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Canada-United States Softwood Lumber Dispute Presentation to Western Forest Economists June 2015
Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations 1
Presentation Outline
2
I. Importance of Forestry to BC
II. Trade Dispute History
III. 2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement
IV. Post 2015
Importance Of Forest Sector In BC
3
GDP $5.9B in 2011 12% of BC goods sector GDP Employment 60,700 in 2014 2.7% of total BC employment Exports $12.4B in 2014 35% of BC merchandise exports 34% of Canadian forest products exports Lumber Prod. 12.5 BBF in 2014 51% of Canadian lumber production Govt Revenue $719M in 2014 over $1 billion in good years
BC Coast vs Interior
Year 2014 Unit Interior Coast Province
Timber Harvest million m3 46.8 19.3 66.1
From private land million m3 1.7 5.4 7.1
% from private land % 4% 28% 11%
Lumber Production million bf 11,128 1,363 12,492
Lumber Exports to US million bf 5,636 566 6,202
Log Exports million m3 0.6 6.0 6.6
As % of Timber Harvest % 1% 31% 10%
4
Sources: Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations Harvest Billing System Statistics Canada, CANSIM 303-0064 Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Daily Export Reports Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations, Log Export Permit Report
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Trade Dispute History
The Main Argument
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Different Forest Ownership: • Canada’s timber is ~90% from Crown land • US timber is ~90% from private land
The US claims: • Canadian lumber industry is subsidized • Main allegation is that provincial stumpage rates charged to
companies for trees logged on Crown land are set too low and do not follow markets
• As a result, lumber imported from Canada should be subject to countervailing duties
Canada disputes this assertion: • Stumpage rates are set in relation to markets • Economic rent theory says even if stumpage were low, it
wouldn’t lead to higher production
Share Of US Lumber Market
7 Source: WWPA Lumber Track
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
US
Cons
umpt
ion
(mill
ion
boar
d fe
et)
Decomposition of US Softwood Lumber Consumption
BC Export Volume Rest of Canada Export Volume Rest of World Export Volume US Domestic Production
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• WTO and NAFTA aim to reduce trade barriers, but set rules for exceptions: ‒ countervailing duties to offset government subsidies ‒ anti-dumping duties to offset companies exporting
products at prices lower than the prices normally charged in the home market
‒ emergency trade restrictions designed to “safeguard” domestic industries
• Each country has its own rules to investigate whether duties are justified – in softwood lumber, the US is applying its rules to Canadian imports
Background: International Trade Rules
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• US industry petitions govt – Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports • US Department of Commerce investigates subsidy and
dumping • US International Trade Commission (ITC) investigates injury • US Trade Representative (USTR) – negotiates/administers
agreements • Each year, Commerce recalculates duties – can result in partial
refund of duties, or requirement to pay more • Uncertainty - exporters don’t know what level of tariff they
will end up paying • High duties – highest in Lumber IV was 27% CVD+AD,
eventually determined to be de minimis after many NAFTA panel remands
US Trade Rules
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NAFTA And WTO Appeals
• Canada can appeal US CVD, AD and injury rulings to arbitration panels under NAFTA and WTO.
• NAFTA panels: ‒ whether US determination accords with US law ‒ can require the US to change its finding
• WTO panels rule on: ‒ whether US is consistent with WTO rules ‒ no authority to require the US to change its finding ‒ may authorize retaliatory measures
• In Lumber IV, Canada appealed numerous US decisions to NAFTA and/or WTO
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Key Panel Decisions In Lumber IV
• Panel on injury – Panel required US to review threat of injury decision 3 times. On 3rd review, panel required US to find no threat of injury.
• Panel on CVD – Panel required US to recalculate CVD 5 times. On 5th Calculation, CVD rate below 1% ‘de minimis’ .
• Panel on AD – Panel returned calculation to US 3 times. Panel discontinued before final ruling.
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Canada-US Lumber Dispute
82-83 Lumber I – Countervailing duty (CVD) case 83-86 No dispute 86 Lumber II – CVD 86-91 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 92-94 Lumber III – CVD 94-96 Agreement Negotiation 96-01 1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) 01-06 Lumber IV – CVD and Anti-dumping (AD) 06-15 2006 SLA 2015 + ??
Source: Random Lengths
Price Differentials Illustrate Level Of Protection
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Jan-
93Ju
l-93
Jan-
94Ju
l-94
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l-95
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96Ju
l-96
Jan-
97Ju
l-97
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l-98
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l-99
Jan-
00Ju
l-00
Jan-
01Ju
l-01
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02Ju
l-02
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03Ju
l-03
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04Ju
l-04
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05Ju
l-05
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06Ju
l-06
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07Ju
l-07
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l-08
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09Ju
l-09
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10Ju
l-10
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11Ju
l-11
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12Ju
l-12
Jan-
13Ju
l-13
Jan-
14Ju
l-14
Jan-
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Cross border lumber price difference: Toronto vs Boston 2x4 price difference as a percentage of Canadian
price
Lumber III 6.5% Duty
Consultations / Negotiat
ions (No
Duty)
Softwood Lumber Agreement Quota
Lumber IV SLA 2006
Canada's Win at NAFTA and ECCSep'04 & Aug'05
13
14
2006 Softwood Lumber Agreement
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Key Features Of 2006 SLA • Came into force October 2006. Expires October 2015 • Returned 80% (US$4.3 billion) of duties to Cdn companies • Two options: (A) Export tax, or (B) Quota with lower tax • Tax collected by federal govt, remitted to provinces • Bottom loaded tax - rate declines as lumber prices rise • Free trade under either Option when benchmark lumber
price is over US$355/MBF • Canada must notify US of changes to forest policy, US can
challenge, certain ‘safe harbours’ (eg environmental) • Dispute Settlement by London Court of International
Arbitration • US agreed to one year standstill on expiry
Lumber Prices And Incidence Of SLA Tax
16 Source: Random Lengths
$175$195$215$235$255$275$295$315$335$355$375$395$415$435$455$475$495$515$535$555
Soft
woo
d Lu
mbe
r Pric
e In
dex
($U
S/m
bf)
Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) Export Tax Trigger Points
No Tax
5% Tax10% Tax
15% Tax
SLA in force,Oct 2006
SLA expiresOct 2015
June 2015
What Happens Next?
17
2006 SLA expires in October 2015 Possible scenarios post-2015: • Extended or Renewed Agreement • New CVD/AD against Canada (Lumber V)
‒ One year standstill to Oct 2016 • New Agreement
Key Factors For Future Of Dispute
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• Market Pricing of Timber: ‒ 2003-2006: BC implements an auction based pricing
system for timber ‒ 2013: Quebec implements similar system
• Reduced Timber Supply in Canada ‒ BC’s harvest expected to fall ‒ Ontario and Quebec harvest also lower
• Diversified Exports ‒ BC and Canada now export a significant share of their
lumber to Asia • Cross Border Mill Ownership
‒ BC companies now own about 14% of US production
• Established in 2003 • Core business goal: To provide credible representative
price and cost benchmark data for the market pricing system (MPS) through auctions of public timber
• BCTS auctions timber tracts to highest bidder: ‒ Approximately 20% of AAC; representative sample ‒ Auction characteristics (e.g. sealed bid, upset rate method,
etc) designed and periodically reviewed with advice from MDI auction consultants.
‒ Minimal eligibility requirements: bidding pool of about 1,000 registrants
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BC Timber Sales
20
BCTS Auctions
BCTS Auction Prices
Major Licensee Estimated
Auction Prices
Cost Adjustment 5) Costs to represent forest management responsibilities major licensees have that BCTS auction purchasers do not (Tenure Obligation Adjustments) are subtracted from estimated auction price.
1) Timber stands representing the variety of provincial harvest are auctioned.
2) Each auction yields a winning price, which varies with stand characteristics. This is what BCTS harvesters pay.
4) Characteristics of major licensee stands are inputted into MPS equation to estimate auction price for non-BCTS stands.
Stumpage for Major Licensees (~80% of Harvest)
Market Pricing System Uses Auction Results
BCTS Stand Characteristics
MPS Formula 3) Statistical relationship between winning price and stand characteristics is estimated.
Major Licensee Stand Characteristics
6) Result is stumpage billed and paid by major licensees.
Mountain Pine Beetle Epidemic Is A Disaster
21
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
140.0
160.0
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
Pine
Vol
ume K
illed
(mill
ions
of c
ubic
met
res)
Year
Entire ProvinceTimber Harvesting Land Base
Current Estimate of Observed Annual Red-Attack (2014*)
Current Estimate of Projected Annual Red-Attack (2014*)
*2014 Publication: 1999-2013 Aerial Overview Surveys and BCMPB.v11
730 Million Cubic Metres Killed To Date
22
Falling BC Timber Supply
23 Source: FLNRO AAC: Allowable Annual Cut
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
2029
2030
mill
ion
cubi
c met
res
Actual AAC AAC Outlook
BC Lumber Exports Have Shifted To Asia
24 Source: StatsCan
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Thou
sand
Cub
ic M
eter
s
BC Lumber Exports By Destination
United States China Japan Rest of World
56%
29%
8%
7% 86% 1%
10%
4%
25
Cross Border Ownership
Conclusions
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• Forestry sector is key to BC’s economy, and lumber exports to US are key to BC forestry
• Declining BC timber supply and diversification of exports to Asia mean BC lumber exports to US not likely to rise
• BC’s forest policy and timber pricing system is market oriented, robust and defensible: – Pricing based on auctions makes sense – MPS is regularly updated and reviewed to ensure validity
• Thus, increased US protection against BC and Canadian lumber imports is not warranted.