bias in favor of the status quo

Bias in Favor of the Status Quo

Scott Eidelman1* and Christian S. Crandall21 University of Arkansas2 University of Kansas

Abstract

People favor the existing and longstanding states of the world. Rational explanations for statusquo maintenance are complemented by a number of non-rational mechanisms; loss aversion,regret avoidance, repeated exposure, and rationalization create a preference for existing states. Weshow that the status quo also benefits from a simple assumption of goodness due to mere existenceand longevity; people treat existence as a prima facie case for goodness, aesthetic and ethicalLongevity increases this preference. These biases operate heuristically, forming barriers to cognitiveand social change.

The principle rule of induction is that we expect the future to be like the past. Weeffortlessly and unconsciously expect gravity to hold us to the ground every morning, weexpect water to be wet, ice cream to be cold, that particle physics and brain surgery aredifficult and cultivating dandelions is easy. The expectation of stability is critical; it isaxiomatic. We expect stasis.

We argue that there are a variety of fundamental judgmental, affective, and aestheticprocesses that are affiliated with this expectation that guide our likes and dislikes, andespecially our judgments about what is good, desirable, legitimate, and moral. One pri-mary way that our fundamental expectation of stability expresses itself is in a handful ofbiases that include status quo bias, system justification, the existence bias, the naturalisticfallacy, endowment effect, and the longer-is-better phenomenon. Many of these biasesare based in a similar equation about the status quo – what is, is good. Although theseterms share much conceptual space, we will distinguish among them to highlight specificpsychological processes.

Supporting the status quo can be rational. There are costs to change, and existing statesoften have the advantage of history, of being well-understood, of having popular support(Burke, 1790 ⁄1999). Still, there are a variety of non-rational, psychological processesthat enhance the force of status quo maintenance, and this preference in many cases isrightfully labeled a bias.

Rational Routes to Status Quo Maintenance

There are several good reasons to provide ongoing support for existing states. Once achoice has been made, and there is no change in preference or choice set, there shouldbe no shift from the status quo (indeed, it would be irrational, or at least random, to doso). Transaction costs may also prohibit change. Institutions, rules, customs, and habitsmay not be for the best, but changing them would be too costly in terms of time,money, and ⁄or effort. And often the status quo is genuinely superior to other alterna-tives.

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Cognitive limitations

Choice is often difficult (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2000), and decision makersmay prefer to do nothing (Ritov & Baron, 1990) and ⁄or to maintain their current courseof action (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) because it is easier. In this case, the cognitivecosts of decision-making may outweigh the benefit of a superior choice. As evidence,decision-makers are more likely to postpone making a decision as alternatives are added(Tversky & Shafir, 1992), and preference for the status quo increases as a function of thenumber of options (Kempf & Ruenzi, 2006; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Status quoalternatives often require less mental effort to maintain (Eidelman & Crandall, 2009).

Informational limitations

In addition to the cognitive limitations imposed by choice, there are also informa-tional limitations. Decision outcomes are rarely certain, nor is the utility they maybring. Because some errors are more costly than others (Friedrich, 1993; Haselton &Nettle, 2006), sticking with what worked in the past is a safe option that makes fora smart choice. As long as previous decisions are ‘‘good enough’’ (Simon, 1956), anenergy-conserving organism in an uncertain world has little impetus to change; in thiscase, satisficing may be the rational thing to do (Schwartz, Ben-Haim, & Dacso,2011).

Non-Rational Routes to Status Quo Maintenance

Status quo bias, loss aversion and regret avoidance

Status quo choices are preferred over alternatives. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988)defined this status quo bias in a way that conflated decision-makers’ preference to donothing (i.e., omission bias; Ritov & Baron, 1992; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991; witha preference to maintain the status quo. When these two biases are disentangled, indepen-dent effects for both emerge (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Schweitzer, 1994), with each provid-ing a net gain for previously selected alternatives.

Both ‘‘do nothing’’ and ‘‘status quo maintenance’’ effects are grounded in loss aversionand regret avoidance (Anderson, 2003; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). People givemore weight to losses than to equal gains (they are ‘‘loss averse,’’ Tversky & Kahneman,1991). Because the status quo operates as a reference point from which change is consid-ered, the costs of change carry more weight than potential benefits, creating a relativeadvantage for the existing state of affairs (Moshinsky & Bar-Hillel, 2010). Loss aversionalso leads to greater regret for action than for inaction (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982); moreregret is experienced when a decision changes the status quo than when it maintains it(Hesketh, 1996; Ritov & Baron, 1992; cf. Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002). Together theseforces provide an advantage for the status quo; people are motivated to do nothing or tomaintain current or previous decisions (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Change isavoided, and decision makers stick with what has been done in the past.

Mere exposure

One way to increase liking for something is repeated exposure over time (Bornstein,1989; Harrison, 1977; Zajonc, 1968). Stimuli as diverse as words, shapes, music, faces,

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and doughnuts have all been shown to become more favorable as a consequence of sim-ple, unreinforced exposure. At the interpersonal level, frequent, incidental contact withothers often leads to attraction (Saegert, Swap, & Zajonc, 1973) and friendship (Festinger,Schachter, & Back, 1950); contact between social groups leads to more favorable inter-group attitudes as well (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006).

A related finding is the truth effect: repeated exposure to statements increases their per-ceived veracity (Bacon, 1979; Hasher, Goldstein, & Toppino, 1977; for a review, seeDechene, Stahl, Hansen, & Wanke, 2010). Like mere exposure, the truth effect is not spe-cific to any one domain but instead occurs for a broad array of topics, including people,politics, history, art, geography, religion, science, and marketing. The repeated presenta-tion of unfamiliar but plausible statements causes these statements to be seen as more true.

There is some disagreement over the mechanisms involved in these effects (mere expo-sure effects may be due to conditioning or processing fluency; truth effects may be dueto familiarity or source variability), but ultimately both stem from repeated exposure. Thebiasing consequences in favor of the status quo are clear. Because existing states areencountered more frequently than non-existent alternatives, they will be evaluated morefavorably and perceived as more true.

Rationalization

People are motivated to justify, defend, and support the status quo. Sometimes existingstates are the result of our own choices. People rationalize these decisions, upgradingwhat was chosen and downgrading what was not (Brehm, 1956). Because people wish tosee the world as a just place where people get what they deserve and deserve what theyget (Lerner, 1980), victims of misfortune are derogated to explain otherwise inexplicablesuffering (Jones & Aronson, 1973; Lerner & Miller, 1978). People are also motivated tojustify extant social systems (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004); even members of underprivi-leged groups rationalize theory own disadvantage by endorsing system-justifying beliefs(e.g., Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003).

This support for the status quo increases in response to manipulations designed tomotivate its defense. When the social system is threatened (e.g., when one’s home coun-try is criticized by an outsider), or when inescapability of the social system becomesapparent (e.g., participants are told emigration from their country is becoming increas-ingly difficult), justification of the social system increases (Kay et al., 2009). These find-ings provide strong evidence that some forms of a status quo bias stem from motivationto see the existing state of affairs as good, right, and fair.

A bias for existence

Recently we have argued for a novel process that maintains the status quo: the existencebias. People simply assume, with little reason or deliberation, the goodness of existingstates (Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009). This idea builds on Hume’s (1739 ⁄1992)observation that people tend to conflate matters of fact (what is) with prescription(what ought to be), a process often referred to as the naturalistic fallacy (e.g., Friedrich,Kierniesky, & Cardon, 1989). Hume was concerned with moral matters, but thetendency to conflate existence with goodness applies to a wide variety of judgments.Independent of exposure and contact, concerns due to change, motivation to rationalize,and even reasoned inference, people seem biased in favor of existence. The existence biasoperates as a simple rule of thumb; existence itself is evidence of positive qualities.

272 Bias and the Status Quo


In a series of studies, we have compared procedures, objects, and other stimuli thatdiffer only in the extent to which they represent the status quo. In one study, studentsconsidered one of two sets of degree requirements at their university, of which one rep-resented current practice (Eidelman et al., 2009, Study 2). The status quo version wasjudged as ‘‘better,’’ more ‘‘right,’’ and ‘‘the way things ought to be’’, as compared toidentical requirement presented as an alternative. Because the status quo was determinedrandomly (and in this case both alternatives were fabrications), previous exposure fails asan alternative explanation.

Still, people may stick with the status quo because change can have costs. And so wemust demonstrate that the existence bias is independent of these concerns – by holdingchange constant across options. To show that people value the status quo regardless ofthe costs associated with change, we created a scenario about the future, manipulated itslikelihood, and measured how good that outcome would be.

During the 2008 Democratic primary for President of the United States, then-SenatorsBarack Obama and Hillary Clinton were vying for the opportunity to represent theDemocratic Party. We manipulated the likelihood that either Obama or Clinton wouldwin the primary by randomly assigning participants to imagine vividly that Obama ⁄Clin-ton won the nomination. Imaging an outcome makes it seem more likely (Anderson,1983; Carroll, 1978), and we conceptualized likelihood as a future status quo. We pre-dicted that imaging an outcome would also make it better, and this is what was found.Imagining Obama (compared to Clinton) winning the primary increased likelihood esti-mates of Obama winning, and also its goodness and rightness. The increased likelihoodmediated the relationship between imagining and evaluation – imaging Obama (or Clin-ton) winning made it seem more likely, and this in turn increased people’s sense thatObama (or Clinton) winning the nomination was a good thing. Because the currentpresident at the time (George W. Bush) was a second-term Republican unable to run forre-election, Obama and Clinton equally represented change from the status quo.

Most research on status quo bias concerns choice and its consequences (e.g., Samuelson& Zeckhauser, 1988). To show that existence bias is a broader phenomenon that extendsbeyond this context, we presented another group of participants with a picture of whatwas ostensibly a galaxy but in fact was a set of random data points connected by a smoothline (Eidelman et al., 2009; Study 4). Participants were led to believe 40%, 60%, or 80%of galaxies took the form of the one shown, and then rated the galaxy for its aestheticqualities. As the degree of existence increased, so too did the galaxy’s beauty. Because thisbetween-participants task was completely absent of choice, accounts such as loss aversionand regret avoidance do not hold sway. The context was also independent of motives forjustice and system justification, and speaks against rationalization as an alternative account(cf. Jost et al., 2010). It seems that existence itself became persuasive evidence of good-ness.

Longer is better

A corollary of the existence bias concerns duration: if existence is good, longer existenceshould be better. Time vets bad endeavors, and those that persist should be judged morefavorably for doing so. This thinking resembles quasi-evolutionary notions of ‘‘survival ofthe fittest,’’ and also the augmentation principle in attribution theory (Kelley, 1972). Inone study, participants were given a brief but (excepting the time manipulation) accuratedescription of acupuncture, described as existing for 250, 500, 1000, or 2000 years (Eidel-man, Pattershall, & Crandall, 2010). Evaluation of acupuncture (whether it was a good



practice and people ought to use it) was a function of time; the longer it was said toexist, the better it was evaluated.

Even negative stimuli benefit from longevity, as demonstrated by a study that focusedon the use of torture interrogations in the ‘‘Global War on Terror.’’ A representativesample of Americans read an accurate description of ‘‘enhanced interrogations’’ conductedat the behest of the U.S. Government (Crandall, Eidelman, Skitka, & Morgan, 2009).Some were told these techniques had been used for decades; others were told their usewas new. When described as longstanding, the techniques garnered more support andwere judged as more justified (although in both conditions, most participants labeled thetechniques as torture).

In another study, we manipulated stimulus valence (Eidelman et al., 2009, Study 5).Under the guise of a product-expansion study, students were randomly assigned to tasteone of two beverages, either a good-tasting mass-market root beer or a not very good-tasting soft drink, similar to root beer but less sweet and noticeably bitter. Before sam-pling their beverage, students were told it had been on the market since 1903 or 2003.Regardless of whether they drank a tasty or not-so-tasty drink, the older beverage waspreferred to its more recent – but otherwise identical – counterpart. Longer existencemade both a bitter and non-bitter beverage better.

Existence, Longevity, and Heuristic Thinking

Existence and longevity biases do more than describe a pro-status quo effect; they providea process explanation for why these effects occur. We argue that these biases operate asquick and simple rules of thumb. From experience, people understand that existence andlongevity may indicate some amount of vetting that signals ability, worth, or goodness.People seem to apply this assumption as a simple decision rule; if it exists and maintains,it is good. In other words, these biases are heuristics, for which evidence comes in threeforms.

One hallmark of heuristic thinking is over-application; although they often work, rulesof thumb are sometimes generalized to contexts where they do not apply (Tversky &Kahneman, 1974). Several studies show that existence and longevity biases occur ondimensions independent of time in existence (Eidelman et al., 2010). In one study, partic-ipants were asked to study a painting said to be 5 or 100 years old. In another, partici-pants were shown a photograph of a tree along with a description that varied only in thetree’s alleged age (500–4500 years). In both cases, aesthetic judgments (e.g., how pleasantthe tree was to look at) increased as a function of longevity. A similar case can be madefor participants’ aesthetic judgments of the galaxy that varied as a function of time in exis-tence (Eidelman et al., 2009; Study 4). In each case, participants over-generalized assump-tions that longer-is-better to what was visually appealing.

Two additional markers of heuristic thinking are efficiency and lack of awareness ofthe process (Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Sherman, 2006; Kahneman &Frederick, 2002). Existence and longevity biases share these properties as well. For exam-ple, when mental resources are consumed with a second task, preference for status quooptions continues unabated (Eidelman et al., 2009). Participants also seem unaware of therole longevity plays in their judgment. In one study, participants’ gustatory evaluationswere affected by time in existence; a piece of chocolate thought to be on the marketlonger tasted better (Eidelman et al., 2010, Study 5). When asked to indicate reasons fortheir preference, all participants failed to recognize time in existence as a source of theirjudgment; they seemed to lack access to what in fact affected their taste for a consumer



good. Instead, they simply applied the heuristic, and had a better taste experience as aresult.

Status Quo Biases: Often Subtle, Sometimes Unreasonable

Other status quo maintenance processes are equally subtle. Initial research on status quobias invited participants to consider the possibility that position as the status quo affectedtheir choices; this possibility was denied (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988, p. 9). The atti-tudinal effects of mere exposure are found when stimuli are presented subliminally (e.g.,Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980); indeed these effects are strongest when exposure occursoutside of awareness (Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992). Rationalization ofexisting states seems to be similarly opaque; anterograde amnesics justify their decisionseven though they cannot recall the choices they have made (Lieberman, Ochsner,Gilbert, & Schacter, 2001), and members of low-status groups favor dominant groupswhen this preference is measured implicitly (e.g., Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002;Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002). Across all of these studies, establishment carriedtwo advantages; it was favored, and participants did not seem to know it.

A lack of awareness does not mean that a process is unreasonable or irrational(e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004). Repeated exposure without incident indicates a stimulus is safe(Zajonc, 2001), and exposure over time renders stimuli easier to understand and process(Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004). These are excellent reasons for a preference.

But there is compelling evidence that in many cases status quo preference is rightfullylabeled a bias. People continue to repeat old choices despite the fact ‘‘new’’ decision-makers privy to the same information choose differently (Samuelson & Zeckhauser,1988). Similarly, the status quo prevails even when there are no costs for change oruncertainty about non-status quo options (Anderson, 2003). Status quo preference due toloss aversion violates the rational principles of consistency and coherence (Moshinsky &Bar-Hillel, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Finally, there’s no accounting for taste;aesthetic and gustatory evaluations are affected by existence and longevity (Eidelmanet al., 2009, 2010), although neither is likely to be mediated by reason (e.g., Reber et al.,2004).

Another rational explanation is possible. By simply labeling a stimulus or a process asthe status quo, people may assume, quite rationally, that the stimulus or process has passedthe inspection of other people. Social norms are often a good guide to correct judgmentand conduct; it is reasonable to use the opinions of others as the basis of our own (Sherif& Sherif, 1964).

But this alternative explanation, too, fails to account for the data. Taste preferencescome from many sources, but what others like does not appear to be one of them (Birch,1999). Other people influence when it is appropriate to eat – and how much – but notso much for what we like to eat (Pliner & Mann, 2004). Yet, status quo flavors are tast-ier. In the chocolate study described above, participants were asked about the preferenceof others. Although participants believed that others would agree with their tastes (Ross,Greene, & House, 1977), the perceptions of others’ tastes were unaffected by our manip-ulation of time in existence. Since time in existence affected tastiness but not ‘‘others’perceptions of tastiness,’’ this rational explanation does not apply.

Economists have taken a serious interest in whether status quo bias and endowmenteffects (i.e., preferring what we already have) can be explained in ways consistent withrational choice theory. Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) point to the shift in the kind of judgmentone makes when a status quo alternative exists. They argue that, in the absence of a status



quo alternative, decision makers generate a summary value for all alternatives, but when astatus quo option does exist, people compare the status quo and its alternatives on an attri-bute-by-attribute basis, and will discard the status quo only when an alternative surpassesit on most or all of the attributes. This technical argument indicates that status quo prefer-ence can be rational, but not when it will be so. And it fails when the bias occurs outsidea choice context, in the absence of alternatives (e.g., when the status quo is operational-ized as frequency of occurrence or time in existence). Rational choice does not explainwhy stars and trees are perceived as prettier when they embody the status quo.

A Political Implication

Preference for the status quo represents a core component of conservative ideology (Bob-bio, 1996; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Some have claimed there is aconservative bias in American politics (Frank, 2004; Jost, 2006), and the status quo biaswe’ve reviewed may play an important role. Because status quo biases should be strongestwhenever quick, simple, or efficient thinking dominates thought (Eidelman & Crandall,2009), these same conditions should increase the appeal of politically conservative ideas.Across several studies, Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, and Blanchar (forthcoming)mea-sured political attitudes in several ways – all of which contained a substantial element ofendorsing the status quo. They found that when low-effort thought dominated (whenparticipants were distracted, under time pressure, fairly drunk, or instructed to thinklightly), participants endorsed politically conservative ideas and policies, as compared tothose who were able or instructed to deliberate. Because preference for the status quo isone significant element of conservative ideology, the bias in its favor plays a role – undercertain conditions – in promoting political conservatism.

Limiting Conditions

In our studies, we have manipulated the existence and longevity of otherwise identicalstimuli; across conditions the stimuli themselves remained unchanged. We have neverincluded information in our studies about degradation, about being anachronistic, orindicated that something is stale or shopworn. Certainly some longstanding entitiesweathered by time and experience will be viewed less positively, in part because suchdegraded stimuli provide evidence of lower survival value. People may also becomebored with stimuli upon repeated exposure (especially when massed, Bornstein, Kale,& Cornell, 1990). Evidence that an entity possesses unfavorable properties may alsoovercome the evaluative advantages conferred by existence and longevity (although wehave found that unpleasant stimuli – questionable interrogation techniques and a bad-tasting beverage – still benefit from time in existence). Our argument is not thatchange never becomes desirable, nor that the status quo is always preferred; such anargument is patently false. When evidence of the need for change becomes substantialenough, it should outweigh status quo biases. Our argument is only that the scalesare not equally balanced at the outset – the status quo alternative begins with a usefuladvantage.

Future research might test these boundary conditions, and others that speak to what ispresumably the underlying (but unrecognized) logic behind existence and longevitybiases. We suspect that people implicitly follow a mode of reasoning that resembles beliefin ‘‘survival of the fittest’’ by assuming that existence and longevity themselves provideevidence of worth, strength, and goodness. Such an inference requires the additional



assumption that establishment is due to characteristic properties of the surviving entityand not any of several ‘‘artificial’’ forces (subsidies, absence of competitors, ingroup bias,etc.). Similar to research on the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977), we believethat social perceivers overweigh internal (natural) explanations for existence and longevityand under-appreciate situational (artificial) forces. Rendering situational forces salientshould diminish existence and longevity biases.

Can Newer be Better?

People do, at times, seek novelty. New cars, updated bathrooms, and the latest smartphone all speak to people’s desire for change. Telling is the finding that the pursuit ofnovelty often occurs in the context of what is familiar, established, and comforting. Newproduct ventures earn higher market shares when linked to established firms (Rao,Chandy, & Prabhu, 2008), minority opinions are most persuasive and influential whenconsistently repeated (Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974), and children’s preference for novelfoods increases when accompanied by familiar flavors (Pliner & Stallberg-White, 2000).In other words, change is pursued, but in the context of a secure base (a primary benefitafforded by the status quo). New living spaces and products people seek are typicallyupdated (‘‘new and improved’’) rather than entirely new. Novelty’s strongest commoditycan be its foundation in the wisdom of the past.

When considering alternatives, decision-makers seem more concerned about avoid-ing false positives than false negatives (Friedrich, 1993; Klayman & Ha, 1987). Littleis lost when sticking with an outcome that has worked well enough in the past (suf-ficiency), even though this strategy may result in missed opportunities for somethingbetter. Another way to promote change-seeking may be to shift focus from sufficiencyto necessity by orienting decision makers away from potential losses and toward poten-tial gains. Under these conditions, people appear to resolve tradeoffs between stabilityand change by pursuing the latter (e.g., Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins,1999).

The Challenge of Change

Bias is rarely recognized as such (Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Even when noticed, a personmust then be motivated to overcome it, and have the energy and resources to do so.Change from the status quo faces hurdles on all these fronts. Many of the biases support-ing the status quo are invisible, and overcoming them requires awareness and also sub-stantial effort. As we have seen, effort conservation is one mechanism through whichstatus quo maintenance persists (Anderson, 2003; Kempf & Ruenzi, 2006; Samuelson &Zeckhauser, 1988).

Changing the world is difficult, and so is changing our understanding of the world. Asan application, consider scientific and philosophical revolutions. Both meet substantialresistance (Menand, 2001), in part because they require energy, attention, and motivationon the part of scientists and scholars. But they also meet resistance from a sometimesinvisible commitment to ideas and concepts based primarily on the basis that they existand are established (e.g., Garst, Kerr, Harris, & Sheppard, 2002).

We began this essay with the argument that human cognition and behavior is predi-cated on the notion that the future will be like the past. This ‘‘cognitive conservatism’’ isfundamental to every person in every culture around the world. We expect substantialstasis; life without it would be impossible.



Without the expectation that reality is largely stable, a vast array of psychological pro-cesses would be worthless. Learning would never transfer to the future, conditioningwould be meaningless, the world would appear completely random, and language wouldhave no value. We are left with the psychological naturalness of the commitment to thestatus quo, and the difficult and delicate balance between the need for the comfort andpredictability it affords, and the questionable but oft-necessary need for change, variety,and transformation.

Short Biographies

Scott Eidelman is an Assistant Professor of psychology at the University of Arkansas.He studied psychology and sociology at the University of Wisconsin, where hereceived a B.A., and then social psychology at the University of Kansas, where hereceived his Ph.D. He was Assistant Professor of psychology at the University of Mainefrom 2004 to 2008 before moving to the University of Arkansas. His research interestsinclude political psychology, stereotyping and prejudice, and identity management strat-egies.

Chris Crandall studies social and political psychology with experiments, surveys, andfield research; work on the status quo and existence bias represents the confluence ofwork on social and political themes. A professor at the University of Kansas since 1992,he has done research on social pressures and eating disorders, prejudice against fatpeople, the psychology of attributions, the acceptance of torture, and eating doughnuts inAlaska. He received a B.S in Psychology from the University of Washington, and aPh.D. in Psychology from the University of Michigan. He has taught at the Universityof Michigan, Yale University, Connecticut College, the University of Florida and theUniversity of Kansas.

Endnote

* Correspondence address: Department of Psychology, University of Arkansas, 211 Memorial Hall, Fayetteville,AR 72701, USA. Email: [email protected]

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