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Back issues of BCAS publications published on this site are

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CONTENTS

Vol. 11, No. 3: JulySeptember 1979

Jon Halliday - The Korean War: Some Notes on Evidence and

Solidarity

Peter F. Bell and Mark Selden - Malcolm Caldwell, 1931-1978

Torben Retboll - Kampuchea and the Readers Digest

Helen Chauncey - Reaching the Other Side by Earl S. Martin /

Review

Robert Salasin - Peking Politics, 1918-1923 by Andrew Nathan /

Review

Paul Clark - Urban Change in China 1890-1949 by David Buck /Review

Victor Nee - Towards a Social Anthropology of the Chinese

Revolution

Ng Gek-boo - The Commune System and Income Inequality in

Rural China

Fred Herschede - Higher Education and the Expansion of

Technically Qualified Industrial Workers During Chinas

Modernization, 1976-1985

BCAS/Critical Asian Studies

www.bcasnet.org

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CCAS Statement of Purpose

Critical Asian Studies continues to be inspired by the statement of purpose

formulated in 1969 by its parent organization, the Committee of ConcernedAsian Scholars (CCAS). CCAS ceased to exist as an organization in 1979,

but the BCAS board decided in 1993 that the CCAS Statement of Purpose

should be published in our journal at least once a year.

We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of

the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of

our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of

Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their

research and the political posture of their profession. We are

concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak

out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to en-

suring American domination of much of Asia. We reject the le-

gitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We

recognize that the present structure of the profession has often

perverted scholarship and alienated many people in the field.

The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a

humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies

and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confrontsuch problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism. We real-

ize that to be students of other peoples, we must first understand

our relations to them.

CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in

scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial

cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansion-

ism. Our organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a

communications network for both Asian and Western scholars, aprovider of central resources for local chapters, and a commu-

nity for the development of anti-imperialist research.

Passed, 2830 March 1969

Boston, Massachusetts

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Vol. 11, No.3 / July-Sept., 1979

Contents Jon Halliday 2 The Korean WarSome Notes on Evidence and Solidarity

Peter F. Bell and Mark Selden 19 Malcolm Caldwell, 1931-1978Torben Retboll 22 Kampuchea and the Reader's Digest

Helen Chauncey 28 Reaching the Other Side by Earl S. Martin/reviewRobert Salasin 32 Peking Politics, 1918-1923 by Andrew Nathan/review

Paulelark 37 Urban Change in China, 1890-1949 by David Buck/reviewVictor Nee 40 Towards a Social Anthropology of the Chinese Revolution

NgGek-boo 51 The Commune System and Income Inequality in Rural ChinaFred Herschede 64 Higher Education and the Expansion of Technically QualifiedIndustrial Workers During China's Modernization, 1976-1985

CorrespondenceAddress all correspondence to:

BCAS, P.O. Box W Charlemont, MA 01339

The Bulletin ofConcerned Asian Scholars is published quarterly. Second class postage paid at Shelburne Falls, MA 01370.Publisher: Bryant Avery. Copyright by Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Inc., 1979. ISSN No. 0007-4810.Typesetting: Archetype (Berkeley, CA). Printing: Valley Printing Co. (West Springfield, MA).Postmaster: Send Form 3579 to BCAS, Box W, Charlemont,MA0I339.

ContributorsPeter Bell teaches in the Social Sciences Divison of the StateUniversity of New York-Purchase.

Paul Clark of New Zealand is currently conducting research atHarvard University.Jon Halliday, Co-Editorof the Bulletin in 1979, is the author ofA Political History ofJapanese Capitalism.Fred Herschede is a Professor of Economics at Indiana University, South Bend.Victor Nee is a Professorof Sociology, UniversityofCaliforniaSanta Barbara, and in 1979-80 a Visiting Research Fellow atCornell University.Ng Gek-boo is associated with the International Labour Officein Geneva, Switzerland.Torben Retboll is a Danish historian who has been doing re-search on Kampuchea and the Western press.Roben Sa/asin, a graduate student at Washington University,St. Louis , is studying P.L.A. factionalism and ideology.

Helen Chauncey is an associate of the Southeast Asia Resource Mark Selden, a member of the Editorial Board of the Bulletin, isCenter and a member of the Bulletin's Editorial Board. a Professor ofHistory at Washington University, St. Louis ..

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The Korean WarSome Notes on Evidence and Solidarity

by Jon HallidayIntroduction

These are reflections and questions* provoked partly bythe experience of two years' work in the Korea Committee(U .K.) and partly by reading three documents written or produced during the Korean War: (a) the diary of Harold Noble, aU.S. Embassy official, written during the war; (b) a volume ofinterviews with inhabitants of Seoul about their experiencesfrom the end of June to late September 1950 (part of U. S. AirForce study); (c) the first major work by Henry Kissinger, CivilAffairs in Korea, the result of research carried out in Korea in1951. I All three volumes raise important questions about propaganda; the first two, especially, provoke vital questions aboutevidence. How can one assess evidence? How did the authorfind out what he/she claims to '"know'''? What did he/sheactually see, and not see? To whom did he/she talk, and nottalk? What does the author withhold from the reader'?Korea is not like Vietnam. In particular, one of the bigproblems about the origins of the Korean War is that even whenone has what one may think is all the evidence assembled, it just

does not seem to fit. Yet, it must fit. What happened happened,and what did not happen did not happen. There is a true storysomewhere. The DPRK (North Korea) says: we are telling thetrue story, and the U.S., Seoul, etc. are lying. Washington andSeoul say the same thing, only the other way round. Both sidesare demonstrably evasive and selective. And one must alsoentertain the possibility that both sides are lying.I have argued the main political issues elsewhere, in earliertexts. 2 However the experience of work in the Korea Committeehas forced me to think more about why in the West there hasbeen so little solidarity with, and understanding of, the Koreanpeople. What are the obstacles to solidarity and understanding-both in the West and in Korea itself?Undoubtedly, the Korean War remains a major issue, and aparticularly difficult one for the left. In these notes I will try to

* I would like to thank Aidan Foster-Carter, Gavan McConnack, Fred Halliday, Sugwon Kang and Bruce Cumings for many helpful suggestions on earlierdrafts.

set the" start" of the Korean War in its wider context of ongoingpolitical struggle. (After all, does anyone ask, "Who started theVietnam War?") I will also attempt to raise some of the issues ofpolitical struggle during the War itself, which have been generally neglected. And, finally, I wish to broach the complicatedquestion of solidarity and the unusually cool relationship between the Western left and the part of the Korean left represented by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Iinclude some tentative observations on the specific politicalpractice of the DPRK, and how this affects Western opinion andthe Korean people as a whole. 3Embassy at War

Written in the years 1951- 1952 and now published in anedited version with an introduction and copious editorial notesby Frank Baldwin, the diary of Harold Noble, first Secretary atthe U.S. Embassy in South Korea, provides an excellent occasion to consider some important issues.4 Both Noble and Baldwin discuss the immediate origins of the war. Both reject theDPRK line and support the U.S. line on the start of the war.Noble refers approvingly to the UN observers' report on theimmediate pre-June 25 (1950) period, the essence of which, hestates, was that the ROK Army "could not possibly be preparing to take the offensive" (16).It is correct that this is indeed the essence of the report. Butis there anything else that could and should be said? Yes, thereis. Section 8 of the same report, which Noble does not mention,states: "Observers made special point inquiring what information was coming in regarding situation north of parallel ... Noreports ... have been received of any unusual activity on part

of North Korean forces that would indicate any impendingchange in general situation along parallel ."5 This was based onobservations carried out up to June 22-23. When examining andpresenting the evidence, one must be scrupulous. I f one wantsto quote one part of the evidence, I think one should quote theother (even if, as I wish to show below, the evidence is not verygood). Noble chooses his source-the UN Observers' Report-which he considers reliable. He quotes the part of theReport which supports his contention that the ROK Army2

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, could not possibly be preparing to take the offensive," but heomits the part of the Report which notes that, after "special[efforts1 inquiring" about the North, the Observers had noinformation indicating that the North was about to do anythingto bring about a "change in [the1general situation.' 6 But eventhis leaves the real problems untouched. First of all, how muchdid the UN observers really see? There were only two of them,both Australians: Squadron Leader Ron Rankin (RAAF) andMajor Stirling Peach (Army). They had only recently arrived inKorea. Did they know Korean? They slept mainly in Seoul andwent up to the Parallel on nine of the days between June 9 and23. 7 How much could they really see in this period oftime? Theterrain is extremely mountainous with deep valleys cut off fromeach other, especially in the Center and East. Admittedly, theywere on the Ongjin peninsula from June 21-23, but they visitedsome sectors of the parallel over 2 weeks before the war"started" -during which time a lot of things could havechanged. So this is one problem: was the Observers' report onthe Southern side reliable, and reasonably complete? In myopinion, there is room for serious doubt on this score.But let us assume, like Noble, it was reliable and reasonably complete asfar as it went (i.e., allowing for quite sizeablechanges between June 9 and June 25 on some sectors of theparallel). Still, why did the observers commit themselves to astatement which excludes the possibility of a Northern invasionnearly as strongly as their statement about the ROK Armyexcluded the possibility of the South invading the North? According to Noble, they had to be mistaken; I'll come back tothis. In a later article for the Saturday Evening Post (August 9,1952) entitled' The Reds Made Suckers of Us All" (reprintedin the Baldwin volume and revised as an Appendix), Nobleconfronts the problem in the title. He sets up the terms of theproblem himself. The United States and its allies did not think awar was about to start then, he states, because they had established criteria by which to detect war preparations: largescale troop movements and large supply dumps. According toNoble, "not the slightest word" was received on what he calls"the two key questions" (229). But why not?

Noble's answer is of the greatest interest, and raises newproblems for the famous UN observers' report. Noble assertsthat there was such a build-up, and that it was concealed, butsays he does not know how it was concealed. Then he suggests,first, that North Korea managed to neutralize all agents:It seems very likely now that during the critical last two weeksthe North Koreans were able to pick up every South Koreanagent near the parallel, or if not that, at least to seal theborder so that none of these operating back and forth in theborder region were able to come south and report in time

Second, he says thatthe greatest [sic] explanation was the superb raule-dauleseries ofdeceptions that had all responsible officials in SouthKorea, including those in the American Embassy, thinkingabout something else instead of studying very carefully thefragments of information leaking through from the north"(230-23/).

A close reading of this Post article (written in mid-1952with time for retlection) raises more questions than it answers.Noble's first "explanation" goes in reverse: there was a buildup: agents on the spot would definitely have noticed this; we hadagents there; we got no news. Ergo, the agents were neutralizedbecause either they were captured or their communications weresealed off. This might be true, but in that case, where does itleave the UN Observers' report'? Section 8 of the report starts outby saying that the observers made a "special point inquiringwhat information was coming in regarding situation north ofparallel. " The observers then record some items of information.Put yourself in their boots. If the Noble hypothesis were true,any observers would say: "All normal sources of informationsuddenly dried up. Sudden, suspicious silence from all agents.No information from North of Parallel since June 10th. AdviseAlert." Or words to that effect. But what did the two Australians, (whose word was then used to swing the UN), actuallysay? They gave what was presumably their most compellinginformation, namely that there was no indication that the Northwas about to start a war. They gave no hint that there was anysudden change in the availability of information from north ofthe parallel. At the very least, Noble's first suggestion isquestionable. 8

I f you want to argue that the KPA attacked after"lengthy, careful planning," you must also acknowledge that the army was only half mobilized on June25th. Whoever heard of an army launching a majorcampaign only half mobilized?

How about his second suggestion that all responsible ROKand US officials were hypnotized and diverted by the "superbrazzle-dazzle series of deceptions"? Leaving aside a majorproblem-namely that Pyongyang has not generally shownitself superb at razzle-dazzle-let us look again at the evidence.Noble hi mself states that even all the evidence they actually haddid not indicate that the North was about to start a war (unless heis suppressing evidence that the North was preparing anattack-a remote possibility). Second, Noble's "greatest explanation" is itself highly suspicious. What kind of professionalintelligence services (two of them-U .S. and ROK) wouldhave every single official "diverted" 24 hours a day for twoweeks? A diversion of the kind suggested by Noble is simplyincredible. In fact the two explanations are mutually incompatible. One says: we did not have the information. The other says:although we had information that the North was about to start awar, we did not notice it.

Noble's original article was apparently written as an attempt to refute I. F. Stone's Hidden History ofthe Korean War,and now his text looks like disinformation. This does not meanthat everything in it is false, or that the opposing thesis isentirely correct. But certainly Noble' s text is speCUlative, inconsistent, and not comprehensive. In his notes Frank Baldwindiscusses the I. F. Stone thesis and later material that substan3

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tially supports Stone. Baldwin correctly stresses that' the largerissue of responsibility for the Korean War is not affected" by arejection of the official DPRK line on the start ofthe war(315). 9Without going into the whole thing again, I would like to saythat I agree with Baldwin and others that the DPRK position hasnot yet been substantiated with cogent and systematic evidence:the DPRK has advanced pieces of evidence which in themselvesmight be believable, but there are far too many holes in theofficial DPRK case and a tremendous lack of hard proof. Moreover, the DPRK has failed to confront explicitly and to iefuteother theses and evidence concerning the start of the war. Thisfailure greatly weakens its position. In other words, it may bethat the DPRK case is true, but it is not proven.Furthermore Baldwin argues that the DPRK has not onlyfailed to produce evidence of a Southern attack on the morningof June 25th, but also that the actions of the Korean People'sArmy (KPA) indicate that it had prepared for a major (first)attack (315). Baldwin writes:

The co-ordinated movement of troops, preceded by artillerybombardment, could have been accomplished only afterlengthy, careful planning. That such a movement offorcescould have been an instantaneous response to a South Ko-rean attack is patently implausible (315).

When discussing reunification, the experiences of thenorthern and southern populations of each other mustbe a central element. In Korea, unlike in Vietnam,virtually the entire popUlation over the age of 30 hasdirectly experienced both regimes.

While for the most part I agree with him, this does not get to theroot ofthe issues. Several things are missing.If you want to argue that the KP A attacked after" lengthy,careful planning' , you must also acknow ledge that the army wasonly half mobilized on June 25th.lo Whoever heard of an armylaunching a major campaign only half mobilized? Why was it soshort of crucial equipment for pursuing its advantage? It lackedvital equipment to get either troops or tanks across the HanRiver-the first big river it would come to-just south ofSeoul. II Similarly, the behavior of its Air Force (14) does notsound like the result of lengthy careful planning.Is the evidence adduced by Baldwin (with most of which, Irepeat, I agree factually) compatible only with the thesis that theNorth attacked the South first? I 2 The KPA was only half mobilized, which tends to go against Baldwin' s thesis. Even the majortroop movements, the use of artillery and a landing on the eastcoast were not so unusual and do not prove a premeditated,plannedfirst attack. After all, there had been a very high level offighting along the Parallel, especially throughout the summer of1949. According to Noble, there were "several large-scalebattles in the Ongjin Peninsula, in the Kaesong area, and nearCh'unchon ... Large NKPA [sic] units, supported by artillery,

invaded the south at least five times in the summer of 1949"(222). According to Gen. Roberts, the head of KMAG (American Military Advisory Group, Korea), there were major borderclashes in the summer of 1949. In a private letter to Gen. Bolte,Roberts wrote:Each was in our opinion brought on by the presence of asmall South Korean salient north of the parallel. Each wascharacterized by the [ROKA} CO's screaming "invasion,reinforce, ammo!" ... The South Koreans wish to invadethe North ... Most incidents on the parallel are due toneedling by opposing local forces. Both North and South areat fault. No attacks by the North have ever been in seriousproportions. IJ

In sum, it is not surprising that the KPA was in a position todeploy fairly large numbers of troops, including artillery. This,in itself, was nothing out of the ordinary. They had used artilleryin 1949. 14Additional "evidence" comes from (alleged) captureddocuments and prisoners. Without more work, it is hard toaccept this evidence as it stands. For example, Baldwin prints aquote from an allegedly captured document, which mentions"G-2" in the "North Korean Army" (315). Yet the KPA neverrefers to itself as the "North Korean Army." And was itsintelligence section called "G-2," just like MacArthur's?

The evidence of the Noble book and many other sourcesleads to the conclusion that the U.S. was not well prepared forthe Korean War in June 1950. Although Stone produces verygood evidence for certain specific tactical retreats and suchlikelater (Stone, 248ff), it is very hard to accept the non-nuancedDPRK-China-USSR line that the entire U.S. state and militaryapparatus was fully prepared for an all out, immediate war,which it planned, or provoked, or launched. But this still leavesopen at least two possibilities: (I) that elements in the U.S. stateand military apparatuses were in favor of eliminating the DPRKand encouraged Rhee to that end; (2) that Rhee provoked war inorder to force the U.S. in to prop up his regime, and, if possible,to overthrow the DPRK. The early defeats and virtual disintegration of the ROK Army are not incompatible with thishypothesis.Refutation of this hypothesis, on the other hand, tends torely on two arguments: (a) after the famous Acheson "defenseperimeter" speech of January 12, 1950, Rhee had no reason tothink the U.S. would intervene;ls (b) most of the ROKA wasquickly smashed, and the Army and government driven out ofSeoul and into the Pusan-Taegu perimeter. Point (b) is a fact,and undisputed. About (a), Baldwin raises the question of "thepossible significance" of Rhee-MacArthur meetings between1945-1950, acknowledging frankly that materials at presentclassified or otherwise not available to researchers may "alterour understanding of some aspects ofthese events" (316). D. F.Fleming also touches on relations between Rhee, MacArthur,Dulles and Chiang Kai-shek in a 1971 article, extensivelY citedby Baldwin. 16 Unfortunately, some of the archives on Korea aretightly sealed. But what if Rhee had good reason to think theU.S. would come in to save him and his regime? It then becomesmuch more difficult to argue that he could not have provoked an

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attack on the North (especially as it was not by any meansuniversally thought or known that the KPA would smash theROKA).17 Light is shed on this in Douglas MacArthur'smemoirs. MacArthur writes that when Dulles visited Korea in1950 "h e apparently reversed the previous policy enunciated bythe State Department, by stating his belief before the Koreanlegislature that the United States would defend Korea if shewere attacked. "1 8 Dulles was not just anybody; he was a leading figure in the formulation of U.S. Far Eastern policy, and his"belief' was tantamount to policy (as MacArthur's first phraseindicates). Moreover, MacArthur" s precis does not indicate thatDulles' speech could reasonably be interpreted as being evenmore "forward" than this. Dulles stated that "never for aminute do we concede that Soviet Communists will hold permanently their unwilling captives [in the North]." According toDulles, this situation is to be remedied by the "irresis tible" and"peaceful" attraction of the South: "You are not alone. Youwill never be alone so long as you continue to play worthily yourpart in the great design of human freedom. "19 Words like"never" and "design" (at a time when "rollback" was anoperative concept) could hardly be treated lightly either by Rheeor by Kim II Sung. Moreover, before and during Dulles' visit,Rhee was making highly belligerent speeches about removingthe DPRK regime. Not only did Dulles fail to distance himself inpublic from Rhee on this, but his June 19 speech could, in myopinion, plausibly be read as an endorsement for Rhee 's generaloutlook.One does not actually have to accept MacArthur's (selfexonerating) explanation-viz., that Dulles did switch U.S. policy. The argument that Rhee had no reason to think the U.S.would support him does not really confront the Dulles speech,or the opinion of MacArthur (or Noble). I f MacArthur is right,Rhee had very good reason to think that the U .S. supported himor that he could force the U. S. to come to his aid. Rhee did nothave to take the Dulles speech as a go-ahead. It is enough that hethought things were going his way and that he could confront theU.S. with an alternative. He might as well have said, "eithercome in and support me, or see the whole of Korea goCommunist. "

All this leaves us with a lot of selective presentation,abused evidence and evasion, as well as outright lying. I f onelooks frankly at the basic military evidence only, it boils downto this: on June 25th the KPA was only half mobilized (a normalsituation); the U. S. Army was not ready to fight on a large scalein Korea immediately. One has to make sense of these facts.Where can one start?Let me try to present a few points. In spite of the lamentable DPRK presentation of its case, it has not been proved that

Rhee, or part of his army, 20 did not launch an attack (of whatever dimensions) on the North on the morning of June 25.Official ROK and other sources claimed major advances into theNorth on the early morning of June 25th. Based on the evidenceat present available, and remembering that the KPA was onlyhalf-mobilized, it seems to me most plausible that the followinghappened. When Dulles made his speech on June 19th, both

Rhee andPyongyang noticed it. The DPRK and various opposition groups in the South had hoped that Rhee could be toppledby means short of military action-hence the major DPRKcampaign for peaceful reunification in June 1950. 21 However,the D PRK may also have felt that time was running out. Perhapsin response to a specific provocation or cross-Parallel raid ofunusual proportions the DPRK decided to move the KPA acrossthe Parallel, hoping to topple Rhee by a combination of militarymight and local popular uprisings. Further, they may havethought that the U. S. would not or could not intervene in time.This is the action which is usually referred to in the West asthe" invasion" of South Korea by the North. Although the term"invasion" is sometimes used to refer, for example, to theAllied landings in France in 1944 without any negative connotations, the term as applied to Korea obscures more than it illuminates. Above all, it obscures two crucial things: first, that Koreawas one country, divided against the wishes of the Koreanpeople; second, that the DPRK claimed (in my opinion, withreasonable cause) to represent the whole of Korea and to havethe right, along with the Southern masses, to liberate the Southfrom the Rhee regime and the U.S. The right of the Koreanpeople to liberate and unite their country cannot be denied. Thequestion boils down to one 's assessment of the nature, legiti-macy and representativity ofthe DPRK and ROK.What would have happened if the DPRK had presented itscase as sole legitimate entity frankly?22 And what would happenif it did so now? In this sense, the 1975 liberation of Vietnamhad more parallels with 1950 Korea than most people acknow ledge or realize. Certainly, the liberation forces werestronger in the southern half of Vietnam in 1975 than they werein the southern part of Korea in 1950. But otherwise the main

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http:///reader/full/ROKA).17http:///reader/full/ROKA).17

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political factors are comparable. I am not saying it was or is agood idea for the DPRK to dissemble and evade. But I think onemust confront not only Western propaganda, which is one thing,but also the political backwardness of the Western masses.When North Vietnamese tanks smashed into Quang Tri therewere no demonstrations in the streets and squares of London,Paris and Washington to celebrate the liberation and reunification of Vietnam. And yet, this was the basic political issuewhat the war was really about.

"In the case of the DPRK, its political presentations, including its propaganda, seem to be frozen in the mode of the late1940s-early 50s (reflecting, to some extent, its actual politicalposition as part of a divided country whose division dates fromand reflects that period). This type of presentation has neverbeen well received in the West. The hearing given the DPRKapproximates that given China in the early years after 1949.While China has broken out of the "lock," the DPRK has not.On the other hand, Western critics should also recognize thevery low level of support available in the West for really radicalmeasures. (The Vietnamese recognized this when they dissembled repeatedly about the presence of DRV troops in theSouth prior to April 1975).

Evidence and OmissionThe word "propaganda" comes from an old Catholicoffice whose work it was to disseminate belief (faith), not truth.Truth, as they say, is often one ofthe first casualties of war, or ofacute political struggle. Harold Noble was an ex-Marine. Canhe be trusted? Douglas MacArthur reminds us in his memoirsthat Harry Truman himself said of the Marines: "They have apropaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's."23 Noblewas, in Baldwin's words, an advocate of "hard-line anticommunism" (vii). According to an adviser to the U.S. Embassy atthe time, only "a very small minority" in the Embassy felt itwas important to do anything about the Rhee governnment's

violations of the basic principles of democracy (256-57). Noblesimply does not discuss many crucial issues.But the problem goes deeper than this. Leaving aside thequestion of direct political bias (including non-reporting ofimportant factors), the Noble diary brings up other basic problems about evidence. In a war situation one person actually seesand understands very little. 24 It is apparent that Noble frequently did not know what was happening. His account containsa large number of straightforward errors. 25 Also, there is verylittle shift in the quality of the reporting between what Noblesaw and what he did not see. The diary opens with a detaileddescription of events in and concerning the U.S. Embassy onJune 25th and June 26th-yet Noble was not there. He was noteven in Korea! According to Baldwin and the official U.S.Army history, Noble's description (given as fact) of the situation within the ROK Army on June 29, 1950 (87) is extremelywild and inaccurate. So what the diary boils down to is this: infact Noble saw very little. He was not even in Korea on June25-26, he is provenly unreliable on things he did not see, and heis not even certainly reliable on things he did see.

These issues need to be re-thought because the Westernline about the start of the war relies on a combination of ignoredissues and tenuous evidence. Noble gives an astounding demonstration of this. He states as a fact something which is quiteuntrue-viz., that the ROK Army captured Haeju in the DPRK,according to him, after the initial KPA attack! (87).26 Yet, assources go, Noble was a relatively "on-the-spot" person.Moreover, as Riley and Schramm show in disclaiming themajority of their own sources (65), how do you know if you cantrust even a first-hand account on a hot political question?27Let us also consider how information was transmitted.Often one single source (perhaps itself cautious, though notalways reliable) is the basis for numerous subsequent assertions(e.g., concerning KPA behavior in the South). One limitedexperience may be generalized to the whole (such as the UNclaiming that it observed an election when it did not). Also,where U.S. officials like Noble are concerned-and he wasboth a former combat intelligence officer and a political adviserto the U.S. Commander, General Hodge-one has to considerthe possibility of '"plausible denial" and misinformation.Lastly, one should perhaps not underestimate sheer class andpolitical blindness. Noble writes that "most Koreans were veryfriendly to us [the Americans]" (9), yet the U.S. adviser citedearlier wrote: "We were the big shots ... We went from onecocktail party to another, lived a life of abundance and glamour[sic] among the misery of the Korean people" (252). These twoobservations fit only with a lot of strain. Nor does Noble refer tothe polls which showed that the majority of the inhabitants ofSouth Korea were anti-American, and that in 1946 half thepopulation of Seoul found U.S. occupation worse than Japanesecolonialism.28What Happened in the South inJune-September 1950?

This issue comes up even more strongly when one tries toexamine the political aspects of the liberation of the South in1950. 29 Interestingly, this crucial field is seldom discussed byeither side. When discussing reunification, the experiences ofthe northern and southern populations of each other must be acentral element. In Korea, unlike in Vietnam, virtually theentire population over the age of 30 has directly experiencedboth regimes. In June-September 1950 the KPA liberated 90percent of the South, and later in the year about 90 percent of theNorth was occupied by the U.S.-UN-ROK forces. Even thosewho were not old enough at the time to register events must havebeen told something by their parents and other relatives. Whatdo people remember? What have they or others transmittedand, therefore, what has stuck?The Reds Take A City is a collection of oral accounts byinhabitants of Seoul during the period from late June to lateSeptember 1950, These accounts are interspersed with sectionsby the two U.S. editors, John W. Riley and Wilbur Schramm.Originally published in the U.S.A. in 1951, this book wasreprinted in 1973. 30 Since Riley and Schramm were members ofa U.S. Air Force team studying the effect of Communist rule onthe popUlation of Seoul, it is fair to ask why this book was

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assembled and published. I do not think the editors would objectto my assessment that it forms part of the struggle againstsocialism. Its main objective seems to be to make out a plausibleworst case against both the KPA and the northern and localcommunist movements during the period covered.One must take into account who compiled the book, whenand under what auspices. This determines what is in it. Theinhabitants of Seoul represented herein are quite patently notrepresentative of the population as a whole. By their ownadmission, many were fairly close to the Syngman Rhee regime;one was a Public Prosecutor; another an avowed antiCommunist newspaperman; another was one of the framers ofthe ROK constitution. All the accounts are anti-Communist.Nonetheless, the volume is not without interest.Like Noble's diary, these accounts force one to think aboutthe quality of evidence. Take one aspect, the question of popularjustice. The book omits the background to this crucial issue. Itincludes only one account of a People's Court, an account byKun-ho Lee, who is described as "the author of several widelyknown volumes on Korean law" (46). According to Lee, thePeople's Court "I n effect ' " massacred innocent people."This is possible, but how do we know? We know because Leeheard this from his "older aunt" who, he says, was an eyewitness (50). Surely a team compiling a book on events, on thespot, only a few months later, can be e x ~ c t e d to do better thanthis. To have only a second-hand account ofa crucial aspect ofthe' 'occupation" - in a book ofselected first hand accounts-just is not very convincing. Moreover, the account comes afterthe following passage:

The so-called People's army was composed of surprisinglyyoung boys. There was a group ofyoung girls also. Each ofthem had a [sub-machine gun}. It was surmised that some ofthem were Soviet soldiers, but I did not see any, although itseemed certain that there were Chinese Communists amongthem. The soldiers began to swagger around, ordering thisand that in their terrible Hamkyung provincial accent.

We can deduce from this that: I) women were in the army aswell as men; 2) our eyewitness is speculating (honestly) aboutSoviet soldiers; 3) he is also speculating (dishonestly) aboutChinese soldiers; and 4) he did not like their' terrible . , . provincial accent.'.'. Tough. 31 Before looking more closely, itshould be stressed that this small volume is the main Englishlanguage source for all subsequent writing on this experience. Itis frequently cited as evidence that Communism was extremelyunpopular in Seoul. value is about the same as would be thatof some volume commissioned by the U S. Air Force about Hueduring the Tet offensive.

It would be good to step back a little. What was Seoul likebefore the KPA arrived on June 28, 1950? There were morepolitical prisoners in South Korea alone before June 25, 1950than there were in the whole of Korea under the Japanese at theend of their occupation. Between 1945 and mid-1950 the left,which had led the resistance to the Japanese, had been imprisoned, tortured, or driven to the North. The police force was runby former trainees and strong-arm men of the Japanese. Torturewas widely used. An adviser to the U.S. Embassy cited by

Conference E.H.Norman:

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Baldwin wrote as follows:The jails in Seoul are overcrowded with political prisoners.Six weeks ago I inspected a police jail in Inch' on. Theprisoners there were living under conditions which I hesitateto describe in this letter. It reminds you of a sense of theDivina Comedia [sic]. Goya could have painted what we sawthere. What is going to happen to the almost /0,000 politicalprisoners in case the capital is to be surrendered? It is hardto imagine the acts ofvengeance and hatred which the peoplewill commit . . . 32This at least sets the scene.Apparently the KPA entered Seoul with relatively littlefighting on June 28 and headed straight for the prisons, releasingall the prisoners. Some of these seem to have taken revenge ontheir former jailers and torturers.33 This is what happened on alarge scale in France in 1944 and virtually everywhere in Europein 1944-45. So why is it so surprising-o r reprehensible-thatit should have happened in Korea? Moreover, although evidence on this is sketchy, many of the political prisoners werepresumably members of the underground Communist movement, and thus "reprisals" can not be seen only on a purelypersonal basis. I f political militants executed former stooges of

the Japanese who tortured them and others, it is understandable- and' normal. " Riley and Schramm do not mentionthese aspects. 34Further, much of the new (post-liberation) administrationwas made up of local Communists, some of whom had been inexile in the North for several years. The Riley-Schramm material says this was just a front (e.g. 41), but more work needs tobe done on this before a definitive conclusion can be reached.The Riley-Schramm accounts are neither comprehensive norpersuasive.Unfortunately, DPRK accounts are also not persuasive.The upshot of the official DPRK position is that real power wasput in the hands of the local southern Communist movement 3Swhich then behaved irresponsibly, especially in the second halfof September 1950, after the Ichon landing. The DPRK laterdisowned these southern Communists, such as the wartimemayor of Seoul, Yi Sun-yop, charging them variously withgangsterism, providing false information on the political situation in the South prior to June 25, espionage, and plotting acoupin the DPRK.

All the available reliable evidence is that the KPA behavedin an extremely disciplined way, and received a very warmwelcome in the South. The evidence also is strong that some ofthe southern Communists went overboard, although it is notclear how much of this was failure to control popular revengeagainst officials of the Rhee regime. In my opinion, althoughthe DPRK case, as it stands, is not persuasive, it deservesfurther examination. One problem is that the accusations concerning indiscipline are deployed together with much harsherand unproven accusations of espionage and plotting, and doubtabout anyone charge naturally tends to affect one's view of theothers. 36 Second, the Southern Communists were only broughtto trial in the DPRK much later, whereas, the events, if true,must have been known to the DPRK leadership much sooner.

Third, the DPRK leadership, including Kim II Sung, have failedto give an adequate explanation of their own responsibility inappointing such allegedly unreliable elements to high posts. 37Riley and Schramm confirm the discipline of the KPA, evengoing so far as to disown the testimony of their interviewees(65). Riley and Schramm write:

even those who had most reason to hate the foes from theNorth typically reported their conduct courteous and reasonable. When orders were given, the reasons for them werepatiently explained. When systematic confiscations ofproperty took place, the new uses to which it was to be put werecarefully indicated. When people were arrested it was doneapologetically and always in terms of the necessity of locating some "outisde" enemy . . . Only a few reports indicated behavior on the part of the invaders that was contraryto this consistent politeness and courtesy(65-66).

According to one of their informants these observations werenot applicable to "some of the guerrillas" (66).It is good to have some of this on record, because it is mostdefinitely not the conventional picture. How do Riley,Schramm and the U. S. Air Force deal with it? They set out theliberation program in terms of promises rather than action, andthey argue that things degenerated badly towards the end, especially after the Inchon landings in mid-September.

On the first aspect, they write:The North Korea,! Reds promised a united and freeKorea, land distribution and nationalization of industry,equal status for women, a broad program of social betterment, lower prices and an assured living for workers, andmore efficient and honest government.(34)For nearly everyone in South Korea, these promises

held both a general and a specific interest. On the people ofSeoul, land distribution, equal status for women, and aunited Korea seemed to have made the greatest impression.There is little doubt that many of these people approved theprogram presented; . . . (35).Riley and Schramm attribute this largely to propaganda:

Unfortunately, it can be safely said that the South Koreans learned the main lessons and made the main associations that the Communists intended, because even fourmonths after the occupation, the citizens of Seoul still repeated freely the idea cluster and the favorite adjectives.(38-9).Apparently the deliberately conceived [sic] pattern ofcorrect offical behavior paid large dividends not only interms of the efficiency of the occupation's activities but alsoin terms of the stereotyped images ofthe Communist and hismotivations (67-68).

Not nearly enough attention has been given to the implementation of the programs for reform. There was an immediate enactment of formal equality for women which from all accounts hada very big effect.38 It was a shock for the people of Seoul to seeKPA soldiers shaking hands with women (33) and to see womenin the KPA. Other information from the countryside as well as8

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from Seoul indicates that land refonn was widely enacted andwelcomed, even in the very short space of time available. 39The possibility that an extensive land refonn might havebeen carried out in a few months has generally been eitherdismissed or ignored in the West. However, quite apart frominfonnation from the DPRK (which has never been disproved),there is extremely strong evidence from the Seoul side that amajor refonn was carried out. A clearly authorized Englishlanguage version of the war published in Seoul in 1973 givesextensive details of the land refonn and reproduces the officialDPRK claims about the land refonn with only the mildest proforma disclaimer, viz., that they "showed some exaggeratedfigures" (which the author makes no effort to disprove orrectify). According to the official figures, 43.3 percent of thecultivated land in the South was confiscated and re-distributedto 66 percent of the 1"JUseholds in the South, with priority goingto poor and landless peasants.4 From the point of view of apolitical assessment now, what one really wants to know is towhat extent the memory of these refonns has stuck. Do peopleremember?The second mechanism employed by Riley and Schrammfor dealing with what is in effect rather threatening infonnationis to argue that after Inchon the Communists went berserk andmurdered and tortured a lot of people. Quite frankly, I have notbeen able to find satisfactory material on this. Naturally, Riley,Schramm and their interviewees say this is what happened.Scattered among the accounts there is infonnation on the extremely unsure situation in Seoul after Inchon, when the capitalwas being heavily bombed and shelled by the US-UN side. 41Yet, the accounts in Riley and Schramm also stress that the"occupation" took a lenient and long-tenn attitude towardspolitical opponents. What is particularly striking in the volume,however, is the acknowledgement by Riley and Schramm thateven after what they claim were the worst excesses took place,"eyewitness accounts . . . tended not to blame Communismor the system, but rather to explain them as the actions offrustrated men who had temporarily been driven insane" (68).Even i f all the Riley-Schramm material is true, one is leftwondering, if the Seoul population really did tum againstCommunism.But there are other important questions. Why does theDPRK not publish a documented account of this experience?What is the real political memory among the population of theSouth? How does the whole experience (i.e., facts and memory)affect the issue of reunification? How and why has the U. S. linebeen accepted so easily?The US-UN-ROK Occupation of the North

The other side of the coin is that a large percentage of thepopulation of the North has had direct experience of the South.Every single division commander in the ROK Anny except onewas a fonner officer in the Japanese Imperial Anny. These weremen who had made their careers fighting for the JapaneseEmpire against their own people. Their early careers had oftenbeen made killing Korean Communists (as was the case for ParkChung Hee, for example). In addition, many of the ROK offi

cers were people who had fled from the North. The US-ROKforces were accompanied to the North by ex-landlords and otherconservative elements who had fled between 1945 and 1950.The DPRK has claimed that widespread massacres occurred inthe North during the war as a whole or specifically in nonmilitary actions during the occupation of the North. The figurefor the war as a whole may well be over 10 percent of the totalpopulation-perhaps somewhere between 12 and 15 percent,which would be higher than the percentage of the populationwhich the Soviet Union lost in the Second World War (10%).The numbers for those killed during the Occupation of the Northby the US-ROK forces is put at "hundreds of thousands. "42According to an official DPRK text, the occupation forcescarried out" mass slaughter of members of the Workers' Partyof Korea and patriotic-minded people. "43 The area which apparently had the highest percentage of the population killedduring the occupation was Sinchon County in South HwanghaeProvince, where 35,383 people. one quarter the population,were reported killed. 44 According to DPRK sources, thosekilled included not only male civilians, but also large numbersof women and children, often with great cruelty. DPRK sourcesassign ultimate responsibility-and often direct responsibility-for these killings to US forces. In addition, it seems a

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large number of people were forcibly deported South by theUS-ROK forces. 45Most people in the West know very little or nothing aboutthese accusations. and the number of people who know of themand believe them is tiny. However it must be recognized that theaccusations are extremely important. Why has their never beenan official US enquiry into them? And why has no university orfoundation put up money for what. after all. was a uniqueexperience-the first US occupation of a country which hadbeen carrying out a thorough-going social revolution?Moreover. the DPRK charges are given inheren(plausibility byseveral factors. including the massacres of civilian suspects andexecutions of those designated by the police as "communists"in the South (e. g. a t Kochang). 46 Other US practices during thewar which might be cited are the strafing and napalming of notonly enemy territory, but even refugee columns and villages onthe US-UN side of the front;47 the extremely high level ofviolence used against the North; and the fact that less than sixmonths after the war started the US Air Force was grounded forlack of targets (something which never happened in Vietnam).Burchett records only two buildings left intact in the whole of

There is, of course, the question (or the "problem") ofKim II Sung. The DPRK puts out a flood of unsubstantiated material about people in the South pantingfor the day they can embrace "the Great Leader."Whatever people in the South may actually thinkabout Kim II Sung, there is plenty of evidence thatDPRK propaganda on this score falls on stony ground.The DPRK largely has itself to blame for this. Butthere is more to it than this.

Pyongyang, a city of nearly half a million people).What happened in South Vietnam, in what was supposed to be "friendly"territory, also must be recalled. The Phoenix Program involvedthe assassination of between 20,00 and 100,000 political cadresin the South-and this was largely carried out by the USoperatives. ROK troops behaved with notorious cruelty in Vietnam. In Korea the US and the ROK regime were intent oneliminating Communism and Communists. and they occupiedthe socialist North where they could reasonably assume thatmany or most of the inhabitants actually were Communists. Inaddition, former landlords, vigilante squads and others werekeen to take a hand. In brief, the DPRK charge is not sounlikely.48

In any case, at the absolute minimum, it seems indisputable that the DPRK suffered terribly, and that its population hada traumatic experience under the US, the UN and the ROKregime. As regards a political assessment now, this is surely thekey factor. The tide of war and political change have wreakedunprecedented havoc on the body of the J5.orean nation. Afternearly half a century of extremely repressive Japanese colonialrule, a break showed in the clouds in 1945. During the next five

years the left suffered decimation and exile from the South,while the North was occupied by the Soviet Union until 1948.Tw o years later war started.Not enough attention has been given to the effect, especially from a political point of view, that this had on attemptsto build socialism in the DPRK. From a preliminary study, itwould seem that the war caused not only military disaster, butalso intense political problems-not all of which were satisfactorily solved. 49 The US-UN-ROK occupation of the Northput the whole structure of the KWP in jeopardy, and there isconsiderable evidence that it did not survive in very good shape.As on the military front, there appears to have been scapegoating to solve (evade) problems. Scapegoating has two sides to it:unloading responsibility onto others and exonerating oneself.This is the opposite of self-criticism. Everyone knows the havocwreaked on the Bolshevik Revolution by outside intervention inthe early years. But the foreign invaders did not occupy 90percent of Russian territory, including the capital, devastate thecountry from one end to the other, and destroy Moscow,Leningrad and every other major city. Surely the BolshevikParty would not have weathered that well.

After the US-UN-ROK occupation of the North came thesecond liberation of Seoul (January 4-March 14, 1951). SomeWestern accounts suggest that it was this experience whichreally finished of f socialism in the South. This may be. But onceagain, the evidence is lacking. By this time, in mid-winter,Seoul had been extremely severely damaged. Food was short.Doubtless, sizeable numbers of people had shifted sides, at leaston the surface. Much of the liberating forces were Chinese-anunknown quantity to the inhabitants of Seoul. Western sourcesoften refer to the number of people who tried to leave Seoul atthis time. But they less often give some of the basic reasons.First, in a situation where one side has virtually total control ofthe air, and is using it to bomb heavily, the only place one canescape the bombing is behind the lines of the side doing thebombing. Second, the ROK and US-UN authorities encouragedrefugees, over and above those wishing to leave out of uncertainty or fear. Equally rarely stressed is how the refugees weretreated. The BBC correspondent Rene Cutforth recorded that inJanuary 1951 U. S. forces shot down the refugees' animals andthen mortared the frozen Han River in front of the refugees. so

Nor is the Western case about what happened inside Seoulduring this second liberation based on very solid sources. On thecontrary, there is excellent evidence that the KPA-Chineseforces behaved well.sl Doubtless severe measures were takenagainst the Rhee police and others. This is hardly surprising.Presumably there were reprisals. By now the radical movementhad suffered terribly and may have taken it out on the hatedrepresentatives of the Rhee state apparatus. Whatever happened, did the events tum the population of Seoul (and theSouth) against socialism-whether as embodied in the DPRK(then and/or now), or in general? Did those who had apparentlywelcomed land reform and the formal liberation of womensuddenly tum against these goals? These are questions whichhave to be studied, since without some understanding of thepolitical and social orientation of the mass of the population ofthe South-which is bound to be determined by its own exper

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AJOURNALFOR BLACK ANDTHIRD WORLDLIBERATION

RLY JOURNAL OF THE INSTITUTE OF RACE RELAT IONSTHE TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTESummer 1979 Number 1

THE IRANIAN REVOLUTIONThe Iranian revolution: a landmark forthe futureOil, economic policy and social conflictResisting the Pharaohs: Ali Shariati onopppressionIran and American geopolitics in the GulfIranian people Y. US news media: a caseof libelOri.,.talism at the service of imperialismTheses on the Iranian revolution

Guest editor: Eqbal AhmadSpecial issue on Iran

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ience-it is difficult to take up a reasoned position on reunification. One thing is certain. The Southern masses have nevergiven their backing to the regimes of Syngman Rhee (overthrown 1960) or Park Chung Hee ( 1961- ).Political Congealment and Reunification

Nonetheless, the Western accusation touches indirectly onan important question which has to be faced. Given there was avery strong left-wing movement throughout Korea, what wasthe effect on it of the division of the country, persecution,imprisonment, starvation, fear, torture-and serious politicalproblems within the left-wing movement itself? The experienceof Greece in the years 1944-49 shows that a left -wing movementcan be virtually destroyed by a combination of counterrevolutionary war, terror and political uncertainty and confusion within the left itself. 52 In Greece the British restoredcollaborators with the Nazis en masse to the police and paramilitary forces.' When these promptly went out to massacreleft-wing militants, the left responded with people's courts,executions and counter-attacks. It also engaged in straightforward reprisals and the taking and execution of hostages. TheGreek civil war (the Greek right, the British and, later, the USvs. the left) was won by the right. But there is more to it thanthis. It virtually destroyed at least for one generation, the Greekmilitant left, which had earlier been in a majority. The leftfought heroically, but it was also scarred and damaged by theright and the Anglo-Saxons. It was forced into political errors,dishonesty and evasion. These things can happen, but it is nogood pretending they cannot. Harry Truman's remark that. Korea is the Greece ofthe Far East" 53 may have been appositein more ways than one.Some Neglected Questionse1. The Korean people have a right not only to reunification,but also to social justice. How can they achieve these

goals, realistically? What has happened to the relationshipbetween social justice and the concept of socialism? Dosocialism and democracy have to be coterminous with theconcepts as they are used in and by the DPRK?e2. What do people in the South really know and think aboutthe North?e3. How does this affect attitudes towards reunificationa) in the South; b) abroad?Let us consider an optimum scenario for the South. UStroops and nuclear weapons are withdrawn. Park Chung Hee issoon ousted, or he dies. A civilian-led government is installed.What then? As is now widely recognized by most fair observers,including emigre Korean liberals in Japan and the USA, theDPRK has made a bigger, and more plausible effort on thereunification question than has Seoul. 54 This appears to beknown in the South among intellectuals and people in themedia,55 but almost certainly not by the masses. Whateverfavorable memories may remain (e.g. , of the 1950 land reform),things have changed a lot since then as anti-Communist ideology has sunk real roots in the South. It seems unlikely that thesouthern masses, in their present condition, wish to embrace the

kind of regime which now exists in the DPRK. This has to berecognized, as does the fact that the division of the country hasproduced distortions on both sides of the dividing line.New and honest thinking about reunification is sorelyneeded. The DPRK could help on this score. Most pronouncements emanating from Pyongyang about the South are vague,and many are hopelessly voluntarist and politically dangerous.Some are completely false as, for example, the claim that in1974 the South had the lowest annual per capita income in theworld at US $50!56There is, of course, the question (or the "problem") ofKim II Sung. The DPRK puts out a flood of unsubstantiatedmaterial about people in the South panting for the day they canembrace "the Great Leader." Whatever people in the Southmay actually think about Kim II Sung, there is plenty of evidence that DPRK propaganda on this score falls on stonyground. The DPRK largely has itself to blame for this. But thereis more to it than this. DPRK pronouncements frequently attribute the DPRK's achievements to Kim, without any reference to 'any state or party body, or to the hard work and initiatives of themasses. This practice is repeated in a voluntarist and dangerousway to relations with the South. For example, Korean DailyNews, the official DPRK news agency report, of March 8, 1977carries an item Only Great General Kim II Sung can realizelifelong desire of peasants in [the] south by giving them land."Interestingly, this does refer to the memory among southernfarmers of the 1950 land reform in the liberated areas. But thelanguage is vague and rhetorical ("the loving care of GeneralKim II Sung is warmer than the sunrays"; "I will never forgetmy debt of gratitude to you, dear General, even in my grave") .But it is also dangerous politically since, by glorifying Kim, itsuggests that no one else, not even the Party or any politicalorganization, is responsible for anything. This presentation isnot only a-political, it is anti-political since by stating that onlyKim can accomplish such deeds, it implies that his death willbring disorientation and disaster. A line which ignores the partyand despises the masses is incompatible with socialistprinciples.Secondly, there is the conspicuous failure of the DPRK toproduce any public scientific analysis of the class structure,economy and ideology of the South. In 1972 Kim II Sung toldHarrison Salisbury: "We do not see South Korea as a completecapitalist society . . . We can say South Korean society is nomore than a society which is just starting to take the road ofcapitalism or worshipping capitalism or something like that[siC!]. "57 This falls short of an analysis. It also seems to meincorrect. Six years later, in his major speech on the 30thanniversary of the founding of the DPRK, Kim implies that theSouth is by now a capitalist country.58The failure to provide any analysis whatsoever of the newstructures in the South affects the question of reunification. Thepopulation of the South has no way to know what kind oftransition is implied in the DPRK's reunification proposals. TheDPRK's lack of analysis of the real economic, social and political situation in the South may well be read as a sign of agenerally unrealistic attitude that could spill over into action ifreunification ever got under way. Only rarely does a down-to

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earth pronouncement on this crucial subject emerge fromPyongyang; and when it does, it is in such contrast with theusual line that it tends not to be taken very seriously, if it isnoticed at all. This is largely the DPRK's own fault.Having said that, let's look at the answers Kim II Sunggave in March 1976 to the editor of Sekai, Yasue Ryosuke. Onthat occasion Kim said:[T]he class problem is yet to be solved in south Korea.How to settle class relations in south Korea is a matter [for]the south Korean people themselves. We will not meddle in it.At present some south Korean democrats fear lest theCommunists sould take advantage oftheir democratic move-ment to impose socialism on them. We have more than oncedeclared that we will not impose socialism on south Korea.So we will not do such a thing .. . . If socialism is forced on [the South], it will causeindigestion . . .We have no intention to impose socialism on southKorea; and we are consistent in our opposition to subjectiv-ism . . . 59

This last remark, unfortunately, is not true, and it is preciselythe amount of subjectivist propaganda issued by Pyongyangabout the South which is one of the big problems. By issuingstatements which are vague, often "ultra-leftist" and also contradictory, the DPRK must confuse and tum off the southernmasses and thus make reunification more difficult.Reunification

The Korean people have had dismally little support fromthe rest of the world in their struggle for reunification. Given therole of outside intervention in dividing Korea, it is incumbent onus to study this question. Also, without interfering in the Koreanpeople's own domain, it may be that outsiders can do somethings Koreans cannot because of the heavy political constraintson Koreans' actions. It is necessary, first, to identify the stumbling blocks-and to what end. What is the political context ofthe time? Intense examination of socialist societies is beingcarried out by many of those in the West who have sympathizedwith, supported, or shown solidarity towards liberation movements and socialism. The concept of "solidarity" is beingre-examined. It is now much clearer than it was that US popularsupport " for the Vietnamese people was very limited in termsof real solidarity with revolution and socialism. In WesternEurope, it is clear that support for socialism as a system ofgreater social and economic equality no longer covers a willingness to evade on issues of democracy.This applies to Korea too, because the DPRK claims to be asocialist society, and is widely accepted as such. As the SouthKorean law scholar, Kim Sun n, observed in Sekai (v. note 55),the DPRK is generally accepted as a member of a very big,worldwide and historically ascendant movement. But it is alsoclear that, even for those who have made every effort to sweepaside Western propaganda, it is a society which has big questionmarks hanging over it. The DPRK has perhaps appropriated theconcept of socialism in Korea, but this is not the same as sayingthe DPRK is a socialist society. Clearly, it has made remarkable

Foreign Indebtedness to the U.S. Government.April,I979

1. Current situation: As of September 30, 1978, debtsowed to the US, excluding those arising from World War I,totaled $45.7 billion. This reflects debts from many differenttypes of transactions such as:.war materiel delivered to our allies during World War II;.the reconstruction effort in post-World War I I Europe;.provision of surplus foodstuffs to developing countries;eloans to assist the developing countries; andeExport-Import Bank loans to aid US exports.

2. Distribution of the debt: About 54% of the debt is owed bythe non-oil exporting developing countries, 25% by Westernindustrial countries (including Greece and Turkey), 9% byIsrael, 7% by members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and about 5% by the USSR andEastern Europe. Six countries account for $18.4 billion, or over40% of the total debt: Israel, $4.2 billion; India, $3.5 billion; theUK, $3.2 billion; Pakistan, $2.6 billion; Korea, $2.5 billion;and Brazil, $2.4 billion. Seven other countries-Indonesia,Turkey, Egypt, the USSR, the authorities on Taiwan, Spain,and Chile-each owe the US over $1 billion. - -

3. US collection policy: US lending agencies are careful toprotect the US right to repayment. Most debts are paid on time.Collections, including interest, on long-term credits extendedsince 1940 now exceed $50 billion. In FY 1978, dollar repayments totaled roughly $4 billion.In contrast, principal and interest payments due and unpaid90 days or more totaled only $612 million, as of September 30,1978. Most of these delinquencies stem from unique circumstances that impede our ability to collect. For example, aboutone-third of current arrearages relates to Korean CooflictLogistical Support Claims, whose validity has not been clearlyestablished. Another one-third relates to debt owed by China,Cuba, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

*From GIST, "a quick reference aid" from the U.S. Dept. ofState.

economic and social advances. But it is also evident that theDPRK is not widely seen as a democratic society. 60 This haspartly to do with the role and presentation of Kim II Sung whichcontravenes basic principles of socialist democracy (this is animportant subject which needs a separate treatment).61 But ithas also to do with past events, such as the elimination of themain southern Communist leaders after the Korean War onunproven charges. Finally it concerns the DPRK's attitude tohistory (one of staccato evasion), and to the South. The DPRKemploys un-Marxist methods, it is neither comprehensive norsystematic, it often fails to confront different theses, and in its

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http:///reader/full/treatment).61http:///reader/full/treatment).61

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political and historical pronouncements it refuses the basicMarxist weapon of the critique. 62Recently the French Communist Party took another majorstep forward out of its Stalinist past: it announced that it had liedabout its knowledge of the Krushchev "secret speech" at theTwentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956. It certainly gained byacknowledging its past mendacity. During the late 1940s andearly 1950s most of the East European "People's Democracies" staged major trials at which leading figures in theCommunist (and Socialist) Parties were sentenced to death.These were shortly followed by big trials in Pyongyang im-mediately the war was over in 1953. It was very largely the EastEuropean trials and concomitant abuses of democratic rightswhich caused Western socialists to develop a systematic critiqueof "socialism" in the "socialist" countries. This critique, itmight be added, also played a role in the rehabilitation (oftenposthumous) by most East European countries of the victims ofthese rigged trials . .At least in the West, the DPRK can notexpect to escape this movement. The extent to which the DPRKis out of touch with, and out of step with the progressive forcesin the West (and, in my opinion to a considerable, though lesserextent in the Third World) is one of the key factors which putsKorea into such a different category from Vietnam prior to1975. The kind of dedicated people, ranging from socialistmilitants to liberals, who gave support to Vietnam, Laos andKampuchea in the West have conspicuously not done the samefor Korea.Yet the Korean people richly deserve- indeed have a rightto-our support and understanding. It was outside forces(especially the US) which divided Korea. The United Statesmaintains tens of thousands of troops there, and is the essentialsupport for a dictatorial regime. There must be room in the Westat least for limited solidarity, for a movement which can agree tofight to remove that for which the West is responsible-viz.,outside intervention in Korea. Since the West is responsible forthe division of Korea, it has a responsibility to support reunification. It also has a responsibility to be principled and consistent.Would anyone suggest that foreign troops should be stationed inFrance and the country divided because the inhabitants of Parislynched large numbers of their fellow countrymen and womenin 1944?In conclusion, I want to look at things from a differentangle. The drift of Western propaganda (including most scholarly publications and suchlike) has been to argue for the continued division of Korea on the grounds that the DPRK is adreadful place, and that people in the South want to havenothing to do with it. It is no good evading this issue. A fairresume of the key issues regarding the DPRK problem" couldgo as follows:

In a situation of social turmoil, with the Rhee regimeisolated in the south, the DPRK, which claimed to represent thenation, and certainly, at an absolute minimum, represented thecountry's national liberation tradition and socialist forces,crossed in force the 38th Parallel, a demarcation line withinKorea (which all acknowledged to be one country), which hadbeen imposed by outside forces. The Rhee regime disintegrated;

so did the army. A considerable part ofthe southern popUlationwelcomed the socio-political change (not the war), especiallyland reform. For the last three decades the DPRK has carriedou t radical social and economic reforms, achieved a high levelof economic growth and social equality and defended Korea'sindependence. Political life has been restricted, and there havebeen undemocratic executions at the top ofthe party, but, sofaras one can see, less mass repression than in other socialistcountries (reflecting popular support for reforms. )6 3

The point of outlining a worst possible case is to force us inthe West to look afresh at the Korean "problem." Even underthe worst honest light, the DPRK comes out much better than itsdetractors imply. And it must also be stressed that while theDPRK may claim ownership of the concepts, it is not theembodiment of socialism and democracy. The Rhee and Parkregimes have aggravated social inequalities and exploitation inthe South. They have also failed to defend the nation's independence on the economic front, and in two very importantways, at least, the Seoul regime has deeply offended the Koreanpeople's strong feelings about national dignity and sovereignty.They have tolerated and encouraged prostitution, both at homeand abroad, partly for foreigners. Second, they sold the ROKArmy to the US to fight against the Vietnamese and Kampuchean peoples. It is on issues such as these-not often broughtinto the discussion-that the North's case is incomparablystronger. Whatever criticisms anyone may have of the DPRK, itis indisputable that it has "stood up" and defended Korea'snational rights.It is reasonable to suppose that a large part of the SouthernpopUlation would, at the very least, like more social justice. TheDPRK is makingthis more, not less difficult. There has to be anew way forward. This does not necessarily have to be a middleway. But it must involve not only the overthrow of the Parkregime, but also recognition by the DPRK, in practice, that itcannot expropriate the concepts of socialism and democracyfrom the Korean masses. The Korean people have a right tosocialism and democracy. One of the stumbling blocks to theachievement of this right is the DPRK' s attempt to make socialism coterminous with undemocratic practices-both historical(the extermination of the southern Communist leadership in1953-55) and current (unsubstantiated exaltation of Kim IISung; distortion of news; etc.).In dealing with these issues, I do not wish to suggest thatthe DPRK is the main problem. This remains Washington, andSeoul. But the DPRK is the specific problem-i.e., the mainelement which differs from the Vietnam equation. AthoughSeoul may in many ways be equated with pre-1975 Saigon,Pyongyang may not be equated with Hanoi. Those of us on theleft should, at the very least, be thinking about ways to tackle theproblems for which the West is responsible. In the case ofKorea, as in that of Vietnam (to 1975), this means trying to findways to bring Western intervention to an end, and to give activesupport to the struggle of the people for reunification.

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Notes* I would like to thank Aidan Foster-Carter. Gavan McCormack, Fred Halliday. Sugwon Kang and Bruce Cumings for many helpful suggestions on earlierdrafts.

I. Harold Joyce Noble. Embassy At War (Seattle and London: Universityof Washington Press. 1975). edited with an introduction by Frank Baldwin;John W. Riley. Jr.. and Wilbur Schramm. The Reds Take A City: The Communist Occupation of Seoul. with Eyewitness Accounts (Greenwood Press:Westport. Connecticut. 1973. Reprint of original 1951 edition); C. DarwinStolzenbach and Henry A. Kissinger. Civil Affairs in Korea /950-5/ (ChevyChase, MD: Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1952): thislast is of very limited interest.

2. "The Korean Revolution," Socialist Revolution, Vol. I, No.6(1970); 'What Happened in Korea?," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars,Vol. 5, No.3 (1973); both these and another article are collected in Halliday,Three Articles on the Korean Revolution, 1945-1953 (London: AREAS, 1972).On the UN role, including the UN Observers' Report discussed immediatelybelow, cf. my "The United Nations and Korea," in Frank Baldwin, ed.,Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship Since 1945 (New York:Pantheon Books, 1974).3. I have tried to discuss some of these issues at greater length in myessay, "Observations on the Presentation and Perception in the West of theKorean People's Struggles," in Gavan McCormack and Mark Selden, eds.,Korea, North and South (New York: Monthly Review Press, 178); this is arevised edition of the 1977 volume, McCormack and John Gittings, eds., Crisisin Korea (Nottingham, U. K.: Spokesma n Books).

4. For a more detailed analysis of Baldwin' s work, see the Appendix.5. United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, 5th Session,Supplement No. 16 (A/1350), Report of the United Nations Commission onKorea, Covering the Period from 15 December 1949 to 4 September 1950,Annex 4 (A/AC.26/II/EMDOC I) , p. 41; the report is also given in full inNoble, pp. 243-4 (Baldwin note).6. In addition, section 8 of the Report states:In some sectors it had been reported that civilians had recently beenremovedf rom areas adjoining paral/elto north to depths varyingfrom4to8kilometres. Another report received during night Thursday 22 June atregimental headiJuarters Ongjin was to effect that there was increasedmilitary activity in Chuyia about 4 kilometres North parallel.

In a later article, Noble discusses the reported removal of civilians, and pointsout that this need not necessarily have been apreparation for an attack. (1952article reprinted in.Embassy At War as an Appendix, p. 230; on this article, seebelow). It may be noted that the ROK (unlike the DPRK) has cleared civiliansfrom its side of the current Demarcation Line-not something which its supporters would accept as proof it was preparing a war. Duri ng an interview with 6senior KPA officers in Pyongyang, July 26, 1977, I asked if it was correct thatthe DPRK had moved civilians away from the Parallel immediately prior to June25, 1950. The answer was: "The KPA has summer and wintertraining. Regulartraining as carried out at this time. Sinc e the Army was deployed along the 38thParallel for defensive reasons, there were units along the Parallel. "In fact, in the crucial week immediately prior to June 25th, they werenowhere near the Parallel most of the time. They returned to Seoul from thePanulel on June 17th, stayed in Seoul until the 21st, and returned to Seoul onJune 23rd (for which day the only entry in the UN Report is that they returned toSeoul by s e a - from the Ongjin Peninsula area) (UN, Report, p. 4, cited in n. 5).I am trying to trace the two Australian officers; if anyone knows of theirwhereabouts, I would be most grateful for information c/o the Bulletin.8. In fact, a really rigorous reading of Noble's text with the otherinformation produces a cogent refutation of his thesis. Noble says: We hadagents and we knew the (cast-iron) criteria for the North preparing a war. But theUN Report (which Noble accepts) is proof that the agents' information had notdried up (even though I am critical of the observers, I accept their report as goodproof of this). Therefore, there was no information that war (in the senseintended) was being prepared. Therefore, it wasn't.

9. The core of the DPRK case is that on the morning of June 25, 1950, theDPRK was the victim of an unprovoked, all-out attack by the ROK Army. Theresponsibility for this attack is attributed ultimately to the United States (orleading individuals such as Douglas MacArthur and John Foster Dulles) and

immediately to Syngman Rhee, who is usually described as a "puppet" of thUSA. So far as I know, the DPRK does not deal with the possibility of a"autonomous" ROK attack. The DPRK presents its decision to cross the 38tParallel in strength as a "counter-attack," the result of the ROK attack (oprovocation), while frequently (though not always) referring to the DPRKright to liberate the southern part of the country and reunify the nation. For recent and fairly detailed exposition of the DPRK case see The US ImperialisStarted the Korean War (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House1977). Unlike most DPRK publications, this book has precise references tWestern works, with page numbers.

10. New York Times. July 31, 1950, citing a US intelligence staff officebriefing correspondents on July 1950, at MacArthu r's headquarters (cited iI. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War, New York & LondonMonthly Review Press, 1969), p. 66.

II . Kim Chum-kon, The Korean War (Seoul: Kwangmyong PublishinCo., 1973) pp. 324-5.

12. See Appendix on the "Haeju question."13. Letter from General Wi lliam Roberts to General Bolte, Aug. 191949, in the National Archives, cited by John Merrill in his paper, "InternaWarfare in Korea, 1948-1950: The Local Setting of the Korean War," (1978p. 13. Rober ts' lette r in effect flatly contradicts Noble's testimony-or, at leasonce again, the Noble version is so incomplete as to be utterly misleadingDuring the interview with the KPA officers on Jul y 26, 1977 (cited in note above), one of the officers said: "i t was really from 1947 that the war in Korestarted . . . The battle began from 1947. "

14. In a speech in Stockholm in March 1974, Wilfred Burchett stated that:According to my own, still incomplete investigations, the war started in facin August-September 1949 and not in June 1950. Repeated attacks wermade along key sections of the 38th parallel throughout the summer of 1949by Rhee's forces . . . Important heights were seized in the western ancentral sectors during that period and deep penetrations into North Koreaterritory were made in the eastern sector. Some key positions in the Haejarea in the West were held for several months.

(Text in Journal o/Contemporary Asia, Vol. 5, No.2 [19751, p. 230).15. I have discussed the limited significance of the Acheson speech iThree Articles, p. 16. In this same spe ech, Acheson assured all the Far Ea

countries of UN support. He was not "abandoning" Korea; he was indicatinthat there had b een a formal t ransfer militarily as well as politically from purelUS tutelage to that of the international organization. the UN, which was thetightly controlled by the US and had been specifically mobilized earlier to givcover to the division of Korea.16. D. F. Fleming, "Can We Escape from Containing China?," WesterPolitical Quarterly 24 (March 1971), cited in Baldwin-Noble, p. 314.17. An official US military historian writes: "there was the general feeling, apparently shared by Brig. Gen. William L. Roberts, Chief of KMAG, othe eve of invasion, that if attacked from North Korea the ROK Army woulhave no trouble in repelling the invaders." Roy E. Appleman, South to thNaktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office1960), p. 18, cf. Kolko and Kolko. p. 574 (cited in note 21).18 .. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (Greenwich, Conn.: Crest paperback edition, 1965), p. 371. Noble's attempt to claim that Rheewas unjustifiein his belief that Dulles had promis ed US support is not convincing (p. 72).19. Cit ed from Donald G. Tewksbury , compiler, Source Materials oKorean Politics an d Ideologies (New York: IPR, 1950):pp. 153-155.20. On April 3, 1977, I interviewed former ROK Brig. Gen. Choi SuNam in New York. I asked him about the start ofthe war. He replied:

The first thing you have to remember is that most leaders of the SoutKorean Army were refugees from the North and hated communism. Thehad already [i.e., 'before June 25, 1950-J. H.I invaded the North severatimes to depth of 3-4 miles . . . The fact is that the high-ranking officers ithe South needed a war.

21. On this, see the excellen t discussion in Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, ThLimits ofPower: The World and United States Foreign Policy, /945-/954 (NewYork: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 574ff. cf. Appendix.22. I have tried to discuss this more fully in Three Articles. DPRKpronounceDJents often referred to the war as ,. a just [or righteous I liberatio

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The Presentation and EditingFrank Baldwin has done a great job in annotating the Noblediary. Personally, I found the combination of Noble's text andBaldwin's very full notes riveting reading. But I do have somequeries and complaints.I. Why tone down Noble's language? I f Noble said"Commie," let's have it (xiii). It is useful to be reminded whatpeople like Noble were like, and changing their language produces a distortion of their presentation.64 (Sam Fuller's KoreanWar films, Steel Helmet and Fixed Bayonets, which to some

appear' 'crude," are in fact the most accurate about the war.)2. Why revise the Saturday Evening Post text (. 'The RedsMade Suckers of Us All"), reprinted here as an Appendix? Thisis especially disconcerting, since this article was published (andpresumably wntten) in mid-1952, and deals explicitly withtheses (e.g., I. F. Stone's) and arguments (e.g. , Douglas MacArthur's) which Noble (and others) were keen to refute. Whatforn1 did the "revision"take?3. Why cut out two whole chapters on the June-September1950 "occupation" of Seoul (xiv)? Baldwin states that thematerial was second-hand, and could not be verified. This is fairas far as it goes. But the whole of the start of the diary hereprinted was second-hand. Moreover, since the main interest ofthe diary (for me) is not that it is an authentic, verified, objectiveaccount, but a subjective and partial account of events, it wouldbe interesting to see his unverified second-hand stuff about the"occupation" of Seoul. This even would have an objectivevalue, since it was people like Noble who contibuted to theconstruction of the conventional Western' picture of what hap-pened in Seoul then. It would be good to see what he said.4. This bringsme to the major query. How can a documentof this nature presented in this way be used? Baldwin hasprovided extensive notes, and at many points corrected errors of

struggle" but tended to make the "just" nature of the war depend on the actionsof the ROK on the morning of June 25th, whereas the essence of the DPRKposition on reunification was that the DPRK had the absolute right to reunify thethe country. This claim stands or falls, it seems to me, irrespective of whathappened on June 25th.23. Letter to Congressman Gordon McDonough of California, cited inMacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 394.24. This is vividly shown in the Mexican film about John Reed,lnsurgentMexico (Paul Leduc, 1971). It is true even of many non-war si