biderkrantz, different groups, different strategies

ISSN 0080–6757© 2008 The Author(s)

Journal compilation © 2008 Nordic Political Science Association

Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008

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Blackwell Publishing LtdOxford, UKSCPSScandinavian Political Studies0080-67570080-6757© 2008 Nordic Political Science AssociationXXX Original ArticlesXXAUTHORS RUNNING HEAD: XX

Different Groups, Different Strategies: How Interest Groups Pursue Their Political Ambitions

Anne Binderkrantz*

The article compares the political activities of different types of interest groups. Drawing ondata from a survey of all Danish national interest groups, it demonstrates significant variationin the strategic choices of different types of groups. Groups with corporative resources directmuch attention towards influencing the bureaucracy. They possess resources valued by officialsand therefore have good options for utilizing a strategy targeting the administration and seekingcorporatist integration. By contrast, public interest groups are more likely to use publicly visiblestrategies in which affecting the media agenda plays a central role. By engaging in such strategies,public interest groups can demonstrate a high level of engagement to their diffuse membership.Furthermore, the goals of public interest groups are typically conducive to pursuit throughpublic strategies. A third category of other groups is incorporated in the analyses as a point ofreference to establish patterns of strategy use. While there are clear differences between groupswith regard to most strategies of influence, different types of groups are equally engaged in aparliamentary strategy. Interacting with Parliament seems to be important for groups integratedin corporatist structures as well as for those relying more on public strategies.

Introduction

All democracies witness political activities by a true plethora of interestgroups. Groups lobby politicians, they interact with the bureaucracy andthey seek to affect public opinion through media campaigns and membershipmobilizations. However, different groups do not necessarily have the sameopportunities to actually be heard. Even though an impressively wide rangeof causes and concerns are promoted, only some of these efforts lead topolicy changes. The question of which groups are most capable of advancingtheir causes is fundamental to understanding the functioning of democracy.In this light, it is no surprise that it has been on the agenda of political sciencefor more than a century (Baumgartner & Leech 1998).

* Anne Binderkrantz, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Bartholins Allé331, 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark. E-mail: [email protected]

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The literature has provided a variety of answers. Upon observing thediversity of groups active in American politics, early pluralists concludedthat all groups have opportunities to promote their causes. Perhaps groupswere not exactly equal in these attempts, but resources and power weresufficiently dispersed to merit a positive evaluation of the interest groupsystem (Bentley 1949 [1908]; Dahl 1961; Truman 1951). Later Americanresearch modified this picture. Empirical studies found some types of groupsto be much more active than others, and access to the political systemwas described as structured and resource-dependent (McConnell 1966;Schattschneider 1960).

In the European literature, the focus on the privileging of certain groupsbecame even more pronounced (Schmitter 1974). Scandinavians found aparticularly important source of inspiration in Stein Rokkan’s distinctionbetween a numerical and a corporative channel. Rokkan emphasized theimportance of the corporatist channel, where interest groups negotiate withthe state (Rokkan 1966, 166). The first wave of corporatist-inspired researchin Scandinavia documented a widespread integration of interest groups inpublic decision making and scholars focused on establishing which groupswere prominent participants in corporatist structures. Later research,however, has been more concerned with the possible decline of corporatism. Inthe last decades, corporatist structures have been rupturing (Blom-Hansen2000). At the same time, other channels of influence have become moreimportant. Lobbying Parliament has gained in prominence (Binderkrantz2003), and interest groups direct much attention towards influencing themedia – a third channel only mentioned in passing by Rokkan (1966, 109).These developments have led scholars to characterize the political processin Scandinavian countries as increasingly pluralistic (Blom-Hansen 2000;Christiansen & Rommetvedt 1999; Hermansson et al. 1999).

This situation suggests a new angle on the question of which types ofinterests are represented in the political system – an angle consistent withRokkan’s original distinction between different channels. Rather than askingwhich groups are integrated through corporatist structures, it is relevant toask whether different types of groups utilize different channels of influence.In other words, are the same groups predominant in the corporative channel,the numerical channel and the media channel, or do different channelspresent different kinds of groups with opportunities to make their voiceheard?

The research in this article contributes to answering this question. Thearticle distinguishes between four different strategies of influence. Two ofthese strategies consist of directly approaching decision makers in thebureaucracy and in Parliament, respectively. The two other strategiesrepresent more indirect means of seeking influence by getting the attentionof the media, or by mobilizing group members and supporters. It is argued


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that different types of groups exhibit different patterns of strategy use. Somegroups – primarily those related to the private or public labor market –possess resources that are central to the corporatist strategy of targeting thebureaucracy. Other groups are more inclined to use indirect strategiesbecause they appeal to the public interest and therefore prefer publiclyvisible strategies. These hypotheses are investigated based on a survey of allnational Danish interest groups. The findings suggest that the existence ofdifferent channels of influence entails options for different types of groups tohave their voices heard.

Why Different Strategies Appeal to Different Types of Groups

Different Strategies of Influence: A Framework

Prior to discussing possible variations between types of groups in the use ofstrategies, it is necessary to outline a general framework of strategies thatinterest groups might turn to in their attempts to influence politics. Asmentioned above, Stein Rokkan in 1966 called attention to the existence ofa corporatist channel alongside the numerical or parliamentary channel.According to Rokkan, in the numerical channel, votes count in the choice ofgoverning personnel, while resources count in the corporatist channel, andthus in the actual policies pursued by authorities. Even though Rokkan isfamous for this two-tier distinction, he explicitly acknowledged the potentialimportance of a third channel: the mass media (Rokkan 1966, 106–7). Froman interest group perspective, this opens up three potential strategies ofinfluence: one of targeting bureaucrats and ultimately seeking corporatistintegration, one of lobbying politicians and parties and one of influencing themedia. Rokkan’s main errand was to emphasize the importance of thecorporatist channel, but the framework is well-suited to an open-endedinvestigation of variation between groups in the use of these channels.

While Scandinavians customarily employ Rokkan’s vocabulary, otherstrands of the interest group literature distinguish between an insiderstrategy of close consultation with political and administrative actors and anoutsider strategy based on public appeals through the media and mobilizationof group members and citizens (Gais & Walker 1991, 103; Jordan & Maloney1997, 181; Kollman 1998, 23). The insider strategy partly resembles thecorporative channel, but also incorporates elements of a strategy directedtowards parliamentary actors. The terms ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ reflecta tendency to equate status as insider or outsider with the use of differentstrategies (Maloney et al. 1994, 181). However, it is preferable to distinguish

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between group activities and group status as the latter is largely ascribed tointerest groups by decision makers.

The research reported in this article builds on a fourfold typology of interestgroup strategies inspired by Rokkan’s work as well as by the literature oninsider versus outsider strategies. A main distinction is made between

directstrategies

, where groups approach public decision makers, and

indirect strat-egies

, where influence on policy is sought in less direct ways. In addition totwo direct strategies of targeting either administrative or parliamentaryactors, the framework includes two indirect strategies: a media strategy,where group efforts are directed towards the media, and a mobilizationstrategy, where members or citizens are mobilized. These four influencestrategies are overall approaches that groups might follow in their pursuit ofpolitical goals. Empirically, strategies can be observed as combinations ofspecific activities or tactics (Berry 1977, 212; Grant 2000a, 410).

Focusing on strategies of influence, this research departs somewhat fromearlier Scandinavian interest group studies. Previous research has most oftenused the interaction between groups and public decision makers – primarily inthe corporative channel – as the analytical point of departure (Blom-Hansen2001). In contrast, the focus on interest group strategies places interestgroups and their strategies at center stage. Even though the analytical pointof departure differs from earlier Scandinavian research, it should be clearfrom the discussion that the research questions are in continuation of theresearch tradition inspired by Rokkan’s seminal work. It is worth notingthat the focus on group strategies does not imply that interest groups areunconstrained in their strategic choices. Groups have some degrees offreedom, but their use of different strategies of influence is constrained byinternal as well as external factors (Jordan & Maloney 1997, 184; Smith 1990,319–20). Notably, access to the corporative channel depends on whethergroups are privileged by decision makers.

The choice of analytical focus has three advantages: First, it avoids makingprior assumptions as to which channels of influence are most important. Thisis particularly important in a context where corporatism has been rupturingand other means of influence on the rise. Second, it enables an investigationof variation between groups in strategic choices. Such an investigation is themain focus of this article. Third, the differentiation between status and strategymakes it possible to distinguish between privileges conferred on groups bydecision makers and group actions.

Different Groups, Different Strategies?

The universe of interest groups includes representatives of almost everyconceivable group of people or viewpoint. Trade unions organize employeesin various sectors, business groups organize companies and other groups


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organize people based on shared characteristics such as being elderly, disabled,student or user of welfare benefits. On top of this, a wide range of groupsdraw members based not on any objective characteristic, but on sharedattitudes. These public interest groups work to further all sorts of concerns,ranging from broad policy agendas to narrow single issues. Categorizingthis broad spectrum of groups into theoretically interesting categories iscomplicated. Nevertheless, this section seeks to order the diverse universe ofgroups into subcategories by pointing to two main features that can beexpected to affect the use of different influence strategies.

First of all, however, it is necessary to define the concept of interest groupsand to distinguish interest groups from other types of political actors. Interestgroups are defined as membership organizations working to obtain politicalinfluence. Group members can be individuals, firms, governmental institutionsor even other interest groups.

1

Interest groups are distinguished frompolitical parties by not running for office in general elections – althoughsome groups have indeed crossed the line and run for election. Limiting thestudy to membership groups is in accordance with the tradition in theScandinavian literature, where for example, individual business firmsseeking political influence are treated separately from interest groups(Christiansen & Nørgaard 2003a; Hermansson et al. 1999). It also follows thesuggestion by the British political scientist Grant Jordan and his collaboratorsto distinguish between interest groups defined as membership organizationsand other actors seeking political influence (Jordan et al. 2004, 205–6).

Having provided a definition of interest groups, it is now time to definesubcategories. In order to explain variation in strategic choices it is fruitfulto differentiate between: groups with corporative resources, public interestgroups, and other groups. Interest groups with corporative resources can beexpected to rely heavily on a strategy of targeting bureaucrats, while publicinterest groups are likely to place emphasis on the publicly visible indirectstrategies. With regard to the parliamentary strategy, it is less clear from theliterature what to expect. The literature also has less to say about the categoryof other groups. However, in the empirical analysis these groups can be usedas a reference for establishing whether the two other types of groups exhibitthe expected patterns of strategy use. The remainder of this section discussesthe definitions of group types as well as the expected relations betweengroup type and use of strategies of influence.

Corporative Resources: Controlling the Economy and the Public Production

The corporatist literature provides the backbone of the argument that someinterest groups possess certain resources that enable them to be particularlyactive towards the bureaucracy. According to corporatist authors, the most

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significant trait in interest group influence is the privileged, institutionalizedintegration of some groups into public decision making. Privileged integra-tion of groups structures their possibilities of action, as they have excellentoptions for engaging in a continuous and intensive use of the administrativestrategy (Christiansen et al. 2004, 298; Feltenius 2004, 30; Smith 1993, 72).Such integration reflects an exchange of resources between interest groupsand state actors. Interest groups want political influence, while bureaucrats– and the politicians who ultimately control the bureaucracy – have an interestin building a relationship to groups who control valuable resources (Blom-Hansen & Daugbjerg 1999, 14).

The idea that group resources are central to corporatism can be found inthe writings of many corporatist authors. For example, Stein Rokkan (1966,106) argues that ‘what really counts [in the corporative channel] is the capacityto hurt or to halt a system of highly interdependent activities’. Although moregeneral resources such as finances or staff might also be relevant – and willbe controlled for in the empirical analysis – the resources discussed in this liter-ature are directly related to the type of interest group. In particular, the partiesin the labor market have consistently been stressed as being the quintes-sential participants in corporatism. Business groups represent the firms thatcontrol societal production, whereas trade unions have the power to paralyzesociety through strikes. Incorporating these groups in policy making can alsolegitimize public policy in the eyes of group members, and hence groups canbe instrumental in implementing policy (Blom-Hansen & Daugbjerg 1999,11–2; Gullberg & Helland 2003, 25–6; Rokkan 1966, 106–7; 1975, 220).

The possession of corporative resources is not limited to the private sector.Groups organizing public sector personnel or organizations have equallygood opportunities to attain privileged integration (Christiansen &Rommetvedt 1999, 198). The literature talks of ‘public sector corporatism’,implying that groups representing public employees are intensely involved indecision making and implementation within the public sector (Christensen1997, 393–5; Christiansen & Nørgaard 2003b, 74; Jensen 2004). Furthermore,associations of public sector institutions such as schools or museums as wellas associations of local public authorities are likely to be privileged (Johansen& Kristensen 1982, 200–1). These groups represent members who controllarge parts of the production in the public sector and therefore have resourcesthat are highly relevant when seeking integration into corporatist structures.

To sum up, corporative resources consist in the ability to affect theeconomy as well as the production of public service. Interest groups possessthese resources because they represent particular groups in the private orpublic sector. Groups with such resources are more likely to obtain a privilegedposition in corporatist structures and can therefore be expected to rely moreon the administrative strategy than other groups. Specifically, this means thatbusiness groups, trade unions and associations of public sector institutions


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and authorities are expected to utilize this strategy particularly intensively.In other words, a proposition can be formulated as:

Interest groups with corporative resources will use the administrative strategy more thanother groups.

Working for the Public Interest: Demonstrating Activity through Visible Strategies

The literature often singles out a group of cause or public interest groups.According to Jeffrey M. Berry (1977, 7), such groups seek collective goods‘the achievement of which will not selectively and materially benefit themembership or activists of the organization’. Examples of public interestgroups are environmental or humanitarian groups. Public interest groups can beexpected to be more engaged in the two indirect strategies than other groups.

The argument that public interest groups are more likely to pursueindirect strategies is based largely on the British and American literature.Here indirect strategies are seen as more than a fallback option for groupsthat are excluded from privileged access to decision-making processes.Rather, indirect strategies are considered an active choice by groups who seean advantage in directing their efforts towards public arenas. Specifically, itis argued that public interest groups will exhibit a high level of engagementin indirect strategies. Three separate arguments support this proposition.

First, the goals of public interest groups are well suited to being pursuedthrough indirect strategies. Public interest groups are characterized byprecisely the furtherance of public interests rather than the interests ofparticular groups. It is therefore natural to appeal to the population at large.Whereas the public might be sceptical towards groups who advance specialinterests, groups working for different versions of the public interestare more likely to be seen in a positive light (Grant 2000b, 126; Jordan &Richardson 1987, 26; Kollman 1998, 51).

Second, many public interest groups can be described as ideologicaloutsiders (Grant 2000a). Such groups prefer to distance themselves fromauthorities in order to retain an uncompromised ideological stance(Rommetvedt & Opedal 1995, 284). Members of such groups might also seecooperation with officials as illegitimate and prefer the group to stick toappealing to the public opinion rather than to flock the halls of power(Christiansen 1999, 154; Jordan & Maloney 1997, 181–3; Lipsky 1968, 1149;Rommetvedt 2000, 120).

The third line of argument centers on the need to recruit and maintain amembership. This is an important priority for all groups (Maloney et al.1994, 34; Wilson 1973, 8–9). However, this priority has different consequencesfor different types of groups. Potential members of interest groups establishedfor the purpose of obtaining benefits for specific groups typically find

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themselves in a common situation, which is decisive for their opportunity tobenefit if the group reaches its goals. They are therefore relatively easy toidentify in organizational locations such as workplaces. Furthermore, interestgroups that recruit their members among particular groups of people will oftenbe in a monopoly situation when it comes to supplying their members withcertain goods (Dunleavy 1991, 20–2, 54–5, 63–8; Gais & Walker 1991, 120).

Public interest groups find themselves in a different situation. Thesegroups appeal to everybody who supports group goals rather than to specificgroups (Berry 1977, 7). Their members share opinions rather than socialcharacteristics that make them easily identifiable. In order to communicatewith members and potential members, groups therefore have to adopt broadstrategies of communication. They tend to choose strategies suited to capturingthe attention of their diffuse membership and to reinforce the loyalty ofgroup members (Beyers 2004, 216–7; Dunleavy 1991, 54–5, 63–8; Gais &Walker 1991, 105–6). Furthermore, public interest groups will often experiencefierce competition from other groups in their efforts to recruit members.This underlines the need to demonstrate publicly that the group is active inpursuing group goals (Dunleavy 1991, 54–5). The last point about degree ofcompetition for members is not a characteristic of the group per se, but aproposition that can be tested empirically. In order to test whether competitionfor members is in fact harsher among public interest groups, a measure ofmembership competition is therefore included in the analyses.

The above discussion has focused on what might be termed ‘pull’ effects.The administrative strategy was argued to be particularly well suited forgroups with corporative resources, and the parliamentary as well as the indirectstrategies as being similarly attractive to public interest groups. However,strategy use might also be explained by ‘push’ effects. Some groups may beforced to pursue second-best strategies because access to their most preferredarena is barred. Notably, groups who are denied access to corporatistinstitutions might use indirect strategies as a fallback option. Previousanalyses, however, have illustrated that in general, different strategies can beseen as active choices rather than as fallback options for groups excludedfrom participation in corporative institutions (Binderkrantz 2005a). Never-theless, the question of the balance between push and pull effects, in generalas well as in specific situations, is an interesting challenge for future morequalitatively oriented research. For now a proposition can be formulated as:

Public interest groups will use indirect strategies more than other groups.

Appealing to Parliament: A Neo-pluralist or Segmented Parliament?

When it comes to the parliamentary strategy, the literature provides less clearguidance on what differences to expect across type of interest group. Rokkanargued that different resources were required to make a strong presence


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in the numerical and corporatist channel. While corporative resources wereimportant in interactions with administrative actors, influence in thenumerical channel – although generally deemed rather insignificant – wasrelated to the ability to affect the electoral fate of parties (Rokkan 1975, 221).

In a more recent contribution, the Norwegian political scientist HilmarRommetvedt places Parliament at center stage in the alleged ‘neo-pluralist’Norwegian political system. Actors who want influence in such systems needto appeal to the common good rather than appear as special interests(Rommetvedt 2002, 40). While it is valid to refer to special interests incorporative relations, interest groups who want parliamentary influence thushave to appeal to broader causes. Public interest groups do not work for thebenefit of particular groups and routinely frame their concerns in terms ofthe public interest. Following this reasoning, they can therefore be expectedto utilize the parliamentary strategy more than other interest groups(Binderkrantz 2005b, 81–3).

The argument rests, however, on whether Parliament does in fact functionaccording to a neo-pluralist logic. A potentially countervailing tendency isfound in the segmentation or specialization of Parliament. In a segmentedParliament, groups representing ‘special interests’ rather than broadconcerns might find it easier to interact with politicians specializing inspecific policy areas as well. The use of the parliamentary strategy cantherefore be expected to be contingent on the degree to which a specificParliament functions in a segmented or neo-pluralist way. With regard tothis, the existing evidence on the Danish Parliament is mixed (Damgaard2003; Jensen 2002). In light thereof, no specific hypothesis about differencesin the use of the parliamentary strategy will be formulated. Rather thequestion will be left open for the empirical analysis to investigate.

Summing up: Categorizing Interest Groups

The preceding discussion has pointed to two important distinctions betweentypes of interest groups: whether groups possess corporative resources, andwhether groups are public interest groups. It is important to note that thereis no overlap between the category of groups with corporative resources andthat of public interest groups. Interest groups have corporative resourcesbecause they represent particular groups in the private or public sector. Theywork specifically to obtain benefits for the groups they represent. By necessity,groups with corporative resources therefore cannot be public interestgroups. Table 1 presents the three types of groups that can be distinguishedbased on the two overall distinctions: groups with corporative resources,public interest groups, and other groups. Groups in the latter category arecharacterized, first, by organizing specific groups who stand to benefit if groupgoals are attained, and second, by not possessing corporative resources.

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As can be seen from the table a direct comparison of groups with corpo-rative resources and public interest groups is not suited to investigating boththe effect of possessing corporative resources and that of pursuing publicinterests. Public interest groups and groups with corporative resources differin both respects that might influence their use of strategies. As demonstratedin Table 1, it is, however, possible to test both hypotheses by comparinggroups with corporative resources as well as public interest groups with thetable’s category of other groups. The inclusion of ‘other groups’ in the empiricalanalyses is therefore paramount in order to investigate the two hypothesesadvanced above.

Classifying groups into three overall categories is not without problems.First, all groups included in the category of groups with corporativeresources do not have the same capacity to affect the economy or theproduction of public service. However, conceptualizing corporativeresources as an effect of representing particular groups in the economy orthe public sector is consistent with the literature. Second, determining whichgroups are public interest groups is not always straightforward as somegroups make broad membership appeals even though they mainly work tothe benefit of more specific groups. For example, some patients’ groups seeksupport from the general population even though they work primarily to theadvantage of people with specific diseases.

Short of an in-depth study of the involved groups it is, however, notpossible to make a more fine-tuned classification of groups. The result is aconservative test of the hypotheses. If a categorization of interest groupsinto three broad categories can confirm that groups differ in their use ofstrategies of influence, this may be regarded as strong evidence thatgroup type matters. Nevertheless, further empirical studies based on lesscrude distinctions can provide us with important insights into the relationbetween type of group and strategic choices.

Research Design

The analysis draws on a survey of all national Danish interest groups.

2

Allgroups that might possibly be classified as interest groups were contacted.

Table 1. Categories of Groups

Public interest

Yes No

Corporative resources Yes Not applicable Groups with corporative resourcesNo Public interest groups Other groups


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The questionnaire opened with a series of questions asking groups whetherthey worked to influence various aspects of politics. Those who reported nopolitical ambitions were excluded from the survey. A total of 2,465 groupswere contacted, 70 percent of whom responded. Of the responding groups,493 indicated that they did not seek any form of political influence. Thisleaves 1,229 completed questionnaires from groups working to influencepublic policy (see also Binderkrantz 2005a). Interest groups were dividedinto subgroups based on information about group names and types of members.

As discussed above, corporative resources are defined as an effect ofgroup type. The category of groups with corporative resources thusencompasses trade unions, business groups and groups of institutions andlocal authorities. The public interest group category consists of environmentalgroups, humanitarian groups, groups working with social issues and otherpublic interest groups. In order to validate the distinction between publicinterest groups and other groups, the respondents were asked whether it wasmost accurate to say that the group appealed to everybody supporting groupgoals or only to a specific group. The large majority of groups categorized aspublic interest groups agreed that their group appealed to everybody whosupported group goals.

The remaining groups were divided into associations of patients,professional/scientific societies, hobby groups, religious groups, and finally, aresidual category encompassing, among others, groups representing specificdemographic groups such as the elderly. Categorizing these as ‘other groups’is somewhat problematic. The difficulty of making a clear-cut distinctionbetween public interest groups and ‘other groups’ has already been discussed.More particular problems arise with regard to hobby groups and religiousgroups as they exhibit characteristics that complicate their categorization.On the one hand, these groups do not represent particular social or demo-graphic groups. On the other, however, their political work typically centerson organizational matters that benefit group members. Furthermore, there isnot much agreement among these groups as to whether they are mostaccurately described as appealing to specific groups or to everyone in supportof group goals (Binderkrantz 2005b, 119). As a consequence of this ambiguity,hobby groups and religious groups were excluded from analysis. Thisenables a better test of the hypotheses about variation in the use of differentstrategies of influence. After removing these groups, the total number ofgroups is 1,081. Table A1 in the Appendix reports the distribution of groupsin different subcategories.

Turning now to the dependent variables – strategies of influence – measuresof these are based on questions asking how often during the last year thegroup used a wide range of methods to gain political influence. Whenanswering this series of questions, respondents were asked to bear in mindthe situation in the policy area in which they were most active. This avoids

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asking groups to aggregate their strategic choices across different policyareas. Each method was weighted (multiplied) by the degree of importanceascribed to the activity by the group. This is essential because some often-used activities might be less important in the group’s political work thanother activities used only on rare occasions. For each strategy, the respondentsreceived their average score on all weighted activities related to the strategyin question. Measures were recoded to range from 0 to 100. Appendix Breports the specific questions used to construct these as well as other variables.

3

An index was constructed to tap the level of membership competitionexperienced by groups. They were asked, for example, how many of thepresent members joined within the last year. The analyses also includeseveral control variables that have been found to affect the pursuance ofinfluence strategies (Binderkrantz 2005a, 2005b). These include a number ofgroup characteristics such as the number of political employees workingfor the group, whether the group has individuals as members, how muchinfluence members are accorded, and the scope of policy areas in which thegroup is actively working. Furthermore, some variables related to the policyarea in question are included. First, an index is constructed to tap thepoliticization of the policy area. Second, the policy areas that the groupreports to be most actively engaged in were divided into those related to generalregulation, specific regulation and public production, respectively. Dummyvariables for the latter two types of policy areas are included in the analyses.

Investigating Variation in Strategic Choices: Empirical Analysis

After outlining the research design, it is time to venture into the empiricalinvestigation of the use of different strategies of influence. This sectionbegins by examining whether similar shares of different types of groupsreport using different tactics and strategies. It continues with an investigationof the extent to which groups combine high levels of engagement in differentstrategies. Finally, multivariate analyses test whether the effect of group typeholds when other factors are controlled for.

Variation in Use of Different Tactics and Strategies

Table 2 shows the frequency with which different tactics are used by differentgroup types. It reports the percentage of each type of group using the tactic‘often’ or ‘very often’. The overall pattern is one of clear differences betweengroup types. In accordance with theoretical expectations, the four tacticsassociated with the administrative strategy are most commonly used bygroups with corporative resources. For example, a larger share of these

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he Author(s)

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olitical Science Association

Table 2. The Use of Different Tactics: Percentage Using Tactics ‘Often’ or ‘Very Often’

Groups with corporative resources

Public interest groups Other groups

All interest groups

Administrative strategy

Contacting the minister

30.3

26.4 19.1 26.2Contacting national public servants

50.6

38.7 24.1 40.5Responding to requests for comments

54.6

23.3 33.4 42.9Actively using public committees and other bodies

44.2

24.0 29.1 36.2

Parliamentary strategy

Contacting parliamentary committees

23.6

22.7 15.8 21.1Contacting party spokespersons 24.3

26.9

15.9 22.2Contacting other members of parliament 12.9

18.9

10.2 13.1Contacting party organizations 6.3

11.6

3.5 6.4

Media strategy

Paid advertisements in newspapers, etc. 5.2 10.9

6.0 6.4Writing letters to the editor and columns 28.1 46.6 21.1 29.1Issuing press releases and holding press conferences 29.7

42.2 18.9 28.5Contacting reporters 38.5

50.3

24.9 36.3Publishing analyses and research reports

19.1

13.4 11.7 15.9

Mobilization strategy

Strikes, civil disobedience and illegal direct action 0.2

3.4

0.6 0.9Legal direct action, public demonstrations and happenings 0.9

12.6

2.5 3.4Encouraging members and others to write letters to the editor 9.9

31.0

15.6 15.2Encouraging members and others to contact decision makers 25.6

27.0

24.8 25.6Conducting petitions 0.7

7.5

2.2 2.3Arranging debate meetings and conferences 40.6 49.1

49.7

44.9

Note

: The table reports answers to the question: ‘How often during the last year has the group engaged in these activities?’ Groups were asked tobear in mind the situation in the policy area in which it was most active. Groups had the option of answering: “never”, “occasionally”, “often” or“very often”. The numbers in bold indicate the type of group using the tactics most frequently. N = 1,021–1,038.

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groups has frequent contacts to public servants. These findings supportthe expectation that trade unions, business groups and associations ofinstitutions and authorities are better able to attain a central role in corporatiststructures and therefore have better options for using the administrativestrategy.

Turning to the three other strategies, the pattern is remarkably different.Public interest groups score highest on 12 out of the 15 different tacticslisted. There are two exceptions to this pattern. Groups with corporativeresources report to contact parliamentary committees as well as publishinganalyses and research reports more often than public interest groups. Thecategory of ‘other groups’ have the highest use of only one tactic: arrangingdebate meetings and conferences. Regardless of these exceptions, the analysisprovides ample support for the expectation that groups with corporativeresources direct much attention towards influencing the administration,whereas public interest groups engage more in other influence strategies.

Besides the contrast in use of different tactics, it is interesting to note thatthe three subtypes of groups do not seem to be equally active overall – notably,‘other groups’ report the lowest use of more than half of the activities. Whenexplaining patterns of strategy use, it is therefore important to distinguishbetween effects of differences in the overall level of political activity anddifferences in the strategies employed given a certain level of activity. In thisarticle, the ultimate interest centers on the last question, which will betreated more thoroughly in relation to the multivariate analysis appearinglater in this section.

First, however, it is time to turn from the level of individual tactics to thatof strategies of influence. Table 3 displays average index scores for differentgroup types on indexes constructed to reflect use of the four strategies. Notsurprisingly, the above conclusions are sustained. Groups with corporativeresources obtain a score of 46.7 on the administrative strategy, which issignificantly higher than the scores of 31.7 and 33.5 by the two other group

Table 3. The Use of Different Strategies of Influence. Mean



Media strategy


Groups with corporative resources 46.7*** 26.0 29.7** 17.1**Public interest groups 31.7 27.6 36.1*** 26.6***Other groups 33.5 21.1** 24.7** 20.0**All interest groups 40.1 24.8 29.2 19.6

Note: Differences between groups has been tested using a Bonferroni test. The stars indicatethat the mean is significantly different from that of both the two other groups. Levels ofsignificance: * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001. N = 1,028–1,035.


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types. The picture with regard to the two indirect strategies is clearly different.Public interest groups score highest, and the average score for these groupsis significantly different from the average scores of the two other groups. Aninteresting difference between the two indirect strategies is that groups withcorporative resources come second in use of the media strategy, while theyuse the mobilization strategy even less than the ‘other groups’ category.

Turning to the parliamentary strategy, the evidence is somewhat moremixed. With an average index score of 27.6, public interest groups exhibit thehighest level of engagement in activities that target parliamentary actors.This is significantly different (though only at the 0.01 level) from the scoreof 21.1 achieved by ‘other groups’. However, groups with corporativeresources use this strategy about as intensively as public interest groups. Infact, the difference between these two types of groups is not significant.Although these groups differ in their contact to bureaucrats, they seem quitealike when the parliamentary channel is analyzed separately.

To sum up, the administrative strategy is quite dominant in the politicalwork of groups with corporative resources. These groups supplement theiruse of the corporative channel with activities directed towards Parliament,but as for the indirect strategies, they clearly lag behind public interestgroups. It might be speculated that groups with a privileged position incorporatist structures have to focus at least some attention on maintaininggood relationships with parliamentary actors, while they can better afford tolay low in terms of mobilization activities because of the results obtained incorporative relations to bureaucrats.

On the other hand, public interest groups can hardly afford to ignore thehighly visible activities associated with the indirect strategies. Consequently,they expend much effort on activities that target the media and on mobilizingmembers, and they clearly distance themselves from other groups in theiruse of these methods. They also maintain high levels of parliamentary activities,while their engagement in the administrative strategy cannot be statisticallydistinguished from that of other groups. The political engagement of publicinterest groups thus stands in clear contrast to that of groups with corporativeresources.

Combinations of Different Strategies

The analyses above established a picture of considerable variation in strategyuse between group types – a picture that largely supports the theoreticalexpectations. Yet another aspect can be added by investigating whethergroups combine high levels of engagement in different strategies. While eachstrategy of influence has so far been treated separately, Table 4 thereforelists combinations of ‘low’ and ‘high’ scores on different strategies. Everyinterest group received either a ‘low’ or a ‘high’ score on strategies, depending

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Scandinavian Political Studies, V

ol. 31 – No. 2, 2008

© 2008 T

he Author(s)

Journal compilation ©

2008 Nordic P

olitical Science Association

Table 4. Combinations of ‘Low’ and ‘High’ Scores for Different Group Types (Percentages)


Media strategy



Low score High score

Low score Low score Low score Groups with corporative resources: 16.7 Public interest groups: 10.5 Other groups: 29.2

Groups with corporative resources: 8.6 Public interest groups: 2.3 Other groups: 3.6

High score Groups with corporative resources: 3.6 Public interest groups: 0.6 Other groups: 3.2


High score Low score Groups with corporative resources: 4.3 Public interest groups: 8.7 Other groups: 4.5

Groups with corporative resources: 2.3

Public interest groups: 1.2 Other groups: 1.3



High score Low score Low score Groups with corporative resources: 2.3 Public interest groups: 8.7 Other groups: 7.5




High score Low score Groups with corporative resources: 1.3 Public interest groups: 10.5 Other groups: 5.5

Groups with corporative resources: 3.9 Public interest groups: 1.2 Other groups: 4. 2



Note : N = Groups with corporative resources: 533, public interest groups: 172, other groups: 308.


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on whether the group index score is lower or higher than the median for allgroups. In the table, interest groups are distributed according to their scoreon all four strategies. That makes it possible to analyze which combinationsof ‘low’ and ‘high’ scores are most common for each group type.

Some combinations of strategies are very widespread, while others areseen less often. Combinations of either ‘low’ or ‘high’ scores on all strategiesare quite common. This reflects differences in the general level of politicalwork between groups. Some are simply more active across the board thanothers. More interesting are the differences between group types in thetendency to combine strategies. The largest contrast is found between publicinterest groups and groups with corporative resources.

In the upper right corner of the table, we see that public interest groupswith low levels of engagement in the mobilization strategy, the mediastrategy and the parliamentary strategy are not likely to exhibit a high scoreon the administrative strategy. For groups with corporative resources,however, the same combination of low scores is more compatible with ahigh score on the administrative strategy (2.3 compared to 8.6). The categoryof other groups looks mostly like the public interest groups, althoughthe contrast between these and groups with corporative resources is lesspronounced.

On the contrary, when looking at interest groups with a high score on allstrategies but the administrative (the lower left corner), it is unlikely thatgroups with corporative resources score low on the administrative strategy.For public interest groups, this is clearly an option in that a rather large shareof them exhibit the combination of a low level of activities targeting thebureaucracy and high scores on the other three strategies. Almost four timesas large a share of the public interest groups fall within this category (16.3compared to 4.1). For other groups, the corresponding share is 6.2, signifyingthat the main contrast here is between public interest groups and the twoother types of groups.

For public interest groups, it is possible to be engaged intensively in a widerange of activities without emphasizing contacts to bureaucrats. On the otherhand, public interest groups are unlikely to combine low levels of activitiesrelated to the indirect and the parliamentary strategies with high levels of theadministrative strategy. The opposite can be said about groups withcorporative resources, who prioritize the administrative strategy and for themost part engage in other strategies in combination with the administrativeone. It is particularly interesting to note that even though public interestgroups and groups with corporative resources use the parliamentary strategyto similar degrees, groups with corporative resources primarily use thisstrategy in combination with the administrative one, whereas public interestgroups are more likely to focus on Parliament when not interacting with thebureaucracy.

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Do Differences Between Groups Persist when Controlling for Other Variables?

Until now, analyses have included only type of interest group as the inde-pendent variable. This has the advantage of providing an easily interpreted– and descriptively correct – picture of the extent of variation betweengroups in strategic choices. It is possible, however, that the results lookdifferent if other variables are included. For example, some types of interestgroups might posses more general resources than others, which mightaccount for differences in strategic choices. If this is so, it will not change theconclusion that there is variation across group types, but it will necessitate are-evaluation of the causality linking group type to influence strategies. Amultivariate analysis enables an investigation of this and other questions.

Such a multivariate analysis can be conducted in several ways. The moststraightforward approach would be to perform separate analyses of the fourstrategies. However, the interest here is not to explain the level of engagement,but rather the strategic choices given a certain engagement. Therefore, eachstrategy’s share of total group activity is analyzed. Alongside group typethese analyses include the variables discussed in the research design section.Results of the four analyses are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix.

Beginning with the negative findings, it turns out that group type does notcontribute to explaining the share of group activities directed towardsParliament. This is in line with the above results where public interest groupsand groups with corporative resources were found to use the parliamentarystrategy in almost similar measure. The descriptive difference found betweenother groups and public interest groups and groups with corporativeresources is not present in the regression analysis. This might be due todifferences in resources or it may simply be caused by a generally lower levelof engagement on the part of other groups.

The type of group does make a difference for the prioritizing of the threeother strategies. As expected, corporative resources make a difference incontacts to the administration. Groups with corporative resources also directa smaller share of their activities towards the media and mobilizations thanother groups. Public interest groups, on the other hand, expend more of theirefforts on affecting the media, but less on contacting the administrationcompared to other groups. These groups also mobilize more than othergroups, but contrary to expectations the difference is not statisticallysignificant. The overall bag of evidence is mixed. While expectations aboutthe role of corporative resources are supported, public interest groups areonly found to direct more of their attention than other groups towards themedia and less towards bureaucrats. When measured as share of totalengagement in the four strategies, they do not mobilize significantly morethan the reference category of other groups.


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A clearer picture of the variation in strategic choices can be obtained byjuxtaposing the administrative strategy and the two indirect strategies.Table 5 presents an analysis of the use of the administrative strategy as ashare of the administrative, the media and the mobilization strategies.The parliamentary strategy is not included in this analysis because of thelack of variation in its use between groups. Naturally, some of the informa-tion contained in the four separate analyses discussed above is lost in thetransformation to one-regression analysis. However, this analysis is wellsuited to sum up the main results in terms of factors affecting choice ofstrategy.

The model contains only those variables that significantly influence theshare of administratively targeted activities (at the 0.01 level). This leavesfour variables in a model that explains 17 percent of the variation in theshare of administrative strategy. Even though the model leaves most ofthe variation unexplained, this must be interpreted as a fairly high level ofexplanatory power for an analysis of the choice of strategy given a certainlevel of overall engagement in the involved strategies.

It should by now come as no surprise that groups with corporativeresources devote a large share of their activities to targeting the administra-tion. Public interest groups, on the other hand, direct a much smaller shareof their activities towards the administration than other groups. In fact, whencomparing groups with corporative resources and public interest groupsdirectly, the difference in administrative share is almost 15 percentagepoints. By inference, the opposite pattern is present for the use of indirectstrategies as a share of these and the administrative strategy. The analysisconfirms the expected effect of group type on choice of strategies of influence.

Table 5. Regression Analysis of Administrative versus Indirect Strategies. OLS

Unstandardized coefficients

Standard error

Standardized coefficients

Constant 52.191 1.946Interest group type:– Group with corporative resources 5.777*** 1.441 0.143– Public interest group −8.813*** 1.822 −0.161– Other group Ref. Ref. Ref.Membership competition −0.213*** 0.034 −0.191Individuals as members −5.023*** 1.433 −0.111R2 0.17

Note: The dependent variable is the administrative share of the use of the total use of theadministrative strategy, the media strategy and the mobilization strategy (administrativestrategy/(administrative + media + mobilization strategy). The model includes variablessignificant at the 0.01 level or better. N = 987.

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Groups with resources valued in corporative relations direct much attentiontowards interacting with bureaucrats. Public interest groups use indirectstrategies intensively and are particularly focused on making their presencefelt in the media. Even though the multivariate analyses do not sustaina difference with regard to the parliamentary strategy, the overall picture isone of profound variation between different types of groups.

The theoretical reasoning concerning the choice of strategies by publicinterest groups gains further support by the inclusion of other variables.While most variables turn out to have no significant effect on the choice ofthe administrative strategy instead of the indirect strategies, membershipcompetition and having individuals as members both make a difference.Groups experiencing a high degree of membership competition are lesslikely to spend much effort on influencing bureaucrats and are – vice versa– more likely to engage in indirect strategies. This is in line with the pictureof indirect strategies as well suited to demonstrate to members and potentialmembers that the group is politically active. As discussed above, this isactually the most direct test of whether the reasoning regarding the relationbetween indirect strategies and membership recruitment holds.

Finally, groups with individuals as members have a smaller share of use ofthe administrative strategies. Again this can be interpreted as reflecting theneed to recruit members through visible strategies. While other types ofmembers such as companies, other interest groups or institutions are ofteneasy to contact directly, individuals must be regarded as the type of membersthat are most likely to be reached only through publicly visible strategiesinvolving media campaigns and membership mobilizations. On top of theresults that directly confirm the effect of group type on strategy choice,the results with regard to other variables therefore lie in continuation of thetheoretical reasoning.

Conclusion

This article pitted different types of interest groups against each other in anattempt to explain why groups use certain strategies of influence rather thanothers. A division of groups into three broad categories was demonstratedto have considerable leverage in explaining strategic choices. Groupswith corporative resources direct much attention towards influencing thebureaucracy. Public interest groups are more likely to use publicly visiblestrategies where affecting the media agenda play a central role. A thirdcategory of other groups was incorporated in the analyses as a point ofreference for establishing patterns of strategy use.

Different strands of the literature are relevant in explaining these results.Scandinavian corporatism focuses mainly on interaction between groups and


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bureaucrats. This literature can explain the strategic choices of groups withcorporative resources. The basic argument is that corporative integrationtakes place as part of a resource exchange between groups and governmentalactors. Groups want influence and decision makers want access to groupresources. Groups with valuable resources therefore attain a privilegedposition and increased options for utilizing the administrative strategy. Thisarticle has focused only on the link between the type of resources emphasizedas particularly important by corporatist authors and the choice of strategy,but the results lend support to this line of reasoning.

Groups with corporative resources do not refrain from engaging in otherforms of activities. In fact, their level of engagement in the parliamentarystrategy is statistically indistinguishable from that of public interest groups.This squares well with the emphasis on the importance of Parliament inrecent literature (Binderkrantz 2003; Christiansen & Rommetvedt 1999).Danish authors argue that the privileged integration of groups in bureau-cratic decision making takes place in ‘the shadow of Parliament’. Politicianshave the ultimate say on the involvement of groups, and all actors are wellaware of the necessity of finding a parliamentary majority to back up resultsof interactions in the corporative channel (Christiansen et al. 2004, 290–3).In this context, it is plausible that groups who rely heavily on their contactsin the administration supplement these with parliamentary contacts in orderto secure a continued central role in dealings with bureaucrats. The analysisof combinations of strategies demonstrates that for groups with corporativeresources, a high score on the parliamentary strategy typically goes hand-in-hand with a high score on the administrative strategy.

For public interest groups, the corporative channel does not loom nearlyas large. With regard to Parliament, their level of engagement is comparableto that of groups with corporative resources. The most striking result con-cerning public interest groups is that they evidently cannot afford to ignorethe media arena. Media activities account for a larger share of the politicalwork for public interest groups than for other groups. They also utilize themobilization strategy more than others, but the difference is not significantin the multivariate analysis of mobilization share.

Three different arguments were advanced to account for the preferencefor indirect strategies on the part of public interest groups. First, becausethey work for public interests, it is natural for them to appeal to the populationat large through publicly visible strategies. Second, many public interestgroups are ideological outsiders whose members prefer their group to keepat arm’s length from authorities. And third, public interest groups need touse highly visible strategies in order to convince their diffuse membershipthat supporting the group is worthwhile. It is not possible to distinguishbetween these three lines of argument based on the present analyses.However, the effects of membership competition and of having individuals

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as members found in the analysis support the postulated relation betweenthe employment of indirect strategies and the need to recruit and maintainmembers.

Even though the analyses in this article build on a large-scale survey, itonly includes Danish interest groups. It is therefore appropriate to considerthe possibilities of generalizing the empirical findings to other settings. Shortof further empirical studies, a number of tentative conclusions can be made.The balance between different channels of influence is likely to vary acrosstime and between countries. For example, the use of the parliamentarychannel will depend on the power of Parliament vis-à-vis the government.Also, the importance of corporative resources can be expected to depend onthe degree of integration of organized interests into administrative decisionmaking and thus to vary between countries and over time. Finally, whilethe specific balance between channels of influence and the importance ofdifferent resources is likely to vary across context, there is reason to expectthe underlying logic of a systematic relation between group type and use ofstrategies to be more prone to generalization. In any political system wheregroups have some degree of access to different channels of influence, variationacross group types is likely.

Interest group strategies are, at the bottom line, worth our attentionbecause of the results groups achieve by engaging themselves in such strategies.Likewise, differences between group types in use of strategies are importantbecause they might teach us about power differentials in the universe ofinterest groups. Even though the article has not investigated whether groupsare successful in their attempts to influence politics, some conclusions can bemade in regard to the question of interest group power.

Overall, the variation in strategy use across group types supports apluralist image of the political process. Corporative resources are relevantin regard to the administrative strategy, but other types of groups notpossessing such resources are more dominant when it comes to affecting themedia. The validity of this conclusion rests on whether different strategiesare likely to yield returns in terms of political influence. Political influenceinvolves many aspects and it is likely that different strategies will be effectivein obtaining different kinds of influence. Corporatism has argued thatprivileged integration of interest groups leads to tangible advantages forthe privileged groups. Other studies illustrate how groups are – at leastsometimes – successful in changing political priorities through mediacampaigns or mobilizations. Based on the literature, different strategies canbe regarded at least as potentially effective. However, it remains to besystematically investigated to what extent groups succeed in their politicalendeavors. Hopefully, this article has demonstrated that a wide range ofstrategies need to be analyzed if an accurate picture of the balance betweendifferent group types is to be established.

Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008 195


Appendix A. Group Distribution and Regression Analyses

Table A1. Distribution of Groups in Survey

Table A2. Regression Analyses of Shares of Total Activity. Unstandardized Coefficients

Group type Percentage of groups

Groups with corporative resourcesTrade unions 21.2Business groups 25.0Groups of institutions 6.3

Public interest groupsEnvironmental groups 3.0Humanitarian groups 5.1Social issue groups 3.1Other public interest groups 5.6

Other groupsAssociations of patients 9.6Professional/scientific societies 14.6Other interest based 6.5

All groups (N) 1,081



Media strategy


Constant 42.459 13.504 24.213 19.825Group with corporative resources 5.157*** 1.521 −2.625* −4.053***Public interest group −7.063*** 1.108 3.992** 1.963Other group Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.Political employees (transformed) −0.987 3.416** 5.356*** −7.785***Individual members −3.679** −0.820 1.354 3.145***Membership competition −0.174*** 0.020 0.141*** 0.013Membership influence 0.112*** 0.012 −0.121*** −0.003Specific regulation −3.036 −2.582* 3.135* 2.484Public production −1.862 1.087 −0.440 1.216General regulation Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.Scope of areas −0.104* 0.084** −0.047 0.067*Politicization −0.045 0.024 0.050 −0.029R2 0.172 0.058 0.118 0.131

Note: Dependent variables are the relevant strategy’s share of the total use of all strategies.Example: administrative strategy/(administrative + parliamentary + media + mobilizationstrategy). Levels of significance: * 0.05 ** 0.01 ** 0.001. N = 886.

196 Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 31 – No. 2, 2008


Appendix B. Measures of Variables

Each index included in the analyses is based on a number of questions.Depending on their answer to a given question, groups were given from oneto four points. Indexes were constructed by assigning the mean score on therelevant questions to each group. Respondents who – due to missing answers– had scores on less than half of the questions included in an index constructionwere excluded. Where nothing else is reported, groups could answer: ‘not atall’, ‘a little’, ‘to some degree’ or ‘to a high degree’.

Strategies of Influence

Indexes for strategies of influence are based on answers to the followingquestion: ‘Below is a list of activities that interest groups can engage in togain political influence. Again, we ask you to bear in mind the situation inthe policy area in which the group is most intensively involved. We ask youto indicate both how important the activities are when the group seekspolitical influence and how often within the last year the group has engagedin the different activities’. The activities included in the four indexes arereported in Table 1. With regard to importance, groups could respond: ‘notimportant’, ‘less important’, ‘important’ or ‘very important’. With regard tofrequency possible answers were: ‘never’, ‘occasionally’, ‘fairly often’ or‘very often’. The indexes have values of Kronbach’s alpha ranging from 0.70to 0.85.

Political Employees

The number of employees working with politics. After visual inspectionsof the relation between the number of political employees and the useof strategies, the variable has been logarithmically transformed to:ln(ln(number of political employees + 2.718)).

Individuals as Members

A dummy variable indicating whether groups have individual persons asmembers.

Membership Competition

The measure of member competition is based on the following questions:

• ‘How many of the present group members have joined within the lastyear?’



• ‘How large a part of the potential members have actually joined thegroup?’

Groups could answer: ‘a small part’, ‘a significant part’, ‘most’ or ‘almosteverybody’. With regard to the second question, points were given in reverseorder. Answers to the following two questions were included in the index aswell. ‘How well do the following statements characterize the group?’

• ‘The number of members fluctuates from year to year.’• ‘Other interest groups are competing for the same members.’

Kronbach’s alpha: 0.50.

Membership Influence

The measure of membership influence is based on the following questions:‘How well do the following statements characterize the group?’

• ‘The statutes of the group give group members influence on the politicalwork of the group.’

• ‘In reality, group members have influence on the political work of thegroup.’

• ‘Members participate actively in the political work of the group.’• ‘There are internal fractions or groupings who disagree on group policy.’• ‘There are contested elections for central positions in the group.’


Specific Regulation and Public Production

Dummy variables indicating whether the group is most active in a policy areathat can be characterized as general regulation, specific regulation orpublic production. General regulation includes policy areas related to: theenvironmental /energy, justice, foreign policy, integration, the EuropeanUnion, taxes and money/finance. Specific regulation includes: labor market,agriculture, business and city/housing. Public production includes: health,education, culture, social policy, science, church, traffic, defense and localareas.

Scope of Areas

The questionnaire included a list of twenty policy areas and asked groupshow active they were within each of these. For each area, groups answering‘very active’ were given three points, those that were ‘active to some degree’two points, and ‘slightly active’ groups, one point. Those indicating that they



were not involved in the policy area at all or did not answer the questionwere given no points. The measure of the ‘scope of areas’ adds togethergroup scores for the twenty policy areas.

Area Politicization

The index of politicization of a policy area is based on the question: ‘Howwell do the following statements characterize the policy area in which thegroup is most intensively involved?’

• ‘There are other interest groups with whom the group typically agrees.’• ‘There are other interest group with whom the group typically disagrees.’• ‘The policy area is characterized by high levels of media attention.’• ‘The policy area is characterized by high levels of attention from

politicians.’• ‘The policy area is characterized by high levels of attention from the

general public.’


NOTES1. A small number of groups without formal membership can be considered functional

equivalents to membership groups and are therefore included in the study. Thesegroups typically have volunteers rather than members.

2. The survey was conducted in 2004 and has previously been reported in a dissertation oninterest group strategies (Binderkrantz 2005b).

3. Factor analyses show that activities associated with an administrative, a parliamentaryand a media strategy, respectively, can be described meaningfully by a one-dimensionalmeasure (the analyses result in only one factor with an eigen-value above 1). Withregard to the mobilization strategy, the analysis results in one factor with an eigen-valueof 2.6 and a second factor with an eigen-value of 1.2 – the second factor distinguishingbetween conventional and confrontational tactics of mobilization. However, the firstfactor captures a much larger percentage of the variance than the second, all activitieshave high positive scores on the first factor and all activities are positively correlated.

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Documents

stat og interesseorganisationer

yale university press

scandinavian political studies

twenty policy areas

interest groups possess

princeton university press

publicly visible strategies

public decision making