World Affairs Institute

Can Congress Do Anything?Source: Advocate of Peace through Justice, Vol. 93, No. 4 (December, 1931), pp. 198-199Published by: World Affairs InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20681612 .

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198 Advocate of Peace, December, 1931

for too many millions to be ignored. The

second fact is that all the heavy arma

ments have not produced a feeling of secur

ity anywhere. Evidently, therefore, there must be a new deal. That new deal need not, indeed it cannot take the form of "total

disarmament," for of course there can be no

such thing as the complete disarmament of

any healthy man or nation. Eliminate all

the guns and battleships, there would re

main carpenter and kitchen tools, fists and

finger nails. But, for men of good will the

limitation of war-like implements on the

basis of the equality of States ought not to

be an impossibility. Such an arrangement is so desirable it must be possible. Nations

are interested to achieve their interests.

They are not achieving them now. We still

count upon the power of enlightened public

opinion to compel their representatives at

Geneva, next February, to produce a more

sensible reduction and distribution of their

swords and pistols than is now the case.

Of course, whatever is done at Geneva

must be done with the voluntary advice and consent of France. We have learned that

France if sufficiently provoked can dictate

to and if need be crush financial structures

in Vienna, ending in the bankruptcy of Ger

many and the flop of the gold standard in

England. She will stand resolutely for her

security, against invasion from Germany,

against attack by Italy, against any on

slaught from England, against any jeopardy to her foreign possessions or to her allies,

Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania,

Yugoslavia. France is the one great Euro

pean Power that has money. Even Austria

and Hungary are now dependent on that

money. There is no Power on earth, nor

combination of Powers, that can achieve

anything at Geneva next February without

the consent of France.

We do not view this dependence on

France with the misgiving now broadly felt.

True, French realism is sometimes too real

istic. We believe this to be the fact in her

emphasis upon military force as the only basis of her security. Yet France is intelli

gent. She wants peace. She has the will

to protect her interests. She knows that

both her security and interests are depend ent upon the good will of other peoples, a fact that applies to us all. She cannot

afford to be offensively unreasonable at

Geneva. She knows that.

Thus we are down to the one answer to

the question, Can nations reduce their

armaments? They can if they have a suf

ficient amount of common sense, tempered

by a normal concern for fair play. Geneva

will test how far the nations possess these

life-saving qualities.

Can Congress Do Anything?

IS

THERE anything that Congress can

do now to make easier the work of the

Delegates of the United States to the Arms

Conference in Geneva? This we conceive

to be a question of major importance. When our delegates go to international Con

ferences they are frequently embarrassed

by the fact that foreigners have learned, sometimes through rather bitter experiences, that whatever our delegates agree to, their

agreements may be wholly undone later by the United States Congress. Our foreign friends now know that even the President

of the United States cannot negotiate with

them with any finality. Since this is true, we have been greatly

interested in a suggestion made by the Hon

orable Huston Thompson, former Chair man of the Federal Trade Commission, member of the Board of Directors of the

American Peace Society, in an address in

Washington on November 11. After point

ing out the limitations upon our Executive

in international negotiations, the necessity for the approval of our Congress in such

matters, he called attention to the uncer

tainty frequently faced by our delegates abroad because of their doubts as to how

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Advocate of Peace, December, l')31 199

far they may go. The result has been that

foreign powers have "lost confidence in our

system of negotiation." We shall be represented at the Geneva

Conference by delegates anxious to do their work well. They should go with some de

gree of confidence that their work will be

supported in the Congress. Addressing himself to this phase of our relations to the

Conference, Mr. Thompson said: "We shall have two months intervening between the

opening of Congress and the Assembly of the Conference at Geneva. Why not in this interim be bold and fearless and tell the

world what we are willing to do. Why not have our Congress suggest to our President

through a joint resolution how jar it will

support him in his negotiations?" Mr.

Thompson pointed out the importance of a

joint action of the House and Senate, as the Senate has the veto power over treaties, and the House similarly where expenditures are

involved. He went as far as to express the

hope that such a joint resolution might be

prepared by the Chairmen of the Foreign Relation Committees of the two Houses and passed possibly before Christmas.

Mr. Thompson went further and sug

gested possible provisions for the resolution, such as the reduction of our total budget for armaments on land, sea and air, for the next ten years "to any point up to fifty per cent to which the other nations of the world

will agree," taking into consideration such items as the purchasing values of the

moneys of the several nations as of the date of the opening of the Conference. He sug

gested the possibilities of authorizing our

delegates to negotiate a five year holiday of all armaments with no further capital in vestment for that period; and of declaring against the use of poison gas and germ war

fare forever.

Mr. Thompson argued that such a resolution would be welcomed by the Executive branch of our Government, giv ing as it would the necessary assurances

to hearten and to guide our delegates in their negotiations. It would be an

invitation for action by all the other na

tions. It would clear away doubts and fears that always accompany uncertainty. Such a plan could meet with no objection by Democrat or Republican, or by the military men, because the reductions would be made alike and on an equitable basis.

Mr. Thompson pointed out what it would mean if the cut were to reach as much as

fifty per cent. There would be a total sav

ing of $17,500,000,000 in ten years to the

nations of the world, money that could be used to ease the unemployment situation, pay national debts, check increased taxa tion and revive business. "In America

alone there would be a saving of more than

$300,000,000 a year; in France $130,000, 000 a year; and in England $280,000,000.

With such savings, the nations of the world

could then afford to make a reasonable re

duction in Germany's reparations, to a point where she could revive and take her place as a solvent nation."

This proposal by Mr. Thompson is as

sound in historical background as it is sensi

ble in theory. When in 1911 President Taft

wished to get his arbitration treaties

adopted by the Senate he tried the method of coercing that body by the force of pub lic opinion. His treaties failed. When

later Mr. Bryan, Secretary of State, con

ceived his plan for "cooling off treaties" he

began by enlisting the interest and support of the Congress by quiet and personal per suasion. After he had won the support of

Congress he defended these treaties before

the public. When finally they came before

the Senate, they were adopted, thirty of

them, by practical- unanimity. Let Congress say now how far it will

support our delegates to the Arms Confer ence at Geneva, and say it clearly, gener

ously, and with some measure of unanimity. America is faced here with another oppor tunity to do a great job in a big way.

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