JAN WOLE NSKI

POLISH ATTEMPTS TO MODERNIZE THOMISM BY LOGIC(BOCHE NSKI AND SALAMUCHA)

ABSTRACT. This paper reports some attempts undertaken in Poland in the 1930sto modernize Thomism by means of modern logic. In particular, it concerns J.M.Bochenski and J. Salamucha, the leading members of the Cracow Circle. Theyattempted to give precise logical form to the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas. Otherworks concerned the concept of transcendentals, the levels of abstraction, and theconcept of essence.

KEY WORDS: essence, logic, transcendentals

This paper concerns Polish attempts to modernize Thomism bymeans of modern logic undertaken by a group of philosophers whocalled themselves the Cracow Circle. It included Jzef (Innocenty)M. Bochenski (19021995), Jan F. Drewnowski (18961978), JanSalamucha (19031944), and Bolesaw Sobocinski (19061980).Since their works are closely related to the Polish analytic school(the Lvov-Warsaw School), I will begin with a short description ofthe latter.1 The Lvov-Warsaw School was established by KazimierzTwardowski in Lvov at the end 19th century. Twardowski was astudent of Franz Brentano and wanted to transplant the philosoph-ical programme of his teacher to Poland. In particular, Twardowskiinsisted that philosophy should satisfy very high methodologicalstandards of clarity and justification. These claims favoured researchin general logic. Moreover, Twardowski had a special vision of thedevelopment of Polish philosophy. According to him, in philosophy,as in other domains of culture, there are centers and provinces.French, German, and English philosophy dominates world philos-ophy. Every philosophy that has arisen in a province (a smallcountry, as Twardowski said) has to define its relation to thedominant current. Now, there are two ways to do this. Firstly, thephilosophy of a small country can be entirely subordinated to thedominant philosophy. Secondly, it can try to find its own direc-

Studies in East European Thought 55: 299313, 2003. 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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tion. However, the second pattern is not easy, because while anynational philosophy must respect the situation in world philosophy,on the one hand, it must also try to remain relatively independentand thereby original, on the other hand. Thus, a national philos-ophy should adopt ideas from various sources, but it should like-wise elaborate them in an orginal way. Twardowskis advice tohis students was: (a) you must know what is going on in currentphilosophy; (b) try to assimilate novelties. Twardowski, an excellentteacher, very soon attracted many young Polish philosophers; andthey soon found their own way, namely, a logically oriented philos-ophy. Although Twardowski himself did not work in mathematicallogic and even warned against some possible negative consequences(symbolomania, pragmatophobia) of applying mathematical logicin philosophy, he is commonly considered to be the father of logicand logical philosophy in Poland. This is clearly asserted by AlfredTarski:

Almost all researchers who pursue the philosophy of the exact sciences in Poland,are indirectly or directly the disciples of Twardowski, although his own workcould hardly be counted within this domain.2

Jan ukasiewicz, Twardowskis oldest student, decided to workin mathematical logic. He obtained his PhD (with a dissertationon the concept of induction) in 1902. Kazimerz Ajdukiewicz,Tadeusz Czezowski, Tadeusz Kotarbinski, and Zygmunt Zawirskiended their studies prior to 1914. In 1911, Stanisaw Lesniewskijoined the Lvov Circle. When Poland gained it independencein 1918, the second main center of the Twardowski schoolarose in Warsaw. Kotarbinski, Lesniewski, and ukasiewicz wereappointed professors in the University of Warsaw. Lesniewskiand ukasiewicz, in collaboration with mathematicians, notablyZygmunt Janiszewski and Wacaw Sierpinski, created the famousWarsaw School of Logic (Tarski grew up in this environment), themost important branch of the entire Lvov-Warsaw School. WorldWar II brought about the end of the Lvov-Warsaw School as an orga-nized movement. Many of its members (Salamucha among others)perished in during the war; many others left Poland (ukasiewicz,Sobocinski, and Tarski, among others).

There are three ways to consider the Lvov-Warsaw School. Thefirst, or most restricted way, identifies this school with logicians and

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philosophers influenced by mathematical logic. The Warsaw Schoolof Logic, together with Ajdukiewicz, Czezowski, Kotarbinski, andZawirski form the core of the Lvov-Warsaw School, when it is sounderstood. A broader picture is acquired as soon as the schoolis seen to comprise all philosophers genetically connected withTwardowski and pursuing philosophical analysis, whether or not itwas carried out in a formal or an informal manner. On this criterion,but not on the former Twardowski himself belongs to the Lvov-Warsaw School. Finally, a still broader understanding is possible.It consists in counting as members of the Lvov-Warsaw Schoolall Polish philosophers who accepted distinctive metaphilosophicalviews and, moreover, were convinced that these views belonged tothe tradition created by Twardowski. This point is well indicated bythe following statement:

The philosophers of the Lvov group were not united by any common doctrine,by a uniform world-view. Not the content of philosophy but rather the methodof philosophizing and the common language were the factors which formed thefoundations of the spiritual community of those people. That is why the schoolcould produce spiritualists and materialists, nominalists and realists, logicians andpsychologists, philosophers of nature and art theorists.3

In addition to the aforementioned claims concerning clarity andjustification in philosophy, Polish philosophers recommended axio-matic constructions in philosophy as well as an antimetaphysicalattitude. With regard to the last point, it must be remarked thatthe criticism of metaphysics in Poland differed from that of theVienna Circle. Polish philosophers were opposed to the excessesof romantic metaphysics rather than metaphysics as a branch ofphilosophy in general. In particular, ukasiewicz proposed anaxiomatic approach to ontology based on the standards of mathe-matical logic. His analysis of determinism, Kotarbinskis reism,or Lesniewski calculus of names, interpreted as a general theoryof objects, can be considered as positive attempts to build onto-logical constructions. Moreover, some Polish logicians, notablyukasiewicz and Lesniewski, decisively favoured ontology overepistemology; according to ukasiewicz, the epistemological turnin philosophy originated with Descartes and Locke, culminated inKant, and became the very misery of philosophy. This attitude toepistemology was not in conflict with the tradition. In fact, the

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Polish analytic school held classical philosophy in great esteemand did not exclude most traditional problems from the domain ofscientific philosophical investigations.

Most Thomists were decisively hostile to or at best suspicious ofmathematical logic.4 Modern logic was accused of conventionalism,relativism, positivism, and liquidating metaphysics. Some Thomistspointed out that mathematical logic leads to atheism (Russell wasmentioned as a principal example, in Poland the same charge waslevelled at Kotarbinski and Lesniewski). Hence Catholic philos-ophers who wanted to apply logic to philosophy found themselves ina difficult situation. On the other hand, claims of doing philosophylogically were so strong and widespread in Poland that they couldnot be ignored by any philosophical camp. The road to the formationof the Cracow Circle began at the end of the twenties. Salamuchastudied theology in Warsaw. Rev. Stanisaw Kobyecki, one ofSalamuchas professors, was quite friendly to mathematical logicand recommended ukasiewiczs courses to his students. Salamuchabecame fascinated by logic. He decided to write his PhD on theconcept of modality in Aristotle obtaining his degree from WarsawUniversity in 1927 (ukasiewicz was his supervisor). In 1930, hepublished an extensive work on the concept of deduction in Aristotleand St. Thomas Aquinas.5 Bochenski wrote a critical review of thisstudy, but very soon thereafter became convinced that logic shouldserve Thomism.6 Two important works were published in 1934,namely, Drewnowskis programmatic paper (he was a student ofKotarbinski, formerly an atheist who later converted to Catholicismunder the influence of Salamucha) and Salamuchas analysis ofthe first way of Thomas Aquinas.7 Following his Habilitation,Salamucha was called to Cracow by Rev. Konstanty Michalski, awell-known historian of medieval philosophy, who wanted to havesomeone competent in logic and theology interpret texts from theMiddle Ages. The most important event took place in 1936. Rev.Augustyn published a book in which he radically criticized theuse of mathematical logic in philosophy, in particular the attemptsin Poland.8 ukasiewicz replied in the same year and patientlycorrected several misunderstandings.9

In September 1936, the Third Polish Philosophical Congresstook place in Cracow. Michalski invited a group of philosophers

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to address the question of the mutual relations of Catholic thoughtand contemporary logic (32 persons accepted the invitation). Specialpapers were delivered by ukasiewicz (In Defence of Logistic),Bochenski (The Tradition of Catholic Thought and Precise-ness), Salamucha (A Confrontation of Scholastic Logical Devicesand Logistic Ones) and Drewnowski (New Scholasticism andthe Modern Requirements of Science). Next, these papers werediscussed by representatives of traditional scholastic philosophy. Allof this material, supplemented by the extensive replies of Bochenski(Logistic Relativism) and Salamucha (On the Mechanizationof Thinking, A Possibility of Formalization of the Domain ofAnalogical Concepts), was published in book from.10 Michalski,who hosted the meeting, wrote a special introduction in which hesaid:It is known that Rev. Zybura distributed a questionnaire concerning the vitalityand non-vitality of contemporary peripatetic philosophy in the United States.Replies came from the camp sympathetic to scholasticism as well as from theopposite camp. The voices radically condemning the traditional style of philo-sophical thinking were not numerous. Good advice also came from the oppositecamp. This advice was most often fruitful in its effects, because it exhibits theexisting inaccuracies. Among other things, it was pointed out that contemporaryperipatetic philosophy, mostly taught in seminars for priests, did not enter intocontact with new mathematical logic, although it could find in it inspiration forown development. [. . .]

Since one of the main centers of creative work in mathematical logic hasarisen in Poland, the relation of peripatetic philosophy to mathematical logicmust necessarily be revised in our country. To pursue an ostrich policy would beto demonstrate own inner powerlessness. Hence one should positively acknowl-edge that, on the occasion of the congress of Polish philosophers in Cracow, aseparate meeting should take place between representatives of mathematical logicand representatives of Christian philosophy for the sake of a trustful and sincerediscussion of the problem.11

The Cracow Circle was the result of the meeting organized byMichalski.12 It is perhaps interesting that a similar problem wasdiscussed at the Cracow Congress, independently of the methodo-logical problems of Thomism. Here is Sobocinskis report (myitalics):In Poland special conditions arose, which caused the problem of mathematicallogic and its applications to philosophy to be particularly important and vital.[. . .] A group of philosophers, although fairly different from one another in

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their philosophical views, quickly grasped the need to replace traditional logicby mathematical logic. Hence at the Congress in Cracow the representativesof logistic stressed that [. . .], independently of the accepted world-view andthe philosophical current, one must apply the principles discovered by logic inperforming ones own inferences. This was emphasized by Prof. K. Ajdukiewiczduring one discussion. He simply said that [. . .] one must be aware that modernlogic should be applied by everyone who wants to infer something responsibly,independently of assumptions underlying the given philosophical system. Thisconcerns theists and atheists, Catholics or, let us assume, satanists. Modern logicmust be used in proofs of Gods existence no less than in other proofs. Oneshould know that modern logic neither assumes nor implies any metaphysics, butif by using it one derives philosophical consequences, this means that extralogicaltheses were assumed. Declarations of this kind were provoked by interventionsof various participants of the Congress who, speaking more or less preciselyand responsibly, expressed a couple of reservations concerning the possibility ornecessity of applying logistic in philosophy. Different accents could be foundin such speeches. The standpoint that an excessive preciseness and responsi-bility in inferences can damage philosophy [. . .] was the exception. [. . .] The[other] group declared that philosophy, in particular metaphysics, has its ownscientific methods, and that only these methods lead to proper results. On the otherhand, according to this view, the application of mathematical logic, for exampleto metaphysics in a manner similar to that occurring in the special sciences,only simplifies and vulgarizes problems without producing proper solutions. Therepresentatives of this standpoint almost never questioned the importance ofmathematical logic (incidentally, they seldom had sufficient knowledge of it), butonly denied its usefulness in investigating philosophical questions.13

In the light of this report, the discussion during the meeting organiz-ing by Michalski mirrored a more general controversy concerningthe nature of philosophy and its methods conducted at the CracowCongress. It is very probable that Sobocinski also summarizedstandpoints concerning the application of modern logic in Thomism.Thus, the Cracow Circle undertook methodological problems whichwere vital for all Polish philosophy.

The Cracow Circle had its own general program. Let me oncemore stress its basic feature by citing the following:Mathematical logic strongly influenced the development of the philosophicalsciences in Poland. Its achievements and methods began to be applied to variousextralogical problems. Mathematical logic taught Polish philosophers how to beprecise in arguments and directed their attention to the importance of logical andsemantic analysis in elaborating philosophical problems.14

This general program had to be qualified somehow in order tobe consistent with Catholicism as a religion. The Cracow Circle

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was entirely loyal to Catholic orthodoxy. In particular, theologywas considered as a negative norm for philosophy. Thus, thephilosophers of the Cracow Circle assumed that philosophy andChristian theology are necessarily coherent. A far-going optimismwas another feature. Drewnowski once said that there is evidencethat catholic thought will outstrip all other philosophical currents.Drewnowski listed the following points of the programme:15

(I) The formulation and defence of the catholic world-viewrequires application of all modern methods of thinking;

(II) One must distinguish the formal elements of the theoryfrom the proper content of its teaching;

(III) Making the theory precise consists in changing andperfecting the formal conceptual apparatus withoutdestroying any of the essential content given by tradition;

(IV) Improving the content means that the related researchcovers all domains of human thought and takes them intoaccount, including those neutral or even inimical to thecatholic standpoint;

(V) The only such catholic current which satisfies the aboveclaims will be the realization of the directives of CatholicAction in the field of human thought.

The last point shows that Drewnowskis program had anexplicitly political flavour. However, other members of the CracowCircle concentrated rather on strictly philosophical matters. Inparticular, all agreed that Catholic doctrine should be formalized andaxiomatized. This concerned mostly ontology considered as appliedlogic. This way of doing philosophy introduces exactness, precisionof form in arguments and makes it possible to eliminate ambiguitiesand unclarities (Salamucha demonstrated this by analyzing a frag-ment from Thomas Aquinas Summa contra Gentiles I, 13 wherethe matter is whether the negation occurs in the original version).Drewnowski argued that logic enables us to speak about uncon-ceivable things (in particular, about the attributes of God) in a simpleand intelligible way. He pointed out that the situation is similar tothat in mathematics where, by formalizing and axiomatizing suitabletheories, we can speak about Non-Euclidean spaces, real numbersand infinite sets, objects transcending usual human standards andresources of conceivability.

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An important place in the programme was attributed to itshistorical justification. In particular, Bochenski argued that Catholicphilosophy always, or at least in its golden times, that is in theMiddle Ages, respected the highest standards of precision. In partic-ular, Thomas Aquinas used the best logical devices accessible in histime. According to Bochenski, Aquinas would have no reservationstoward mathematical logic. This was partly based on ukasiewiczsview that there is a continuity in formal logic from Aristotle to the20th century, eventually with interruptions created by the epistem-ological trend in philosophy. In general, Bochenski contrastedMr. Paleo (a scholastic orthodox), Mr. Neo (an anti-philosophicalmodern logician) and the Aristotelian (an enlightened philosoph-ical logician who knows mathematical logic as well as historyof logic and philosophy).16 This last attitude should be adoptedby contemporary Thomists if they actually want to continue themethodological strategy of their master. Bochenski also comparedthe relation between traditional and (postulated) modern Thomismto that of positivism and neopositivism.17 Salamucha formulatedtwo criteria for assessing philosophical systems. One appeals tothe range of their content, the other to basic methodological prin-ciples defining the status of their theses. Thus, we can distinguish(a) maximalism as regards the range of content and methodologicalminimalism (for example, Bergson), (b) minimalism as regards therange of content and methodological maximalism (for example,logical empiricism). Now we can and should look for (c) methodo-logical maximalism combined with maximalism as regards in therange of content. Thomism improved by mathematical logic is acandidate for such a philosophy.18

All members of the Cracow Circle had a great respect for ThomasAquinas and his philosophical thought. Salamucha and Bochenskiconsidered themselves to be Thomists.19 However, this positive atti-tude to the Doctor Angelicus was never dogmatic. This was nicelyexpressed by Bochenski:

At a certain philosophical congress I reported my discovery that logic is neitherscholastic nor Aristotelian logic. Then, one young professor, a layman but froma catholic university, said As a priest and a Thomist you should know . . .. Ireplied immediately Stop, please, please; a philosopher never is an ist. If onewants, I am a Thomist in the sense that I accept the principal attitude of Thomas,but I have no intention to contribute to Thomism; stricly speaking, I dislike it.20

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Thus, for Bochenski, logic was the way to change Thomism into anormal scientific philosophy.

Of course, it is much easier to propose a philosophical pro-gramme than to realize it. Fortunately, we can also cite concreteattempts to pursue the declared claims in the case of the CracowCircle. I will briefly illustrate this by four examples: (a) a discus-sion about the proofs of Gods existence; (b) Salamuchas treatmentof levels of abstraction; (c) Salamuchas treatment of the conceptof essence; (d) Salamuchas suggestions about how to formalizeanalogical concepts.21

Ad (a) It is not surprising that Thomas Five Ways became themain object of logical analysis, even before the Cracow Circlebegan its official history.22 The general direction was guided bythe view that the Aristotelian syllogistic used by Aquinas himselfand his followers until our times was not enough for a properanalysis of the arguments. A full treatment must exhibit all theassumptions, logical as well extralogical, in particular, the physicalones, and apply much more advanced logical tools than tradition-ally admitted. Salamucha tried to outline an axiomatic treatmentbased on the logic of relations. He argued that ontology can bemodelled by linear ordering with the first element identified as theprimum movens immobile. This attempt required assuming that therelation of moving is connected. According to Salamucha, althoughthe logical structure of ex motu demonstration is sound, its physicalassumptions are not acceptable from the point of view of modernscience. Salamuchas pioneering analysis gained a wide influence.Bochenski, in his review of Salamuchas paper, argued that Thomashad in mind not the first universal movens but motionless being.23Another point raised by Bochenski was that the moving relationdoes not need to be connected. Bochenski returned to the problemin the last years of his life.24 He entirely rejected the proofs from thedegrees of perfection and the teleogical structure of the world, thatis, the fourth and fifth ways. The other proofs could be improved,but although it is possible to demonstrate (following Aristotle) theexistence of God conceived philosophically, this being is not theperson in the sense of the Old and New Testaments. In general, theFive Ways are rather ways of persuasion than proofs in the strictlogical sense.25

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Ad (b) Thomistic philosophy distinguished three levels ofabstraction: physical (concerning qualities), mathematical (concern-ing quantities) and metaphysical (concerning analogical concepts).Logic in its traditional sense was considered as universal and valid atevery level of abstraction. This view motivated the following objec-tion against mathematical logic. Since it proceeds by mathematicalmethods, it is not applicable to analogical concepts. This showsthat the heart of philosophy, the domain of analogical concepts, isnot subject to analysis by means of the new logic, whose validityis at best restricted to mathematical abstraction. According toSalamucha, since mathematics is a part of logic, we can continuethe old way of thinking, that is, to consider logic as universal.26However, this motivates a revision of the traditional doctrine in twodirections. Firstly, the method of emprical sciences is not purelyquantitative and, secondly, a new treatment of analogical conceptsis required (see ad (d) below).

Ad (c). In Thomism essence was traditionally considered eitheras a collection of properties determining that an object just issuch and such or as a collection of properties determining that anobject belongs to a certain kind. For Salamucha, both understand-ings were very obscure.27 He proposed returning to Aristotle, whomaintained that essences are modelled by geometry. The axiomaticmethod provides a suitable solution here. We can think about theapriori knowledge of essences of objects as constituted by axioms.Empirical objects cannot be treated in this way. Eventually, theiressences are limit points. It is noteworthy that this standpoint isat odds with orthodox Thomism, according to which every objecthas its place in the framework of the unique structure of kindsand species. According to Salamucha, modern science requires arevision of the traditional account of abstraction. In particular, themethodology of mathematical physics sets up challenges here.

Ad (d) As I remarked above, analogical concepts play a specialrole in philosophy, in particular in metaphysics. Being, truth, andthe good, that is, the transcendentals (I omit other concepts of thissort), are fundamental metaphysical ideas, and they were classicallyregarded as analogical. Transcendentals, according to the tradi-tional account, transcendunt omnia genera (transcend all kinds).They are neither univocal nor ambiguous, but analogical. Their

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properties cause difficulties in logical analysis. For example, thetraditional modes of definition are not applicable to transcendentals.Salamucha proposed a very ingenious solution consisting in consid-ering transcendentals as systematically ambiguous categories.28Salamucha based his proposal on the theory of logical types,developed by Russell and Whitehead in the Principia Mathematica.Transcendentals are systematically ambiguous in a way similar tothat in which the concepts of set or relations are.

How successful was the programme of the Cracow Circle?Certainly, it can be considered as a radical attempt to refreshThomism and Catholic philosophy. However, reactions were ratherhostile or at best quite sceptical. This was pointed out by Bochenskiin a quite ironic manner:

This conversation [of Mr. Paleo, Mr. Neo and the Aristotelian; see above J.W.]having become known in authoritative circles, the Aristotelian has been excludedfrom two Academies of which he was formerly a member, that of Tradition andthat of Science [perhaps Tradition it is an allusion to Clarke and Sobocinski].It was stated in the first that a man who dares to tread Principia Mathematicainstead of the Logique du Port Royal is evidently a madman; while the board ofother declared that an Aristotelian could no be longer be tolerated in the companyof scholars who have proved once for all that all truth is relative, including theirown opinion to this effect.29

Let me also quote another opinion of the same author:

I was greatly annoyed when I was working on my second textbook in logic. It wasan introduction to mathematical logic. My church censor ordered me to strike outreferences to scholastic thought. He argued that it is beyond any doubt that theSchoolmen had something similar to mathematical logic.30

We wanted to convert teachers in the seminaries, but to no avail avail.31

We wanted to apply mathematical logic to traditional Christian problemsconsidered by St. Thomas. However, we lost.32

Although, as I already noted, some authors continued the effortsof the Cracow Circle, the criticism of this style of doing Thomismprevailed. Even in Poland, where the tradition of logical philos-ophy preserved the dominance of Marxism, Thomists (in particular,those belonging to the Lublin School) expressed several reserva-tions concerning the logical analysis of philosophy.33 The typicalobjections of Jakubisiak and others were repeated. It was said that

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although logic is useful as a device of analysis, one must be verycareful with formalization and axiomatization, for the content ofconcepts exceeds formal tools. Salamuchas proposal to consideranalogical concepts as systematically ambiguous was rejected. Inparticular, metaphysical abstraction is governed by special prin-ciples, elaborated by metaphysics but not by logic. This is also thereason why the Five Ways find their sufficient justification in meta-physics. In this way, Thomism, as far as mathematical logic and itssignificance for philosophy are concerned, returned to the moderateposition of the 1930s. In fact, this is a sign of conservatism.

NOTES

My participation in this colloquium devoted to Bochenski and the preparationof this paper were possible owing to the support of the organizers (personally,Prof. E. Swiderski) and the Geneva-Lausanne IRIS project on the Philosophy andHistory of Logic (Director Prof. K. Mulligan).1 This school is extensively presented in H. Skolimowski, Polish AnalyticalPhilosophy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967; and in J. Wolenski,Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School, Kluwer Academic Publishers,Dordrecht, 1989. See also Z. Wolak, Neothomism and the Lvov-Warsaw School(in Polish), Osrodek Badan Interdyscyplinarnych, Krakw, 1993, and the paperscollected in Logic and Metaphilosophy (in Polish), Z. Wolak (ed.), Osrodek BadanInterdyscyplinarnych, Krakw, 1995.2 A. Tarski, [A Letter to O. Neurath 25. IV. 1930], trans. from German by J.Tarski, Grazer Philosophische Studien 43 (1992), p. 20.3 I. Dambska, Fifty Years of Philosophy in Lvov 18981948 (in Polish),Przeglad Filozoficzny 44 (1948), p. 17.4 For example, Jacques Maritain was known as a radical critic of modern logic.The relation of Thomism to new logic is reported in Z. Wolak, Neothomism andthe Lvov-Warsaw School (see note 2), Chapter I.5 J. Salamucha, The Concept of Deduction in Aristotle and St. ThomasAquinas, Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, Warszawa, 1930. All of Salamuchaspublished and some unpublished works are collected in J. Salamucha, Scienceand Faith. Selected Philosophical Papers (in Polish), J.J. Jadacki and K.Swietorzewska (eds.), Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Universytetu Lubel-skiego, Lublin, 1997 (the editors wrote an extensive report about Salamuchaswork, also in French translation), pp. 549594. The book published in 1930was intended as the Habilitation dissertation. Salamuchas Habilitation tookplace in Cracow in 1933, but it was confirmed by the Ministry only in 1936.Salamucha was a priest in Warsaw diocese. His superiors attempted several timesto block his scientific career. Finally, the intervention of the Cardinal Sapieha,

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the archbishop in Cracow, enabled Salamucha to continue his philosophicalresearch.6 Bulletin thomiste 710 (19301933), pp. 401405. Bochenski studied law andeconomy in Lvov and Poznan before his entering the Dominican Order. Thenhe studied philosophy and theology in Rome and Fribourg. His PhD (1931)was about the concept of Ding an Sich in M. Straszewski, a Polish philosopherteaching in Cracow at the turn of 19th and 20th century. Bochenski became inter-ested in mathematical logic about 1930 and soon began his contacts with Polishlogicians, particularly with ukasiewicz.7 J. Salamucha, The Proof ex motu for the Existence of God. Logical Analysisof St. Thomas Argument (in Polish), Collectanea Theologica 15 (1934), pp. 5392 (English trans. by T. Gierymski and M. Heitzman); New Scholsaticism 32(1958), pp. 334372; J.F. Drewnowski, An Outline of Philosophical Programme(in Polish), Przeglad Filozoficzny 37 (1934), pp. 338, 150181; all Drewnowskispublished and unpublished works are collected in J.F. Drewnowski, Philosophyand Precision. An Outline of Philosophical Programme and Other Writings (inPolish), S. Majdanski and S. Zalewski (eds.), Towarzystwo Naukowe KatlickiegoUniwersytetu Lubelskiego, Lublin, 1996 (Majdanskis Introduction is only inPolish, pp. 552).8 A. Jakubisiak, From the Scope to the Content (in Polish), Droga, Warszawa.9 J. ukasiewicz, Logistics and Philosophy (in Polish), Przegad Filozoficzny36, pp. 113131 (English trans. by O. Wojtasiewcz); in J. ukasiewicz, SelectedWorks, L. Borkowski (ed.), North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam,1970, pp. 218235.10 Catholic Thought and Contemporary Logic (in Polish) (Studia GnesnesiaXV), Ksiegarnia Sw. Wojciecha, Poznan, 1937. This book was prepared bySalamucha. At the end (pp. 155193) one can find an extensive French summaryof the papers and discussion. The English translation of ukasiewiczs paper(trans. by O. Wojtasiewicz) is included into J. ukasiewicz, Selected Works (seenote 10), pp. 236249.11 P. 7.12 Many details about the Cracow Circle are found in Between Logic and Faith.Jan Parys Interviews with Father Jzef M. Bochenski, Les Editions Noir surBlanc, Montricher, 1988 (this book was also simultaneously published in French),pp. 1921. Bochenski says that the Circle existed as of 1934. However, this is amistake. Its beginning is usually related to the Cracow meeting in 1936. See Z.Wolak, An Outline of the History of the Cracow Circle (in Polish), in Logic andMetaphilosophy (see note 2), pp. 7984.13 B. Sobocinski, The Developmental Tendences in Polish Philosophy (Reflec-tions on the Occasion of the 3rd Polish Philosophical Congress, Cracow 2427IX 1936 (in Polish), Nowa Ksiazka III (1936), pp. 155156. Sobocinski wasa student of Kotarbinski, Lesniewski, and ukasiewicz. He worked primarilyon Lesniewskis systems. He supported the Cracow Circle in spirit rather thanactively.

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14 B. Sobocinski, Polish Philosophical Publications in 19181939 (in Polish),Nowa Ksiazka III (1936), p. 114.15 It is a summary on the basis of Drewnowskis paper mentioned in note 8and his, Bochenskis, and Salamuchas contributions to Catholic Thought andContemporary Logic (see note 11).16 See P. Banks (pseudonym of Bochenski), On the Philosophical Interpretationof Logic: An Aristotelian Dialogue, in A. Menne (ed.), Logico-PhilosophicalStudies, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1962, pp. 114; this paperwas originally published in Dominican Studies III (1950), pp. 139153.17 See book quoted in note 13, pp. 146/147. Of course, this comparisonconcerned the method, not the content.18 J. Salamucha, Thomism as philosophia perennis (in Polish), TygodnikPowszechny 5 (1946). Perhaps we should complete Salamuchas matrix by adding(d) minimalism as regards the range of content and minimalism in method.Postmodernism is an example of this combination. Bochenski would have muchenjoyed this assessment of Derrida and his fans.19 In the last period of his philosophy, Bochenski considered himself rather as ananalytic philosopher than a representative of Thomism.20 Between Logic and Faith (see note 13), p. 125.21 This report is very selective and mainly concerns works of Salamucha. Heis relatively unknown, although certainly deserves an attention. Bochenskisachievements are much better known. Let me note that Bochenskis works aboutthe concepts of authority and the logic of religion are perhaps the extreme realiza-tion of the ideology of the Cracow Circle. History of logic was another importantfield in which achievements of Bochenski and Salamucha are very remarkable.22 See the paper mentioned in note 8.23 Bulletin thomiste 12 (1935), pp. 601603.24 See J.M. Bochenski, Die Fnf Wege, Fribourger Zeitschrift fr Philosophieund Theologie 36(3) (1989), pp. 235265. Bochenskis book about Thomass FiveWays is to be published hy Philosophia Verlag.25 Analysis of the Five Ways by modern logic was continued by, amongothers, J. Bendiek, F. Rivetti Barb, E. Nieznanski, and K. Policki. These worksare reported in E. Nieznanski, Logical Analysis and Thomism. The PolishProgramme that originated in 1930s, in J. Srzednicki (ed.), Initiatives in Logic,Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1987, pp. 128155. Several stronglogical tools were used by the mentioned authors, for example, the Zorn Lemma(Policki) or lattices (Nieznanski).26 J. Salamucha, A Possibility of Formalization of the Domain of AnalogicalConcepts (in Polish), in Catholic Thought and Contemporary Logic (see note11), pp. 122153.27 J. Salamucha, Remarks on the History of One Word (Essence) (in Polish),Tygodnik Powszechny 6 (1947), pp. 34.28 See paper mentioned in note 26. See also J.M. Bochenski, Logic andOntology, Philosophy East and West 7(3) (1974), pp. 275292. Bochenskiremarked that the expression systematic ambiguity was a translation of aequi-

POLISH ATTEMPTS TO MODERNIZE THOMISM BY LOGIC 313

vocatio in consilio, a phrase used in the Middle Ages; see Between Logic andFaith (see note 13), p. 62.29 P. Banks, On the Philosophical Interpretation of Logic: An AristotelianDialogue (see note 17), p. 14.30 Between Logic and Faith (see note 13), p. 15.31 Ibid., p. 19.32 Ibid., p. 139.33 See, for example, S. Kaminski, What Does the Application of Formal Logicto Classical Metaphysics Mean? (in Polish), Roczniki Filozoficzne 12 (1961),pp. 107112.

Institute of PhilosophyJagiellonian Universityul. Grodzka 5231-044 KrakowPoland