boutros‐ghali's cyprus initiative in 1992: why did it fail?

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Boutros-Ghali's Cyprus Initiative in 1992:Why Did it Fail?

SUHA BOLUKBASI

The Cyprus dispute is one of the international/intercommunal conflictsthat appears to have become less solvable in the wake of the end of theCold War. The reduced probability of a negotiated settlement is all themore surprising given the commitment of the American-led and morehomogeneous-looking UN Security Council to a rapid solution in thepost-1990 era. In early 1991, departing from its traditional low-profilemediation role in the Cyprus dispute, the Security Council authorized theUN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to use all the means necessary tocompel the parties to compromise. The United States also did not hesitateto put pressure on Ankara to dissuade Turkish Cypriot leader RaufDenktash - who was perceived to be more of a problem than recentGreek Cypriot leaders George Vasiliou or Glafkos Kleridhis - fromresisting a settlement. Yet neither the recent high-handed Americanapproach nor the unconventional assertiveness of Boutros-Ghali hasbrought the parties any nearer to a settlement.

Actually, the failure of the recent intercommunal negotiations andNew York summits should not have caught anybody familiar with thedispute unawares. In nearly two decades of intercommunal talks signifi-cant progress has been made in establishing the characteristics of thefederal state, but serious disagreements remain over a number of issues.Nevertheless, Ghali heralded the recent developments as promising thesettlement of the age-old dispute, and in 1992 the then Greek PrimeMinister Constantine Mitsotakis reflected the same optimism when hestated that 'only a few weeks are left before the Cyprus problem issolved'.1

Yet the Ghali-organized talks which lasted on and off throughout 1992and 1993 led nowhere, and the Turkish and Greek Cypriots blamed eachother for not being sincere enough in their commitment to a settlement.Throughout 1992 and 1993 Ghali - for the first time in the history of theintercommunal talks - sided with one of the protagonists and accusedDenktash of being intractable.2 Denktash, for his part, blamed Ghali forhaving overstepped his 'mission of good offices' and for having tried toimpose an inequitable settlement.3

This article will show that the failure of the Ghali mission and the

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.31, No.3, July 1995, pp.460-482PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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BOUTROS-GHALI'S CYPRUS INITIATIVE, 1992 461

differences between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot negotiating positionsare due to both communities' different perceptions of how a viable settle-ment should look. The Turkish Cypriots are convinced that if the proposedfederal state does not accord them extensive independence to be mastersof their own zone they could fail to stem the tide of rising Greek ethno-centrism in the future. The break-up of the multinational states in thepost-Cold War era has further worried the Turkish Cypriots regarding theprospects for a federal solution and has made them less interested insharing one state with the Greeks. Hence Denktash insists on demandswhich he believes would protect the Turkish zone of the federal state fromfuture Greek Cypriot encroachment. These demands range from holdingon to as much territory as possible to requiring that the federal presidencybe rotational.

For their part, the Greek Cypriots consider their Turkish compatriots'negotiating positions as proof that the Turks do not actually want tobecome part of a new multinational Cyprus state and that they wouldrather partition the island and unite their portion with Turkey. Hencethey believe that Denktash is not sincerely interested in negotiations andthat it is a waste of time to try to convince him that what the GreekCypriots really want is a viable federal state and not the hellenization ofthe island, as the Turkish community suspects.

The dispute dates back to 1964, when the Greek Cypriots succeeded inousting their Turkish compatriots from the partnership administration,which was based on a fixed proportional communal representation asstipulated by the 1960 constitution. The 1960 constitution was the out-growth of the 1959 Zurich-London Treaties between Turkey, Greece,Britain and the Cypriot communities which ended the British rule as wellas the Greek Cypriot armed rebellion for enosis (unification with Greece).From 1964 on, the Turkish Cypriots, who constituted 20 per cent of theisland's population, were excluded from the political life of the island andwere forced to live in enclaves covering less than five per cent of Cyprus'territory. The Greek Cypriots - in violation of the 1960 constitution -filled all civil service and government posts, and effectively hellenized theisland.

This situation lasted until July 1974, when the Greek Junta overthrewPresident Makarios, whose anti-Junta and pro-Third World credentialshad made him persona non grata in Athens. Greece's installation of NikosSampson as president, well known for his involvement in anti-Turkishviolence and his zeal for enosis, alarmed Turkey, which sent militaryforces to the island. Turkey justified its action as an exercise of its rightof unilateral intervention to uphold the constitutional order as stipulatedunder Article IV of the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee, which was signed

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462 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

by the founder states of Greece, Turkey and Britain and appended to theCyprus constitution.4

Since the Turkish military intervention in 1974, which placed 35 percent of the island's territory under Turkish Cypriot control, the Cyprusdispute revolved around the intercommunal disagreement over how torestore the Cyprus state. The dispute also poisoned the relations betweenAnkara and Athens, magnifying the disagreements on the Aegean and onthe minorities. In short, it would be fair to assume that, had there been noCyprus dispute, other Turco-Greek problems would have been moremanageable, or their settlement more probable.

Since Turkey's intervention in July 1974, there have been numerousmeetings between the two communities' leaders, most of them arrangedby UN mediation. The first of such intercommunal talks took place inSeptember 1974 between Turkish and Greek community leaders, Kleridesand Denktash, focusing on humanitarian problems caused by the fightingof the previous months. In February 1975 more comprehensive talksresumed and the parties agreed on an independent, demilitarized andnon-aligned Cyprus.5

In February 1977 the leaders of the two communities - Makarios andDenktash - agreed on four principles which characterized the future Cyprusstate as bicommunal and bizonal, and territory under the administration ofeach community would be determined according to economic viability,productivity and the existing property rights of individual citizens.6 For theTurkish Cypriots this means that the Turkish zone need not be proportionalto the Turks' share of the population, i.e. the Turks could control morethan 20 per cent of the land because they used to own more than 20 per centof the agricultural land in Cyprus.7 Makarios and Denktash also agreed todiscuss the so-called three freedoms- the freedoms of movement, settle-ment, and the right to own property - and they concurred that the powersand functions of the central federal government would be such as to safe-guard the unity of the country. These two principles were adopted tosatisfy Greek Cypriot demands, but they were vaguely worded so as toassure the Turks that they need not be categorically applied.

In May 1979 Denktash and the then Greek Cypriot leader Kyprianoumet and issued a ten-point communique which provided for the resumptionof intercommunal talks on the basis of the 1977 principles.8 The communi-que foresaw the return to Turkish Cypriot-controlled Varosha of Greekinhabitants as soon as an agreement was reached on this specific issue, butwhereas the Greek Cypriots insisted on the return of Greeks only ifVarosha was put under UN control, the Turkish Cypriots refused, insistingthat the territorial exchanges could only be part of a final settlement.

Between September 1980 and January 1981 there were four rounds

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of talks focusing on Varosha's resettlement, goodwill and confidence-building measures, and constitutional and territorial aspects. Althoughafter a recess the talks resumed in November 1981, the election of AndreasPapandreou as Prime Minister of Greece, in October 1981, drasticallychanged the behaviour of Kyprianou. At a meeting in Athens on11 December 1981, Papandreou convinced Kyprianou that as long asthere were no international pressures on Ankara, Denktash - who wasconsidered a puppet of Turkey-would not make any concessions at inter-communal talks. Hence both men agreed to downgrade their reliance onintercommunal talks and emphasize lobbying in international forumsbecause, as they stated, 'in this way we can arrive at a point when Turkeywill finally feel the pressure of the international society and abandon itspolicy'.'

Afterwards, the Greek Cypriots chose to attend the intercommunaltalks only to state their positions but did not seem ready to bargain ormake any concessions. Moreover, in conformity with Athens' wishes theGreek Cypriots took the dispute to the UN General Assembly, and on13 May 1983 they were able to obtain a pro-Greek resolution which calledfor the withdrawal of all the 'occupation forces' and the return of theGreek Cypriot refugees to their former homes. It also called for thedemilitarization of the island and an international conference to tacklethe dispute.10

The Greek Cypriot recourse to the United Nations strengthened theTurkish Cypriot belief that what the Greek Cypriots really wanted was aunitary state they would dominate, and that their participation in inter-communal talks was simply intended to hide this fact. Hence on 15November 1983, in response to the latest UN resolution, the TurkishCypriot Legislative Assembly unanimously voted to proclaim the inde-pendence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). In theproclamation text it was stated that 'the Greek Cypriot leadership aban-doned the conference table in a bid to drag the Cyprus problem to inter-national fora to which the Turkish Cypriot people had no access and nopossibility of defending their rights [sic]'." The proclamation made itclear, however, that the achievement of a federal state would be easierbecause both communities would have equal political status.

The proclamation of the TRNC was approved by Turkey, the first andthe only state to recognize the TRNC. The UN Security Council deploredthe independence of the TRNC and called it legally invalid.12 GreekCypriot leader Spiros Kyprianou reacted harshly and said that he wouldnot negotiate with Denktash unless the Turkish Cypriots abrogated theirindependence resolution.13

Kyprianou's refusal to negotiate with Denktash determined the mode

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of the next round of the talks which were called 'proximity talks' becausethe then UN Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, shuttled back and forthbetween two separate rooms at the UN building in New York whereDenktash and Kyprianou sat. The proximity talks, which took place inseveral rounds in September, October and November 1984, culminatedin a summit meeting in New York on 17 January 1985 under the auspicesof Perez de Cuellar, when Kyprianou gave up his boycott of Denktash.The two leaders talked face to face about the draft agreement prepared byPerez de Cuellar. The draft outlined major points of agreement as estab-lished during the proximity talks, and identified several major problemsto be resolved through negotiations. The summit ended in failure becauseKyprianou considered the draft document only a basis for further discus-sion whereas Denktash agreed to sign it without any revision.14

In April 1985 Perez de Cuellar prepared another draft agreement in anattempt to satisfy Greek Cypriot objections to the January 1985 document.This document made a significant revision in the voting procedures inboth houses of parliament. Whereas the January draft required separatemajorities - meaning a majority of the Turkish Cypriot representatives aswell as of the Greek Cypriot members - in both chambers on majorissues, and simple majorities in both chambers on other matters, therewas a clause which required the approval of at least 30 per cent of theTurkish members in the upper house on 'other matters'. This pro-Turkishclause was omitted from the April document, thus reducing the leverageof the Turkish community in 'other matters'. Therefore the GreekCypriots accepted the draft while the Turkish Cypriots rejected it."

After holding another series of meetings with the representatives ofboth communities, Perez de Cuellar presented on 29 March 1986 yetanother draft framework agreement, which included a few adjustments toaccommodate Turkish Cypriot objections to the April 1985 document.This time, the Turkish Cypriots welcomed the draft whereas the GreekCypriot leadership and Papandreou considered it inadequate because thedocument dealt with constitutional issues, but failed to solve such GreekCypriot priority issues as the withdrawal of Turkish troops, the threefreedoms and international guarantees. Kyprianou, after consultationswith Papandreou, demanded once again an international conference totackle these priority issues.16 A few months earlier Papandreou had him-self called for an international conference and had opposed the discussionof constitutional issues 'until the last Turkish soldier leaves'.'7

On 21 February 1988 Kyprianou lost the presidential elections toGeorge Vasiliou, an independent candidate supported by the communistAKEL party. Although his election coincided with the start of the Davosprocess, or the relaxation of tensions between Greece and Turkey, and

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despite his image of a man of compromise, Vasiliou initially refused tomeet Denktash on an equal basis, arguing that Ankara determined thecourse of events in the island and that Denktash was simply implementingTurkey's policies. Hence he demanded a meeting with the then TurkishPrime Minister Turgut Ozal, which was rejected by the latter on thegrounds that the Cyprus dispute could only be solved through inter-communal negotiations.18

Eventually Vasiliou decided to see Denktash and both leaders met inGeneva in late August 1988, starting another series of intercommunaltalks mediated by the representatives of the UN Secretary General.Despite initial enthusiasm on both sides for a settlement, the talks endedin failure on 2 March 1990." The major reason for the failure was thedisagreement over the process and the objective of the negotiations. TheTurkish Cypriots insisted on reaching an agreement first on the constitu-tional aspects, while the Greek Cypriots gave priority to an agreement ontroop withdrawals, the question of guarantees and the three freedoms.The apparent and immediate reason for the breakdown of the talks was,however, Denktash's insistence that the Greek Cypriots recognize theTurkish Cypriots' right of self-determination and therefore that a futurefederation would be composed of two equal political entities. Denktashsaid 'no federation can be established between a community in Cypruswhich does not have a right to self-determination and a party which claimsthat it is the state and the legal government of the entire island' .20 Vasiliou,for his part, feared that such an admission would mean the Greek Cypriotrecognition of the Turkish Cypriot state, which he did not want, andblamed Denktash for introducing an entirely new argument to the inter-communal talks in order to ensure their failure.

After the failure of the intercommunal talks on 2 March 1990, neitherparty expected a fruitful dialogue in the immediate future. Although theUN envoys and American intermediaries continued their mediation, thenegotiating positions of both parties seemed inflexible. Yet by early 1991a more optimistic mood was evident in the UN headquarters and inWashington. This new mood was partly due to Turkey's then PresidentTurgut Ozal's departure from Turkey's policy of no direct involvement inintercommunal negotiations. In May 1991 he proposed quadripartitetalks between Greece, Turkey, and the Cypriot communities.21 He likenedsuch a summit to the 'election of the Pope', suggesting that a 'marathonsession' would be quite productive. At the end of a specified period, heargued 'what we solve, we solve, what we don't, we don't'.22

Ozal, believing that Greece's and the Greek Cypriots' international-ization campaigns had led to a deterioration of Turkey's relations with theEuropean Community, was convinced that the stalemate reached at the

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intercommunal talks could be overcome at a new summit meeting whereAthens and Ankara would also take part. Ozal's enthusiasm for quadri-partite talks was partly due to his knowledge that in 1959 a similar dead-lock in the Cyprus dispute was solved after Greece and Turkey decided tonegotiate; and afterwards each made significant concessions.

Greece and the Greek Cypriots then rejected this offer, and insteadintensified their demands for an international conference in which thefive permanent members of the Security Council would also take part.23

Although, for its part, Ankara rejected the idea of an internationalconference, it had already created an image of a country willing to bemore cooperative and conciliatory in the Cyprus negotiations. This ledUN officials to conclude that 'following the discussions in Ankara inAugust 1991, justifiable expectations had been raised that an agreementwas finally within reach and that the high-level meeting to conclude theagreement could take place in September 1991.'24 The UN officials wereconvinced that Ozal was willing to force Denktash to make the necessaryterritorial concessions and to accept a significant number of Greek Cypriotrefugees in the northern zone.25 Vasiliou also argued that in his contactswith George Bush in 1991 Ozal had agreed to consider the map of theformer UN Cyprus mediator Hugo Gobbi - which was prepared in theearly 1980s - as a basis for a territorial settlement. This map, whichallocates 27 per cent of Cypriot territory to the Turks, was then consideredunacceptable by Denktash.26

The expectations for significant Turkish concessions were somewhatdashed when the ruling Motherland Party (ANAP) lost its comfortableparliamentary majority in the October 1991 elections and a coalitionbetween the conservative True Path Party (DYP) and the left-wing SocialDemocratic Populist Party (SHP) took over the reigns of governmentfrom ANAP. While Ozal's influence on the policies of ANAP, the partyhe founded and led until 1988, was significant, his advice was simplyignored by the new coalition government which went so far as to questionOzal's impartiality and his election as President. Nevertheless, thecoalition government did not categorically reject the quadripartitesummit formula - Ozal's brainchild - and Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetineven indicated that a 'quadripartite meeting could be useful to finalizeany solution reached in [Denktash-Vasiliou] meetings'.27

Another cause for the United Nations' optimism was the comingto power in Greece in April 1990 of the conservative government ofConstantine Mitsotakis. Unlike his predecessor, Andreas Papandreou,who was known for his hawkish attitude toward the 'enemy in the east',Mitsotakis was generally perceived as a reasonable man who believed inthe necessity of improved relations with Turkey. Yet Mitsotakis knew all

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too well that Greek public opinion would not allow the settlement ofbilateral disputes unless there was significant progress in the Cyprusnegotiations. In a speech in 1988 he had stated:

The Turks must be made to understand that it will be impossible tomake progress in Greek-Turkish relations, as well as in Turkey'sattachment to the European Community if they do not solve theCyprus issue first, and then address the Greek-Turkish differ-ences.28

Immediately after the Greek general elections Mitsotakis told Turkishgovernment officials that both countries should strive for a settlement ofthe Cyprus dispute because without a Cyprus settlement he could not tryto solve the bilateral problems, including those related to the Aegean.29

Mitsotakis' readiness to engage in bilateral negotiations with Turkeywas clearly more accommodating when compared with the stand ofPapandreou, who refused to even talk to the Turks before the Cyprusdispute was settled. In 1982 Papandreou had stated:

For us the Cyprus issue is an issue of foreign occupation, occupationof an independent member state of the United Nations, and theinternational community should understand that there can be nosolution to the Cyprus problem without the ending of foreignoccupation.3"

Yet, after the exacerbation of tension over the Aegean dispute inspring 1987, Papandreou revised his 'no dialogue' policy, which he hadpursued since October 1981. In January 1988, he met with Turgut Ozal inDavos, Switzerland, and both men decided to work to improve bilateralties." Nevertheless, the so-called 'Davos sprit' proved to be short-lived,and by late 1988 Papandreou reverted to his traditional policy of nottalking to the Turks before they withdrew their troops from Cyprus.

Constantine Mitsokatis' replacement of Andreas Papandreou in April1990 and Turgut Ozal's decision in spring 1991 to take an active part in thenegotiation hence greatly encouraged UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. Encouraged also by the newly adopted assertiveness of the SecurityCouncil, he became very optimistic about the prospects of a rapid settle-ment. By the end of March 1991 he felt that 'an agreement should bewithin reach if it was possible to move forward on the issues of territorialsettlement and displaced persons'.32

In April 1992 in his report to the Security Council, Boutros-Ghalistated that during the course of the talks in 1991, both Cypriot partiesagreed, in general, on the powers and functions of the federal govern-ment. The agreement envisaged a bicameral legislature with the lower

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house having a 70:30 ratio between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriotsand a 50:50 ratio in the upper house. Furthermore, the federal executive,the Council of Ministers, would consist of 7 Greek and 3 Turkish Cypriotministers.33 Ghali's optimism led to his failure to mention the fact that theparties had widely diverging views on the process of decision-making inthe parliament and the cabinet, with the Turks insisting that they shouldenjoy veto powers on 'major issues'.

Boutros-Ghali indicated that the parties agreed in principle on theimplementation of the so-called three freedoms, but he again failed tostress that the Turkish side insisted on a restricted and gradual imple-mentation of these freedoms.34 On the issue of international guaranteesand the maintenance by Turkey and Greece of their forces on the island,Ghali indicated that the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance wouldbe valid, but that they would be 'appropriately supplemented'. If true,this heralded a major Greek Cypriot concession on the continued presenceof a contingent of Turkey's troops and the recognition that Ankara wouldhave the right to intervene in the island's affairs if the constitutional orderbroke down.35 Yet Ghali's optimism on these issues was probably prema-ture because Greek Cypriot policy-makers since then have never acknow-ledged that they made these concessions.

The Security Council - by then more homogenous after the recentchanges in Eastern Europe and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union -upheld the overly optimistic Ghali report by adopting Resolution 750 on10 April 1992.x The Council also gave priority to such issues as territorialadjustments and displaced persons, and made the unprecedentedannouncement that the Secretary General should keep the Councilinformed on the negotiations and should 'seek the Council's direct supportwhenever necessary'. The Council also asked the Secretary General 'tosubmit a full report to the Council on the outcome of his efforts by July1992 at the latest and to make specific recommendations for overcomingany outstanding difficulty'.37

In the post-Cold War era the Turkish Cypriot apprehension about animposed settlement became more pronounced, and they began even toquestion the necessity of a settlement. Whereas until recently it was theTurkish Cypriot side which complained about the Greek Cypriots' reluc-tance to move ahead in intercommunal talks, the roles seem to havereversed. The Turkish Cypriot government officials have recently begunto advocate that the preservation of the current status quo may be betterthan a badly working federation with the Greeks. The dissolution of suchfederations as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union appearsto have instilled in the Turks the fear that no matter how strong the build-ing blocks of a new federation, the Turks could be faced with a new Greek

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Cypriot assault not dissimilar to that of the Serbs against the Muslims inBosnia.™

Although the Turkish Cypriots were not too unhappy with the optimisticconclusions of the Ghali Report, they were less enthusiastic about Reso-lution 750 which heralded the unprecented involvement of the SecurityCouncil in the negotiations. The uneasiness of the Turkish Cypriots wasunderstandable because of their usual assumption that the internationalcommunity favours the Greek Cypriot negotiating positions. The TurkishCypriots are convinced that any direct Security Council involvementwould be contrary to their interests because they would not be able towithstand pressures to impose an unfavourable settlement.

Pointing out that such federations as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Unionno longer exist, the then Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Dervis Eroglusaid in early 1992 that 'federation ceased to be a solution any more',because it was impossible 'to coexist for societies which had blood amongthemselves'.19 In another speech he said: 'We have established an order,and we will keep it alive. The border drawn in 1974 will be preserved.People from the south and north who are now firmly settled in this land[TSNC) will not be upset by introducing Greek Cypriots among them.'40

Although Denktash has not been as outspoken as his Prime Minister,he reflected his uneasiness about the failed federation experiences inYugoslavia and the Soviet Union by his insistence since early 1991 thatthe Turkish Cypriots are not part of a sovereign Cypriot nation, but thatthey are a sovereign people by themselves. Denktash explained this newemphasis on sovereignty by stating:

As in the case of Switzerland, the federal sovereignty of Cyprusmust be established and recognized. The Greek Cypriot side mustnot be given an opportunity to place the entire island under itscontrol through a coup against the constitution of the federal regimethat will be established in Cyprus, as was the case in 1963. The factthat such an initiative would be an aggression against our sovereigntymust be accepted. What must also be accepted is our right to defendourselves against such aggression. This will prevent the agreementthat will be reached on Cyprus from being torn to pieces. Those whomay wish to turn Cyprus into a Greek island must realize that thiswill never be possible.41

The same Turkish Cypriot apprehension about the Greek Cypriotmotives was also the reason why Denktash perceived the Greek Cypriots'application to the EC for full membership in July 1990 as a hostile act. TheEC has not yet responded to the application, but the fact that the GreekCypriots undertook such a significant step without bothering even to

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inform the Turkish Cypriots made them wonder what the real Greekintentions were. Denktash characterized the application as an attempt atcamouflaged enosis. He said:

The Greek Cypriot plan is that whatever concession they make onthe constitutional aspect, once an agreement is struck and Cyprusenters the EC as a full member, all concessions will have to belooked at in the light of EC laws, regulations and principles. Theywill be able to take away everything they have pretended to give us.That is why it is very important for us to base all our rights onsovereignty as it is in the Swiss cantons . . . It is a further steptowards their getting Cyprus for themselves because if Cyprusenters the EC because of the Greek Cypriot application only, it willmean that Cyprus has integrated with Greece, which is in the EC,while Turkey is not. It is the end of the road for them. For us it is thebeginning of a very new and violent struggle to extricate ourselvesfrom that position which we regard as tantamount to a camouflagedenosis.42

These fears seemed to be well-founded because Greek Cypriot officialsalso argued from time to time that federation was indeed a compromisefor Greek Cypriots, but its deficiencies would be surmounted whenCyprus joined the EC.43

Denktash's insistence on the issue of sovereignty is, however, notuniversally supported within the Turkish community. Left-wing opposi-tion parties especially have accused Denktash and Eroglu's ruling NationalUnity Party (NUP) of trying to prevent a Cyprus settlement by coming upwith such principles as sovereignty and self-determination whenever anew round of intercommunal negotiations begins. One such oppositionfigure is Ozker Ozgur, leader of the Republican Turkish Party, who, likemany others, has accused NUP officials of corruption by having illegallyexpropriated large chunks of territory belonging to absentee Greeklandowners. This is why, he said, 'the NUP categorically opposes thereturn of the Greek Cypriots' to northern Cyprus.44

The Greek Cypriots, for their part, thought that the Ghali Report andResolution 750 disproportionately favoured the Turks. In strategy meet-ings of the Cypriot National Council, including major Greek Cypriotparties, Spiros Kyprianou and Vasos Lissaridis, leaders of DIKO (Demo-cratic Party) and EDEK (United Democratic Union of Cyprus) evenargued that Vasiliou should refuse to take part in the New York talks.Dhimitrios Khristofias and Glavkos Kliridhis, leaders of AKEL (Restora-tive Party of the Working People) and DISI (Democratic Rally) insisted,however, that no matter how unfavourable Resolution 750 is, Vasiliou

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should go to New York lest the international community perceive theTurks as the righteous party.45 Eventually, Kliridhis' and Khristofias'viewpoints dominated and Vasiliou was authorized to go to New York.

One of the most important rounds of the proximity talks took placebetween 18 June and 14 August 1992 in New York, with Boutros-Ghalibelieving that the heightened expectations created by his report and theSecurity Council Resolution 750, combined with the greater co-operationof Ankara and Athens, would make Denktash and Vasiliou more willingto compromise. The negotiations were conducted in the form of promixitytalks, with Ghali meeting with Denktash and Vasiliou separately,apparently because he wanted to iron out the differences between theirnegotiating positions. During the last two days of the summit, however,the two leaders met to negotiate face to face.

The talks were the scene of a tense debate, especially betweeenDenktash and Ghali. This was unique in the sense that no previousSecretary General had been involved in actual bargaining to this degree.Instead of letting the parties fight it out among themselves - as KurtWaldheim and Perez de Cuellar used to - Ghali virtually became a partyto the dispute by engaging in arm twisting, cajoling, and not so subtlyhinting that he might turn the case over to the Security Council if theparties (i.e. Denktash) did not go along with the suggestions outlined inhis 'Set of Ideas', Ghali's blueprint for a Cyprus settlement.46

Although at the outset the Greek Cypriot side was not enthusiasticabout the whole summit idea, Vasiliou was surprisingly spared Ghali'spressure tactics. The major reason for Ghali's concentration of hisbargaining efforts on Denktash was Ghali's quite naive expectation thatVasiliou would accept almost all Turkish Cypriot demands related toconstitutional arrangements.47 For Ghali, the major stumbling blocs to asettlement hence seemed to be the issue of territorial compromise and thereturn of the Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes in the Turkish zone.Since Denktash was the person who would decide the extent of the con-cessions the Turkish Cypriot side was to make, Ghali concentrated ontalks with him.

The talks started with discussion of the territorial compromise issue asforeseen by the Security Council. Unexpectedly Ghali produced a map ofCyprus requiring that the territory held by the Turks be reduced from thecurrent 35.04 per cent to 28.20 per cent of the island's territory.48 The mapprovided that the Turks should withdraw from such areas as Maras (Varoshaor the new city of Famagusta) in the east and Guzelyurt (Morphou) in theWest, and 34 towns and villages scattered between them.49

Although the minimum amount of territory Denktash was ready toaccept was '29 per cent plus', and hence there was only about 1 per cent

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difference between the 'Ghali Map' and Denktash's fall-back position,the Turkish Cypriot leader refused even to consider the map as a basis fornegotiations. There were various reasons why Denktash dragged his feet.First, the Guzelyurt (Morphou) area contained the northern zone's mainirrigable land, and most of the 55 thousand donums of orange groves heldby the Turks are in this area.5" The Turks contend that with Guzelyurtthey hold 23 per cent of the island's irrigable land and without it theywould not be able to produce commercially viable agricultural produce,and hence they would be condemned to rely on Greek hand-outs in afuture federation.

Second, the Turkish Cypriots argue, the leaders of the two communitieshave agreed in various previous summit meetings that a territorial settle-ment should respect criteria related to the principles of productivity,sufficiency, land ownership and security.5' When rejecting the GhaliMap, Denktash indicated that the Turks owned five times more irrigableland before 1974 and hence the Turkish community could not give up theonly fertile area it was able to hang on to. Denktash said: 'Most of whatwe have now is arid land. There are certain criteria to be considered.Fertility of the land is fundamental; agricultural viability of the land isbasic.'52 According to Denktash, Guzelyurt also contained the Turkishzone's major aquifer, making it vitally important. Of the 700 million tonsof water used annually in Cyprus, the sources of 160 tons are located inthe Turkish zone and more than half of these are situated beneath theorange groves of Guzelyurt.53

Third, acceptance of the Ghali Map would have meant that the Turkswould lose almost 25 per cent of their territory, and 50,000 to 60,000Turkish Cypriots, or one-third of the Turkish Cypriot population, wouldbecome refugees.54 Given the fact that between 1964 and 1974 most of theTurkish Cypriots were forced by Greek Cypriot irregulars to seek refugein Turkish enclaves, and that after 1974 about half of the Turkish Cypriotsleft their homes and belongings in the south and trekked to the north forsecurity, makes the issue of territorial compromise a sensitive subject forany Turkish Cypriot negotiator.

Fourth, Denktash refused to make a decision on Guzelyurt at theoutset of the negotiations, because he believed that to do so would havetaken away from Turkish hands the major bargaining chips in negotiationson the constitutional issues to be finalized at a later stage. Denktashactually criticized Ghali for producing and committing himself to a mapthat he perceived to be more pro-Greek than pro-Turkish. He said:

This encouraged the Greek Cypriots and they thought they werepromised certain areas. As a result, they will not negotiate other

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issues now with the Turkish Cypriots, and even if they do, they willnot take things very seriously."

Denktash's strong resistance to even considering the Ghali Map as astarting point, and his insistence that he would not commit himself to anyterritorial settlement before seeing what Vasiliou was ready to offerformally in constitutional issues, forced the major participants in the talksand in the background, including Ghali, Turkey, Greece, the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom, to look for a means to salvage the talksbefore they completely deadlocked. Their solution was to move to thenext item in the list of disagreements as drafted by Resolution 750,namely the question of 'displaced persons' or refugees. ApparentlyAnkara's promises to Ghali that if a satisfactory solution was to be foundto the constitutional issues, the last item in the negotiations list, it couldpersuade Denktash to be more forthcoming in the territorial settlement,played a significant role in deferring this problem to the later stages of thetalks.

Yet talks on the displaced persons also deadlocked after a few sessions.This happened mainly because Denktash insisted on the gradual andlimited implementation of the so-called principle of freedom of settle-ment, one of the three freedoms whose unconditional implementationVasiliou considered a litmus test for the Turkish Cypriots' sincerety.56

Vasiliou insisted - and apparently Ghali sympathized with his demand -that the Greek Cypriot displaced persons should be able to return to theTurkish administered zone or be compensated for their property if they sodesired. The deadlock could not be surmounted even after Ghali broughtthe two leaders together for talks on 12 August 1992. Two days later, in anapparent move to prevent the collapse of his initiative, Ghali convincedthe parties to take a break, and the talks were postponed until 28 October1992."

The Ghali mission resumed on 28 October 1993, once again bringingDenktash and Vasiliou together for talks. In ten separate meetings bothleaders discussed controversial issues including displaced persons, con-stitutional aspects of the federation and territorial adjustments, whileGhali recorded their respective positions.58 By the end of the talks itappeared that Denktash had not changed his mind concerning many ofGhali's suggestions as outlined in the Set of Ideas. A major debate centredaround the issue of the return of Greek Cypriot refugees to the northernzone and the resettlement of the Turkish Cypriots who had been living inGreek Cypriot properties since 1974. Denktash insisted that the preserva-tion of the homogeneity of the Turkish zone required a ceiling on the totalnumber of Greeks returning and that there should be a waiting period

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even for those allowed to return, so that those Turkish Cypriots affectedcould be relocated. Furthermore, Denktash insisted that the GreekCypriots would not be able to return to their pre-1974 homes if the currentTurkish Cypriot occupants were also refugees from the south, and in thiscase the Greek Cypriots should be compensated.

Vasiliou for his part rejected the postponement of the return of refugeesand insisted that all Greek Cypriot refugees should be allowed to return,and that it should be up to them to opt not to return and be paid compen-sation instead. Moreover, he objected to Denktash's offer of swappingTurkish Cypriot property in the south with Greek Cypriot property in thenorth, suggesting instead that the Turks could return to their homes in thesouth if they wished. Vasiliou also insisted that Turkish settlers frommainland Turkey should return to Turkey once a settlement was reached.59

On constitutional and territorial issues the parties repeated theirpositions. On the question of the validity of the Treaties of Guarantee andAlliance, Denktash insisted on their validity. While Vasiliou agreed onthe legality of these treaties, he put forward a traditional Greek thesisinsisting that the Treaty of Guarantee did not grant Turkey a unilateralright of intervention in Cypriot affairs.

The talks ended inconclusively with Ghali siding more enthusiasticallywith Vasiliou's views and openly denouncing as unjustifiable Denktash'sstand on various issues. In his report to the Security Council he stated thatDenktash's positions were outside the framework of the earlier agree-ments, and that by referring to practical difficulties Denktash was negatingthe right to return and the right to property and that he was refusing toaccept the Ghali map even as a basis for discussion.6" In conclusion, Ghaliadded that there was a 'deep crisis of confidence between the two sides',and that it would be difficult 'to envisage any successful outcome to thetalks for as long as this situation prevailed]'.6'

Ghali's last recommendation set the stage for the 24 May-1 June 1993talks in New York on confidence-building measures. With Denktash andGlafkos Kleridhis - president of the Greek Cypriot zone after his defeatof Vasiliou at the February 1993 elections - present, Ghali outlined hisproposals. They included placing the suburb of Famagusta (Magosa),Varosha (Maras) to settlement under UN administration. Varosha, amainly Greek Cypriot trading and tourism zone which was captured bythe Turkish forces in 1974, has been kept by the Turks as a bargaining chipand hence was not opened to settlement to the Turkish refugees from thesouth. Ghali's plan provided for the two-stage opening of Varosha tosettlement and the promotion of intercommunal and tax-free trade in thezone.62

The other confidence-building measure Ghali suggested provided for

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the opening of the Nicosia (Lefkose) international airport to civiliantraffic under the administration and operational control of the UnitedNations. Landing rights at the airport would be restricted to 'foreign air-lines which have traffic rights in Cyprus'.63 Furthermore, foreign visitorswho entered Cyprus through Nicosia airport would not be hindered frommoving freely between the northern and southern zones.

The reactions of Denktash and Kleridhis to Ghali's confidence-buildingpackage were ambiguous. During the talks the Turkish Cypriot leaderwondered aloud whether: the northern zone would continue to use itsown Ercan Airport; the Turkish Cypriots would be able to use theirpassports issued by the TRNC at the Nicosia Airport; and whether state-owned North Cypriot Turkish Airlines would be allowed to use NicosiaAirport for landings and departures. Denktash also asked whose laws andcourts would have jurisdiction in the Varosha region if the pre-1963 lawswere to prove inadequate: those of the Greek Cypriots or those of theTurkish Cypriots. He also asked what kind of currency would be incirculation in the Varosha area.64

The ambiguities surrounding these questions led Denktash to ask forsome time for deliberation and to return to Cyprus. Yet in Cyprus theTurkish Cypriot National Assembly upset Denktash's handling of thetalks and unequivocally rejected Ghali's package almost as soon asDenktash returned home.65 When faced with this fait accompli engineeredby his political rival, the then prime minister Dervis Eroglu, Denktashannounced that he would not represent Turkish Cypriots as long as theparliament rejected his negotiating strategy.66

Kleridhis' reaction to the Ghali package was also non-committal.Knowing that DIKO, the party of his coalition partner Spiros Kyprianou,and opposition parties considered such confidence-building measures asconducive to the international recognition of the TRNC, he did notclearly state his views on them.67 Kleridhis' own election platform inFebruary 1993 was actually based on his criticism of Vasiliou for havingmade excessive concessions to Denktash in proximity talks, and he hadbeen lukewarm about Ghali's Set of Ideas.68

Despite Ghali's premature optimism, the current deadlock in theCyprus negotiations is not unexpected. Although the positions of theparties have never been closer, there are still several salient issues to betackled. Moreover, the differences between the parties over individualquestions became all the more apparent because the protagonists -especially the Turkish Cypriot camp - consider all the issues as part of apackage. Hence the parties find it difficult to compromise on a specificissue before being assured that they will be compensated during settle-ment of other issues. Theoretically an overall settlement could have been

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achieved more easily had all the outstanding issues been debated simul-taneously. Therefore, Ghali's accordance of precedence to such issues asterritorial settlement and displaced persons was perhaps intended totackle the most serious problems, but it backfired, leaving nobodysatisfied with this recent UN initiative.

While Vasiliou was president, the Greek Cypriot side seemed to bebetter disposed towards the points raised in Ghali's Set of Ideas, andGhali had not hesitated to commend Vasiliou for that. Glafkos Kleridhis'election as President in February 1993 led, however, to confusion as tothe importance of the Set of Ideas as a basis for negotiations. Before beingelected president Kleridhis had been critical of them and after the elec-tions there has been no indication that he has revised his position.Kleridhis stated that although the set of ideas included positive aspects italso was disadvantageous for 'Cypriot Hellenism'. Unlike the totalrejectionists, such as Lissaridhis (EDEK) and Kyprianou (DIKO), whorejected the Set of Ideas out of hand, Kleridhis argued that it couldbecome acceptable if it underwent significant revision.69

On individual issues Vasiliou and Denktash had put forward argumentswhich have their merits. On the question of territorial settlement Vasiliouimplied satisfaction with the Ghali map and stated that it was a sacrificefor Greek Cypriots to agree to the allocation of 28.2 per cent of the island'sterritory to the Turkish Cypriots who make up 20 per cent of the island'spopulation. Vasiliou stated, however, that he would agree to such a largezone provided Greek Cypriot refugees in the south were allowed toreturn to their former homes in the north. Kleridhis believes that theGhali map is too generous to the Turks and he demands a reduction in thesize of the Turkish Cypriot zone.70

Ghali's offer of 28.2 per cent is actually not much less than the '29 percent plus' demanded by Denktash. His opposition to the Ghali Map hasmore to do with which areas the Turks should turn over to the Greeksrather than with how much territory should be evacuated. His argumentthat without Guzelyurt (Morphou) - the main irrigable part of the Turkishzone which also contains much of its underground water resources - theTurkish zone would not be economically viable, is not a simple pretext totorpedo the talks, as the Greek side contended. Denktash believes thatwithout economic viability the Turkish community could become depen-dent on the Greek Cypriots and lose its quasi-independent status in theproposed federation.

On the question of refugees Denktash's position is to restrict thenumber of Greeks who would return to the Turkish zone lest the Turkishcharacter of that zone should be lost. Denktash offered to pay compen-sation to most Greek Cypriots whose properties are located in the northern

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zone, and he believes that this is the only just way to satisfy Turkish andGreek objectives. According to this proposal, only a few of those GreekCypriot refugees would be allowed to take up residence in the Turkishzone. Freedom of movement, however, would be guaranteed for all.

Vasiliou, for his part, considered Denktash's proposal inadequate anddemanded that most of the Greek refugees return to the Turkish zone. Inorder to mollify Denktash, he suggested that those Greek Cypriots whowould settle in northern Cyprus could be required to vote in the GreekCypriot zone and this would ensure the Turkish Cypriot political controlover local administration regardless of how many Greeks moved to thenorth. This solution does not guarantee, however, that in the future therewould not be intercommunal violence in the north which could eliminateTurkish Cypriot political control in their own region.

Kleridhis, however, insists that all Greek Cypriot refugees shouldreturn to their homes in the north and he is critical of Vasilou's flexibilityon this issue." Hence the differences of opinion between the two partiesmay become more marked in the near future.

Disagreements also exist on the so-called constitutional issues, and,although Ghali believes that they are minor, they might neverthelessfurther delay a settlement. One such major issue is Denktash's demandthat his community's sovereignty - or its right to self-determination -should be recognized. This demand means in practice that the TurkishCypriots' political equality should be recognized and that they should beconsidered a 'founding community' of the new republic. Related to theseprinciples is Denktash's recent demand that the presidency of the republicshould not be the prerogative of the Greek Cypriots, but that a TurkishCypriot should also be elected president on a rotational basis.

For Vasiliou and his successor Kleridhis, all these constitutionaldemands are unacceptable. They believe that Denktash strives for therecognition of a separate right to sovereignty because he would use theearliest political crisis in the unified island as a pretext to secede. OnDenktash's demand for rotational presidency, they argue that although aTurkish Cypriot should not be excluded from being elected president, therotation principle is undemocratic. The Greek Cypriots state that if aTurkish Cypriot receives the majority of the votes he or she could becomepresident. This would require, however, the support of more than 30 percent of the Greek Cypriots who make up almost 80 per cent of the island'spopulation. Denktash believes that this possibility is hypothetical andthat most Greek Cypriots would not vote for a Turk.

Although Ghali's Set of Ideas accords wide-ranging powers of veto tothe Turkish community, it is not clear whether Kleridhis would acceptthem without asking for revisions. During the November 1992 talks

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Vasiliou had refused to grant veto powers to the Turkish members of thecabinet, and Kleridhis is also against such a concession. Hence it wouldnot be wrong to suggest that another disagreement centres around theTurkish Cypriots' demand that they should have veto powers over themajor decisions of the cabinet and the parliament. On the face of it thisdemand seems excessive and in practice it might prevent effective govern-ment. Actually a similar requirement existed in the 1960 Constitution andit contributed to intercommunal friction because the Turks refused toapprove draft laws and governmental resolutions which did not fullysatisfy their community. The Greek community believes that if wide-ranging veto powers are granted to the Turks, they would be able deliber-ately to impede governmental efficiency. For this reason, the GreekCypriots are opposed to the Turkish demand for separate majorities onimportant legislation, and during the November 1992 talks Vasiliouopposed Ghali's proposal for separate majorities as outlined in the Set ofIdeas. Yet, the Turkish community is convinced that without an ability toreject bills or governmental decisions the Turks could be once againexcluded from the administration of the state, as was the case between1964 and 1974.

The Greek Cypriots have traditionally opposed the presence of tokenTurkish troops, as allowed by the Treaty of Alliance of 1959, and Turkey'sunilateral right of intervention according to the Treaty of Guarantee of1959. Vasiliou, unlike most other Greek Cypriot leaders, accepted thevalidity of these treaties, but he refused to recognize that Turkey and theother guarantor powers, Britain and Greece, have a unilateral right ofmilitary intervention, arguing that 'this would be contrary to the Charterof the United Nations'.72 Vasiliou also suggested that if Denktash were toinsist on this issue he was ready to refer it to the International Court ofJustice.

Kleridhis has been less enthusiastic than Vasiliou on these 'colonialtreaties', as the Greek Cypriots referred to them, and they prefer entrust-ing the UN Security Council or the CSCE with the task of protection ofCyprus's constitutional order.73 For the Turkish community the Treatiesof Guarantee and Alliance and Turkey's unilateral right of interventionare sine qua non, because they feel that without Turkey's guarantee theywould be totally vulnerable in the event of a future attack by the GreekCypriots.

The latest Ghali initiative concerning confidence-building measuresdoes not seem to have brought the two sides any closer together. TheTurkish Cypriot National Assembly rejected this new package as inade-quate and prevented Denktash from engaging in further negotiations.The Greek Cypriot political parties were also not enthusiastic about the

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package, fearing that the confidence-building measures could lead tointernational recognition of the TRNC without a final settlement. Thenegotiations concerning the package were postponed until after theDecember 1993 parliamentary elections in the Turkish zone, but theprospects for consensus are slim.

Given these wide-ranging disagreements, Ghali's optimism for a quicksettlement of the dispute seems premature indeed. The Turkish Cypriotsare convinced that if the Greek Cypriot proposals were to be adopted, theTurkish zone would rapidly become hellenized and the Turks would againbecome second-class citizens. Moreover, they suspect that the GreekCypriots have not yet given up the idea of uniting the island with Greece,and any withdrawal from the Turkish Cypriot negotiating positions wouldbring the possibility of enosis closer. The Turks even fear the prospect ofa quasi-enosis resulting from Cyprus's prospective EU membership andpossible integration of Cyprus with the EU member states, includingGreece. Hence, in a future referendum the Turks would be expected tovote against EU membership.

For their part, the Greek Cypriots consider all the Turkish Cypriotdemands as evidence proving that they do not want to live within the samestate. Since the 1950s Greek Cypriots have suspected - and with somejustification - that their Turkish compatriots would rather partition theisland and unite their part with Turkey. Hence they take the TurkishCypriot proposals with a pinch of salt. For them the demands for curbingthe three freedoms, the Turkish Cypriot right to self-determination, vetopowers, Turkey's guarantorship, rotational presidency, and '29 per centplus' territory are all indications that the Turks want to have as muchautonomy as possible in order to unite with Turkey as soon as there is aserious political crisis on the island.

Reconciling these two antagonistic views is not easy. The enthusiasticand active participation of Ghali in the negotiations may have beenhelpful, but by no means sufficient to convince the parties of each other'sgood intentions. Perhaps even good intentions would not suffice in afuture federation to stem the tide of the rising ethnocentrism of bothcommunities. Both parties know this better than anyone and hence theyare extremely reluctant to make concessions.

These considerations lead us to wonder whether the protagonists couldopt for another settlement formula, the partition of the island betweentwo communities which later may or may not wish to join with theirrespective mainlands. The partition idea was first proposed by the TurkishCypriots in the mid-1950s in respone to the Greek Cypriots' enosiscampaign, but after the establishment of the Cyprus state in 1960 it waslargely forgotten. Given the mutual suspicions, the poor record of both

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communities in coexisting and co-operating during the federation experi-ence between 1960 and 1974, and the mainly antagonistic perceptions ofboth communities of each other's policies, partition might be not just theonly feasible solution, but also the only viable one. Although this alterna-tive has long been considered taboo by Ankara and the Turkish Cypriotsfor fear that the Greeks could perceive it as a sign of Turkish expansion-ism, the break-up of the multinational states in the post-Cold War era haslegitimized its consideration once again.

NOTES

1. Hurriyet, 26 June 1992, p.20.2. 'Report of the Secretary General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus', S/24472,

21 Aug. 1992.3. Cumhuriyet,2& Aug. 1992, p.8.4. For the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance see Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H.

Flank, Constitutions of the Countries of the World: Cyprus (Dobbs Ferry, NY: OceanaPublications, 1972).

5. See Necati Ertekun, The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic ofNorthern Cyprus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp.25-44.

6. UN DocumentS/12323.7. See Richard Patrick, Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict (Ontario, Canada:

University of Waterloo, 1976).8. UN Document S/13369.9. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts (hereafter BBC.SWB), 14 Dec. 1981,p.C/2.

10. See UN Document A/37/253.11. For the full text see BBC, SWB,16Nov. 1983, pp. C/4-C/9.12. S/PV 2497, Appendix 4.13. Cyprus Mail, 20 ]an. 1984.14. For the text of the draft agreement see Zaim M. Necatigil, The Cyprus Question and the

Turkish Position in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989),pp.332-5;BBC,SWB,22Jan. 1985.

15. Necatigil,op.cit.,p.335.16. BBC, SWB, 23 April 1986, P.C/1. For the text of the draft see Necatigil, op. cit.,

pp.336-41.17. BBC, SWB, 13 Dec. 1985,p.C/3.18. BBC, SWB, 24 Feb. 1988, p.C/1; BBC, SWB, 2 March 1988, P.C/1, C/2; Foreign

Broadcast Information Service Reports/Western Europe (hereafter FBIS/WE),13 April 1988, p. 10.

19. Nicosia Domestic Service, 3 March 1990 and Ankara Domestic Service, 5 March 1990in FBIS/WE, 5 March 1990, pp.25-6.

20. Birlik, Lefkose, 5 March 1990, pp.1,5, in FBIS/WE, 7 March 1990, p.26.21. ,4m»ofcj,30Mayl991,inFBIS/WE,31Mayl991,p.28.22. Ibid.23. Anatolia, 7 June 1991, in FBIS/WE, 10 June 1991, p.55.24. 'Report of the Secretary General on His Mission of Good Officies in Cyprus', S/24472,

21 Aug. 1992.25. Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, in Greek, 8 June 1991, in FBIS/WE, 10 June 1991,

p.40.26. Ibid.27. 5afca/i,18Junel992,p.lO.

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28. Athens Domestic Service, 5 June 1988, in FBIS/WE, 6 June 1988, p.22.29. Hurriyel, 8 July 1990, p.13. For the problems between Turkey and Greece see Suha

Bolukbasi, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations andCyprus (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988); Suha Bolukbasi, 'TheTurco-Greek Dispute: Issues, Policies and Prospects', in Clement H. Dodd (ed.),Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects (Cambridge, UK: Eothen Press, 1992).

30. BBC,SWB,27Jan. 1982,p.C/l.31. BBC,SWB,2Feb. 1988,p.C/l.32. See 'Report of the Secretary General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus',

S/23780 (3 April 1992), p.5.33. Ibid.,p.5.34. Ibid.,p.6.35. Blaustein,op.cit.36. UN Security Council Resolution 750 (10 April 1992), p.2.37. Ibid.38. See the 'Open Letter to President Rauf Denktash', in Kibris (Lefkosa), in Turkish,

15 June 1992,p.1.39. Anatolia (Ankara), in English, 21 Feb. 1992 in FBIS/WE, 21 Feb. 1992, p.23.40. Bayrak Radio (Cyprus), in Turkish, 8 May 1992, in FBIS/WE, 8 May 1992, p.37.41. Kibris (Lefkosa), 23 Jan. 1992, pp.1,2.42. Turkish Daily News, Ankara, 14 May 1992, p.2.43. See Greek Cypriot Government Spokesman's statement in Selidhes, Nicosia, in Greek,

lFeb. 1992, pp.42-7 in FBIS/WE, 6 Feb. 1992, p.25.44. Cum/mnve/, 9June 1992, p.9.45. CYBC Television Network (in Greek), Nicosia, 21 April 1992, in FBIS/WE, 23 April

1992,p.19.46. See Secretary General, 'Set of Ideas on An Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus',

p.7.47. This conclusion is implied by Ghali in his Aug. 1992 report to the Security Council,

op.cit.,p.l6.48. 'SetofIdeas',p.25.49. Ibid.50. Currently the Greek Cypriots hold 59.56 per cent and the British bases cover 2.76 per

cent of the island's territory. The remaining 2.64 per cent is the buffer zone between theTurkish and Greek areas controlled by the UN peacekeeping force. See Kibris (Nicosia),28 May 1992, p.3.

51. See Miimtaz Soysal's column in Hurriyet, 20 June 1992, p.4.52. Kibris,30June 1992, p.3.53. Bayrak Radio, (Cyprus), in Turkish, 13 May 1992, in FBIS/WE, 13 May 1992, p.64.54. Soysal,op.cit.,p.4.55. Kibris,3O3une 1992, p.3.56. Bayrak Radio (Nicosia), in Turkish, 30 June 1992, in FBIS/WE, 30 June 1992, p.56.57. Hurriyet, 15 Aug. 1992, p.14.58. UN Security Council, 'Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices

in Cyprus', S/24830,19Nov. 1992.59. Ibid.,pp.4,5.60. Ibid.,pp. 12,14.61. Ibid.,p.15.62. 'Confidence-Building Measures', an unpublished working paper.63. Ibid.64. Cumhuriyet, Istanbul, 1 June 1993, p.7.65. Cumhuriyet, 6My 1993, p. 15; Cumhuriyet, 18 June 1993, p.6.66. Cu/nfcuriv<?f,7Julyl993,p.ll.67. Cumhuriyet,!June 1993,p.7.68. Hurriyet, \6Feb. 1993,p.14.69. Nicosia, CYBC TV Network, in Greek, 18 Dec. 1992, in FBIS/WE, 23 Dec.

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1992, p.55.70. Milliyet,26March 1993, p. 15.71. Ibid.72. 'Report of the Secretary General. . .', S/24830,19 Nov. 1992, p. 10.73. Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation Radio Network, in Greek, 28 Nov. 1992, in FBIS/

WE, 2 Dec. 1992, p.49.

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boutros‐ghali's cyprus initiative in 1992: why did it fail?

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