Peace%Enforcement%:%the%UN’s%new%conflict%management%tool%

Can%we%do%it%????%

By#Andre#Roux,#Senior#Researcher#and#Training#Coordinator#for#ISS#“Training#for#Peace”#program#

Peace%Enforcement%and%Peace%Interven=ons…..%Who%does%What!%

SCOPE%•  The#UN#and#Peace#Enforcement#

–  Recent#developments,#Legal#framework,#Failures#and#reform#

•  What#do#we#mean#by#peacekeeping,#peace#enforcement#and#peace#intervenJons#

•  Examples#of#peace#intervenJons#•  Case#Study#:#The#DRC#

–  Dealing#with#spoilers#:#Goma#and#M23#–  The#MONUSCO#Force#intervenJon#Brigade#–  Enablers##and#challenges#for#IntervenJon#deployment#

•  Future#rapid#intervenJon#–#is#it#possible#•  Conclusion##

A Humanitarian Crisis

WHY%PKO%G%COMPLEX%%EMERGENCY%

•  In#the#wake#of#complex#human#security#emergencies#engendered#by#modern#conflicts,#the#internaJonal#community#responds#by#deploying#a#range#of#actors#and#strategies#to#obviate#threats#to#human#security.#

•  Such#response#uJliJes#are#called#peace#support#operaJons#(PSOs).#

•  Usually,#they#involve#the#deployment#of#military#and#humanitarian#assets#in#affected#regions#and#are#generally#directed#under#the#auspices#of#the#United#NaJons#(UN)#because#it#has#the#biggest#conflict#resoluJon#potenJal#owing#to#its#global#membership.#

•  Currently#97#602#Military#and#Police#peacekeepers#in#17#Peacekeeping#OperaJons#under#DPKO#

WHY%PKO%G%COMPLEX%%EMERGENCY%

DEVELOPMENT#OF#UN#PEACEKEEPING#OPERATIONS%%

!  Classical#peacekeeping#_#consent%of%the%par=es%involved%%G%impar=ality%G%nonGuse%of%force%except%in%selfGdefence%

!  Agenda#for#Peace,1992##

!  Brahimi#Report,#2000#!  Capstone#doctrine,#2008##_#conflict%preven=on%%G%peacemaking%%G%peacekeeping%%G%peace%enforcement%%G%peacebuilding%

!  New#Horizons,#July#2009##

!  New#concepts:#######_#sovereignty%as%responsibility%%%%%%%%G%humanitarian%interven=on%%%%%%%G%responsibility%to%protect%G%R2P%

%Peace%enforcement%

UNs%LEGAL%BASIS%FOR%CONFLICT%MANAGEMENT%

"  UNSC.% % Under%Ar=cle% 24%UN%Charter% of% 1945,% the%UN%Security%Council% has% the%primary% responsibility% for% the%maintenance%of%interna=onal%peace%and%security.%

"  Chapter#VI%G%Pacific%Se^lement%of%Disputes%mechanisms%such%as%nego=a=on,%media=on,%concilia=on%etc.%

"  Chapter# VII% –% Use% of% coercion% “Peace% Enforcement”%interpreta=on.%

"  Chapter#VIII#–%Authorize%regional%arrangements….%

PEACEKEEPING%"  Peacekeeping# is# a# mechanism# for# prevenJng# and# controlling#

conflict#and#promoJng#peace.##"  It# is# the#UN#Security# council# authorized#deployment#of#military#

or# police# personnel# and# frequently# civilians# as# well,# while#poliJcal#soluJons#are#sought.#

"  PK# is#usually# interposed#between#hosJle# states#and#someJmes#between# hosJle# communiJes# within# a# state# and# must# be#directed#by#the#UN#Secretary#General.#

"  Beyond# the# tradiJonal# acJviJes# of# PK# operaJons# namely,#maintaining# internaJonal# peace# and# security,# today#peacekeepers# do# more# and# this# includes# the# following:# _#humanitarian# relief# assistance# to# vicJms# of# armed# conflict;#respond# to# the# needs# of# refugees# and# IDPs;# enforce# armed#embargoes,;#remove#mines;#and#strive#to#disarm#hosJle#parJes.##

PEACE%%ENFORCEMENT%

PEACE%%ENFORCEMENT%"  Unlike#PK,#Peace#Enforcement#is#a#mechanism#designed#to#

idenJfy#and#support#structures#which#tends#to#strengthen#and#solidify#peace#in#order#to#avoid#a#relapse#into#violent#conflict.# E.g.,# ensuring# implementaJon# of# any# peace#accord#reached#between#parJes.#

"  This# may# involve# the# use# of# armed# force# for# collecJve#security# intervenJon# as# was# the# authorisaJon# for#ECOMOG’s# intervenJon# in# Liberia# and# Sierra# Leone#1990_2005# as# well# as# NATO’s# intervenJon# in# Kosovo/former#Yugoslavia,#1999_2000,#France#in#Côte#d’Ivoire.#

PEACE%ENFORCEMENT%•  The#meaning#of#the#term#peace#enforcement#is#oken#

misunderstood.#Consider#that#when#soldiers#are#performing#enforcement#acJons#under#a#UN#Security#Council#mandate,#they#are#sJll#called#peacekeepers.##

#•  The#term’s#origins#are#found#in#the#UN#Charter#under#

Chapter#VII#and#ArJcles#39,#41,#and#42.#ArJcle#47#goes#on#to#outline#the#procedures#for#managing#“breaches#of#peace#and#acts#of#aggression”.#

•  A%clear%defini=on%of%peace%enforcement%did%not%emerge%un=l%the%Bri=sh%and%the%American%military%doctrines%on%peacekeeping%were%published%in%1994..%

•  The%US%Army’s%Field%Manual%100G23%of%December%1994%defined%peace%enforcement%as,%“the#applicaJon#of#military#force#or#the#threat#of#its#use,#normally#pursuant#to#internaJonal#authorizaJon,#to#compel#compliance#with#generally#accepted#resoluJons#or#sancJons.”##

•  The%Bri=sh%field%manual,%Wider%Peacekeeping,%published%in%September%1994%defined%peace%enforcement%as:%“operaJons#carried#out#to#restore#peace#between#belligerent#parJes#who#do#not#all#consent#to#intervenJons#and#who#may#be#engaged#in#combat#acJviJes”.##

•  Consent%of%the%local%par=es%is%the%criJcal#difference#between%peacekeeping%and%peace%enforcement.%

PEACE%%ENFORCEMENT%

AU%%PEACE%ENFORCEMENT%Today,#ArJcle#8(1)#of#the#AU#ConvenJon#for#the#ProtecJon#of# IDPs# in# Africa# (Kampala,# 2009)# confers# right# on# AU# to#intervene#in#a#member#state#in#accordance#with#ArJcle#4(h)#of#the#AU#ConsJtuJve#Act#in#respect#of#grave#circumstances#such#as#war# crimes,#genocide#and#crimes#against#humanity#arising# from# gross,# massive,# systemaJc# or# widespread#human#rights#violaJons.##So,#AU#can#legally#intervene,#without#consent,#for#grave#circumstances…..#and#this#now#specifically#includes#issues#of#protecJon#of#IDPs….#

PEACE%%INTERVENTION%•  Peace#IntervenJon#has#tradiJonally#taken#the#form#of#“lead#

naJons”#and#coaliJons#or#regional#organisaJons#deploying#military#combat#forces#to#deal#with#spoilers#to#peace#processes.#

•  Oken#a#humanitarian#moJvaJon#and#normally#with#consent#of#host#government.#

•  They#create#condiJons#for#mulJ_dimensional#peacekeeping#operaJons#to#deploy.#

•  Oken#remain#as#internaJonally#authorised#but#separate#parallel#force#to#do#the#“heavy#liking”#–#the#teeth#to#deal#with#spoilers#

•  SomeJmes#“rehat”#to#become#(paid)#UN#peacekeepers#as#part#of#a#new#PKO.#

EXAMPLES%OF%PEACE%INTERVENTIONS%•  1992,#Failure#of#UN#PK#mission#mission#to##Somalia#–#US#

deployed#28#000#troops.#•  Former#Yugoslavia#–#UNPROFOR#(38#000)#•  Kosovo#_#KFOR#•  HaiJ#–#US#forces#•  Sierra#Leone#–#ECOWAS#with#ECOMIL##•  Liberia#–#ECOMOG##•  Sierra#Leone#–#BriJsh#Op#“Palliser”#•  Cote#d’Ivoire#–#French#“Licorne”#operaJon#•  East#Timor#–#ASEAN#intervenJon#with#Australia#as#lead#naJon.#•  Comoros#–#AU#intervenJon#•  Mali#2013#–#French#Op#“Serval”#

Follow_on#PKOs#would#not#have#been#possible#without#the#“peace#intervenJon”#of#combat#forces#in#

these#mission#areas.##

SPOILERS……%

ACTORS/ CORE TASKS[ ]

ECON GOV INFRA INVESTMT

CIVIL ADMINELECTIONSPOLITICAL SECURITY

DDRRULE OF LAW

CAPACITY BLDG HUMANIT ASST

LOCAL IN

STITU

TION

S

TransitionPhase

Long-termDevelopment

StabilizationPhase

UN Country Team, Donors

World Bank/IMF

UN PKO

ICRC / NGOs

Indicative post-conflict tasks

Peace%enforcement%

Peacekeeping#

Peace%Interven=on%

Modern%mission%environments%

22

iii) Support the early re-

establishment of Rule of Law

i) Help the Parties Maintain Stability

and Order

ii) Help restore State Authority and the State’s monopoly over

legitimate means of violence

iv) Support the emergence of

legitimate Political

Institutions

v) Build and Sustain a Regional & International consensus around the peace process

GENERIC MISSION CORE OBJECTIVES & MANDATED TASKS

HOM/##SRSG#

HOMC/Force##Commander#

DSRSG#RC/HC#

HOPC/Police#Commissioner#

UNDP%

Formed%Police%Units%

Police%%advisers%

UN Authority UN OPCON

Coordination (UNCT)

Civil%%Affairs%

Poli=cal%Affairs%

Legal%%Affairs% Press/%

Public%Info%Human%Rights%

Conduct%&%Discipline% Protec=on%

DDR%Elec=ons%

Chief#of##Staff#

Director#Mission#Support#

#DSRSG/##

Deputy#HOM##

Chief#ISS#

Chief#Admin#Services#

OCHA#UNICEF

UNHCR

OHCHR

WFP

WHO

NGO Fora (International & National

JLOC%

JMAC%

Senior%Military%Observer%Units%

Sector%%Commanders%

WB%Hum%Affairs%

Rule%of%Law%

Mine%Ac=on%

Force%Support%%Elements%

UNMO%Teams%

JOC%

UNFPA

FAO IOM

UNWomen

MULTIDIMENSIONAL#MISSION#GENERIC#STRUCTURE#

DEMOCRATIC#REPUBLIC#OF#THE#

CONGO#

CONFLICT#DRIVERS#IN#THE#DRC…..#Although#ciJzens#of#the#DRC#are#among#the#

poorest#in#the#world,#the#DRC#is#widely#considered#to#be#the#richest#country#in#the#world#regarding#natural#resources;#untapped#deposits#of#raw#minerals#are#esJmated#to#be#

worth#in#excess#of#US$#24#trillion.##

(World#Bank#study#2011)%Coltan%

Gold%

PSOs#in#the#DRC#

##MONUSCO#MANDATE#

MONUSCO#STRUCTURE#

MISSION&COURSE&OF&ACTIONDefined'by'CONOPS

Organised'by'Capabilities

MISSION&CAPABILITIESDefined'by'3'Lines'of'Development

Organised'by'Lines'of'Development'and'cross'cutting'concepts'and'themes'detailed'in'Component'CONOPS

LINES&OF&DEVELOPMENTDefined'by'WorkplansDelivered'in'Parallel

MISSION&WORKPLANSGrouped'into'Mission'Components

Defines'Mission'Structure

MISSION&STRUCTUREOrganised'By'Mission'Areas

Provides'Resourcing'of'Capabilities

MONUSCO&CAPABILITY

Mission'Concept

RBBComponent'CONOPS

MONUSCO%PLANNING%CYCLE%

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" �.,�.!#$���--!--(!).�" ���!)�,$*��'�))$)#�" ��!0$!1�*"��--!--(!).�" �����!)�,$*-�

2 �����*)$.*,$)#��**'�2 �����!,"*,(�)�!��!+*,.-�2 �����0�'/�.$*)�2 �����*).,*''!,-��/ $.*,�

" ������,�(!1*,&-�" ��!-*/,�!�(�++$)#�" �� !).$"$��.$*)�*"��/) $)#�

##" ��)$.��*,&��'�)-�" ��$!' ��""$�!��*,&��'�)-�" ��) $0$ /�'��*,&��'�)-�

##

DEC#OCT#SEP#AUG# NOV# JAN# FEB# MAR# MAY# JUNE#JUL#

�--!--(!).�*"�*,#�-.,/�./,!-���� �������.�""$)#����'!-���+*-.�%/-.$"$��.$*)�Integrated#Strategic##

Framework#

�*)$.*,$)#���!+*,.$)#���0�'/�.$*)����$ ��!,(�*,,!�.$*)�*"��(+'!(!).�.$*)��'�)-�

Cost#EsJmates#&#Support#RBB#to#DPKO/DFS#

DPKO#Strategic##Guidance#

Quarterly#Performance#Reports#due#

SubstanJve#RBB#to#DPKO/DFS#

ACABQ#GA#Approves#the#Budget#

Performance#Report#

APR#

LoD#ProtecJon#of#Civilians#•  1.1##ProtecJon#of#civilians#under#imminent#threat#of#physical#

violence,%%•  1.2##ProtecJon#of#UN#pers,#faciliJes,#installaJons#&#equip%•  1.3##IdenJfy#threats#to#civilians#and#implement#exisJng#

response#plans%%•  1.4##Joint#Assessment%•  1.5##Neutralizing#armed#groups%•  1.6##Monitoring#the#implementaJon#of#the#arms#embargo%•  1.7##Human#Rights%•  1.8##Children#and#armed#conflict%•  1.9##Sexual#violence%•  1.10##Mine#acJon%•  1.11##Public#outreach%

LoD#StabilisaJon#•  2.1##Enable#stabilizaJon#acJviJes%•  2.2##Good#offices,%•  2.3##StabilizaJon#Strategy#(I4S):#%•  2.4##Security#Sector#Reform:#%•  2.5##Defense#Sector%•  2.6##Police%•  2.7##DDR,#DDRRR:#.%•  2.8##JusJce%•  2.9##CorrecJons%•  2.10##ExtracJon#and#trade#of#natural#resources%•  2.11##Public#outreach%

END#STATE#

IDPs%:%the%consequence%of%conflict!%•  Since#early#May#2012,#more#than#three#million#people#have#fled#their#homes#in#the#eastern#Congo.##

•  About#2.5#million#have#resesled#in#Congo,#but#some#500,000#have#crossed#into#neighboring#Rwanda#and#Uganda.##

•  700#000#displaced#in#North#Kivu#alone#

IDPs#Fleeing#KibaJ#near#Goma#

IDPs#near#Goma#

Valerie#Amos#the#UN#ERC,#visits#IDP#camp#near#Goma#

PE#–#DEALING#WITH#SPOILERS#•  Over%30%Armed%rebel%groups%(Non%State%Actors),%including%:%

o  Lord's%Resistance%Army%

o  M23%(mili=a)%

o  MaiGMai%

o  Movement%for%the%Libera=on%of%the%Congo%

o  Na=onal%Congress%for%the%Defence%of%the%People%

o  Na=onalist%and%Integra=onist%Front%o  People's%Armed%Forces%of%Congo%

o  Rally%for%Congolese%Democracy%

o  Rally%for%Congolese%Democracy–Goma%

o  Republican%Rally%for%Democracy%in%Rwanda%

o  Resistance%Patriots%of%Dongo%o  Union%of%Congolese%Patriots.%

o  Alliance%of%Democra=c%Forces%for%the%Libera=on%of%Congo%

o  Alliance%of%Patriots%for%a%Free%and%Sovereign%Congo%

o  Army%for%the%Libera=on%of%Rwanda%

o  Congolese%Revolu=onary%Movement%

o  Democra=c%Forces%for%the%Libera=on%of%Rwanda%(FDLR)%

o  Forces%for%Renewal%o  Front%for%Patrio=c%Resistance%in%Ituri%o  F%cont.%o  Front%for%the%Na=onal%Libera=on%of%

the%Congo%

o  Interahamwe%

o  %FDC%milicia%

PE#–#DEALING#WITH#SPOILERS#•  Main##Security#problems##are:#

–  RCD#Goma#/#MLC,#now#M23#(Tutsi,#Rwandan#Backed)#–  FDLR#(Hutu#/Genocidians)#–  ADF#NALU#(Ugandan)#–  Lords#Resistance#Army#(LRA)#–  “Mai#Mai”#Ethnic##MiliJas#

M23# LRA#FDLR#

MONUSCO#Peacekeepers#of#InBas#2#defending#their#Kiwanja#base#as#M_23#rebels#asacked#the#town.#Several#casualJes#where#evacuated#and#many#civilian#came#for#

protecJon.#25th#of#July#2012#

PE#–#DEALING#WITH#SPOILERS#

MONUSCO#Peacekeepers#of#InBas#2#defending#their#Kiwanja#base#as#M_23#rebels#asacked#the#town.#Several#casualJes#where#evacuated#and#many#civilian#came#for#

protecJon.#25th#of#July#2012#

PE#–#DEALING#WITH#SPOILERS#

# However,##this#is#“defensive#posture”,#Chapter#6#mentality#(Only#shoot#if#they#shoot#at#you).#

#### Will#this#resolve#the#situaJon?###

## You#are#only#protecJng#civilians#(maybe)#within#

max#of#3#km#from#your#base!##

# Several#incidents#of#mass#atrociJes,#murders,#rapes#by#armed#groups#within#a#few#km#of#UN#

bases…….#

NORTH#KIVU#:#GOMA#

PE#–#DEALING#WITH#SPOILERS#

New#UN#FC# M23#

FARDC%

NORTH#KIVU#:#GOMA#

KibaJ#–#“Front#line”#

Minova#–#Mass#Rapes#

Goma#

Sake#–#FIB#Base#

RWANDA#

PE#–#DEALING#WITH#SPOILERS#

Congolese#M23#rebel#fighters#near#Kibumba,#north#of#Goma.#

•  Ex#MLC,#integrated#into#FARDC#then#deserted#•  Ethnic#Tutsi,#Rwanda#backed,#new#alliances#•  Captured#Goma#in#Nov#2012#–#withdrew#due#to#Intnl#pressure#•  Internal#divisions#–#lost#800#with#Bosco#Ntaganda#facJon#split/

fight#•  Leader#is#Sultani#Makenga.#Has#approx#2000#fighters.#Forced#

recruitment,#use#of#demob#RDF,#child#soldiers#•  Stalled#ICGLR#sponsored#peace#talks#(DRC#Gov#pre_condiJons….)#

M23#SITUATION#

The#Framework#Agreement#seeks#to#resolve#the#conflict#situaJon#through#addressing#enablers/root#causes,#including:#•  Non#intervenJon/support#by#external#actors/states#•  Build#state#insJtuJons,#•  Democracy/local#elecJons#•  RoL,#•  local#governance#•  SSR#•  Economic#development#

%%%%%%%%%%Goma………%%

%%%

GOMA#

MUJA#

RUSAYO#

GOMA#HILL#

MUGUNGA -3 60,000

KIBATI#

KIBUMBA#

MUNIGI#

KANYANZA#

NDOSHO#

R#######W#######A######N######D#######A###IDP CAMPs

MUTAHO#

BULENGO 20,000

LAC VERT 23,000

SCALE%G5%KM%%

8101

810

MUGUNGA -1 25,000

DON BOSCO 6000

321

KANYARUCHINA

150 -200

300-400

10061

322

41 C 391

322

NYARAGONGO#

41

N HILL

42

10071

X 803

150 -200

Munigi#Base#

FARDC POSITIONS

M23#SITUATION#

FORCE##INTERVENTION##BRIGADE#

FORCE##INTERVENTION##BRIGADE#

%%%

GOMA#

MUJA#

RUSAYO#

GOMA#HILL#

MUGUNGA -3 60,000

KIBATI#

KIBUMBA#

MUNIGI#

KANYANZA#

NDOSHO#

R#######W#######A######N######D#######A###IDP CAMPs

MUTAHO#

BULENGO 20,000

LAC VERT 23,000

SCALE%G5%KM%%

MUGUNGA -1 25,000

DON BOSCO 6000

KANYARUCHINA

150 -200

300-400

NYARAGONGO#

N HILL

X 803

150 -200

1ST#FIB#OperaJons#

“Security#Zone”#

FIB#Enablers#

•  “CoaliJon#of#the#willing”##•  Surveillance#–#unarmed#drones##•  Intelligence#–#Special#forces##•  Fire#power#–#asack#helicopters#(on#call),#

D30#ArJllery,#over#300#MG.##•  ProtecJon#Mech#Coy#and#Mot#with#APCs##•  PK#and#PE#experience##•  Language#(Swahili)##•  Good#training#and#preparaJon##•  UN#Pays…….#

FIB#Challenges#•  MONUSCO#is#Integrated#mission#–#mulJ_dimensional#

approach#(sokly#sokly#–#take#ALL#units#and#components#with#you).###

•  Influence#of#humanitarian#impact#(pop#displacement,#casualJes)#

•  #Terrain,#climate,#infrastructure#

•  Well#armed#and#effecJve#opposiJon#(Mortars#and#MMG)#

•  Human#Rights#issues#when#working#with#FARDC#

•  Possible#collateral#damage#(strict#targeJng#procedures/authorisaJon#lines)#

•  No#direct#command#of#asack#helicopters#–#complicates#Close#air#support#and#role#of#FAC#regarding#flexibility#

•  KineJc#operaJons#effecJve#but#limited#–#opposiJon#will#soon#change#tacJcs#–#guerilla#warfare,#counter#insurgency#approach#needed#etc#

•  Role#of#Rwanda#?##

•  Human#cost#–#body#bags……#

Rapid%deployment%–%is%it%possible%•  The%UNs%concept%of%rapid%deployment%is%s=ll%under%discussion.%

Current%=meGlines%are%s=ll%stuck%in%the%4G6%month%range.%

•  The%now%disbanded%SHIRBRIG%gave%the%UN%a%6%week%capacity%–%In%mission,%up%and%running%with%a%Div%HQ%backbone%and%Brigade%deployed%capacity%within%6%weeks.%%(UNMEE).%

•  The%ASF%RDC%was%supposed%to%be%able%to%provide%that,%which%is%now%superseded%by%the%ACIRC%concept.%

•  The%UN%cannot%change%its%lengthy%deployment%drills%and%will%therefore%have%to%rely%on%a%regional%organisa=on%or%lead%na=on%–%and%then%foot%the%bill….%

•  The%FIB%is%a%gradual%development%of%an%established%force%–%and%then%s=ll%taking%6%months….%

•  Can%the%UN%do%an%interven=on%–%not%on%its%own….%•  Can%Africa%do%it%–yes%with%help%–%all%the%normal%enablers……%

Need%for%new%technologies%

Need%for%combat%capable%forces%like%deployed%in%AMISOM%

•  AMISOM%has%proved%–%at%a%high%cost,%that%combat%interven=on%is%possible.%

•  However%–%that%was%a%slow%buildGup%following%neighborly%interven=on%–%rapid%deployment%is%different….%

•  The%most%important%ingredient%however,%is%the%willingness%to%fight….%

Mali#intervenJon#–#you#need#capaciJes…#

Future%Mission%Requirements%•  More%capable%forces%needed%

•  Lean%and%mean%%

•  Greater%capacity%–%ASF%30%000%theore=cally%–%follow%–%on%forces?%

•  Mobility,%firepower,%netcentric%

•  Intelligence%intelligence%intelligence%–%IPB,%ISR,%CCCIRS,%HUMINT,%human%terrain%mapping,%%

•  Technical%surveillance%capabili=es%–%“drones”%•  Air%support,%mobility,%replenishment%

•  3%block%war%mentality,%skills%and%training.%

•  language%and%cultural%understanding%•  Suitable%equipment%–%from%tents%to%APCs%

•  Rapidly%deployable%

Capacity%gaps%•  Early%warning%•  Intelligence%•  Leadership%•  Technical%surveillance%capability%–%eg%“drones”%•  Helicopters%•  Close%air%support%•  Medium/heavy%liq%–%air%capability%•  Interoperability%•  Poli=cal%will%%•  Language%and%cultural%knowledge%

And#a#willingness#to#fight…….#

CONCLUSION%•  Regional%organiza=ons%and%na=ons%with%the%capability%to%respond%to%challenges%to%world%peace%have%a%clear%and%challenging%responsibility%to%prepare%for%the%next%call.%

•  %Regional%organiza=ons%need%to%improve%their%capability%to%manage%peace%enforcement%opera=ons%and%na=ons,%with%the%will%and%the%ability,%need%to%seriously%consider%commirng%military%forces%to%places%outside%their%sphere%of%interest.%

Ques=ons%?%