvestment of capital into the NFL as a sign that the firm was

confident the deal was highly profitable for both parties. For the 2016-2017 NFL season,

Bud Light partnered with 28 of the 32 NFL teams to create a custom can for each

team’s fans to enjoy.

SAB Miller Acquisition

In September of 2016, AB InBev finalized a deal to purchase SAB Miller for $108 billion.

The process of the acquisition has taken over a year to finalize. AB InBev made multiple

offers to acquire SAB Miller, however many were declined for various reasons. There

were also issues with the Department of Justice in the US and in China based on anti-

trust laws. AB InBev was forced to sell off some of the subsidiaries, including the Miller

brands to Molson Coors. SAB Miller was considered a major competitor of AB InBev in

the brewers’ industry. The combined company will produce around a third of the beer

around the world. As a result of this acquisition, determining the value of the firm has

many variables.

Page 16: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

16

Major Products

AB InBev is the largest brewing company in the world and has grown in a multitude of

ways. However, the firm is consistent with a strategy and it is proving to be successful.

AB InBev rigorously reinforces the ‘Focus Brand’ strategy. Focus Brands are those that

they invest most of their marketing money in and to which are dedicated the greatest

proportion of attention. With a portfolio of well over 200 brands, AB InBev prioritizes a

small group of brands with strong growth potential within each relevant consumer

segment. These Focus Brands, include what the company considers Global brands

(Budweiser, Corona and Stella Artois), International brands (Beck’s, Hoegaarden and

Leffe), and ‘local champions’ which are different in every region the world.

The “King of Beers”, Budweiser, was introduced by

Adolphus Busch in 1876 and is still brewed with the

same care and high-quality, exacting standards. What

began as an American original 139 years ago is a

global brand today, enjoyed by consumers in 85

countries. In accordance with its original recipe, this

great American lager is aged over beechwood chips

for 21 days which results in a perfectly balanced

flavor and a crisp, clean refreshing taste. Budweiser is

considered the world’s most valuable beer brand.

Corona is the leading beer brand in Mexico, the

6th most valuable beer brand in the world, and the

most popular Mexican beer worldwide, with sales in

more than 120 countries. Corona Extra was first

brewed in 1925 at the Cervecería Modelo in Mexico

City. Ten years after its launch, Corona became the

best-selling beer in Mexico, and today continues to

stand for Mexican pride around the world.

Page 17: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

17

Stella Artois has been called the most sophisticated

beer brand in the world. Based on a rich Belgian

brewing heritage of more than 600 years, this legacy

of quality and elegance is reflected in its iconic chalice

and exacting 9-step Pouring Ritual. Stella Artois is still

brewed using the finest natural ingredients in the

tradition of hand-crafted luxury. Today, Stella Artois is

the world’s 4th most valuable beer brand, sold

in more than 90 countries.

The world’s No. 1 German beer, Beck’s is renowned

for uncompromising quality by consumers in some 85

countries. Since 1873, the brand has been dedicated

to innovation and independent thought. True to its

original recipe, Beck’s has been brewed in the same

way using four key natural ingredients for more than

140 years. The hops used to brew Beck's today still

come from the Hallertau region, and every bottle of

Beck's is brewed according to the uncompromising

German Reinheitsgebot (Purity Law).

Making the extraordinary just perfect, Leffe is the beer

that enriches special moments. The flavorful and full

bodied character of the Leffe family of beers provides

a recipe for life’s best experiences. Made from only

the highest quality ingredients, Leffe's unique brewing

heritage is now shared and enjoyed by consumers in

more than 70 countries worldwide.

Page 18: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

18

A unique, authentic Belgian wheat beer with a

brewing tradition dating back to 1445, Hoegaarden is

totally different by nature. Hoegaarden has a unique

and extremely complex brewing process whereby the

beer is first top fermented and then is refermented

within the bottle, resulting in a distinctive cloudy-white

appearance and refreshing taste experience.

Consumers in over 70 countries in the world can

enjoy Hoegaarden’s refreshing nature.

AB InBev’s presence in North America is especially prevalent. In the US, they have

45.8% of the market share, the largest in the brewing industry. AB InBev’s local brands

in the US include Bass, Bud Light, Busch, Michelob and Natural Light. AB InBev

approaches Canada with a very similar makeup. In Canada, AB InBev has a market

share of 42.4% and are also the largest company in the brewing industry. Canada’s

local brands include Alexander Keith’s, Bass, Bud Light, Kokanee, Labatt, Lucky,

Lakeport and Oland. AB InBev’s market share in Mexico is an astronomical 58.2%. AB

InBev’s local brands consist of Barrilito, Estrella, Leon, Modelo, Montejo, Pacifico,

Tropical, and Victoria. In 2015, US and Canada beer sales combined to contribute

36.5% of AB InBev’s EBITDA while Mexico contributed 11.9%.

AB InBev also has a strong presence in Latin America. In Brazil, they not only sell beer,

but also soft drinks. AB InBev has a beer market share of 67.5% and a soft drink market

share of 19.2%. As a result, the firm is first in the beer industry and second in the soft

drink industry in regards to market share. AB InBev has different local brands in this

region including Antarctica, Bohemia, Brahm, Skol, Gaurana Antarctica and Pepsi. AB

InBev’s Argentinian operations have an even stronger market share in both industries.

In Argentina, AB InBev has a 76.7% market share in the beer industry and 19.9% in the

soft drink industry. Argentinian local brands include Andes, Brahma, Notre, Patagonia,

Quilmes, Pepsi, 7UP, and H2OH!. The Northern part of Latin America contributed

27.8% of AB InBev’s 2015 EBITDA and the Southern portion contributed 9.4%.

AB InBev’s strategy in Europe is different than that of other regions. AB InBev has a

specific strategy for each European country. For Belgium, the firm has a market share

of 55.5% and their local brands include Belle-Vue, Jupiler and Vieux Temps. AB InBev

is the largest brewing company in Belgium. The firm’s market share goes down to

17.7% in the UK. UK brands also include Bass, Boddingtons, Brahma, Whitbread, and

Mackeson. AB InBev’s market share drops even more in Germany. AB InBev reports a

Page 19: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

19

minimal 8.6% market share. Despite this, the firm is the second largest company in the

industry in terms of market cap with their different local brands. Europe contributed

6.4% to AB InBev’s 2015 EBITDA.

AB InBev also sells beer in China and South Korea. In China, they have a market share

of 18.6%, resulting in the firm having the 3rd largest market share in the industry.

Chinese local brands include Big Boss, Double Deer, Ginsber, Harbin, Jinling,

Jinlongquan, KK, Nancheng, Sedrin, and Shilang. In South Korea, AB InBev’s market

share is 57%. South Korean local beers are Cass, Cass Light, Cafri, The Premier OB,

and Aleston. 8.0% of AB InBev’s 2015 EBITDA came from the Asia Pacific sector’s beer

sales.

AB InBev operates on a global scale but as a result of selling beer all over the world,

expenses are significant. In 2015, Cost of Sales (CoS) increased 3.9% or 4.5% on a per

hectoliter basis. The increase was driven primarily by unfavorable foreign exchange

transactional impacts, higher depreciation from recent investments, and increase in the

company’s product mix. These increases were partly offset by procurement savings and

the synergies delivered in Mexico. On a constant geographic basis, cost of sales per

hectoliter increased by 5.2%. Total operating expenses increased 8.1% in 2015. Other

key data pertaining to expenses includes;

• Distribution expenses increased 8.3% in 2015, driven mainly by increased own

distribution in Brazil, which is more than offset by the increase in net revenues;

the growth of the company’s premium and near beer brands; and inflationary

increases in Latin America South.

• Sales and marketing expenses increased 9.4% in 2015 with increased support

behind the long term growth of the company’s brands, innovations and sales

activations.

• Administrative expenses increased by 8.3% mainly due to variable

compensation accruals.

Page 20: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

20

Competitors

After all of the mergers and acquisitions that have happened in the brewery industry,

only a few companies control a majority of the market share. The most well-known

brewing companies that people think of as independent are actually owned by just a few

major companies. Anheuser-Busch is by far the largest brewing company, especially

following their latest acquisition of SABMiller. AB InBev has almost 10 times the market

cap of Molson Coors and has about 100 times the market cap of Boston Beer Co.,

which are considered two major competitors in the brewery industry.

Global market share of the leading beer companies 2014, based on

volume sales

Anheuser-Busch InBev NV 20.8%

SABMiller Plc 9.7%

Heineken NV 9.1%

Carlsberg A/S 6.1%

China Resources Enterprise Ltd 6.0%

Tsingtao Brewery Co Ltd 4.7%

Molson Coors Brewing Co 3.2%

Beijing Yanjing Brewery Co Ltd 2.8%

Kirin Holdings Co Ltd 2.3%

Asahi Group Holdings Ltd 1.2%

Global market share of the leading beer companies 2014, based on volume sales data

Anheuser-Busch InBev NV

SABMiller Plc

Heineken NV

Carlsberg A/S

China Resources Enterprise Ltd

Tsingtao Brewery Co Ltd

Molson Coors Brewing Co

Beijing Yanjing Brewery Co Ltd

Kirin Holdings Co Ltd

Page 21: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

21

Competition

Companies within the brewing industry all compete in different ways. However, in the

US, 3 out of the top 5 domestic beers in 2015 were brewed by AB InBev. This

generated a significant amount of revenue because many people prefer the domestic,

lighter beers in the US.

Additionally, these brands compete in the market of premium domestic beers. AB InBev

also did very well in this category in 2015, producing 3 out of top 5 in the US. This is a

strong indicator that AB InBev has effectively operated in the US.

Page 22: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

22

Market Cap V. Competitors

AB InBev is also able to compete with other large companies in the beverage industry

outside of brewing companies. Coca-Cola has a beverage industry market cap of $186

Billion, Pepsi Co has a market cap of about $152 Billion, and Monster Beverage Co. has

a market cap of about $28 Billion. Despite focusing on alcoholic beverages, AB Inbev’s

market cap of approximately $200 Billion is significantly higher than any of the other

beverage companies.

Market Cap

Company (USD

Billions)

AB Inbev $201

Coca Cola Co $182.40

PepsiCo $149.70

Monster

Beverage

$28.10

Molson Coors $21.80

Boston Beer

Co.

$2.20

$0

$50

$100

$150

$200

$250

USD

(b

illio

ns)

Market Cap

Market Cap (USDBillions)

Page 23: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

23

Corporate Control: Management Qualifications and Ownership

Below is a list of AB InBev’s upper management.

Carlos Brito: CEO

Born in 1960 as a Brazilian citizen, and received his undergraduate

degree in mechanical Engineering from the Universidade Federal

do Rio de Janeiro and an MBA from Stanford University. He held

positions at Shell Oil and Daimler Benz prior to joining Ambev in

1989. Before being appointed Chief Executive Officer in January

2004 he held other roles within the company. He was appointed

Zone President North America at InBev in January 2005 and Chief

Executive Officer in December 2005. He is also a member of the

Board of Directors of Ambev and Grupo Modelo.

Sabine Chalmers: Chief Legal & Corporate Affairs Officer

As Chief Legal & Corporate Affairs Officer, and Secretary to the

Board of Directors. Ms. Chalmers holds many important roles in the

company. Born in 1965, Ms. Chalmers is a US citizen of German

and Indian origin and holds an LL.B. from the London School of

Economics. Ms. Chalmers joined in January 2005 after over 12

years with Diageo plc where she held a number of senior legal

positions in various geographies across Europe, the Americas and

Asia including as General Counsel of the Latin American and North

American businesses. Prior to Diageo, she was an associate at the

law firm of Lovells in London, specializing in mergers and

acquisitions. Ms. Chalmers is a member of the Board of Directors of

Grupo Modelo. She also serves on several professional councils

and not-for-profit boards, including the Association of Corporate

Counsel and Legal Momentum, the United States’ oldest legal

defense and education fund dedicated to advancing the rights of

women and girls.

Page 24: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

24

Felipe Dutra: CFO & Chief Technology Officer

Born in 1965, Mr. Dutra is a Brazilian citizen and holds a Degree in

Economics from Candido Mendes, and an MBA in Controlling from

Universidade de São Paulo. He joined Ambev in 1990 from Aracruz

Celulose, a major Brazilian manufacturer of pulp and paper. At

Ambev he held various positions in Treasury and Finance before

being appointed General Manager of one of the beverage

subsidiaries. Mr. Dutra was appointed Ambev’s Chief Financial

Officer in 1999 and he became the Chief Financial Officer in

January 2005. In 2014, Mr. Dutra became the Chief Financial &

Technology Officer. He is also a member of the Board of Directors

of Ambev and Grupo Modelo.

Claudio Garcia: Chief People Officer

Born in 1968, he is a Brazilian citizen and holds a Degree in

Economics from the Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro. Mr.

Garcia joined Ambev as a Management Trainee in 1991 and

thereafter held various positions in Finance and Operations before

being appointed Information Technology and Shared Services

Director in 2002. Mr. Garcia was appointed InBev’s Chief

Information and Services Officer in January 2005 and its Chief

People and Technology Officer in September 2006. To ensure a

greater focus on building the best people pipeline globally, Mr.

Garcia was appointed Chief People Officer in 2014 focusing on the

company’s People organization globally. This includes the Global

Management Trainee Program, Global MBA recruitment, Executive

education and training and engagement initiatives.

Tony Milikin: Chief Procurement Officer

Born in 1961, Tony is a U.S. citizen and holds an undergraduate

Finance Degree from the University of Florida and an MBA in

Marketing from Texas University in Fort Worth, Texas. Mr. Milikin

joined the company in May 2009 from MeadWestvaco, where he

was Vice President, Supply Chain and Chief Purchasing Officer,

based in Richmond, Virginia, since 2004. Prior to joining

MeadWestvaco, he held various purchasing and supply chain

positions with increasing responsibilities at Monsanto.

Page 25: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

25

Luiz Fernando Edmond: Chief Sales Officer

Born in 1966, he is a Brazilian citizen and holds a Degree in

Production Engineering from the Federal University of Rio de

Janeiro. Mr. Edmond joined Brahma, which later became Ambev, in

1990 as part of its first Management Trainee Program. At Ambev,

he held various positions in the commercial, supply and distribution

areas. He was appointed Zone President Latin America North and

Ambev’s Chief Executive Officer in January 2005 and then Zone

President North America and Chief Executive Officer of Anheuser-

Busch in November 2008. He also is a member of the Board of

Directors of Ambev; is Vice Chair of the Beer Institute, a national

association of the brewing industry; and a member of Civic

Progress, an organization of St. Louis leaders working to improve

community and business life in the region.

Claudio Braz Ferro: Chief Supply Integration Officer

Born in 1955, Mr. Ferro is a Brazilian citizen and holds a Degree in

Industrial Chemistry from the Universidade Federal de Santa Maria,

RS, and has studied Brewing Science at the Catholic University of

Leuven. Mr. Ferro joined Ambev in 1977, where he held several

key positions, including plant manager of the Skol brewery,

Industrial Director of Brahma operations in Brazil and later VP

Operations at Ambev in Latin America. Mr. Ferro also played a key

role in structuring the supply organization when Brahma and

Antarctica combined to form AmBev in 2000. He was appointed the

Chief Supply Officer in January 2007 and then the Chief Supply

Integration Officer in March 2016.

Page 26: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

26

Miguel Patricio: CMO

Born in 1966, Miguel is a Portuguese citizen and holds a Degree in

Business Administration from Fundação Getulio Vargas in São

Paulo. Prior to joining Ambev in 1998, Mr. Patricio held several

senior positions across the Americas at Philip Morris, the Coca-

Cola Company and Johnson & Johnson. At Ambev, he was Vice

President Marketing, before being appointed Vice President

Marketing for InBev’s North American Zone based in Toronto in

January 2005. In January 2006 he was promoted to Zone President

North America, and in January 2008, he moved to Shanghai to take

on the role of Zone President Asia Pacific. He became the Chief

Marketing Officer in July 2012.

Pedro Earp: Chief Disruptive Growth Officer

Born in Petropolis, Pedro is a Brazilian citizen and holds a Bachelor

of Science degree in Financial Economics from the London School

of Economics. Mr. Earp joined in 2000 as a Global Management

Trainee in the Latin America North Zone. In 2002, he became

responsible for the Zone’s M&A team and in 2005 he moved to

Leuven, Belgium to become Global Director, M&A. Later, he was

appointed VP, Strategic Planning in Canada in 2006; Global VP,

Insights and Innovation in 2007; Global VP, M&A in 2009 and VP,

Marketing for the Latin America North Zone in 2013. He was

appointed Chief Disruptive Growth Officer in February 2015.

David Almeida: Chief Integration Officer

Born in 1976, David is a dual citizen of the USA and Brazil and

holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Economics from the University of

Pennsylvania. Most recently, he served as Vice President, US

Sales, a role he took on in 2011, having previously held the position

of Vice President, Finance for the North American organization.

Prior to that, he served as InBev's head of mergers and

acquisitions, where he led the combination with Anheuser-Busch in

2008 and the subsequent USA integration activities. Before joining

InBev in 1998, he worked at Salomon Brothers in New York as a

financial analyst in the Investment Banking division.

Page 27: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

27

Marcio Froes: Zone President of Latin America South

Born in 1968, he is a Brazilian citizen and received a Degree in

Chemical Engineering from the Universidade Federal do Rio de

Janeiro and a Masters Degree in Brewing from the University of

Madrid, Spain, in Industrial Technology. He joined Ambev in 1993

as a Management Trainee and has held roles in Supply, People

and Sales, before being appointed Vice President People for the

Canadian business in 2006. In Canada, he also served as Vice

President Supply and Sales prior to being appointed Business Unit

President from 2008 to 2009. Most recently, he was Vice President

Supply in Latin America North and was appointed Zone President

Latin America South in January 2014.

Bernardo Pinto Paiva: Zone President of Latin America North and Ambev’s CEO

Born in 1968, he is a Brazilian citizen and holds a Degree in

Engineering from Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro and an

Executive MBA from Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de

Janeiro. Mr. Pinto Paiva joined Ambev in 1991 as a management

trainee and during his career at the company has held leadership

positions in Sales, Supply, Distribution and Finance. He was

appointed Zone President North America in January 2008 and

Zone President Latin America South in January 2009 before

becoming Chief Sales Officer in January 2012.

Michel Doukeris: Zone President Asia Pacific

Born in 1973, he is a Brazilian citizen and holds a Degree in

Chemical Engineering from Federal University of Santa Catarina in

Brazil and a Master’s Degree in Marketing from Fundação Getulio

Vargas Mr. Doukeris joined the company in 1996 and held sales

positions of increasing responsibility before becoming Vice

President Soft Drinks for the Latin America North Zone in 2008. He

was appointed President AB InBev China in January 2010 and

currently serves as Zone President Asia Pacific, a position he has

held since January 2013.

Page 28: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

28

João Castro Neves: Zone President North America and CEO of Anheuser-Busch

Born in 1967, Mr. Castro Neves is a Brazilian citizen and holds a

Degree in Engineering from Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio

de Janeiro and an MBA from the University of Illinois. He joined

Ambev in 1996 and has held positions in various departments such

as Mergers and Acquisitions, Treasury, Investor Relations,

Business Development, Technology and Shared Services. He was

Ambev’s Chief Financial Officer and Investor Relations Officer and

was appointed Zone President Latin America South in January

2007 before being appointed Zone President Latin America North

and Ambev’s Chief Executive Officer in January 2009.

Ricardo Tadeu: Zone President Mexico

Born in 1976, he is a Brazilian citizen, and received a Law Degree

from the Universidade Cândido Mendes in Brazil and a Master of

Law from Harvard Law School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He

joined AB InBev in 1995 and has held various roles across the

Commercial area. He was appointed Business Unit (BU) President

for the operations in HILA (Hispanic Latin America) in 2005, and

from 2008 to 2012, served as BU President Brazil.

Stuart MacFarlane: Zone President Europe

Born in 1967, he is a citizen of the UK and received a Degree in

Business Studies from Sheffield University in the UK. He is also a

qualified Chartered Management Accountant. He joined the

company in 1992 and since then has held senior roles in Finance,

Marketing, Sales, and was Managing Director for the company’s

business in Ireland. Mr. MacFarlane was appointed President of AB

InBev UK & Ireland in January 2008, and in January 2012, became

the Zone President Central & Eastern Europe. In January 2014 he

was appointed as Zone President Europe to lead the European

Zone.

Page 29: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

29

Peter Kraemer: Chief Supply Officer

Born in 1965, he is a US Citizen. A fifth-generation Brewmaster and

a native of St. Louis, Peter holds a Master's degree in Business

Administration from St. Louis University and a Bachelor's degree in

Chemical Engineering from Purdue University. He joined AB InBev

27 years ago and has held various brewing positions over the

years, including Group Director of Brewing and Resident

Brewmaster of the St. Louis brewery. In 2008, Peter became VP,

Supply, for AB InBev’s North America Zone, leading all brewery

operations, quality assurance, raw materials and product innovation

responsibilities. He was appointed Chief Supply Officer of AB InBev

in March 2016.

Page 30: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

30

Executive Compensation (Salary, Equity Options, Other)

In order to ensure executive salaries align with market practices, AB InBev’s base

salaries are reviewed against benchmarks on an annual basis. These benchmarks are

collated by independent compensation consultants in relevant industries and

geographies. Executives’ base salaries are intended to be aligned to mid-market levels

for the appropriate market. Mid-market means that for a similar job in the market, 50%

of companies in that market pay more and 50% of companies pay less. AB InBev’s

executives’ total compensation is intended to be 10% above the 3rd quartile. In 2015

Carlos Brito, the Chief Executive Officer earned a fixed salary of 1.64 million USD. The

other members of the executive board of management earned an aggregate base

salary of 11.04 million USD. Top executives at AB InBev have what is called a variable

performance related compensation element. This is aimed at rewarding executives for

driving short and long term performance.

Below is information regarding the number of stock options granted in 2015 under the

2009 long-term incentive stock option plan to the Chief Executive Officer and other

members of the executive board of management. Options granted on the 22nd of

December 2015, have an exercise price of $125.68 USD, and become exercisable after

five years.

Name Long-Term Incentive options granted

Carlos Brito – CEO 487,804

David Almeida 12,977

Miguel Patricio 55,005

Sabine Chalmers 68,756

Michel Doukeris 45,837

Felipe Dutra 123,761

Pedro Earp 18,335

Luiz Fernando Edmond 82,507

Claudio Braz Ferro 45,837

Claudio Garcia 32,086

Stuart MacFarlane 36,670

Tony Milikin 22,918

João Castro Neves 82,507

Ricardo Tadeu 34,378

Page 31: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

31

Compared to other beverage companies the same size, AB InBev falls in the middle of

alike company’s executive compensation plans. Coca Cola’s executive compensation

plan for 2015 as listed by the most current 20 F statement from the SEC’s website

indicates Coca Cola’s total cash compensation is comprised of yearly base pay and

bonuses. Total equity compensation aggregates the grant date fair value of stock and

option awards and long term incentives granted during the fiscal year. Other

Compensation covers all compensation-like awards that don't fit in any of the other

standard categories. Reported compensation does not include change in pension value

and non-qualified deferred compensation earnings.

Name/Title Total Cash Equity Other

Total

Compensation

Irial Finan

$2,496,791.00

$3,516,121.00

$1,542,463.00

$7,555,375.00

Executive Vice

President and

President, Bottling

Investments and

Supply Chain

Muhtar Kent

$6,200,000.00

$7,735,445.00

$655,126.00

$14,590,571.00

Chairman of the

Board and Chief

Executive Officer

J. Alexander M.

Douglas Jr.

$1,936,025.00

$5,396,799.00

$63,682.00

$7,396,506.00

Executive Vice

President

Kathy N. Waller

$1,928,489.00

$2,992,214.00

$59,755.00

$4,980,458.00

Chief Financial

Officer

James Quincey

$2,224,004.00

$4,364,163.00

$199,713.00

$6,787,880.00

President and

Chief Operating

Officer

Page 32: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

32

Compared to AB InBev, executives at Coca Cola receive much higher salaries plus

additional compensation. However, stock option remains about the same between the

two companies’ CEOs if analyzed on a yearly basis.

Pepsi Co is another comparable company when analyzing compensation structure. For

its 2015 fiscal year, Pepsi Co, listed the following executives on its annual proxy

statement to the SEC. The chart below features a breakdown of the total annual pay for

the top executives. Total cash compensation information is comprised of yearly base

pay and bonuses. Total Equity aggregates grant date fair value of stock and option

awards and long term incentives granted during the fiscal year. Other compensation

covers all compensation-like awards that do not fit in any of the other standard

categories. Reported compensation does not include change in pension value and non-

qualified deferred compensation earnings.

Executives at Pepsi Co are compensated with a higher annual salary then AB InBev.

Especially the CEO Indra K Nooyi. However, when it comes to equity stock options

Pepsi Co has very similar annual compensation levels to AB InBev. An important fact to

mention between AB InBev, Coca Cola, and Pepsi Co is that Coca Cola and Pespi Co

offer stock options to their executives on an annual basis. AB InBev only offers a stock

options package that can’t be exercised until five years after the options package is

received.

Name/Title Total Cash Equity Other

Total

Compensation

Indra Nooyi

$15,567,308.00

$6,251,479.00

$370,520.00 $22,189,307.00

Chairman of the

Board and CEO

Albert Carey

$5,011,800.00

$2,236,620.00

$81,288.00

$7,329,708.00 CEO, NAB

Hugh Johnston

$4,982,800.00

$2,222,763.00

$25,350.00

$7,230,913.00

Vice Chairman,

EVP and CFO

Thomas Greco

$3,290,588.00

$1,447,120.00

$79,059.00

$4,816,767.00 CEO, FLNA

Ramon Laguarta

$2,735,746.00

$1,111,382.00

$1,320,504.00

$5,167,632.00 CEO, ESSA

Page 33: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

33

AB InBev’s Members on the Board of Directors

AB InBev's board structure is composed of four members nominated by EPS SCA, a

Luxembourg company that represents Interbrew's founding families; four members

nominated by BRC S.à.r.l., a Luxembourg company that represents AmBev's founders;

two members appointed in accordance with the terms of the Modelo acquisition and four

independent directors.

Board Member Type

Oliver Grudet Independent Board Member

M. michele Burns Independent Board Member

Kasper Rorsted Independent Board Member

Elio Leoni Sceti Independent Board Member

Gredoire de Spoelberch Representative of the Main Shareholders

Alexandre Van Damme Representative of the Main Shareholders

Carlos Alberto da Veiga Sicupira Representative of the Main Shareholders

Marcel Herrmann Telles Representative of the Main Shareholders

Stefan Descheemaeker Representative of the Main Shareholders

Paul Cornet de Ways Ruart Representative of the Main Shareholders

Paulo Alberto Lemann Representative of the Main Shareholders

Alexandre Behring Representative of the Main Shareholders

Maria Asuncion Aramburuzabala Other Non-Executive Director

Valentia Diez Other Non-Executive Director

Page 34: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

34

The Board is assisted into five Committees: The Audit Committee, the Finance

Committee, the Strategy Committee, the Nomination Committee and Remuneration

Committee.

Member's

Names

Audit

Committee

Nomination

Committee

Finance

Committee

Remuneration

Committee

Strategy

Committee

Maria Asuncion

Aramburuzabala Member

Alex Behring Member

Michèle Burns Chair Member

Paul Cornet de

Ways Ruart Member

Stéfan

Descheemaeker Member

Grégoire de

Spoelberch Member

Valentin Diez Member

Olivier Goudet Member Member Member Member

Paulo Lemann Member

Kasper Rorsted Member

Elio Leoni Sceti Member

Carlos Alberto

da Veiga

Sicupira

Member

Marcel

Herrmann

Telles

Chair Chair Member

Alexandre Van

Damme Member Chair Chair

Page 35: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

35

AB InBev’s Institutional Share Ownership

According to AB InBev’s ownership summary as reported in the most recent 13F filings,

AB InBev has 542 Institutional Holders, holding 96,225,853 Total Shares.

Outstandingly, this makes up just 5.98% of all shares outstanding. The five largest of

these being: Soroban Capital Partners LP, Gardner Russo & Gardner LLC, Fisher Asset

Management LLC, Franklin Resources INC, and Lone Pine Capital LLC. 4 of these 5

firms have increased their positions in the company’s stock in the last 6 months.

Increases vary from a (3%) change in position to a 141% change in position. Analyzing

institutional shares at a macro level amongst firms in the beverage industry it is

determined that;

AB InBev, 5.98% institutional ownership, Change in Stock Price in last yr. 17.29%

Increased Positions = 14,372,168

Decreased Positions = 6,579,904

Held Positions = 75,273,781

Total Institutional Shares = 96,225,853

CocaCola, 65.36% Institutional Ownership, Change in Stock Price in last yr. 13.36%

Increased Positions = 90,380,802

Decreased Positions = 99,100,041

Held Positions = 2,631,685,660

Total Institutional Shares = 2,821,166,503

Pepsi Co, 71.18% Institutional ownership, Change in Stock Price in last yr. 16.25%

Increased Positions = 50,375,843

Decreased Positions = 43,928,779

Held Positions = 930,123,230

Total Institutional Shares = 1,024,427,852

Molson Millercoors, 87.10% Institutional Ownership, Change in Stock Price in last

yr. 50.14%

Increased Positions = 12,274,858

Decreased Positions = 14,005,398

Held Positions = 42,613,871

Total Institutional Shares = 68,894,127

Page 36: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

36

This analysis is interesting considering that when looking at comparable companies of

similar sizes, AB InBev has just 5.98% of shares owned by institutions. This figure is

insignificant when compared to competitors within the beverage industry. By analyzing

Coca Cola, Pepsi Co, and Molson Millercoors one is able to gain a better idea of

average institutional ownership for similar companies. Below is the information

pertaining to what we found

Page 37: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

37

Sales and Earnings Estimates

AB InBev operates on a fiscal year that coincides with the calendar year. As a result,

their quarterly results come out in early May, late July, late October and full year results

coming out in late February. At the time of this analysis, the public only has access to

the earning reports from the first 2 quarters of 2016 and they have been lower than

expected. In Q1, AB InBev missed estimates on both the top and bottom line. EPS was

short of the Zacks Consensus Estimate by 36 cents; only having an actual EPS of

$0.51. According to Carlos Brito, as quoted in the Wall Street Journal, some of these

shortfalls in the first quarter could be a result of the macroeconomic issues that are

going on in Brazil, AB InBev’s second largest market. The firm was able to perform

better in Q2 compared to the estimates however fell short again. In Q2, they only

underperformed by 3 cents, missing the $1.09 estimate with a real EPS of $1.06. This

has been a trend in recent quarters. In the past 5 quarters, they have only beat

estimates in 1 quarter, Q4 of 2015, when they beat it earnings estimates by 25 cents,

producing an EPS of $1.56.

Page 38: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

38

In the future, the estimates from Zacks Investment Research predict that the EPS will

trend upwards for both the quarterly and yearly earnings.

Page 39: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

39

Analyst Recommendations

9/13/2016

Edward Mundy

Jefferies Group

On September 13th 2016, Jefferies Group, an investment bank and institutional

securities firm headquartered in New York, initiated coverage of AB InBev with a buy

rating. Jefferies Group’s Analyst, Edward Mundy, believes that the company is

“understating the cost savings generated through the recent SABMiller deal.” Along with

the buy rating, Jefferies Group set a target price of $146.

11/16/2016

Kenneth Shea

Energy drinks, wine and beer lead us beverage sales growth

(Bloomberg Intelligence)—Energy drink sales rose 4.2% in the four weeks ended Nov 6

to lead major us beverage category growth in IRI all channel data markets. Wine (up

4%) and beer (up 3.8%) were the next top gainers. These categories are benefiting from

positive pricing trends, reflecting in part the increasing emphasis on premium-price craft

offerings. New labels that will require the disclosure of added sugar are promoting

producers to emphasize low-calorie options with natural sweeteners.

Key Point:

- US beer sales up 4%: Bud Light boosted by water-melon-rita - 3.8% raise in four weeks ended on Nov 6 based on 2% higher volumes - 3Q sales down 2.6% according to AB InBev - Bud Light held a leading 17.4% dollar-based us brand share in the period,

helped by new flavor variants, especially watermelon

11/16/2016

Robert E Ottenstein

Recommendation: buy

Evercore ISI

Before the 3Q report came out, he recommended a buy as well with his target price at

137 when the price was 105 on 10/21. He still had a buy recommendation on 10/31

when the price was 100 but his target price was lowered to 127. On 11/16 he

recommended buy again when the price had dropped down to 94, although the target

price stayed at 127. All of these figures are in Euro.

Page 40: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

40

Our Forecasts for the Future

Analysts believe that AB InBev earnings will increase for the next couple of years, which

is an encouraging sign. This growth could come from both internal growth as well as

acquisitions. AB InBev acknowledges that there is room to improve and return to having

growth as a company. However, they have decided to remain with their idea to grow

organically despite over a year in decreasing quarterly sales. In the US, revenue has

declined by 1.7% and a drop in sales of 2.1%. AB InBev is attempting to counteract this

decline by revamping their marketing scheme for Bud Light, their most popular beer in

America. To do this, AB InBev is incorporating high profile celebrities in advertisements,

which they believe will help their most popular beer grow in upcoming years. Another

thing that could potentially increase their sales in the next coming years is Corona is

having its 100th year anniversary in 2025. The Corona brand has already had an

increase in sales after making a serious effort to market the celebration. Aside from

organic grown, the acquisition of SABMiller was a landmark event in the alcoholic

beverage industry. AB InBev is optimistic that there $108 billion investment will pay off

substantial dividends. By acquiring SABMiller, AB InBev is able to tap into growing

markets and leverage current SABMiller brands to promote their own brands.

AB InBev is also able to leverage their size to collaborate with entertainment

powerhouses such as the NFL or the Made in America music festival. At these events,

AB InBev doesn’t market their brand as a consumable product, but rather a lifestyle.

This tactical marketing will result in loyal consumers and additional business to business

transactions.

As consumer’s tastes begin to change, AB InBev stays ahead of the curve. In 2016

generic beer brands have become less popular and consumers favor craft beer and

flavored malt beverages. AB InBev leverages brands such as Shock Top, Goose Island,

and Leinenkugel to compete in the craft brewery market. These brands are marketed to

appeal to beer drinkers who enjoy the sensation of consuming niche and unique beers.

In addition to the shift towards craft beer, consumers are also beginning to favor

flavored malt beverages over generic beer. AB InBev combats this change in the

industry by introducing “The Rita Family”, a flavored malt beverage that mimics the taste

of a margarita. The Rita family spearheaded the flavored malt beverage industry and

with the acquisition of Boathouse Beverage LLC it appears that AB InBev will begin to

innovate more. As a result of the company staying ahead of industry trends, experts are

confident they will be able to enjoy sustainable year-over-year growth.

Page 41: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

41

Historical Financial

Analysis

Page 42: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

42

Table of Contents

Historical Financial Analysis

Topic Page #

Executive Summary 42

Stock Price Performance

Price V. Competitors 43

Absolute Performance 44

Financial Performance

Growth Performance 45

Financial Performance Metrics 48

DuPont Analysis 50

Altman Z-Score Analysis 53

Page 43: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

43

Executive Summary of Historical Financial Analysis

Growth of Major Metrics

LTM 12 months

Jun-30-2016

5 yr Compounded

Rate Total Revenue -7.55% 2.30% Gross Profit -6.27% 4.03% EBITDA -10.53% 2.28% EBIT -10.17% 2.63% Earnings from Cont. Ops. -54.22% -4.75% Net Income -59.03% -3.90% Diluted EPS before Extra -59.09% -4.58% Accounts Receivable -11.64% 3.86% Inventory 5.46% 3.80% Net PP&E 0.07% 3.05% Total Assets 38.14% 10.30% Common Equity -28.65% -1.61% Cash from Ops. -16.11% 2.83% Capital Expenditures 4.57% 8.03% Levered Free Cash Flow 77.84% 31.09% Dividend per Share -44.89% 15.17%

In the recent LTM from June 30, 2016, there are

many metrics that show negative growth rates. This

is a potential cause of concern, however, if you look

at the five-year compounded rate AB InBev shows

positive growth in 75% of the major metrics.

Stock Price Growth

AB InBev shows a consistent rise in stock price with

decreasing average stock price growth over the

course of the last five years. A significant amount of

this growth is from acquiring smaller breweries.

Compared to similar competitors within the industry,

AB InBev’s standard deviation and coefficient of

variance are right in the middle. Confirming a long

term and consistent growth state. Additionally, the

beverage industry, more specifically the alcohol

industry, is relatively inelastic with low betas.

$-

$50.00

$100.00

$150.00

$200.00

$250.00

$300.00

AB InBev Molsoncoors BostonBrewing

Coca Cola

Average Annual Stock Price

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Major Ratio Analysis

AB InBev’s ability to generate profit from money invested by shareholders dwarfs the main competitor Molson

Coors. Although slightly under performing Coca-Cola and Boston Beer Co., ROE remains constant with the

exception of 2013 when the firm reported huge profit margins as a result of absorbing Grupo Modelo’s net

income. The Z Score for AB InBev over the past three years has hovered between 1.69 and 2.25 signaling

slight financial destress.

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

30.00%

35.00%

40.00%

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Return On Equity

Year

AB InBev

Molson Coors

Boston Beer

Coca Cola

Page 44: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

44

Stock Price Performance V. Industry Competitors

AB InBev shows a consistent rise in stock price over the course of the last five years

compared to other competitive beverage companies. When analyzing average annual

stock price growth rates, AB InBev decreased over the last five years signaling the

company transitioning into a more mature state. A significant amount of the growth in

AB InBev from 2011 until the present is a result of acquiring smaller breweries.

Page 45: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

45

Absolute Performance & Industry Competitors

Compared to similar competitive companies within the industry, AB InBev’s standard

deviation and coefficient of variance are in the middle of the industry. Confirming a long

term and consistent growth state with an overall smaller standard deviation and

coefficient of variance. The beverage industry, more specifically the alcohol industry is

relatively inelastic with low betas. 100 dollars invested at the start of 2011 would have

grown to 213 dollars today.

20.61 20.11

58.01

2.92

-

10.00

20.00

30.00

40.00

50.00

60.00

70.00

AB InBev Molson Coors Boston Brewing Coca Cola

Standard Deviation of Stock Prices

0.20

0.31 0.31

0.07

-

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

0.35

AB InBev Molson Coors Boston Brewing Coca Cola

Coefficient of Variance of Stock Prices

Page 46: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

46

Growth Performance

AB InBev shows consistent growth performance over the past 4 time periods. Even if it

is a down year compared to the previous year. There are no significant changes in key

statistics such as total revenue, gross profit, EBITDA, EBIT, earnings from continuing

operations, net income and diluted EPS excluding extra items. The first graph shows

the total amounts in millions of EUR. The second graph has the same statistics with the

same corresponding colors but is showing growth percentage.

Page 47: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

47

AB InBev’s growth in some of the important metrics over 2 different time periods is

encouraging. Over the past 5 years, 75% of the metrics have shown positive growth

while only 25% of them have shown positive growth for the LTM since June 30th 2016.

Page 48: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

48

Compared to performance metrics of Molson Coors, Coca Cola and Boston Beer, AB

InBev is right in the middle in terms of growth rates. Boston Beer is a company that has

shown positive growth and is continuing to grow at a fast rate. However, they are in a

different stage of the life cycle of a business. Due to the craft beer market starting to

grow tremendously in the US, Boston Beer is able to trick consumers into believing they

are a leader in brewing craft beer. Boston Beer also has a good position in the rapidly

expanding flavored malt liquor market with their Angry Orchard Cider. AB InBev is at

more of a steady state and their growth rate is beginning to plateau. A significant

amount of AB InBev’s growth now comes from the acquisition of other companies, such

as the very recent acquiring of SABMiller. This chart below shows the growth rate for

AB InBev, Coca Cola, Boston Beer and Molson Coors as well as other important

comparable metrics.

AB InBev Coca Cola Boston Beer Molson Coors

Total Revenue 2.30% 0.50% 14.60% 1% Gross Profit 4.03% 0.00% 12.80% -0.50%

EBITDA 2.28% 0.80% 14.90% 0.50%

EBIT 2.63% 0.70% 13.20% -2.50%

Earnings from Cont. Ops. -4.75% -9.50% 8.20% -10.80% Net Income -3.90% -9.50% 8.20% -10.70%

Diluted EPS before Extra -4.58% -8.30% 9.50% -11.70%

Accounts Receivable 3.86% -3.30% 16.40% -2.20%

Inventory 3.80% -1.50% 14% 1.00%

Net PP&E 3.05% -3.20% 24.10% 1.80% Total Assets 10.30% 3.30% 15.70% 3.20%

Common Equity -1.61% -5.40% 17.80% 3.90%

Cash from Ops. 2.83% 0.80% 10.80% 4.40%

Capital Expenditures 8.03% 0.10% 31.80% 6.30% Levered Free Cash Flow 31.09% 7.20% 5.70% -43.80%

Dividend per Share 15.17% 8.40% NA 7.20%

Page 49: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

49

Financial Performance Metrics

AB InBev’s comparable statistics with Molson Coors Brewing Company, Boston Beer

Co and Coca Cola Co have been analyzed and are presented below. AB InBev is most

comparable to the size of Coca Cola in the beverage industry. AB InBev is significantly

larger than the competition in the brewer’s industry.

AB InBev Coca Cola Boston

Beer Molson Coors

Brewing Equity Valuation Market Cap (mm) € 191,435.00 $182,654.40 $1,909.20 $23,581.10 P/E 55.4x 24.3x 23.2x 56.9x Price/BV 6.2x 6.9x 4.6x 2.4x P/Tang BV NM 61.9x 4.7x 7.9x Margins Gross Margin % 61.10% 60.30% 51.40% 40.30% EBITDA Margin % 32% 27.70% 19.90% 18.10% Earnings from Cont. Ops. Margin % 12.60% 17.70% 9.40% 10.90% Net Income Margin % 9.30% 17.60% 9.40% 10.90% Leverage Total Debt/EBITDA 6.8x 4.0x 0.0x 4.8x Total Debt/Equity 288% 180.40% 0.10% 30.70% Total Debt/Capital 74.20% 64.30% 0.10% 23.50% Enterprise Valuation TEV (mm) € 234,067.20 $207,194.40 $1,882.10 $23,637.70 TEV/Total Revenue (LTM) 6.2x 4.8x 2.0x 6.7x TEV/EBITDA (LTM) 16.4x 16.4x 10.0x 20.6x TEV/EBIT (LTM) 19.9x 19.3x 13.4x 26.9x Profitability Return on Assets % 5% 6.70% 13.70% 1.60% Return on Capital % 6.60% 8.50% 18.90% 1.90% Return on Equity % 12% 27.50% 19.10% 4.40% Coverage Current Ratio 2.1x 1.2x 1.5x 2.4x EBITDA/Interest Exp. 5.1x 20.5x NA 5.6x (EBITDA-CAPEX)/Interest Exp. 3.7x 16.2x NA 3.3x

Page 50: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

50

Below, comparable ratios have been analyzed and presented for both the brewers and

beverage industry. This shows that AB InBev is not only the largest in the brewer’s

industry, but also the Beverage industry.

Equity Valuation Brewers Beverages Market Cap. ($mm) $652,316.60 $1,562,825.90 P/E 36.5x 29.4x Price/BV 4.1x 4.4x P/Tang BV 8.5x 7.7x

Margins Gross Margin % 41.0% 41.6% EBITDA Margin %† 22.0% 20.1% Earnings from Cont. Ops. Margin % 14.7% 12.4% Net Income Margin % 14.1% 11.9%

Leverage Total Debt/EBITDA† 0.6x 1.0x Total Debt/Equity 26.1% 34.1% Total Debt/Capital 20.7% 25.4%

Enterprise Valuation TEV ($mm)† $776,880.20 $1,799,991.90 TEV/Total Revenue (LTM)† 3.5x 3.3x TEV/EBITDA (LTM)† 14.3x 14.7x TEV/EBIT (LTM)† 19.0x 18.6x

Profitability Return on Assets % 4.9% 5.8% Return on Capital % 6.6% 7.8% Return on Equity % 11.1% 14.5%

Coverage Current Ratio 1.3x 1.3x EBITDA/Interest Exp.† 28.7x 20.3x (EBITDA-CAPEX)/Interest Exp.† 8.3x 9.5x

Page 51: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

51

DuPont Analysis of AB InBev & Competitors

AB InBev’s reports indicate exceptional return on equity (ROE) over the past 5 years. Compared to industry competitor’s ROE, AB InBev is relatively consistent with the rest of the beverage industry. Miller Coors, in terms of market cap, is AB InBev’s closest competitor in the alcoholic beverage industry. Over the past 5 years, AB InBev’s metrics dwarf Molson Coors especially in terms of ROE.

Using the DuPont Analysis, it can be inferred that AB InBev is more efficient at generating profit with money shareholders have invested than Molson Coors. In 2013, AB InBev absorbed the net income and assets of Grupo Modelo. The absorption is prevalent in the significant increase of AB InBev’s ROE in 2013. Expect a similar increase when AB InBev’s absorbs SABMiller’s financials in 2016.

DuPont Analysis of Anheuser-Busch Inbev SA (NYS: BUD) Financial Statement Data ($ millions) 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011

Sales $43,604 $47,063 $43,195 $39,758

$39,046 Net Income (Income for Primary EPS) 8,273 9,216 14,394 7,223 5,855 Assets 138,593 142,108 132,144 117,524 113,385 Equity 46,055 50,169 45,754 39,317 36,376 Three-Step DuPont Model: Net Profit Margin (Net Income ÷ Sales) 19.0% 19.6% 33.3% 18.2% 15.0% Asset Turnover (Sales ÷ Assets) 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) 3.01 2.83 2.89 2.99 3.12

Return on Equity 17.96% 18.37% 31.46% 18.37% 16.10%

DuPont Analysis of Molson Coors Brewing Co. (NYS: TAP) Financial Statement Data ($ millions) 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011

Sales $5,127 $5,928 $6,000 $5,615

$5,170 Net Income (Income for Primary EPS) 360 514 564 444 665 Assets 13,136 14,788 15,896 14,318 12,561 Equity 7,453 8,251 8,303 7,807 7,723 Three-Step DuPont Model: Net Profit Margin (Net Income ÷ Sales) 7.0% 8.7% 9.4% 7.9% 12.9% Asset Turnover (Sales ÷ Assets) 0.39 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.41 Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) 1.76 1.79 1.91 1.83 1.63

Return on Equity 4.82% 6.23% 6.80% 5.69% 8.61%

Page 52: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

52

Compared to Boston Beer Co. and Coca-Cola, AB InBev is slightly worse at utilizing shareholder’s money for profit. Boston Beer reports strong ROE because they are growing in order to be a legitimate competitor to Molson Coors and AB InBev. With a significantly smaller market cap, Boston Beer is a fast growing company in a fast growing industry, which allows them to show strong net income and ROE. Coca-Cola, while still in the beverage industry, does not sell alcoholic beverages and can leverage their resources differently in order to keep their ROE consistent.

DuPont Analysis of Boston Beer Co Inc (NYS: SAM) Financial Statement Data ($ millions) 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011

Sales $1,204 $966 $794 $629 $558 Net Income (Income for Primary EPS) 99 91 71 60 65 Assets 625 525 402 316 266 Equity 449 369 274 215 175 Three-Step DuPont Model: Net Profit Margin (Net Income ÷ Sales) 8.2% 9.4% 8.9% 9.5% 11.6% Asset Turnover (Sales ÷ Assets) 1.93 1.84 1.98 1.99 2.10 Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) 1.39 1.42 1.47 1.47 1.52

Return on Equity 21.99% 24.65% 25.80% 27.75% 37.10%

DuPont Analysis of Coca-Cola Co (NYS: KO) Financial Statement Data ($ millions) 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011

Sales $44,294 $45,998 $46,854 $48,107

$46,542 Net Income (Income for Primary EPS) 7,351 7,098 8,584 8,994 8,572 Assets 91,058 91,039 88,116 83,074 76,448 Equity 27,937 31,747 32,982 32,213 31,319 Three-Step DuPont Model: Net Profit Margin (Net Income ÷ Sales) 16.6% 15.4% 18.3% 18.7% 18.4% Asset Turnover (Sales ÷ Assets) 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.58 0.61 Equity Multiplier (Assets ÷ Equity) 3.26 2.87 2.67 2.58 2.44

Return on Equity 26.31% 22.36% 26.03% 27.92% 27.37%

Page 53: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

53

Over the past five years, AB InBev reported consistent ROE. Using the DuPont Analysis, it is clear that the firm is the dominant force in the brewing industry. Although Boston Beer usually has a higher ROE, AB InBev’s profit margins are unmatched by any other competitor. The metrics increase AB InBev reported in 2013 was a result of their acquisition of Grupo Modelo. Investors saw net income, profit margins, and ROE increase dramatically. Experts are enthusiastic for the company’s financials when the acquisition of SABMiller occurs in 2016, expect another increase in the firm’s DuPont metrics.

0.00%

5.00%

10.00%

15.00%

20.00%

25.00%

30.00%

35.00%

40.00%

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Return On Equity %

Year

DuPont Analysis

AB InBev

Molson Coors

Boston Beer

Coca Cola

Page 54: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

54

Altman’s Z-Score Analysis

The Altman’s Z-Score is a statistic used to determine if a company is facing financial distress. According to the Z-Scores from S&P Capital, AB InBev is and has been facing financial distress for the past three and a half years. In this time frame, AB InBev hasn’t reached the score of 2.675, the benchmark of not having any financial distress.

One reason for the low Z-Score is because their total assets grew by 41.96% in the period, while EBIT dropped by 4.04%. The part of the Z-Score calculation that has the

highest weight is 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇

𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 , so this will cause the score to significantly decrease. 4 out

of the 5 calculations that go into the Z-Score have a denominator of Total Assets. A growth this large in Total Assets will unavoidably force the total Z-Score to decrease. Investors consider this worrisome because for such a large company, ideal Z-Score numbers would be much higher. Compared to Coca Cola, Boston Beer, and Molson Coors, AB InBev has a low Z-Score.

1.69

3.552.83

11.24

0.00

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

12.00

AB InBev Coca Cola Molson Coors Boston Beeer

Altman Z Score

Page 55: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

55

Capital Structure

Analysis

Page 56: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

56

Table of Contents

Capital Structure Analysis

Topic Page #

Executive Summary 56

Cost of Debt & Equity 57

Capital Stack 59

Debt Ratios 60

Beta Calculations 61

Distribution to Shareholders 62

Page 57: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

57

0.57

3.212.11

7.47

0.130.46 0.71

1.89

7.49

0.14

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Debt/Assets Debt/Equity CurrentAssets/Current

Liabilitys

Debt/EBITDA Cash FlowsOps/Total Debt

Debt Ratios

AB InBev Industry Average

AB InBev has had a decreasing plowback ratio since 2013 due to preparation of the SAB Miller acquisition.

The plowback ratio in 2008 is significantly low due to InBev acquiring Anheuser Busch.

The company is using the retained earnings to purchase other companies rather than to grow internally.

Executive Summary of Capital Structure Analysis

1.07 1.08 0.98 1.02

1.17

3.21

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Debt/Equity Ratio In 2016, AB InBev’s debt to equity ratio has increased to a level of 3.21, a level that has been triple the historical rates.

This is not only exceptionally high for AB InBev but also for the brewers’ industry.

The industry average is split the opposite direction, having 71% equity and only 21% debt.

AB InBev’s debt ratios are in line with the brewer industry average for all ratios except debt to equity.

The debt to equity is abnormal due to the large debt issuance to finance the SAB Miller acquisition.

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006

Plowback Ratio

Page 58: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

58

Cost of Debt & Equity

Cost of Equity = 6.36%

Cost of Debt = 7.4%

The cost of equity is derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)

6.36% = 1.6% + 1.19 * 4.0%

This CAPM equation assumes a ten-year treasury constant maturity rate as the risk free

rate, a standard market risk premium of 4.0%, and AB InBev’s current beta of 1.19. The

market risk premium has decreased since the financial crisis in 2008, so the cost of

equity has generally decreased as well. The historical cost of equity over the past ten

years is 8.75%. This was calculated by averaging the costs, while weighting the years

similar to AB InBev’s activities in 2016 more. Overall CAPM is not the most practical

model to use to calculate AB InBev’s historical cost of capital due to the constant

change in the debt to equity ratio.

The cost of debt is derived from the average coupon payments of the outstanding debt.

This average is derived from the $59 billion of new debt added in 2016 and the debt that

was outstanding prior to this year.

The calculation of WACC depends heavily on the debt to equity proportion. Using the

costs of debt and equity above and the debt proportion of 71% and equity of 29%, the

WACC is calculated to 7.10%. The WACC has been changing over the past 10 years

due to the change in capital structure.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Historical WACC

WACC

Page 59: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

59

Debt & Equity Weights

Values Debt Equtiy

Book Value 76% 24%

Market Value 32% 68%

Target Capital Value 29% 71%

1.07 1.08 0.98 1.021.17

3.21

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Debt/Equity Ratio

Page 60: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

60

Capital Stack

The capital stack graph shows how AB InBev’s book value of debt and equity

proportions have changed since 2010. In these seven years, the proportion has been

fairly constant, with equity staying between 41% and 48% of the companies financing.

In 2016, the equity side decreased significantly to 29% due to the $59 billion debt

issuance this year. The SAB Miller takeover was financed with mostly debt, increasing

the debt proportion up to 71%. The equity was 73% in 2008, the year that InBev

acquired Anheuser Busch. It apprears that when AB InBev has a major acquisition, the

company takes out debt to purchase the company that they are acquiring.

74%64% 59% 55% 55% 52% 53% 56%

71%

26%36% 41% 45% 45% 48% 47% 44%

29%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Capital Stack

Debt Equity

Page 61: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

61

Debt/Equity & Financial Debt Ratios

AB InBev’s primary debt ratios listed in the graph above have maintained in line with the

Brewers Industry Average, with the exception of the Debt/Equity ratio. AB InBev’s

debt/equity ratio is 352% larger than the Brewers Industry Average. The significant

increase in AB InBev’s debt level can be explained by the recent purchase of SAB Miller

for $108 billion, totaling approximately 99% of AB InBev’s debt outstanding. The other

ratios have maintained their levels because the acquisition increased both assets and

liabilities to the extent of what SAB Miller had on their books.

0.57

3.21

2.11

7.47

0.130.46

0.71

1.89

7.49

0.14

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Debt/Assets Debt/Equity Current Assets/CurrentLiabilitys

Debt/EBITDA Cash Flows Ops/TotalDebt

Debt Ratios

AB InBev Industry Average

Page 62: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

62

Beta Calculations

Current Listed Beta 1.19 Current Equity Beta 1.19 Target Equity Beta 0.523

Five Year Beta 0.45 Current Asset Beta 0.33

When levering and un-levering AB InBev’s beta to the target capital level (Industry

average level of debt and equity), AB InBev’s current beta is brought down by .667. This

numerical difference in asset betas is caused by the difference in debt to equity levels of

AB InBev and the industry average. The current debt to equity ratio for AB InBev is 3.21

while the industry average is only .71. This high debt to equity ratio drives our current

equity beta higher, due to the higher volatility of the stock based on AB InBev’s

acquisition of SAB Miller. The amount of capital that AB InBev has levered to finance

the acquisition is worrisome to investors, increasing the volatility of the stock. This

volatility has only recently grown, as the five-year beta has averaged to a low rate of

.45.

Page 63: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

63

Distributions to Shareholders

AB InBev has historically retained a significant proportion of earnings but a sharp

decline in the plowback ratio the past two years could lead to a shift in traditional

practices for the company. With the exception of 2008, AB InBev maintained their

plowback ratio in the range of 62%-78% indicating that the firm preferred to reinvest the

majority of its earnings back into the company. In 2014 and 2015 AB InBev’s plowback

ratio dropped to 35% and 19% respectively, a significant decrease in reinvestments to

the firm. AB InBev has slowed reinvestments back into the firm due to alternative uses

of retained earnings, specifically acquiring other companies. The extremely low

plowback rate in 2008 is due to InBev acquisition of Anheuser Busch.

Due to the sharp decrease in the plowback ratio, it can be assumed that the firm will

invest less back into the company in the short-term future. Despite a decrease in

plowback ratio, the 2016 percentage of retention is expected to be higher than 2015’s

19%. One theory behind the decrease in the plowback ratio was AB InBev using

retained earnings to assist in the acquisition costs of SABMiller.

The plowback ratio was calculated using the following equation

(Net Income – Dividends Paid)/Net Income = Plowback Ratio

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006

Plowback Ratio

2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006

Dividends Paid 7966 7400 6253 3632 3088 1924 1313 2088 769 617

Net Income 9867 11302 16518 9434 7959 5762 5877 2099 3048 2126

Plowback Ratio 19% 35% 62% 62% 61% 67% 78% 1% 75% 71%

Page 64: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

64

Financial Statement

Forecasts

Page 65: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

65

Table of Contents Financial Statement Forecasts

Topic Page #

Executive Summary 65

Pro Forma Parameters and Assumptions 66

Projected Fade Rate Graph Analysis 67

Historical and Pro Forma Ratios

Efficiency Ratios 75

Leverage Ratios 77

Coverage Ratios 78

Profitability Ratios 79

Pro Forma DuPont Analysis 80

Pro Forma Altman Z-Score 80

Page 66: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

66

Executive Summary of Financial Statement Forecasts

Critical Pro Forma Ratios:

Debt Ratio:

AB InBev is a signigiantly leveraged company and pro forma analysis indicated the company

will continue to embrace debt as its main source of capital.

Gross Profit Margin:

AB Inbev’s gross profit margin is an encouraging sign for investors. As a result of gross profit

margin being the first level of profitability, the high margin is a sign that AB InBev is an expert at

depriving profit from their main operation.

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Debt Ratio 0.69 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.81

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Gross Profit Margin 69% 65% 66% 67% 68% 68% 69% 70% 70%

Sales Growth Rate:

Based on the sales growth rate for the InBev acquisition of Anheuser Busch and the relative

sizes of the companies, the acquisition of SAB Miller will cause a 27% sales growth rate

increase. The addition of the SAB Miller revenue will bring the total sales amount to over $60

billion annually. The growth rate will level off to a long term rate of 3% growth in the horizon.

This growth is critical due to all other functions of the business relying off of sales.

Projected DuPont Analysis & Altman Z-Score

12/31/2015 12/31/2017 12/31/2025

Net Profit Margin 0.19 0.03 0.21

x Asset Turnover 0.32 0.24 0.22

x Leverage Ratio 3.20 6.28 4.88

Return on Equity 20% 4% 23%

Page 67: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

67

Pro Forma Parameters and Assumptions

The significant size of AB InBev following the acquisition of SAB Miller causes the sales

projections to show growth in the near future. According to the ‘wall street estimates’ on

Morningstar, AB InBev is valued as a buy stock from four out of the seven analysts. The

positive growth of this company is apparent based on the market share and popularity

of the brands it owns. The sales growth rate increased 128% for the year after the

takeover of Anheuser Busch and the SAB Miller takeover will show a significant

increase in sales as well. AB InBev management has shown tremendous ability to get

rid of duplicate costs after an acquisition. The SAB Miller deal comes with a cost

savings of $1.4 billion, part of which comes from a job reduction of about 3%.

(Bloomberg)

AB InBev has a significant competitive advantage over their competition, an advantage

that has grown with the acquisition of SAB Miller. SAB Miller was one of their biggest

competitors in the brewers’ industry and the two now combine to control more than a

fourth of the world beer market. AB InBev also owns a 62% interest in the 3rd largest

company in the brewers’ industry, Ambev. (Philip Gorham) Due to anti-trust laws some

of the businesses will have to be sold off in certain places around the country. “But even

after that, it would have a leading market share in the U.S. (46%), Mexico (57%), Africa

(33%), Brazil (63%) and the rest of Latin America (62%), according to Plato Logic.” –

WSJ article by Tripp Mickle.

Having the largest market share in most major markets will prove to grow the already

massive sales numbers worldwide. The economic leverage of AB InBev is growing with

every acquisition that was made in the past and the future acquisitions that will be

made. The SAB Miller takeover is expected to grow sales to over $60 billion annually.

This can be attributed to the popularity of the beer brands that are owned by SAB Miller

and AB InBev. “AB InBev owns five of the world's largest beer brands by volume, either

directly or through equity ownership in the brand operator. Two of those brands, Corona

Extra and Brahma, are in the premium category, where brand loyalty is higher than the

mainstream and craft beer segments. Even in the mainstream category, the firm's

leading brands have instantly recognizable brand equity among global consumers.”

(Philip Gorham)

The forecasting part of the model is mainly based on the inputs tab. This tab uses a

starting rate for different growth rates and ratios and projects out to a long term rate

based on a fade rate. Each ratio and growth rate has different starting rates and fade

rates, all depending on various factors. Some ratios are much more volatile than others.

Many of the ratios follow a pattern around AB InBev’s history of acquisitions. In 2008,

InBev acquired Anheuser Busch, which had effects on all of the ratios and growth rates

in that year or in the following years. Based on the size of that acquisition and the

similarities with the SAB Miller takeover, that became official this year, many of the

assumptions were based on previous trends following the AB takeover.

Page 68: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

68

Fade Rate of Financial Ratios

AB InBev’s sales grew 128.3% in 2009 because of the acquisition of Anheuser-Busch.

This merger created the largest brewer in the world. This increase in sales causes all of

the ratios in relation to sales to be abnormal when compared to historical analysis.

Sales Growth Rate

The sales growth rate will return to a highly positive value due to the acquisition of SAB

Miller but will decrease to a slightly negative number in the following year, as it is not

possible to sustain such a growth rate of sales. The rate will slow in the horizon to a

steady growth rate as the two companies become one. The sales volumes for the 3rd

Quarter was down 0.9% compared to the previous year’s Q3, mainly due to the large

drop in sales in Brazil. Struggles in Brazil were shared by other companies, such as

Coca Cola, so this is not thought of as a continuing problem.

COGS/Sales

The cost of goods sold to sales ratio will increase 5% due to the SAB Miller takeover, as

it did when Anheuser Busch merged with In-Bev. It will then drop to a long term rate of

28% because of the synergies that the merger will create, which is 3% lower than the

average has been for the past ten years.

Page 69: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

69

SGA/Sales

The selling, general and administrative expenses will drop 3% in the first year, similar to

the 2009 merger and then will go into a steady, consistent rate of 28% for the future. It

is lower than the ratio has been averaged over the past ten years due to the synergies

that come with the takeover of SAB Miller.

Depreciation/Net PPE

The depreciation expense has hovered between 15.5% and 17.5%, with 2 exceptions,

in the past 10 years. There are no indicators that this will change significantly in the

future. As a result the analysts stayed with the average when analyzing the pro forma.

Cash/Sales

The cash ratio peaked for the two largest takeovers in the history of AB InBev. As a

result of the takeovers being all cash deals, they were increasing their cash amount to

pay for these. The newest SAB Miller acquisition was financed with debt so the cash

ratio will not spike, as it did for the other two.

Page 70: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

70

Inventory/Sales

The inventory to sales ratio spiked by jumping up 8% in the year of the Anheuser Busch

takeover and then falling 12% the year after. It has stayed relatively constant from 2009

until the present. The SAB Miller takeover will increase the ratio by 2.5% but then will

drop back down to the average for the horizon.

AR/Sales

The accounts receivables increase with each large acquisition so the SAB Miller

takeover will be no different. This acquisition will stay with the trend of being smoother

than the previous takeover.

Other Short-term Operating Assets/Sales

The takeover of SAB Miller will cause other short-term operating assets to increase in

the first 2 years, as it will take time to combine the two industry titans. It will then level

out to a steady rate.

Page 71: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

71

Net PPE/Sales

The net PPE added from SAB Miller is 40% of AB InBev’s current Net PPE value. This

will cause an increase of the ratio followed by a steady rate out into the horizon, similar

to the takeover of Anheuser Busch although this will be more gradual.

Other Long-Term Operating Assets/ Sales

The long-term operating assets are essential to the brewing business and will increase

with the acquisition of SAB Miller as the two work to combine the two businesses.

AP / Sales

The accounts payable increased for the year of the InBev and Anheuser Busch. It will

act in a similar manner for the SAB Miller takeover and then level out into the horizon.

Page 72: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

72

Accruals / Sales

The merger of Anheuser Busch and InBev caused an increase of 35% in accruals. The

acquisition of SAB Miller will cause an increase, but it will be less of one. The size of AB

InBev today will help them deal with the merger and have less of an increase in

accruals, only a 7% increase and then level out into the horizon.

Other Current Liabilities / Sales

Other current liabilities will increase for this acquisition, similar to the 2008 merger but

will be less severe. The increase will only be 2.5% compared to the 4% increase back in

2008, as AB InBev is more equipped to handle this size of a takeover.

Deferred Taxes / Sales

Deferred taxes increase with a large acquisition due to the purchase price including

goodwill. The deferred taxes on goodwill are high and with a large amount of goodwill

involved in the SAB Miller takeover, the deferred taxes from the takeover will increase

up to 82% and fall slowly into the horizon.

Page 73: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

73

Tax Rate

EBT will be lower in the years after the takeover of SAB Miller due to a higher interest

expense. Once this expense balances out with the growing EBT, the tax rate will

balance out to a normal rate of 19.5%.

Dividend Policy

There will be a decrease in the dividends paid out to shareholders after the SAB Miller

takeover. The money will be plowed back into the company to create the synergies

needed to make this acquisition profitable.

Non-Operating Income / Sales

The non-operating expenses will increase with the acquisition and then it will balance

out to a more desired and sustainable level. Acquisitions cost the company money from

increased costs of blending the two companies together.

Page 74: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

74

Extraordinary Income / Sales

The extraordinary expenses will level out to 3.14% of sales, 100 bps higher than the

average has been due to the synergies that will come from the acquisition with SAB

Miller.

Long-term Investments / Sales

The long-term investment account comes from investments in unconsolidated

subsidiaries. This ratio will increase to 45% with the acquisition of SAB Miller and will

fade out to a long-term rate once the two companies are consolidated.

Other long-term Liabilities / Sales

The other long-term liabilities increased with the Anheuser Busch merger and balanced

out to a more normal level within two years. This trend will cause the ratio to increase to

15% with the SAB Miller takeover and balance out by 2019.

Page 75: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

75

Interest Expense

The interest expense is going to increase significantly due to the financing costs of the

SAB Miller takeover. I have increased the starting rate but I left the long-term rate

because the expense should drop to a normal level after the financing cash flows settle

down after this takeover.

Page 76: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

76

Historical and Pro Forma Financial Ratios

Efficiency Ratios

I. Current Ratio

Upon analyzing AB InBev’s current assets in relation to the firm’s current liabilities,

data shows that the firm’s liabilities are greater that its assets. It is expected that until

2019, AB InBev will be unable to pay off their creditors if obligations came due.

II. Quick Ratio

As a result of AB InBev being a consumer goods company, Inventory is a significant

contributor to current assets. When examining the quick ratio as opposed to the current

ratio, it is assumed that AB InBev would be unable to pay off their creditors if obligations

came due until 2020.

III. Inventory Turnover Ratio

Although the inventory turnover ratio pro forma indicates that AB InBev will sell their

entire average inventory at least four times in a given year, the ratio is significantly less

than industry competitor Molson Coors. In 2015, AB InBev reported an inventory

turnover ratio of 4.66 whereas Molson Coors reported a ratio of 10.99. The discrepancy

between the two companies could be a result of the fact that AB InBev’s average

inventory is greater than Molson Coors.

IV. Days Sales of Inventory

In order to determine how many days it takes AB InBev to turn its inventory into

sales, the inventory turnover ratio was divided by 365. In 2015 it takes the company

approximately 78 days to turn bottled beer into cash. The pro forma indicates that the

2015 figure will increase to 83 days as a result of increased production due to SABMiller

acquisition.

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Current Ratio 0.13 0.28 0.66 0.99 1.22 1.41 1.56 1.70 1.83

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Quick Ratio 0.54 0.10 0.20 0.56 0.89 1.13 1.31 1.47 1.62

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Inventory Turnover Ratio 4.66 4.38 4.36 4.35 4.34 4.33 4.32 4.31 4.30

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Days Sales of Inventory 78.31 83.43 83.67 83.90 84.11 84.32 84.51 84.69 84.86

Page 77: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

77

V. Total Asset Turnover

AB InBev’s low asset turnover may cause some concern amongst potential

investors, however the ratio is acceptable within the industry and actually

outperforms industry competitor, Molson Coors. In 2015, AB InBev reported a total

asset turnover of 0.32 while Molson Coors reported a total asset turnover of .29.

VI. Fixed Asset Turnover

As a result of AB InBev’s significant amount of PP&E the fixed asset turnover is only

slightly higher than the total asset turnover. Again, even though it is a low number it is

acceptable within the brewer industry.

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Total Assets Turnover 0.32 0.17 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.23

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Fixed Asset Turnover 0.37 0.18 0.26 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33

Page 78: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

78

Leverage Ratios

I. Debt Ratio

The debt ratio for AB InBev indicates that the firm is significantly leveraged

compared to its competitors. In 2015, AB InBev recorded a debt ratio of 0.69 while

Molson Coors reported a debt ratio of .43. What is concerning is that AB InBev is only

expected to become more leveraged in the future, implying greater financial risk.

II. Long Term Debt Ratio

Similar to the debt ratio, AB InBev’s projected long term debt ratio indicates a firm

that is dependent on debt to grow or sustain business.

III. Debt to Equity Ratio

AB Inbev’s debt to equity ratio is currently a major concern and is projected to only

get worse. As a result of the high ratio, investors can tell that the company is dominated

by lenders and creditors rather than shareholders.

IV. Long-Term Debt to Total Capitalization Ratio

Again, when analyzing AB InBev’s long-term debt to total capitalization ratio, the

amount of leverage the company takes on in concerning. Molson Coors’ long-term debt

to total capitalization ratio in 2015 was 0.29 as opposed to AB InBev’s at 0.53.

V. Equity Multiplier

An encouraging multiple for AB InBev’s shareholders is its equity multiplier. In 2015

its multiple was 3.2, and the pro forma projection indicates it will only become stronger.

As a comparable Molson Coors’ 2015 equity multiplier was 2.04.

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

L/T Debt Ratio 0.48 0.48 0.59 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.63

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Debt/Equity Ratio 2.20 6.31 5.28 5.11 5.13 5.03 4.84 4.60 4.35

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Equity Multiplier 3.20 7.31 6.28 6.11 6.13 6.03 5.84 5.60 5.35

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

L/T Debt to total capitalization ratio 0.53 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.74

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Debt Ratio 0.69 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.81

Page 79: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

79

Coverage Ratios

I. Cash Coverage Ratio

AB Inbev’s cash coverage ratio is favorable. In 2015, it is an astronomical 10.26

indicating that the company has a significant amount of cash available to pay for interest

expense. The cash coverage ratio is projected to drop to a more reasonable figure, yet

still substantially greater than one.

II. Times Interest Earnings

Just like the cash coverage ratio, AB InBev’s TIE is encouraging. AB InBev’s 2015

TIE indicates that the firm could cover its interest charges 8.3 times on a pretax

earnings basis. Although the firm takes on significant leverage, it does not have an

issue paying off interest expenses.

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Cash Coverage 10.26 5.82 2.46 3.77 4.27 4.32 4.35 4.39 4.44

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Times Interest Earnings 8.30 3.37 1.80 2.97 3.46 3.55 3.60 3.65 3.70

Page 80: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

80

Profitability Ratios

I. Gross Profit Margin

AB InBev’s gross profit margin is acceptable. Compared to Molson Coors’ 2015

gross profit margin of 39%, AB InBev reported 69%. This means AB InBev earns 30

more cents on the dollar in gross margin than Molson Coors. A high gross profit margin,

the first level of profitability, indicates AB InBev is an expert at creating a product

compared to competitors.

II. Net Profit Margin

As a result of selling beverages, AB InBev has a low net profit margin. Each unit of

beer sold only produces so much profit. An encouraging fact for investors would be the

fact AB InBev sells a lot of units of beer.

III. Operating Profit Margin

AB InBev reported an operating profit margin of 31% in 2015, or 31 cents in profit for

each dollar in sales. AB InBev’s pro forma indicates a decrease in the operating profit

margin until 2019, when a high margin will return.

IV. Return on Assets

AB InBev’s net profit margin multiplied by its asset turnover gives investors the firm’s

ROA, this can also be calculated using net income divided by total assets. AB InBev’s

ROA is a low percentage and can be attributed to the large amount of assets the

company manages.

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Gross Profit Margin 69% 65% 66% 67% 68% 68% 69% 70% 70%

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Net Profit Margin 19% 3% 3% 10% 14% 15% 17% 18% 19%

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

Operating Profit Margin 31% 19% 26% 30% 32% 33% 34% 34% 35%

Historical Projected

Date 12/31/2015 12/31/2016 12/31/2017 12/31/2018 12/31/2019 12/31/2020 12/31/2021 12/31/2022 12/31/2023

ROA 6% 1% 1% 3% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4%

Page 81: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

81

Historical and Pro Forma DuPont Analysis

AB InBev’s reported ROE in 2015 was 20%. The firm’s pro forma predicts a significant

decrease in net profit margin in 2017 resulting in an abnormal ROE of 4%. A decrease

in net income is a result of the decrease in the net profit margin, this is a result of sales

not outperforming expenses. It is predicted that the firm’s ROE will recover in a time

horizon of 10 years to 23%. If investors require a firm that they can invest in short term,

they should avoid AB InBev. On the contrary investors who seek a long term investment

might find AB InBev as a viable account.

Historical and Pro Forma Altman’s Z-Score Analysis

The Z-score proves to be volatile when using the most recent full year of data, the next

full year projection and a horizon year in 2025. In the most recent full year, the z score

shows the company being in slight financial distress. With a company the size of AB

InBev that has a z score of 2.0524, the slight financial distress shown from a z score

calculation is less worrisome than it would be for a company with less financial

leverage. The market value of equity is a dominating factor in the first year. The

percentage is so high that it makes up for the lack of weight in the z score calculation.

The large debt issuance cut the equity to liabilities by over 92%. The other parts of the z

score equation had much smaller changes from the end of the first year of data to the

end of the first full projection year. This meant that the z score was going to drop

significantly. The z score of 1.1038 shows very serious financial distress but it is

artificially low due to the large debt issuance. For the horizon year, the z score

increased very slightly, still showing financial distress. The large amount of debt that

was issued in order to purchase SAB Miller is still a dominating factor in the z score

equation. An increase in the retained earnings to total assets ratio does help to offset

this large amount of debt.

12/31/2015 12/31/2017 12/31/2025

Net Profit Margin 0.19 0.03 0.21

x Asset Turnover 0.32 0.24 0.22

x Leverage Ratio 3.20 6.28 4.88

Return on Equity 20% 4% 23%

Page 82: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

82

Cash Flow Valuation

Page 83: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

83

Table of Contents

Cash Flow Valuation

Topic Page #

Executive Summary of Cash Flow Valuation 83

Entity Value 84

Alternative Present Value (APV) 85

Modified Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) 87

Analysis of Cash Flow Valuation 90

Page 84: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

84

Executive Summary of Cash Flow Valuation

*All Data is current as of AB InBev’s 3rd quarter financials of 2016 aside from specifically

specified stock prices

Valuation Method Entity Value APV Modified FCFE

Value of Op. Assets $ 275,639,800,000 $ 244,722,471,238 $ 323,629,847,832

Value of Non-Op. Assets $ 95,179,000,000 $ 95,179,000,000 $ 95,179,000,000

Value of the Firm $ 370,818,800,000 $ 339,901,471,238 $ 418,808,847,832

Interest Bearing Debt $ 108,563,000,000 $ 108,563,000,000 $ 108,563,000,000

Minority Interest $ - $ - $ -

Preferred Stock $ - $ - $ -

Value of Equity $ 262,255,800,000 $ 231,338,471,238 $ 310,245,847,832

Value of a Share $ 163.09 $ 143.87 $ 192.94

Shares Outstanding 1,608,000,000

Date 1/1/2016 6/1/2016 11/11/2016

AB InBev Stock Price $ 124.75 $ 129.03 $ 107.80

The new 59-billion-dollar corporate debt issuances during Q3 of 2016 hyper-inflates the free

cash flows to equity holders as well as the overall 2016 cash flows from operations.

Additionally, there is a 49-billion-dollar change in net working capital due to a large increase

in cash and cash equivalents. Including these one-time-items gives us a significantly high

FCFE for 2016. Throughout the course of the next decade, AB InBev will decrease its level of

cash and cash equivalents in order to fund shortages in liabilities and owners-equity (pay off

short term debt). This decrease in net working capital will be offset from an equal increase in

debt repayments (a negative account). Another item to consider is the overall positive level of

growth rates from 2018 onward, leveling at 3%. These could potentially be negative in

regards to the acquisition of SAB Miller yielding an ROIC that falls short of the company’s

WACC.

Page 85: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

85

Entity Value

The entity value of a firm is a measure of AB InBev’s total company value, used as an

alternative to equity market capitalization. The market capitalization of AB InBev is its

share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, plus its debt, minus its

cash. In this scenario, the minority interest and preferred equity is effectively zero.

The current market value of equity is derived from a recorded share price of $107.80 on

November 11th, 2016. At this moment in time AB InBev recorded 1,606,000,000 shares

of stock outstanding. The total debt is a sum total calculation of the book value of

current long term and short term debt.

This firm valuation method is useful to quickly calculate AB InBev’s value. However, it

does not provide the most accurate projection of AB InBev’s firm value, and in fact

overvalues the firm due to its abnormal degree of debt leverage. This is explained further

in the analysis section for cash flow valuation.

MV of Equity Debt Cash EV

$ 173,126,800,000 $ 108,563,000,000 $ 6,050,000,000 $ 275,639,800,000

Page 86: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

86

Alternative Present Value (APV)

AB InBev’s APV is the net present value (NPV) of the company’s operating cash flows

(Op. CF) if financed solely by equity plus the present value (PV) of any financing

benefits, which are the additional effects of debt. The only financing effect that AB InBev

currently experiences is the interest tax savings from its corporate bond issuances.

*All APV data is represented in Millions

Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Growth Rate -2% 5.30% 3.80% 3.30% 3.10% 3%

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Op. CF $ 13,073 $ 12,812 $ 13,491 $ 14,003 $ 14,465 $ 14,914 $ 15,361

HV $ 267,150

Annual Interest Tax Savings $ 1,607

PV of Interest Tax Savings $ 7,565

NPV of Op. CF $ 244,722

*All data used for the APV calculation above is derived from the values listed below

10-Year Treasury Rate as of Sep 30th, 2016 1.60%

Current Market Risk Premium 4%

Current Beta 1.19

Current Cost of Equity (CAPM Model) 6.36%

Historical Cost of Equity 8.75%

Tax Rate 20.00%

Interest on Total Debt 7.40%

Current Debt 108,563

Page 87: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

87

In calculating AB InBev’s APV, the historical cost of equity is used opposed to its current

cost of equity. The current cost of equity fails to capture an accurate representation of

what the cost of equity will be in the future when used to discount cash flows from the

company’s future operations.

A tax rate of 20% was used to calculate the APV. This corporate tax rate is consistent

throughout this analysis of AB InBev’s intrinsic valuation. 20% is the 10-year historical

tax rate the company uses in its current/historical financial statements, and thus

provides the most accurate data.

The interest on debt of 7.40% is the average annual coupon payment the company is

expected to makes on its 108-billion-dollar corporate debt.

A non-constant growth model is used to project the company’s growth in Op. CF’s. As a

result, -2% is used to project the 2017 decline in Op. CF’s, this number is negative

because of recent acquisition in 2016 of SAB Miller, and assumes that it will take over a

year to effectively organize the companies supply line to streamline all products at the

most profitable level. After this year, the company is expected to experience growth

rates between 3-5% which eventually plateau to a constant growth level of 3%. This is

the exact growth behavior the company experienced after announcing the taking over of

Modelo in 2012.

The APV model solves for a net present value of 237-billion-dollars by discounting the

Op. CF’s at 8.75% (historical cost of equity).

The interest tax savings is calculated by multiplying the tax rate by the current amount

of debt by the interest on said debt (20%*7.8%* 108B). This results in an annual interest

tax savings of 1.6-billion-dollars. The PV of this financing benefit over a period of 6-

years (years tell a steady growth state) discounted at the cost of debt presents a value

of 7.6-billion-dollars. This PV of 7.6-billion is added to the NPV of Op. CF’s of 237B to

calculate an APV of 244.7-billion-dollars.

The APV calculation is by far the best method for calculating the value of this company,

by presenting the most accurate data outputs. This is explained further in the analysis

section for cash flow valuation.

Page 88: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

88

Modified Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE)

AB InBev’s free cash flow to equity (FCFE) is a measure of how much cash can be paid

to equity holders of the company after all expenses, reinvestments and debt are paid.

FCFE = Net Income + Depreciation – Change in Net Working Capital + New Debt - Debt Repayment

The FCFE is projected forward at the growth rate of sales until the growth is a constant

state and then discounts the cash flows at the cost of equity producing an accurate

NPV.

*All APV data is represented in Millions

*All data used for the FCFE calculation above is derived from the values listed below

Financials 2016

NI 7,113.33 DEP 16,377.00 CAP EXP (5,084.02) Change in NWC (46,727.00) New Debt 59,097.00 Principal Repayment of Debt - FCFE 30,776.31

FCFE decreases a substantial amount from 2016 to 2017. This decline is a result of the

assumption that years seceding 2016 won’t have new debt issuances or changes in net

working capital of the same magnitude that 2016 did.

Period 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Growth Rate -2% 5.30% 3.80% 3.30% 3.10% 3%

2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

FCFE $ 30,776 $18,038

$18,994

$19,716

$20,367

$20,998 $ 21,628

HV $376,138

NPV $323,630

Page 89: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

89

Net Income (NI) was calculated from the current 2016 Q3 NI of 5.335-billion amounting

75% of the current years NI. That number divided by three represents the company’s

average NI for one quarter in 2016 (1.778-billion-dollars). The average quarterly NI was

then multiplied by four to represent the full years’ worth of NI (7.113-billion-dollars).

Using a historical depreciation calculation as well as the company MARCS depreciation

table for is larger capital assets, the pro forma deprecation was calculated by taking the

company’s current 2016 deprecation and adding the projected 2016 Q4 deprecation.

Capital expenses for 2016 were calculated the same as NI for 2016, by calculating 2016

quarter averages and then multiplying that amount by four to arrive at a total annual

amount.

Change in net working capital (Change in NWC) for 2016 is considered an outlier when

compared to the company’s averages for change in NWC. The unusual increase is the

outcome of an increase in cash and cash equivalents by 889.02%

Year 2013 2014 2015 2016

CA $ 18,690 $ 18,541 $ 18,294 $ 74,433 CL $ 17,775 $ 19,719 $ 22,531 $ 27,706 NWC $ 915 $ (1,178) $ (4,237) $ 46,727

Change in NWC $50,964.00

Year 2015 Q3 2016

Cash and MS $ 6,978.00 $ 62,032.00

Growth 889.0%

AB InBev issued new corporate debt in 2016 (second largest corporate debt issuance in

history) to finance the accusation of SAB Miller, thus inflating 2016 levels of new debt

issuances to a level the company has never experienced before. No principal debt was

repaid.

Page 90: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

90

Year 2015 2016 New Debt

Total Debt $ 49,466 $ 108,563 $ 59,097

FCFE is not the best method to calculate the value of the company, because of 2016’s

one-time-events, and irregular predictions of sales growth. This is explained further in

the analysis section for cash flow valuation.

Page 91: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

91

Analysis of Cash Flow Valuation

The APV model is the most efficient for analyzing an accurate firm value of AB InBev

and gives the most accurate intrinsic stock price calculation. However, the calculated

intrinsic price is a larger price then the current stock price as of 11/11/2016. The Pro

Forma intrinsic price projects a 10% larger price then where the price was at the

beginning of 2016. The new 59-billion-dollar corporate debt issuances during Q3 of

2016 hyper-inflates the free cash flows to equity holders in 2016 giving the impression

that the company has a larger debt level then it historically ever has. The 49-billion-

dollar change in net working capital due to a large increase in cash and cash

equivalents has a similar outlier effect as the new debt issuance. Including these one-

time-items gives us an extremely high FCFE for 2016. The value of Non-op. assets is

pulled directly from the companies reports to date for the year 2015, and is aligned with

historical levels. Another item to consider is the overall positive level of growth rates

from 2018 onward, leveling at 3%. These could potentially be negative in regards to the

acquisition of SAB Miller yielding an ROIC that falls short of the company’s WACC.

Valuation Method Entity Value APV Modified FCFE

Value of Op. Assets $ 275,639,800,000 $ 244,722,471,238 $ 323,629,847,832

Value of Non-Op. Assets $ 95,179,000,000 $ 95,179,000,000 $ 95,179,000,000

Value of the Firm $ 370,818,800,000 $ 339,901,471,238 $ 418,808,847,832

Interest Bearing Debt $ 108,563,000,000 $ 108,563,000,000 $ 108,563,000,000

Minority Interest $ - $ - $ -

Preferred Stock $ - $ - $ -

Value of Equity $ 262,255,800,000 $ 231,338,471,238 $ 310,245,847,832

Value of a Share $ 163.09 $ 143.87 $ 192.94

Shares Outstanding 1,608,000,000

The above prices show an overestimate of the current stock price of 107.80

(11/11/2016). This discrepancy is the result of generous growth projections, and one-

time-items appearing on the financial statements as a result of the recent accusation of

SAB Miller as explained in the paragraphs above.

Page 92: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

92

Multiples Valuation

Analysis

Page 93: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

93

Table of Contents Multiples Valuation Analysis

Topic Page #

Executive Summary 93

Relative Multiples Valuation Analysis 94

Relative Multiples Analysis vs. Comparable Companies 95

Relative Multiples Analysis vs. Comparable Index’s 96

AB InBev Intrinsic Price Calculations 96

In-depth Multiples Analysis 97

Market & Industry Multiple Analysis 100

Page 94: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

94

Executive Summary of Multiples Valuation Analysis

AB InBev has slight

value discrepancies in

ratios due to current

levels of volatility

resulting from, but not

limited to, the recent

acquisition of SAB

Miller, current geo-

political uncertainty

and higher levels of

LT/ST debt than the

company has ever

experienced before.

This multiple analysis leads to one of two conclusions:

1.) When compared to other brewing companies making up the global beverages-

brewers industry, AB InBev is over-valued. However, this leaves out an important

factor, AB InBev is immensely larger then almost all of the companies that make up

the global beverages-brewers industry. Thus, leading to higher price multiple ratios.

2.) AB InBev is fairly valued and deserves to have higher price multiples because of

its size and recent external growth (acquisitions) as well as its high level of goodwill

as reported on the balance sheet.

23.30

1.19

4.30 6.40

15.20 17.90

24.90

0.662.51

4.41

14.42

30.91

19.90

0.69 2.312.99

14.54

22.90

-

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

Forward P/E Ratio Current Beta Price to Sales Price to Book Price to CashFlows

Price to Free CashFlows

AB InBev Group Comparisons

AB InBev BUD Average of Comparabel Companies Median of Comparabel Companies

AB InBev Comparable

Price of $107.08

Forward P/E

Ratio

Price to

Sales

Price to

Book

Price to

Cash Flows

Price to

Free Cash Flows

AB InBev (Multiples) 23.30

4.30

6.40

15.20

17.90

Current Value

(Over/Under as compared to

Global Beverages-Brewers index) Under Over Over Over Under

Page 95: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

95

Relative (Multiples) Valuation Analysis

Our valuation analysis of AB InBev’s multiples is aligned with what that of many wall street analysts’ predict, including that of beverage sector expert Philip Gorham, CFA, FRM. AB InBev is currently experiencing greater than average volatility due to the recent acquisition of SAB Miller pushing the firm to make the second largest corporate debt issuance in the history of the firm. Additionally, current geopolitical uncertainty resulting from U.S. presidential elections, and the dovish attitude of the U.S. FED. Philip Gorham states “heightened levels of uncertainty could create attractive buying opportunities for long-term investors interested in building a position in competitively advantaged global consumer names. That being said, investors must be aware of short- and potentially longer-term changes across the broader consumer sector. First, while unlikely to be sustained, we recognize that erratic changes in foreign currency rates are likely to have a near-term impact, particularly for firms with exposure to Mexico (with the peso trading at all-time lows against the U.S. dollar).” This is important to consider for properly valuating AB InBev’s Latin American operations. Overall our multiple analysis shows slight value discrepancies when comparing the company’s financials to that of other companies/index’s both inside and outside the market sector.

*Data Current as of November 11th, 2016*

Page 96: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

96

Relative Multiples Analysis vs. Comparable Companies

Stock Price as of (11/11/2016): $107.80

AB InBev & Comparable Companies (Valuation Ratios)

Company Ticker

Forward P/E Ratio

Current Beta

Price to Sales

Price to Book

Price to Cash Flows

Price to Free Cash Flows

AB InBev BUD 23.30 1.19 4.30 6.40

15.20

17.90

Molson Coors TAP 16.90 0.89 5.93 2.15

24.40

35.25

Boston Beer SAM 26.10 0.66 2.50 4.81

16.60

28.01

Coca Cola KO 20.40 0.80 4.23 6.79

20.28

27.99

Pepsi PEP 19.90 0.69 2.44 11.80

14.54

20.04

Dr Pepper Snapple Group DPS 17.40 0.67

2.43 7.12

16.31

21.15

Carlsberg A/S CABGY 2.70 1.09

1.40 1.94

7.70

12.64

United Breweries CCU 15.80 0.52 1.61 2.33

11.20

100.32

Heineken HEINY 10.70 1.02 2.00 2.99

11.65

23.11

Suntory Beverage & Food STBFY 35.40 0.26

0.96 2.80

9.10 N/A

Tsingtao Brewery TSGTY 84.40 0.86

1.40 2.10

15.90 N/A

China Resources Beer CRHKY 19.70 0.16

1.11 3.50

10.50 N/A

Brick Brewing BIBLF 31.00 (0.25)

2.31 2.63

14.02

22.68

Average N/A 24.90 0.66 2.51 4.41 14.42 30.91

Std. Dev N/A 19.71 0.40 1.47 2.90 4.58 25.16

Median N/A 19.90 0.69 2.31 2.99 14.54 22.90

Page 97: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

97

Relative Multiples Analysis vs. Comparable Index’s

AB InBev Comparable

Price of $107.08

Forward P/E

Ratio

Current Beta

Price to

Sales

Price to

Book

Price to Cash Flows

Price to Free Cash Flows

AB InBev (Multiples)

23.30 1.19 4.30 6.40 15.20 17.90

S&P 500 24.90 1.00 1.91 2.88 N/A N/A

Global Beverages-

Brewers 23.75 0.54 1.88 2.15 13.79 21.69

Global Beverages- Soft

Drinks 23.60 0.42 1.41 2.70 11.60 22.40

AB InBev Intrinsic Price Calculations

AB InBev Comparable Price

of $107.08

Forward P/E

Ratio Current

Beta Price to Sales

Price to

Book

Price to Cash Flows

Price to Free Cash Flows

AB InBev (Multiples) 23.30 1.19 4.30 6.40 15.20 17.90

Intrinsic Price (As Compared to

Average) $115.20 N/A $62.91 $74.31 $102.23 $186.14

Intrinsic Price (As Compared to

Median) $92.07 N/A $57.91 $50.36 $103.12 $137.88

Intrinsic Price (As Compared to Global

Beverages- Brewers Index) $109.88 N/A $47.13 $36.21 $97.80 $130.62

Current Value (Over/Under as

compared to Global Beverages-Brewers

Index) Under N/A Over Over Over Under

EPS Beta RPS BVPS CFPS FCFPS

AB InBev 4.63 1.19 25.07 16.84 7.09 6.02

Page 98: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

98

In-depth Multiples Analysis

AB InBev has a current forward P/E Ratio that sits at a fair to slightly lower level than

what many professional analysts believe it should be at. Our Analysts predict that its

current P/E ratio is espicially fair valued, differing only from the Global Beverages-

Brewers Index (AB Inbev’s most comparable index) by 1.85%.

AB InBev’s most current beta is well above the current average form similar companies.

This is a result of the company’s current levels of volatility resulting from but not limited

to; the recent acquisition of SAB Miller, current geopolitical uncertainty, and higher

levels of long term and short term debt then the company has ever experienced.

23.30 16.90

26.10 20.40 19.90 17.40

2.70

15.80 10.70

35.40

84.40

19.70

31.00

- 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00 60.00 70.00 80.00 90.00

Forward P/E Ratio

1.19

0.89

0.66 0.80

0.69 0.67

1.09

0.52

1.02

0.26

0.86

0.16

(0.25) (0.40)

(0.20)

-

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

1.20

1.40

Comparable Betas

Page 99: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

99

AB InBev’s price to sales ratio is considerably greater then (1.88) that of the Global

Beverages-Brewers Index, and all but one of its comparable competitors. This is a result

of a more generous market valuation due to the company’s increasing external growth,

and size compared to other competitors in the market.

AB InBev’s greater than average price to book ratio when compared to the above list of

similar companies, as well as its grater then average ratio compared to (2.15) of the

Global Beverages-Brewers Index, is a result of generous market valuation based on the

company’s size and recent external growth.

4.30

5.93

2.50

4.23

2.44 2.43

1.40 1.61 2.00

0.96 1.40

1.11

2.31

-

1.00

2.00

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

7.00

Price to Sales

6.40

2.15

4.81

6.79

11.80

7.12

1.94 2.33 2.99 2.80

2.10 3.50

2.63

-

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

12.00

14.00

Price to Book

Page 100: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

100

AB InBev’s price to cash flow ratio is at moderate to median level within the industry

average, and compared to Global Beverages-Brewers Index ratio of (13.79). This shows

us that the company’s revenue per share as compared to its price per share is within

the acceptable industry level, and being valued at the most realistic multiple level when

compared to other price multiples.

AB InBev’s price to free cash flow ratio is again shown at a lower to medium level when

compared against similar companies and the Global Beverages-Brewers Index ratio of

(21.69). This ratio is lower than company historical averages and is expected to

continue to decrease, because of the recent corporate debt issuances, specifically the

issuance to fund the accusation of SAB Miller.

15.20

24.40

16.60

20.28

14.54 16.31

7.70 11.20 11.65

9.10

15.90

10.50 14.02

-

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

Price to Cash Flows

17.90

35.25 28.01 27.99

20.04 21.15 12.64

100.32

23.11

- - -

22.68

-

20.00

40.00

60.00

80.00

100.00

120.00

Price to Free Cash Flows

Page 101: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

101

Market & Industry Multiple Analysis

In the above listed multiples ratios, one can note that AB InBev’s intrinsic value varies

based off the use of different price multiple ratios. The company’s stock price and

intrinsic value is derived from many internal and external factors. Including but not

limited to future company expectations of sales growth and external growth through

acquisitions. Over all, this multiple analysis leads to one of two conclusions. First being

when compared to other brewing companies making up the Global Beverages-Brewers,

AB Inbev is over-valued. However, this leaves out an important factor, AB InBev is

immensely larger then almost all of the companies that make up the Global Beverages-

Brewers. Thus, leading to higher price multiple ratios. Second, AB InBev is fairly valued

and deserves to have higher price multiples because of its size and recent external

growth (accusations) as well as its high level of goodwill as reported on the balance

sheet.

23.30

1.19

4.30 6.40

15.20 17.90

24.90

0.662.51

4.41

14.42

30.91

19.90

0.69 2.312.99

14.54

22.90

-

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

Forward P/E Ratio Current Beta Price to Sales Price to Book Price to Cash Flows Price to Free CashFlows

AB InBev Group Comparisons

AB InBev BUD Average of Comparabel Companies Median of Comparabel Companies

23.30

1.19 4.30 6.40

15.20 17.90

24.90

1.00

1.91 2.88

- -

23.75

0.54 1.88

2.15

13.79

21.69

23.60

0.42 1.41

2.70

11.60

22.40

-

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

Forward P/E Ratio Current Beta Price to Sales Price to Book Price to Cash Flows Price to Free CashFlows

AB InBev vs Benchmarks

AB InBev BUD S&P 500 N/A Global Beverages-Brewers N/A Global Beverages- Soft Drinks N/A

Page 102: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

102

Valuation Summary &

Conclusion

Page 103: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

103

Table of Contents Valuation Summary & Conclusion

Topic Page #

Introduction to Summary 103

Cash Flow Methods 103

Summary & Analysis of Cash Flow Valuation 104

Summary of Multiple Analysis 105

Final Conclusion 106

Page 104: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

104

AB InBev Valuation Summary and Conclusion

The following is the final intrinsic valuation of AB InBev using different cash flow

methods, and multiples analysis. The projected stock prices from these valuation tools

are to be used as estimates for the intrinsic valuation of AB InBev’s stock price. The

modernity of the data used will be presented above all data tables, graphs and charts to

allow for further accuracy in computing the intrinsic valuation of AB InBev.

Cash Flow Methods

*Data in the table below is current as of AB InBev’s 3rd quarter financials of 2016 aside from specifically

specified and dated historical stock prices

Valuation Method Entity Value APV Modified FCFE

Value of Op. Assets $ 275,639,800,000 $ 244,722,471,238 $ 323,629,847,832

Value of Non-Op. Assets $ 95,179,000,000 $ 95,179,000,000 $ 95,179,000,000

Value of the Firm $ 370,818,800,000 $ 339,901,471,238 $ 418,808,847,832

Interest Bearing Debt $ 108,563,000,000 $ 108,563,000,000 $ 108,563,000,000

Minority Interest $ - $ - $ -

Preferred Stock $ - $ - $ -

Value of Equity $ 262,255,800,000 $ 231,338,471,238 $ 310,245,847,832

Value of a Share $ 163.09 $ 143.87 $ 192.94

Shares Outstanding 1,608,000,000

Date 1/1/2016 6/1/2016 11/11/2016

AB InBev Stock Price $ 124.75 $ 129.03 $ 107.80

Page 105: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

105

Summary and Analysis of Cash Flow Valuation

In calculating the most accurate intrinsic value of AB InBev’s firm value and stock price

the APV model provides the best data outputs for arriving at a fair value and intrinsic

stock price by solving for the net present value (NPV) of the company’s operating cash

flows (Op. CF) if financed solely by equity, adding the present value (PV) of any

financing benefits, which are the additional effects of debt. This valuation method led an

intrinsic stock price of $143.87, compared to three separate actual stock prices

calculated at specified dates throughout 2016. With the closest and most comparable

actual stock price falling just $14.84 below or 11.5% below the intrinsic stock price

calculated by the APV method. When analyzing this intrinsic value of AB InBev it’s

important to take into account that the overall positive level of growth rates from 2018

onward, leveling at 3%. These growth rates could potentially be negative in regards

complications with the acquisition of SAB Miller potentially yielding an ROIC that falls

short of the company’s WACC, changing the overall NPV of the Op. CF’s and lowering

the intrinsic stock price. While this outcome is unlikely, it is possible and has to be

accounted for and mentioned in the analysis of the company’s intrinsic value.

When calculating the intrinsic value of the firm from the Entity Valuation method the

stated market value of equity is derived from a recorded share price of $107.80 on

November 11th, 2016 when there were 1,606,000,000 shares of stock outstanding. The

total debt is a sum total calculation of the BV of current long term and short term debt

amounting to 108-billion-dollars. This firm valuation method is useful to quickly calculate

a company’s value. However, it does not provide the most accurate projection of AB

InBev’s firm value, and in fact over-values the firm due to its extreme degree of debt

leverage.

FCFE is a measure of how much cash can be paid to equity holders of the company

after all expenses, reinvestments and debt are paid. The FCFE is projected forward at

the growth rate of sales tell a constant state and then discounted at the cost of equity

presenting a NPV. This despite being more in depth and data rich does not provide an

accurate intrinsic value for AB InBev. This method over-value the firm by a far greater

magnitude then the EV and APV methods. If this method was used exclusively, it would

lead one to believe the company is under-valued by a magnitude of 80%. Much of this

value discrepancy is a result of one-time-items inflating the value of FCFE by large

amounts deriving from the new debt issued for the SAB Miller accusation, and change

in NWC.

Page 106: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

106

Summary of the Multiple Analysis

The following data tables and graphs provide the best depiction of AB InBev’s valuation

through price multiples and present an intrinsic stock price from said multiples.

* Data in tables and graphs below current as of November 11th, 2016

AB InBev Comparable Price

of $107.08

Forward P/E

Ratio Current

Beta Price to Sales

Price to

Book

Price to Cash Flows

Price to Free Cash Flows

AB InBev (Multiples) 23.30 1.19 4.30 6.40 15.20 17.90

Intrinsic Price (As Compared to

Average) $115.20 N/A $62.91 $74.31 $102.23 $186.14

Intrinsic Price (As Compared to

Median) $92.07 N/A $57.91 $50.36 $103.12 $137.88

Intrinsic Price (As Compared to Global Beverages-

Brewers Index) $109.88 N/A $47.13 $36.21 $97.80 $130.62

23.30

1.19

4.30 6.40

15.20 17.90

24.90

0.662.51

4.41

14.42

30.91

19.90

0.69 2.312.99

14.54

22.90

-

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

35.00

Forward P/E Ratio Current Beta Price to Sales Price to Book Price to CashFlows

Price to Free CashFlows

AB InBev Group Comparisons

AB InBev BUD Average of Comparabel Companies Median of Comparabel Companies

Page 107: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

107

Current Value (Over/Under as

compared to Global Beverages-Brewers

Index) Under N/A Over Over Over Under

Final Conclusion

When combining the analysis of AB InBev’s cash flows, price multiples, and analyst

reports, the company is fairly valued. Using only one method to value the intrinsic stock

price of the company leads to an incorrect valuation of where the company currently sits

from a general financial stand point, but when combining all analysis methods to create

a clear picture of the company’s value, it proves that the market has dictated the true

correct value of the company.

Page 108: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

108

Appendix & Excel

Sheets

Page 109: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

109

CONDENSED SHEETS

Page 110: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

110

Page 111: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

111

PROJECTED SHEETS

Page 112: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

112

Page 113: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

113

WACC ESTIMATES

Page 114: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

114

HISTORICAL RATIO SHEETS

Page 115: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

115

Page 116: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

116

Bibliography

Page 117: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

117

Sources: 2015 Brandz Top 100 - Most Valuable Global Brands - WPP". Wpp.com. N.p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016. "AB Inbev 2015 Annual Report". Annualreport.ab-inbev.com. N.p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016. Notte, Jason. "These 11 Brewers Make Over 90% Of All U.S. Beer". MarketWatch. N.p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016.

"AB Inbev 2015 Annual Report". Annualreport.ab-inbev.com. N.p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016. "DOJ Approves Anheuser-Busch Inbev's $107 Billion Deal For Sabmiller". USA TODAY. N. p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016. Mickle, Tripp. "AB Inbev Acquires Spikedseltzer Creator Boathouse Beverage ". WSJ. N. p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016.

"Japan’s Renesas Electronics To Buy U.S. Chipmaker For $3.2 Billion". Fortune. N. p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016.

"Man Files Lawsuit Against A-B Inbev Over Leffe Origins - Beer Street Journal".Beer Street Journal. N. p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016.

Roberts, Daniel. "Bud Light Will Remain NFL's Official Beer Until 2022". Fortune. N. p., 2015. Web. 15 Sept. 2016.

"After Turning Down Five Offers, British-Based Brewer Sabmiller Accepted In Principle An Improved Takeover Bid Worth $106 Billion From Anheuser Busch Inbev, Which Along With Budweiser Makes Corona, Stella Artois And Beck's". vagazette.com. N. p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016.

"Beverages - Brewers Industry Snapshot - Nytimes.Com". Markets.on.nytimes.com. N. p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016.

Global market share of the leading beer companies in 2014, based on volume sales. "Global Beer Industry Market Share | Statista". Statista. N. p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016.

"Anheuser-Busch Inbev SA (BUD) Institutional Ownership & Holdings".NASDAQ.com. N. p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016.

Salary.com, Site. "Executive Salaries By Education, Experience, Location And More - Salary.Com". Www1.salary.com. N. p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016.

"Anheuser-Busch Inbev". N. p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016.

News, Market et al. "Jefferies Sees Double The Cost Savings For Anheuser-Busch Inbev". Seeking Alpha. N. p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016.

"Changes To Anheuser-Busch Inbev SA (NYSE:BUD) Target Prices". Fiscal Standard - Financial Market News For Investors. N. p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016.

"National Beer Sales & Production Data - Brewers Association". Brewers Association. N. p., 2016. Web. 15 Sept. 2016. Mickle, Tripp. "AB Inbev Takeover Of Sabmiller Would Realign Global Beer Industry". WSJ. N. p., 2016. Web. 17 Nov. 2016.

Page 118: Capital Investments Valuation Project (1)

118

Merced, Michael. "Anheuser-Busch Agrees To Be Sold To Inbev". Nytimes.com. N. p., 2015. Web. 17 Nov. 2016. "Anheuser-Busch Inbev Clinches $103 Billion Sabmiller Deal". Bloomberg.com. N. p., 2016. Web. 17 Nov. 2016. Fenebris.com, Frankfurt/M. "US - Market Risk Premia". Market-risk-premia.com. N. p., 2016. Web. 17 Nov. 2016. Bray, Chad. "Shareholders Approve Sabmiller Takeover By Anheuser-Busch Inbev". Nytimes.com. N. p., 2016. Web. 17 Nov. 2016. recession', One. "One Of Trump's Major Economic Polices Could Lead To A 'Global Recession'". Business Insider. N. p., 2016. Web. 17 Nov. 2016. "Shibboleth Authentication Request". Www-capitaliq-com.colorado.idm.oclc.org. N. p., 2016. Web. 17 Nov. 2016. "Shibboleth Authentication Request". Library.morningstar.com.colorado.idm.oclc.org. N. p., 2016. Web. 17 Nov. 2016. "Anheuser-Busch Inbev/NV (BUD) Weighted Average Cost Of Capital (WACC)". Gurufocus.com. N. p., 2016. Web. 17 Nov. 2016. "Shibboleth Authentication Request". Mergentonline.com.colorado.idm.oclc.org. N. p., 2016. Web. 17 Nov. 2016.