berkeley’s theory of mind: some new models

Berkeley’s Theory of Mind: Some New Models1

Talia Mae Bettcher*California State University

Abstract

Berkeley didn’t write very much about his ‘philosophy of mind’ and what he did write is ratherperplexing and perhaps inconsistent. The most basic problem is that it just isn’t clear what a mind(or, more accurately, a spirit) is for Berkeley. Unsurprisingly, many interpretations tend to under-stand Berkeleian spirit in models provided by other philosophers – interpretations in which Berke-leian spirit turns out to be a close cousin of the Cartesian ego, Lockean spiritual substratum,Lockean self, and Humean bundle of perceptions. Stephen H. Daniel and I have each offered dif-ferent interpretations of Berkeley that refuse to reduce Berkeley’s account of spirit to that of othercanonical thinkers and, indeed, which place Berkeleian spirit in some tension with the Aristote-lian-Cartesian-Lockean traditions. In this paper, I argue that Daniel’s account is too extreme inthat it implausibly removes Berkeley from this tradition altogether. I show how my account avoidsthat extreme and I defend it against some objections.

Berkeley didn’t write very much about his ‘philosophy of mind’ and what he did write israther perplexing and perhaps (some have argued) deeply inconsistent.2 Why does hereject material substance while retaining spiritual substance? Why does he deny that spiritcan be perceived and that we can have an idea of it, and yet affirm that spirits are none-theless known? Minds are supposed to be his metaphysical foundation: The entire sensibleworld depends upon mind for its existence. So one is left wondering what Berkeley couldhave said to lessen the perplexity and to fill in the gaps. It’s hardly surprising, at any rate,that a host of interpretations have been offered purporting to shed light on Berkeley’sviews.

The most basic problem is that it just isn’t clear what a mind (or, more accurately, aspirit) is for Berkeley. This fogginess helps explain why many interpretations tend tosituate Berkeley’s account in terms of other thinkers – interpretations in which Berkeleianspirit turns out to be a close cousin of the Cartesian ego,3 Lockean spiritual substratum,4

Lockean self,5 and Humean bundle of perceptions.6 We’re looking for another model tohelp make sense of Berkeley’s account. It raises the related question: What is the relation-ship of Berkeleian spirit to the early modern tradition? Where and how does it fit intothe scheme of things?

Recently, Stephen H. Daniel (2000, 2001a,b,c, 2007) and I (2007, 2008a,b, 2009) haveeach offered different interpretations of Berkeley that refuse to reduce Berkeley’s accountof spirit into that of other canonical thinkers and, indeed, which place Berkeleian spiritin some tension with the Aristotelian-Cartesian-Lockean traditions. In this paper, I arguethat Daniel’s account is too extreme in that it implausibly removes Berkeley from thistradition altogether. I then show how my own account avoids that extreme and I defendit against some objections.

Philosophy Compass 6/10 (2011): 689–698, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00427.x

ª 2011 The AuthorPhilosophy Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

1. Perception–Object Ontology

Berkeley’s theory of mind is situated, says Stephen H. Daniel, within ‘the stoic tradi-tion’ (2008). While Berkeley affirms that spirit is indeed a substance, his own accountdeparts very dramatically from the Aristotelian-Cartesian-Lockean conceptions thereof(2008: 203). Rather than adopting a substance–mode ontology, Daniel’s Berkeley canbe said to adopt a ‘perception–object ontology’. This means two things. First, it meansthat he ‘lops off’ as too abstract the thinking thing taken as distinct from the concreteacts of perception alleged to inhere in it (2008: 204–6). While, for example, the iden-tity of a Cartesian mind isn’t determined by the actual thoughts that it happens to have(it could be the same mind, even if it had thought otherwise), the identity of a Berk-elian mind is determined by its actual cognitions because it just is those cognitions(2001c: 245–6).

Second, it means that ideas are distinct from the activity of cognition. In a Cartesianmodel, ideas just are cognitions. For Daniel’s Berkeley, however, the activities of cogni-tion by which ideas are differentiated are not themselves ideas. Ideas are objects of cogni-tion distinct from cognition (2001c: 245). This is necessary in Daniel’s reading sinceBerkeley sees mind and ideas as distinct and since Daniel has identified minds with theactivities of cognition. Instead, in Daniel’s reading, Berkeleian mind (cognition) is thevery existence of its ideas: ‘Because minds or souls are the existence of ideas, they cannotbe identified as independently existing things or realities’ (2000: 623). In this view, then,there’s a distinction between an idea and its existence insofar as spirit and idea are them-selves recognized as distinct. The upshot is that rather than understanding spirit to idea asperceiver to perception, Daniel understands spirit to idea as perception to object. Andrather than understanding spirit to idea as substance to mode, Daniel understands spirit toidea as existence of thing to the thing itself.

This appeal to perception–object ontology, for Daniel, is partially motivated by Berke-ley’s perplexing claim that spirits and ideas are ‘entirely distinct’:

Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that when we say, they exist, they are known, orthe like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures. Thereis nothing alike or common in them. (PHK I 142, see also PHK I 89)

From this Daniel concludes, ‘to claim, therefore, that spirits exist or are beings or eventhings at all is, for Berkeley, to misunderstand the nature of mind’ (2008: 203). Althoughthis is a non-sequitur, it does at least seem that Daniel’s split between object ⁄ thing andconscious perception ⁄ existence serves as a possible interpretation of Berkeley’s peculiarremarks about the difference between spirit and idea. To be sure, it’s not clear how wellthis reading works. Berkeley says that spirit and idea are ‘entirely distinct and heteroge-neous’ and they ‘have nothing in common but the name [thing]’ (PHK I 89). But byreading spirit as the existence of ideas – spirit and idea do seem to have a lot in common.The relation between a thing and its existence is rather intimate to say the least.

At any rate, as a consequence of this distinction between perception and object, Berke-ley’s claim that a spirit cannot be perceived is read as the claim that a spirit is not theobject of cognition, but rather the cognition of objects. Daniel writes, ‘The existence ofthat thing thus depends on its being perceived, but the activity by means of which it isperceived is not itself perceived’ (2008 208). This means that if there’s any knowledge ofone’s existence as activity at all, it must be inherent in the activity of cognition itself. AsDaniel writes, ‘my notion of myself is not an idea of myself as object of thought but isthe very ‘‘being of myself’’ in the activity of thinking’ (2000: 635).

690 Berkeley’s Theory of Mind

ª 2011 The Author Philosophy Compass 6/10 (2011): 689–698, 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00427.xPhilosophy Compass ª 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

In departing from a Cartesian account which refers the various activities of a mind to asingle substance (constituted by the principal attribute, thought), Daniel’s account aban-dons the traditional conception of substance in a fairly serious way. Indeed it seems indanger of collapsing into a Humean bundle of perceptions. Daniel attempts to avoid sucha collapse. ‘This does not mean that the mind is a Humean bundle of already differenti-ated ideas’, he writes, ‘but rather the unique, singular, divinely instituted principle oractivity of differentiation and association by means of which ideas are identified andrelated’ (2008: 216). According to him, a Humean account presupposes already differenti-ated ideas which are then grouped together. In his view, by contrast, the ideas are differ-entiated and so related by a singular conscious activity – the mind.

It’s not clear, however, that this is enough. And in fact, the contrast is slightly mislead-ing. In Daniel’s reading, a finite mind is given by the particular activities that it engagesin, and these are distinguished with reference to the ideas themselves. So there doesremain the worry how all the particular acts are unified into a single mind. In his view,individual finite minds are differentiated only because ‘God … wills for all eternity thatthere be the specific perceptions, thoughts, and volitions that differentiate minds as dis-tinctive and simple unities’ (2008: 215). But if that’s all there is to the unity, then thisaccount, while not a bundle account, fails to confer much more of a unity: The onlymeaningful difference between a disunited collection of various mental acts and the unitythat Daniel has in mind, apparently, is this appeal to God as unifier.

Even if we waive this concern, however, Daniel’s reading obviously has Berkeleyabandoning the traditional notion of substance in a fairly dramatic way. First, spirits countas ‘things’ in only an improper sense (2001b: 490; 2008: 203). Properly, they’re the exis-tence of things. In the traditional understanding, of course, substances are things which existpar excellence. Second, against a traditional conception of substance, spirits lack a kind ofpermanence – there’s no underlying persisting core – there’s an on-going process, asequence of ever-changing cognitions (2008: 213–5). In the traditional understanding, bycontrast, substances persist through change. Finally, minds are in some way individuatedin terms of the ideas they perceive – they’re thus not independent of the things they arealleged to support (2001c: 245–6).7 This undermines the view that substances are inde-pendent of the items they support – that is, could retain their identity without those par-ticular dependents.

Daniel is content with these consequences: He argues that it’s a mistake to situateBerkeleian spirit within the Aristotelian-Cartesian-Lockean substance traditions. However,it’s worth appreciating the extremity of the view. It suggests that what Berkeley meanswhen he’s talking about substance is very different from what Aristotle, Descartes, andLocke mean when they’re talking about substance – so different that it scarcely seems likethe word ‘substance’ could retain a shared meaning. This makes it difficult to see howBerkeley could ever seriously engage with that tradition on the topic of substance with-out talking about something completely different.

Crucially, Daniel reads Berkeley’s use of the word ‘subsistence’ to contrast with ‘exis-tence’ (2008: 208). Since Berkeleian minds are the very existence of ideas, it’s odd to saythat existence exists. Hence, they’re properly said to ‘subsist’. Daniel writes:

It is more appropriate to say of minds that they subsist rather than exist. Or course, minds orsouls are real in that ideas exist. But the subsistence of minds or souls is nothing other than theexistence of ideas. (2000: 623)

Notably, however, Berkeley generally uses ‘subsistence’ in the context of saying that anidea ‘cannot subsist by itself’ (PHK I 89) while a spirit does ‘subsist by itself’ (PHK I

Berkeley’s Theory of Mind 691


137).8 In doing so, he appears to draw on the traditional use of ‘subsistence’ according towhich substances possess self-subsistence (that is, roughly, independence) whereas itemssuch as accidents, modes, etc. do not.9

Daniel’s reading makes it impossible to place Berkeley into conversations with figuresspeaking from Aristotelian-Cartesian-Lockean traditions. When Daniel’s Berkeley attri-butes subsistence to spirits, what he means is that spirits don’t properly exist, aren’t prop-erly things. Rather they’re the sheer existence of things and so lack independence. Whathis interlocutors hear, however, is that spirits are proper things which do possess a kind ofindependence. Daniel’s Berkeley therefore means almost the opposite of what thinkers inthe tradition mean. This hardly seems like a plausible consequence.

The most powerful argument in favor of Daniel’s view, however, is its capacity toaccommodate some of Berkeley’s cryptic remarks about mind in his early notebooks(written around 1707–1708). For example, Berkeley notoriously writes things like this:‘The very existence of Ideas constitutes the soul’ (PC 577), ‘Mind is a congeries of Per-ceptions. Take away Perceptions & you take away the Mind put the Perceptions & youput the mind’ (PC 580), and ‘Say you the Mind is not the Perceptions, but that thingwhich perceives. I answer you are abus’d by the words’ (PC 581). Daniel’s account seemsto have the capacity to accommodate such remarks, so – if it can remain consistent withBerkeley’s published works – it can boast a unified account of Berkeley’s position.

However, there’s another possible interpretation of Berkeley’s remarks in the Note-books -namely, that they reflect the changing views of a young man in the process ofworking out his philosophy. This reading, commonly adopted by scholars, is plausible.10

Sometimes very intelligent philosophers change their minds even in their publishedworks. So it’s not surprising the private notebooks of a young philosopher would reflectsome development; the thesis makes good sense from a psychological point of view. Butthis seems enough to halt the main argument in favor of Daniel’s view. For the conse-quences of his view are extreme, while this proposed reading of the Notebooks is not.Of course, Daniel can argue that a unified account of Berkeley’s philosophy of mind issuperior to an interpretation which needs to postulate some early development. But theproposed interpretative advantage still doesn’t outweigh the unpalatable consequence ofDaniel’s reading: It’s more reasonable to believe Berkeley’s views developed when he wasyoung, than that he uses ‘substance’ in a sense that departs so wildly from the Aristote-lian-Cartesian-Lockean traditions.

Indeed, it’s not even clear that there is any interpretive advantage. There can only be aninterpretive advantage if Berkeley never shows any development in his views. Once hisviews on other topics exhibit development, it becomes implausible to suppose his theoryof mind didn’t change as well – at least in light of the tensions between the notebookentries and his published accounts. However, there’s good reason to think there is suchdevelopment. For example, as Bertil Belfrage has argued (1987: 32–6), it seems Berkeley’sviews about ‘general ideas’ in the Manuscript Introduction (1708) differ from his views in thepublished Introduction to the 1710 Principles. While in the former, Berkeley denies suchideas are possible, in the latter Berkeley allows for the possibility that some ideas canbecome general representatives of others. If Berkeley’s views changed about this, however,it seems more – rather than less – plausible to suppose that his views changed about spirit.

2. Subject–Object Ontology

In the view that I have defended, by contrast, Berkeley remains committed to a conceptof substance that’s largely in line with the Aristotelian-Cartesian-Lockean traditions –



namely, a self-subsistent thing that supports dependent items (2007: 26). However,Berkeley also departs from tradition by rejecting the canonical counter-part of the substance– the mode (2007: 26–40).11 In this view, while spirits support ideas, ideas aren’tmodes.12 And nothing else in Berkeley’s mental economy (volitions, operations, etc.) canbe understood within what I have called ‘mode ontology’.

I understand Berkeley’s views as ‘transformative’: We proceed with traditional accountsof consciousness (adopted by Descartes and Locke, for example), introduce Berkeley’sontological innovations (his rejection of mode ontology), and then see how Berkeley’stransformed model of consciousness can ground his new conception of (spiritual) sub-stance. In the account that I have defended, Berkeleian spirit turns out to be nothing but‘the I’ related to its objects (ideas) through consciousness.

In the traditional view, modes are something like states or properties which ‘exist in’the substance. They’re individuated per substance. For example, my particular height isdistinct from your particular height – even if we have ‘the same’ height. These items are‘adjectival’ on the subject insofar as knowledge of them is inevitably knowledge of thesubstance: One cannot know about my height without reference to me. In my view,Berkeley rejects this model by refusing to make any serious ontological commitment tosuch entities. Why does he do so?

Berkeley discusses two kinds of ‘existence in’ (‘existence in by way of idea’ and ‘exis-tence in by way of mode’) (PHK I 49, 3D III 237). When we say that an idea ‘exists in’the mind or that my height ‘exists in’ me we shouldn’t, according to Berkeley, be under-stood to speak in a literal way about spatial relations (PHK I 16, 3D I 199, 3D III 250–1). My height doesn’t ‘exist in’ my body as my pencil ‘exists in’ my drawer. When wesay that a mind ‘supports’ an idea or that my body ‘supports’ my height, we don’t meanthat as a base supports a pillar. What do we mean? In my reading, Berkeley argues thatwhen we depart from common usage, and speak in a more philosophical sense, we owean account of what we mean (2007: 32–3). Berkeley translates ‘supports’ as ‘perceives’.But he doesn’t find any other translations of ‘support’ that would work in the case ofmode ontology. Because of this, he seems to regard the expression ‘support’ (whenapplied to Lockean substratum at least) as unintelligible. When we say that I ‘support’ myheight – we are using unexplained metaphors that must be rejected.

This much is a relatively unsurprising reading of the passages in which Berkeley offersan argument against Locke’s notion of an unknown material substratum. The argument istaken to show that Locke isn’t allowed to conclude the existence of material substratumbecause the relation of support justifying the inference from (sensible ideas of ) modes andqualities is deemed vacuous and, indeed, because he now lacks even a relative idea ofsubstratum as ‘a support of accidents’.

However, I go on to argue that because Berkeley rejects the relation of support betweensubstance and mode, he also rejects the very notion of a mode:

In rejecting the support relation as unintelligible, Berkeley must not only reject the notion of a(material) substratum – he must also reject this notion of mode as well. Such items are informedby the relation of inherence, and cannot be understood without it. (2007: 36)

Not only does Berkeley reject the support relation when it’s not understood in terms ofperception, he rejects the very notion of ‘existence in by way of mode’ altogether.

Although this argument works fairly well when we assume a Lockean position, how-ever, it’s less clear that it works once we assume a Cartesian one. In a Cartesian account,modes are, in a sense, the substance itself existing in a determinate way: Shapes are justextension, doubts, affirmations, etc. are nothing but conscious thought. In this model,



there’s no need to explain any ‘support’ relation, since the extension isn’t really distinctfrom the underlying matter – it is the underlying matter. This means that my argumentfor Berkeley’s rejection of ‘mode ontology’ works only if I can show that Berkeleydoesn’t accept a Cartesian model. And it seems a real possibility that Berkeley adopts aversion of the Cartesian mind.

In defending my claim that Berkeley rejects ‘mode ontology’, I point to textual evi-dence13 that Berkeley sees the Cartesians as ‘confounding’ supporter and supported (selfwith thought, extended substance with extension) (Letter to Molyneux, 1708, Works VII,26).14 I also point to the fact that Philonous convinces Hylas to agree that ‘extension isonly a mode, and matter is something that supports modes’ (3D I 198). Indeed, Hylas asks‘Is it not evident that the thing supported is different from the thing supporting?’(198).And this anti-Cartesian concession proves crucial in the success of Philonous’ argumentagainst Hylas’ Lockean material substratum. But it may also appear that this is not entirelydecisive. For example, one might object that it isn’t clear that Hylas’ (and Philonous’apparent) acceptance of this distinction evinces Berkeley’s actual acceptance of it.15

So let me add now that it is notable that in the Three Dialogues Berkeley also has Philo-nous argue against the Cartesian account of extension. He says:

If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct abstract idea of motion or extension, divested of allthose sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and the like … I willthen yield the point you contend for. (3D I 193)

Yet it is plain that the same argument can be made about thought: Is it possible for thereto be a conception of thought, divested of all particular thoughts? Surely, the answer, forBerkeley, must be ‘no’. But then, how could Berkeley posit a (Cartesian) unity over timewith respect to the ever-changing cogitations? How, indeed, could he secure that unitywith respect to the multiplicity of thoughts even at a single time? There’s no way hecould, as far as I can tell, without forming a concept of thought ‘divested from all partic-ular thoughts’. (So the result is going to be an outright collapse into a Humean bundle orelse a Daniel-style mind). And if that’s right, then Berkeley has a reason for rejecting theCartesian account of the mind, just as he has a reason for rejecting Cartesian matter. Therejection is grounded in his anti-abstractionism. Consequently my argument that Berkeleyrejects mode ontology still goes through.

In order to develop my positive account of Berkeleian spirit, I proceed by recognizingthat Locke (and many of his contemporaries) adopt the view that thought is essentiallyreflexive (2007: 43–7; 2009: 197). Locke writes, ‘thinking consists in being conscious thatone thinks’ (E.2.1, 19, 115).16 This means that to think about a unicorn is just to be con-scious that one thinks about a unicorn. And to experience blue is just to be consciousthat one experiences blue. I call this constitutive awareness ‘essential consciousness’. AndI raise the question about its structure (2007: 47–50; 2008: 197–9).

In my reading, Locke (and Descartes) recognizes two elements of essential conscious-ness – the ‘constant element’ (‘I’) and the ‘variable elements’ (thoughts). To be consciousthat one experiences blue is to be aware of (A) oneself as an existent and (B) the state ofexperiencing blue. This model has a structure reflecting substance-mode ontology: Thevariable element is ‘adjectival’ on the self: To have knowledge of the state (‘one’s experi-encing blue’) is to have knowledge of oneself. I call this consciousness ‘singular’ since theonly object of awareness is the self (2007: 47–9; 2009: 198–9).

Once Berkeley rejects ‘mode ontology’, however, he cannot view the variable elementas a mental state ‘adjectival’ on the self. The awareness that one experiences blue is nowanalyzed as awareness of (A) oneself as an existent and (B) blue. The latter is not a mental



state (i.e., not ‘one’s experiencing of blue’). Rather, one’s experiencing of blue is thesheer relation that obtains between the constant and variable elements. This relation canbe understood in terms of essential consciousness that links the I and the blue together(i.e., one’s essential consciousness that one experiences blue includes both the I and thevariable element blue).

In this model, since the variable element is no longer ‘adjectival’ on the self, to haveknowledge of it is not to ipso facto have knowledge of the self (2007: 47–50; 2009: 199–202). For example, to have knowledge of blue is not ispo facto to have knowledge of theself. (By contrast, to have knowledge of one’s experiencing blue is to have knowledge ofoneself). This means that the ‘singular self-consciousness’ comprised of both constant andvariable elements has now been split into two modalities of consciousness – consciousnessof self (I) and consciousness of non-self (blue). This is to say that self-consciousness nolonger extends beyond the constant element of consciousness (the I) to include the vari-able one (as a kind of state).

This is an admittedly subtle shift in ‘essential consciousness’. However, it yields severalimportant interpretive consequences. First, Berkeley can explain how selves are genuinelypermanent through time (2007: 99–100; 2009: 206–7). In a Lockean model of essentialconsciousness, since ‘the I’ as datum is a constituent of any given thought, there will bedifferent representations of the I with each passing thought.17 But in Berkeley’s view,perceptions become mere relations of self to its objects. So objects are allowed to changewhile the I remains numerically the same.

Second, my reading sheds light on Berkeley’s peculiar views about self-knowledge(2007: 51–3; 2009: 201–3). Essential consciousness is bifurcated, so it’s important not toconfuse the self with its objects. By confusing the two, one treats ‘bifurcated’ conscious-ness as ‘singular’ and thereby misconstrues ideas as modes which are adjectival on theself.18 To ensure that we distinguish between self-consciousness and ‘support’ I readBerkeley as restricting the word ‘perception’ to the latter only – thus yielding the viewthat a self cannot be perceived (i.e., a self cannot be supported).

Finally, this account purports to explain why perception (of all things) is, for Berkeley,a relation of support (2007: 53–4; 2008: 203–4). In my view, perception is a relation thatobtains between constant and variable elements of essential consciousness. This means thatthe variable elements are inherently elements of consciousness; they cannot exist except assuch elements. But given the fact that essential consciousness has a structure (that includesa constant element), variable elements are always bound to a self – they cannot exist with-out a self.

Alas, as I have defended it, this last advantage actually hasn’t been so clear. For while itmay be true that variable elements cannot exist except as bound to a self, it’s equally truethat a self cannot exist except bound to variable elements. Since the self can’t exist exceptas an element of essential consciousness, it’s not clear why we shouldn’t say that it toocannot exist unperceived. Both constant and variable elements seem to be objects of con-sciousness. So there’s no subject–object asymmetry necessary to say that the former per-ceives the latter.

But what I do think that I can say in response to this potential objection is this: The Iis self-conscious and the variable element isn’t. Since the constant element alone is (self)conscious, it follows that essential consciousness must belong to it (rather than the variableelement). And while neither can exist except as elements of essential consciousness, thelatter is genuinely dependent; it cannot exist on its own and needs something else to beconscious of it. In short: The I is that which is conscious (the subject) and the variableelement is that which needs ‘the support’ (the object). While both spirit and idea are



objects (or ‘elements’) of consciousness only the latter is an object of perception (i.e., thatwhich is supported). If this is right, then I can point to the asymmetry necessary to makesense of perception as a genuine relation of support.

I take these explanatory benefits to weigh heavily in favor of my account. And I seethe cost of the account as fairly minimal. To be sure, the claim that Berkeley abandonsmode ontology is a striking one. But we need to posit only a very subtle shift in howessential consciousness is conceptualized. And Berkeley still retains the notion of ‘sub-stance’ in a way that leaves him in dialog with the Aristotelian-Cartesian-Lockean tradi-tions.

That said, there do remain some challenges. Since mode ontology has been rejected,all mental operations must now be explained in terms of the relation of perception ⁄ sup-port between self and its objects (2007: 55). And on the face of it, this seems like a bigchallenge. Consider the difference between imagining a color and sense-perceiving acolor. In my view, in both cases there’s a relation of support ⁄perception between self andcolor. But while there may be a difference in the object (the imagined color is faint, thesense-perceived color is vivid), this doesn’t seem enough to capture the crucial difference:In the case of imagination one produces the idea, while in the case of sense-perceptionone doesn’t. So how do I explain it?

In my reading, for Berkeley there are two fundamentally different kinds of perception(i.e., relations of support) – active and passive. The difference is characterized as follows.In active perception, the existence of a perceived idea consists in being perceived by thatspecific perceiver (2007: 72). In passive perception, it doesn’t (78). Because of this, aspirit can literally produce and destroy ideas through (actively) perceiving them. The veryperceiving (i.e., ‘supporting’) of them brings them into existence. In the case of sense-perception, however, perception can’t create an idea (since the existence of the ideadoesn’t consist in being perceived by that spirit). On the contrary, the very perception iscaused from without. In my view then, it turns out that volition is nothing but activeperception itself while passion is nothing but passive perception.

Once the distinction between volition and passion is explained, work can then be doneto accommodate the full repertoire of mental operations (such as division, composition,memory, and so forth) by explicating them in terms of the active production of ideas.That is, mental operations should turn out to be different kinds of imaginings distin-guished by appeal to differences in effects and circumstances (2007: 83–4). For example,the operation of composition requires only two starting ideas and then the imaginativeproduction of one unified idea.

Admittedly, it remains to be seen whether such a reductive account can accommodatea rich mental economy replete with various mental operations. Yet it is also worthremembering that the actual details Berkeley provides about the mind are notoriouslysparse – particularly with regard to this richer mental economy. Berkeley just doesn’thave much to say about the various operations. So it wouldn’t be so surprising that hismodel of mind ended up being a little explanatorily thin. In this respect, my reading mayseem to mirror Berkeley’s in its meagerness.

But what I do hope to have shown now, at any rate, is that unlike Daniel’s account,my reading doesn’t labor under the same weight of implausibility. Its chief benefit is thatit carves out enough space for Berkeleian spirit so that it doesn’t have to be reduced to aCartesian mind, a Lockean self, or a Humean bundle. But it does this without makingBerkeley so foreign to the Aristotelian-Cartesian-Lockean traditions that he ends upspeaking an entirely different language.



Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Sam Rickless for inviting me to submit an essay to PhilosophyCompass. And I am grateful to an anonymous referee for very helpful comments.

Short Biography

Talia Mae Bettcher is a Professor of Philosophy at California State University, Los Ange-les. She is the author of Berkeley’s Philosophy of Spirit, Berkeley: A Guide for the Perplexed,and several articles on Berkeley’s philosophy of mind.

Notes

* Correspondence: Department of Philosophy, California State University, Los Angeles, 5151 State UniversityDrive, Los Angeles, CA 90032-8114, USA. Email: [email protected].

1 Citations of A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (PHK) refer to part and section, Three Dialoguesbetween Hylas and Philonous (3D) refer to dialogs number and page, Philosophical Commentaries(PC) refer to entry. Allreferences to Berkeley are from A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (ed).2 For a classic formulation of this, see Turbayne (1959).3 See Atherton (1983) and Beardsley (2001) for this reading.4 See Flage (1987: 133–70). While Flage doesn’t explicitly claim that that Berkeleian spirit should be understood asa Lockean-style substratum, he does argue that Berkeley spirit is only known through its relations to ideas. We haveno positive conception of its nature.5 See Tipton (1966) for this reading.6 See Muehlmann (1995) for this reading.7 Caution is required since in this account, it’s the mind that individuates the ideas through this process of identifi-cation and differentiation. However, minds are nonetheless differentiated by their activities, which are differentiatedby their objects ‘after the fact’ (2008: 214). This means that different ideas would yield a different mind. Danielsays: ‘God thus inscribes each mind with the affective ideas that not only differentiate it from his and other mindsbut also link to one another in virtue of similar (and perhaps even the same) ideas’ (2001c: 245–6). The specific con-tent of what a finite mind perceives allows it to be differentiated from other minds.8 There isn’t any textual basis for attributing to Berkeley a distinction between subsistence and existence in thePrinciples, since he consistently uses both terms when speaking of spirits (Hight and Ott 2004: 13).9 ‘I call whatever is conceived as subsisting by itself and as the subject of everything conceived about it, a thing. Itis otherwise called a substance. I call a manner of a thing, or mode, or attribute, or quality that which, conceived asin the thing and not able to subsist without it, determines it to be in a certain way and causes it to be so named’(Arnauld and Nicole 30).10 See McCracken (1989) and Belfrage (2007).11 I use this as a convenient abbreviation for a list of related notions – accidents, modifications, qualities, properties,and so forth.12 This, by itself, is not new. While it’s a disputed point, others have denied that ideas are modes which inhere inmind for Berkeley. For example, see George Pappas (2000: 131). PHK I 49 and 3D III 237 are particularly relevantpassages.13 2007: 34–5.14 For a nice discussion of this issue, see Walter Ott (2006).15 It is tempting to appeal to Berkeley’s claim that what philosophers say of substance and mode is ‘very groundlessand unintelligible’ (PHK I 49) to move quickly to the claim that Berkeley rejects mode ontology. However,defenders of the view that Berkeley’s conception of mind is largely Cartesian have alternative ways of reading thispassage. See Beardsley (2001) for example. See my discussion as well (2007: 30–1).16 Consequently, he distinguishes between consciousness (in which thinking itself consists) and reflection (the sec-ond major source of ideas).17 Thus, Locke appeals to memory (or, rather, consciousness of past actions).18 This yields the view that there are many possible intrinsic states of the mind (since for every idea one can per-ceive, there is a new intrinsic state of mind). In the bifurcated model, by contrast, since mental states are merelyrelational, there’s no concern about further unknown (intrinsic) states: There’s only new objects of perception.



Works Cited

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Atherton, Margaret. ‘The Coherence of Berkeley’s Theory of Mind.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43(1983): 389–99.

Beardsley, William H. ‘Berkeley on Spirit and its Unity.’ History of Philosophy Quarterly 18.3 (2001): 259–77.Belfrage, Bertil. ‘George Berkeley’s Four Concepts of the Soul (1707–1709).’ Reexamining Berkeley’s Philosophy. Ed.

Stephen H. Daniel. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 2007. 172–87.——. ‘Editor’s Commentary.’ George Berkeley’s Manuscript Introduction: An Editio Diplomatica Transcribed and Edited

with Introduction and Commentary by Bertil Belfrage. Doxa: Oxford, 1987. 28–57.Berkeley, George. The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. 9 vols. Ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop. London:

Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1948–1957.Bettcher, Talia Mae. ‘Berkeley’s Dualistic Ontology.’ Analisis Filosofico 28.2 (2008a): 147–74.——. ‘Berkeley and Hume on the Self and Self-Consciousness.’ Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind. Ed. Jon

Miller. Netherlands: Springer Verlag, 2009. 195–224.——. Berkeley’s Philosophy of Spirit: Consciousness, Ontology, and the Elusive Subject. London: Continuum, 2007.——. ‘Berkeley on Self-Consciousness.’ New Interpretations of Berkeley’s Thought. Ed. Stephen Daniel. Amherst: Jour-

nal of the History of Philosophy Books Humanity Press, 2008b. 179–202.Daniel, Stephen H. ‘Berkeley’s Christian Neoplatonism, Archetypes, and Divine Ideas.’ Journal of the History of Phi-

losophy 39.2 (2001c): 239–58.——. ‘Berkeley’s Stoic Notion of Spiritual Substance.’ New Interpretations of Berkeley’s Thought. Journal of the History

of Philosophy Books Series. Ed. Stephen H. Daniel. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2007. 203–30.——. ‘Berkeley, Suarez, and the ‘Esse-Existere’ Distinction.’ American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74.4 (2000):

621–36.——. ‘Edwards, Berkeley, and Ramist Logic.’ Idealistic Studies 31.1 (2001a): 55–72.——. ‘The Ramist Context of Berkeley’s Philosophy.’ British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9.3 (2001b): 487–

505.Flage, Daniel. Berkeley’s Doctrine of Notions: A Reconstruction Based on his Theory of Meaning. London: Croom Helm.

1987.Hight, Marc and Walter Ott. ‘The New Berkeley.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2004): 1–24.McCracken, Charles J. ‘Berkeley’s Notion of Spirit.’ History of European Ideas 7 (1989): 56–88.Muehlmann, Robert G. ‘The Substance of Berkeley’s Philosophy.’ Berkeley’s Metaphysics: Structural, Interpretive, and

Critical Essays. Ed. R. Muehlmann. University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1995. 89–105.Ott, Walter. ‘Descartes and Berkeley on the Mind: The Fourth Distinction.’ The British Journal for the History of

Philosophy 14.3 (2006): 437–50.Pappas, George. Berkeley’s Thought. Ithaca: Cornell UP. 2000.Tipton, I. C. ‘Berkeley’s View of Spirit.’ New Studies in Berkeley’s Philosophy. Ed. Warren Steinkraus. New York:

Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966. 59–71.Turbayne, Colin M. ‘Berkeley’s Two Concepts of Mind.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20.1 (1959):

85–92.



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