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Wisdom beyond words?Ineffability in yogācāra andmadhyamaka buddhismDavid Burton aa Keble College , OxfordPublished online: 09 Jun 2008.

To cite this article: David Burton (2000) Wisdom beyond words? Ineffabilityin yogācāra and madhyamaka buddhism, Contemporary Buddhism: AnInterdisciplinary Journal, 1:1, 53-76, DOI: 10.1080/14639940008573721

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Wisdom Beyond Words?Ineffability in Yogācāra andMadhyamaka BuddhismDavid BurtonKeble College, Oxford

Yogacara Buddhism is often interpreted to be a form of ontological idealism. It isclaimed that for the Yogacarins what really exists is non-dual (advaya)consciousness (citta/vyñana) which, in that it is envisaged as a causally connectedprocess, is called the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva). In the state ofunenlightened ignorance (avidyá) this dependent nature is concealed by theimagined nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) of dualities, including most fundamentallythe duality 'subject-object' (grahaka-grahya, literally meaning 'grasper-grasped').Contrary to the modern scientific paradigm, according to which consciousness (ifits distinct nature is admitted at all) evolves out o/matter, the ordinary world of(supposedly) external objects is for the Yogacarin a mental fabrication, a creationo/deluded consciousness.

The shared experience of the external world is a collective hallucination. Yourworld is similar to my world because we both fabricate similar worlds. Ourcommon perceptions of entities are actually perceptions of similarly fabricatedentities. We fabricate similar entities, according to the Yogacarin, as the similarresults (vJpāka) of our similar skilful (kus'ala) or unskilful (ahiśa/a) actions(karmari) in past lives. (These results are said to exist in potential as seeds (bī/'a)in one's substratum consciousness (alayavijñana) until they ripen). The hungryghost (jpreta), by contrast, as a result of his very different and ethically inferiorpast actions, fabricates a very different and much more unpleasant world (thecommon example given is that whereas we fabricate a river flowing with water,the hungry ghost fabricates a river flowing with pus). But, of course, the hungryghost's fabricated world is similar to the fabricated world of other hungry ghosts!1

Enlightenment (bodhi) occurs when the perfected nature {parinispanna-svabhāva) - the absence (emptiness (s'ünyatá)) of the imagined nature in thedependent nature - is perceived. The dependent nature is seen to be not reallyconstituted by, it is empty (sünyá) of, the adventitious imagined dualities by whichit is ordinarily concealed. The enlightened being thus sees through the concealingimagined nature and perceives unobstructed the pure non-dual flow ofconsciousness. Ultimate reality is, therefore, consciousness-only (cfttamātm) orcognition-only (yijñaptimatra) in the sense that behind the veil of imagineddualisms lies only the non-dual flow of consciousness. As this ultimate reality canbe accurately described as 'consciousness', the Yogacara philosophy is clearly a

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species of ontological idealism.2

It may be objected, however, that Yogacara philosophy is not actually ontologicalidealism. Yogacara texts say that reality—the dependent nature when it is seen asit really is, empty of the imagined nature—is not in fact describable. It isineffable. All descriptions of the dependent nature are superimpositions. That is,they constitute the imagined nature. The Samdhinirmocanasūtra (a seminal sourcefor Yogacara philosophy), for instance, says that the imagined nature (kun brtagspa) is 'the characteristic/aspect which is established as names and signs' (mingdang brdar rnampargshagpa 'imtshan nyidyin)} Language always pre-supposesa dualistic framework, 'x-not x'. Language imposes categories—x (as opposed tonot x) or not x (as opposed to x)—on a reality (the dependent nature), the pristinenature of which actually escapes such categorization. Descriptions of thedependent nature thus always entail falsification/distortion of the dependentnature.4 The enlightened being who apprehends the dependent nature in anundistorted way sees a reality which is inexpressible.

Thus, a central theme of the Tattvārtha chapter of the Bodhisattvabhūmi'is theinexpressible intrinsic nature (nirabhilapyasvabhavata) of all dharma-s, which thetext equates with suchness (tathata), reality (tattva), and emptiness (sünyatá).s

And in the Madhyantavibhaga, Asańga (along with Vasubandhu in thecommentary) declares that the signless (animitta)—as well as suchness (tathata),reality-limit (bhūtakoti), the ultimate (paramarthata), and the sphere of reality(dharmadhātu)—is a synonym for emptiness (s'unyata).6 This statement appears tomean that emptiness—understood as the dependent nature empty of the dualismsof the imagined nature—is signless, i.e. inexpressible. Furthermore, in thecommentary to the Vimšatikā Vasubandhu says that, though dharma-s are withoutself (nairatmya) in their imagined nature—where they are fabricated as dualismssuch as subject and object {grāhaka and grahya)—dharma-s nevertheless have aninexpressible (anabhilapya) nature (atinan) which is not selfless7, which I take tomean that this inexpressible nature is really there, i.e. it is not a product offabrication. And the Sarņdhinirmocanasūtia clearly and often refers to theinexpressible (brjodmed) nature of reality. For example, there is the declarationof the bodhisattva Gambhīrārthasarņdhinirmocana at the end of the first chapter:

zab mo byis pa'i spyod yul ma yin pa/brjod med gnyis min rgyal bas bstan mdzad kyang/byis pa gti mug rmongs pa 'di dag ni/smra ba'i spros la dga' zhing gnis la gnas//8

The conqueror [i.e. the Buddha] taught that the profound—inexpressible[and] non-dual—is not the sphere of fools [i.e. the unenlightened] but thesefools—confounded by ignorance—delight in verbal diffusion and abide induality.

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Reality is experienced by unenlightened beings as if it is constituted byconsciousnesses and objects of consciousnesses. However, as reality is ineffable,it cannot in fact be accurately described in terms of either consciousnesses ortheirobjects. Thus, for instance, in the Trisvabhávanirdesa Vasubandhu seems torefute citta just as much as the objects of dttar.

cittamatropalambhenajñeyarthanupalambhata/jñeyárthanupalambhena syac cittānupalambhatā//9

Through the apprehension of cittamātra there is non-apprehension of theobject to be known. Through the non-apprehension of the object to beknown, there should be non-apprehension of citta.

Consciousness itself must be denied as one half of the dualism 'consciousness-object of consciousness'. Object of consciousness and consciousness arecorrelative notions. Without the object of consciousness, there can be noconsciousness. Thus, the Madhyantavibhaga says that 'its [consciousness's]object does not exist—on account of the non-existence of that [object], it[consciousness] also does not exist' (nāsti casyarthas tadabhāvāt tad apy asai)}0

And Asanga's Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra declares that:

nāstīti cittāt param etya buddhya cittasya nāstitvam upaiti tasmāt/dvayasya nāstitvam upetya dhīmān samtisthate 'tadgatidharmadhātau//11

Having discerned that [objects which are] different from citta do not exist,one thus understands the non-existence of citta. Having understood the non-existence of duality, the wise man abides in the dharmadhātu which is notthe domain of that [duality].

So, it may be concluded, it is inappropriate to call Yogacara philosophy'ontological idealism' because the identification of the indescribable reality as'consciousness' is already a distortion of this reality. Having negated the entireimagined world of consciousnesses and their objects, the ineffable reality whichlies behind, and is ordinarily concealed by, this fabricated world becomes evidentfor the enlightened person, like a mirror from which dust has been removed. Oneis left then, in enlightenment, with simply an ineffable reality, not finallydescribable either in terms of objects of consciousness or consciousness itself.Understood in this way, Yogacarins are proponents of what I will call 'theineffability thesis'.

Interpreters who see Yogacara as advocating the ineffability thesis rather thanontological idealism include J. Willis and T. Kochumuttom.12 In her study ofAsanga's Tattvārtha chapter of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, Willis (1979: 132-133)comments that,

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far from advocating the superiority of thought over objects, Asa{ga'sexplication of 09nyat2 and the Middle Path involves the cessation of bothsubject and object, both apprehender and things apprehended. Onlyknowledge freed completely of discursive thought knows an object as itreally is... Hence, not idealism, but a state of intimate, inexpressibleknowledge of reality is aimed at.

And Kochumuttom (1982: 213) remarks that Vasubandhu's philosophy ofvijnaptimātratā,

is not an ontological theory worthy of the name idealism: It does not saythat reality in its ultimate form is in [sic] the nature of consciousness. Onthe contrary, for the most part it is an epistemological theory, which saysthat one's (empirical) experience of objects is determined by one's psychicdispositions, especially the idiosyncrasy for subject-object distinction, andthat, therefore, one in the state of samsāra does not at all come to know thethings in their suchness (tathatā). Things in their suchness are ineffable, andas such are known only to the enlightened ones (buddhas).

The frequent Yogacara assertions of consciousness-only (cittamātra) andcognition-only {vijnaptimātra) are not to be understood as claims thatconsciousness/cognition alone really exists. Rather, they are statements of theYogacara position that the world as it is perceived by the unenlightened—in termsof dualities such as 'consciousness-object of consciousness'—is a web of merefabrications superimposed on the ineffable reality. That is, the world apprehendedby unenlightened beings is cittamātraAijnaptimātra in the sense that it is merelyimagination—nothing more than a mental fabrication. This dualistic world isunreal, a mere product of consciousness/cognition. Unenlightened beings see onlythe fabricated dualisms, and not the underlying ineffable reality. Enlightenment infact consists in seeing through these fabricated dualisms to the ineffable realitywhich lies behind them. The enlightened being achieves supramundaneknowledge Ģokottarajnāna)n which sees reality in its true nature, free ofsuperimposition. He is freed from the cittamātra/vijnaptimātra world whichordinarily conceals the ineffable reality. Thus I. Harris (1991: 83) claims thatVasubandhu,

distinguishes between an unenlightened state in which one may be justifiedin saying that mind only [i.e. cittamātra] or representation only [i.e.vijnaptimātra] operates, and an enlightened state which is equivalent to aradical transformation of the mind which has now been freed to see realityas it is. There is no hint of idealism here. For Vasubandhu enlightenment isthe realisation that, in the unenlightened state, one has been deluded intotaking the representations of consciousness to be real. This is the trueinterpretation of the term vijnaptimātratā.4

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The notion that the Yogacarin upholds the ineffability thesis is very attractive tosyncretists who envisage that the Madhyamaka and Yogacara philosophies arefundamentally saying the same thing. That is, the syncretist here will want tostress that there is no disagreement between the Madhyamaka and Yogacaraphilosophies about the nature of reality. The syncretist will argue that theMadhyamika and Yogacarin are alike in claiming that reality transcends language,being accessible only to a wisdom beyond words.15

Such a syncretic view has been advanced, for example, by S. Anacker (1998:184-185) for whom the ineffability of reality 'is the fundamental point of contactbetween the philosophies of Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu'. And I. Harris (1991: 2,176) writes that, 'the axioms of the Madhyamaka and Yogacara are found to beheld fundamentally in common' (the italics are Harris's) and that for both theMadhyamika and the Yogacarin,

there is an ontological existence realm which is not amenable to predication.. Any attempt to describe it is doomed to failure since, by definition,

description is intimately associated with a dichotomised world view basedon the abstractive tendencies of a mind infected by ignorance. Since thestructure of language itself is so infected it will be impossible to state theprecise state of reality.

Hence the frequent claims in Madhyamaka texts that the Madhyamika has noview (dŗsti), position (paksa) or thesis (pratyñá).16 The Madhyamika, according tothis interpretation, holds no position at all about the nature of reality, but simplyrefutes all other positions, knowing that reality is finally quite indescribable. AsR. Olson (1974: 410) says, for the Madhyamika17 'no positive statementwhatsoever can have final meaning; the Dharma, from the standpoint of ultimatetruth, is after all incapable of any expression in verbal terms.' Thus, for example,Nāgārjuna seems to declare the ineffability of reality in the Lokātītastava:

animittam anagamya mokso nāsti tvamuktavān/atas tvayá mahayane tat sakalyena deśitam//yad avāptam maya punyam stutvā tvām stutibhājanam/nimittabandhanāpetam bhüyat tenākhilam jagat//18

You [the Buddha] have said that without entering into the signless there isnot liberation. Therefore you comprehensively taught it in the Mahayana.May the whole world become free from the bond of signs, by means of themerit obtained by me, having praised you, the worthy recipient of praise!

And the Madhyamikas often say that reality is not describable in terms ofexistence or non-existence.19 This claim may be interpreted by the syncretist tomean that reality transcends all predication—either as 'reality is x' or 'reality isnot x'. The Madhyamika agrees with the Yogacarin that all descriptions of reality

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are valid only insofar as they are taken as provisional, conventional expressions ofa reality which in the final analysis is inexpressible. Hence in the PrasannapadaCandrakīrti cites with approval the following passage (without naming thesource), which he says is stated by the Buddha (bnagavan):

anaksarasya dharmasya śrutih kā ca deśana ca kā/śrayate deśyate cāpi samāropād anaksarah//20

What hearing and what teaching [can there be] of the unutterable dhaimalAnd yet, the unutterable [dharma] is heard and taught throughsuperimposition.

It may be that reality is for the Yogacarin/Madhyamika (understood as proponentsof the ineffability thesis) a pure flow of causally connected change which has notbeen divided up into describable entities—such as consciousnesses and objects ofconsciousness. This would certainly be in accord with the general Buddhistemphasis on transiency and dependent origination. The reality which exists priorto and independent of the superimposition of names and labels is a process ofindescribable events (dharma-s) which are only categorized as 'this or that' by thefalsifying dualistic mind. (One thinks here especially of Dignāga's andDharmakirti's distinction between inexpressible momentary particulars(svalaksaņa-s)—which are reality as it actually is—and the superimposedconceptualization and labelling of these inexpressible momentary particulars,which inevitably entail distortion/falsification of this reality).21

But if this is the case the Yogacarin/Madhyamika is surely inconsistent. Forthe Yogacarin/Madhyamika, while having eschewed the 'consciousness-object ofconsciousness' duality, has still described the non-dual reality as being the 'flowof causally connected change'. Complete consistency must surely require theYogacarin/Madhyamika to renounce even this description, which seems to favourone side of the duality 'change-stasis'. Indeed, even the notion that reality is non-dual seems to favour one side of the duality 'duality-non-duality'! It seems thatthe entirely consistent Yogacarin/Madhyamika, if understood as a proponent ofthe ineffability thesis, would have to remain, like the eponymous bodhisartva ofthe Vimalakīrtinirdesasūtra22, entirely silent about the nature of reality. For to sayanything at all about reality is to to become embroiled in the web of dualities.

One might of course object here that the Yogacarin/Madhyamika, understoodas a consistent advocate of the ineffability thesis, is caught in a paradox, for hesurely cannot consistently deny that the ineffable reality can be correctly describedas ineffable. But if he descubes reality as ineffable, then reality is not in factineffable. That is, if the statement 'reality is ineffable' is true, it is false.

The Yogacarin/Madhyamika is not necessarily defeated by this objection,however. He might try to avoid the apparent paradox of ineffability by arguingthat the assertion 'reality is ineffable' is a statement about the inability of languageto describe reality, rather than a statement which describes reality itself. In other

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words, 'ineffability' is not in fact a predicate of reality, just like my inability toname the capital of Arkansas is not a predicate of Arkansas. There is thus noparadox in the statement that reality is ineffable.

Alternatively, the Yogacarin/Mádhyamika might I suppose accept the paradoxof ineffability as itself a symptom of the difficulties by which the ordinary mind isdefeated when confronted by the notion of an ineffable reality. He might, in thiscase, embrace the paradox as a challenge to transcend ordinary dualistic thinking,bound by the principle of non-contradiction. The paradox does not disprove thatthere is an ineffable reality. It does prove, however, that ordinary dualisticthinking ties itself in knots when attempting to apprehend an ineffable reality.

But the ineffability thesis presents some further philosophical difficulties. Thenotion of an ineffable reality is, it can be objected, a concept without any positivecontent. It seems difficult to make any sense of a reality the knowledge of whichis not convertible into language. How does such a reality differ from merenothingness, and how is the supposed knowledge of it different from totalblankness?

What I am questioning here is the notion of a form of knowledge which has aninexpressible content, this content being inexpressible in principle?* (It is not justthat the knower is having trouble expressing the content because he does not as ofyet have the ability to say what the content is, because of lack of linguistic skill,etc.). Something is known, but what is known cannot be communicated verbally.The ineffability thesis says such knowledge is possible, but I am not at all sure thatthis is correct.24

At any rate, if there is such knowledge of an ineffable reality, then it certainlyfalls outside of the rationalist philosopher's purview. For an ineffable reality isnot accessible finally to articulation in various views and theories, and it is theexamination, explication, and evaluation of theories about reality which is thephilosopher's concern. Without the theories, the philosopher's subject matter hasbeen taken away. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the philosopher tends tocry foul. He is searching for the ultimate truth yet the ineffability thesis says thatthe final discovery of this truth is not within the philosopher's domain at all.

The ineffability thesis is thus an attack on the final efficacy of the philosophicalproject. The philosopher is here accused of a myopic disregard for the non-rational. The philosopher's methods cannot detect the ineffable reality. Like ablind man, who might deny the existence of the visual world because he does nothave visual capacity, the philosopher, adept only at rational argument, denies theineffable reality because he has not developed the (non-rational) capacity toapprehend such a reality. The philosopher is here envisaged as a pitiful figure,trapped in the mundane, rational world. His eyes have not been opened to thereality which transcends rationality and language.

The philosopher may fight back, however. He may say that the appeal to anineffable reality is in fact a capitulation to irrationality. The ineffability thesis,which masquerades as a final solution to the quest for ultimate truth, is in factmerely a premature termination of the search. The appeal to the ineffability thesis

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may be seen as a sign simply of intellectual fatigue, inability, or cowardice.The philosopher may argue that a knowledge-claim which cannot be shared

(via language), discussed and assessed is vacuous. Indeed, what meaning can begiven to a knowledge-claim which cannot be made publicly accessible? And howwithout the possibility of any public assessment can the possessor of such anineffable knowledge-claim know that what he supposedly knows is indeed a caseof knowledge rather than a private fantasy?

Of course, the Yogacarin/Madhyamika may object that he has the evidence ofhis meditative experience on his side. (It is often argued by modern commentatorsthat the insights of the Yogacarin/Madhyamika are derived from his meditations).The fact that the Yogacarin/Madhyamika has realized the ineffable reality inmeditation is the proof that there is such a reality.

But such an appeal to special experience simply will not do. People have allsorts of special experiences (of God, of themselves as the messiah, of messagesfrom the deceased, and so forth). These experiences may be correct or incorrect,but the experience itself cannot be used as proof of the correctness of theexperience. The experience may be a delusion, no matter how strongly it is felt tobe correct.

Furthermore, what the Yogacarin/Madhyamika experiences in his meditationsmay well be a function of the training which he has undergone. AYogacarin/Madhyamika, fully indoctrinated into the view that reality is ineffable,might well find that his meditation confirms his view. This is hardly surprising,given that he has been taught to experience reality as ineffable! His meditation isnot necessarily a direct apprehension of 'things as they actually are'. It maysimply be that the Yogácárin's/Madhyamika's training predisposes him to seereality in this way. If, by contrast, one were indoctrinated into the view that Godcan speak to one in meditation—for example—then it is not unlikely that onemight start to have meditative experiences of what one takes to be conversationswith God. Meditative experiences may well be a result of the conceptual systemone has adopted, rather than an apprehension of the real nature of things.25

One may also wonder how a (supposedly) enlightened being, who achieves thesupramundane knowledge in meditation of the ineffable reality unconcealed bythe fabricated entities of unenlightened experience, subsequently is able to engagewith the fabricated world. The Yogacarin/Madhyamika might explain that suchan enlightened being for pragmatic purposes (and, no doubt, in order to fulfil hisbodhisattva vow) acquiesces in the fabricated world of unenlightened people, butin the full knowledge that it is a fabrication. But would the enlightenedYogacarin/Madhyamika actually be able to re-build the world of fabricatedentities which he had totally deconstructed? If not, the enlightenment of theYogacarin/Madhyamika might in fact be indistinguishable—for the observer atleast—from insanity, the enlightened Yogacarin/Madhyamika being locked intohis incommunicable vision of reality, and unable to participate in the fabricatedworld of unenlightened people.

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Of course, to point out the philosophical difficulties with the ineffability thesis isno refutation of the syncretist's claim that the Yogacarins/Madhyamikas areunited in their claim that reality is ineffable. (After all, throughout history thinkershave advocated philosophically problematic positions). It is simply to say that, ifindeed the Yogacarins/Madhyamikas uphold the ineffability thesis, they areconfronted by the philosophical difficulties which I have described. So, perhaps,it might be thought, the syncretist is right that Yogacara and Madhyamaka have afundamentally similar view of reality as ineffable.

The syncretist is, however, confronted by an awkward historical fact. IndianMadhyamaka texts from about the sixth century onwards—most notably theBodhicittavivamņa,26 Bhāvaviveka's Madhyamakahrdayakariká (and Tarkajvāla),Prajnāpradīpa, Karatalaratna and Madhyamakaratnapradipa2'', and Candrakīrti'sMadhyamakavatara (along with the Bhasyaf*—offer strident and sustainedcritiques of Yogacara philosophy. In addition, Sāntideva in the Bodhicaiyavataraconfronts a Yogacarin opponent29, and Sāntaraksita also criticizes the Yogacara inhis Madhyamakalamkara.30

In these critiques, the Madhyamikas say that both consciousness and its objectslack intrinsic existence (svabhāva). For example, the Madhyamakavatara declaresthat 'just as the object of cognition does not exist, likewise the mind also does notexist' (Jiltarshes bya medde bzhin bloyangmedf1, and the Bhasya explains thatwhat is meant is that neither the object of cognition nor the mind have intrinsicexistence {rang bzhin) (also referred to by the Bhasya as 'intrinsic nature' (ranggibdagnyid))?1

One must appreciate here that for Madhyamaka 'intrinsic existence' meansreal, substantial existence (dravyasat)—that is, existence which is not simply theresult of mental fabrication. An entity which exists but without intrinsic existenceis simply a mental fabrication, like a dream-object or an illusion. It exists insofaras it appears, yet it has no more substance than a mere appearance.33 Thus, theMadhyamikas' assertion that consciousnesses and objects of consciousness lackintrinsic existence means that both consciousnesses and objects of consciousnessare simply mental fabrications and have no more reality than dreams.

The Madhyamikas in their critiques contrast their position with that of theYogacarins, whom they depict as advocating the intrinsic existence ofconsciousness. Although the Yogacarins admit that objects of consciousness lackintrinsic existence, they say, according to the Madhyamikas, that the causallyconnected flow of consciousness—the dependent nature—is not a fabrication; itexists in a real, substantial way.34 Consciousness is for the Yogacarins, accordingto these Madhyamikas, the intrinsically existing reality which still exists when allfalse imaginings have been abolished. In other words, these Madhyamikasrepresent the Yogacara philosophy as a form of ontological idealism. But theMadhyamikas protest that there is no such intrinsically existing consciousness.As the Bodhicittavivaraņa declares, 'from the very beginning consciousness hasnever had intrinsic existence' (thog ma nyid nas sems kyi ni rang bzhin rtag tumedpar 'gyur).35

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The syncretist might want to advocate the essential philosophical identity ofMadhyamaka and Yogacara thought, but these Madhyamikas do not appear toshare his view. In other words, the syncretist might be accused of ignoring thehistorical evidence that Madhyamikas themselves did not claim that theirphilosophical position was in essence the same as that of the Yogacarins. If theMadhyamikas themselves thought that they had a philosophical position differentfrom (and, in their eyes, superior to) the Yogacara philosophical position, thensurely the syncretist is wrong to assert the basic identity of the Yogacara andMadhyamaka philosophies. The syncretist, according to this powerful objection,is guilty of artificially unifying the Madhyamaka and Yogacara philosophies.

The syncretist might, however, reply that the Madhyamaka critiques are based ona misunderstanding of the Yogacara position. The Madhyamikas think that theYogacarin asserts that consciousness has intrinsic existence. In fact, however, theYogacarin says that consciousness is one half of the fabricated duality'consciousness-object of consciousness'. Contrary to the Madhyamikas'impression, the Yogacarin actually agrees with the Madhyamaka position thatconsciousness lacks intrinsic existence.

But it seems very unlikely that the Madhyamikas would make such afundamental mistake about the philosophical position of their rivals. In whichcase the syncretist might argue that the Madhyamikas are engaged in a wilfulmisreading of the Yogacara position. Maybe in an environment of competingschools, the Madhyamikas were prone to misrepresent, even to caricature, theirrivals in order to exaggerate or fabricate differences between themselves and theirpolitical opponents, and to cast these opponents in a bad light. One should notexpect a disinterested, neutral account by the Madhyamikas of the doctrines oftheir adversaries.

Indeed, the Madhyamika attacks sometimes seem rather churlish. As Harris(1991: 77) notes, Bhāvaviveka, throws insults at his Yogacarin opponents—in theMadhyamakaratnapradlpa he accuses them of having 'mediocre minds',36 and inthe Madhyamakahrdayakarika he becomes quite vitriolic, saying that theYogacara criticisms of Madhyamaka are 'the stench of hatred's putrid meat' andthis proves the Yogacarins' 'undigested conceit'.37 Candrakīrti, I might add, inthe Yuktisastikavrtti, compares the Vijnānavādins (i.e. the Yogacarins) to a wildhorse (ría dmurgod) which imitates the behaviour of an ass (bongbii)\3S

One might surmise that the Madhyamaka critiques are the result of insecurity,and may originate from a group which felt threatened and marginalized. Perhapsit was the very ascendancy of Yogacara thought which led to such sustained andrather bitter attacks on the part of the Madhyamikas. (It is interesting that, despitethe various lengthy critiques by the Madhyamikas of the Yogacara, there is norecord of any extensive reply by the Yogacarins. One possible explanation is thatthe Madhyamikas, though voluminous writers, were not sufficiently numerous orinfluential to warrant a serious response).

Maybe, then, what is at issue in the Madhyamaka critiques of Yogacara is

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political power and influence/status more than fundamental philosophicaldifferences. As S. Anacker (1984: 3) comments about the Indian controversiesbetween the Madhyamikas and Yogacarins:

These are really the disagreements of sixth-century followers of Nāgārjunaand Vasubandhu. They belong to a time when Buddhism had become anacademic subject at places such as the University of Nālandā. They mayhave disagreed because they were academics fighting for posts andrecognition.

So, perhaps the Madhyamaka attacks on Yogacara philosophy are examples ofrhetoric used in order to establish authority, legitimacy (and hence power) ratherthan a genuine philosophical criticism of Yogacara. The Madhyamika attempts todiscredit his Yogacarin opponent, not because the Madhyamika really thinks thatthe Yogacara philosophy is wrong, but because the Yogacara school is a differentand rival group—the 'competition', to put the point bluntly. The dispute is oneabout power, masquerading in the form of a disagreement about the nature ofultimate truth. A good strategy, surely, in a power struggle with a rival group is toconcoct an artificial distinction between the two groups to show that one's owngroup is actually different from the group one opposes, and then to argue that theposition of one's own group is superior to that of the rival group.

I am not convinced by this argument, however. I am quite sure that theYogacarins and the Madhyamikas would have been engaged in battles forprestige, etc. and would no doubt have sometimes succumbed to the tactic ofmisrepresenting one another. But the Madhyamikas' claims that the Yogacarins'position is that consciousness has intrinsic existence are very frequent and aremaking a fundamental point about the Yogacara philosophy. That theMadhyamikas would consistently misrepresent the Yogacarins so fundamentallyand crudely seems an improbable, not to mention cynical, suggestion. Such amisrepresentation would surely have been too obvious to be sustainable. It is farmore likely, I think, that the Madhyamikas thought that they had a genuine andbasic philosophical disagreement with the Yogacarins.

Perhaps, however, the syncretist may be saved by an appeal to a pristineYogacara teaching, later adulterated. R. King (1995: 266-267), inspired by thework of Y. Ueda (1967), argues that there are two philosophical traditions withinthe Yogacara school. The first and original tradition is that of Asańga andVasubandhu whereas the second and later tradition, which 'differs from theworks of the early Yogacarins in upholding the ultimate reality of consciousness',is most fully expressed by Hsüan-tsang as well as, in the Ch'eng weishin lun, byDharmapāla.

The syncretist may thus argue that the Madhyamika critiques are to beunderstood as chastising only the later idealistic Yogacara tradition. Harris (1991:83), for example, argues that it is likely that the Madhyamaka critiques are of thelater, deviant Yogacara tradition and are thus 'taking issue with a point of view

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which was never held by exponents of the classical interpretation.' (Perhaps alsothe Madhyamika critics of Yogacara—influenced by their contact with the lateridealistic Yogacara tradition—misread as idealism the earlier non-idealisticYogacara tradition).

The later Yogacara tradition, by asserting the ultimate truth of consciousness,deviates from the classical Yogacara position—which says that consciousnesses,as well as objects of consciousness, lack intrinsic existence. For the classicalYogacarins, only the ineffable reality has unfabricated, i.e. intrinsic, existence.The syncretist may conclude, then, that what really exists for the classicalYogacarin and the Madhyamika alike is the ineffable reality which is, forunenlightened people, obscured by the imagined nature, i.e. the proliferation ofentities—consciousnesses and their objects—which lack intrinsic existence.

Obviously, a crucial question here is whether there actually is such a classicalnon-idealistic form of Yogacara. Is it really the case that, unlike later Yogacarins,Asańga and Vasubandhu did not claim that the reality which remains when theimagined nature is eliminated is describable as 'consciousness'? One cannotentirely discount this possibility, given the assertions of both Asańga andVasubandhu that reality is inexpressible and is neither citta nor the objects of citta.Nevertheless, I have reservations about this interpretation. There is evidence, Ithink, that even Asańga and Vasubandhu claim (at least sometimes) that reality isdescribable as 'consciousness '.

For instance, the Madhyintavibhāga(bhāsya) says that emptiness (s'ünyatá) isneither afflicted (¿lista) nor unafflicted (aklisti), neither pure (śuddha) nor impure(as'uddhi). The text says that this emptiness, on account of the luminousness(prabhāsvaratva) of citta, is by nature (prakrti) neither afflicted nor impure andthat, on account of the adventitiousness (āgantukatva) of the afflictions, it isneither unafflicted nor pure.39

This passage appears to mean that emptiness—here a synonym for reality,called 'emptiness' because it is in fact empty of the imagined nature—can bedescribed as a citta which is unafflicted and pure (i.e. luminous) in its essentialnature, and yet is nevertheless afflicted and impure insofar as it is tainted orconcealed by adventitious defilements (i.e. the imagined nature). Here at leastthere seems to be a willingness by Asańga (as the author of the verse) and•Vasubandhu (as the author of the commentary to the verse) to describe reality as'consciousness'.

Furthermore, in the Mahayanasütralamkára Asańga declares that consciousness(citta) is always (sada) luminous by nature (prakŗtiprabhāsvara) but that it iscontaminated by adventitious faults (āgantukadosa). This luminous consciousnessis declared to be,the dharmatācitta.40 The commentary (which may be by eitherAsańga or Vasubandhu) identifies this luminous consciousness, which it too callsthe dharmatācitta, with the sphere of reality (dharmadhātii), and with suchness(tathatá).41 Dharmatā, dharmadhātu and tathatā are common epithets for thingsas they really are. Clearly, then, reality is here equated with the luminousconsciousness, purged of its adventitious defilements.

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Such passages provide some evidence that there is no discontinuity betweenthe classical Yogacarins and the later tradition. Asańga and Vasubandhu, itappears, were sometimes willing to describe reality as 'consciousness'.

But it can be objected that these passages contradict the statements (which Ihave already cited) by Asańga and Vasubandhu that citta is to be refuted as part ofthe dualism 'consciousness-object of consciousness' and also their claims thatreality is inexpressible. This apparent contradiction can be resolved, however.Perhaps Asańga and Vasubandhu are saying, when they deny that reality is citta,only that reality is not the ordinary dualistic (defiled) consciousness. And theirclaims that reality is inexpressible might be read as not ruling out the descriptionof this otherwise indescribable reality as non-dual, luminous consciousness. Inother words, they are not strict proponents of the ineffability of reality. Perhaps,then, even the early Yogacarins are best read as ontological idealists after all.

Indeed, Asańga and Vasubandhu (and the later Yogacarins) surely have acompelling philosophical reason for claiming that reality, as understood by them,is describable as 'consciousness'. Let me explain.

As I have shown already, the Yogacarins say that enlightenment occurs whenthe imagined nature is removed and reality is seen as it actually is. Reality is seendevoid of the fabricated dualisms by which it is normally obscured. Reality ishere perceived by an undistorted supramundane knowledge Ģokottarajnāna), aknowledge without mental construction (nirvikalpajñána).

The question arises, who or what is doing the knowing? Who or what isenlightened? As all that remains when the fabricated dualisms which are theimagined nature have been dispelled is reality itself, it must surely be the case thatit is reality itself which is doing the knowing, and reality itself which isenlightened. Enlightenment is, one might say, the knowledge by reality ofreality. The ultimate reality has here come to full self-knowledge.

As reality has this capacity for self-knowledge for the Yogacarins, it seemsirresistable to call this reality 'consciousness'. Only conscious entities have thecapacity for knowledge. No non-conscious entities have the capacity forknowledge. To claim that ultimate reality is both capable of self-knowledge andis not describable as consciousness would be non-sensical. If reality is not capableof consciousness then the Yogacarins must deny that it can know itself. Theymust, in this case, deny that enlightenment is possible. But the Yogacarins clearlywant to uphold that enlightenment is possible and thus they must admit thatultimate reality can be described as 'consciousness'.

Granted, this consciousness cannot be dualistic in form. It is not aconsciousness that apprehends an object. It cannot be consciousness of a realityseparate from the apprehending consciousness. The 'consciousness-object ofconsciousness' duality is, according to the Yogacara, a fabrication and inenlightenment all fabrications have ceased. Reality knows itself in enlightenmentwithout functioning within the dualistic framework of 'consciousness-object ofconsciousness'.

One is reminded here of the notion—prevalent in Yogacara philosophy at least

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from the time of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti—of svasamvedana the 'self-luminous', reflexive nature of consciousness. In mundane terms, this 'self-luminous' reflexivity means that consciousness knows itself in the very act ofknowing its object, just like (to employ the commonly used analogy) a light, inilluminating an object, automatically illuminates itself. There is no need for aseparate consciousness of consciousness of an object, just like there is no need fora separate light to illuminate the light which illuminates an object. It is simply thenature of consciousness to be aware of itself in this non-intentional way. The finalspiritual significance of this Yogacara notion of svasamvedana may well be that,when in enlightenment consciousness occurs in its pristine state, no longerconcealed by dualistic imaginings, this consciousness (identifiable with ultimatereality) is self-luminous, i.e. knows itself without taking itself as an object.42

Whether it is correct to say that there is in fact such a non-dual enlightenedconsciousness is of course debatable. What seems clear, however, is that if theYogacarin were to be philosophically consistent he would have to uphold amitigated version of the ineffability thesis. Given that, when the imagined natureis extinguished, there is knowledge by reality of reality, he would have to say that,though reality is in many respects inexpressible, ultimate reality nevertheless canbe described accurately as '(non-dual) consciousness'.

However, this is not to deny that the words 'non-dual consciousness' areimpossible for ordinary, unenlightened people to understand fully, as they havenot had the experience to which the words refer. Ordinary, unenlightened peoplecertainly have the experience of consciousness, but only in its dualistic form.Their attempt to understand the words 'non-dual consciousness' will thereforemeet only with limited success, like the colour-blind person who, thoughunderstanding what a traffic-light is, cannot fully appreciate the words 'red traffic-light', insofar as he does not have the experience of the colour to which the word'red' refers. But this does not mean that the Yogacarins' understanding of realitycannot be accurately described as 'non-dual consciousness'; this just means thatthe words 'non-dual consciousness' refer to a phenomenon (assuming, of course,that such a phenomenon actually exists) to which ordinary, unenlightened peoplehave not had access. It is not that reality is indescribable as 'non-dualconsciousness'. It is rather that the description has limited significance for thosewho have yet to experience this reality.

But the syncretist, who claims that Yogacara and Madhyamaka are united in theiradvocacy of an ineffable reality, has another problem. Even if there were adistinctive classical Yogacara position—adhering strictly to the ineffability thesisunlike the later Yogacara idealists—it is far from clear that the Madhyamikasactually claim that there is an ineffable reality which underlies the mentallyfabricated world.

On the contrary, it seems quite likely that the Madhyamikas in fact claim thateverything whatsoever completely lacks intrinsic existence. The whole world ismere mental fabrication, and there is no reality beyond or beneath this fabrication.

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The ultimate truth is here understood to be simply the absence of any unfabricatedexistence anywhere at all. Everything has the ontological status of a dream-objector an illusion. There is no further, deeper ineffable reality. As Nāgārjuna says inthe Acintyastava:

etat tat paramam tattvam nihsvabhāvārthadesanā/bhāvagrahagŗhītānām cikitseyam anuttarā//43

This is the ultimate truth: The teaching that objects are without intrinsicexistence. This is the best medicine for those trapped through grasping atentities.

The Madhyamaka denial of views/positions/theses, in this case, may beunderstood as a rejection of all views/positions/theses which assert intrinsicexistence. Madhyamikas actually accept the position that the ultimate truth is theabsence of intrinsic existence of all entities. And the Madhyamaka assertions thatthe ultimate truth cannot be described in terms of existence or non-existence maybe interpreted as meaning that the ultimate truth is neither that entities do not existat all nor that entities exist with intrinsic existence. The ultimate truth is thatentities exist but without intrinsic existence.

The only state beyond words admitted by the Madhyamika in this case is thestilling of verbal diffusion (prapañca)—the absence of fabrication—which mightoccur (perhaps in meditation) through deep insight into the merely fabricatednature of all entities. One becomes focused on the ultimate truth which is theemptiness of all entities, and one thus stops perceiving the manifold fabricatedentities of ordinary experience. 'The calming of all perceiving', Nāgārjuna says inthe Mulamadhyamakakarika 'is the fortunate calming of verbal diffusion'{sarvopalambhopasah prapancopaśamah śivaH).u But the 'fortunate calming ofverbal diffusion' is here arguably simply the cessation of the proliferation offabricated entities rather than a gnosis of an ineffable reality.

This cessation of fabication would certainly be 'signless' (animitta) and'unutterable' (anaksari), as some Madhyamaka texts (such as the Lokātītastavaād-āļ and Prasamapadā ātŗ cited above) say. No entities occur, because allentities are entirely fabrications, i.e. empty, and there is for the meditator, havingrealized this emptiness of all entities, no such fabrication taking place. Thus, thereis nothing to be signified and nothing to be described. Given that for themeditator who is focused on emptiness the entire fabricated world of entitiescomes to a stop, there is for this meditator, as Nāgārjuna declares in the dedicatoryverses of the Mulamadhyamakakarika,

anirodham anutpādam anucchedam asāsvatam/anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam//45

no cessation, no origination, no destruction, no permanence, no identity, nodifference, no coming, no going.

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This interpretation of Madhyamaka poses a real problem for the syncretist who iscommitted to the essential philosophical identity of Madhyamaka and Yogacara.As the Yogacarin advocates a reality—be it strictly ineffable or describable asnon-dual consciousness—which intrinsically exists, i.e. is not simply a mentalfabrication, he is in a fundamental sense diverging from the Madhyamika abouthow things actually are. The fundamental issue at stake is whether or not theworld of appearances—of mere imagination—is all that there really is. TheYogacarin says that the imagined world has an intrinsically existing basis orsubstratum (adhisthāna/vastu) which continues to exist even when all falseimagining is eliminated. The Madhyamika denies that there is any suchintrinsically existing basis. The fabricated world is all that exists, there is nounfabricated reality behind or beyond it. Whereas for the Madhyamika emptinessmeans that everything entirely lacks intrinsic existence, for the Yogacarinemptiness means that everything except the basis of the imagined world lacksintrinsic existence and also that this intrinsically existing basis, as it really is, isempty of the imagined world.

Such an anti-syncretic interpretation is advocated, for instance, by mKhas grub rje('Kay drup jay', 1385-1438), an important disciple of Tsong kha pa ('Dzong kaba', 1357-1419).45 He argues that for Madhyamaka (which mKhas grub rjehimself, despite his very sympathetic presentation of Yogacara, considers to bethe highest philosophical position) everything has an existence which is merelyconceptually constructed (btagspa tsamsprajñaptimatrá) whereas the Yogacarinsclaim that entities with conceptual constructed existence have a basis orsubstratum (gzhi) which has real existence (yang dag par yod pa), i.e. existencewhich is not the result of conceptual construction.47

mKhas grub rje also claims that for the Yogacarins this real basis isconsciousness. He cites as evidence a passage from Sthiramati's Trimsikāvŗttr.

yang na rnam par shes pa bzhin du shes bya yang rdzas nyid du kha cigsems pa dang/gzhan dag shes bya bzhin du rnam par shes pa yang kun rdzobnyid du yod kyi don dam par yod pa ma yin no snam du sems pa mtha' gcigtu smra ba 'di rnam pa gnyis dgag par bya ba'i phyir rab tu byed pa 'dibrtsams so/

Some people consider objects of consciousness to be substances (dravya)just as consciousness is. Other people think consciousness existsconventionally [i.e. without intrinsic existence] but not ultimately [i.e. withintrinsic existence] just as objects of consciousness do. This treatise wascomposed in order to refute both varieties of this asserting one extreme.

mKhas grub rje comments that this passage 'clearly explains that [for theYogacarins] external objects do not exist [intrinsically] and consciousness existsultimately [i.e. intrinsically]' [phyi don medpa dang rnam shes don dam du yodpa gsal bar bsnad).4* In other words, mKhas grub rje sees Yogacarins as

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ontological idealists, rather than as proponents of a strictly ineffable reality.Curiously, however, mKhas grub rje himself at one point in his discussion of

the Yogacara philosophy quotes a passage (in Tibetan translation) from theBodhisattvabhūmi, an important Yogacara text, which describes the ultimatelyexisting reality (don dam par yod pa yang dag pa'i dngosposparamarthasadbhüta)—which is the basis (gzhisadhisthāna) or support(rtenssamnisraya) for conceptually constructed entities (which the text calls 'thesigns which are conceptual designations' (btags pa'i tshig gi mtshanmasprajñaptívadanimitta))—as having a nature which is inexpressible (bijod dumedpa V bdag nyidsnirabhilapyatmakata).49 mKhas grub rje does not comment,however, on the apparent contradiction between this passage (and, indeed, themany other passages like it in the Yogacara texts) and his claim (which issupported by some passages in Yogacara texts) that for the Yogacara reality isdescribableas 'consciousness'.

Be this as it may, in the present context, whether for the Yogacarins the realbasis of fabricated entities is describable as consciousness or is strictly ineffable isnot actually of primary importance. Insofar as the Yogacarins posit a real basis—be it strictly ineffable or describable as consciousness—for fabricated entities theyare advocating a very different philosophical position from the Madhyamikas whoare committed to the merely fabricated existence of everything whatsoever.

It is intriguing that mKhas grub rje refers to an unnamed opponent (whom herefers to pejoratively as 'someone without training' (ma bslabspa kha cig)) whoclaims that the Yogacara Abhidharmasamuccaya (by Asańga) is saying the samething as the Madhyamaka corpus of reasoning (dbu ma rigs pa'i tshogs), i.e. theMulamadhyamakakarika, and so forth.30 mKhas grub rje (with characteristicarrogance) accuses this opponent of 'non-sensical blithering'.51 mKhas grub rjethinks that it is simply not true that Yogacara, like Madhyamaka, asserts theabsence of intrinsic existence (ngo bo nyidmed) of all entities whatsoever. Thus,mKhas grub rje says that Yogacara texts—such as the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, theBodhisattvabhūmi, the Samuccaya-s, the Mahayanasamgraha, and theNimayasamgraha—by contrast with Madhyamaka writings do not take literallyscriptural passages which seem to assert the universal absence of intrinsicexistence.52 mKhas grub rje's comments here seem to indicate that there wassomeone (or some people) in Tibet at or before his time who advocated theessential philosophical identity of Madhyamaka and Yogacara. It seems clearthat the debate about whether or not the Yogacara and Madhyamaka have anessentially similar philosophical position was alive and well in classical TibetanBuddhism. It is not an issue which has pre-occupied modern scholars alone!

However, the syncretist to whom mKhas grub rje refers does not seem to arguethat the essential philosophical identity of Madhyamaka and Yogacara consists intheir assertion of an ineffable reality. This classical Tibetan syncretism does notclaim, it seems, that the Yogacarin and the Madhyamika posit an unfabricatedreality behind or beyond the fabricated world of expressible entities. On thecontrary, this classical Tibetan syncretism appears to advocate that the

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Yogacarins, like the Madhyamikas, say that everything whatsoever lacks intrinsicexistence. mKhas grub rje's opponent thinks that the Yogacarins agree with theMadhyamaka position that there is no unfabricated reality at all.

In support of his anti-syncretic reading, mKhas grub rje points out that theBodhisattvabhūmi and the Samdhinhmocanasūtra, both early Yogacara texts,refer to opponents whose position is that entities are all merely conceptuallyconstructed {btags pa tsamsprajnaptimātra), i.e. they are all entirely fabrications.There is for these opponents nothing whatsoever with intrinsic existence. There isno unfabricated reality on which fabricated entities are founded.53

These early Yogacara texts say, as mKhas grub rje explains, that theopponents' position entails nihilism {medparīta ba). A merely fabricated entitymust have some unfabricated stuff out of which it is fabricated. Otherwise thefabrication would not be possible, and nothing at all would exist. Nihilism cannotbe avoided if everything is said to have existence which is conceptuallyconstructed (prajnaptimātra).

The opponents' view, and the Yogacarins' response, is represented succinctlyin a passage from the Bodhisattvabhūmi, quoted (in Tibetan translation) bymKhas grub rje:

de bas na gang zag kha cig shes par dka' ba'i mdo sde theg pa chen po dangldan pa/zab mo stong pa nyid dang ldan pa'i dgongs pa'i don bstan pa dagthos nas/bshad pa'i don yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du ma shes nas tshulbzhin ma yin par rnam par btags te/ rigs pa ma yin pas skye pa'i rtog patsam gyis 'di thams cad ni btags pa tsam du zad do/ 'di ni de kho na yinno/su 'di ltar lta ba de ni yang dag par lta ba yin no zhes de ltar lta zhingde skad smra'o/de'i ltar na 'dogs pa'i gzhi'i dngos po tsam yang medpas/'dogs pa nyid kyang thams cad kyis thams cad du med par 'gyurna/gdags pa tsam gyi de kho na yod par lta ga la 'gyur te/de bas na rnamgrangs des na de dag gis ni de kho na dang btags pa de gnyi ga la yang skurba btab par 'gyur te/

Hence, some people—having heard the abstruse teachings with a non-definitive meaning of the sūtra-s associated with the Mahayana andassociated with profound emptiness, not understanding the meaning of theexposition as it actually is, conceiving [of it] incorrectly—with mereconjecture which arises because of error think that 'all this is onlyconceptual construction. This is reality. He who sees in this way seescorrectly.'

[The Yogacarin responds:] If this were so, on account of the non-existence of even the mere substratum which is the basis of conceptualconstruction even the conceptual construction itself would not exist at all.How could the reality which is mere conceptual construction be consideredto exist? Therefore, in this manner these [people] negate both reality andconceptual construction.54

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The Bodhisattvabhümi'goes on to accuse these opponents of being the principal ormost important (gtso bc&pradhāna) nihilists (medparīta basnāstika).55 Giventhe text's statement that these people come to their nihilistic view as a result oftheir misunderstanding of the Maháyána teaching of emptiness, it is quite likelythat these principal or most important nihilists are the Madhyamikas (though theyare not named as such). mKhas grub rje, at any rate, is sure about the identity ofthe opponents. He says that this passage from the Bodhisattvabhümi teaches thatthe Madhyamikas (dbumapa) commit the fault (¿nodpa) of nihilism by assertingthat all entities are only conceptual constructions.56

The Madhyamika, understood in this way as a proponent of prajñaptimatra,will perhaps claim that he is not a nihilist because he denies only the unfabricated,i.e. intrinsic, existence of entities, and not their existence perse. Entities exist, butthey do not have intrinsic existence. The Madhyamika treads, he contends, thefamous Buddhist Middle Path, understood here as the Middle Path between theextremes of total non-existence and intrinsic existence. He furthermore regardsthe Yogacarin as deficient in failing to negate the intrinsic existence of everythingwhatsoever. The Yogacarins thus stray from the Middle Path.

But the Yogacarin thinks that universal lack of intrinsic existence is tantamountto the extreme of universal non-existence. The Yogacarin thinks that fabricatedentities cannot exist without some unfabricated reality (the dependent nature) onthe basis of which, in unenlightened ignorance, the fabricated world is created andwhich remains when the fabricated world—through the enlightened vision of theperfected nature (the absence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature)—iseliminated. Madhyamikas certainly claim to tread the Middle Path but they aremistaken. The true Middle Path, according to the Yogacara, is the position whichdenies the intrinsic existence of the dualistic entities which are the imaginednature, but which does not deny the intrinsic existence of the real basis for thisfabrication. This position thus avoids both the extreme of asserting the intrinsicexistence of entities which are actually fabrications and also the extreme ofasserting the lack of intrinsic existence of everything whatsoever.

It is debatable whether the Madhyamika or the Yogacarin is right . (It is ofcourse quite possible that both the Madhyamika and the Yogacarin are wrong,insofar as they both claim that the ordinary dualistic world lacks intrinsicexistence, i.e. is a fabrication). What is clear, however, is that there appears to bea fundamental philosophical disagreement between the two schools. There is hereno room for a syncretism which asserts the essential philosophical identity ofMadhyamaka and Yogacara thought. There is here no place for the interpretationwhich asserts that Madhyamaka and Yogacara are essentially philosophicallyunited, in that they both posit an ineffable reality, accessible only to a wisdombeyond words.

References

Anacker, S. 1998 (corrected ed). Seven Works of Vasubartdhu. Motilal Banarsidass:

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Delhi.Bhattacharya, K. 1990 (3rd ed.). The Dialectical Method of Nāgāņuna. Motilal

Banarsidass: Delhi.Burton, D. 1999. Emptiness Appraised. Curzon: Richmond.Cabezón, J. (trans.) 1992. A Dose of Emptiness. State University of New York Press:

Albany.Dutt,N. 1966. Bodhisattvabhūmi. K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute: Patna.Forman, R. (ed.) 1990. The Problem of Pure Consciousness. Oxford University Press:

Oxford.Harris, I. 1991. The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra in Indian Mahāyāna

Buddhism. Brill: Leiden.Ichigo M. (trans.) 1989. Madhyamakālatnkāra. In Gomez, L.O. and Silk, J.A. (eds.)

1989. Studies in the Literature of the Great Vehicle: Three Mahāyāna Buddhist Texts.University of Michigan: Ann Arbour, 141-240.

mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang. sTong thun chen mo. In gSungs 'bum, volume Ka.King, R. 1995. Early AdvaitaVedānta and Buddhism. State Univesity of New York Press:

Albany.Kochumuttom, T. 1982. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience. Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi.Lamotte, É. (trans.) 1976. The Teaching of Vimalaklrti. (Trans, from the French by S.

Boin), P21i Text Society: Oxford.La Vallée Poussin, L. 1970 (reprint). Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Bibliotheca

BuddhicalX. Biblio Verlag: Osnabruck.Limaye, S.V. 1992. Mahāyānasūtrālarnkāra. Indian Books Centre: Delhi.Lindtner, C. 1982. Nagarjuniana. Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi.Lindtner, C. 1986a. 'Bhavya's Critique of Yogācāra in the Madhyamaka-ratnapradlpa,

Chapter IV.' In Matilal, B. and Evans, R. (eds.) 1986. Buddhist Logic andEpistemology. D. Riedel: Dordrecht. 239-263.

Lindtner, C. 1986b. 'Materials for the Study of Bhavya.' In E. Kahrs (ed.),Kalyāņamitrāŗāgaņam. Essays in Honour of Nils Simonsson. Oxford University Press:Oxford, 179-202.

Olson, R. 1974. 'Candrakīrti's Critique of Vijnānavāda', Philosophy East and West 24,405-411.

Pandeya,R. 1988. Madhyamakaśāstram of' Nāgāņuna. Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi.Powers,J. (trans.) 1995. Wisdom of Buddha. The Samdhinirmocana Mahāyāna Sūtra.

Dharma Publishing: Berkeley.Scherrer-Schaub, C.A. (ed.) 1991. Yuktisastikāwtti. Instituí Beige Des Hautes Etudes

Chinoises: Bruxelles.Sharma,P. 1990. Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra. Aditya Prakashan: New Delhi.Thurman, R. 1984. Tsong Kha Pa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence.

Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi.Ueda, Y. 1967. 'Two Main Streams of Thought in Yogācāra Philosophy'. Philosophy

East and West, 17.Vaidya, PL. 1960. Madhyamakaśāstra of Nāgāņuna with the Commentary: Prasannapadā

by Candrakīrti. The Mithila Institute: Darbhanga.Ward.K. 1994. Religion and Revelation. Oxford University Press: Oxford.Williams, P. 1989. Mahāyāna Buddhism. Routledge: London.Williams, P. 1998. The Reflexive Nature of Awareness. Curzon: Richmond.Willis, J. 1979. On Knowing Reality. Columbia University Press: New York.

Notes1 See Vimśatika(vrtti), Anacker (ed.) 1998: 413-421.

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2 See, for example, P. Williams 1989: 82-90 for a presentation of Yogācāra asontological idealism.

3 Samdhinirmocanasūtra, Powers (ed.) 1995:98.4 The Yogācārin understood in this way displays what might be described as a

pathological distrust of dualisms and language. It is in fact far from self-evident andseems to be counter-intuitive that all dualisms are simply fabrications and that alllanguage is always distorting of things as they actually are.

5 See Bodhisattvabhūmi, Dutt (ed.) 1966: 26, bodhisattvānām buddhānārņ cabhagavatām dharmanairātmyapravesāya pravistena suvisuddhena casarvadharmānāmnirabhilāpyasvabhāvatāmārabhyaprajfiaptivādasvabhāvanirvikalpajñeyasamena jñānena yo gocaravisayah sāsau paramā tathatā niruttarājñeyaparyantagatā yasyāh sarva samyagdharmapravicayā nivartante nābhivartante/.See also Bodhisattvabhūmi, Dutt (ed.) 1966: 32, yathābhūtam ca tathatārnnirabhilāpyasvabhāvatam yathābhutam prajānāti/iyam ucyate sugŗhītā śunyatāsamyakprajñayā supratividdheti/iyam tāvad upapattisādhanayuktir ānulomikl yayanirabhilāpyasvabhāvatā sarvadharmāņām pratyavagantavyá/.

6 Madhyāntavibhāga I, 14, tathatā bhutakotiś cānimittam paramārthatā/dharmadhātušca paryāyāh śunyatāyāh samāsatah//. Madhyāntavibhāgabhāsya I, 14, nimitta-nirodhārthenānimittamsarvanimittābhāvāt/. Anacker(ed.) 1998: 428.

7 Vimsatikāvŗttilš, yo bālair dharmāņām svabhāvo grāhyagrāhakādih parikalpitas tenakalpitenātmanā tēsām nairātmyam na tvan abhilāpyenātmanā yo buddhānārņ visayaiti/. Anacker (ed.)' 1998: 416.

8 Satņdhinirmocanasūtra, Powers (ed.) 1995: 20.9 Trisvabhāvanirdesa 36, Anacker (ed.) 1998:466.10 Madhyāntavibhāga I, 3, Anacker (ed.) 1998:425.11 MahāyānasūtrālamkāraV\, 8, Limaye (ed.) 1992: 72.12 See also Harris 1991.13 See, for instance Trimšikā 29, Anacker (ed.) 1998:423.14 See also Willis 1979: 26.15 I note in passing that the appeal to the ineffability thesis is a favourite tactic of

syncretists who want to assert the fundamental unity of—not just Yogācāra andMadhyamaka—but also all the seemingly disparate traditions of Buddhism. AllBuddhists, the syncretist will argue, agree that reality is finally ineffable. (This is,however, a highly contentious point. It is not clear in fact that all Buddhists claimthat reality is ineffable). For such a syncretist, the apparently divergent teachings ofthe Buddhist traditions are simply different conceptual formulations of the samefinally ineffable reality. The same strategy is sometimes employed in the field ofcomparative religion, when it is argued that the vast variety of religious teachingspresent in the world point towards the same ineffable reality. All religions are thusunited in their common advocacy of a reality beyond words. Note, however, that suchapparently irenic syncretism, even if tolerant of most religions, certainly cannottolerate any religion—including, arguably, some forms of Buddhism—which does notaccept that reality is ineffable.

16 See Mülamadhyamakakāríkā XIII., 8, Pandeya (ed.) 1988: 240-241; Yuktisastikā 50,Lindtner (ed.) 1982: 114; Vigrahavyāvartani 29, Johnston, E.H. and Kunst A. (eds.)in Bhattacharya 1990: 61-62.

17 Actually, Olson says the 'Prsańgika Mādhyamika'. This is an allusion to thetaxonomy (popular in Tibet and of uncertain provenance) which divides the IndianMadhyamaka tradition into 'Svātantrikas' and 'Prāsangikas'. According to one(disputed) interpretation of this taxonomy—which Olson is evidently following—thePrāsangikas maintain that there can be no correct statements from the standpoint ofultimate truth whereas the Svātantrikas maintain that there can be correct statements

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from the standpoint of the ultimate truth. But this is a controversy into which I donot want to enter here.

18 Lokātītastava 27-28, Lindtner (ed.) 1982: 138.19 See for example, Acintyastava 22-23, Lindtner (ed.) 1982: 146,148.20 Prasannapadā, Vaidya (ed.) 1960: 264. Candrakirti cites the same passage (again

without giving the source) in the Madhyamakāvatārabhāsya, yi ge med pa'i chos lani/ nyan pa gang dang ston pa gang/'gyur ba med la sgro btags pas/ 'on kyang nyanzhing ston pa yin//. La Vallée Poussin (ed.) 1970:178.

21 See Matilal 1986: 357-378, Dreyfus 1997: 67 ff.22 VimalakīrtinirdesasūtraVlll, 33, Lamotte (trans.): 1976: 202-203.23 Such knowledge with an ineffable content must be distinguished from the disputed

phenomenon known in recent literature as the 'pure consciousness event', understoodas a wakeful but contentless state of consciousness. See Forman 1990. It is a mootpoint whether a pure consciousness event can exist (can one be awake without one'sconsciousness having some content?). However, what is clear is that, as the pureconsciousness event is said to be contentless, it would not involve knowledge ofanything.

24 I am not here doubting that the experience of reality may be in a senseincommunicable. I am simply making the point that the reality which is experiencedmust be in principle describable. It may plausibly be argued that experiences,including the experience of reality (assuming that such an experience is possible),have an inalienably first-person character. Even if I describe accurately myexperience to you, the description will not enable you to have my experience.Experiences qua first-person events are not publicly accessible objects likemountains, trees, and so forth. There is an irrevocably private dimension to one'sexperience. Other people cannot have a direct perception of my experience. Myexperience is never directly accessible to others. No matter how well I might describemy experience to you, you will never know quite what it is like for me to have theexperience. But, granted this incommunicability of experience qua first-person event,what is known in an experience must nevertheless be in principle expressible. If, forinstance, I have an experience of a red car, the experience qua first-person event (asmy experience) is perhaps inexpressible, but this in no way inhibits my ability todescribe the red car which is known in the experience. Similarly, if I have anexperience of reality, the experience qua first-person event is inexpressible, but this inno way inhibits my ability to describe the reality which is known in the experience.

25 For a useful discussion of this point, see Ward 1994:164-165.26 Bodhicittavivaranald ff. Lindtner (ed.) 1982:193 ff.27 See Lindtner 1986a.28 Madhyamakāvatāra(bhāsya) VI, 45-97, La Vallée Poussin (ed.) 1970: 136-193.29 Bodhicaryāvatāra IX, 11 ff. Sharma(ed.) 1990.30 See Madhyamakālamkāra 44 ff, Ichigo (ed.) 1989. It is true that Sāntaraksita effects a

famous synthesis of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka but he does this, not by asserting theidentity of the two philosophies, but by making the Yogācāra a non-definitive(neyārthi) teaching (an upāya) by contrast with which the Madhyamaka philosophy isthe final, definitive (nītārtha) teaching. See Madhyamakālarnkāra 92-93, Ichigo (ed.)1989. In fact, the other Mādhyamika critics of the Yogācāra also admit that thedoctrine of cittamātra has value as a non-definitive teaching. (See, for example,Bodhicittavivarana 25, 27, Lindtner (ed.) 1982: 192; Madhyamakāvatāra VI, 84-97,La Vallée Poussin (ed.) 1970: 182-199 and Madhyamakaratnapradlpa IV, 1-2,Lindtner (ed.) 1986b: 192-193). No doubt this strategy was in part necessitated bythe fact that various sütra-s, such as the Lankāvatārasūtra and the Dasabhūmikasūtra,do teach cittamātra. Such buddhavacana cannot of course be wrong according to the

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Mādhyamikas, but it can be accommodated by them as having a provisional, asopposed to a final, meaning.

31 MadhyamakāvatāraV\,l\, La Vallée Poussin (ed.) 1970: 164.32 Madhyamakāvatārabhāsya, La Vallée Poussin (ed.) 1970: 164, shes bya rang bzhin

med pa ji lta ba de bzhin du shes bya'i rnam pa can gyi blo yang rang gi bdag nyidkyis ma skyes par rig par bya'o/

33 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Burton 1999:87-121.34 See, for example, Madhyamakāvatār(bhāsya) VI, 45-47, La Vallée Poussin (ed.)

1970: 135-140; Bodhicittavivaraņa 26, 30, Lindtner (ed.) 1982: 192, 194.35 Bodhicittavivaraņa 55, Lindtner (ed.) 1982: 200.36 The translation here is by Lindtner 1986a: 252. The Tibetan textreads 'blo gros 'bring

dag'. See Lindtner (ed.) 1986b: 195.37 The translation is by Lindtner 1986a: 241.38 See Yuktisastikāvrtti 40-41. Scherrer-Schaub (ed.) 1991.39 Madhyāntavibhāga(bhāsya) I, 22 (verse in italics), na klistā nāpi cāklisti

suddhāsuddhā na caiva sā katham na klistā nāpi cāsuddhā prakrtyaiva—prabhāsvaratvāc cittasya katham nāklistā na suddhā—klesasyigāntukatvatahll evarņśunyatāyā uddistah prabhedah sādhito bhavati. Anacker(ed.) 1998: 431.

40 Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra XIII, 19, matam ca cittarn prakŗtiprabhāsvararņ sadā tadāgantukadosadūsitam/ na dharmatācittam ŗte 'nyacetasah prabhāsvaratvam prakŗtauvidhiyate//. Limaye(ed.) 1992:253.

41 Mahāyānasūtrālamkārabhāsya XIII, 19, dharmābhāvas ca dharmopalabdhiś cetitrāsasthānam nihsamklestā ca dharmadhātoh prakrtyā visuddhatā ca pascād ititrāsasthānam bālānārņ...yathā toyam prakrtyā prasannam āgantukena tu kālusyenalutitarņ bhavaty evam cittarn prakrtyā prabhāsvaram matam āgantukais tu dosairdūsitam iti/ na ca dharmatācittād ŗte 'nyasya cetasah paratantralaksanasyaprakŗtiprabhāsvaratvam vidhīyate/tasmāc cittatathataivātra cittarn veditavyam//.Limaye (ed.) 1992:253.

42 On the Yogācāra notion of svasamvedana, see Williams 1998.43 Acintyastava 52, Lindtner (ed.) 1982: 156.44 Mulamadhyamakakārikā XXV, 24, Pandeya(ed.) 1988: 242.45 Mulamadhyamakakārikā, Pandeya(ed.) 1988:1.46 mKhas grub rje's anti-syncretic interpretation seems to be inspired by that of his

teacher Tsong kha pa as found, for instance, in the Legs bshad snying po. R.Thurman (1984: 259) notes that Tsong kha pa thinks that Asańga himself was aMādhyamika who explained the Yogācāra system 'in adaptation to the needs of theperiod and people.' However, this is not to say, as one might be inclined to think, thatTsong kha pa is therefore a syncretist for whom Yogācāra and Madhyamaka share thesame philosophical view about reality. On the contrary, Tsong kha pa is claiming(rightly or wrongly) that Asańga, though often understood to be a Yogācārin, was inthe final analysis a Mādhyamika who used the Yogācāra doctrine as a skilful meansto be finally replaced by the Madhyamaka perspective. Tsong kha pa says, accordingto Thurman, that Asanga's advocacy of Madhayamaka is evident especially in theRatnagotravibhāgavyākhyā (a text normally associated with tathāgatagarbhateachings). Note, however, that the traditional Tibetan attribution of this text toAsańga is not shared by the Chinese (for whom the author is someone named'Sāramati') and is certainly questionable. See Williams 1989: 103.

47 See mKhas grub rje's sTong thun chert mo 30-31.48 sTong thun chen mo 31.49 sTong thun chen moll, byang sa las/ btags pa'i tshig gi mtshan ma'i gzhi/btags pa'i

tshig gi mtshan ma'i rten du gyur pa/brjod du med pa'i bdag nyid kyis don dam paryod pa yang dag pa'i dngos po la.... In Sanskrit, this passage from theBodhisattvabhümi reads: ...prajnaptivādanimittādhisthānam

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prajñaptivādanimittasamhisrayam nirabhilāpyātrhakatayā paramārthasadbhūtarņ... .Dutt (ed.) 1966: 30-31.

50 sTong thun chen mo 32, ma bslabs pa kha cig/kun las btus dbu ma rigs pa'i tshogsdang mthun par smra ba ni/

51 I borrow here the translation of Cabezón (1992: 47), as the manuscript from which Iam working is illegible at this point.

52 sTong thun chen mo 32, gzhan yang mdo dgongs 'grel dang/gtan la dbab pa bsdu badang/byang dang/theg bsdus dang/kun las btus rnams las/mdo las/chos thams cad maskyes pa ma 'gags pa gzod ma nas zhi ba rang bzhin gyis yongs su mya ngan las 'daspa zhes gsungs pa dgongs pa can dang Idem pa po'i dag tu gsungs'i phyir/ngo bo nyidmed par smra ba'i dbu ma'i lugs su ji ltar 'gyur/

53 sTong thun chen mo 27-28.54 In Sanskrit, this passage from the Bodhisattvabhūmireads: ato ya ekatyā durvijñeyān

sūtrān mahāyānapratisarnyuktān gambhīrān chūnyatāpratisarņyuktānābhiprāyikārthanirūpitān chrutvā yathābhütam bhāsitasyārtham anabhijñāyāyonisovikalpyāyogavihitena tarkamātrakeņaivam drstayo bhavanty evatmvādinah/prajnaptimātram eva sarvam etat tattvam/yaś caivam paśyati sa samyakpaśyatiti/tesām prajñapty adhisthānasya vastumātrasyābhāvāt saiva prajñaptih sarveņasarvam na bhavati/kutah punah prajfiaptimātram tattvam bhavisyati/tad anenaparyāyeņa tais tattvam api prajñaptir api tadubhayam apy apavāditam bhavati/. SeeDutt (ed.) 1966: 31.

55 The Tibetan, quoted at sTong thun chen mo 28, reads: btags pa dang de kho na laskur ba btab pa na/med par lta ba'i gtso bo yin par rig par bya'o/. In Sanskrit, thispassage from the Bodhisattvabhūmi reads: prajnaptitattvāpavādāc ca pradhānonāstiko veditavyah/. See Dutt (ed.) 1966:31.

56 sTong thun chen mo 28, zhes dbu ma pa chos thams cad btags pa tsam du smra ba pamed par lta bar 'gyur ba'i gnod pa bstan.

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