Southeast European and Black Sea StudiesVol. 5, No. 2, May 2005, pp. 167–169

ISSN 1468–3857 (print)/ISSN 1743–9639 (online) © 2005 Taylor & Francis LtdDOI: 10.1080/14683850500161313

Bringing the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the European Union CloserTaylor and Francis LtdFBSS116114.sgm10.1080/14683850500161313Southeast European and Black Sea Studies1468-3857 (print)/1743-9639 (online)Editorial2005Taylor & Francis Ltd52000000May 2005Fotinibelloufotinibellou@eliamep.gr

While developing regional cooperation within the framework of the Black SeaEconomic Cooperation (BSEC), the participating states regarded it as a stepping stonetowards integrating into European and world structures. BSEC was conceived as aregional endeavor, ‘open’ in character, and characteristic of the wave of sub-regionalformations that dominated the European scene in early 1990s. It currently includestwelve member states: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece,Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia-Montenegro, Turkey and Ukraine. Thirteen yearsafter its establishment in June 1992, BSEC is still trying to find its place in the Europeanarchitecture and shape its relationship with the European Union (EU). This came tothe forefront during the six-month Hellenic Chairmanship-in-office of the BSEC(October–April 2005) whose program developed around the logo ‘Bringing BSECcloser to the European Union’. Today, the main incentives for reconsidering the funda-mentals of BSEC-EU affairs lie in the institutional and operational maturity that theBSEC has acquired; the enlargement process of the EU and its implications for theregion; the new quality of bilateral affairs between each BSEC member state and the EUespecially in the post-2004 enlargement period.

Despite the clear preference on the part of the EU for ‘bilateralism’ in shaping itsBlack Sea strategies, the European Commission was the first to place EU-BSEC affairsinto a comprehensive political framework in its Communication to the Council on‘Regional Co-operation in the Black Sea area: state of play, perspectives of EU actionencouraging its future development’, presented on 19 December 1997. It listed for thefirst and probably the only time until now, all the major issues of BSEC-EU relationsthat continue to remain topical today: the European Community’s (EC) observerstatus with the BSEC, the notion of Black Sea synergies, utilization of existing financialinstruments in a regional Black Sea format, and identification of priority areas for EU-BSEC interaction. Since then, the debate over BSEC-EU affairs has developed preciselyaround these key issues. The BSEC’s reply to the EC’s Communication came two yearslater, in 1999, with the adoption of the ‘Platform for Cooperation between the BSECand the EU’, which was not acknowledged by the EC as a realistic and complete basis

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for further cooperation. Official communication at the high level has not made muchprogress since then.

Re-reading these two policy documents—the EC Communication of 1997 and theBSEC Platform of 1999—we see that some general directions have maintained theirvalidity, but at the same time it becomes obvious how much Europe as a whole haschanged during these years. The facts on the ground have evolved (in some cases dras-tically), therefore the assessment made six to eight years ago has to be reconsidered,while the conditions and recommendations for practical action simply have to be re-invented. Nevertheless, a lot has been happening in the meantime at a grassroots level.The EU has made good use of its ‘official guest’ status and participated in BSEC activ-ities in an informal and practical way by sending officials or representatives at expertlevel to participate in sectoral Ministerial Meetings, BSEC Working Groups andWorkshops (e.g., on transport, energy and institutional renewal).

Relations between the BSEC and the EU has actually developed at two levels:between the EU and individual Black Sea countries, and between the EU and the BSECitself. A first observation is that while EU’s relations with individual Black Sea countrieshave seen considerable, though uneven, progress, direct links between the EU andBSEC have stagnated. The reasons for this situation are diverse, but the fact remainsthat it has hampered the formulation of a BSEC-EU regional partnership. The BSEC-EU dialogue will always reflect certain aspects of the state of affairs in bilateral relationsaccounting for a certain degree of diversification. Thus, when considering the pros-pects for a meaningful and structured relationship among the two organizations, wehave to consider both of these levels in a realistic manner. The BSEC member states, fortheir part, are able to make use of the potential available through their specific relation-ship with the EU and its institutions to promote BSEC’s image as a locomotive of posi-tive interaction, integration and stability in the Black Sea area and stress the increasingsignificance of the Black Sea dimension in existing EU policies. At the same time, theyhave ample opportunities to promote the Black Sea as a region with its own economic,cultural and, to a certain degree, political identity. Today, the Black Sea region, thanksto its strategic location and tremendous potential for growth, is given a chance to playa new role in the European system.

The fact that the EU might envisage BSEC as a ‘regional partner’ as mentioned in theEuropean Neighborhood Policy (ENP) strategy paper has not passed unnoticed. BSECitself is now expected to respond and formulate a definition of how it views its role asa ‘regional partner’. It has to be stressed that this type of exercise would benefit BSECin broader terms, not just in terms of its interaction with the EU, but also with theinternational community and other organizations. Beyond that strategic approach,there is a need for concrete modalities of interaction with BSEC to be considered firstof all by the BSEC member states and institutions. A first step would be for the EU toaccept the longstanding offer to become an observer in the BSEC process. This wouldbe in line with the recognition of the BSEC as a regional partner. It would allow thedevelopment of direct contacts at executive and technical levels. As mentioned in theBSEC Economic Agenda ‘joint meetings of relevant working bodies of the BSEC andthe EU as well as conferences, workshops, and seminars of experts in specific fields of

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common interest would play a useful role in building up new opportunities of produc-tive cooperation between the two organizations’. A second step would be for the EU toincorporate a ‘Black Sea’ dimension into its strategies, and adjust its present and planfuture financial instruments in a way that could facilitate joint programming andimplementation of cross-border cooperation.

It stands to reason that BSEC must face up to the challenges of the evolving Euro-pean system and initiate a comprehensive review of the BSEC-EU relationship result-ing in specific recommendations on detailed modalities of cooperation, including:

● Engaging EU institutions in the work of subsidiary bodies. EU’s involvement in thesubsidiary bodies of BSEC would no doubt enhance the prospect of result-oriented,realistic approaches in the quest for workable solutions in areas of mutual interest,and entail a continuous and structured dialogue between senior officials and experts.

● Elaborating a revised version of the Platform for Cooperation between the BSECand the EU with due consideration of the evolving political landscape and economicrealities of European integration.

● Engaging EU institutions more actively in the work of BSEC Related Bodies such asthe Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB), the BSEC Business Council,the Parliamentary Assembly of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC) and theInternational Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS).

● Reviewing the priority fields of possible EU-BSEC interaction on the basis of accu-mulated experience in regional cooperation with a view to identifying new synergiesof competence and mutual interest.

International community’s interest in the broader Black Sea region is not lacking.Almost all international organizations and major global players are one way or anotherpresent in the region. What has been missing, however, is the involvement of the inter-national community and especially the EU in the work of the organization of the BSEC.To address this problem, BSEC should come up with its own conceptual contributionsand should strive to produce some ‘success stories’ of cooperation.

In order to be credible and effective, the new BSEC comprehensive approachtowards the EU should include clear goals and practical modalities rather than generalstatements. Such a new Platform for Cooperation should be focused on what is realisticrather than what may be desirable in an ideal world. To advance and strengthen theBSEC’s voice in European and world affairs, it will have to formulate its own vision anddevelop practical solutions on how it can function as a reliable partner for other orga-nizations that are active in the region. The time has also come for the EU to develop aBlack Sea dimension in its strategic outlook, complementary to and mutually reinforc-ing its established Mediterranean and Northern Dimensions.

The conditions for a substantial and effective relationship between the EU and theBSEC are there. The positive results of interaction with the EU will generate new condi-tions on the ground and lead to a qualitatively new environment in the region.

Panagiota ManoliInternational Center for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS)