berkeley's argument for a divine visual language

BERKELEY'S A R G U M E N T F O R A D I V I N E V I S U A L L A N G U A G E

Towards the end of the Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision Berkeley concludes that

. . . the proper objects of vision constitute an universal language of the Author of Nature, whereby we are instructed how to regulate our actions in order to attain those things that are necessary to the preservation and well-being of our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may be hurtful and destructive of t h e m . . . And the manner wherein they signify and mark unto us the objects which are at a distance is the same with that of languages of human appointment, which do not suggest the things signified by any likeness or identity of nature, but only by an habitual connexion between them. 1

Berkeley is not arguing that the proper objects of vision, namely "light, shades, and colours, variously combined ''2 are like a language, or even that they are very much like a language, but rather proposes the much stronger claim that the proper objects of vision are a language. 3 The model of language is not, therefore to be thought of as a merely useful heuristic device - perhaps suggestive of a theory - but it is rather that the concept of 'language' and the word "language" can be applied directly and without qualification to the proper objects of the senses. This implausible claim would seem to be an evident and obvious mistake, and would appear to be a clear case of falling prey to one's own heuristic fictions. Yet it is abundantly clear from Berkeley's works that this claim is one of the central tenets of the theory of immaterialism, and primafacie it

1 The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (Edinburgh: Nelson and Sons, i948), Vol. I, p. 23 I. 2 Alciphron IV, 7. Works of George Berkeley, Vol. I I I . 3 It is clear from the passage that other proper sensibles could also be said to constitute a language; the visual elements are one among several possibilities.

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does not s e e m that Berkeley has been misled by his comparison? But such a claim is obviously in need of some justification - assuming that a plausible case can be made out at all; and a first step towards providing such a justification is that of isolating a syntactic form for the argument. From this point one can then proceed to a determi, nation of the correctness or acceptability of the premisses themselves.

No syntactic form is explicitly given or stated and it is therefore necessary to suggest a plausible candidate. Berkeley's argument has, in fact, a number of similarities with the dialectical argument which, in the scholastic period, was called the "argument from definition. ''5 But this tradition provides little in the way of a useful theory, primarily for the reason that the presupposed theory of essences is quite incompatible with the Berkeleian metaphysical theories. It is not too difficult, however, to develop (informally) an argument-form, similar to the scholastic argument from definition, and which does give the syntactic character of the argument: hence, the written or spoken word "language" may be said to have correlated with it a concept or "meaning" which is "menta l" in character; if the word "concept" is interpreted in this intensional manner it will mean at least " that which is understood in the use of the word", and one way in which the expression " that which is understood" can be specified for substantive terms, such as 'language', is by means of the terminology of'connotation', 'signification', and 'denotation', where these terms have the sense assigned to them by C. I. Lewis. Ignoring the designation and denotation of the term 'language' for the moment and considering the signification and connotation (or intension), this is then a question as to the the features or characteristics which the denoted entity must have in order to merit the verbal designation, or, on the "menta l" side, a question as to the "criteria-in-mind" to which one would be prepared to appeal in applying the word. It would then be possible to provide a list of such features or characteristics and - for the sake of simplicity ignoring the ordering of the members of the set and other internal logical relations between the members - this set of features or characteristics will then constitute a part of the

For an exhaustive analysis and application of the linguistic model see C.M. Turbayne, The My h of Metaphor (New Haven: Yale University Press, I962 ). a Cf. William of Sherwood's Introductiones in Logicam, ed. and trans, by Norman Kretz- mann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, I966), p. 72.

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concept of the entity. Hence, if Berkeley is to have a plausible argument its plausibility will depend upon what is "'contained in" the two concepts of 'language' and 'proper objects of vision'. The argument must then be said to succeed if the features and characteristics identified as the signification and connotation of 'language' coincides through a one-to-one pairing relation with the signification and connotation of 'proper objects of vision'. Conse- quently, if it can be shown that the proper objects of vision, which initially and perhaps naively certainly do not appear to be a language or anything like a language, should have the properties or attributes which, when functioning as the elements of the connotation of 'language', constitute the definition of 'language', then it would be necessary to admit that the proper objects of vision are a language.

But clearly the important questions have to do, not with the form of the argument which can be given a simple set-theoretic characterization, but with the question of the "content" of the two concepts. No doubt the forcefulness of the argument is increased if the set of characteristics identified for the concept of 'language' is as large as possible, but even though this should be the case there is still the question as to the membership of the set. One could, conceivably continue the process of identifying features in the concept of 'language' to the extent that the word "language" could apply only to English of a certain dialect, if more and more features are included in the set without any attempt to discriminate between the essential and accidental. One justifiably hesitates now to state categorically precisely and exactly which characteristics constitute the members of the defining set. There are too many distinguishable features and characteristics such that it is difficult to decide whether they should be included or excluded from the defining set. But it would be also mistaken to assert that the membership is entirely and only arbitrary. It is not, in fact, entirely a matter of arbitrary choice which distinguishable elements are members of the set, nor is it merely and entirely a function of either" the conceptual scheme or the particular "language-game" one happens to be using. Some statements are true or false simpliciter of the ordinary and familiar objects in terms of the ordinary and common meanings of the words, and this set of statements consti- tutes a kind of touchstone for the purposes of definition. The initial problem, then, will be that of determining the set of features or


characteristics which Berkeley takes to be the defining set for the word 'language', and whether this set is a plausible set will depend upon the possibility of claiming that the individual features or characteristics are individually necessary and collectively sufficient for the use of the term 'language'.

It has been pointed out by several commentators that Berkeley's theory of language is strikingly contemporary, and a considerable amount of work has now been done on this aspect of Berkeley's philosophy. Here it is most convenient to simply quote one of Berkeley's more compendious descriptions of language. Language is

� 9 the arbitrary use of sensible signs, which have no similitude or necessary connexion with the things signified; so as by the apposite management of them to suggest and exhibit to my mind an endless variety of things, differing in nature, time, and place; thereby informing me, entertaining me, and directing me how to act, not only with regard to things near and present, but also with regard to things distant and future. No matter whether these signs are pronounced or written; whether they enter by the eye or ear: they have the same use, and are proofs of an intelligent, thinking, designing cause. 6

In this passage (and others) Berkeley distinguishes the following characteristics of language: (I) a set of marks or sounds which can be combined in a very large number of different ways to form a composite sign, namely the written or spoken word; (2) both the signs forming words and the words combined to form sentences or other complex expressions are combined according to rules; (3) sentences formed from groups of such marks or sounds may have a number of distinct and different functions or purposes and Berkeley identifies the statement function, an expressive-emotive function, and an admonitory-imperatival function; (4) for most uses or functions there is a predictive and expectational element; (5) language signs (typically) have no similitude or likeness with the things signified; iconic signs are not, apparently, typical signs, although there is no reason why Berkeley would rule such signs out. The characteristics divide conveniently into two types, namely those

6 Alciphron IV, 7.

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features or characteristics which have reference to the physical occurrence of language, and those which refer to types of meaning, emotive, descriptive, or imperatival. In the cited passage it is said that the signs suggest something else to the mind, and this can be taken as a clue to the theory of meaning. But in order to follow up this clue it is more fruitful to examine the theory of generality or universality, and with respect to this Berkeley writes:

. . . universality, so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions, being in their own nature particular, are rendered universal, v

Or again, what makes a word or sign a universal is by

� 9 an idea, which considered in itself is p a r t i c u l a r , . . , being made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. s

In comparison with the classical theories of universality this is not so much a theory of universality as a theory of general names - despite Berkeley's claims to the contrary. There is no doubt that there is the beginning of a theory of universals and it is also true that in rough outline there are a number of similarities between the Berkeleian notion of generality and the theories of the Ockhamist or terminist logicians. There are, however, two points which stand out with very considerable clarity in Berkeley's theory: (I) specific signs become general names when some specific and particular sig n stands in a one-many relation with a multiplicity of other particulars. But (2) in addition to this extension factor in general names, the occurrence of the sign "brings to mind" or "suggests" a multitude of particulars of a certain sort or kind; that is, the general name is not a name for any arbitrarily selected individuals, but only for the members of certain class or sort or type. It should be noted that this reference to types and sorts, which evidently determine the "limits of application" of the general word, is inconsistent with the "official" view of Berkeleian nominalism which imputes to

v Principles of Human Knowledge; Works of George Berkeley, Vol. II , (see. I5). 8 Ibld., I2.

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Berkeley only the extensional notion. It is quite incorrect to describe the meaning relation (for general names) as only a one- many relation between some arbitrary but conventionally agreed upon sign and a set of arbitrary but conventionally agreed particulars. There is a hint here of some theory of universals, but there is only a hint and Berkeley does not develop anything resembling a theory until Siris.

But of immediate importance is the use of this theory of language for interpreting and explaining selected aspects of the domain of conscious phenomenal experience. On this point Professor C. M. Turbayne 's investigations are decisive, and the simplest procedure is to state the major "theorems" which Turbayne isolates as the crucial principles in the theory of the phenomenal language of nature :

VII .

VII I .

IX.

X. XI.

I. The phenomena of nature constitute a universal language of nature ;

II. The Author of Nature communicates with intelligent decoders so that He may direct their actions;

III . The phenomena of nature constitute a written language;

IV. The letters of the alphabet of nature constitute what we call "sensible qualities";

V. The letters of the alphabet are abstract entities: they never occur each of them apart by itself and sepa- rated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together;

VI. The letters of the alphabet of nature are universals: the same few original letters recur in many different combinations; The letters of the alphabet of nature are combined to make what we call "particulars" or "sensible things" ; What we call "particulars" or "sensible things" are analyzable into the letters of the alphabet of nature; The rules of syntax of the language of nature are called "the laws of nature"; Rules of syntax provide explanations; Rules of syntax provide predictions and retro- dictions ;

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XII .

XI I I . XIV.

Rules of syntax are expressed in terms of"s ign" and "thing signified"; Rules of syntax help us to write; Rules of syntax are prescriptions. 9.

Hence, physical objects are the phenomenal equivalent of words; the proper objects of vision, namely "light, shades, and colours, variously combined" (or the proper objects of the other senses) constitute the equivalent of letters, i.e., the specific marks or sounds in a conventional language. The phenomenal equivalent of words illustrate a syntax or rules of combination, these rules or laws being the "laws of nature" and the object of study in natural science. The phenomenal words form then the equivalent of propositions and these "propositions of nature", in the order of nature, can be said to have a number of distinct and different functions, analogous to those distinguished for conventional language, namely that of providing information as to what in fact exists, and there is a clear sense in which they can provide warnings and admonitions as well as something like an equivalent of the emotive expressive function. Hence, so far as the public and "physical" aspect is concerned, and up to this point, the phenomena of nature form a language on a one-one pairing.

But only as long as the focus of attention is on those features ot language characterizing it as a physical fact or occurrence: in the Berkeleian theory language is not merely a physical occurrence but an occurrence for some perceiver. From the perspective of the perceiver - the agent who intends - a number of puzzling problems appear. Some of the puzzles are not necessarily serious difficulties, in that there may be ways in which the language model can, perhaps, be interpreted in order to avoid the difficulties. In any case, interpretations and perhaps modifications are required.

(I) A standard use of discourse is the referential use, and this is equally the case for the Berkeleian theory of meaning as well. For while Berkeley is remarkably contemporary in distinguishing a number of distinct functions of language there is no hint that he would want to deny a descriptive and a referential (truth-functional)

9 C. M. Turbayne, "Berkeley's Metaphysical Grammar". A Treatise Concernh~g the Principles of Human Knowledge, with critical essays, ed. by Colin Murray Turbayne (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, i97o), pp. 3 if-

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use of discourse: indeed, to do so would have a number of serious consequences for his theories. Yet it is just at this point that the language model would appear to break down: ordinary discourse has a referential function but the phenomenal language does not have such (and indeed in terms of the attack on matter and sub- stance, the phenomenal language cannot have such). The "'words" and "expressions" of the phenomenal language cannot be said to be about anything at all. To use the sense-reference distinction, the phenomenal language might be said to have a sense factor but no referential function. By way of contrast, if the model were applied as an interpretation of representative realism (e.g., Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, et al.) it could be argued that the phenomenal language has a referential character since then the perceived objects or "words" are representations of the extra-mental object. But this is an option which Berkeley is at great pains to dismiss.

There are at least two ways in which this difficulty can be re- moved. One could simply refuse to allow that the referential feature of the language model applies to the phenomenal language. This is to admit in effect that the model breaks down at this point, and that the explanatory capacity of the model cannot be extended further. But this unwelcome alternative is not only drastic, it is also unnecessary. Hence, the language of the Author of Nature might well be said to be without a referent, having only a sense, and in the following way: the language of the Author of Nature is spoken; Berkeley often uses the locution of the Author of Nature speaking to one through the visual sense. One has, therefore a rough equivalent to the grammatical subordinate clause type of construction, that is, " Ssays 'p ' " or "S says that p". A useful device at this point is to adopt Frege's theory that the referent of subordinate clauses is not a truth value but a thought or the sense. Then the sense of the expressions of the phenomenal language will be the complex of distinguishable elements or features of what, in English, would be the referent of "material objects" and the various relations of these one with another. It should be noted, however, that this interpretation renders expressions of the phenomenal language without a truth-value value, and hence one cannot say that the Author of Nature asserts anything - and this in turn means that the possible "linguistic" functions which might be distinguished for the phenomenal language are rather more restricted than those which

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hold for English. But in support of this interpretation it might be noted that in the language of traditional phenomenalism in which "appearing-statements" and "seeming-statements" are basic there are no categorically true or false statements and hence there is an analogue to the phenomenal language.

(2) But should it be admitted that the referent of "expressions" in the phenomenal language is the sense of these "expressions" there would then appear be to be another difficulty. The words in the phenomenal language are instantiation of the specific universals - the proper objects of vision - and hence the immediately perceived colours are tokens of the universal types. But what, to be specific and exact, is the sense of the words or expressions in the phenomenal language? The answer which was given above, namely the collec- tion or set of properties which constitute what, in English, would be the extension of "material object" (to use one familiar sort of object), is superficial and inexact under closer scrutiny. But the membership of the set of features or characteristics constituting the material object is not merely instantiations of the relevant universals or "letters" in the phenomenal language. Being able to say something in one's field of vision is an object is, on Berkeley's theory of vision, both a matter of sensitivity to colours, hues, and shapes, but also a matter of responding to various clues which, in the case of distant objects are such factors as obscurity, faintness, etc. But it is evident that the perceiver adds something in the response to the clues, namely that it is an object, that it is distant, that it is a tower, and so on. One of the aims of the Essay is precisely to show that there is, so to speak, considerable interpretation by the perceiver who, in effect, converts the flat plane of the field of vision into the three-dimensional field of vision. I f Berkeley's theory is correct these latter additions are functions of the perceiver and are therefore of a considerably different status from that of the instantiated universals. But from this it would apparently follow that a part of the sense of the phenomenal word is a result of interpretation added by the perceiver, or a function of the perceiver. And therefore the referent of phenomenal expressions, namely the sense, is in part functions of the perceiver himself, a consequence which, to say the least, is rather odd.

There is, it has to be admitted, a reply which is at least partially satisfactory: it could be argued on the basis of the language model


that this factor of the phenomenal language is no different from that which is required of anyone who has to interpret English or any other language (Turbayne's theorem II). Just as one has to interpret a written or spoken presentation, interpret the marks or sounds, so there has to be an interpretation of instantiations of the proper objects of vision. But this does not resolve the difficulty that the sense of the language of the Author of Nature, namely the referent of the language, is in part a function of the perceiver, and this marks a divergence from the model of the subordinate clause in English.

(3) In application of the language model English functions as, and is said to function as, a metalanguage with respect to the phenomenal language which is now the "object" language. It is possible for the object language to have for its content the "letters" and "words" of the phenomenal language. But the typical case is rather different, since the object language is comprised of "material objects". The typical case, in other words, is rather that the object language corresponding to the English metalanguage is an interpreted set of "words", and this in turn is a sense and not the equivalent of the English sentence, words, or complex expressions. Even if the object language is taken to comprise the "words" and "expressions" in the phenomenal language, the "extension" of the phenomenal language still remains the sense of the expressions. But then the object language metalanguage distinction tend to collapse altogether, and the reason for this is that the meaning of the expressions in the metalanguage (English) is in effect the sense of the phenomenal language; or alternatively, the meaning of the metalanguage expressions is the "extension" of the object language. The reason for this is that, in the case of substantive expressions, the meaning of the terms denoting the entities or substantives is a function of the properties, qualities, and in general the features and characteristics included within the signification and the connotation of the term. The signification of the term is, however, identical with the sense of the "words" in the phenomenal language and therefore there is no distinction between the meaning in English and the "meaning" in the phenomenal language; the most that one might be said to have is an analogue to the translation context, as for example "tree" in English and arbor in Latin.

I would not want to argue that this latter problem cannot be

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given a satisfactory resolution. But I should want to argue that some kind of solution is required if the metalanguage-object language distinction is to be retained, and since this distinction would appear to be a fundamental presupposition for the use of the language model it is all the more important that these puzzles be sorted out. The possible suggestion that ultimately in Berkeley's theory of meaning there is no descriptive function at all is much too drastic since then metaphysical solipsism lurks in the background and I should want to argue that it is by means of the descriptive function that a case can be made out for the defeat of solipsism.

WALTER E. CREERY York University

berkeley's argument for a divine visual language

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