black sea regional security: present multipolarity and future possibilities
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Black Sea regional security: presentmultipolarity and future possibilitiesCarol Weaver aa Department of Politics and International Relations , University ofLeicester , Leicester, UKPublished online: 22 Mar 2011.
To cite this article: Carol Weaver (2011) Black Sea regional security: present multipolarity andfuture possibilities, European Security, 20:1, 1-19, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2010.510517
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Black Sea regional security: present multipolarity and future possibilities
Carol Weaver*
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester, Leicester, UK
(Received 21 May 2010; final version received 12 July 2010)
Three theories that can be usefully employed to analyse the security of the BlackSea region are structural realism, security communities and supranationality(based on the European Union (EU) model). Given that the Black Sea areacurrently has too many conflicts and rivalries to be a truly cooperative region or a‘security community’, we must examine its dynamics in terms of its presentrealism, especially in the east of the region (‘what is’), as well as considering itsfuture (‘what could be’). Regionalisation and Europeanisation are both possibi-lities for the longer term but, for the development of a fully cooperative region,possibly based on the EU model, it is posited that a condition of ‘balancedmultipolarity’ must initially exist. The paper analyses the extent to which this typeof polarity applies at the moment and then uses all the theories to outline possibleways forward for the region.
Keywords: Black Sea region; balanced multipolarity; European security; structuralrealism; security community; supranationality
Introduction
European Union (EU) policies regarding its eastern neighbourhood are changing
from bilateral only (European Neighbourhood Policy � ENP) to a combination of
bilateral and multilateral (Eastern Partnership and Black Sea Synergy; European
Commission 2007, 2008). It could be asserted that the reason for this is an overall
change in policy from enlargement to regionalisation, but can the Black Sea area
develop into a distinct cooperative region of equal nations or will many of its diverse
states remain fated to be the ‘clients’ of hegemonic powers? And can the theories of
realism, security communities and supranationality help us to answer this question?
The land area around the shores of the Black Sea is very diverse with many
ethnicities, cultures, languages and religions. Throughout history there have been
wars in the region but empires have also been built and different peoples have traded,
migrated and married. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union (USSR) and the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, newly independent states have been created, some of
which are suffering from old tensions and hostilities which may be internal, external
or both. The amount of interstate trading has been more limited in recent decades as
a result of the regional conflicts and visa requirements (Gavras 2010).
Nevertheless the area is becoming more recognised as a region, partly through the
efforts of the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation
of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Black Sea Naval Cooperation
*Email: [email protected]
European Security
Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2011, 1�19
ISSN 0966-2839 print/ISSN 1746-1545 online
# 2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2010.510517
http://www.informaworld.com
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Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) and other organisations including the Georgia
Ukraine Azerbaijan Moldova (GUAM) Organization for Democracy and Economic
Development.1 However, the borders of the Black Sea region are not clearly
delineated which complicates analysis (Aydin 2009).The Black Sea area is currently of importance for many reasons including: the
post-cold war independence of various states, the conflict zones including South
Ossetia where a war took place in 2008, oil and gas in Azerbaijan, and pipelines via
various routes across the region. It has also been an area of dispute between the
United States of America (US) and Russia, as the US has encouraged states to join
NATO. Of course, joining NATO has been the post-cold war security method of
choice for many of the Black Sea states.
After having introduced the region and its countries, this paper initially outlinesthe theory of structural realism (as discussed by Hyde-Price (2007) in his book
European Security in the 21st Century) which draws on the work of Waltz (1979) and
Mearsheimer (2001), then proceeds to explore the Black Sea region as a case study of
structural realism. This is followed by a discussion of security communities,
supranationality and the EU model, before drawing on all the theories in order to
make conclusions for the future of the Black Sea region and its security.
The paper draws on non-attributable interviews and discussions with senior
diplomats and politicians of Black Sea countries, senior NATO and EU officials, andMembers of the European Parliament (MEPs).
The Black Sea region
The term ‘Black Sea region’ is not always clearly defined and does not always include
the same countries. In some descriptions it is the six states that have Black Sea
coastlines (littoral states): Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Georgia and Bulgaria;
in others it is just the ‘shared neighbours’ of Russia and the EU especially the statesincluded in the EU’s ‘Eastern Partnership’ policy. Yet another grouping is of the
‘wider Black Sea region’ or ‘wider Black Sea area’ which might include all the
participants in the EU’s ‘Black Sea Synergy’ or the members of BSEC. This paper
will be concentrating primarily on the Black Sea littoral states plus Moldova and the
South Caucasus countries of Armenia and Azerbaijan, although for much of the
article Romania and Bulgaria will be discussed as part of the EU especially as, along
with Greece, they are two of the main countries involved in Black Sea policies such as
Black Sea Synergy.There have been many debates on the definition of ‘region’. Is it just a piece of
contiguous territory or more than that? And, if it is more, then is the Black Sea a
region at all? Buzan (1991, p. 188) maintains that a region must have some history or
connections between the states. He also writes, ‘In security terms, ‘‘region’’ means
that a distinct and significant subsystem of security relations exists among a set of
states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each
other’. This paper asserts that, due to past empires and quasi-empires as well
as current security preoccupations, this is the case with the countries around theBlack Sea.
The largest and by far the most militarily powerful littoral state of the Black Sea
is Russia, which dominated all the other states, apart from Turkey, during the time of
the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. Since the end of Soviet times, Russia has seen
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Romania and Bulgaria join NATO (2004). When Ukraine and Georgia also came
close to NATO membership in 2008, Russian foreign policy seemingly turned to a
‘thus far and no further’ stance, with its security policy now stating that there are
regions in which Russia has ‘privileged interests’ (Sherr 2010b). The Collective
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is a mutual defence alliance dominated by
Russia and includes Eastern Partnership members, Armenia and Belarus. Although
Ukraine has recently dropped its aspirations to join NATO, it has stated that it willbe a military non-aligned country and will not apply to join the CSTO.2
Under President Yushchenko after the ‘Orange Revolution’, Ukraine was pro-
West and at times seemingly desperate to join both NATO and the EU. Nevertheless
the country was divided as far as its citizens were concerned, with the Russian-
speakers in the East not wanting to lose close ties with Russia. Polls and surveys
seemed to imply that the majority of people wanted a strong independent cohesive
country which might become a member of the EU but not NATO.3 In early 2010 the
‘pro-Russia’ candidate Viktor Yanukovych narrowly won a presidential victory and,
although his first visit was to Brussels, he then put pro-Russia policies into operation
including extending the lease on Sevastopol Harbour for the Black Sea Fleet. It is too
early to say how balanced his policy might be regarding East and West but a
European Partnership Association Agreement with the EU is still going ahead and
President Yanukovych has stated that cooperation with NATO will continue.4
Ukraine has a semi-parliamentary system and as Sherr (2010a) explains, ‘Yanukovych
is well short of a majority in the parliament, and will need to pursue policies it willsupport if he wishes to avoid deadlock’.
An opposite swing has arisen in Moldova where, after many years of communist
‘democratic choice’, liberal parties were able to form a coalition after the 2009
elections. The new government is now working on democratic reform, their proposed
EU Association Agreement, requirements needed for visa-free EU travel and other
pro-Western policies. Moldova has strong historical links with Romania and many
Moldovans have dual nationality, Romania having issued passports to a large
number of Moldovans since 2007 when it became part of the EU. The main
stumbling block for Moldova is the issue of the ‘frozen conflict’ zone of Transnistria
where many citizens have Russian passports and where Russian troops are stationed.
In June 2010 Germany and Russia proposed a new EU-Russia committee which
would involve Baroness Cathy Ashton (High Representative of the EU for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy) and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov trying to resolve
issues such as Transnistria.5
The three South Caucasus countries of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan arelargely considered to be Black Sea states even though Georgia is the only littoral
state and Azerbaijan is situated on the Caspian Sea. Georgian policy has been pro-
West since the Rose Revolution (2003), which brought President Saakashvili to
power. After a large military build-up, possibly connected to the ‘frozen conflict
zones’ of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, war occurred in the latter in 2008 followed by
declarations of independence from both zones. Since then the declared strategy of the
Georgian government has been to ‘achieve the full de-occupation of Abkhazia and
the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, reverse the process of annexation of these
territories by the Russian Federation, and peacefully reintegrate these territories and
their populations into Georgia’s constitutional ambit’ rejecting a military solution
(Government of Georgia 2010, p. 49).
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The two other South Caucasus countries of Azerbaijan and Armenia have
displayed open hostility towards each other since the early 1990s conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh and the subsequent occupation of part of Azerbaijan by
Armenia. The latter country depends on Russian support through the CSTO, whilst
long-term President Aliyev of Azerbaijan tries to balance East�West relations and
retain its main regional ally, Turkey. Azerbaijan has large reserves of oil and gas with
pipelines extending to Russia and to Turkey through Georgia, bypassing Armenia.Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 and an official ‘candidate’ for
EU membership since 1999, having originally made an application to join the
Community in 1987. Despite this there is disagreement between EU members as to
Turkey’s future full membership of the Union. The West has regarded Turkey as
being a vital link both to the East in general and also to the Islamic countries of
the Middle East. However, there have been tensions in recent times including during
the war in Georgia when Turkey refused to allow overweight US ships through the
Bosporus and Dardanelles because they were breaking the Montreux Convention
(Weaver 2010). At one time Turkey was supportive of NATO’s Black Sea project but
then dropped it in order to improve relations with Russia (NATO � personal
communication, July, 2009). The Turkish-Armenian border is closed although since
2008 there have been Turkish proposals for a ‘Caucasus Stability and Cooperation
Platform’ and discussions with Yerevan on reopening the border. One difficulty with
regard to the latter is that improved relations between Turkey and Armenia could
cause problems with Azerbaijan if the Nagorno-Karabakh status quo remains.Turkey is keen to preserve good relations with both Azerbaijan and Georgia, partly
to maintain and enhance its role as an energy transit state (Fotiou 2009).
Both Romania and Bulgaria, especially the former, have championed the Black
Sea region within the EU and NATO, even though at times they have felt they were
failing in their attempts (personal communication, May, 2009). Now they are both in
the process of making bilateral agreements with the US to host elements of its
‘missile defence shield’ on US bases in their respective countries, although Larrabee
(RAND corporation) says that Georgia, Bulgaria, and Romania have all wanted an
increased US presence for a long time (personal communication, July, 2009).
Previous attempts at installing anti-ballistic missile systems in Poland and the Czech
Republic failed, partly due to Russian hostility over the project and threats to site its
own missiles in Kaliningrad. More recently, there have been ongoing discussions
regarding both NATO and Russia cooperating in missile defence, whilst Transnistria
has offered its territory for Russian systems if required.6 NATO Secretary General
Rasmussen has said, ‘I believe that building missile defense in a way that includes
Russia would help create the true European security architecture we would all like tosee’ (Lobjakas 2010).
Although the EU is not a state, it has bordered the Black Sea since 2007, when
Romania and Bulgaria joined the Union, so it could be said that the wider Black Sea
region stretches from Ireland and Portugal in the west to the far east of Russia. As
one senior EU official said (personal communication, July, 2009), ‘The EU is a Black
Sea power’. Romania and Bulgaria, although having their own individual foreign
policies are included within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which
is presently presided over by Cathy Ashton and is evolving. The External Action
Service (EAS), the first supranational foreign service, is appointing diplomats and
setting up EU embassies throughout the world. This could, however, mean that
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current special representatives for the Black Sea region may cease to exist in the near
future.
The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) currently includes two
missions in the Black Sea region which are the EU Border Assistance Mission
(EUBAM) to Ukraine and Moldova, and the post-war civilian EU Monitoring
Mission (EUMM) to Georgia. In many respects the CSDP is taking over European
missions that might previously have been within the domain of NATO as the latter
organisation has become more involved with ‘out-of-area’ concerns, such as the war
in Afghanistan. As NATO reviews its strategic concept, there have been heavy
debates about how, from an American point of view, Europe wants to rely too much
on the US for its security, whilst, from a European perspective, the US wants to use
NATO for its own national interests in the world rather than for European defence.
Nevertheless the EU and NATO are cooperating with each other more now than at
times in the past and trying to avoid duplication over military operations (personal
communication, July, 2009).
Structural realism and the Black Sea region
Structural realism
Structural realism is a form of neorealism which has some basic differences from
classical realism; in particular it is ‘systemic’ as opposed to ‘reductionist’ according
to Hyde-Price (2007). It focuses purely on the international and not the domestic,
being a parsimonious theory. Realists say the domestic is hierarchical and the
international is anarchical. Structural realism explains behaviour by examining the
structural distribution of relative power capabilities, how they shape the behaviour of
units (i.e. states), and how systemic/structural factors influence their domestic
factors. According to the theory, forces operate at system level not unit level.
Realism is concerned with anarchy, polarity and balance; Hyde-Price writes that
realists look at ‘what is’ rather than ‘what ought to be’ (2007, p. 16) and that their
concept of security is narrow, focusing on power and military ideas of strategy rather
than the broader concept of security, where the object to be secured is often the
individual rather than the state (p. 18).
Neorealism is a theory of great power politics which posits that the best way for
states to guarantee their own survival is to be as powerful as possible. According to
the theory, rational states will be impelled by systemic pressure to maximise security
and ultimately to maximise power (Mearsheimer 1994, pp. 11�12). However, the
theories of Waltz and Mearsheimer differ from each other in certain ways; in
particular, Waltz is a ‘defensive’ realist and Mearsheimer is an ‘offensive’ realist
(Hyde-Price 2007, p. 9). This plays out as ‘security maximisation’ vs. ‘power
maximisation’ i.e. Waltz posits that states primarily secure themselves for defence
reasons, whereas Mearsheimer (1994, p. 12) maintains that states are also power
maximisers i.e. they are both offensively oriented and defensively oriented.
Power politics or ‘realpolitik’ was always an essential part of classical realism
which, unlike liberalism, set aside morality or ethics in international relations.
Realpolitik builds on Machiavelli’s (1962) Prince amongst other works.Polarity is one of realism’s main concepts within which there are four types:
(1) unipolarity as seen after 1989 when the US became the only superpower in the
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world; (2) bipolarity which was the situation during the cold war prior to 1989; (3)
balanced multipolarity which is less stable and predictable than bipolarity and occurs
when no single power can make a bid for hegemony; and (4) unbalanced
multipolarity where one state has greater power than the others and can make abid for hegemony. Polarity can be seen at either a global or a regional level such as
Europe or the Black Sea area and will be further evaluated during the case study of
the Black Sea region.
The core assumptions of neorealism are: (a) that international systems are
anarchic; (b) that states are the primary international actors; (c) that states are
functionally similar; and (d) that states are rational unitary actors (Hyde-Price 2007,
p. 30). All of these assumptions can be debated as follows: (a) Liberals might say that
international systems involve institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the EU,or NATO, although there are examples of powerful states ignoring these institutions
e.g. when the US acted unilaterally against Iraq in 2003. (b) Other international
actors exist as well as states, for example the EU, Al Qaeda, the Taliban and large
multinational corporations such as oil companies. (c) States are not necessarily
functionally similar. For example, some states are advanced democracies whereas
others are heading towards the ‘failed state’ category. For example, Georgia was a
failed state for at least the first half of the 1990s according to Nixey (2010). (d) In the
case of a failed state where there is no definite government or clearly defined head ofstate then there may be internal anarchy and a lack of rationality. These debates will
need to be borne in mind later in the paper when analysing the Black Sea as a case
study of structural realism.
When faced with a potential hegemon, great powers have four main options
which are ‘balancing’, ‘buck-passing’, ‘bandwagoning’ and ‘aggression’. Smaller
states also have additional options including ‘hiding’ and ‘transcendence’ (Hyde-
Price 2007). It will be necessary to explore these ideas in terms of the behaviour of the
various Black Sea states. For example, is Turkey currently ‘balancing’ possiblehegemons (Russia, US, EU) or attempting to ‘bandwagon’ with one or more of
them?
Europe and the Black Sea region
According to Hyde-Price, structural realist international theory is a tool for
elucidating the dynamics of security competition in Europe and elements of
cooperation and governance since the end of the cold war (2007, p. 2). It examinesthe ‘structural dynamics underlying the ebb and flow of events’ in particular
‘balance’ (2007, p. 3). He writes that the primary factor shaping foreign and security
policy is the structural distribution of power. Also, that neorealism can only be used
for a few important questions such as structural pressures in European security and
cannot explain all state behaviour which is anarchic (2007, p. 12).
Realism need not necessarily be the global study of structural dynamics but may
be regional. Hyde-Price (2007, p. 4), in applying the theory to the contemporary
European security order, describes it as being characterised by ‘balanced multi-polarity’, the particular states involved in keeping the balance being the US, Russia,
Germany, UK and France. So does the Black Sea region have the same dynamics as
the wider Europe in general or do they differ? This region would seem to be a most
suitable regional candidate for study.
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So if there are five balancers in Europe as a whole, what is the situation in the
Black Sea region? Is it also ‘balanced’ multipolarity or is it a case of ‘unbalanced’
multipolarity given that the region is far more unstable? Mearsheimer (2001) has
looked at how ‘unbalanced multipolarity’ is particularly dangerous as compared withbipolarity or balanced multipolarity due to the lack of stability. He says that war is
more likely with multipolarity in general (as we have seen in Georgia) but especially
with unbalanced multipolarity where there is a potential hegemon; unbalanced
multipolarity causes the most fear in the region concerned (2001, p. 45). This latter
could seem to be the case in the Black Sea region where several states including
Georgia and Ukraine have feared Russia as do still some Eastern European states
that are now members of both the EU and NATO including Lithuania, Poland, and
Romania (personal communication, July, 2009, October, 2009, May, 2010). Ofcourse, from a Russian point of view the hegemon has been NATO or ‘the West’.
This section will examine realism’s four prime typologies, as previously discussed,
in relation to the region before continuing the task of analysing the Black Sea area in
terms of structural realism.
The Black Sea region and the four prime typologies of power configurations
(1) With regard to unipolarity, Mearsheimer’s view is that hegemony is only possiblein regions made up of contiguous states so global hegemony is not possible. On the
other hand, freedom of action in the international system is relatively unconstrained
(Hyde-Price 2007, p. 42). Waltz (1979, p. 194) describes this freedom as having the
ability to do the, ‘same dumb things over and over’.
According to structural realism, unipolarity is not durable, one theory for this
being that balancing coalitions will ultimately form (Hyde-Price 2007, p. 42).
Another theory for why unipolarity is only short-lived is that other great powers
might emerge as rivals. At a global level, the US became the only superpower afterthe end of the Soviet Union but now the world is moving in a multipolar direction,
giving some credence to the theory.
For the Black Sea region, unipolarity is a possibility as the region’s states are
contiguous; the fact that throughout history this region has been engulfed many
times by empires, including the Ottoman and the Russian, demonstrates the point.
Russia and Turkey are still the most powerful single states within the contiguous
region, although the EU is an important actor and the US has a powerful ‘off-shore’
interest.(2) In a bipolar global system such as the one seen during the cold war, two
superpowers balance each other out, creating a more stable situation than that under
unipolarity or multipolarity. Both powers have ‘allies’ and ‘clients’ which they
moderate (Hyde-Price 2007, p. 41). So can the Black Sea region be seen in a bipolar
context with Russia and ‘the West’ being the two balancing poles? It is certainly quite
clear that some countries in the immediate or wider region are or have been clients of
Russia (e.g. Belarus); some are or have been clients of the US (e.g. Georgia); and
some are now full members of the EU (Romania, Bulgaria). Turkey, although amember of NATO, has more recently tried to keep good relations with both Russia
and the West without fully falling into the ‘sphere of influence’ of either. Ukraine has
often been divided amongst both its politicians and citizens. With regard to the
South Caucasus countries, Vasilyan (2010) claims that Armenia is a client of Russia,
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Azerbaijan a client of Turkey and Georgia a client of the US. And now that Russia
has recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, it could be argued
that these regions are also clients of Russia.
But is the ‘West’ quite as unified as it was during the cold war? There are manydivisions within the EU, especially between those members who want to ‘bandwagon’
with the US and those who do not. NATO also has divisions amongst its (similar)
members particularly with respect to Russia and ‘Article 5’.7
(3) Balanced multipolarity is less stable and predictable than a bipolar system but is
more stable than unbalanced multipolarity because no power is strong enough to
become a regional hegemon. The emphasis within this typology is on security
maximisation as described by Waltz, rather than Mearsheimer’s power maximisation.
The largest state within the Black Sea region, Russia, could be considered to bestrong enough to be a regional hegemon, thereby ruling out the Black Sea being seen
in terms of balanced multipolarity. However, if we include the EU, and its members,
as a quasi-state, or the US as an ‘off-shore’ balancer, or the western coalition of
NATO as an actor then balanced multipolarity could be considered to be one of the
possibilities. Turkey too is becoming a stronger individual player in the region. And
although Russia acted with aggression during the Russia�Georgia war of 2008 and
there was little direct military support for Georgia from its allies, Russia is now
seemingly trying to improve its relations with the West. There are also rumours thatPresident Obama informed President Medvedev that if a second war in Georgia was
initiated then the US would become more involved (Whitmore 2009).
(4) Unbalanced multipolarity is when one power has greater power than the others
and can make a bid for hegemony. This state of affairs is ‘primed for conflict’ with
much fear and mistrust. ‘Second order’ concerns such as human rights are
overridden by national security concerns. Great powers pursue power maximisation
strategies and the possibility of war causes much fear in international politics.
We could theorise that by invading Georgia in August 2008, Russia has shownthat it is in a position to act as a hegemon. However, Russia has maintained that it
only acted defensively in Georgia (Felgenhauer 2009) and that it has otherwise
shown restraint rather than power maximisation strategies. Nevertheless, ‘unba-
lanced multipolarity’ could be regarded as another possibility for describing the
situation in the Black Sea region.
A ‘balanced’ region?
One difficulty in analysing the Black Sea region is whether or not to view the EU as a
‘quasi-state’ for the purposes of examining the balance in the region. Three of the
powerful European balancers described by Hyde-Price i.e. Germany, France and the
UK are all EU members. For this reason, and the fact that the EU has specific
policies regarding the region (the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy) as
well as members that border the sea, this analysis will regard the EU as a ‘balancer’
of the region. It should also be noted that three of the littoral states (Turkey,
Romania, Bulgaria) are members of NATO which still supports ‘Article 5’ despitemuch current debate over its new strategic concept.
So if we agree with Hyde-Price that Europe is a balanced region and that the
balancers in general are Russia, the US, Germany, UK and France (or Russia, the
US and the EU), then can we assume that the situation is the same for the Black Sea
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region? Perhaps not, given that Turkey too is an important player in this region, one
of the largest littoral states, but not yet an EU member despite being a member of
NATO. It could then be posited that there are four balancers of the region, namely
Russia and Turkey, which are the most powerful individual littoral states of the BlackSea, the EU which incorporates two littoral states (Romania and Bulgaria) and the
US, which is an ‘off-shore’ balancer.
However, the US, Turkey and most EU members are allies through NATO and
could therefore be seen as one pole against Russia’s other pole in a bipolar system
similar to that of the cold war i.e. the region could be seen as having bipolar
dynamics which are the remnants of the cold war. This viewpoint could be further
consolidated if a line of anti-ballistic missiles is established without agreement.
Nevertheless, there have been tensions between NATO allies recently, with EUmembers, the US and Turkey showing signs of splits, especially during the Russia�Georgia war when Turkey would, on occasions, be seen to be supporting Russia
rather than the US, in particular with regard to Black Sea access via Istanbul, as
previously discussed.
Aybak (2010) writes that Russia and Turkey have a growing regional inter-
dependence due to their negative experiences regarding the EU. They are becoming
closer and considering the development of their own neighbourhood. So if Turkey, a
powerful and strategic country, is balancing itself between East and West, it cannotbe regarded as ‘bandwagoning’ with either and must therefore be considered as an
individual ‘balancer’ in the region, contradicting the idea of a regional bipolar
system.
The above scenario would make it reasonable to conclude that the Black Sea
region is in a condition of ‘balanced multipolarity’ in mid 2010. Nevertheless this
balance is fragile and some Black Sea states are afraid that neither the US nor the
West would support them should Russia make a further bid for hegemony. For
example former US Ambassador to Ukraine, Steven Pifer has said that according tomany in Ukraine, ‘The EU does not know what to do with us, but Russia does’.8
The US is no longer the superpower it once was as the global situation moves
from unipolar to multipolar but Hyde-Price (2007) tells us that, as a power
maximiser, the US will remain engaged in European affairs in order to retain
influence, prevent a rival, form new allies and minimise balancing instincts. He adds
that the US will cooperate with particular allies on particular issues and that all
European allies must decide whether to ‘bandwagon’ with the US or ‘balance’
against it. Since 2007, however, the Bush administration has changed to the Obamaadministration which is not quite as focused on Europe or the Black Sea region.
There has also been a global economic crisis. So it is necessary to question if the US
will maintain its power maximisation policy for long into the future. Sammut
(2010), however, asserts that the US still has interests in the Black Sea area and
continues to balance Russian influence, especially in the military and security
sphere. This assertion can be backed up by the US missile defence scheme for the
area.
Security communities
The second theory to be used in this analysis of the Black Sea region is that of
security communities. According to the theory, a good example of a ‘security
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community’ is the EU (Deutsch et al. 1957) which consists of a community of
sovereign entities, within a particular region, that do not expect war with each
other. Whilst many might regard the EU as having begun as an economic
community, in fact the purpose of its founders, including Schuman, Monnet
and Churchill, was to prevent war happening again in Western Europe (Schuman
1950).Deutsch and his co-authors described a security community as a group of people
who believe that common social problems must and can be resolved by the process of
peaceful change using appropriate institutions. The people within the security
community develop a sense of trust and common interest which means that, in order
for such a community to arise, a ‘bottom-up’ approach is required as well as top-
down institutionalism (Buzan 1991). Constructivists Adler and Barnett (1998) added
that shared identities, values and meanings as well as direct interactions and shared
long-term interests are of importance too.
The EU’s current move towards multilateral policies in the Black Sea region
with the development of its Black Sea Synergy and Eastern Partnership policies
(European Commission 2007, 2008), rather than relying on bilateral relations via
the ENP, demonstrates a desire to build a security community rather than to further
enlarge into the region at the present time. The setting up of the Eastern
Partnership’s Civil Society Forum in addition to Black Sea Synergy sectoral
initiatives, such as transport, energy and the environment, could represent part of
the bottom-up approach referred to in the last paragraph.Cichocki (2010) writes that this regionalisation of the ENP East is ‘an upshot of
attaching greater importance than before to the geopolitical factor in security
policy’. He also believes it to be, ‘a consequence of a clear revival of political realism,
noticeable in the European, Russian and American perceptions of international
affairs’. Raszewski (2010) adds that the EU did have some hopes that its Energy
Diversification Policy could have helped to create a security community in the Black
and Caspian Sea regions, but he concludes that this has not happened in the area.
Only a ‘regional security complex’ of a different type might exist.
Constructivists Buzan and Wæver (2003, p. 4) explain that the central idea in
regional security complex theory is that, ‘since most threats travel more easily
over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally
patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes’. They add that the
combination of sovereign, territorial states becoming the principal global players in
security matters, along with the international system becoming global, leads to
‘distinct regional security subsystems’ emerging. They also say that, whilst a few
very powerful states act globally by ‘projecting their power into far-flung regions’,
the majority are more concerned with their near neighbours (Buzan and Wæver2003, p. 14). The South Caucasus is regarded as an example of a ‘mini security
complex’.
Analysing the Black Sea Region in the light of the full theory of regional security
complexes is beyond the scope of this paper. However, according to Buzan (1991) the
two extremes of security complexes are chaos (Hobbesian, enmity between all) and
security communities (Kantian, amity between all). On a continuum between these
extremes are other possibilities such as ‘security regimes’ where states are rivals but
cooperate to try to avoid war (Jervis 1982). Given that there has been a recent war in
the Black Sea region but there are elements of cooperation via organisations such as
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BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR and GUAM we could conclude that the region is currently
neither a security community nor in a condition of total chaos but is somewhere in
between these extremes.
Antonenko (2009, p. 268) writes that the progress towards regional security
cooperation in the Black Sea area has been disrupted by Russia which has seen
attempts towards this progress as a prelude to further NATO or EU enlargement.
She informs us that there is a lack of necessary drivers for creating a security
community in the region at present. However, the approach of holding regional
security discussions in the area under the auspices of a bigger international
organisation such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) could be useful. Also, ‘Given that discussions about the new European
security treaty are most likely to take place within the OSCE, this approach could
offer a building block towards developing a new regional institution in the longer
term’(2009, p. 268).Despite the Russia�Georgia war, there have been moves towards better
cooperation between the US, Russia and NATO since the election of President
Obama, with NATO Secretary General Rasmussen asserting that improved relations
with Russia are one of his top priorities (Lobjakas 2010). So a security community is
one example of ‘what could be’ in the future. The third theory of supranationality
has much overlap with security communities and will be examined in the next
section.
Supranationality and the EU model
Supranationality and post-sovereign politics
With the threatened Balkanisation of more states and regions in the world, including
those of the South Caucasus, and the ensuing rise in the number of nation states,
European politicians (e.g. Watson et al. 2007) are asking whether the sovereign state
system can continue indefinitely. They agree that ‘post-sovereign politics’ or
‘supranationality’ will be the way forward at a global level not just the EU level.
‘Post-sovereign’ does not mean that nation states no longer exist, just that part of
their sovereignty is shared or pooled to some extent with other states in a global or
regional system rather than being absolute.
Academics have discussed these ideas for decades, often related to other theories
and concepts such as ‘institutional liberalism’, ‘multi-layered governance’ or
‘effective multilateralism’. Wallace (1999b), for example, wrote about the European
state order which developed from the Westphalian system and questioned if Europe
was still an interstate order or a ‘post-sovereign regional system’. His conclusions
were that the EU was emerging into a post-sovereign regional system but one that
depended on external support from the US. He observed that the US might not be
prepared for this indefinitely unless it was on their terms but also questioned if the
EU would be willing to go along with that. He predicted that the Union could extend
stability, prosperity and mutual trust to the Eastern European applicant members of
the time but that further afield it could be more problematic with or without the
cooperation of the US. This is what we are now witnessing with regard to the
‘Eastern neighbourhood’ or the ‘Black Sea region’.
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The EU model, territorial integrity and sovereignty
The EU is a unique organisation, not a superstate like the US or a weak superpower
dominated organisation like the UN. Its structure combines intergovernmental
aspects (member states) with supranational aspects (EU Commission) and an elected
parliament, resulting in multi-layered governance. Much interest in the model has
been shown by other regions in the world including South America (MERCOSUR),
Africa (African Union) and South East Asia (ASEAN). Perhaps these regions will
eventually copy the model adopting their own rules and laws (acquis communautaire).
So could the Black Sea region develop a similar structure? And if so, might
autonomous regions such as those within the South Caucasus be less intent on
independence or, if they gained it, would the consequences be less problematic?‘Territorial integrity’ and ‘sovereignty’ are claimed by Black Sea states such as
Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan with regard to the sub-regions of Transnistria,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh that want ‘self-determination’.
The US and the EU mainly support the former ideas despite their recognition of
Kosovo. Russia also supports the ideas despite its recognition of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. So what do we mean exactly by sovereignty?
Camilleri and Falk (1992, p. 15) submit that the ‘origin and history of the concept
of sovereignty are closely related to the nature and evolution of the state, and in
particular to the development of centralised authority’. Yet regions can be
autonomous without having sovereignty and it is doubtful that any nation state
can have absolute sovereignty in present times. For example, whilst many states that
were formerly part of the USSR or the Warsaw Pact have celebrated their
sovereignty, they have also rushed to join or apply to join either the EU, NATO
or both. Also, in federal systems, autonomy can be claimed by both the central
authority and the local ones i.e. subsidiarity applies. So does this mean there is
sovereignty at both levels, at neither or that the sovereignty is shared? Wallace
(1999a, p. 503) writes, ‘No government in Europe remains sovereign in the sense
understood by the diplomats or constitutional lawyers of half a century ago’. Javier
Solana says we must think about ‘responsible sovereignty’ which has to be tackled
politically not just academically, with the EU providing a good model.9
Supranationality and regional integration
‘Balkanisation’ is a term used to describe the breakdown of a region into numerous
quasi-independent statelets. Whilst the term has been used throughout the twentieth
century, it is particularly relevant at the beginning of the twenty-first century,
especially with regard to the territory of the former single state of Yugoslavia, now
occupied by six UN recognised states as well as Kosovo, which is not recognised by
Russia or China and therefore not the UN which follows the recommendations of the
Security Council. Even amongst EU members there are dissenters (Cyprus, Greece,
Romania, Slovakia and Spain) with regard to recognition.
The self-determination and separation of Kosovo, a former autonomous region
in Serbia, has set a precedent according to the leaders of Russia and the autonomous
regions in the Black Sea area. Former President Putin stated, ‘If somebody assumes
that Kosovo can achieve full state independence, then why should we refuse it to the
Abkhaz and the South Ossetians’? (Illarionov 2009, p. 61). The nationalism that
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arose in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism led to demands for ethnic
autonomy in some regions. This is in complete contradiction to the norms of the EU,
which accepts multiculturalism and the free movement of persons as the way
forward.The South Caucasus is an example of a small region or ‘mini security complex’
which includes three states, namely Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as
three autonomous regions, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia
has recently recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as separate states whilst other
members of the UN Security Council have not. However, if the three regions
mentioned above were to be eventually recognised internationally as independent
states then there would be double the number of states in the South Caucasus region
all having international representatives. It could be argued that the more states thereare in the world, whether recognised or not, the more need there is for cooperation
and supranationality, including the appointment of regional representatives.
The EU’s ‘Eastern Partnership’ policy which covers most of the non-EU wider
Black Sea countries (apart from Turkey and Russia) was initially drafted with an
accession prospect in mind but in the final version this wording was omitted (Weaver
2010). Enlargement is still a possibility for some or all of the Black Sea countries in
the longer term, but for now ‘enlargement’ has become ‘a dirty word in the cafeteria’
according to one Commission official (personal communication, July, 2009).So without EU (or NATO) enlargement as a solution to the lack of regional
stability in the present time, and without allowing Russia to form a strong ‘sphere of
influence’, what can be done in the Black Sea region? Might regional integration of
some kind ameliorate the situation? According to Hettne and Soderbaum (1998),
‘Regional integration implies a security dimension which is quite essential to the
dynamics of the integration process. Security regionalism refers to attempts by the
states and other relevant actors in a particular geographical area [. . .] to transform a
security complex with conflict-generating interstate relations into a securitycommunity with cooperative relations’.
One example of possible regional integration with shared sovereignty in the
South Caucasus is a federal system resulting in one state. A second example is where
the various states and autonomous regions adopt their own mini ‘EU model’ system
with intergovernmental and/or supranational institutions and open borders, a more
modern and equal form of how it was in Soviet times. Neither of these options is
likely to happen in the near future given present hostilities, although Emerson and
Tocci (2000) and Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan (2008) have proposed regionalstability and cooperation pacts.
Another possible solution could be a larger region such as the wider Black Sea
area or the Eastern Partnership members adopting a supranational layer, possibly
involving BSEC and/or the proposed EU Neighbourhood East (EURONEST)
Parliamentary Assembly.
A domino effect?
So could the EU cause a domino effect where regions such as the South Caucasus or
the Black Sea share sovereignty, relax their border controls and create a situation
where territory and nationalism are less likely to cause wars? And if so, might it
eventually lead to a more democratic UN or perhaps ‘United Regions’ (Galtung
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2010) as the highest layer in a multi-layered global system? This may sound too
idealistic but the same applied to the EU itself in the early days.
Meanwhile Hyde-Price gives the realist argument that institutions are ‘fair-
weather friends’ writing that, ‘The time for liberal-idealist illusions in a Europe
‘‘whole and free’’ is past’ (2007, p. 179). Even if this is true and the Union cannot last
forever without either collapsing like an empire or evolving into a state like the US, it
has, arguably, helped to maintain ‘balanced multipolarity’ and, along with NATO,
helped to deter war amongst its members for over half a century.
Europeanisation and regionalisation
‘What is’ and ‘What could be’
This paper has so far analysed the Black Sea region in relation to three theories,
asserting that realism is in the main ‘what is’ and a security community based on
either intergovernmental or supranational institutions is ‘what could be’. However,
whilst realism might be ‘what is’, the EU also exists in one part of the Black Sea
(Romania and Bulgaria) and is also ‘what is’ even if its foreign policy aims of
establishing peace and stability in the region are not yet achieved.One difficulty in these discussions is that realists talk about ‘states’ and contrast
their theory with liberal ‘institutions’. The EU may be classified by them as an
institution or a collection of institutions yet the EU is more than an institution whilst
being less than (or beyond) a state. As previously discussed, realism says that in times
of crisis, institutions do not hold up (and the EU is certainly being tested at this
moment in time partly due to financial crises). Liberalism is more inclined to be
optimistic and to view genuinely democratic and cooperative global institutions as
the way forward if the world is to avoid destruction through wars or climate change
catastrophe. Indeed, liberals and constructivists are more likely to think beyond the
state (Moravscik 1997).
Realists say that institutions are dominated by the most powerful states which
can be quick to abandon them when they are no longer of use, with Mearsheimer
(1994, p. 14) writing that institutions are essentially ‘arenas for acting out power
relationships’. He cites NATO as an example of US domination. Liberals state that
institutions ‘mitigate fear of cheating and so allow cooperation to emerge, so they
can alleviate fears of unequal gains from cooperation’ (Keohane and Martin 1995,
p. 45). Constructivists say that international relations are socially constructed on the
basis of shared ideas, norms and values. Institutions can be upholders of these ideas,
norms and values as well as agents of change (Haas and Haas 2002).
Hyde-Price (2007, p. 26) suggests that liberalism is good at domestic level but that
the international level is anarchic. However, it could be posited that more powerful
institutions could work towards making the world pseudo-domestic by using the EU
model. In many ways EU members regard other members as domestic rather than as
rival states which might need to be secured against (Buzan and Wæver 2003).
Nevertheless it is necessary to agree that, at the beginning of the twenty-first century,
the EU model is not always strong and its states have been inclined to act unilaterally
when dealing with foreign policy and security matters. Romania and Bulgaria are
good examples, as previously mentioned. Nevertheless the Lisbon Treaty was ratified
and the EAS is being put into place.
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Realists might also say that liberalism misunderstands the nature of power and
that liberals have normative political agendas, confusing ‘what is’ with ‘what ought
to be’ (Hyde-Price 2007, p. 16). But surely it is possible to distinguish between ‘what
is’ and ‘what could be’, admitting that both types of thinking are necessary in today’sEurope.
Regional cooperation
EU policies are not currently focused on Europeanisation by expanding the Union
into the Black Sea and South Caucasus regions, despite enlargement being viewed as
a solution to the problems of the former Yugoslavia. Instead the policies are
becoming more multilateral via Black Sea Synergy and the multilateral aspects of the
Eastern Partnership. Nevertheless, Turkey is still an EU candidate despite its moving
closer to Russia; Moldova under its coalition government is keen to join the EU; and
there are mixed views in Ukraine, the government of which is no longer pro-NATO
membership but is enthusiastic about its EU Association Agreement.Of course, the Union is not the only institution involved in trying to create a
cooperative region. There have been various attempts, most notably by the BSEC
organisation. However, according to Hajizada (2010), despite all states in the region
being members of BSEC, they are not truly interested in creating a cooperative
region. This is partly due to the many antagonisms between the various members, for
example Armenia and Azerbaijan, or Turkey and Greece, or Russia and Georgia.
Energy and pipelines have also been divisive factors in the wider region, with
Marshall and Rofe (2009) outlining how within the ‘energy game’, Eastern Europehas become a ‘grand chessboard’, with an accompanying race by both the US and
Russia to gather ‘allies and clients’.
It would seem that the Black Sea region is far from becoming a cooperative
security community based on the EU model. Nevertheless, Aybak (2010) comments
that BSEC was a remarkable post-Cold War achievement, with former Soviet
countries having an equal footing with Russia. He also tells us though that Russian
perceptions have been that BSEC is Turkey’s bid for hegemony in the region. Other
BSEC members have described Russia as dominating or disrupting the organisation,with Hajizada (2010) writing that, ‘Some attempts by various BSEC members to take
into account even the possibility of soft-security cooperation by BSEC member
states has been constantly contested by some delegations (e.g. the representatives of
the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation) that constitute a minority of
all parties’.
Nevertheless, since Ukraine’s 2010 presidential elections, Russia and Ukraine
have made an agreement to ‘enhance the effectiveness’ of BSEC, as well as continuing
cooperation between their navies and the naval forces of other Black Sea statesthrough BLACKSEAFOR which has, as members, all littoral states.10 Unfortunately,
though, Russia has refused to take part in naval exercises involving Georgia so the
latter does not participate.11
The way forward
So, according to our initial study of structural realism what conditions must exist
amongst states in order for a cooperative region to develop? Hyde-Price says the
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situation existing in Europe during the development of the EU (post-cold war) has
been ‘balanced multipolarity’, so perhaps we could extrapolate that this is the best
condition required for other regions too. Earlier it was argued that ‘balanced
multipolarity’ is the current condition in the Black Sea region, despite the fragility ofits situation. Russia has been an outsider ‘great power’ and the behaviour of a great
power when faced with a potential hegemon (the West) can be defensive aggression.
It can also be balancing, buck-passing, or bandwagoning. Since the 2008 war, Russia
has been less defensive and could be becoming less of an outsider. Discussions on the
possibility of Russia working more closely with NATO and the EU on President
Medvedev’s ‘Vancouver to Vladivostok’ security proposals demonstrate how Russia
is now, at least, considering the bandwagoning possibility. Also, Turkey and Russia
seem to be balancing the West’s ‘encroachment’ onto former Soviet territory withoutnecessarily bandwagoning with each other.
The behaviour of smaller states can also be of importance. Their additional
behaviour options within the theory of structural realism can be ‘hiding’ and
‘transcendence’. The former means that states may assume a low profile or neutrality
whilst the latter means that there is an attempt to ‘surmount international anarchy
and go beyond the limits of conflictual politics’ (Schroeder 1995, p. 430). Vasilyan
(2010) tells us though that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia think in a realist
fashion with regard to their foreign policy and that their ability to ‘transcend’ theirthinking beyond survival and relative power maximisation to EU-type positive peace
is not possible at the moment. So, although the conditions for regional development
are there, the will must be found amongst all the states to work towards greater
cooperation
Finally, even if EU membership is what some countries in the region are working
towards in the longer term, perhaps improved regional cooperation could be at least
one step forward. The enlargement and neighbourhood commissioner Stefan Fule
has said that after the experiences of accepting countries into the Union that werenot fully ready, especially Bulgaria and Romania, future candidates must be one
hundred per cent ready (Jovanovska et al. 2010). Creating a Black Sea regional
security community would not exclude members from joining the EU and indeed,
according to Fule, countries need to make greater use of regional cooperation in
order to become closer to the EU whose ultimate goal is to make borders ‘less
relevant’ (Pop 2010).
Summary
This paper has examined structural realism’s theories of polarity and balancing then
proceeded to apply them to the wider Black Sea region. The conclusion is that the
version of polarity most appropriate for the region in the year 2010 is a fragile but
balanced multipolarity. This is arguably the most likely type of polarity for a
cooperative region to begin to develop, yet the situation in the Black Sea region is
complex.
The theory of security communities tells us that in order to create a cooperativeregion we need a bottom-up approach (with the help of civil society) as well as top-
down institutionalism.
The more general question of, ‘Are we in the process of changing from a state
dominated, realist, anarchic world to one where effective supranational regional and
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global organisations take precedence’? has also been asked. Realists might say that
this is ultimately not possible but perhaps regional and supranational institutions can
endure for many decades at least if the conditions are right.
In the Black Sea region, in mid 2010, realism and pragmatism are ‘what is’ yet
there are theories and policies that point towards ‘what could be’. A security
community is a possibility for the longer term if the condition of ‘balanced
multipolarity’ remains and there is enough desire for peace and stability amongst the
Black Sea nations.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Rick Whitaker and Rizwana Abbasi, University of Leicester, for readingearlier drafts of this paper.
Notes
1. For a fuller report on regional organisations see P. Manoli, Reinvigorating Black SeaCooperation: a policy discussion. Commission on the Black Sea, 2010.
2. J. Benitez, 27 May 2010. http://www.acus.org/natosource/ukraine-drops-nato-member-ship-aim
3. RIA Novosti, March 2010. http://en.rian.ru/world/20100302/158069130.html4. RIA Novosti, March 2010. http://en.rian.ru/exsoviet/20100301/158051301.html5. A. Rettman, EUobserver, 7 June 2010. http://euobserver.com/24/302236. Russia Today, 2 June 2010. http://rt.com/Politics/2010-02-16/transdniester-iskander-missile-
abm.html7. Article 5 states that an attack against one member of NATO is effectively an attack against
them all, so collective defence must apply. If Georgia had been a full member of NATO in2008 then NATO would have been at war with Russia.
8. ‘Ukraine in Crisis’, conference 29 July 2009, Center for American Progress, WashingtonDC (personally attended). Available from: http://www.americanprogress.org/events/2009/07/Ukraine.html
9. Lecture. ‘Europe as a Global Actor? A Conversation with Javier Solana’ London Schoolof Economics, 18 March 2010.
10. Kyiv Post, 17 May 2010. Yanukovych, Medvedev sign joint statement on security in BlackSea region. [Accessed 6 June 2010.] Available at: http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/66938/#ixzz0r5xd76fi
11. RIA Novosti, 8 April 2010. ‘Russian warship en route to Blackseafor naval drills’ http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100408/158487103.html
Notes on contributor
Carol Weaver is a part-time lecturer and researcher in the Department of Politics andInternational Relations at the University of Leicester. She is co-editor and co-author of theforthcoming book The Black Sea and EU policy: the challenge of divergent agendas (AshgatePublishing).
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