black sea regional security: present multipolarity and future possibilities

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This article was downloaded by: [Ryerson University] On: 01 December 2014, At: 22:48 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK European Security Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/feus20 Black Sea regional security: present multipolarity and future possibilities Carol Weaver a a Department of Politics and International Relations , University of Leicester , Leicester, UK Published online: 22 Mar 2011. To cite this article: Carol Weaver (2011) Black Sea regional security: present multipolarity and future possibilities, European Security, 20:1, 1-19, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2010.510517 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2010.510517 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions

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Page 1: Black Sea regional security: present multipolarity and future possibilities

This article was downloaded by: [Ryerson University]On: 01 December 2014, At: 22:48Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

European SecurityPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/feus20

Black Sea regional security: presentmultipolarity and future possibilitiesCarol Weaver aa Department of Politics and International Relations , University ofLeicester , Leicester, UKPublished online: 22 Mar 2011.

To cite this article: Carol Weaver (2011) Black Sea regional security: present multipolarity andfuture possibilities, European Security, 20:1, 1-19, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2010.510517

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2010.510517

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Page 2: Black Sea regional security: present multipolarity and future possibilities

Black Sea regional security: present multipolarity and future possibilities

Carol Weaver*

Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK

(Received 21 May 2010; final version received 12 July 2010)

Three theories that can be usefully employed to analyse the security of the BlackSea region are structural realism, security communities and supranationality(based on the European Union (EU) model). Given that the Black Sea areacurrently has too many conflicts and rivalries to be a truly cooperative region or a‘security community’, we must examine its dynamics in terms of its presentrealism, especially in the east of the region (‘what is’), as well as considering itsfuture (‘what could be’). Regionalisation and Europeanisation are both possibi-lities for the longer term but, for the development of a fully cooperative region,possibly based on the EU model, it is posited that a condition of ‘balancedmultipolarity’ must initially exist. The paper analyses the extent to which this typeof polarity applies at the moment and then uses all the theories to outline possibleways forward for the region.

Keywords: Black Sea region; balanced multipolarity; European security; structuralrealism; security community; supranationality

Introduction

European Union (EU) policies regarding its eastern neighbourhood are changing

from bilateral only (European Neighbourhood Policy � ENP) to a combination of

bilateral and multilateral (Eastern Partnership and Black Sea Synergy; European

Commission 2007, 2008). It could be asserted that the reason for this is an overall

change in policy from enlargement to regionalisation, but can the Black Sea area

develop into a distinct cooperative region of equal nations or will many of its diverse

states remain fated to be the ‘clients’ of hegemonic powers? And can the theories of

realism, security communities and supranationality help us to answer this question?

The land area around the shores of the Black Sea is very diverse with many

ethnicities, cultures, languages and religions. Throughout history there have been

wars in the region but empires have also been built and different peoples have traded,

migrated and married. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union (USSR) and the

dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, newly independent states have been created, some of

which are suffering from old tensions and hostilities which may be internal, external

or both. The amount of interstate trading has been more limited in recent decades as

a result of the regional conflicts and visa requirements (Gavras 2010).

Nevertheless the area is becoming more recognised as a region, partly through the

efforts of the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation

of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Black Sea Naval Cooperation

*Email: [email protected]

European Security

Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2011, 1�19

ISSN 0966-2839 print/ISSN 1746-1545 online

# 2011 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2010.510517

http://www.informaworld.com

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Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) and other organisations including the Georgia

Ukraine Azerbaijan Moldova (GUAM) Organization for Democracy and Economic

Development.1 However, the borders of the Black Sea region are not clearly

delineated which complicates analysis (Aydin 2009).The Black Sea area is currently of importance for many reasons including: the

post-cold war independence of various states, the conflict zones including South

Ossetia where a war took place in 2008, oil and gas in Azerbaijan, and pipelines via

various routes across the region. It has also been an area of dispute between the

United States of America (US) and Russia, as the US has encouraged states to join

NATO. Of course, joining NATO has been the post-cold war security method of

choice for many of the Black Sea states.

After having introduced the region and its countries, this paper initially outlinesthe theory of structural realism (as discussed by Hyde-Price (2007) in his book

European Security in the 21st Century) which draws on the work of Waltz (1979) and

Mearsheimer (2001), then proceeds to explore the Black Sea region as a case study of

structural realism. This is followed by a discussion of security communities,

supranationality and the EU model, before drawing on all the theories in order to

make conclusions for the future of the Black Sea region and its security.

The paper draws on non-attributable interviews and discussions with senior

diplomats and politicians of Black Sea countries, senior NATO and EU officials, andMembers of the European Parliament (MEPs).

The Black Sea region

The term ‘Black Sea region’ is not always clearly defined and does not always include

the same countries. In some descriptions it is the six states that have Black Sea

coastlines (littoral states): Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Georgia and Bulgaria;

in others it is just the ‘shared neighbours’ of Russia and the EU especially the statesincluded in the EU’s ‘Eastern Partnership’ policy. Yet another grouping is of the

‘wider Black Sea region’ or ‘wider Black Sea area’ which might include all the

participants in the EU’s ‘Black Sea Synergy’ or the members of BSEC. This paper

will be concentrating primarily on the Black Sea littoral states plus Moldova and the

South Caucasus countries of Armenia and Azerbaijan, although for much of the

article Romania and Bulgaria will be discussed as part of the EU especially as, along

with Greece, they are two of the main countries involved in Black Sea policies such as

Black Sea Synergy.There have been many debates on the definition of ‘region’. Is it just a piece of

contiguous territory or more than that? And, if it is more, then is the Black Sea a

region at all? Buzan (1991, p. 188) maintains that a region must have some history or

connections between the states. He also writes, ‘In security terms, ‘‘region’’ means

that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of

states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each

other’. This paper asserts that, due to past empires and quasi-empires as well

as current security preoccupations, this is the case with the countries around theBlack Sea.

The largest and by far the most militarily powerful littoral state of the Black Sea

is Russia, which dominated all the other states, apart from Turkey, during the time of

the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. Since the end of Soviet times, Russia has seen

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Romania and Bulgaria join NATO (2004). When Ukraine and Georgia also came

close to NATO membership in 2008, Russian foreign policy seemingly turned to a

‘thus far and no further’ stance, with its security policy now stating that there are

regions in which Russia has ‘privileged interests’ (Sherr 2010b). The Collective

Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is a mutual defence alliance dominated by

Russia and includes Eastern Partnership members, Armenia and Belarus. Although

Ukraine has recently dropped its aspirations to join NATO, it has stated that it willbe a military non-aligned country and will not apply to join the CSTO.2

Under President Yushchenko after the ‘Orange Revolution’, Ukraine was pro-

West and at times seemingly desperate to join both NATO and the EU. Nevertheless

the country was divided as far as its citizens were concerned, with the Russian-

speakers in the East not wanting to lose close ties with Russia. Polls and surveys

seemed to imply that the majority of people wanted a strong independent cohesive

country which might become a member of the EU but not NATO.3 In early 2010 the

‘pro-Russia’ candidate Viktor Yanukovych narrowly won a presidential victory and,

although his first visit was to Brussels, he then put pro-Russia policies into operation

including extending the lease on Sevastopol Harbour for the Black Sea Fleet. It is too

early to say how balanced his policy might be regarding East and West but a

European Partnership Association Agreement with the EU is still going ahead and

President Yanukovych has stated that cooperation with NATO will continue.4

Ukraine has a semi-parliamentary system and as Sherr (2010a) explains, ‘Yanukovych

is well short of a majority in the parliament, and will need to pursue policies it willsupport if he wishes to avoid deadlock’.

An opposite swing has arisen in Moldova where, after many years of communist

‘democratic choice’, liberal parties were able to form a coalition after the 2009

elections. The new government is now working on democratic reform, their proposed

EU Association Agreement, requirements needed for visa-free EU travel and other

pro-Western policies. Moldova has strong historical links with Romania and many

Moldovans have dual nationality, Romania having issued passports to a large

number of Moldovans since 2007 when it became part of the EU. The main

stumbling block for Moldova is the issue of the ‘frozen conflict’ zone of Transnistria

where many citizens have Russian passports and where Russian troops are stationed.

In June 2010 Germany and Russia proposed a new EU-Russia committee which

would involve Baroness Cathy Ashton (High Representative of the EU for Foreign

Affairs and Security Policy) and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov trying to resolve

issues such as Transnistria.5

The three South Caucasus countries of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan arelargely considered to be Black Sea states even though Georgia is the only littoral

state and Azerbaijan is situated on the Caspian Sea. Georgian policy has been pro-

West since the Rose Revolution (2003), which brought President Saakashvili to

power. After a large military build-up, possibly connected to the ‘frozen conflict

zones’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, war occurred in the latter in 2008 followed by

declarations of independence from both zones. Since then the declared strategy of the

Georgian government has been to ‘achieve the full de-occupation of Abkhazia and

the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, reverse the process of annexation of these

territories by the Russian Federation, and peacefully reintegrate these territories and

their populations into Georgia’s constitutional ambit’ rejecting a military solution

(Government of Georgia 2010, p. 49).

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The two other South Caucasus countries of Azerbaijan and Armenia have

displayed open hostility towards each other since the early 1990s conflict over

Nagorno-Karabakh and the subsequent occupation of part of Azerbaijan by

Armenia. The latter country depends on Russian support through the CSTO, whilst

long-term President Aliyev of Azerbaijan tries to balance East�West relations and

retain its main regional ally, Turkey. Azerbaijan has large reserves of oil and gas with

pipelines extending to Russia and to Turkey through Georgia, bypassing Armenia.Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 and an official ‘candidate’ for

EU membership since 1999, having originally made an application to join the

Community in 1987. Despite this there is disagreement between EU members as to

Turkey’s future full membership of the Union. The West has regarded Turkey as

being a vital link both to the East in general and also to the Islamic countries of

the Middle East. However, there have been tensions in recent times including during

the war in Georgia when Turkey refused to allow overweight US ships through the

Bosporus and Dardanelles because they were breaking the Montreux Convention

(Weaver 2010). At one time Turkey was supportive of NATO’s Black Sea project but

then dropped it in order to improve relations with Russia (NATO � personal

communication, July, 2009). The Turkish-Armenian border is closed although since

2008 there have been Turkish proposals for a ‘Caucasus Stability and Cooperation

Platform’ and discussions with Yerevan on reopening the border. One difficulty with

regard to the latter is that improved relations between Turkey and Armenia could

cause problems with Azerbaijan if the Nagorno-Karabakh status quo remains.Turkey is keen to preserve good relations with both Azerbaijan and Georgia, partly

to maintain and enhance its role as an energy transit state (Fotiou 2009).

Both Romania and Bulgaria, especially the former, have championed the Black

Sea region within the EU and NATO, even though at times they have felt they were

failing in their attempts (personal communication, May, 2009). Now they are both in

the process of making bilateral agreements with the US to host elements of its

‘missile defence shield’ on US bases in their respective countries, although Larrabee

(RAND corporation) says that Georgia, Bulgaria, and Romania have all wanted an

increased US presence for a long time (personal communication, July, 2009).

Previous attempts at installing anti-ballistic missile systems in Poland and the Czech

Republic failed, partly due to Russian hostility over the project and threats to site its

own missiles in Kaliningrad. More recently, there have been ongoing discussions

regarding both NATO and Russia cooperating in missile defence, whilst Transnistria

has offered its territory for Russian systems if required.6 NATO Secretary General

Rasmussen has said, ‘I believe that building missile defense in a way that includes

Russia would help create the true European security architecture we would all like tosee’ (Lobjakas 2010).

Although the EU is not a state, it has bordered the Black Sea since 2007, when

Romania and Bulgaria joined the Union, so it could be said that the wider Black Sea

region stretches from Ireland and Portugal in the west to the far east of Russia. As

one senior EU official said (personal communication, July, 2009), ‘The EU is a Black

Sea power’. Romania and Bulgaria, although having their own individual foreign

policies are included within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which

is presently presided over by Cathy Ashton and is evolving. The External Action

Service (EAS), the first supranational foreign service, is appointing diplomats and

setting up EU embassies throughout the world. This could, however, mean that

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current special representatives for the Black Sea region may cease to exist in the near

future.

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) currently includes two

missions in the Black Sea region which are the EU Border Assistance Mission

(EUBAM) to Ukraine and Moldova, and the post-war civilian EU Monitoring

Mission (EUMM) to Georgia. In many respects the CSDP is taking over European

missions that might previously have been within the domain of NATO as the latter

organisation has become more involved with ‘out-of-area’ concerns, such as the war

in Afghanistan. As NATO reviews its strategic concept, there have been heavy

debates about how, from an American point of view, Europe wants to rely too much

on the US for its security, whilst, from a European perspective, the US wants to use

NATO for its own national interests in the world rather than for European defence.

Nevertheless the EU and NATO are cooperating with each other more now than at

times in the past and trying to avoid duplication over military operations (personal

communication, July, 2009).

Structural realism and the Black Sea region

Structural realism

Structural realism is a form of neorealism which has some basic differences from

classical realism; in particular it is ‘systemic’ as opposed to ‘reductionist’ according

to Hyde-Price (2007). It focuses purely on the international and not the domestic,

being a parsimonious theory. Realists say the domestic is hierarchical and the

international is anarchical. Structural realism explains behaviour by examining the

structural distribution of relative power capabilities, how they shape the behaviour of

units (i.e. states), and how systemic/structural factors influence their domestic

factors. According to the theory, forces operate at system level not unit level.

Realism is concerned with anarchy, polarity and balance; Hyde-Price writes that

realists look at ‘what is’ rather than ‘what ought to be’ (2007, p. 16) and that their

concept of security is narrow, focusing on power and military ideas of strategy rather

than the broader concept of security, where the object to be secured is often the

individual rather than the state (p. 18).

Neorealism is a theory of great power politics which posits that the best way for

states to guarantee their own survival is to be as powerful as possible. According to

the theory, rational states will be impelled by systemic pressure to maximise security

and ultimately to maximise power (Mearsheimer 1994, pp. 11�12). However, the

theories of Waltz and Mearsheimer differ from each other in certain ways; in

particular, Waltz is a ‘defensive’ realist and Mearsheimer is an ‘offensive’ realist

(Hyde-Price 2007, p. 9). This plays out as ‘security maximisation’ vs. ‘power

maximisation’ i.e. Waltz posits that states primarily secure themselves for defence

reasons, whereas Mearsheimer (1994, p. 12) maintains that states are also power

maximisers i.e. they are both offensively oriented and defensively oriented.

Power politics or ‘realpolitik’ was always an essential part of classical realism

which, unlike liberalism, set aside morality or ethics in international relations.

Realpolitik builds on Machiavelli’s (1962) Prince amongst other works.Polarity is one of realism’s main concepts within which there are four types:

(1) unipolarity as seen after 1989 when the US became the only superpower in the

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world; (2) bipolarity which was the situation during the cold war prior to 1989; (3)

balanced multipolarity which is less stable and predictable than bipolarity and occurs

when no single power can make a bid for hegemony; and (4) unbalanced

multipolarity where one state has greater power than the others and can make abid for hegemony. Polarity can be seen at either a global or a regional level such as

Europe or the Black Sea area and will be further evaluated during the case study of

the Black Sea region.

The core assumptions of neorealism are: (a) that international systems are

anarchic; (b) that states are the primary international actors; (c) that states are

functionally similar; and (d) that states are rational unitary actors (Hyde-Price 2007,

p. 30). All of these assumptions can be debated as follows: (a) Liberals might say that

international systems involve institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the EU,or NATO, although there are examples of powerful states ignoring these institutions

e.g. when the US acted unilaterally against Iraq in 2003. (b) Other international

actors exist as well as states, for example the EU, Al Qaeda, the Taliban and large

multinational corporations such as oil companies. (c) States are not necessarily

functionally similar. For example, some states are advanced democracies whereas

others are heading towards the ‘failed state’ category. For example, Georgia was a

failed state for at least the first half of the 1990s according to Nixey (2010). (d) In the

case of a failed state where there is no definite government or clearly defined head ofstate then there may be internal anarchy and a lack of rationality. These debates will

need to be borne in mind later in the paper when analysing the Black Sea as a case

study of structural realism.

When faced with a potential hegemon, great powers have four main options

which are ‘balancing’, ‘buck-passing’, ‘bandwagoning’ and ‘aggression’. Smaller

states also have additional options including ‘hiding’ and ‘transcendence’ (Hyde-

Price 2007). It will be necessary to explore these ideas in terms of the behaviour of the

various Black Sea states. For example, is Turkey currently ‘balancing’ possiblehegemons (Russia, US, EU) or attempting to ‘bandwagon’ with one or more of

them?

Europe and the Black Sea region

According to Hyde-Price, structural realist international theory is a tool for

elucidating the dynamics of security competition in Europe and elements of

cooperation and governance since the end of the cold war (2007, p. 2). It examinesthe ‘structural dynamics underlying the ebb and flow of events’ in particular

‘balance’ (2007, p. 3). He writes that the primary factor shaping foreign and security

policy is the structural distribution of power. Also, that neorealism can only be used

for a few important questions such as structural pressures in European security and

cannot explain all state behaviour which is anarchic (2007, p. 12).

Realism need not necessarily be the global study of structural dynamics but may

be regional. Hyde-Price (2007, p. 4), in applying the theory to the contemporary

European security order, describes it as being characterised by ‘balanced multi-polarity’, the particular states involved in keeping the balance being the US, Russia,

Germany, UK and France. So does the Black Sea region have the same dynamics as

the wider Europe in general or do they differ? This region would seem to be a most

suitable regional candidate for study.

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So if there are five balancers in Europe as a whole, what is the situation in the

Black Sea region? Is it also ‘balanced’ multipolarity or is it a case of ‘unbalanced’

multipolarity given that the region is far more unstable? Mearsheimer (2001) has

looked at how ‘unbalanced multipolarity’ is particularly dangerous as compared withbipolarity or balanced multipolarity due to the lack of stability. He says that war is

more likely with multipolarity in general (as we have seen in Georgia) but especially

with unbalanced multipolarity where there is a potential hegemon; unbalanced

multipolarity causes the most fear in the region concerned (2001, p. 45). This latter

could seem to be the case in the Black Sea region where several states including

Georgia and Ukraine have feared Russia as do still some Eastern European states

that are now members of both the EU and NATO including Lithuania, Poland, and

Romania (personal communication, July, 2009, October, 2009, May, 2010). Ofcourse, from a Russian point of view the hegemon has been NATO or ‘the West’.

This section will examine realism’s four prime typologies, as previously discussed,

in relation to the region before continuing the task of analysing the Black Sea area in

terms of structural realism.

The Black Sea region and the four prime typologies of power configurations

(1) With regard to unipolarity, Mearsheimer’s view is that hegemony is only possiblein regions made up of contiguous states so global hegemony is not possible. On the

other hand, freedom of action in the international system is relatively unconstrained

(Hyde-Price 2007, p. 42). Waltz (1979, p. 194) describes this freedom as having the

ability to do the, ‘same dumb things over and over’.

According to structural realism, unipolarity is not durable, one theory for this

being that balancing coalitions will ultimately form (Hyde-Price 2007, p. 42).

Another theory for why unipolarity is only short-lived is that other great powers

might emerge as rivals. At a global level, the US became the only superpower afterthe end of the Soviet Union but now the world is moving in a multipolar direction,

giving some credence to the theory.

For the Black Sea region, unipolarity is a possibility as the region’s states are

contiguous; the fact that throughout history this region has been engulfed many

times by empires, including the Ottoman and the Russian, demonstrates the point.

Russia and Turkey are still the most powerful single states within the contiguous

region, although the EU is an important actor and the US has a powerful ‘off-shore’

interest.(2) In a bipolar global system such as the one seen during the cold war, two

superpowers balance each other out, creating a more stable situation than that under

unipolarity or multipolarity. Both powers have ‘allies’ and ‘clients’ which they

moderate (Hyde-Price 2007, p. 41). So can the Black Sea region be seen in a bipolar

context with Russia and ‘the West’ being the two balancing poles? It is certainly quite

clear that some countries in the immediate or wider region are or have been clients of

Russia (e.g. Belarus); some are or have been clients of the US (e.g. Georgia); and

some are now full members of the EU (Romania, Bulgaria). Turkey, although amember of NATO, has more recently tried to keep good relations with both Russia

and the West without fully falling into the ‘sphere of influence’ of either. Ukraine has

often been divided amongst both its politicians and citizens. With regard to the

South Caucasus countries, Vasilyan (2010) claims that Armenia is a client of Russia,

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Azerbaijan a client of Turkey and Georgia a client of the US. And now that Russia

has recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, it could be argued

that these regions are also clients of Russia.

But is the ‘West’ quite as unified as it was during the cold war? There are manydivisions within the EU, especially between those members who want to ‘bandwagon’

with the US and those who do not. NATO also has divisions amongst its (similar)

members particularly with respect to Russia and ‘Article 5’.7

(3) Balanced multipolarity is less stable and predictable than a bipolar system but is

more stable than unbalanced multipolarity because no power is strong enough to

become a regional hegemon. The emphasis within this typology is on security

maximisation as described by Waltz, rather than Mearsheimer’s power maximisation.

The largest state within the Black Sea region, Russia, could be considered to bestrong enough to be a regional hegemon, thereby ruling out the Black Sea being seen

in terms of balanced multipolarity. However, if we include the EU, and its members,

as a quasi-state, or the US as an ‘off-shore’ balancer, or the western coalition of

NATO as an actor then balanced multipolarity could be considered to be one of the

possibilities. Turkey too is becoming a stronger individual player in the region. And

although Russia acted with aggression during the Russia�Georgia war of 2008 and

there was little direct military support for Georgia from its allies, Russia is now

seemingly trying to improve its relations with the West. There are also rumours thatPresident Obama informed President Medvedev that if a second war in Georgia was

initiated then the US would become more involved (Whitmore 2009).

(4) Unbalanced multipolarity is when one power has greater power than the others

and can make a bid for hegemony. This state of affairs is ‘primed for conflict’ with

much fear and mistrust. ‘Second order’ concerns such as human rights are

overridden by national security concerns. Great powers pursue power maximisation

strategies and the possibility of war causes much fear in international politics.

We could theorise that by invading Georgia in August 2008, Russia has shownthat it is in a position to act as a hegemon. However, Russia has maintained that it

only acted defensively in Georgia (Felgenhauer 2009) and that it has otherwise

shown restraint rather than power maximisation strategies. Nevertheless, ‘unba-

lanced multipolarity’ could be regarded as another possibility for describing the

situation in the Black Sea region.

A ‘balanced’ region?

One difficulty in analysing the Black Sea region is whether or not to view the EU as a

‘quasi-state’ for the purposes of examining the balance in the region. Three of the

powerful European balancers described by Hyde-Price i.e. Germany, France and the

UK are all EU members. For this reason, and the fact that the EU has specific

policies regarding the region (the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy) as

well as members that border the sea, this analysis will regard the EU as a ‘balancer’

of the region. It should also be noted that three of the littoral states (Turkey,

Romania, Bulgaria) are members of NATO which still supports ‘Article 5’ despitemuch current debate over its new strategic concept.

So if we agree with Hyde-Price that Europe is a balanced region and that the

balancers in general are Russia, the US, Germany, UK and France (or Russia, the

US and the EU), then can we assume that the situation is the same for the Black Sea

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region? Perhaps not, given that Turkey too is an important player in this region, one

of the largest littoral states, but not yet an EU member despite being a member of

NATO. It could then be posited that there are four balancers of the region, namely

Russia and Turkey, which are the most powerful individual littoral states of the BlackSea, the EU which incorporates two littoral states (Romania and Bulgaria) and the

US, which is an ‘off-shore’ balancer.

However, the US, Turkey and most EU members are allies through NATO and

could therefore be seen as one pole against Russia’s other pole in a bipolar system

similar to that of the cold war i.e. the region could be seen as having bipolar

dynamics which are the remnants of the cold war. This viewpoint could be further

consolidated if a line of anti-ballistic missiles is established without agreement.

Nevertheless, there have been tensions between NATO allies recently, with EUmembers, the US and Turkey showing signs of splits, especially during the Russia�Georgia war when Turkey would, on occasions, be seen to be supporting Russia

rather than the US, in particular with regard to Black Sea access via Istanbul, as

previously discussed.

Aybak (2010) writes that Russia and Turkey have a growing regional inter-

dependence due to their negative experiences regarding the EU. They are becoming

closer and considering the development of their own neighbourhood. So if Turkey, a

powerful and strategic country, is balancing itself between East and West, it cannotbe regarded as ‘bandwagoning’ with either and must therefore be considered as an

individual ‘balancer’ in the region, contradicting the idea of a regional bipolar

system.

The above scenario would make it reasonable to conclude that the Black Sea

region is in a condition of ‘balanced multipolarity’ in mid 2010. Nevertheless this

balance is fragile and some Black Sea states are afraid that neither the US nor the

West would support them should Russia make a further bid for hegemony. For

example former US Ambassador to Ukraine, Steven Pifer has said that according tomany in Ukraine, ‘The EU does not know what to do with us, but Russia does’.8

The US is no longer the superpower it once was as the global situation moves

from unipolar to multipolar but Hyde-Price (2007) tells us that, as a power

maximiser, the US will remain engaged in European affairs in order to retain

influence, prevent a rival, form new allies and minimise balancing instincts. He adds

that the US will cooperate with particular allies on particular issues and that all

European allies must decide whether to ‘bandwagon’ with the US or ‘balance’

against it. Since 2007, however, the Bush administration has changed to the Obamaadministration which is not quite as focused on Europe or the Black Sea region.

There has also been a global economic crisis. So it is necessary to question if the US

will maintain its power maximisation policy for long into the future. Sammut

(2010), however, asserts that the US still has interests in the Black Sea area and

continues to balance Russian influence, especially in the military and security

sphere. This assertion can be backed up by the US missile defence scheme for the

area.

Security communities

The second theory to be used in this analysis of the Black Sea region is that of

security communities. According to the theory, a good example of a ‘security

European Security 9

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community’ is the EU (Deutsch et al. 1957) which consists of a community of

sovereign entities, within a particular region, that do not expect war with each

other. Whilst many might regard the EU as having begun as an economic

community, in fact the purpose of its founders, including Schuman, Monnet

and Churchill, was to prevent war happening again in Western Europe (Schuman

1950).Deutsch and his co-authors described a security community as a group of people

who believe that common social problems must and can be resolved by the process of

peaceful change using appropriate institutions. The people within the security

community develop a sense of trust and common interest which means that, in order

for such a community to arise, a ‘bottom-up’ approach is required as well as top-

down institutionalism (Buzan 1991). Constructivists Adler and Barnett (1998) added

that shared identities, values and meanings as well as direct interactions and shared

long-term interests are of importance too.

The EU’s current move towards multilateral policies in the Black Sea region

with the development of its Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership policies

(European Commission 2007, 2008), rather than relying on bilateral relations via

the ENP, demonstrates a desire to build a security community rather than to further

enlarge into the region at the present time. The setting up of the Eastern

Partnership’s Civil Society Forum in addition to Black Sea Synergy sectoral

initiatives, such as transport, energy and the environment, could represent part of

the bottom-up approach referred to in the last paragraph.Cichocki (2010) writes that this regionalisation of the ENP East is ‘an upshot of

attaching greater importance than before to the geopolitical factor in security

policy’. He also believes it to be, ‘a consequence of a clear revival of political realism,

noticeable in the European, Russian and American perceptions of international

affairs’. Raszewski (2010) adds that the EU did have some hopes that its Energy

Diversification Policy could have helped to create a security community in the Black

and Caspian Sea regions, but he concludes that this has not happened in the area.

Only a ‘regional security complex’ of a different type might exist.

Constructivists Buzan and Wæver (2003, p. 4) explain that the central idea in

regional security complex theory is that, ‘since most threats travel more easily

over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally

patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes’. They add that the

combination of sovereign, territorial states becoming the principal global players in

security matters, along with the international system becoming global, leads to

‘distinct regional security subsystems’ emerging. They also say that, whilst a few

very powerful states act globally by ‘projecting their power into far-flung regions’,

the majority are more concerned with their near neighbours (Buzan and Wæver2003, p. 14). The South Caucasus is regarded as an example of a ‘mini security

complex’.

Analysing the Black Sea Region in the light of the full theory of regional security

complexes is beyond the scope of this paper. However, according to Buzan (1991) the

two extremes of security complexes are chaos (Hobbesian, enmity between all) and

security communities (Kantian, amity between all). On a continuum between these

extremes are other possibilities such as ‘security regimes’ where states are rivals but

cooperate to try to avoid war (Jervis 1982). Given that there has been a recent war in

the Black Sea region but there are elements of cooperation via organisations such as

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BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR and GUAM we could conclude that the region is currently

neither a security community nor in a condition of total chaos but is somewhere in

between these extremes.

Antonenko (2009, p. 268) writes that the progress towards regional security

cooperation in the Black Sea area has been disrupted by Russia which has seen

attempts towards this progress as a prelude to further NATO or EU enlargement.

She informs us that there is a lack of necessary drivers for creating a security

community in the region at present. However, the approach of holding regional

security discussions in the area under the auspices of a bigger international

organisation such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE) could be useful. Also, ‘Given that discussions about the new European

security treaty are most likely to take place within the OSCE, this approach could

offer a building block towards developing a new regional institution in the longer

term’(2009, p. 268).Despite the Russia�Georgia war, there have been moves towards better

cooperation between the US, Russia and NATO since the election of President

Obama, with NATO Secretary General Rasmussen asserting that improved relations

with Russia are one of his top priorities (Lobjakas 2010). So a security community is

one example of ‘what could be’ in the future. The third theory of supranationality

has much overlap with security communities and will be examined in the next

section.

Supranationality and the EU model

Supranationality and post-sovereign politics

With the threatened Balkanisation of more states and regions in the world, including

those of the South Caucasus, and the ensuing rise in the number of nation states,

European politicians (e.g. Watson et al. 2007) are asking whether the sovereign state

system can continue indefinitely. They agree that ‘post-sovereign politics’ or

‘supranationality’ will be the way forward at a global level not just the EU level.

‘Post-sovereign’ does not mean that nation states no longer exist, just that part of

their sovereignty is shared or pooled to some extent with other states in a global or

regional system rather than being absolute.

Academics have discussed these ideas for decades, often related to other theories

and concepts such as ‘institutional liberalism’, ‘multi-layered governance’ or

‘effective multilateralism’. Wallace (1999b), for example, wrote about the European

state order which developed from the Westphalian system and questioned if Europe

was still an interstate order or a ‘post-sovereign regional system’. His conclusions

were that the EU was emerging into a post-sovereign regional system but one that

depended on external support from the US. He observed that the US might not be

prepared for this indefinitely unless it was on their terms but also questioned if the

EU would be willing to go along with that. He predicted that the Union could extend

stability, prosperity and mutual trust to the Eastern European applicant members of

the time but that further afield it could be more problematic with or without the

cooperation of the US. This is what we are now witnessing with regard to the

‘Eastern neighbourhood’ or the ‘Black Sea region’.

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The EU model, territorial integrity and sovereignty

The EU is a unique organisation, not a superstate like the US or a weak superpower

dominated organisation like the UN. Its structure combines intergovernmental

aspects (member states) with supranational aspects (EU Commission) and an elected

parliament, resulting in multi-layered governance. Much interest in the model has

been shown by other regions in the world including South America (MERCOSUR),

Africa (African Union) and South East Asia (ASEAN). Perhaps these regions will

eventually copy the model adopting their own rules and laws (acquis communautaire).

So could the Black Sea region develop a similar structure? And if so, might

autonomous regions such as those within the South Caucasus be less intent on

independence or, if they gained it, would the consequences be less problematic?‘Territorial integrity’ and ‘sovereignty’ are claimed by Black Sea states such as

Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan with regard to the sub-regions of Transnistria,

Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh that want ‘self-determination’.

The US and the EU mainly support the former ideas despite their recognition of

Kosovo. Russia also supports the ideas despite its recognition of Abkhazia and

South Ossetia. So what do we mean exactly by sovereignty?

Camilleri and Falk (1992, p. 15) submit that the ‘origin and history of the concept

of sovereignty are closely related to the nature and evolution of the state, and in

particular to the development of centralised authority’. Yet regions can be

autonomous without having sovereignty and it is doubtful that any nation state

can have absolute sovereignty in present times. For example, whilst many states that

were formerly part of the USSR or the Warsaw Pact have celebrated their

sovereignty, they have also rushed to join or apply to join either the EU, NATO

or both. Also, in federal systems, autonomy can be claimed by both the central

authority and the local ones i.e. subsidiarity applies. So does this mean there is

sovereignty at both levels, at neither or that the sovereignty is shared? Wallace

(1999a, p. 503) writes, ‘No government in Europe remains sovereign in the sense

understood by the diplomats or constitutional lawyers of half a century ago’. Javier

Solana says we must think about ‘responsible sovereignty’ which has to be tackled

politically not just academically, with the EU providing a good model.9

Supranationality and regional integration

‘Balkanisation’ is a term used to describe the breakdown of a region into numerous

quasi-independent statelets. Whilst the term has been used throughout the twentieth

century, it is particularly relevant at the beginning of the twenty-first century,

especially with regard to the territory of the former single state of Yugoslavia, now

occupied by six UN recognised states as well as Kosovo, which is not recognised by

Russia or China and therefore not the UN which follows the recommendations of the

Security Council. Even amongst EU members there are dissenters (Cyprus, Greece,

Romania, Slovakia and Spain) with regard to recognition.

The self-determination and separation of Kosovo, a former autonomous region

in Serbia, has set a precedent according to the leaders of Russia and the autonomous

regions in the Black Sea area. Former President Putin stated, ‘If somebody assumes

that Kosovo can achieve full state independence, then why should we refuse it to the

Abkhaz and the South Ossetians’? (Illarionov 2009, p. 61). The nationalism that

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arose in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism led to demands for ethnic

autonomy in some regions. This is in complete contradiction to the norms of the EU,

which accepts multiculturalism and the free movement of persons as the way

forward.The South Caucasus is an example of a small region or ‘mini security complex’

which includes three states, namely Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as

three autonomous regions, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia

has recently recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as separate states whilst other

members of the UN Security Council have not. However, if the three regions

mentioned above were to be eventually recognised internationally as independent

states then there would be double the number of states in the South Caucasus region

all having international representatives. It could be argued that the more states thereare in the world, whether recognised or not, the more need there is for cooperation

and supranationality, including the appointment of regional representatives.

The EU’s ‘Eastern Partnership’ policy which covers most of the non-EU wider

Black Sea countries (apart from Turkey and Russia) was initially drafted with an

accession prospect in mind but in the final version this wording was omitted (Weaver

2010). Enlargement is still a possibility for some or all of the Black Sea countries in

the longer term, but for now ‘enlargement’ has become ‘a dirty word in the cafeteria’

according to one Commission official (personal communication, July, 2009).So without EU (or NATO) enlargement as a solution to the lack of regional

stability in the present time, and without allowing Russia to form a strong ‘sphere of

influence’, what can be done in the Black Sea region? Might regional integration of

some kind ameliorate the situation? According to Hettne and Soderbaum (1998),

‘Regional integration implies a security dimension which is quite essential to the

dynamics of the integration process. Security regionalism refers to attempts by the

states and other relevant actors in a particular geographical area [. . .] to transform a

security complex with conflict-generating interstate relations into a securitycommunity with cooperative relations’.

One example of possible regional integration with shared sovereignty in the

South Caucasus is a federal system resulting in one state. A second example is where

the various states and autonomous regions adopt their own mini ‘EU model’ system

with intergovernmental and/or supranational institutions and open borders, a more

modern and equal form of how it was in Soviet times. Neither of these options is

likely to happen in the near future given present hostilities, although Emerson and

Tocci (2000) and Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan (2008) have proposed regionalstability and cooperation pacts.

Another possible solution could be a larger region such as the wider Black Sea

area or the Eastern Partnership members adopting a supranational layer, possibly

involving BSEC and/or the proposed EU Neighbourhood East (EURONEST)

Parliamentary Assembly.

A domino effect?

So could the EU cause a domino effect where regions such as the South Caucasus or

the Black Sea share sovereignty, relax their border controls and create a situation

where territory and nationalism are less likely to cause wars? And if so, might it

eventually lead to a more democratic UN or perhaps ‘United Regions’ (Galtung

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2010) as the highest layer in a multi-layered global system? This may sound too

idealistic but the same applied to the EU itself in the early days.

Meanwhile Hyde-Price gives the realist argument that institutions are ‘fair-

weather friends’ writing that, ‘The time for liberal-idealist illusions in a Europe

‘‘whole and free’’ is past’ (2007, p. 179). Even if this is true and the Union cannot last

forever without either collapsing like an empire or evolving into a state like the US, it

has, arguably, helped to maintain ‘balanced multipolarity’ and, along with NATO,

helped to deter war amongst its members for over half a century.

Europeanisation and regionalisation

‘What is’ and ‘What could be’

This paper has so far analysed the Black Sea region in relation to three theories,

asserting that realism is in the main ‘what is’ and a security community based on

either intergovernmental or supranational institutions is ‘what could be’. However,

whilst realism might be ‘what is’, the EU also exists in one part of the Black Sea

(Romania and Bulgaria) and is also ‘what is’ even if its foreign policy aims of

establishing peace and stability in the region are not yet achieved.One difficulty in these discussions is that realists talk about ‘states’ and contrast

their theory with liberal ‘institutions’. The EU may be classified by them as an

institution or a collection of institutions yet the EU is more than an institution whilst

being less than (or beyond) a state. As previously discussed, realism says that in times

of crisis, institutions do not hold up (and the EU is certainly being tested at this

moment in time partly due to financial crises). Liberalism is more inclined to be

optimistic and to view genuinely democratic and cooperative global institutions as

the way forward if the world is to avoid destruction through wars or climate change

catastrophe. Indeed, liberals and constructivists are more likely to think beyond the

state (Moravscik 1997).

Realists say that institutions are dominated by the most powerful states which

can be quick to abandon them when they are no longer of use, with Mearsheimer

(1994, p. 14) writing that institutions are essentially ‘arenas for acting out power

relationships’. He cites NATO as an example of US domination. Liberals state that

institutions ‘mitigate fear of cheating and so allow cooperation to emerge, so they

can alleviate fears of unequal gains from cooperation’ (Keohane and Martin 1995,

p. 45). Constructivists say that international relations are socially constructed on the

basis of shared ideas, norms and values. Institutions can be upholders of these ideas,

norms and values as well as agents of change (Haas and Haas 2002).

Hyde-Price (2007, p. 26) suggests that liberalism is good at domestic level but that

the international level is anarchic. However, it could be posited that more powerful

institutions could work towards making the world pseudo-domestic by using the EU

model. In many ways EU members regard other members as domestic rather than as

rival states which might need to be secured against (Buzan and Wæver 2003).

Nevertheless it is necessary to agree that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century,

the EU model is not always strong and its states have been inclined to act unilaterally

when dealing with foreign policy and security matters. Romania and Bulgaria are

good examples, as previously mentioned. Nevertheless the Lisbon Treaty was ratified

and the EAS is being put into place.

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Realists might also say that liberalism misunderstands the nature of power and

that liberals have normative political agendas, confusing ‘what is’ with ‘what ought

to be’ (Hyde-Price 2007, p. 16). But surely it is possible to distinguish between ‘what

is’ and ‘what could be’, admitting that both types of thinking are necessary in today’sEurope.

Regional cooperation

EU policies are not currently focused on Europeanisation by expanding the Union

into the Black Sea and South Caucasus regions, despite enlargement being viewed as

a solution to the problems of the former Yugoslavia. Instead the policies are

becoming more multilateral via Black Sea Synergy and the multilateral aspects of the

Eastern Partnership. Nevertheless, Turkey is still an EU candidate despite its moving

closer to Russia; Moldova under its coalition government is keen to join the EU; and

there are mixed views in Ukraine, the government of which is no longer pro-NATO

membership but is enthusiastic about its EU Association Agreement.Of course, the Union is not the only institution involved in trying to create a

cooperative region. There have been various attempts, most notably by the BSEC

organisation. However, according to Hajizada (2010), despite all states in the region

being members of BSEC, they are not truly interested in creating a cooperative

region. This is partly due to the many antagonisms between the various members, for

example Armenia and Azerbaijan, or Turkey and Greece, or Russia and Georgia.

Energy and pipelines have also been divisive factors in the wider region, with

Marshall and Rofe (2009) outlining how within the ‘energy game’, Eastern Europehas become a ‘grand chessboard’, with an accompanying race by both the US and

Russia to gather ‘allies and clients’.

It would seem that the Black Sea region is far from becoming a cooperative

security community based on the EU model. Nevertheless, Aybak (2010) comments

that BSEC was a remarkable post-Cold War achievement, with former Soviet

countries having an equal footing with Russia. He also tells us though that Russian

perceptions have been that BSEC is Turkey’s bid for hegemony in the region. Other

BSEC members have described Russia as dominating or disrupting the organisation,with Hajizada (2010) writing that, ‘Some attempts by various BSEC members to take

into account even the possibility of soft-security cooperation by BSEC member

states has been constantly contested by some delegations (e.g. the representatives of

the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation) that constitute a minority of

all parties’.

Nevertheless, since Ukraine’s 2010 presidential elections, Russia and Ukraine

have made an agreement to ‘enhance the effectiveness’ of BSEC, as well as continuing

cooperation between their navies and the naval forces of other Black Sea statesthrough BLACKSEAFOR which has, as members, all littoral states.10 Unfortunately,

though, Russia has refused to take part in naval exercises involving Georgia so the

latter does not participate.11

The way forward

So, according to our initial study of structural realism what conditions must exist

amongst states in order for a cooperative region to develop? Hyde-Price says the

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situation existing in Europe during the development of the EU (post-cold war) has

been ‘balanced multipolarity’, so perhaps we could extrapolate that this is the best

condition required for other regions too. Earlier it was argued that ‘balanced

multipolarity’ is the current condition in the Black Sea region, despite the fragility ofits situation. Russia has been an outsider ‘great power’ and the behaviour of a great

power when faced with a potential hegemon (the West) can be defensive aggression.

It can also be balancing, buck-passing, or bandwagoning. Since the 2008 war, Russia

has been less defensive and could be becoming less of an outsider. Discussions on the

possibility of Russia working more closely with NATO and the EU on President

Medvedev’s ‘Vancouver to Vladivostok’ security proposals demonstrate how Russia

is now, at least, considering the bandwagoning possibility. Also, Turkey and Russia

seem to be balancing the West’s ‘encroachment’ onto former Soviet territory withoutnecessarily bandwagoning with each other.

The behaviour of smaller states can also be of importance. Their additional

behaviour options within the theory of structural realism can be ‘hiding’ and

‘transcendence’. The former means that states may assume a low profile or neutrality

whilst the latter means that there is an attempt to ‘surmount international anarchy

and go beyond the limits of conflictual politics’ (Schroeder 1995, p. 430). Vasilyan

(2010) tells us though that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia think in a realist

fashion with regard to their foreign policy and that their ability to ‘transcend’ theirthinking beyond survival and relative power maximisation to EU-type positive peace

is not possible at the moment. So, although the conditions for regional development

are there, the will must be found amongst all the states to work towards greater

cooperation

Finally, even if EU membership is what some countries in the region are working

towards in the longer term, perhaps improved regional cooperation could be at least

one step forward. The enlargement and neighbourhood commissioner Stefan Fule

has said that after the experiences of accepting countries into the Union that werenot fully ready, especially Bulgaria and Romania, future candidates must be one

hundred per cent ready (Jovanovska et al. 2010). Creating a Black Sea regional

security community would not exclude members from joining the EU and indeed,

according to Fule, countries need to make greater use of regional cooperation in

order to become closer to the EU whose ultimate goal is to make borders ‘less

relevant’ (Pop 2010).

Summary

This paper has examined structural realism’s theories of polarity and balancing then

proceeded to apply them to the wider Black Sea region. The conclusion is that the

version of polarity most appropriate for the region in the year 2010 is a fragile but

balanced multipolarity. This is arguably the most likely type of polarity for a

cooperative region to begin to develop, yet the situation in the Black Sea region is

complex.

The theory of security communities tells us that in order to create a cooperativeregion we need a bottom-up approach (with the help of civil society) as well as top-

down institutionalism.

The more general question of, ‘Are we in the process of changing from a state

dominated, realist, anarchic world to one where effective supranational regional and

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global organisations take precedence’? has also been asked. Realists might say that

this is ultimately not possible but perhaps regional and supranational institutions can

endure for many decades at least if the conditions are right.

In the Black Sea region, in mid 2010, realism and pragmatism are ‘what is’ yet

there are theories and policies that point towards ‘what could be’. A security

community is a possibility for the longer term if the condition of ‘balanced

multipolarity’ remains and there is enough desire for peace and stability amongst the

Black Sea nations.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Rick Whitaker and Rizwana Abbasi, University of Leicester, for readingearlier drafts of this paper.

Notes

1. For a fuller report on regional organisations see P. Manoli, Reinvigorating Black SeaCooperation: a policy discussion. Commission on the Black Sea, 2010.

2. J. Benitez, 27 May 2010. http://www.acus.org/natosource/ukraine-drops-nato-member-ship-aim

3. RIA Novosti, March 2010. http://en.rian.ru/world/20100302/158069130.html4. RIA Novosti, March 2010. http://en.rian.ru/exsoviet/20100301/158051301.html5. A. Rettman, EUobserver, 7 June 2010. http://euobserver.com/24/302236. Russia Today, 2 June 2010. http://rt.com/Politics/2010-02-16/transdniester-iskander-missile-

abm.html7. Article 5 states that an attack against one member of NATO is effectively an attack against

them all, so collective defence must apply. If Georgia had been a full member of NATO in2008 then NATO would have been at war with Russia.

8. ‘Ukraine in Crisis’, conference 29 July 2009, Center for American Progress, WashingtonDC (personally attended). Available from: http://www.americanprogress.org/events/2009/07/Ukraine.html

9. Lecture. ‘Europe as a Global Actor? A Conversation with Javier Solana’ London Schoolof Economics, 18 March 2010.

10. Kyiv Post, 17 May 2010. Yanukovych, Medvedev sign joint statement on security in BlackSea region. [Accessed 6 June 2010.] Available at: http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/66938/#ixzz0r5xd76fi

11. RIA Novosti, 8 April 2010. ‘Russian warship en route to Blackseafor naval drills’ http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100408/158487103.html

Notes on contributor

Carol Weaver is a part-time lecturer and researcher in the Department of Politics andInternational Relations at the University of Leicester. She is co-editor and co-author of theforthcoming book The Black Sea and EU policy: the challenge of divergent agendas (AshgatePublishing).

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