ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS As ever, I am primarily indebted to mywife, Pat, who has borne the brunt ofmoaning, whingeing and frustrationthat is part and parcel of me writing abook, and to my editor at The Historypress, Jo De Vries, whose patienceseemingly knows no bounds. I am alsoindebted to the various societies whohave, from time to time, invited me togive presentations about thisremarkable battle. I like to think thatthe many questions that I have beenasked at such events have helped tomake me more aware of the widerange of factors that forged theenvironment and influenced theprocesses that made things turn outthe way they did. Finally, I am indebtedto three kings: Edward I, Edward II

and Robert I, as well as, of course, thepeople of fourteenth-century Englandand Scotland, without whom – as theysay – none of this would have beenpossible.

CONTENTS Title Acknowledgements List of Illustrations Introduction Timeline Historical Background The Armies The Commanders The Soldiers The Tactics

Before the Battle Edward II’s Forces Robert I’s Forces The Battlefield After the Battle The Legacy Orders of Battle Further Reading Copyright

LIST OFILLUSTRATIONS

1. Inchcolm Abbey, where – over

100 years after the event – AbbottBower penned a highly colourfuldescription of the battle.

2. A page from Sir Thomas Grey’sScalacronica.

3. The coronation of Edward I.Edward only commanded oneScottish action in person, theBattle of Falkirk, 1298. His deathin 1307 was a major blow to thefortunes of the English occupationforces, however the tide of thewar had probably already startedto turn in favour of the Scots.

4. A sixteenth-century Englishartwork, depicting a fictitiousparliament of Edward I attended

by Llewellyn, Prince of Wales andAlexander III. Artworks and forgeddocuments were an importantweapon in the propagandaarsenals of medieval kings: the‘Dodgy Dossier’ is not a moderninnovation.

5. John Balliol, from a Scottishamorial illuminated between 1581and 1584. The king is surroundedby the broken symbols of his rule.

6. Illuminated capital from anEnglish medieval documentdepicting a scene from the siegeof Carlisle.

7. The obverse and reverse of theseal of Edward I.

8. Significant towns and castles inlate medieval Scotland.

9. A silver penny of Robert I.Pennies of a given weight andpurity of silver were known as‘sterlings’ (a term that originatedfrom Germany) and were

acceptable right across Europe.10. The Great Seal of Robert I.11. The memorial of Angus Og, Lord

of the Isles. Although he was avital supporter of Robert I’skingship from 1307 onward, it isnot clear whether he was presentat Bannockburn.

12. Detail from a Scottish grave effigyshowing a fourteenth-centurysoldier with bascinet, padded jackand the ‘heater’-shaped shieldtypical of the period.

13. An assemblage of plate armourto protect the arm. Pieces assophisticated as this one were stillrelatively rare in 1314 and wouldhave been very much the provinceof the wealthy or of men whospent a large proportion of theirtime in military service.

14/15. A mail hauberk might be wornunderneath a padded garment oron top of it. Opinion was divided

about the relative effectiveness.16. A re-enactor wearing the sort of

brase and hose generally wornunder clothing.

17. Closed helmets of this style weredefinitely old-fashioned by 1314,but were still serviceable and likelyto have been passed on to therank and file from better-equippedmen-at-arms.

18. A selection of ordinary personaleffects: a dagger, flint and steel,leather pouch, rosary and dice.

19. A man-at-arms and a spearman.The man-at-arms is wearingparticularly extensive and heavymail. By 1314 pieces of platearmour – particularly at theshoulder and elbow – were beingadded to supplement mail.

20. A chapel-de-fer or ‘iron hat’.These were widely usedthroughout northern and westernEurope in the thirteenth and

fourteenth centuries.21. It was possible, though a little

difficult, to don mail unaided. Notethe thickness of the paddedgarment under the mail.

22. A party of medieval spearmenwould have looked rather like this,though the spears would havebeen a good deal longer.

23. A close-up of the same party ofspearmen. Although individualswere responsible for theacquisition of their ownequipment, there were well-understood minimum standardswhich had to be observed.

24. An archer bending his bow.Although a skilled archer could hita man at 300 yards, the arrowwas unlikely to inflict seriousdamage on even a lightlyarmoured man.

25. A typical fourteenth-centuryarcher.

26. Very few soldiers would have hadthe luxury of a sophisticated tentlike this one.

27. With their spear points presentedto the enemy in a thick hedge, aschiltrom was virtually invulnerableto cavalry attacks.

28. Articulated armour for the legsand arms was becomingincreasingly common by 1314.This re-enactor is mounted on a‘covered’ or ‘barded’ horse,though in the fourteenth centurythe barding would have consistedof several layers of cloth to reducethe effectiveness of arrows andedged weapons.

29. Grave effigy of Sir Roger deTrumpington. This image datesfrom about 1280; by the time ofBannockburn the absence of anyplate armour other than kneeprotection would have made thebearer look rather outdated, but

would still have been acceptableas equipment for a man-at-arms

30. Looking south from theapproximate position of KingRobert’s division on the afternoonof 23 June.

31. The contemporary materialindicates that the Scots moveddown to the plain from higherground in the New Park. Theyprobably formed up in the areawhere the new Bannockburn HighSchool stands.

32. Once the Scots had formed upthey had to negotiate this steepslope before deploying on theplain.

33. A Scottish ‘birlinn’ or galley.Vessels like this were usedextensively by Robert I in hiscampaigns on the west coast ofScotland. A number of barons andother landholders were obliged toprovide manned warships like this

for their ‘knight service’ ratherthan serving as mounted men-at-arms, though it was notuncommon for such men to servein both capacities as required.

34. The Battle of Bannockburn asenvisaged by Oman and Gardiner,though it bears very littleresemblance to the contemporarysource material.

35. The open farmland on which themain battle took place. Contrary toVictorian interpretations, all of thecontemporary material makes itclear that the main engagementtook place on firm ground, notamong bogs and marshes.

36. The Bannock burn. The burn wasprobably rather wider in 1314, buteven today it has a very soft andmuddy floor which would be aconsiderable barrier to armouredmen trying to escape thebattlefield.

37. A view toward ‘The Entry’, wherethe Earls of Gloucester andHereford made the first attack andwhere de Bohun was killed in asingle combat with King Robert.

38. A well-equipped infantry man ofthe fourteenth century, with achapel-de-fer helmet and two thin,padded garments, one under hismail and another over it.

39. The sole remaining building ofCambuskenneth Abbey. Duringthe night of 23/24 June, the Earlof Athol mounted an attack onKing Robert’s stores. Of the fouractions of the battle, this is theonly one of which the preciselocation can be identified withoutquestion.

40. A well-intentioned re-enactor inthe tradition of Brigadoon meetsBraveheart; however, neither kiltsnor two-handed swords have anyrelevance to the fourteenth

century.41. The head of a battle-hammer

allegedly recovered fromBannockburn battlefield.

42. Letter patent of John Balliol,acknowledging the feudalsuperiority of Edward I.

43. The seal of John Balliol.44. The Pilkington Jackson statue of

Robert I at the National Trust forScotland’s Bannockburn VisitorCentre.

45. The nineteenth-century brasseffigy of King Robert from hisburial place at Dunfermline Abbey;in the 1330s the tombs of bothKing Robert and his queen –Elizabeth de Burgh – weredestroyed by English troops.

INTRODUCTION The Battle of Bannockburn hasbecome the subject of a considerablerange of romantic – and in some casesrather unromantic – mythologising.Quite why this should be the case is abit of a mystery in itself; there is reallyvery little of any importance that we donot know about this battle. Thecontemporary and near-contemporarysource material is actually quiteextensive and contains sufficient datato provide us with a reasonablycoherent picture of the nature of thearmies and of the course of the Battleof Bannockburn. As we would expect,the value of the record material isreally limited to information about thepolitical situation and some insightconcerning enlistment, supplies and

the progress to the battlefield; it offersus very little indeed about the battleitself beyond a basic outline of theprogress of the engagements.

Overall there is surprisingly littlecontradiction between the differentchronicle writers, though all of themmust be used with caution: each of theauthors had an agenda and not allnarrative material is of equal value.Walter Bower’s Scotichronicon was notwritten until more than a century afterBannockburn; it is wildly inaccurateand virulently anti-English. On theother hand, Sir Thomas Grey, authorof Scalacronica, was not present at thebattle himself, but his father (alsoThomas) was taken prisoner duringthe first day of the fighting. The authorwas able to consult Scottish accounts,which have not survived, whilst he washimself a prisoner of war of the Scotsa generation later. Additionally, unlikeall of the other chroniclers, Grey was a

professional soldier who spent most ofhis career fighting in Scotland; he is byfar the closest thing we have to anexpert witness.

1. Inchcolm Abbey, where – over 100 years after theevent – Abbott Bower penned a highly colourfuldescription of the battle.

2. A page from Sir Thomas Grey’s Scalacronica.

NARRATIVE EVIDENCE

This is the collective term for allchronicle material. The monastic

chronicle from Lanercost has a briefbut useful account of the battle, which

the writer tells us was given by aneyewitness who he knew personallyand thought was a reliable person.

Scalacronica was written by the son ofa participant in the battle, Sir Thomas

Grey. Both father and son wereprofessional soldiers who spent a greatdeal of their careers in Scotland, and

Thomas junior tells us that he hadaccess to Scottish material (which hasnot survived) while he was a prisonerof the Scots more than twenty years

after the battle.

All the narrative material is greatlyenhanced if we examine the record

material for the preceding twenty yearsor so. Pay rolls, horse valuations andother records can provide us with abetter picture of the general militaryand social environment.Comprehending record evidence letsus understand the terms that thechroniclers use and failure to do socan lead us into serious errors. Oneexample is the expression ‘esquire’. Tomost people it means a young manaspiring to knighthood, and if he foughtat all it was with lighter armour and alighter horse than his knightlyassociate. In the fourteenth century itsimply meant a man-at-arms, usually alandholder, who was not a knight. Hewas armed and mounted to the samestandard and his role in battle wasidentical; in any force of heavy cavalryonly a handful – perhaps 10 or 15 percent at most – were actually knights.Failure to understand this has led tothe invention of whole units of lightly

armed gentry cavalry that exist only inthe minds of modern writers.

Seven hundred years on from thebattle, it is hardly surprising that we donot have all the evidence andinformation that we should like. In theabsence of the 1314 pay rolls andmuster rolls (which we can assumewere lost on the battlefield), we canonly make an educated guess aboutthe numbers involved. This is less ofan issue than it might appear since wehave so much material – particularlyabout English armies – fromcampaigns in the years before andafter 1314, from which we can makeuseful deductions. Army strengths area thorny issue at the best of times andnot necessarily especially usefulinformation: nobody really knowsexactly how many men fought atWaterloo in 1815 or on the Somme in1916, but that does not have asignificant impact on our

understanding of either event. Whatmatters more than a preciseheadcount is our ability to see acampaign or a battle in the round. Ifwe have a decent understanding of therelative size of the forces involved, thearms and other equipment, theadministrative practices of the day, thesocial and cultural ethos of thecommunities, and, most importantly,an understanding of how tacticalpractice was applied to the lie of theland, we will be far better informedthan if we merely know that 20,000men met 10,000 men in battlesomewhere in the vicinity of aparticular geographic feature.

As with any other battle – or indeedany event at all – the conclusions wecome to today should not be set instone. There is very little chance that apreviously unknown contemporaryeyewitness account of Bannockburnwill come to light 700 years on, but if it

did, it might completely alter ourperception of the battle, even if it didnot actually contradict any of thematerial we have today. Alternatively,it might invalidate a lot of the materialwe have now, but not change ourunderstanding of the sequence ofevents; it certainly could not changethe general outcome of the fighting:the Scots won and the English lost.

RECORD MATERIAL

As the name implies, this is evidencethat we can find in Crown and other

records of the day. There are severalcollections of such material from thelater medieval period which can be

accessed relatively easily through theinter-library loan scheme, including

Bain’s Calendar of Documents Relatingto Scotland, Register of the Great Sealof Scotland and the Exchequer Rolls of

Scotland.

There is a greater possibility thatscholars might uncover recordevidence that would help to further ourunderstanding. It is generally assumed– and probably correctly – that all ofthe English administrative recordswere lost on the battlefield, but it is notabsolutely impossible that copies of

pay rolls or other material may cometo light and give us another glimpseinto the structure or articulation of thearmy.

We can be a little more hopeful inregard to archaeology. The techniquesof battlefield archaeology and thequality of interpretation are developingrapidly. There are currently plans for amajor survey of the potential battlesites at Bannockburn and we may seea major breakthrough over the nextfew years which may compel historiansto re-evaluate all of the record andnarrative material that we have reliedon in the past. Unfortunately, the soilin the Stirling area is not conducive topreserving organic material such aswood, cloth or leather, and is wetenough that ferrous (iron) artefacts arelikely to have crumbled to dust longago. Even so, traces of extensivenumbers of fire hearths and therecovery of copper and brass objects

or silver coins may yet provide us withsome fresh data. Given the nature ofthe soil, it seems unlikely that theremains of the combatants will havesurvived, though clearly there were agreat number of them, but it is quitepossible that developments in soilanalysis, geophysics or in the analysisof aerial photography may help toimprove our comprehension of thebattle.

Equally, we should be hopeful that inaddition to archaeology, improvementsin scholarship may develop our pictureof the fighting. Until recent times thishas not been a happy tale. Thepopular view of Bannockburn – indeed,of medieval war generally – bears littleresemblance to what we actually knowabout it, and the fault for this can belaid fairly and squarely at the feet ofscholars who, rather like the medievalchroniclers, have often had an agendato pursue. Over a century ago, S.R.

Gardiner and C.W.C. Oman (seeFurther Reading) developed a view ofBannockburn that fitted what theywanted to believe. They started withcertain conclusions and accepted,enhanced or rejected – in some casesinvented – evidence to suit thoseconclusions. Since that time manywriters (including several who shouldhave known better) have incorporatedOman or Gardiner’s views into theirown work. To this day, a writer can,with impunity, declare thatBannockburn was fought in bogs andswamps. Although all of thecontemporary material is very clearthat this was not the case, the bogsand swamps have become part of the‘received history’ of Scotland andEngland.

Oman and Gardiner sought toestablish a rationale for the mystery ofEdward II’s defeat, rather thansearching for the roots of Robert I’s

victory. In fact, there is nothing verymysterious about Bannockburn. If wegive due attention to the record andnarrative material, we find that thebattle was really a very straightforwardaffair and well within the ‘norms’ ofmedieval warfare.

TIMELINE 1286 Death of Alexander III1290 Death of Margaret, Maid

of Norway1291–92 The Great Cause1292 John Balliol inaugurated

as King of Scotland1295October Franco-Scottish treaty

1296 AprilEdward I invadesScotland; the sack ofBerwick

July Edward deposes KingJohn

1297Spring Rise of William WallaceSeptember Battle of Stirling Bridge1298 July Battle of Falkirk

1303February

Battle of Roslin

Franco-English peaceagreement

1304 Strathord Agreement1306March

Robert Bruce declareshimself King of Scotland

June Battle of Methven1307 April Battle of GlentroolMay Battle of Loudoun Hill1308 May Battle of Inverurie1309March

Robert I’s first parliamentheld at St Andrews

1312January Robert I captures Perth1313October

Edward II announcesinvasion of Scotland

1314March

Fall of Edinburgh to theScots

LentEarl of Carrick negotiatessurrender pact for Stirling

castle23/24 June Battle of Bannockburn

1328Treaty of Edinburgh-Northampton recognisesRobert I as King ofScotland

HISTORICALBACKGROUND

At the time of Alexander III’s death in1286, Scotland and England hadenjoyed a long tradition of, essentially,good relations. Intermittent attemptsby English kings over the precedingtwo centuries and more to procure adegree of sovereignty over theirScottish counterparts had never reallytaken root; indeed, it is questionablewhether any English king had everseriously believed that they would.William the Lion (reigned 1165–1214)was obliged to give homage for hiskingdom after he was captured in 1174as part of his ransom arrangements,but fifteen years later he paid a largesum to ensure that he and hissuccessors would be free of any feudal

obligation to the English Crown in thefuture. A century later, when Edward Icame to the throne in England, theScottish king, Alexander III, made atrip south to give homage for hisvarious properties in England. Edwardmade a rather half-hearted attempt tohave Scotland included in the homageceremony, but this was robustlyrejected by Alexander, who told himthat the Kingdom of Scotland was held‘from God alone’1, which Edwardaccepted and there the matter rested.

3. The coronation of Edward I. Edward onlycommanded one Scottish action in person, the Battleof Falkirk, 1298. His death in 1307 was a major blowto the fortunes of the English occupation forces,however the tide of the war had probably alreadystarted to turn in favour of the Scots.

Relations between the two countrieswere largely based on socialrelationships – cross-borderlandholding was fairly commonplace,but almost all of the properties wererelatively modest. Although a Scottishlord might own several properties inEngland (or in France or Ireland), orvice versa, nobody was a top-rankingnoble (or magnate) in both kingdoms.Naturally, any level of landholdingautomatically meant a degree ofobligation to the Crown and thereforeanyone who held land in both countrieshad a range of responsibilities to bothkings, but this was never really a veryserious problem before the English

invasion of 1296, and its significancethereafter has been ratherexaggerated by historians. Thenumber of individuals involved was notterribly large in either kingdom and theproperties concerned were mostlyquite modest. No individual held aproperty of greater significance than abarony in more than one kingdom.Contrary to the claims of many writersin the past, neither Robert Bruce, norJohn Comyn or even Alexander III,was considered a magnate in theEnglish political structure, though allthree of them did hold valuable Englishproperties.

4. A sixteenth-century English artwork, depicting afictitious parliament of Edward I attended byLlewellyn, Prince of Wales and Alexander III.Artworks and forged documents were an importantweapon in the propaganda arsenals of medievalkings: the ‘Dodgy Dossier’ is not a modern

innovation.

There was surprisingly littleeconomic activity between the twocountries. England’s trade lay mainlywith France and Scotland’s mainly withthe Baltic and the Low Countries – theNetherlands and Belgium. Bothcountries depended on wool as thechief export crop and there wastherefore little point in exporting woolfrom one to the other. There was,however, a considerable degree ofcultural overlap. Both kingdoms hadadopted the political and military ethosof France that we now call feudalism.In England this had come aboutthrough the Norman Conquest of1066; in Scotland it had come aboutthrough a mixture of exposure to thepractices of her southern neighbour, aconsiderable degree of intermarriagebetween the two royal families and thesenior nobility, and the general

adoption of ‘feudal’ practice acrossNorthern and Western Europe. Inshort, that was how a ‘modern’ nationfunctioned in the later Middle Ages.Long before the outbreak of the warsof independence there was preciouslittle practical cultural, military orpolitical difference between most ofScotland and most of England. Therewere some very clear regionaldifferences within both countries, butlittle or nothing to distinguish the socialethos of Brechin from that of Bedford,save that the average ‘parish gentry’landholder in Bedford might be morelikely to speak French – or at least beable to speak French – than hisnorthern counterpart.

BARONY

A form of landholding, baronies camein all shapes and sizes. Possession of

a barony gave limited localgovernment powers to the baron. Thebarony would be ‘held’ from the Crown

in exchange for various obligations,usually an annual sum of money,though this was often a nominal

payment. The chief responsibilities ofthe baron focused on maintaining lawand order and the provision of a set

number of men-at-arms for the king’sarmy, and often, though not

universally, providing infantry serviceas well. The baron would have the

right to hold local courts, occasionallyfor capital crimes, and would collectrents and other sums (collectively

known as the issues of the barony)from his tenants. Portions of the

barony would generally be granted to

other men who would, in exchange,provide the baron with the knight

service he needed to fulfil hisobligations to the Crown.

The generally cordial relationshipbetween England and Scotland startedto unravel with the death of AlexanderIII in March 1286. Alexander’s twosons by his first marriage had alreadydied, and his granddaughter Margaret(daughter of Erik II of Norway) hadbeen recognised as his heir. There is apossibility that Alexander and Edwardwere planning a dynastic union of thetwo countries, which would beachieved by the marriage of Margaretto Edward’s eldest son (the futureEdward II), but Alexander, still only inhis forties, married Yolande de Dreuxin 1285 and clearly hoped to produce adirect heir. Alexander’s death did notcause an immediate crisis. The

Scottish political community wassupportive, though the prospect of afemale heir, especially one that wasstill a child, was certainly an unusualthing in medieval Europe. The politicalsituation did, however, become amajor issue when Margaret died enroute to Scotland in 1290. There werenow two serious claimants to thethrone, John Balliol and Robert Bruce(grandfather of the man who wouldbecome Robert I), and a number ofothers who might make claims of moredubious validity. Since the death ofAlexander, Scotland had beenadministered by a council of‘guardians’ representing the majorpolitical groups in the community. Thissystem had worked well for theintervening four years but the questionof the succession was too momentousto be decided by a council of lords andclerics, and there was no prospect ofreaching a unanimous agreement

since the council contained supportersof both of the significant candidates.The council approached Edward I foradvice, for which they have attracted agreat deal of criticism from historians,but their actions were perfectlyrational: Edward had had a goodrelationship with the late Alexander III;he was known to have a real interest injurisprudence; he was powerful enoughto impose the final decision ifnecessary; and he was acceptable toboth of the main contenders. As theKing of Scotland’s only neighbour anda major player on the Europeanpolitical stage, he simply could not beignored and if the processdegenerated into a civil war – a realpossibility – Edward might well allowthe two sides to exhaust themselvesand simply march into Scotland at thehead of a great army and take over,as he had in Wales.

5. John Balliol, from a Scottish amorial illuminatedbetween 1581 and 1584. The king is surrounded bythe broken symbols of his rule.

Edward was more than happy totake on the role, correctly identifying it

as an opportunity to further his owninterests in Scotland. The council dideverything they reasonably could toensure the future security of the realm,but Edward was an astute politicianand would clearly have a strongnegotiating position. He was not invitedto arbitrate on the question of thesuccession. His role was to conduct acourt of inquiry, ensure a fair andequitable process, and then overseethe installation of the successfulcandidate. In due course, a grand juryof 104 auditors was assembled. Theauditors included forty chosen by JohnBalliol and forty chosen by RobertBruce – a clear indication that none ofthe other candidates really had aserious case to present, but weresimply making a demonstration of theirinterest in the event that both theBruce and Balliol lines failed toproduce heirs in the future. Edwardwas able to manipulate all of the

candidates into accepting hisoverlordship as a condition of havingtheir bids for the crown recognised atall. There was some resistance to thisfrom various barons, but their positionwas undermined by the acceptance ofEdward’s demands by the differentcandidates. The case ran for over ayear, but in November 1292 a decisionwas finally reached and John Balliolbecame King of Scotland, but wasobliged to give homage for his realm toEdward.

Almost immediately, Edward’sactions became increasinglyoverbearing. He asserted a right tohear appeals against John’s courtjudgements and generally set aboutundermining John’s authority at everyopportunity. John was not in a positionto challenge Edward’s action and hispolitical credibility suffered accordingly.Edward hoped to provoke John intoopen resistance and the opportunity

arose when Edward issued writsdemanding military service from Johnand various prominent members of theScottish nobility for service againstFrance.

At around this time, the majority ofthe Scottish political community hadtaken power out of John’s hands.Initiatives of this nature were – to saythe least – rare in medieval politics, butthe process was eased by the fact thata committee of guardians had ruledeffectively during the years betweenthe death of Alexander III and thedeath of his granddaughter Margaret:a period of four years. The Scottishpolitical community had acquired someexperience of governing a kingdomwithout actually having a king;experience that would prove invaluablein the years between 1297 and 1304.

6. Illuminated capital from an English medievaldocument depicting a scene from the siege ofCarlisle.

The new council made a treaty ofmutual defence with the King of

France. And from 1295 there was, intheory at least, a state of war betweenEngland and Scotland. In practice,very little happened. Edward wasalready busy with his war in Franceand was unable to pursue operationsin Scotland until the spring of 1296.Both sides raised armies, but theScots simply had no idea about how toconduct a war. There had not beenwar in Scotland for more than thirtyyears, and that had been a relativelyshort affair that had been dealt with bythe county communities of the south-west. Edward, on the other hand, wasan experienced commander whopursued his campaign with purpose.The Scots made some ratherpurposeless raids into northernEngland, but Edward approached thetown of Berwick, stormed it andsacked the community with enormousloss of life. The town – in those daysone of the most significant commercial

centres in the British Isles – waslargely destroyed, but Edwardeffectively sent a signal to every othertown in Scotland: resistance was notonly futile, since hardly any Scottishtowns had defences of any kind, letalone serious fortification, but wouldalso result in the utter destruction ofthe community. There was only oneaction in the rest of the 1296campaign. A body of Scottish men-at-arms encountered a similar Englishforce near Dunbar and werecompletely routed. Only one fatality isrecorded, but in the fighting and thesubsequent surrender of Dunbar castlemore than 200 members of theScottish nobility and gentry were takenprisoner. The main body of theScottish army, now bereft ofleadership and purpose, simplydissolved and made their way homewithout ever seeing action.

7. The obverse and reverse of the seal of Edward I.

The Scottish government had notenjoyed the full support of the politicalcommunity. One, Robert Bruce(grandson of the man who had soughtto become king in 1291–92), had sidedwith Edward I in the hope that hisfather (his grandfather had died in theinterim) would now be installed on thethrone at the hands of Edward I. Hewas quickly disabused of this; Edwardhad no plans to make anybody King ofScotland, least of all Robert Bruce.

Instead, Edward marched northwardsdemanding homage and the surrenderof castles and towns, all of which waseasily accomplished, given the eventsat Berwick. By July he had capturedJohn, forced his abdication and packedhim off to London as a prisoner.Assuming – perhaps understandably –that the war was won, Edward left theconsolidation of an occupationadministration to his lieutenants andreturned to the more pressing affairsat home.

The Scots had certainly beendefeated and Edward had obliged agreat number of Scottish nobles andtowns to give homage, but recoverywas rapid. Within a matter of months,Edward’s officers reported that theScots were in the process of forming agovernment and were appointingofficials in many areas, and that onlytwo counties – Berwickshire andRoxburgh – were under occupation

control and they ‘only lately’2. Anyhopes that Edward had of imposing hisown rule quickly and securelydisappeared in early 1297. One of theprisoners taken the previous year, SirAndrew Murray, escaped fromcaptivity, made his way back to thenorth-east of Scotland and raised aforce which set siege to strongholds.Robert Bruce had decided to jump shipand was assembling a force in thewest, while William Wallace, youngestson of an obscure Ayrshire knight, wasconducting operations in centralScotland.

Bruce was now fighting for KingJohn, though he had beenconspicuous by his absence theprevious year. In practice, if he everwanted to be king himself, Bruce hadto be seen as espousing the cause ofindependence. For Wallace andMurray the matter was more clear-cut:they were simply fighting to get John

restored to the throne. Due to hiscommitments elsewhere, Edward wasunable to take to the field himself andentrusted operations in Scotland to hislieutenants. The ‘noble revolt’ of Bruceand others was resolved throughnegotiations at Irvine, though therewas a strong suspicion that hedragged the discussions out as long ashe could to allow Wallace and Murraymore time to gather and train theirtroops. True or not, by the time SirHugh Cressingham – Edward’streasurer for Scotland – was able toget to Stirling, he found that Murrayand Wallace had combined their forceson the north bank of the river.Confident that his force was more thana match for anything the Scots mighthave to offer, Cressingham tried tocross the river and was soundlydefeated.

Wallace and Murray were noweffectively masters of Scotland north

of the River Forth and throughoutmuch of the south. They acted asguardians in the name of King John,but Murray died a few weeks after thebattle – possibly of wounds incurred inthe action – leaving Wallace in solecharge. It was rare indeed forsomeone of such lowly political statusto acquire so much power, but therewas something of a political vacuum.Some of the more prominent lords hadalready been neutralised at Irvine;some simply wanted a quiet life andwere prepared to accept Edward’slordship; some – particularly in thesouth-east, where they were mostvulnerable to English military power –were hesitant to resist; but, mostsignificantly, a large number were stillprisoners of war following the debacleof the 1296 campaign.

At about this time, Edward freed anumber of senior figures – notably SirJohn Comyn, Lord of Badenoch – to

serve in his army in Flanders inexchange for their liberty, only to havethem defect and escape to France atthe earliest opportunity and then returnto Scotland to continue the fight.

Clearly Edward had to act if he wasto achieve his goals in Scotland, but hewas unable to bring an army to thefield until the late summer of 1298. Bythis time most of Scotland was underWallace’s control and initially Edwardstruggled to come to grips with hisopponent. Just as he was on the vergeof running out of money and suppliesto keep his army in existence, Edwardwas able to steal a march on Wallaceand inflicted a major defeat on him atFalkirk. Since Wallace’s politicalauthority had depended entirely on hismilitary credibility, he was swiftlyousted from the position of guardianand his place was taken by Bruce andComyn. This was not a happyarrangement. The Comyns had an

excellent track record as servants ofthe Crown and were closely associatedwith King John, but Bruce had been onthe English side in 1296 and clearlyhad royal ambitions of his own.Despite their differences, Comyn andBruce managed their campaignreasonably effectively. In the aftermathof Falkirk, Edward had been obliged toleave Scotland once again to tend toconcerns elsewhere and may evenhave believed that the Scottishsituation was now largely settled andcould be left to his subordinates.

This was clearly not the case. In1299 – at the behest of the pope andas part of negotiations with France –Edward had released John Balliol, andby 1300 there seemed to be a realpossibility that he might be restored tothe throne. This was not an attractiveproposition to Robert Bruce, who nowmade his peace with Edward,abandoning the Balliol cause. Despite

his defection, the Scots continued tomake headway, but Edward could notmake an opportunity to take mattersinto his own hands until he hadreached a satisfactory conclusion inFrance. Eventually he was able toforce a peace treaty which specificallyexcluded the Scots and secured astatement in which King John rejectedany further involvement in Scottishaffairs.

The loss of France as an ally was abody blow to the Scots, and sinceJohn was no longer interested in hisown restoration, it was now difficult forhis supporters to be clear about whatthey were fighting for. Additionally,Edward now brought a large army toScotland, but also made it clear thathe was prepared to negotiate terms. InFebruary 1304, an agreement wasreached at Strathord and the warcame to an end. For Edward this wasa very important achievement. Aware

that he was nearing the end of his life,he was eager to finish his Scottishbusiness, but it is not at all clear thathe really believed he had secured hisauthority. At least a proportion of theScots seem to have seen theStrathord Agreement as more of anarmistice than a final settlement, and afew prominent figures – notablyWilliam Wallace – were specificallyexcluded from the terms and werethus still active in the field. In August1305, Wallace was captured,subjected to a travesty of a trial andexecuted.

The exclusion of Wallace and a fewothers was, to some extent, a matterof public relations. The garrison ofStirling castle – which had also beenspecifically excluded from theStrathord terms – held out for sometime, declaring that they were notfighting for Balliol’s kingship, but for‘The Lion’ (the heraldic symbol of the

nation), but with no prospect of relieftheir resistance was probably more todo with seeking honourable terms thananything else. Wallace was a differentmatter. The Scottish war had been aheavy burden on Edward’s kingdomand someone had to carry the can andsatisfy English public opinion for‘rebellion’. Overall, the execution ofWallace – and the manner of it – wasan unwise move on the part ofEdward. Wallace was, by this time,politically insignificant, but deliberatepersecution made Edward look pettyand the elaborate executions were notpart of the general ethos of medievalScotland. Had Edward simplyimprisoned him, Wallace wouldprobably have fallen out of publicconsciousness along with the othermen who had resisted the occupationand are now known only to a handfulof medieval scholars and enthusiasts.

Although he felt a need to make an

example and perhaps demonstrate adegree of closure to his Scottish wars,Edward could not afford to impose tooheavy a settlement on the Scottishmagnates and the wider politicalcommunity. If he was to rulesuccessfully he needed their supportto run the country. It was clear that hecould not simply execute all of thenobles who had fought against himand replace them with English lords.There were not enough candidatesand such a policy would inevitablybreed hostility; moreover, he could notpossibly execute all the sons, cousinsand nephews of Scottish lords whomight at some point rebel to recovertheir lost heritages, and who wouldvery likely be able to gather supportfrom the community quite easily.Edward had not made sweepingchanges to administrative or legalpractices in Scotland – the only law heabolished was the ‘law of the Scots

and the Brets’ which had been indesuetude for generations – but hisoccupation government was seen asoppressive and, inevitably, foreign. It isimportant to remember that in theMiddle Ages England and Scotlandwere as much different countries asPortugal and France. This may havebeen rather lost on Edward himself,since there was a good deal ofcommon practice in both kingdoms.

His general intention towardScotland is less than clear. He madeno effort to incorporate Scotlandformally into England, nor did hearrange to have himself officiallydeclared as king. It is possible that hehoped to achieve a situation in whichScotland would be a spate lordshipowned by the English Crown, but notsubject to interference by the Englishparliament, and he seems to have hadno intention of calling a Scottishparliament. Instead he set up a council

of magnates – mostly Scottish – andentrusted administration to them.Edward may have genuinely believedthat the death of Wallace was the finalact in the conquest of Scotland,though that would have been a ratheroptimistic assessment. Realisticallythere were at least two possiblesources of contention. One wasRobert Bruce, who was certainly inEdward’s peace but is most unlikely tohave given up on his regal ambitions atany point. The other was EdwardBalliol, son of the deposed King John.John’s deposition and abdication hadbeen forced at the point of the swordand was therefore easily recognisableas an act of coercion by a greatermilitary power. Medieval legal practiceunderstood the concept of duress andJohn’s abdication was thus invalid initself. In 1303 he had surrendered allhis rights in Scottish matters, but itwas, at best, questionable as to

whether he could legally discard theclaims of his legitimate heir. EdwardBalliol was still young and in duecourse might well attempt to restorethe family line. The Scottish politicalestablishment was rather conservativeand if Edward Balliol could bring anysort of a force to Scotland there wasevery chance that he would be able togather widespread support since hewas, after all, the legitimate heir to thethrone.

PEELS

Edward I constructed a number ofpeels in the late 1290s and early

1300s. A peel was not really a castle,but was more purely a military

establishment. Most of the peels weremajor installations with powerful

garrisons containing a mobile strikingforce of several scores of men-at-armswho could be committed to actions in

support of castles in the vicinity,though the peel at Linlithgow was a

very small affair with only a handful ofarchers and men-at-arms.

Through the autumn and winter of1305/06, there seems to have been noserious opposition to Edward’s rule inScotland. The royal castles, and somebaronial ones, were garrisoned andwork continued on the construction of

a number of peels, though not with anygreat sense of urgency. The garrisonswere mostly quite small and, all in all,there was a brief period of peace, butthe situation was far from settled.Robert Bruce was still determined toacquire the throne and in February1306 he met with his chief politicalrival, John Comyn. According to thepoet John Barbour, writing more thanhalf a century after the event, Bruceoffered to grant all of his property –most significantly the Earldom ofCarrick and the Lordship of Annandale– to Comyn in exchange forunequivocal support for Bruce’skingship. Alternatively, Bruce wouldgive his support to Comyn in exchangefor all of the great Comyn lordships ofthe north-east. Barbour’s account is, atbest, suspect in this regard. The Bruceclaim to the throne was weaker thanthat of the Balliols, but he wouldcertainly be the next legitimate heir to

the throne if the Balliol line wasexcluded; the Comyn family, however,had no legal claim to the throne at all.Regardless, the two men met atDumfries for some purpose, and it isalmost certain that they were planningto take action against the occupation.The Comyns’ long tradition of loyalservice to the Crown would suggestthat John Comyn favoured a coup thatwould, in due course, put EdwardBalliol on the throne, but that might bea threat to the Bruce family, since theyhad not supported John’s kingship in1296 and had only fought for himintermittently thereafter.

8. Significant towns and castles in late medievalScotland.

Whatever the motivation andwhatever offers were made, themeeting was a disaster for the Bruceparty. Robert – or one of hissupporters – killed John Comyn at thealtar of the Greyfriars and therebystarted a ferocious blood feud betweenthe two families. It is a reasonableassumption that Bruce was planning tomake a move anyway, but the death ofComyn forced his hand. He tried tocommunicate with Edward, but wasrebuffed, and on Palm Sunday 1306he had himself inaugurated as King ofScotland. Less than a year after theend of Wallace’s resistance to Edward,there was war once again. Robertwould probably have preferred to waitfor a better opportunity. Edward wasold and ill, and could not be expected

to live much longer; furthermore hisheir – Edward of Carnarvon – wasseen as being less assiduous than hisfather and not such a potentadversary.

Robert’s campaign started badly. Hewas able to gather a considerabledegree of support from the politicalcommunity, but this was offset by thefact that the Comyn family and theirallies were vehemently opposed to himand by the fact that he was not reallythe legitimate heir. By early summer,Bruce had gathered something of anarmy, but he was not yet a verycompetent commander. On 19 Junehis troops were attacked and scatteredin a dawn attack at Methven by a forceunder Sir Aymer de Valence, Earl ofPembroke and brother-in-law to thelate John Comyn. Bruce moved to thewest in search of further support whilesending his queen – Elizabeth deBurgh – into the north-east to take

sanctuary at Tain. A second defeat atthe hand of John of Lorne reduced himto being no more than the leader of aparty of bandits, and for the nextseveral months Robert disappearsfrom record. It is generally believedthat he sought and found shelter in theWestern Isles; Edward ordered a partyto seek him out on the island ofRathlin, off the coast of Ireland, andsome writers have made a case thatRobert travelled to Orkney orShetland, or even to Norway. In hisabsence, Edward was able to restorehis own authority across much of thecountry and a number of Bruce’s earlysupporters came to Edward’s peace,either because they were disillusionedwith the Bruce cause or because theyfeared for their estates or even theirlives.

The latter was unmistakeably aserious consideration. Robert’s queenand his daughter by his first marriage

(Marjory) fell into Edward’s hands andwere imprisoned, but his brother Neilwas executed. The same fate mighthave befallen Elizabeth, but her fatherwas the Earl of Ulster, a powerful Irishmagnate and a crucial part ofEdward’s Irish administration. He couldnot afford to alienate the earl, butequally he could not afford to releaseElizabeth, lest she escape to Scotlandand provide Robert with a male heir.Executing his existing heir, Marjory,would have been barbaric in theextreme, besides which she couldpotentially prove useful in the future. IfEdward succeeded in destroyingRobert Bruce, he might at some pointput a favourable face on appointing areplacement Earl of Carrick bymarrying her off to his new appointee.

Robert returned to the stage inFebruary 1307. He organised twoattacks in the south-west. One partyunder himself and his younger brother

Edward made a landing at Turnberry,which was less than successful, butthe other under his brothers Thomasand Alexander landed at Loch Ryanand was thoroughly defeated. LikeNeil, Thomas and Alexander wereexecuted without trial, which was aclear political statement on the part ofEdward. In future, his opponents inScotland could not expect to betreated with the normal usages ofmedieval warfare: there would be noransoms or imprisonment, just deathsentences. Edward adhered to thispolicy for a while, but it had to beabandoned some time before the closeof 1308 due to the increasing numberof English prisoners in Scottishcustody.

Edward’s death at Burgh-on-the-Sands in 1307, when he was en routeto yet another campaign in Scotland,passed the problem to his son, EdwardII. The new king was not happy about

the Scottish situation, but he had manyother issues to deal with, not least hiscoronation, a major financial crisis anda difficult relationship with France, andwas unable to focus his attention onScotland. Edward’s problems helped toease the course of the Bruce party.Despite the major setbacks of the firstyear and more of his reign, by thesummer of 1308 he had defeated mostof his internal opponents, acquiredpolitical control over much of thenorthern part of Scotland and wasstarting to make serious inroadsagainst the occupation government.His approach differed considerablyfrom the policies adopted by Wallaceand Murray, and from the guardianshipin which he had taken an active role.He made no attempt to hold on to thecastles that he captured. Doing sowould have depleted the strength ofhis field army and any castle that waslater recaptured and garrisoned by the

English would put a dent in hiscredibility, so instead he slighted them.He did not actually destroy them,which would have taken a good deal oftime and effort, but he tore down gatedefences and breached walls to makethem indefensible without a majorprogramme of reconstruction, forwhich Edward could afford neither themanpower nor the money.

In the summer of 1310, Edward IIwas at last able to mount a significantcampaign aimed at reinstating theground lost to the Bruce party and, ifpossible, bringing Robert to battle.Little, if anything, was achieved,though the cost was considerable bothfinancially and in terms of Edward’sprestige and credibility. He failedutterly to force a major engagementand by the end of the year, having runout of money and with his armymelting away through desertion,Edward had retired to Berwick, where

he would spend the next six months orso. The campaign was a failure forEdward, but was inevitably apropaganda coup for Robert. Twomonths after Edward left Berwick toattend to his domestic issues, Roberttook an army into Tynedale, wherethey seized considerable sums ofmoney and vast numbers of cattle.

A month later he mounted a secondexpedition into Northumberland. Unlikesimilar raids by Wallace in 1297,Robert’s force did not indulge in lootingand pillaging. Instead, Robertdemanded – and received – theenormous sum of £2,000 from thecommunity of Northumberland inexchange for a truce until February1312. The funds gathered allowedRobert to pay his troops instead ofallowing them to plunder, but theabsence of destruction meant that hewould be able to demand similar sumsin the future and, just as usefully,

demand free passage into moresoutherly counties which would besubjected to the same treatment in theyears to come.

At the end of 1311, Robert hadgained complete control of Scotlandnorth of the River Forth with theexceptions of the towns and castles ofPerth and Dundee. The first fell to anight attack in January 1312, when avisiting French knight was surprised –even horrified – to see Robert himselfstrip off and swim through the coldwater of the Tay to take part in theoperation. Dundee fell later in the year,possibly through a surrender pact.

By the end of the year Robert’scredibility had grown to the point wheremodest numbers of landholders incentral counties like Lothian, Fife andClackmannanshire, which were stillmore or less under English control,were starting to enter his peacedespite the risks to their estates

should he be defeated. Clearly the warhad swung in his favour and there wasless belief that Edward was capable ofre-imposing his government inScotland. There was greateropposition elsewhere. Many of thegentry and aristocracy ofRoxburghshire, Berwickshire, Lothianand Dumfriesshire served in Englishgarrisons; some for wages and somebecause they were obliged todischarge the military obligationsattached to their landholding or faceforfeiture. And, of course, there wasstill the matter of Robert’s legitimacyas king. So long as the Balliol linesurvived, John – and, after his death,his son Edward – would continue to bethe legitimate king and Robert wouldcontinue to be a usurper.

All the same, success draws supportand by the summer of 1313 evenLothian was only nominally underoccupation rule as greater numbers of

the political community turned to theBruce party, in part at least becauseRobert was now forcing them to makethe same sort of payments for peacethat he had forced on the communityof Northumberland, and partly becausethe Bruce party was increasingly seenas being in a better position to providean environment of steady law andorder. That perception wasencouraged by the behaviour of someof the occupation garrisons, who hadtaken to seizing goods and moneyfrom local inhabitants – even thosewho had been supportive of theoccupation government over severalyears.

Edward had not, however,abandoned his hopes for a recovery.In an exercise that smacks strongly ofpolitical stage management, thejusticiar (chief judge) of Lothian, SirAdam Gordon, petitioned Edward tocome to the aid of his loyal subjects in

Scotland. Edward’s response was toannounce a major offensive for thefollowing summer. At this juncture thegreat castles of southern and centralScotland were not yet seen as being atrisk, though the great peel may havefallen to the Scots at about this time.Clearly Edward hoped to restore hisScottish administration by militarymeans. If he could bring about a majorbattle and defeat Robert, he wouldhave taken a major step in thatdirection. A similar policy had,superficially, been successful againstWilliam Wallace in 1298; however, theBattle of Falkirk – though a majorvictory – had really achieved little morethan the replacement of Wallace asguardian. It had not brought about acollapse of the Scottish resistance,which in fact continued to prosper –even the great castle of Stirling fell tothe Balliol party in 1299. In fact,Edward had little choice but to make a

major demonstration, though he hadproblems enough at home already.Failure to have pursued the war withthe Scots would have reflected badlyon his own abilities as king. He wouldhave been seen as abandoning hisfather’s achievements, though inreality Edward I had failed to bring hisScottish wars to a satisfactoryconclusion. He had to show somecommitment to those Scots who hadaccepted his kingship, many of whomwere now pensioners of the EnglishCrown and living in exile, as well asthose who continued to support hiskingship in the southern counties,especially in Lothian, Roxburghshire,Berwickshire and Dumfriesshire. Healso had to support the claims of thoseEnglish who had been granted landsand offices in Scotland by himself orby his father, or who – like Henry deBeaumont – had claims to estates thathad been declared forfeit by King

Robert.Edward’s plans seem to have had

little or no effect on the Bruce party.King Robert’s forces continued topress on with the campaign. Althoughthe most obvious sign of their successwas the capture of castles and towns,the Bruce party’s progress was reallymore a matter of expanding the areaunder Robert’s control, and by the endof 1313, even in those areas wherethe garrisons still held out, there wasvery little of the occupation to rescue.The castles were still manned, but theyseem to have become isolatedoutposts holding out against theenemy rather than active garrisonsimposing Edward’s administration inthe localities. The early months of1314 did nothing to improve theposition. In February and March thecastles of Roxburgh and Edinburgh fellto forces under Douglas and the Earlof Moray respectively, thus effectively

compromising the ability of theremaining strongholds to support oneanother. By Lent the garrison ofStirling was under close siege from theEarl of Carrick, and this is what forcedthe hand of the constable of the castle– Sir Philip Moubray – to make asurrender pact with the earl. Criticismof both parties rather fails to takeaccount of the reality of the situation.Given the time of year, Moubray’ssupply situation must have been poorat best and perilous at worst for boththe men and the horses of thegarrison. His stores would havebecome depleted through the winter;even if he had acquired massivequantities of hay in the autumn of1313, the horses of the men-at-armswould have consumed at least thegreater part of it by March and hecould not hope to replenish it whilstunder siege. By making the pact,Moubray was able to ensure that his

men would not be either starved intosurrender or killed in a siege that hecould not hope to withstandindefinitely. Equally, although it is easyto assume that Carrick was simplybored with conducting a siege, this is asupposition based on Barbour’s view ofCarrick as a rather flighty sort of man.In fact, the pact allowed Carrick toconduct more immediately usefuloperations elsewhere. Since KingEdward was already committed to amajor invasion of Scotland in thesummer of 1314, it made no realdifference whether Stirling castleremained in English hands untilstarved out or stormed, or whether thegarrison held out until the arrival ofEdward’s army.

To some extent the threat of losingthe castle possibly encouraged Edwardto make Stirling his initial objective, butthe key word is ‘initial’. He had to domore than simply take an army to

Scotland and inflict a defeat – even acrushing defeat – on the Scots. Hewould have to lead his forcesthroughout Scotland if he was tosuccessfully re-impose hisgovernment. If the castle fell and wasthen recovered after a successfulbattle, it would only be one fortressamong many that would requireextensive repair and renovation.Stirling was certainly a key location inthe sense that a powerful garrisonthere could control movement acrossthe Forth, but it was no moresignificant politically than Edinburgh inthe south or Aberdeen in the north. Ifthe occupation was to be effective, itneeded to have control of the majortowns and castles, but there was novalue to that unless the garrisons wereable to operate in the widercommunity. They had to be able to domore than just collect rents and taxes,control law and order and extract

military service; they had to be able toprevent anybody else from competingfor authority. NOTES1 J. Stevenson, Documents Illustrativeof Scottish History2 Ibid.

THE ARMIES

The Commanders

Edward II

Edward has carried a great weight ofhostility for 700 years, which is ratherless than just. He had accrued quite anextensive experience of campaigningagainst the Scots, though he hadnever been able to bring them tobattle. He has been widely criticised fornot carrying out his father’s wishes andpursuing the campaign on whichEdward I died in 1307, but as a newking he had more than enough issuesto deal with at that moment – not leastthe enormous debts that his father hadincurred in a decade of unsuccessfulwars in Scotland. In 1307, Robert Iwas still little more than a brigand inthe hills with very limited overt support

and a great deal of opposition fromthose who were prepared to acceptthe Plantagenets and from the rathergreater proportion of the populationwho still favoured the return of theBalliol line. However much Edwardmight have wanted to pursue hisScottish affairs, his immediatepriorities lay elsewhere. He might haveenjoyed greater success if he hadpursued his campaign against Robertmore assiduously in 1308–11, but hehad to face extensive opposition fromhis own nobility as well as dealing withthe situation in France. By the end of1312 he had managed to overcome asignificant part of his domestic politicaldifficulties, but by this point Robert hadbecome sufficiently powerful that onlya major campaign was likely todislodge him. In 1314, Edward had astaff of talented and experiencedofficers, all of whom were taken just asmuch by surprise at the dawn attack of

Robert I as Edward was.

Aymer de Valence, Earl ofPembroke

A competent and experienced soldierand a valued diplomat, de Valence hadhad mixed fortunes in Scotland. Hehad defeated Robert at Methven in1306 only to be beaten in turn atLoudoun Hill a year later. He was, ingeneral, a loyal and effective servantof both Edward I and Edward II. Hewas one of the ‘Lords Ordainer’ rebelswho tried to exert control over whatthey saw as Edward II’s excesses, butaligned himself with the king after theOrdainers executed Piers Gaveston.De Valence was able to extract himselfand a considerable body of troopsfrom the defeat at Bannockburn.

Sir Robert Clifford

Clifford spent a very considerable partof his career in Scotland. He waspresent at the Irvine negotiations thatended the ‘noble revolt’ of 1297 and atthe Battle of Falkirk the following year.From 1308 he was Edward II’s chiefofficer in Scotland, but was unable toprevent King Robert from gainingcontrol over most of the country.Clifford was killed in action atBannockburn and his body was senthome to be buried at Shap Abbey.

Gilbert de Clare, Earl ofGloucester

A grandson of Edward I, Gloucesterwas active in the Scottish wars andheld significant posts in the occupationarmy. He held a senior command atBannockburn and was, arguably, themost prominent of the Englishcasualties. According to Barbour, KingRobert held a vigil over Gloucester’sbody, which was returned to Englandfor burial at Tewkesbury Abbey.

Humphrey de Bohun, Earl ofHereford

De Bohun was less than happy abouthis status within the army. As marshalof England, he felt – understandably –that he should have had a moreprominent position. He managed toescape capture at Bannockburn andfled to Bothwell castle, where he wasadmitted and then promptly takenprisoner when the commander of thecastle learned of the defeat of theEnglish army.

Sir Henry de Beaumont

Definitely one of the most outstandingcareer soldiers of his day, deBeaumont served Edward I in Flandersand then extensively in Scotland,losing his horse at Falkirk. He had avested interest in defeating Brucesince he had married Alice, heir toJohn Comyn, Earl of Buchan, andclaimed the earldom in right of his wife.He was a leading figure in the attemptto put Edward Balliol on the Scottishthrone in 1332 and should probably becredited with developing the classiclongbow tactic, which was first used atDupplin Muir. Beaumont escaped fromBannockburn with Edward II.

Sir Giles d’Argentan

Sir Giles was not, strictly speaking,one of the commanders, but he wasone of the most prominent paladins ofthe age. Entrusted with the security ofKing Edward II, he ensured that theking escaped from the battlefield andthen returned to the fight and waskilled in action.

Sir Henry de Bohun

De Bohun was not one of the moresignificant commanders, but wasdefinitely one of the more famousnames. Immediately before the firstengagement at the New Park, deBohun (a nephew of Humphrey deBohun, Earl of Hereford) saw anopportunity to acquire great fame andstatus by killing Robert in singlecombat. The duel did not have theoutcome that Sir Henry expected,since King Robert killed him with asingle stroke of an axe, but hecertainly got his name into the historybooks.

Robert I

Within weeks of declaring himself king,Robert was roundly defeated by Aymerde Valence at Methven, near Perth.The following year started badly for theBruce cause, with a landing in thesouth-west and the capture of two ofRobert’s brothers, both of whom wereexecuted by Edward I in a fit of pique.

By the end of 1307, Robert hadcome to grips with his situation andwas soon making steady, ifunspectacular progress. Initially hewas very dependent on troops fromthe Hebrides and West Highlandsfurnished by Angus Og and otherCeltic lords, possibly includingChristina MacRuarie, who wasrumoured to have become hismistress. These western potentateshad largely escaped the attentions ofEdward I, but were now concerned

that the relative independence theyhad enjoyed in the past might bethreatened and that their future wouldbe more secure under the rule of aScottish king than an English one.

Robert’s first significant victoriesagainst the occupation forces – atGlentrool and Loudoun Hill – were notlarge actions, but they did give him adegree of credibility and by 1308 hewas in a position to take on his internalopposition, primarily the Comyn family.The Comyns had a long track recordas loyal and effective supporters of theCrown and had only given up the fightagainst Edward I in 1304, when thecountry was in a state of physical andfinancial exhaustion. Even at thatpoint, it is not absolutely clear that theyhad really finally accepted thesuzerainty of Edward I, but rather thatthey viewed the Strathord Agreementmore as an armistice and might welltake up arms again on behalf of the

Balliol cause, if not for King John, thenpossibly for his son Edward, who wasnow approaching an age when hecould take an active role in his ownright. Robert had had a tempestuousrelationship with the Comyns and hadfinally destroyed any prospect ofgaining their support by his murder ofJohn Comyn, Lord of Badenoch, at theGreyfriars, Dumfries, in February1306. This was an act that likelypropelled Robert to seize the crownrather earlier than he had planned. Aseries of campaigns in the north-eastand the south-west, and his ability toforce the Earl of Ross to accept hisauthority, gave Robert control over agreat deal of Scotland; in 1309 he wasable to hold his first recordedparliament at St Andrews. His enemy,Edward II, had more than enoughtroubles of his own and was unable toprevent Robert from forcing truces,which allowed him to consolidate his

administration across most of thecountry and then, from 1311 onward,to mount increasingly ambitious raidsinto England, demanding ransoms andfree passage from communities inNorthumberland and Cumbria.

9. A silver penny of Robert I. Pennies of a givenweight and purity of silver were known as ‘sterlings’(a term that originated from Germany) and wereacceptable right across Europe.

10. The Great Seal of Robert I.

Although Edward II mountedexpeditions into Scotland, his forcesfailed to force Robert to offer battleand one by one the remaining English-held strongholds fell to the Scots. In1312, Dundee was surrendered –

possibly through a surrender compactsimilar to the one procured by EdwardBruce at Stirling in 1314. With the fallof Edinburgh and Roxburgh in the latewinter and spring of 1314, only Stirling,Berwick and Bothwell remained inEnglish hands. Bothwell was not aparticularly important castle, butBerwick and Stirling were significantstrongholds; however, in both casesthe garrisons were unable to fulfil theirmain function – the imposition ofgovernment – and were no more thanisolated outposts in a country most ofwhich was firmly in the Bruce camp.

Edward Bruce, Earl of Carrick

As Robert’s sole surviving brother,Edward Bruce was his closest maleheir and naturally held a significantposition in the Bruce cause, but hewas also a competent and assiduoussoldier, leading a successful campaignto bring Galloway under Bruce control.

In Barbour’s narrative, Carrick’sdecision to make a surrender pact withSir Philip Moubray was a major factorin bringing about a battle at Stirling andrashly gave Edward II a whole year toprepare his invasion. In reality, thepact was agreed at Lent in 1314, not1313, and therefore was to last foronly three months, and Edward hadbeen committed to a major invasion ofScotland since the previous October, ifnot before. Pacts of this nature werenormal practice in medieval warfare.

Moubray was well aware that Edwardintended to bring an army to Stirlingbefore midsummer and the Bruceparty seem to have been fairly wellinformed about decisions at EdwardII’s court, so Carrick was probablyaware of the plan as well. The pactsuited both parties since the garrisonwould no longer be under threat andcould purchase supplies in the townwhile the besiegers could move off toundertake other projects.

Thomas Randolph, Earl ofMoray

A nephew of Robert I, Sir Thomas hadbeen one of his earliest supporters buthad defected to the Plantagenet causeafter being captured at the Battle ofMethven in 1306. He was takenprisoner by King Robert’s forces in1308 and sometime thereafterrenewed his allegiance to Robert. Heserved his king well and soon becameone of his principal lieutenants. In1312, Robert resurrected the title ofEarl of Moray and bestowed it onRandolph, thus giving him theresources and authority to bring thenorth-east firmly under Bruce controland fatally undermining the prestige ofthe Comyn family. Moray seizedEdinburgh castle in a daring nightattack in March 1314 and commanded

the action near St Ninian’s chapel on23 June, and a division of the army onthe following day.

Sir James Douglas

Although Douglas would eventuallybecome one of the great militaryfigures of the age with a reputationacross the whole of Europe, in 1314his star was still in ascendance. Hehad yet to become a figure of anygreat political significance. His father,William ‘le Hardi’, had resisted EdwardI in the early stages of the conflict. Hehad been captured and forfeited of theBarony of Douglas in Lanarkshire,which Edward granted to Sir RobertClifford. Educated in Paris, he returnedto Scotland in the household of WilliamLamberton, Bishop of St Andrews. In1304, he asked Edward I for the returnof the family property that had beenforfeited by his father, but wasrefused. Concluding that the prospectsof restoration to the family estate were

better with the Bruce party, Douglasjoined King Robert and acquired areputation as a great warrior.

Barbour accords Douglas a majorrole in the main battle at Bannockburn,claiming that the Scots deployed infour divisions, one of which wascommanded jointly by Douglas andWalter the Stewart. Barbour had twoagendas to pursue in doing this. SinceDouglas was such a great figure toBarbour’s audience, it was almostunthinkable that he would not have asignificant command role, and Barbourduly obliged. Equally, Barbour’s patronwas Robert II, grandson of Robert Iand the son of Walter. By ascribing animportant position to the Stewart andassociating him so closely withDouglas, Barbour effectively securedthe approval of his benefactor.Douglas continued to enhance hisreputation after Bannockburn. He ledthe pursuit of Edward II to Dunbar,

conducted several campaigns inEngland and very nearly capturedEdward III during the Weardalecampaign of 1327.

Sir Robert Keith, Earl Marischal

Captured in a small action on the RiverCree in 1300, Sir Robert was releasedunder the terms of the StrathordAgreement in 1304. By 1308 he wasfirmly in the Bruce camp, though hisproperty lay in areas under Englishcontrol. As Earl Marischal hecommanded the Scottish cavalry atBannockburn and undertook variousdiplomatic tasks for the king in theyears after the battle. He was killed inaction at Dupplin Muir in 1332.

11. The memorial of Angus Og, Lord of the Isles.Although he was a vital supporter of Robert I’skingship from 1307 onward, it is not clear whether hewas present at Bannockburn.

12. Detail from a Scottish grave effigy showing afourteenth-century soldier with bascinet, padded jackand the ‘heater’-shaped shield typical of the period.

The Soldiers

What we know of other English armiesof the time would indicate that asubstantial proportion of the troopswere drafted rather than volunteersand that some served to avoid criminalprosecution or paying fines, but weshould not equate that with crudecriminality such as robbery, but with awide variety of shortcomings includingtax avoidance or failure to performsome civic duty. Men of all social ranksserved to procure pardons for theirfailings and in some cases men wouldjoin the army to procure ‘protections’ –Crown documents which allowed themto avoid court actions being raised intheir absence.

Military service was certainly a dutyfor virtually every male in anemergency, but planned armies – likethose of 1314 – were largely drawn

from the classes that could afford themoney to equip themselves and thetime to train, and who owed stipulatedmilitary obligations to the Crown or to afeudal superior.

Almost every modern description ofthe Battle of Bannockburn lists trooptypes which are assumed, rather thandemonstrated, to have been present,or in some cases – like the lightlyarmed young squire – only existthrough a failure to understand thenature of fourteenth-century militaryterms and practices. Foremostamongst these are the ‘small folk’ ofBarbour’s poem. We should notdiscard the idea of their existence; farfrom it. The Scottish army, like anyother, would have had a large numberof farriers, blacksmiths, armourers,fletchers, bowyers, grooms and othertradesmen vital to the operationalcapacity of the fighting men. Therewould also have been large numbers

of camp servants, cooks and a host ofother personnel, some of whom wouldhave had assistants. There wouldundoubtedly have been a considerablenumber of ‘hangers-on’ with noparticular role or skill, but who hadattached themselves to the army in thehope that there would be pickings ofsome kind in due course. It would bemore than just strange if these men –and we should assume that they wouldmostly be men – were to witness asuccessful battle and not seize theopportunity to descent to the field inthe hope of acquiring some sort ofbooty or perhaps even a prisoner theywould be able to ransom. They mighteven be seized with the excitement ofthe moment and a touch of blood lustand rush to the battlefield, but it isclear from those accounts closer to theevent than Barbour that the ‘small folk’played no part in King Robert’s victory.One of the weaknesses of trying to

find a place for every piece ofinformation available from chronicles isthe danger of adding items to thenarrative that are clearly not valid. Thechronicler Bower tells us that theEnglish army included slingers andbrought caltrops, though nocontemporary material indicatesslingers for this battle any more thanfor any other campaign of the wars ofindependence. Even so, numerousaccounts of the action have not onlyincluded slingers, but maps have beenproduced to show their location on thefield. Curiously, although Bower alsotells us that the English army wasequipped with bombards, no writer hasfound a place for them in the narrative,though they have just as muchprominence as the slingers or thecaltrops.

CALTROPS

A caltrop was fashioned from two orthree short lengths of iron to form a

four-pointed object – generallybetween 2in and 4in tall – which wouldpresent a vertical spike whichever way

up it landed and thus be a threat tounwary soldiers, particularly mountedmen. Although a few caltrops haveallegedly been ‘recovered’ from the

Bannockburn area, it is clear that all ofthem (so far) have been the product of

local blacksmiths hoping to makesome money by ‘finding’ caltrops and

selling them to visitors.

13. An assemblage of plate armour to protect thearm. Pieces as sophisticated as this one were stillrelatively rare in 1314 and would have been verymuch the province of the wealthy or of men whospent a large proportion of their time in militaryservice.

The same question of inclusion ofevery point of evidence also arises forsuch observations and deductions aswe might make from record evidencedrawn from other campaigns of the

same period. The fact that certaintroops are not described as taking partdoes not mean that they were absent,though it’s a reasonable assumptionthat if they were not mentioned theydid not have a significant impact on thecourse of the fighting. Other Englishexpeditionary forces in the fourteenthcentury certainly included a variablenumber of hobelars. Lightly armouredand lightly mounted, the hobelarsserved as reconnaissance andforaging troops and were quite capableof imposing themselves on minor localresistance, but could not stand up to abody of men-at-arms and, in the eventof a major battle, dismounted to serveamong the infantry. It is a reasonableassumption that there were hobelars inEdward’s army, but there is noevidence to suggest that theyperformed any significant role in thecampaign as a whole or in the battle.That does not necessarily mean that

they were present in smaller numbersthan in previous campaigns, butmerely that they did not register insurviving records or in chronicles. Theformer may simply be dependent onthe fact that very little in the way ofarmy records have survived and thatsince any hobelars served among theinfantry on the battlefield there wasnothing in the course of theengagement that distinguished them.On the other hand, one of Edward I’searly campaigns had included a forceof 200 mounted crossbowmen, whowould undoubtedly be professionalsoldiers and possibly hired en bloc asa ready-formed distinct unit. No suchunit appears in the pay and musterrolls – or horse valuations – ofsubsequent armies. It is not impossiblethat there were mountedcrossbowmen in Edward II’s 1314army, but it would seem less thanlikely.

14/15. A mail hauberk might be worn underneath apadded garment or on top of it. Opinion was dividedabout the relative effectiveness.

BARDING

A covering for chargers generallymade from cloth, though sometimes

with connecting pieces of leather, hornor even mail at vulnerable points. A

man-at-arms needed to have a‘barded’ (or barbed) mount to qualify

for his full rate of pay. The term‘covered’ horses was also used to

describe barding. A Scottish force inthe 1290s had, as reported to Edward

I by an English spy in the Scottisharmy, ‘one hundred and fifty covered

horses’.

The mainstay of the mountedelement of both armies was the man-at-arms, a term that covered everyheavy cavalry man from the lowliest ofthe rank-and-file armoured horsemanto the king himself.

It is understandable that manymodern observers equate themedieval knight and the modern tank,though this really isn’t a valid analogy.A force of tanks is seldom themainstay and virtually never the soleconstituent part of a major operationalinitiative, even if it does sometimesappear – superficially – to be the case.On the other hand, medievaloperations were very frequentlyconducted exclusively by parties ofmen-at-arms. More medieval militaryrecords refer to the men-at-arms, or to‘knight service’, than any other aspectof martial activity. Most ‘knight service’was not discharged by men who wereactual knights, or who even had anythought that they might becomeknights at some point; it was no morethan a convenient administrative termto describe the nature of the servicedemanded rather than the men whodischarged it.

16. A re-enactor wearing the sort of brase and hosegenerally worn under clothing.

17. Closed helmets of this style were definitely old-fashioned by 1314, but were still serviceable andlikely to have been passed on to the rank and filefrom better-equipped men-at-arms.

18. A selection of ordinary personal effects: a dagger,flint and steel, leather pouch, rosary and dice.

BASCINET

A close-fitting steel helmet with eitheran open face or a visor, the bascinet isgenerally assumed to have come into

use in the mid-fourteenth century;however, there are several examples

of bascinet being ordered andpurchased from the 1290s onward.

Given the duration of the war and thevery fashion-conscious nature of thegentry and nobility on either side, itseems reasonable to assume that agreat many of the man-at-arms class(and other men for whom soldieringwas more than just an occasional

venture when called upon to providemilitary service) had equipped

themselves with bascinets before1314.

RIVETED MAIL

Mail formed from a large number ofsmall rings, generally rather less than1cm across and with a gauge of metal

of about 0.2mm. Riveted mail isdistinguished by the fact that the two

ends of each link have been flattened,placed over one another and then

pierced and secured with a tiny rivet.The level of protection offered by

riveted mail was not noticeably greaterthan that of butted mail, but the

structural integrity was very muchbetter.

The exact requirements of knightservice, from the quality of horsefleshto the extent and quality of armour,changed significantly over the yearsfrom the twelfth to fifteenth centuries,but the term was always understood

by both those who served and bythose who paid their wages. Thedistinction between hobelars and men-at-arms did, however, become ratherblurred; some years afterBannockburn, an English commanderin Berwick made the reasonable pointthat it was hard to justify lower pay forhis hobelars since they were as wellarmed (meaning ‘armoured’, in amedieval context) and as well mountedas the men-at-arms of the garrison.The man-at-arms of 1314 was verymuch the figure we might imagine as a‘knight in armour’. He wore a coat,gloves and hood of mail, a ‘heater’shield, a light and incredibly strongsword about 3ft in length, a lance anda helmet. The closed barrel helm wasfast giving way to the lighter bascinetstyle – so much so that by 1314 abarrel helm would probably have beenseen as rather old-fashioned, sincebascinets first start to appear in record

evidence (purchase orders andreceipts) nearly twenty years beforeBannockburn. Most men-at-armswould have some plate armour,particularly to protect the arms, elbowsand shoulders. These enhancementsto the mail were often iron, but manywore pieces made from leather thathad been boiled in wax, which provideda good level of protection for ratherless weight and at a lower price.

The horse (charger) that the man-at-arms rode was not the sort ofClydesdale-sized beast of Victorianartworks, but was much more akin to amodern hunter. Strong, fast andremarkably nimble, chargers had to bevery well-schooled and obedientcreatures; the rider had to control hismount in battle with little use of thereins as he had to handle both hislance and his shield. Contrary to theromantic picture, the charger was nottrained or encouraged to rear, bite or

kick in battle, but to provide a secureplatform for the rider to fight on. At thebeginning of a campaign that was tobe conducted outside of England (orperiodically when in garrison service),each English man-at-arms had one ofhis horses valued by a committeeappointed for the purpose. If the horsewas lost on active service, he would beable to claim that value (or restauro)from the Crown, but in order to beeligible for his pay he needed to havea mount ready for battle every day. Assuch, virtually every man-at-armsensured that he had a second mount(not subject to restauro) lest hisprimary charger was killed in action orbecame sick or lame. It seems unlikelythat Scottish men-at-arms enjoyed thisprivilege, although it was not unknownfor the Crown to provide a mount forindividuals.

BUTTED MAIL

Easier, quicker and therefore verymuch cheaper to produce than rivetedmail, butted mail was formed by simply

bringing the two ends of each linktogether and trusting to the circularnature of the links to hold the shirt

together.

The men-at-arms provided themobile striking force of the army, andmight operate independently and atsome distance from the main body.They might even, on occasion, formthe entirety of a force: the Battle ofRoslin was fought between two bodiesof men-at-arms. However, they mightserve on foot, not as a discrete bodyof men but rather as means ofreinforcing the rank and file. It ispossible that all the men-at-arms in

King Robert’s army served in that way,though there is a strong possibility thathe kept a subtracted reserve of 500men-at-arms to deal with anyunexpected threat or opportunity. If hedid not have such a force undercommand it would seem that at least asubstantial proportion of the men-at-arms kept their horses sufficientlyclose at hand so that they could mountup to charge English archers and/orpursue Edward II after the battle.

Scottish and English men-at-armswere indistinguishable from oneanother and shared a common ethosand class; nevertheless, men certainlycould make the transition fromcommon soldier to man-at-arms oreven to knight. They also shared acommon advantage over the rank andfile of either army. They were easilyrecognisable as men who, if captured,would almost certainly be able to raisea ransom.

Spearmen

The greatest number of troops oneither side were spearmen. The billhad yet to become a staple close-combat weapon of English soldiers,and there were doubtless manyvarieties of pole-arm to be seen, butthe majority of the close-combatinfantry carried a stout spear, anythingup to 50mm thick and 4m long.

19. A man-at-arms and a spearman. The man-at-arms is wearing particularly extensive and heavymail. By 1314 pieces of plate armour – particularly atthe shoulder and elbow – were being added tosupplement mail.

20. A chapel-de-fer or ‘iron hat’. These were widelyused throughout northern and western Europe in thethirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

21. It was possible, though a little difficult, to don mailunaided. Note the thickness of the padded garmentunder the mail.

22. A party of medieval spearmen would have lookedrather like this, though the spears would have been agood deal longer.

As with the men-at-arms, there wasno real difference in the equipment orappearance of Scottish and Englishspearmen. Some years afterBannockburn, Robert enactedlegislation requiring all men with more

than a specified level of wealth – landsworth £10 per annum or goods worth£40 per annum – to own a habergeon(which might mean either a paddedjacket or possibly a short chain-mailshirt), a spear, a ‘good iron’ (generallytaken to mean a helmet of somedescription) and a pair of armouredgloves. It is very likely that Robert’slegislation was simply an attempt toconfirm and codify the level ofarmament that was already expected,or even that it was a repetition ofearlier legislation that has not survived.Re-affirming the legislation of previouskings was not unusual.

23. A close-up of the same party of spearmen.Although individuals were responsible for theacquisition of their own equipment, there were well-understood minimum standards which had to beobserved.

Cuir-Bouille

Formed by boiling pieces of leather inwax, cuir-bouille provided light,effective and relatively cheap

protection. It was frequently used forshoulder, elbow or knee protection.

Due to its organic nature, fewexamples have survived, but it was

used extensively in the thirteenth andfourteenth centuries.

Poorer men were required to providethemselves with either a spear or abow with arrows, but these men wereseldom called upon to give service,save in cases of an extremeemergency such as an unexpectedraid. Robert’s stipulations should beseen as a minimum requirement ratherthan a general standard. The life of theindividual soldier might well depend on

the quality of his equipment and therewas therefore an incentive to acquirethe best protection one could afford;moreover, there had already beennearly two decades of near-continualwarfare, so arms and armour wereprobably quite easy to come by andrelatively cheap. Robert’s forces hadenjoyed several years of steadysuccess so there was almost certainlyquite a plentiful supply of material thathad been captured on the battlefield orat the surrender of castles. Theaverage English soldier had just asmuch to gain by ensuring that hewould be as well protected in action ashe could be and we should thereforeexpect that the overwhelming majorityof common soldiers on either sidewere properly equipped for battle.

The only serious distinction betweenScottish and English spearmen in 1314lay in the quality and quantity of theirexperience and training. Men in both

countries had an obligation to attendtraining days a couple of times everyyear, but Robert’s army had beentraining intensively for several weeks.They had also developed a degree ofconfidence in their commanders and inone another through a succession ofbattlefield successes. The victorieshad been on a relatively small scale,but the cumulative effect was that theScottish rank and file were ready forthe fight. The fact that a considerableproportion of the men-at-arms weregoing to fight shoulder to shoulder withthe common spearmen would havegiven them a greater confidence. If thegentry and nobility – and even the kinghimself – were prepared to dispensewith their horses, then they wereunmistakeably confident of victory.

Archers

The majority of modern accounts ofBannockburn explore – sometimes insome detail – the principal differencebetween England and Scottisharchers; specifically that Englisharchers used a longbow constructedfrom a piece of yew and Scottisharchers used a short bow. The shortbow, sometimes referred to as the‘Ettrick’ bow, has featured in manyexpositions of the battle for more than100 years, but there is no trace of it inmedieval records or narratives. Thereis no reason to assume that there wasany difference at all between anEnglish bow and a Scottish one, andwe should be confident that if therehad been a difference then at leastone chronicler would have told usabout it. In fact, the pay rolls and other

material relating to both English andScottish archers in the garrisons ofEdward I, Edward II and Edward IIImake no distinction whatsoeverbetween the two groups.

24. An archer bending his bow. Although a skilledarcher could hit a man at 300 yards, the arrow wasunlikely to inflict serious damage on even a lightlyarmoured man.

25. A typical fourteenth-century archer.

In 1314, the carefully drilled andwell-organised bodies of archers that

would be so critical to the outstandinglongbow victories of Dupplin Muir,Crécy, Poitiers and Agincourt had yetto be developed. Archery wasrecognised as a potentially significantfactor in breaking up formations ofclose-order spearmen so that thecavalry could make effective charges –as at Falkirk in 1298 – but the archerswere still seen as a relatively minorancillary to the main body of theinfantry, let alone to the army as awhole. Even in the most spectacularlongbow victories of later years, theoutcome of the battle still had to besecured with hard combat between thespearmen and men-at-arms on eitherside.

The traditional view of medieval warthroughout Europe presents a pictureof two quite separate bodies of men inthe same army: one group consistingof heavily armoured knights and theother of impoverished and bedraggled

foot soldiers whose chief function wasto be killed by their social and politicalsuperiors. The picture starts to breakdown when English archers arebrought into the equation, but is still anelement in the ‘perceived history ‘ofthe Middle Ages.

Some loose assumptions about thenature of the English army in particularhave encouraged the belief that theinfantry were little more than a mob ofmen with spears. These assumptionsare based chiefly on a widespreadbelief that only archers and men-at-arms were of any significance in battle,the rate of pay on offer and thenumber of English soldiers grantedpardons in exchange for service. Forthe latter, it is far too simplistic toassume that a man accused of acriminal offence would necessarily bepoor. In fact, one could argue that hiscriminality might well have made himrather better off than most people. The

rate of pay – customarily in the regionof 2d per day – was certainly small anddid not compare well with agriculturalday labour, let alone with skilledemployment of any kind, but it is morevalid to see that sum as an allowancefor expenses rather than a wage.

Much the same applies to theshilling (12d) per day paid to men-at-arms or the 2 shillings paid to knights.The distinction in rate was not,however, a reflection of greaterfinancial burdens, but rather anacknowledgement of the socialsuperiority of knighthood. Undoubtedlysome men managed to serve with less(or poorer quality) equipment than theyshould have had and still successfullydrew their pay, but on the whole, weshould see both armies as consistingof properly equipped men bearing thearms and armour that the law requiredthem to keep, whether there was waror peace. However, even the higher

rate of pay for knights was probablyinsufficient to cover the outlay costsinvolved, let alone the time that had tobe devoted to training.

The Tactics

A great deal of comment about thenature of medieval armies and theirdeployment for battle is still heavilyinfluenced by what Victorianantiquarians wanted to think and byquestionable deductions fromdisparate source materials which arenot always – if at all – relevant.

Two particularly important factorshave led to widely heldmisapprehensions. Oman andGardiner both took the view that theScots had fought a defensive battle.Quite why they thought this is notclear, since both had evidently readthe narrative sources. The mostprobable answer is that they simplyassumed that infantry could neverattack an opponent with a strongercavalry element, especially if itincluded a powerful force of heavily

armoured knights and men-at-arms.

SURCOAT

A form of cloth overall, the surcoathelped to protect the bearer –

generally a member of the gentry ornobility – from the elements, and wasa means of showing his coat of arms.Other than those of a few prominent

individuals, the coat of arms itself wasoften rather meaningless since therewere many thousands of them, but itdid indicate the social and economic

class of the bearer and thereforewhether or not he would be worth a

ransom if captured.

26. Very few soldiers would have had the luxury of asophisticated tent like this one.

SCHILTROMS

Generally perceived as huge circularbodies of men with spears facingoutward as a protection against

cavalry, there is, however, only oneknown example of a Scottish army

deploying as a group of circularschiltroms: Falkirk in 1298. In practice,

the term simply means a body ofclose-order spearmen of any shape,

but almost always a rectangulararrangement.

They may also have been misled intheir assumptions about the mainbattle by the fact that on the first dayRobert’s formation took a defensivestance, but it did so in a position whichinvited an attack and was thereforeessentially a hostile posture; Robertwas looking for a fight, not trying to

dissuade his enemy. Similarly, Moray’sforce, though it stood to receive acharge, had, again, invited that attackby barring the route to Stirling. In fact,Moray had deliberately moved to aposition that, superficially at least,would favour a cavalry action.

Popular perceptions andassumptions about the Scots fighting adefensive battle have also beenreinforced by observations about otherbattles – most notably Falkirk, whereWallace’s army stood still againstEdward I and was roundly defeated.Because Wallace’s army was deployedin four large circular formations, therehas been a tendency to believe thatthis was the traditional and customarybattlefield posture of medieval Scottisharmies. In reality, so far as we know,Falkirk was the one and only occasionwhere this approach was used, and itwas chosen from a lack of otherchoices. Edward I had stolen a march

on Wallace and he could see no otherpractical option. In short, he had a planfor avoiding defeat – which did notwork – but no plan for victory. Apartfrom Falkirk, there is only one exampleof a Scottish infantry force of any size,let alone a whole army, deploying in acircular or near-circular formation:Moray’s action on the first day ofBannockburn.

27. With their spear points presented to the enemy ina thick hedge, a schiltrom was virtually invulnerableto cavalry attacks.

The term ‘schiltron’ or ‘schiltrom’ hasbecome associated with these roundspear formations – though formedieval writers the term did not implyany particular shape, simply a densebody of infantry – and it has becomecustomary to assume that Robert’sarmy deployed in circular formations.This despite the fact that the sourcematerial clearly tells us that on the dayof the main action the Scots marcheddown from the high ground throughwoods and then formed a moving wallof infantry stretching from thePelstream to the Bannock.

Clearly – even if various writers havethought otherwise – moving a body of1,500 or more men in a vast circlewould be extremely difficult to achieve

on a parade ground with highly trainedprofessional soldiers and modernsystems of foot-drill and articulation,but in the Middle Ages such systemsdid not exist. In fact, the ‘cadenced’marching (that is to say moving thelegs in strict time ‘left, right, left, right,left, right’), which is the basis of allprecision foot-drill and that we take forgranted when we see a troops onparade, would not be invented foranother 300 years or more. Medievalarmies – and for that matter classicalarmies before them and early modernarmies after – moved in column andfought in line as far as possible.Bringing his troops down the slope incolumn and then turning the head ofeach column to the left or right, haltingthem and then turning the entirecolumn to face the enemy, thusforming the line of battle, would havebeen infinitely more practical thantrying to manoeuvre a tightly packed

‘hedgehog’ formation.Medieval battle is often depicted as

a massive free-for-all of hundreds oreven thousands of individual combatsmilling about the battlefield. In reality,effective combat was a matter ofbringing formations together into battleat a single blow. This was true for bothinfantry and cavalry. The impact of amounted charge was very muchreduced if the leading ranks arrived ina piecemeal fashion.

The free-for-all view is underminedby the nature of the weaponsthemselves. Although most, if not all,men carried a sword, axe or mace, formost soldiers the primary weapon inbattle – as opposed to single combats– was the spear or lance. In individualcombat, a man with a sword or axemight be able to slip past the spearpoint of his adversary and would thenhave a significant advantage. In abattle, the man with a sword would

have to evade or beat away not justone spear point, but perhaps a dozenor more before he could get closeenough to land a blow with his axe ormace. To take an example fromnature, a hedgehog is well protectedby having a great array of spines, butwould be extremely vulnerable toattack if it had only one spine, howeversharp and strong that spine might be.The spear and the lance were only attheir most effective if they were usedin large numbers operating in close co-operation. This could only be achievedby working hard to maintain a uniformformation in close order and byensuring that as many men aspossible were in a position to inflictblows on the enemy. For this reason,medieval close-combat troops almostinvariably moved into battle in linearbodies. The formation had to beseveral ranks deep in order to continueto present an array of spear points to

the enemy, so the ‘dressing’ of the unit– the matter of maintaining regularranks and files – was of paramountimportance.

Keeping to a regular formation alsohad the added benefit of ensuring thatmen knew who they were fighting.Quite simply, the linear formationsmeant that the soldier was aware thatthe enemy were the men facing himand that his comrades were thosefacing in the same direction as himself.This could not possibly be achieved ifthe action degenerated into a greatnumber of individuals fighting otherindividuals, and in an age beforeuniforms or other forms of battlefieldidentification, this was a crucial matter.Traditionally, heraldry has been seenas an important factor in identifyingfriend from foe, but this was simply notthe case. Heraldic colours andsymbols were limited in number, butthere were still many thousands of

possible permutations. Although effortswere made – and occasionally courtcases pursued – to preventduplication, there might be very littledifference between one coat of armsand another. Even if an individualcould memorise thousands of differentshields, and who bore them and whichside they were on, it could prove verydifficult to identify them accurately inthe heat of battle.

SHIELD

Every man-at-arms, and most othersoldiers, would have a shield in his

personal arsenal; it had a vital functionin mounted and dismounted combat.Made from plywood, the shield had to

be thick enough to offer decentprotection against arrows, swords,

spears and axes, and was in fact thefirst ‘line of defence’ for the soldier. Itis extremely difficult to handle a long

spear effectively while carrying a shieldand it is therefore very likely that the

rank-and-file Scottish infantrydispensed with their shields at

Bannockburn; they do not figure in thedescriptions of Scottish troops in

contemporary material relating to thebattle, but would have been invaluable

in other circumstances.

This does not mean that heraldicdevices were without value. A lot ofmen would have been aware of a fewspecific examples. In the case of KingRobert or King Edward, thatrecognition would be virtually universal,and many people would recognise thearms of a handful of great lords orparticularly famous warriors like deValence, Carrick, Douglas or Clifford.The banners of these men would beprominently displayed, perhaps besidea national or royal ensign, and wouldbe a means of identification; even so,the direction of approach and the closeproximity of one’s comrades wouldhave been much more significant oncebattle was joined.

The tactical roles of the varioustroop types were not complicated:spears, bows, cavalry all needed to acttogether efficiently to procure victory.Archers were very vulnerable if notsupported by close-combat troops,

and close-combat troops could beequally vulnerable to archery if theyhad no archer support. The infantrywere not an afterthought in medievalarmies; in fact, they would generallyconstitute at least 70 per cent of thearmy and often as much as 90 percent. In 1314, Edward specificallycalled for a good turnout of footsoldiers since he anticipatedoperations in territory where thecavalry would not be able to operateeffectively.

Heavy cavalry could be devastatingin the right circumstances, but – as theengagements at Bannockburn woulddemonstrate all too clearly – werevirtually powerless against steady anddetermined infantry. The common-espoused view that men-at-arms couldsimple crash through infantry is notborne out by the experience ofmedieval battle. Although it is possibleto persuade a man to throw himself

into the fight against a hedge of spearpoints, the average horse is a sensiblecreature and will simply slow to a haltbefore it makes contact. To somedegree, the reluctance of the horsecan be overcome by training, but not,as a rule, to the point of the horsegalloping full tilt on to the spears.Combat between mounted men-at-arms was a rather different matter.Opposing bodies of cavalry did notpresent anything like the same close-set array of threatening implements asa body of infantry; even so, in order tokeep the formation as tight aspossible, it seems probable that mostcavalry clashes were conducted at around trot rather than a flat-out gallop.Discipline in the charge was certainlyseen as an important, even crucial,factor. Men who had a knight-servicecommitment almost invariably had anobligation to take part in the huntingactivities of their superior. Obviously

this was a social activity, but it had amilitary aspect in that the members ofthe hunt became accustomed to ridingin close proximity, riding over difficultterrain and generally acting as a teamunder one leader. Keeping control ofthe charge was a serious business.There are several examples of menbeing disciplined – usually with a fine –for advancing ‘ahead of the king’sbanner’. This does not imply that theking was actually present, but ratherthat a royal or national ensign wascarried in the front rank of theformation and that riding on ahead of itcould disrupt the integrity and thus theeffectiveness of the formation. Overall,medieval armies were much morecarefully organised than traditionaldepictions would suggest, and weshould bear that in mind when weconsider the process of individualbattles.

28. Articulated armour for the legs and arms wasbecoming increasingly common by 1314. This re-enactor is mounted on a ‘covered’ or ‘barded’ horse,though in the fourteenth century the barding wouldhave consisted of several layers of cloth to reducethe effectiveness of arrows and edged weapons.

BEFORE THEBATTLE

Edward II’s Forces

Edward started the process of raisingan army as early as October 1313 andwas probably already planning anexpedition before that. Doubtless hewould have mounted a major responseto Robert earlier had it not been for hisinternal political difficulties, hisproblems in France – not least thethorny business of negotiating theperformance of the homage that heowed for Gascony – and the greatburden of debt that he had inheritedfrom his father. Similarly, Robert hadstarted gathering his troops severalweeks before the campaign and wasable to have his forces in place beforethe English army mustered at Berwickand Wark.

The size of the Bannockburn armieshas been the subject of much debate.Chronicle figures simply cannot be

taken at face value. Barbour’s claimthat there were 30,000 Scots and100,000 English has been the basis formany estimates, though largely thiswould seem to be a matter of laterwriters assuming that he had inflatedthe armies by a factor of four, resultingin 7,500 Scots and 25,000 English.These figures are not altogetherimpossible, but in fact Barbour was notreally offering figures to be takenliterally. Many medieval authors usedmultiples of three to give an idea ofscale in much the same way that wemight use the term ‘thousands’ or even‘millions’ when we just mean ‘a lot’. Inmedieval literature 300 can mean ‘amodest body’, 3,000 can be taken toindicate ‘a substantial body’ and30,000 to mean ‘a very large body’.Barbour’s use of ‘30,000’ for the Scotsand ‘100,000’ for the English isprobably best interpreted as meaningthat the Scottish army was very large

and the English army was very muchlarger still. For Barbour, and hisaudience, the key information was thatKing Robert had assembled a massiveforce from across the country,demonstrating his political power. Thatsaid, Barbour did not shy away fromthe fact that there were still Scots inthe English camp, telling us thatEdward had the services of a greatcompany of Scottish men-at-armsfrom Lothian. Although this isundoubtedly true, the claim doesrequire a little examination. It isprobably reasonable to assume thatthe company in question was drawnfrom more than just Lothian.

29. Grave effigy of Sir Roger de Trumpington. Thisimage dates from about 1280; by the time ofBannockburn the absence of any plate armour otherthan knee protection would have made the bearerlook rather outdated, but would still have been

acceptable as equipment for a man-at-arms.

Although Roxburgh had fallen to theBruce party in February 1314 andEdinburgh only a month later, It ismore than likely that Robert had not,as yet, been able to fully assert hispower in Roxburghshire and Lothian;even if he had, there would almostinevitably be men who felt that Edwardwould be able to crush Robert in theevent of a major battle and that even ifthere was no actual engagement, hewould be able to recover and repairthe castles and re-impose hisgovernment, at least in southernScotland. For men in that position,turning out for the Bruce party wouldhave been an enormous risk no matterif they were supportive of Robert’skingship. If Edward was able to restorehis authority, they would face thestrong possibility of forfeiture or, ifcaptured, the death penalty for

treason.Not all Scots were happy about

Robert’s acquisition of the throne inthe first place; he was, after all, ausurper. Furthermore, there was nostrong tradition of political leadershipby the Bruce family in the south-eastof Scotland. So long as King John’sheir was alive, Robert could not be thelegitimate king. Additionally, some ofthose who might have been willing toaccept his kingship would have beendiscouraged by the fact that he hadkilled a political rival in a church andhad been excommunicated.

Although there was clearly stillopposition to Robert’s reign and,naturally, doubts that he couldwithstand Edward’s invasion, thenumbers in Barbour’s ‘great company’were hardly enough to make a majorcontribution to Edward’s army. Evenunder the best of circumstances, it isunlikely that Lothian, Berwickshire and

Roxburghshire combined could raisemore than a few hundred men-at-arms, and there is nothing to indicatethat Edward II – or his father for thatmatter – ever made any effort to raiseinfantry service from these counties.The summer of 1314 was not, in anycase, the best of circumstances.Although Robert could not be confidentof exerting his authority to the utmostdegree in the south-east, he certainlyhad more sway there than Edward II,so it is unlikely that the contribution ofLothian men-at-arms amounted tomore than a few score, especiallygiven that a party who did attempt tojoin the English army arrived in thevicinity only to discover that Edwardhad already been defeated andtherefore promptly changed sides.

These Lothian men were not,however, the only Scots in Edward’sallegiance. A considerable number ofScots who had not come into King

Robert’s peace were living aspensioners of the English Crown.Some had lost their lands becausethey had refused to renounce theirallegiance to the Comyn family or toKing John or to King Edward; othershad been refused admission to theBruce party because of acts in thepast. For these men, the only hope ofrecovering their lands and titles wasthrough service to the Plantagenetcause. They were relatively few innumber, but their presence did have apolitical significance, since it was anindication that there was someScottish support for Edward’s rule, but,like the company of Lothian men, theircontribution to the man-at-armselement of Edward’s army wasmarginal.

Although we do not have accurateinformation about the size of Edward’sarmy, we can make some viabledeductions based on what we know of

previous and later expeditions forwhich the pay rolls and other recordmaterial survive. This was aparticularly large force by thestandards of late English medievalarmies, but it was nothing like the100,000 men suggested by Barbour.The major armies recruited for servicein Scotland under Edward I andEdward II included a heavy cavalryelement of about 2,500 men-at-arms,as shown by horse valuations and payrolls. This is a little misleading sincevarious categories of men did not havetheir service recorded. A few chosenot to serve for pay and a rather largenumber served without pay to gainpardons for crimes, but neithercategory amounted to a verysignificant portion of the cavalryelement. There would have beensimilar elements in the army of 1314,but there were also a number of majorlords – the Earl of Lancaster, for

example – who refused to serve at all.On balance, the figure of 2,500 men-at-arms is probably a validassessment. In other armies of asimilar scale in this period, the men-at-arms were divided into four units, threeled by important nobles and one,rather larger than the others, nominallydirectly under the king’s command.Assuming that the 1314 army adheredto this structure then three bodies ofabout 500 men and one of 1,000would fit the evidence rather well.

The situation is less clear in regardto the infantry. Edward issued writs toraise over 21,000 men, but it is clearfrom other armies of the period thatactual recruitment seldom exceededtwo-thirds of what was called for.Additionally, desertion was a constantproblem, though the 1314 army wasprobably not in existence for longenough for that to have become acritical factor. Conscription was not the

sole source of men: there would havebeen additional troops who served toprocure pardons and some whovolunteered in search of plunder oradventure or to avoid troubles athome, but these are unlikely to haveconstituted a very significant number.In total, it is unlikely that Edward hadmuch more than 15,000 infantry underhis command by the time the armymade camp at Stirling on 23 June, andprobably something closer to 12,000would be a more realistic estimate.However, naturally, there would havebeen a substantial number of non-combatants as well.

Of these 12–15,000 infantry, thegreater number would certainly havebeen spearmen, the balance beingarchers, but we should not assumethat the latter were the equivalent ofthe well-drilled bowmen of the Englisharmies of Edward II’s reign. It seemsvery likely that a random proportion

were simply issued with bows at thetime of enlistment or at the muster,regardless of ability. This is probablyless significant than it might at firstseem. Obviously, it would result inthere being only a very small numberof skilled marksmen, but the chieffunction of the archers would be toshoot at large, closely packedformations of spearmen or cavalry –hardly the most demanding of targets.

Like the cavalry, the infantry werenot simply an amorphous horde oftroops. There was a system ofarticulation. We cannot be absolutelycertain that the army of 1314 utilisedthe same system as those of thepreceding and subsequent decades,but it would be anomalous if it did not –so much so that we should expect thatsome comment would have survived.The evidence from other Englisharmies indicates three clear levels ofadministrative articulation: large units

commanded by officers called‘millenars’, which consisted of smallerunits commanded by ‘centenars’,which in turn were made up of smallerunits under the command of‘vintenars’. It would be simplistic toassume that these units werenecessarily exactly 1,000 or 100 or 20strong respectively, but there is a clearimplication that they would have beenof that order. We know from recordmaterial that there were men whowere referred to as ‘corporals’ and‘petty officers’, but it is not clearwhether these were any more thanalternative terms for the lowest rank ofinfantry leaders, the vintenars. Thereis a possibility that when an army wasnewly mustered, these three levels ofarticulation did actually reflectnumerical strength quite accurately,though clearly desertion, sickness and,of course, combat would all have aneffect – especially desertion, which

was clearly a perennial problem forEnglish armies operating in Scotland toa far larger degree than in thosedeployed to France or Ireland, simplybecause it was a much more practicalproposition for an individual or a groupof men to return home on foot orhorse. For operational purposes, itseems likely that the commands of themillenars were combined into largeunits.

Barbour’s assertion that the Englisharmy was in ten divisions is probablybetter seen as literary rather thanliteral, though it is possible that he hadaccess to material that he did notnecessarily fully understand, and thatthe English army really was organisedin ten divisions of infantry in the formof the commands of the millenars. Towhat extent these units were tacticalentities as well as administrative onesis impossible to say, yet there is atleast one example of a millenar being

held responsible for the failure of themen of his formation to provide anadequate night guard on campaign.

Edward’s infantry was not a mereafterthought. He and his subordinateswere familiar with fighting in Scotlandand Edward was eager to ensure thata large infantry force was raised, sincehe believed that there might well beextensive fighting in difficultcountryside, where the cavalry couldnot operate effectively.

Robert I’s Forces

The Scottish army was certainly rathersmaller than that of Edward II, which isno more than we should expect giventhe disparity in population. We can,however, be reasonably confident thatRobert did not raise an army basedsimply on numbers. The tactics headopted depended on having well-equipped infantry and we are told byBarbour that in the weeks before thebattle Robert turned away volunteerswho did not have adequate armourand weapons.

It is much harder to identify anyform of articulation in the Scottisharmy, though clearly there must havebeen one to enable administration of aforce of several thousand men, if onlyfor the purposes of regulating workingparties and issuing rations. Since it isclear that Robert concentrated his

troops at Stirling some weeks beforethe battle it is reasonable to assumethat there was some form ofarticulation at various levels to facilitatepersonal and unit training. It is possibleto discern an element of this in theleadership structure. The Earl ofMoray had command of a majorportion of the army – a body of 2,000men or more – but in his action nearSt Ninian’s chapel on the first day ofthe battle, he took only a portion ofthat force into the fight. Barbourdescribes Moray’s force in thatengagement as being 500 men ‘of hisown leding’ (leading). This implies thatthey were men who owed him theirmilitary service directly in his capacityas Earl of Moray. This highlights adifference in the political structures ofEngland and Scotland. After theconquest of 1066, William theConqueror granted the title of ‘earl’ ofthis or that county to his more

prominent followers, but the title wasnot directly attached to the land; itwas, essentially, honorific.

In Scotland – as in France or pre-conquest England – an earl was aregional potentate with a wide varietyof powers, including the administrationof certain aspects of justice andresponsibility for raising troops onbehalf of the king. Scotland did notconsist of earldoms alone, and, as inEngland, the sheriff or the burghcouncil had an obligation to raise acertain number of men when required.The earl’s official responsibility might –in fact, perhaps generally did – extendbeyond his own lands within theearldom, but even if certainlandholders were exempted from hisauthority, they could hardly afford toignore the most powerful man in thearea. It was a system that could beopen to abuse. When King Robert wasEarl of Carrick, he was obliged to

promise not to use his position as anearl to demand military service for hisown purposes from men who were nothis tenants but happened to residewithin the bounds of his authority, butonly to call them out in the nationalinterest.

30. Looking south from the approximate position ofKing Robert’s division on the afternoon of 23 June.

The king and the greater lords, suchas the Earls of Carrick or Moray, hadtwo quite separate forms of militaryresponsibility. Mustering the rank andfile of the army was a matter ofadministering the ‘common army’service which was, in theory, due fromevery able-bodied man, but in practicewas generally only demanded frommen of a certain level of wealth –those who could afford to purchase thenecessary equipment. The other wasknight service: a military obligation onthose who held estates – usuallyheritably – in exchange for service asmen-at-arms, regardless of whetherthey were knights. A large estate mightbe held in exchange for the service offive or ten knights or more and a smallone might be held for a fraction of theservice of a knight. How exactlyfractional service was discharged isnot clear from the record evidence,and some of it may have been

delivered in the form of archer serviceor a monetary payment, or as ashared expense between a number ofneighbours who each owed a fractionof a knight to the king’s army. Thelatter was probably more prevalentthan one might expect, since a gooddeal of fractional knight service cameabout through the division of aproperty between female heirs, andthe two or more properties that cameinto being by that route would, as arule, be adjacent to one another.

31. The contemporary material indicates that theScots moved down to the plain from higher ground inthe New Park. They probably formed up in the areawhere the new Bannockburn High School stands.

32. Once the Scots had formed up they had tonegotiate this steep slope before deploying on theplain.

33. A Scottish ‘birlinn’ or galley. Vessels like thiswere used extensively by Robert I in his campaignson the west coast of Scotland. A number of baronsand other landholders were obliged to providemanned warships like this for their ‘knight service’rather than serving as mounted men-at-arms, thoughit was not uncommon for such men to serve in bothcapacities as required.

EARLDOM

In England the title of ‘earl’ was aheritable honour, but it did not carryany specific legal or administrative

responsibility. The Earl of Gloucesteror the Earl of Cornwall did not haveany particular rights, privileges or

duties within those counties, but anyearl was likely to hold a great deal of

property spread across the wholecountry and be an important figure in

the national political communityaccordingly. This was not the case inother European kingdoms. In France

or Scotland an earl would wield a greatdeal of almost sub-regal power –holding courts, administering localdefence, raising troops for nationalarmies – but only within his stated

jurisdiction. The earl did not, however,own all the land in his county. Major

properties within the earldom might be

held by any number of people andmight in some instances be excusedvarious obligations to the local earl.

The body of men-at-arms raisedfrom knight service was smallcompared with that available to theKing of England, but was notinsubstantial. Although Robert did notas yet have absolute control in someof the areas that would traditionallyhave produced the greatest numbersof men-at-arms, it is most likely thatnearly two decades of war – andseveral years of steady militarysuccess – would have produced anumber of men who would notnormally have aspired to knightservice, but for whom war presentedan opportunity for social advancement.On balance, it would not beremarkable if Robert had something inthe region of 1,000 men-at-arms under

his command in June 1314.Another possible aspect of

articulation is archery. There are anumber of references from both laterand earlier sources that refer to anindividual being the leader of Scottisharchers. It is possible, therefore, thatthere was a capacity for, or perhapseven general practice of, organisingthe archers as one or more separatecommands within the army structure.Given the relatively small numbersinvolved – perhaps 10 per cent of theentire strength – this would makesense both administratively andtactically, but the evidence is far toomeagre to come to any firmconclusions. On balance, given thesum of what we know of the strengthand nature of Scottish and Englisharmies of the later medieval period, wemight make an informed guess thatthe armies of 1314 are unlikely to haveexceeded 7−8,000 Scots and

16−18,000 English at most.The English army is unlikely to have

been any smaller than 10,000 foot and2,000 men-at-arms, but is equallyunlikely to have been any greater than16,000 foot and 3,000 men-at-arms.The Scottish army almost certainlyfalls with the range of 5,000 foot and1,000 men-at-arms (though many, andperhaps all, certainly served on foot inthe main engagement), with an upperlimit of perhaps 8,000 infantry.

These are, however, estimates ofcombat strength; they take no accountof the large numbers of ancillary staffthat undoubtedly accompanied botharmies and we cannot be totallycertain that records of all thecontributions to the army havesurvived. Edward certainly called fortroops from Ireland, but there is noclear evidence to indicate that theywere ever actually raised, let alonethat they made the journey to Scotland

or, if they did, that they joined the mainarmy before the battle. However, itwould seem much more probable thannot that if they had crossed over toScotland there would be some recordof their passage, their activity or theirreturn (or failure to return) to Ireland.

THE BATTLEFIELD

The First Day

Stirling was hardly terra incognita toEdward in 1314. He had very probablybeen there himself during the time hehad spent in Scotland, and if he hadnot visited there himself, at least someof his senior officers – particularlythose who had held offices in theoccupation government – had done soin the past. The English army left itsmustering areas at Wark and Berwickon 17 or 18 June and marched onEdinburgh through Lauderdale andTweeddale. Since Edinburgh castlehad fallen to the Scots three monthspreviously, there was little reason to goto Edinburgh other than possibly tomeet up with a convoy of supplyshipping and to intimate to the localpopulace that the occupationgovernment was being resurrected.The army marched westward to

Falkirk, where it spent the night of22/23 June before moving on towardStirling. They had made reasonablygood time, but it was clearly far frombeing a forced march – presumably adeliberate policy to ensure that thearmy was not unduly tired when itarrived in what Edward and hislieutenants hoped would be the battlearea. However, they believed – notunreasonably – that Robert might welltry to avoid a general engagement.

34. The Battle of Bannockburn as envisaged byOman and Gardiner, though it bears very littleresemblance to the contemporary source material.

At some point during the march, twoformations were detached from the

main body of the army, a force underthe Earls of Gloucester and Herefordtaking what we might consider themain road from Falkirk straight toStirling and a second force consistingentirely of men-at-arms under SirRobert de Clifford and Sir Henry deBeaumont – including Sir ThomasGrey, father of the author ofScalacronica – moving closer to thecourse of the River Forth on the lowground to the east of the New Park.

These operations were undertakenfor a variety of purposes. One role ofthe cavalry force under Clifford andBeaumont was clearly to bring about atechnical relief of the garrison inStirling castle. In a sense, this wasalmost superfluous given that theEnglish army had arrived within strikingdistance and in great force within thestipulated period, but protocol andform were important aspects ofmedieval war and politics. Bringing a

force into the castle would certainlysatisfy the requirements of thesurrender compact, but it would alsoconform to the spirit of the age. Itwould be a feat of arms – an act ofchivalry – and would play well inchronicle accounts, which Edwardcould be confident would be writtenafter the campaign; in fact, he hadbrought along the noted English poetFriar Baston for that very purpose.

35. The open farmland on which he main battle tookplace. Contrary to Victorian interpretations, all of thecontemporary material makes it clear than the mainengagement took place on firm ground, not amongbogs and marshes.

There were more practicalconsiderations. Edward wasdetermined to bring the Scots to battleand was concerned – understandably,given the extensive experience of hisown and his father’s Scottishcampaigns – that King Robert wouldnot stand and fight, but would withdrawinto the west or north and avoid amajor engagement until such time as ashortage of food and money forcedEdward to abandon the campaign.

Placing a strong mobile force to theeastern flank and rear of the enemymight not prevent the Scots fromretreating, but it would certainly makethe process more difficult, since alargely infantry army on the march

would be vulnerable to sudden cavalryattacks. Alternatively, if the Scots didnot withdraw, Edward and hissubordinates would hope to gatherintelligence about their strength anddispositions. The other force, underGloucester and Hereford, had a similarrole. The Scots could hardly ignoretheir presence and must either try toblock their path to Stirling or take totheir heels and therefore allow theEnglish a clear passage to the town.That would not have been thepreferred option for Edward as he wasanxious to inflict a serious defeat onthe Scots, but it would not becompletely unattractive. Robert hadbrought a large force to Stirling andkept them there for weeks of training.If he did not put his army to any use,his prestige as a military leader wouldbe undermined, and his politicalcredibility as the man best suited forprotecting Scotland from invasion

would be severely compromised.Robert had raised large forces in thepast and avoided battle, but he couldnot do so indefinitely without impairinghis reputation and authority.

With any luck, from Edward’sperspective, the two forces wouldachieve one or more of a number ofpositive outcomes. The castle wouldbe relieved and there might be one ormore actions in which his forces wouldbe successful, possibly forcing Robertto abandon the area entirely. It waseven possible that one successfulfight, even on a relatively small scale,might demoralise the Scots so muchthat their army might disintegrate; thishad, after all, been the case at Dunbarin 1296. Although these were allacceptable possibilities, the real hopewas that the two forces would not onlyreveal everything about the strengthand position of the Scots, but that theywould effectively pin the enemy and

force Robert to give battle whether hewanted to or not.

Edward could afford to be quiteconfident about the enterprise. Thesmaller cavalry force moving betweenthe Scottish positions to their left andthe River Forth on their right waspowerful enough to take on fairlysubstantial opposition and mobileenough to avoid a major body of theenemy if that became necessary. Thelarge force under Hereford andGloucester might well score asignificant victory by itself, but if theenemy proved to be too strong forthem, it would provide a barrier to theScots so that the rest of Edward’sarmy could complete their march to asuitable campsite.

36. The Bannock burn. The burn was probably ratherwider in 1314, but even today it has a very soft andmuddy floor which would be a considerable barrier toarmoured men trying to escape the battlefield.

The only suitable site for such a

large force lay between the Pelstreamand the Bannock burns. AlthoughEdward and, to a lesser degree, hissubordinates have been the subject ofa great deal of criticism for their choiceof a camp, they really had very limitedoptions. Like any medieval army,Edward’s force included a very largenumber of horses and a considerablequantity of oxen as draught animalsand as beef on the hoof, in addition toperhaps 15,000 men or more. All ofthese would require fresh water inlarge amounts and the two streams –each rather larger then than they aretoday due to drainage developmentsthat have changed the water courseconsiderably – would be absolutelyvital if the army and the animals werenot to suffer dehydration at the end ofa day’s march in hot, sunny weather.The strip between the burns was morethan large enough to accommodatethe army and its baggage, but the

burns themselves would give a degreeof protection against any Scottishsurprise attacks during the shortsummer nights. This was considered –by Edward at least – to be a realpossibility. The campsite would notprovide any sort of barrier between theEnglish army and the Scots, who werecamped on the higher ground to thewest, but neither Edward nor hislieutenants seems to have been at allconcerned that the Scots might mounta direct full-scale attack from the highground. Given their lengthy experienceof fighting in Scotland, this was not anunreasonable conclusion; to date, thechallenge had been more a matter ofgetting the Scots to commit to battle atall, let alone to make a set-pieceattack on firm, open ground that wouldfavour greater numerical strength ingeneral and especially the far largercontingent of heavy cavalry availableto Edward.

CARSE

A carse is a low-lying area which isprone to flooding, or at least

saturation, during the winter months,but forms dry pasture in the spring and

summer.

The Scots, of course, were waitingfor the arrival of Edward’s army. Thethree main formations of the army,commanded by the king, the Earl ofCarrick and the Earl of Moray, were allstationed on the high ground of theNew Park, with the baggage andstores to the rear, possibly around thearea of the southern end of the King’sPark. The King’s Division was closestto the enemy, with Carrick’s men tothe rear and Moray’s troops further tothe north, where they could intervene ifan English force marched across the

farmland to the east of the king’sposition. Carrick, roughly midwaybetween the two, could march quicklyto the aid of either the king or Moray ifnecessary, but could remain out ofsight until required.

Gloucester and Hereford’s forcemarched well in advance of the mainbody of the army and crossed thestretch of the Bannock burn, which liesto the south of the present NationalTrust for Scotland Visitor Centre, andproceeded up the slope toward thenearest Scottish position.

Gloucester and Hereford may havethought that they were facing theentire Scottish army, which they musthave known would have been a ratherlarger force than their own, but morerealistically they were probably awarethat they would be encountering only aportion of King Robert’s force.Assuming that they were aware of deBohun’s unsuccessful attack on King

Robert, they would very likely havededuced that the enemy to their frontwould consist of Robert’s ownimmediate command and that therewas therefore probably not a greatdiscrepancy in numbers, but even ifthey did not, they would have beenwell aware that over the precedingdecade and more since Falkirk, theScots had not often chosen to make astand in front of a determinedadvance. In that light, it was not anunreasonable decision to make anattempt to dislodge the Scots fromtheir position and even possibly causethem to panic and desert the battlefieldin disorder.

37. A view toward ‘The Entry’, where the Earls ofGloucester and Hereford made the first attack andwhere de Bohun was killed in a single combat withKing Robert.

The Scottish position was, however,naturally strong and may have beenenhanced to favour a defensive stand.At the top of the rise, the road passedinto an area known as ‘The Entry’,where the gap between two stretchesof woodland became narrower to the

left and right of the road. The governorof Stirling castle had sent a report toEdward informing him that the Scotshad been mustering at the New Park,training and busily blocking the pathsin the woodland – presumably toprevent bodies of troops fromoutflanking their position. According tosome sources, the Scots had also dugnarrow pits or ‘pots’ at a particularlocation and had camouflaged thesewith sticks and grass so that unwaryhorsemen might ride into them and bethrown when their horses stepped intothem and broke their legs. It seemsmost likely that this was the location ofthe ‘pots’, though no sign of them hasever emerged from aerial photographyor archaeological surveys.

The purpose of such a stratagemwas not so much to inflict casualties asto deny sections of the terrain to theenemy. As soon as the first rider fellfrom his horse, his comrades would be

aware of the danger and actaccordingly. Assuming that the potswere distributed on either side of theroad, they would have the effect ofdenying a flank approach against theScots and of funnelling the Englishadvance toward Scottish spears and atthe same time giving protection to theScottish archers among the trees oneither side. Regardless of theexistence or otherwise of the pots, theEnglish force moved into The Entry,presumably hoping to force their wayalong the road to Stirling, but foundtheir route blocked by a large body ofspearmen and Scottish archers whoshot at them from woods on eitherflank.

There was an action, but it does notseem to have lasted for very long;Gloucester and Hereford could makeno headway and there was little pointin standing around taking casualties ifthey could not make progress toward

Stirling castle, so they broke off theaction and made their way back downthe slope and then eastwards to thecamp area. There is no reason toassume that Gloucester andHereford’s force had been weakenedin any material way either inconfidence or numbers, but the actionhad been beneficial to the Scots. It didnot prove that cavalry withoutadequate infantry support were at adisadvantage when confronted bysteady infantry – that had beendemonstrated many times in the past– but it was certainly a boost toScottish morale, which was alreadyhigh after King Robert’s rather publicdispatch of Sir Henry de Bohun in asingle combat.

There was a wider consideration,however. Edward’s army had suffereda reverse, and Robert could now, if hechose, withdraw and avoid a majorbattle without damaging his political

standing in the community. Part of theprice of gathering a large army wasthat if he never brought the troops intoaction he would eventually start to lookindecisive, even weak, which –particularly as a usurper – he could notafford if he was to retain the credibilityand prestige necessary for effectivekingship.

No sooner was this engagementover, than Robert received news ofanother development. WhileGloucester and Hereford had beenapproaching along the main road, thesecond force of men-at-arms underthe command of Clifford andBeaumont had been moving alonganother road through the fields to theeast of the New Park and were headedtoward the area around St Ninian’schapel, presumably en route to relievethe Stirling castle garrison and thusfulfil the bargain struck between thecommander, Sir Philip Moubray, and

the Earl of Carrick some three monthsearlier. Formally discharging the pactwas of limited significance; in fact, ithad possibly already been dealt withsince, according to Barbour, theagreement was that an English armyhad to come within 3 leagues of thecastle for a relief to be recognised.The term ‘league’ is a challenging oneand often appears in chronicles withoutabsolute clarity as to whether it means1 mile or 3, but assuming that in thiscontext the term meant 3 miles, thecastle had already been relieved bythe afternoon of 23 June, andMoubray was therefore no longerbound to surrender his post. Morerealistically, the security or otherwiseof the garrison would depend on thedevelopments of the next twenty-fourhours or so. If the Scots withdrew, thecastle would be safe for as long as amajor English army could bemaintained in Scotland. If Edward

retired to England without striking amajor blow against the Bruceadministration and imposing his owngovernment securely in its place, theScots would simply return and lay anew siege. Equally, if Edward was ableto bring Robert to battle and defeathim, the Bruce cause would probablybe fatally compromised, even if Robertwas able to escape with his life. In alllikelihood, no one on the English side –and very few among the Scots – hadreally given much thought to thepossibility that Robert might actuallyforce a battle, let alone that he mightwin it decisively.

38. A well-equipped infantry man of the fourteenthcentury, with a chapel-de-fer helmet and two thin,padded garments, one under his mail and anotherover it.

Even so, honour rather demandedthat an effort be made to relieve thecastle and there was the additionalpotential value of gaining betterinformation about the strength,dispositions and intentions of theScottish army.

It seemed to King Robert that theEarl of Moray had lost concentrationand that Beaumont and Clifford wouldbe able to reach Stirling unmolestedunless immediate action was taken. Hetold Moray that a ‘Rose was fallenfrom his Chaplet’ (Barbour) – that hehad blotted his copybook – and senthim off to deal with the situation.Moray was the commander of a majorformation within the army, probablyabout one-quarter of the total strengthand about one-third of the mainstrength of the Scots, the rank-and-filespearmen, but he chose to take only aportion of that strength into the fight.Instead he relied on what Barbour

terms the men ‘of his own leding’(leading), which is to say the men whoformed his own ‘comitiva’ of about 500men. These would have been drawnchiefly from his tenants, but would alsoinclude men who had chosen to serveunder his command over a period ofyears; they were his personal followingwho he could rely on to act together asa close-knit team of competent,confident and experienced soldiers.

Moray swiftly led his men down onto what Sir Thomas Grey (inScalacronica) calls the ‘good ground’ –meaning firm land suitable for cavalry– and barred the way to the town. ForClifford and Beaumont, this was anunmissable opportunity and theyactually drew their men back to allowthe Scots to occupy a position on theflat plain before making an attempt tocharge through them. As it turned out,this was not a wise move. The Englishcavalry failed repeatedly to break into

the Scottish formation and, after aspell of hard fighting, found that theywere actually being pushed backwardstoward the River Forth. There hadbeen examples in the past ofdetermined and well-drilled infantrysuccessfully repelling a cavalry attack,but this may have been the firstmedieval example of infantrysuccessfully turning the attack againstmen-at-arms. After a prolonged fight,the English force eventually split intotwo parts, one heading for Stirlingcastle and the other retiring toward themain body of the army. Casualties hadnot been very high – according toBarbour the Scots did not lose a singleman, which seems less than credible –but a number of prisoners were leftbehind, including Sir Thomas Grey.

Although the clashes of the first dayhad both been favourable to Robert,he was still not absolutely committedto giving battle. While he was

deliberating his course of action, athird engagement took place atCambuskenneth Abbey. Robert hadselected the abbey as a repository forwhat Barbour describes as his ownsupplies. No doubt the abbey didhouse foodstuffs and the like, but itprobably also housed Robert’srecords. The various lords and officersof the Crown who were obliged tofurnish men and the differentinstitutions charged with collecting anddelivering the enormous quantities offood and other materials to keep thearmy in good shape would want tohave receipts to show that they hadfulfilled the demands made upon them.Because the troops were simplyfulfilling the obligations required bynational defence, Robert did not – sofar as we can tell – have to pay themwages, but the costs would still havebeen considerable, and his officers,especially the chamberlain and the

clerks of the Livery and the Spence(the financial departments of theScottish Crown administrativestructure), would have been busy men.

39. The sole remaining building of CambuskennethAbbey. During the night of 23/24 June, the Earl ofAthol mounted an attack on King Robert’s stores. Ofthe four actions of the battle, this is the only one ofwhich the precise location can be identified withoutquestion.

During the night of 23/24 June, theabbey was attacked by a party oftroops under David Strathbogie, theEarl of Atholl. Atholl had been in KingRobert’s peace until very shortlybefore this, and had left Robert’s sidein anger because the king’s brother,the Earl of Carrick, had jilted Atholl’ssister. The attack was successful. Anumber of people were killed, includingthe elderly Sir William de Airth andvarious members of the royalhousehold. The king’s stores weredestroyed and, in all probability, all therecords of the army were lost alongwith them.

Barbour’s account relates that on

the night of 23 June, Robert had stillnot made a final decision aboutwhether to offer battle the followingday. So far the outcome had favouredhis troops and there was something tobe said for avoiding anotherengagement. The action atCambuskenneth Abbey had been ablow, but a minor one, and an eventthat would not have any political,tactical or propaganda value. Theother two actions had been definitesuccesses. Neither had inflictedserious casualties on either side, butRobert could certainly claim to havehad a good day. If he now chose towithdraw through the night it wasunlikely that Edward would be able tomake any effort to pursue the Scotsuntil well into the next day, and it wouldbe difficult, if not impossible, for theEnglish army to close the distance thatwould separate them from the Scots. Itwould certainly be possible to detach a

major portion of the cavalry, leavingthe infantry behind, and catch up withthe Scots within a day or perhaps two,but that would be risky policy: theevent of 23 June had clearlydemonstrated that the Scots wereperfectly capable of dealing withunsupported cavalry attacks, and –assuming Robert withdrew into morechallenging terrain – there would besome risk of suffering a major defeat.On the other hand, if Robert didretreat, Edward would be able torelieve Stirling castle and would havean opportunity to install a newadministration to take the place of theone that had been dislodged over thepreceding years. These factors werenot so significant as they might at firstappear.

If Robert avoided battle, Edwardwould quickly run out of the moneyand supplies to keep his forces in thefield and would inevitably have to

disband at least a large proportion ofthe army. He might be able to keepRobert at bay with a smaller force, butagain that would be a risky policy sinceRobert had demonstrated his tacticalabilities in the past and might go onthe offensive. The last thing Edwardcould afford was to be obliged toabandon his Scottish plans throughforce. Equally, although Stirling was amajor prize, its value was limitedunless Edward’s administration coulddominate the surrounding area to allowStirling to be a centre of government.In the past, the occupationgovernment had been able to maintainits authority through possession of anextensive chain of castles and peelsthroughout the country. This was nolonger a viable option. Ever since hisfirst successful campaigns, Robert hadmade a practice of slighting everystronghold he captured specifically toprevent them being used for this

purpose. Most, if not all, of the castlesand peels could be repaired, but onlyat considerable expense and Edwardhad neither the time nor the money forsuch an initiative.

The worst-case scenario for Robert– if he chose not to fight – was thatStirling would remain in English hands,but realistically, that would only be thecase as long as Edward could keep amajor army in Scotland. As soon as hewithdrew his forces, the Scots couldsimply sweep back and Stirling wouldbe in much the same position as it hadbeen since spring 1314. Edward couldcertainly not afford to raise anotherarmy to return later in the year, and itwas very doubtful that he would beable to do so the following year, plushe might well struggle to get thenecessary political support. Thegreatest magnate in England hadrefused to give service in 1314 andwas too powerful to be disciplined, and

several others had had doubts aboutthe 1314 campaign; indeed, there wassome doubt about the wisdom of tryingto conquer Scotland at all. As such, itmight well have proven impossible toraise an army of any real stature for acampaign in 1315.

There was clearly a good case forRobert to avoid battle, but there wereseveral factors that encouraged amore active stance. Although the twoactions of 23 June had caused littlematerial damage to Edward’s army,the results inevitably had somedeleterious effect on English moraleand a very positive effect on the Scots.The effectiveness of the training of thelast few weeks had been clearlydemonstrated and the men were readyfor a fight. Tactically, Robert’s positionwas excellent. His forces were still outof sight of the enemy – his strength,organisation and dispositions weresecure from view – whereas Edward’s

army was laid out on the plain belowand could not make a move withoutbeing observed. Edward’s army hadnot made a particularly rapid marchfrom Northumberland, but werecertainly not as fresh as they might be,while Robert’s troops were well restedand had every confidence in theirleaders. Only a fraction of the Scottisharmy had been engaged, and for manyof the others this would be their firstbattle, but there would have been ahigh proportion of experienced menand they had become accustomed towinning. Robert was not in the way ofoffering battle and only did so whenutterly confident of success. His menwould have been aware of this and,therefore, Robert could be confidentthat they would trust him not to leadthem into a fight if there was not anextremely high probability of victory.With a well-armed, well-trained,confident army, hungry for victory and

in a highly advantageous tacticalposition, Robert had good reason tobelieve that this was an excellentopportunity to offer battle.

There were two other factors forRobert to bear in mind. During the latemorning or early afternoon of 23 June,he had sent a party forward underDouglas to observe the English army;Douglas had reported back that theEnglish army was enormous, butRobert now ensured that his owntroops were told that the English wereapproaching in a state of disorder.Whether this was true wasunimportant; what mattered was thathis troops had been given anothermodest boost to their confidence andmorale. The second factor was theappearance of a defector in theScottish camp. Sir Alexander Setonhad been an early supporter of theBruce cause but the bulk of hisproperty lay in Lothian and Robert’s

early failures meant that theoccupation government there hadbeen quite secure. Seton either had toaccept the forfeiture of his familyheritage or accept Plantagenet rule.Unsurprisingly, he had chosen thelatter, but that does not mean that hehad been happy to do so. Now heapproached Robert, telling him ofdiscontent and disorganisation in theEnglish camp and that he wasconfident that if Robert mounted anattack he would win a great victory; hebacked up his claim by offering to fightat Robert’s side so that if there wasany question of treachery Robertwould be able to ensure that Setonwould pay the traditional price.

Seton’s defection was probably not aspur-of-the-moment decision. TheScots had taken the last majorstronghold in Lothian a few monthsbefore, and although Robert had notyet been able to bring the area fully

under his rule, clearly the writing wason the wall. Whether Seton reallyidentified a lack of cohesion in theEnglish army and whether it was themost significant factor in his change ofheart is open to question, thoughpresumably he would not have chosento change sides in what was,essentially, a lull in the battle if he hadbeen confident that Edward could leadhis troops to a victory. All the same,his defection was significant. Setonwas not quite a member of themagnate class, but he was certainly amajor figure in the local politicalcommunity: a man whose name wouldbe well known throughout the Scottisharmy, and doubtless Robert madesure that his transfer of allegiance waswell advertised to the troops. For allthese reasons – and doubtless othersof which we are not aware – Robertdecided to take the plunge andprepared his army for battle.

Sir Alexander Seton

An early supporter of King Robert atthe time of his attempt to take the

throne, Seton soon entered the peaceof Edward I and thereby retained hisproperty and his local influence as a

member of the Lothian politicalcommunity. He re-joined the Bruceparty on the night of 23/24 June,

informing Robert that the English campwas in poor order and that there was

an opportunity to strike a major blow inthe morning.

The Second Day

Traditionally, the action of 24 June hasbeen described in terms of an Englishassault toward high ground which theScots, arrayed in four great circles ofspearmen, met with sturdy resolveuntil the English army was exhaustedand broke into a headlong retreat. Thisis not in any degree borne out by thesource material. Robert did not merelyoffer or accept battle, he activelyforced it.

In the early dawn of 24 June – anddawn would have broken by 4 a.m. –Robert mustered his army for battle,probably in the area now covered byStirling High School. Far from waitingfor the English to attack, he moved hiscolumns quickly down to the flatground and deployed them in threeformations with a thin screen ofarchers to the front. Two of the major

forces – under Carrick and Moray –formed up as broad formations somedistance apart, with the third, underthe king himself, between them andsome distance to the rear. This did notpass unnoticed in the English camp. Itseems likely that the English army wasalready preparing for the day, but thatthey were preparing for an advancetoward the Scots, not to receive anattack. This is an issue of somesignificance. All in all, medieval armiesmoved in column and fought in line,and redeploying from one to the otherwas not something that could be easilyor quickly achieved at the best oftimes, let alone in a relatively smallarea with the enemy in close proximity.

Once the Scots had made their waydown on to the plain, they did aremarkable thing: they knelt down inprayer. Edward observed this andasked – perhaps in jest – if the Scotswere kneeling to beg for mercy, only to

be told that if they were, it was formercy from God, not him. This is anincident that has generally been seenas a demonstration of medieval piety,and doubtless that had significance tothe men on the battlefield, but theremay have been a tactical value. Thebroad and relatively shallow spearformations would only be effective ifthe ‘dressing’ (the regularity of theranks and files) of the troops was keptin good order. If the majority of thetroops were kneeling down, it would bea great help to what we would now callthe ‘junior leaders’ of the units to moveup and down the ranks quickly,ensuring that every man was firmly inline with his neighbours, and that theunit as a whole was in the bestpossible order.

The Scottish army was nowdeployed on a front of a thousandyards or more between the courses ofthe Pelstream and the Bannock burns

and, at most, a mile from the mainbody of the English. As they marchedeastward toward the enemy, thescreen of archers to their front sooncame into action against a similarscreen of English archers, who hadpresumably been positioned toobstruct the sort of night attack thatEdward and his subordinates hadanticipated. The Scots archers seemto have made little impression on theiropponents and were either quicklydriven off or had instructions to makea demonstration rather than to pressthe fight. Either way, they had fulfilledtheir purpose by preventing the Englisharchers from disrupting the advancingspearmen, because by the time theScottish archers made their exit, theschiltroms were too close for comfort,as far as the English archers wereconcerned, and they made a quick exitto avoid being overwhelmed.

While this opening phase of the

engagement was taking place, at leastone senior English commander wastaking action. The Earl of Gloucestermanaged to organise a body of cavalryand mount a charge against thenearest Scottish schiltrom under theEarl of Carrick. Gloucester may havehoped that the Scots would crumble atthe first blow or that his attack wouldat least cause the Scots to pause andperhaps give the rest of the Englisharmy an opportunity to completeredeployment for battle, but this wasnot to be the case. His attack groundto a halt against Carrick’s spearmenand his men were driven back towardthe main body of the army. As thedistance between the two forcesshrank in the face of the Scottishadvance, it proved impossible forGloucester’s men to retire and regroupfor a second charge, but Gloucesterhimself was unable to influence thesituation since he had been killed at

the outset.The repulse of this first attempt to

stop the Scots in their tracks doubtlessput something of a dent in the moraleof the rest of the English army, andthe scattered and disorganisedremnant of Gloucester’s commandprobably made it more difficult forother English commanders to get theirtroops into good order to receive theScottish attack.

40. A well-intentioned re-enactor in the tradition ofBrigadoon meets Braveheart; however, neither kiltsnor two-handed swords have any relevance to thefourteenth century.

On the other side of the battlefield,

Moray pressed forward to contact andsome hard fighting ensued, but again itproved impossible to stop the Scottishadvance. Clearly things were not goingwell for Edward’s army, since theywere now being forced backwards inincreasingly poor order toward theircampsite, with an inevitable effect onmorale and cohesion. This wascompounded by the advance of thethird Scottish formation, which the kingled forward between the commands ofCarrick and Moray so that a completefront was formed, stretching from thePelstream to the Bannock burns. Asthe army advanced, effectively as asingle body, there was less and lessroom to organise a counterstroke and,even if an adequate force could begathered, the opportunity to deliver ablow to the inner flanks of Moray orCarrick’s divisions had been lost.

Nevertheless, the battle was, as yet,far from lost. The Scots were having a

hard fight of it and were still heavilyoutnumbered. There is some doubtabout the next development in thebattle since it is recorded in only oneaccount. According to Barbour,Edward – or one of his subordinates –was able to get a grip on the situationand bring a large body of archers intoaction on one flank. However effectiveit might be against cavalry or close-combat infantry, a schiltrom was avery easy target for archery, andcasualties started to mount quickly.Robert had foreseen the possibilitythat he might need a force to interveneat a critical juncture and had organiseda reserve of cavalry under Sir RobertKeith, who now charged into the flankof the archers and scattered them.This force is generally described asbeing ‘light’ cavalry, but thatassumption rests on one word in oneline from Barbour’s poem, in which hetells his audience that the horses were

‘lecht’. Whether this means that theywere not the strong and fast destriersand chargers generally favoured bymen-at-arms is open to question.Barbour may simply have meant thatthe horses were fresh andmettlesome, or he may only haveincluded the term to complete themetre (rhythm) of the line. In practice,it would make very little difference tothe men of the receiving end of thecharge. Any body of armoured cavalrythat broke into a formation or archerswas almost certain to rout theiropponents with ease.

The case against this part of theaction happening at all, let alone asBarbour describes it, is worthexamining. English chroniclers statethat the entire Scottish army –including the king, who carried hisspear among the rank and file –served on foot. On the other hand, it ismost unlikely that Robert did not

arrange for horses to be readilyavailable so that any opportunity topursue the enemy could be exploitedor so that he and others might have achance of making their escape if thebattle went badly. One English writer,Geoffrey Baker, writing about thirtyyears after the battle, informs us thatthe English archers were unable tomake an effective contribution to thefighting as they were in the rearmostdivisions of the army and could notshoot for fear of hitting their owncomrades. This does make sometactical sense. If, as the Lanercostchronicle states, both armies were‘arrayed’ at dawn on 24 June, it wouldbe perfectly viable for the close-combat troops to be at the front of thearmy, given that Edward and hiscommander expected to have to locateand then advance on the Scots. Hadthat been the case, the logicalapproach to deployment would have

been to ensure that the archers werenot vulnerable to an advance by theScots, but would be available fordeployment once the Scots had beenpinned in a particular position, as hadbeen the case at Falkirk.

PALFREY

A ‘riding’ horse, as opposed to acharger for battle. A palfrey was not abreed but a type, and might be little

more than a nag or, on the other hand,a very expensive, cherished piece ofhorseflesh. King Robert was riding his

palfrey when he killed Sir Henry deBohun in single combat. It has beensuggested – even stated – that the

animal was named ‘Ferrand’; however,the term crops up frequently in horsevaluations and simply means ‘grey’.

DESTRIERS

A type rather than a specific breed ofanimal, destriers were not terribly

common and most men-at-arms werecontent to have a courser, which was

cheaper and easier to replace.Contrary to common belief, they werenot particularly large animals, generallybetween 14 and 15 hands tall and very

powerfully built.

For Barbour, the rout of the Englisharchers was a crucial event in thebattle, since they now fled toward themain body of the army and causedeven greater disorganisation, which, asthe Scottish schiltroms pushed on,induced a degree of panic. All of thiswas compounded by a lack of room tomanoeuvre. The two streams that hadgiven Edward’s army the vital supply of

fresh water for both men and beasts,and had afforded his campsite andinitial deployment area some securityfrom night attacks, now proved to be aliability rather than an asset. Neitherstream was necessarily an insuperablebarrier to an individual who couldcarefully pick his way across the leastchallenging parts of the burns, butboth were rather more significantstreams than they are today andundoubtedly presented a majorobstacle to a body of troops. It isimportant to bear in mind that therewas only a very short period of timefrom the arrival of the Scots on theplain to the point when both armieswere heavily engaged right acrosstheir respective fronts. Although thegreat majority of the Scottish armywas now in action, a large portion ofthe English troops were not yet in thefight. However, extricating a worthwhileforce from the main body of the army

and then getting them across theBannock or the Pelstream, with a viewto delivering an attack on the flanks orrear of the enemy, would have takensome time and was not, in any case, avery practical proposition. It is notclear that any of Edward’s officers triedto effect such a manoeuvre, but evenif they had, there was every likelihoodthat Robert would have been affordedample time to take action against anythreat to his flanks, or that by the timesuch a force had been gathered anddeployed, the battle would alreadyhave been lost.

There is no way of knowing whetherleaders in Edward’s army tried toeffect a flanking move against theScots, but if they did, it certainly didnot lead to anything. As the Scotspressed forward greater numbers ofEnglish troops lost heart and started tomake to the rear passing through thecamp area, only to find their way

blocked by the Bannock burn. ThomasGrey (Scalacronica) informs us thatmany tried to escape by the route thathad brought them to the battlefield,only to fall foul of what he calls the‘stinking ditch’ and to drown, getcrushed underfoot or be picked off bythe Scots as they floundered in themuddy stream bed. Others retreateddirectly away from the Scottishadvance and soon found themselveson the western bank of the RiverForth. The Forth is still subject to thetide as far Stirling; at low tide theexpanse of water is not great, but theexposed banks are deep, sticky mudand would be a challenge to anyone,let alone a man encumbered by eventhe lightest armour.

At a late point in the battle, anotherincident may have occurred toundermine the English army.According to Barbour, the grooms,servants and various camp followers of

the Scottish army had been stationedwell way from the battlefield withinstructions to remain there until thefighting was finished. Seeing that theEnglish were defeated, these men –and doubtless women too – gatheredbehind a leader of their own numberand rushed down to the plain to makea contribution to the fighting. There issome doubt about their involvement,but the ‘small folk’, as Barbour callsthem, would certainly have existed –medieval armies required aconsiderable number of skilled andsemi-skilled ancillary workers – and itis hard to imagine that they would nothave seized an opportunity to take partin the plundering of the English campand baggage trains. What is less likelyis that their participation had any effecton the outcome of the battle. Even ifthey were only a mile or two from theaction – and it is unlikely to have beenless – if they started out toward the

fight at the point when the Englisharmy started to disintegrate, they canhardly have arrived before the finaloutcome had been decided.

As it became all too apparent thatthe Scots had won the day, Edwardthrew himself into the fight but wasdragged away from combat by themen who were responsible for thesafety of his person, including Sir Gilesd’Argentan. The problem now waswhere to take him. As Edward’sstandard was seen leaving the field,those English troops who were still inaction finally gave up the struggle andeither attempted to surrender or tofollow after those who were alreadyattempting to escape. Getting awayfrom the battlefield was, however,easier said than done. To the norththere was the Pelstream burn, butthere was also, assuming thatBarbour’s account is valid, the force ofScottish men-at-arms who had

scattered the English archers. A strongbody of men might make a safepassage there if they could retainenough cohesion to deter the Scottishhorse, but it would be a risky option fora small group or an individual, and anymove northward would lead away fromthe English border and security. To theeast there was the River Forth – not ahuge river, but any kind of watercourse is a major obstacle to a man inarmour. Furthermore, the banks of theForth at that point are very broad andsoft, so crossing the river is actuallymuch more difficult than it might seem.To the south there was the Bannockburn. Like the Pelstream, it is not alarge river, but like the Forth the banksare soft and muddy. According toThomas Grey’s Scalacronica, this wasthe main line of retreat and largenumbers of English troops ‘fell back onthe ditch of Bannock burn tumblingone over the other’.

King Edward’s party forced their wayacross the Pelstream burn and headedfor Stirling castle as the nearest placeof safety. Any hope that this mightprove an adequate sanctuary wasshort-lived. The garrison commander,Sir Philip Moubray (the man who hadmade the surrender pact with the Earlof Carrick three months earlier),informed Edward that although he wasprepared to take Edward into thecastle and offer him what protection hecould, the plain fact was that he wasobliged to surrender the castle to theScots at the earliest opportunity. Evenif he refused to honour the agreement,for all practical purposes defending thecastle was a lost cause. The Scotswould simply restore the siege thatthey had lifted back in April and thegarrison would be starved out orstormed long before there was anyprospect of a new army being raised inEngland to rescue the king; in fact,

with Edward holed up in Stirling, therewas little prospect of a relief forcebeing raised at all.

Clearly Edward either had to attemptto make his way home to England orface surrendering to King Robert,which would be an unmitigateddisaster. The prestige of Edward – andof English kingship in general – wouldbe very badly damaged, which wouldlikely have consequences for hiscredibility among his subjects inFrance, as well as finally destroyingany standing he might retain amongScots who had accepted Plantagenetrule. Additionally, there would be thepolitical and financial cost of obtaininghis liberty. Undoubtedly, any termswould have to include a complete andunreserved acceptance of Robert’skingship and solemn oaths never toattack Scotland again, but there wouldalso be the matter of a ransom, whichmight well run into hundreds of

thousands of pounds. Edward could besure of his personal safety – Robertwas hardly going to execute him – butequally he could hardly expect to beset free before a ransom had beenagreed and at least a substantialproportion delivered.

The chances of making a successfulescape were actually quite good.Edward was not alone, but wassurrounded by a large party – probablysome hundreds – of men-at-arms.Many of these would have been themen of personal retinue, joined bythose who had followed the royalbanner on their own initiative whenEdward left the battlefield. Betweenthem they formed a fairly formidableforce. The decision was made to passround the western side of the NewPark and King’s Park and then toproceed to nearest point of safety.

Down on the plain, where the battlewas finally coming to a close, Edward’s

party was observed leaving Stirling andKing Robert dispatched a force ofmen-at-arms under Douglas in thehope of capturing Edward. Douglastook to the pursuit with his usualdetermination, but his party was toosmall to force an action againstEdward’s following. During the pursuitDouglas encountered Sir LaurenceAbernethy, who had brought a party ofmen-at-arms – eighty strong,according to Barbour – to join theEnglish army. Ever the realist,Abernethy quickly decided that thePlantagenet cause was lost and joinedDouglas in the chase. However, evenwith these unexpected reinforcements,Douglas could not risk an engagementand settled for picking up thoseEnglish stragglers who fell behind therest of the party. Barbour describes ahell-for-leather ride through thecounties of the south-east as far asDunbar, where the earl, still firmly

opposed to the Bruce party, admittedEdward and provided him with a boatto take him to Berwick, where hewould be in no immediate danger. Infact, the pursuit was probably a moreleisurely business than Barbourdescribes, since the horses of bothsides would soon have collapsed withexhaustion if they had been driven totrot, let alone gallop over such a longdistance.

While Edward made his way toDunbar, at least one of hiscommanders was trying to rescuewhat he could from the fight. Aymer deValence, Earl of Pembroke, gathered aforce of infantry and men-at-arms thatwas strong enough to discourage anyserious interference and marchedsouth. Others were less fortunate. Aparty escaped as far as Bothwell,where the commander of the garrisonclaimed that he could onlyaccommodate the leaders of the

group, who then entered the castleonly to be taken prisoner. For the restof the army, the situation was morethan bleak: it was desperate. No doubtmany managed to escape thebattlefield only to be killed or capturedas they fled south. Of those who didnot die on the field, many weredrowned or crushed trying to escapeacross the Bannock or the Forth;many more surrendered – someapparently even to peasant women –in the hope that their value asprisoners for ransom would help tokeep them alive.

RANSOMS

Throughout most of the war, a manwho was captured could secure hisrelease by payment of a ransom.

Ransoms were normally set at a levelthat the prisoner could reasonably beexpected to raise and payment terms

might be spread over some years.Ransoms were usually a matter

between the captor and his captive,though it was not unusual for theCrown to receive a portion of the

money since the captor would – as ageneral rule – be serving in the king’s

army.

Robert certainly took a majorgamble at Bannockburn, and two ofthe greatest Scottish medievalhistorians, Professors RanaldNicholson and Geoffrey Barrow (and

others in his wake), have concludedthat it was a gamble he should nothave taken. His authority as kinglargely depended on his militarysuccess. Some men had joined hiscause through family traditions,patriotic convictions or coercion, butfor many Robert seemed to offer thebest prospect for delivering whatmedieval writers called ‘good lordship’:secure and steady government thatcould be relied upon to provide stabilityand prosperity. A single defeat on thebattlefield would utterly compromisehis credibility even if he escaped, andif he was captured he would certainlyface execution.

All battles involve risk, but Roberthad taken pains to load the dice veryfirmly in his own favour. Edward II hadmade reference to taking an army to‘our castle of Stirling’ as early asOctober 1313, but that was not thesole target and he might easily have

chosen a different course for hisexpedition, or at least one thatencompassed other objectives. Theclear challenge to Stirling that wascreated by the pact between the Earlof Carrick and Sir Philip Moubray didnot completely force Edward’s hand,but it would have been a sign ofweakness had he not made a seriouseffort to relieve the garrison beforemidsummer. If anything, the pact gaveEdward a clear target, since Robertwould have to make some sort ofdemonstration of opposition. With anyluck, Robert would muster a significantforce and be brought to battle.

41. The head of a battle-hammer allegedly recoveredfrom Bannockburn battlefield.

For Robert, the Stirling area hadvery real advantages as a place toobstruct, if not engage, an Englishinvasion. The strategic value lay in thefact that Stirling is right in the centre ofthe country and had, by medievalstandards, excellent communicationsin all directions. Since the castlegarrison was completely contained,supplies could be brought up the Forth

in barges to within a couple of miles ofthe army’s training and concentrationarea without fear of interruption.Additionally, the first bridge over theForth was at Stirling. In a previousexpedition, Edward I had built apontoon bridge over the Forth and itwas not impossible that Edward IImight do the same. If so, news of itwould come to Robert long before itwas completed; this would allow him tomarch his army to block Edward’scrossing on the north bank. Therewere also tactical attractions: theterrain had good potential for adefensive action on the wooded highground of the New Park, whereEdward’s superiority in cavalry andarchers would be less significant, andthere was also ample dry, open terrainwhere Robert could drill large bodies ofspearmen.

Robert’s troops were well motivated,confident, well armed and well trained.

He and his commanders were totallyfamiliar with the terrain. They haddeveloped a series of combatmanoeuvres and had instilled theminto the troops, but above all, Roberthad planned thoroughly. His army waspositioned so that if the English gainedthe upper hand in the pre-battlemanoeuvres, he would be able towithdraw into territory that favoured hisown forces over those of his enemy,but he was also ready to seize anopportunity to accept, offer or, as itturned out, force battle on his enemy ifthe circumstances were favourable.

If the risks of defeat wereenormous, the advantages to begained from victory were even greater.If Edward could be decisively beatenon the battlefield, Robert’s ownprestige would be secured and thefinal significant English-held strongholdin central Scotland would be takenwithout a blow being struck.

Additionally, there was the prospect oftaking some prominent prisoners whocould then be exchanged for thevarious Scots in English captivity.However, there was also the questionof the risks of not giving battle. Roberthad been assiduous in regularlydemanding military service from hissubjects even though the greatmajority of his troops never sawaction. If he continually called out menbut never took them to battle theexercise would come to be seen as awaste of time and effort. In thesummer of 1314, he raised the biggestforce of his reign to date and avoidingbattle might well have had adetrimental effect on the morale of histroops: what was the point of all thattraining if the king was afraid tocommit himself to the sort of battlethat could decide his own future andthat of his kingdom? Howeverhazardous the decision to force a

battle might have been, the decisionpaid off handsomely and Robert’sstatus, both at home and abroad, washugely enhanced by his victory.

AFTER THE BATTLE Edward’s flight to Stirling castle andthen to Dunbar and on to Berwickended the campaign of 1314. Thefinancial cost had been enormous andthere was nothing to show for it.Raising another army immediatelywould have been an impossible strainon the economy and the loss of somany members of the English politicalcommunity was a further barrier. Thelords and gentry who were now deadon the battlefield or prisoners inScotland would not be available toraise troops, fulfil command andadministration roles or serve as men-at-arms. The communities of northernEngland had provided the bulk of theinfantry and could not be expected tofill the ranks of a new army, so men

would have had to be recruited fromthe southern counties, which wouldweaken defences against raids or eveninvasion from France.

A number of major lords had refusedto serve in 1314 and several of thosewho had were now prisoners. Manyhad been killed and even if their heirswere of military age, many of themwould have had their hands filled withthe business of establishing theirleadership within their communities,and very few of them would have hadany significant command experience.Additionally, the mere fact of thedefeat – and its scale – was hardly anencouraging factor. Few men wouldhave retained any confidence inEdward as a commander, and thesituation did not reflect well on those ofhis senior subordinates who hadescaped death or capture. For some,there would have been a big questionmark over the value of pursuing the

war at all, given the costs, the risksand the potential benefits of victory.There were probably some men of amore pious nature who saw the handof God at work and concluded that thewar was not justified. Beyond that,there was the question of whether thewar could be won. Robert hadmanaged to survive every initiativetaken against him, but even if he couldbe killed and the Scots defeated inbattle, was it not likely that the Scotswould find another captain tochampion their cause? Edward Brucewould almost certainly take on thechallenge and, whether he did or not,Edward Balliol might well do the same.

None of these factors would beenough necessarily to dissuadeEdward II from raising another army,but there was the very real possibilitythat it, too, might be defeated.Additionally, even if a victory could beachieved, what was the benefit? A

relatively modest number of men mightmake good the grants of lands, officesand titles bestowed on them byEdward I, but it was abundantly clearthat Scotland could not be garrisonedby a few handfuls of men in scatteredcastles and peels. If an occupationgovernment was to be successful, itwould have to be secured by verylarge forces and at enormous costs.Most, if not all, of the castles that hadbeen slighted by Robert and hislieutenants would have to be repairedand the garrisons would have to bepaid and supplied from Englishresources. It was not even clear thatthe manpower to provide the garrisonscould be recruited. From 1297 to 1314,it had been possible to enlist men-at-arms and archers from Scottishcommunities and to extract the knightservice of several counties to providesoldiers to man the castles and peels.This was likely to be much harder to

achieve in the wake of such a majordefeat. There were certainly somemen available: Scottish men who hadnot entered the peace of King Robertand had become exiles, but there werenot enough of them to provide the sortof active garrisons that would beneeded to impose Edward’s rule.Furthermore, Robert had established ageneral practice of accepting suchmen into his peace on reasonablyattractive terms, but also made it clearthat there was a limited window ofopportunity and that men who did notenter his peace – at the price ofabandoning any landholding from orallegiance to the kings of England –would be forfeited forever. Given thechoice of submitting to Robert,accepting his kingship and beingreinstated to some or even all of one’sheritage, or spending who knew howlong as a pensioner of the EnglishCrown in the hopes that one day

Plantagenet or even Balliol kingshipwould be restored, it would hardly besurprising if a high proportion of these‘disinherited’ lords sought to make theirpeace with the Bruce party.

All in all, the events of 1314 leftEnglish military prestige andconfidence severely shaken. This wasa major issue given Edward’srelationship with France and thechallenges to English authority inIreland and Wales. The failure of thecampaign also generated profounddismay in the communities of northernEngland. If Edward could not protecthis subjects in Northumberland,Cumberland and Westmorland, therewas always the risk that the politicalcommunities in those areas would lookto someone who could provide themwith better lordship: King Robert.Although Robert always maintainedthat he had no ambitions to conquerEnglish territory, there were clear

symptoms of a collapse in northernconfidence in Edward’s kingship. In theyears after Bannockburn severallandholders in northern Englishcounties, having paid the ransoms thatRobert demanded for refraining fromdestruction, approached Robert forlegal decisions or to have theircharters confirmed.

There was also increasing cause forconcern to other communities furthersouth. Part of the price for peace inthe northern English counties wasRobert’s insistence on free passagefor his troops from ransomedcommunities, which potentially gavehis raids much greater range. FromRobert’s point of view, the repeatedincursions into England were notsimply a matter of keeping his army ingood condition – though clearly thatwas a significant factor – or even witheasing his own financial problems. Heentertained hopes that such activity

would eventually force Edward to opennegotiations for a proper peaceagreement, but he misread thesituation. Quite simply, Edward wasjust not that concerned about thecommunities of northern England.

Edward was neither willing nor ableto abandon Scottish ambitions; to doso would be an admission of defeatand would be seen as throwing awaythe accomplishments of his father.This was hardly realistic as his fatherhad, in fact, failed to defeat the Scots,but he had achieved at least anappearance of nearing his objective in1304–05. At the time of Edward’sdeath in 1307, Robert Bruce was aninsignificant threat and, superficially atleast, Scottish independence as apolitical concept was very close tobeing extinguished – at least in Englishpublic perception.

Edward II inherited the Scottish warfrom his father; the war was Edward

I’s project and over the years itbecame something of a fixation, and –for Edward II – to some extent itbecame a means of deflectingattention from internal problems. To adegree, it had served a similar functionfor Edward I. In the late 1290s,England was sometimes on the brinkof civil war and focusing attention onthe Scottish situation helped to give acommon purpose to the differingfactions in domestic politics.

By 1314, the desire to conquerScotland had become so thoroughlyentrenched that it was virtuallyimpossible to abandon it. Massivesums of money had been committedand there would be nothing to show forso much effort if Edward simplyaccepted Robert’s kingship.Bannockburn did not bring the war toan end: Edward would mount furtherexpeditions into Scotland, but he wasnever able to bring the Scots to battle

on their own soil. However, his forcessuffered defeats on English soil andthis did nothing to improve Edward’sstanding among his nobles or thewider community.

The economic damage incurredfrom Robert’s operations in northernEngland did not have a major directeffect on Edward’s personal income,but the raids did lead to depopulationas people moved south to avoid theconflict; this, in turn, made it moredifficult to recruit adequate numbersfor English operations in Scotland, sothe cost in manpower and money hadto be found from counties in the south,and that did not help to make Edwardpopular with his subjects. Additionally,the prospects for his Scottishpensioners became increasingly bleak.Their number was not great, but it wasnot trivial either, and they became asteady drain on Edward’s treasury.The same applied to men who had

been granted Scottish estates andoffices. Clearly, they now had norealistic chance of gaining their landsor salaries any time soon, but many ofthem had to be compensated for theirlosses with grants of land in Englandor money from Edward’s treasury.

42. Letter patent of John Balliol, acknowledging thefeudal superiority of Edward I.

In addition to the internal dissentthat was encouraged by Bannockburn,Edward’s prestige abroad – which wasnever very strong in the first place –was seriously undermined.Bannockburn gave Robert political andmilitary credibility, particularly inFrance and the Low Countries, whocould now more safely resume tradeon the sort of level that had pertainedin the years before the war.

Nevertheless, one area of successwas in the diplomatic struggle. Edwardwas able to dissuade the pope fromlifting the sentence ofexcommunication from Robert, whichhad been decreed for his murder of SirJohn Comyn of Badenoch in 1306.However, it is questionable whetherany of Edward’s subjects really sawthat as a victory of any consequence.

For Robert, the victory brought anynumber of rewards. His control ofScotland was complete and effectivelyunquestioned; the men who mighthave opposed him were either dead orexiles in England. However, strictlyspeaking, he was still not universallyregarded as the legitimate king.Although John Balliol had abdicated in1296 and then some years later hadforsworn any and all rights in Scotland,he had done so under duress andtherefore there was some doubt aboutthe validity of his actions, and evenmore doubt about whether he couldlegitimately give away the rights of hisheir, Edward Balliol. As long as Balliolfils lived, there would always be a riskthat a pro-Balliol movement mightarise and attempt to topple Robert inorder to put the legitimate heir on thethrone. This might have seemed a littlefar-fetched in the immediate afterglowof such a stunning victory or in the

wake of Robert’s successfulcampaigns in England, but theprinciple of legitimacy in inheritancewas of enormous importance inmedieval societies. A mere six yearsafter Bannockburn there was a plot tomurder King Robert. Barbour points toSir John de Soulis as the man that theconspirators were seeking to put onthe throne, but he also reports that aband of 360 men-at-arms hadgathered at Berwick to carry out acoup once Robert had beendispatched. These men wereundoubtedly drawn from the ranks ofthose who had lost their lands throughtheir opposition to the Bruce party, andtheir intention was to make EdwardBalliol king in Robert’s place. The plotwas a complete failure and many ofthe conspirators were tried andexecuted, the remainder fleeing toEngland or France, but clearly therewas still life in the Balliol cause.

43. The seal of John Balliol.

Robert faced other problems. Anattempt to take the war to Irelandinitially looked like it might bear fruitand even result in Edward Brucebecoming king of an independent

Ireland, but in due course the attemptfizzled out and Edward Bruce himselfwas killed in action at Faughart on 4October 1318.

Despite these setbacks, Robert wasable to conduct the affairs of thekingdom with considerable successand there was a general economicrecovery despite some very poor yearsfor agriculture. In one sense, themilitary picture was relatively bright.Control over the more pastoral areasof Scotland allowed Robert to recruitlarger numbers of men-at-arms, whichhelped to make his raids into Englandmore effective. Douglas and Moraywere able to gain victories against theforces of Edward II, but the range oftheir operations was limited. Theycould make forays as far south asHuntingdonshire, but could not reallythreaten Edward’s political power basein the south of England. Robert’sarmies could win the battles, but

securing a permanent peace continuedto elude him.

In the meantime, as he pursued hismilitary and diplomatic campaigns,Robert was able to devote himself tothe business of running the country.Like any medieval king, his domesticpriorities revolved around ensuring thathis rule was firmly establishedthroughout the realm and encouragingeconomic development. Possession ofall of Scotland’s ports allowed aresumption of the wool trade. Woolwas the most significant export of bothEngland and Scotland. Of all thetradeable wool sold in late medievalWestern Europe, somethingapproaching 80 per cent of it wasproduced in England and virtually all ofthe rest came from Scotland. Woolwas not the only export, but it was theonly one subject to export taxes, and,as such, there is more evidence aboutthe wool trade than any other

commodity; however, that does notmean that other trade goods wereinsignificant. Furs, hides, timber, salt,honey and grain were all of someconsequence, but none came remotelyclose to wool in terms of generatingincome either for merchants of for theCrown. Export is generallyaccompanied by import, and medievalScotland was no exception. Iron was inshort supply locally and a great dealhad to be brought in from abroad, buta large proportion of the importedmaterial consisted of luxury goods. Ofthese, wine was probably the mostsignificant as there was no domesticproduction whatsoever. The sameapplied to spices, which appearfrequently – and in remarkably largequantities – in medieval records. Themost popular spices seem to havebeen cumin, pepper and galingale (aform of ginger), which rather suggeststhat the Scottish devotion to curry

(chicken tikka masala was possiblyinvented to appeal to Scottish tastes)is not a modern phenomenon.

In the immediate aftermath ofBannockburn, and intermittently forsome years thereafter, war itself was amajor source of economic activity. Theransoms that Robert demanded fromEnglish towns and counties helped toease his financial difficulties, though itwould seem probable that a great dealof that income was spent on wages forhis soldiers. The forces that Moray,Douglas and Robert himself led intoEngland maintained very highstandards of discipline and that couldonly have been maintained if thetroops were rewarded with cash ratherthan by being allowed to take plunder.Even so, there were opportunities. Themen captured at Bannockburn, atMyton and Byland, and at scores ofother actions could only obtain theirliberty by paying ransoms to their

captors, so a good many Scottishsoldiers became personally wealthythrough their service in the field.

Imposing law and order was a majortask for Robert and his lieutenants.The war had produced extensive socialdislocation. There were a good manylandless men who had turned torobbery and extortion to make a living.This was not a uniquely Scottishproblem. Even in peacetime, thebusiness of hunting down bandits waspart of the fabric of life in everycountry in Europe, but it wassomething that flourished in periods ofconflict due to the fact that the class ofmen who would normally haveresponsibility for ensuring peace andgood order were generally morefocused on the business of conductinga war. In peacetime, the knight serviceowed to the Crown and to figures oflocal authority could be committed tothe task of suppressing bands of

criminals, but in war the service wasneeded elsewhere.

Eventually it would be a series ofinternal political crises in England thatwould give Robert the treaty of ‘finalpeace’ that he desired. Edward wasnever able to exert the level of controlover his nobility that his father hadmostly been able to achieve, but amixture of social conservatism anddivisions in his opposition kept him onthe throne long after he haddemonstrated that the task of being acompetent king was beyond hisabilities. A chain of revolts and refusalsto give service undermined hisauthority and in May 1325 he made ahuge tactical error in sending his eldestson, the future Edward III, to act as hisproxy in giving homage to the King ofFrance for the Duchy of Gascony.Edward’s French queen, Isabella, hadalready travelled to France tonegotiate a peace treaty, but now, with

custody of her son, she refused toreturn at Edward’s request. InSeptember the following year shemounted an invasion and within a shorttime Edward was not only defeated,but imprisoned.

PEACE (OF KING EDWARD OR KINGROBERT)

An individual changing sides from oneparty to the other was considered tohave ‘entered the peace’ of the king

and was thereby pardoned hisprevious resistance – though normally

for a price.

In January 1327, Edward wasformally charged with an enormousrange of failures, including the ‘loss’ ofScotland, though in fact neither he norhis father had ever really secured theirrule there in the first place. He agreedto abdicate in favour of his son andwas placed in prison for life, but aslong as he lived there was always thechance that his supporters might sethim free and restore his kingship.Edward may not have been a very

successful king, but the principle oflegitimacy that constituted such athreat to Robert Bruce from the Balliolfamily was just as strong in medievalEngland as it was in Scotland.Additionally, although Edward III wasnow king in theory, he was still tooyoung to rule in person and thegovernment of the land lay withIsabella and her lover, RogerMortimer.

The crisis in England had a bearingon the situation vis-à-vis Scotland.After years of demanding ransomsfrom communities in the north ofEngland, the nearest thing to peacethat Robert had been able to forcefrom Edward II had been a truce tolast for thirteen years – the medievalequivalent of a political problem being‘kicked into the long grass’. KingRobert now took the view that thetruce had been a personalarrangement between himself and

Edward, and that his death renderedthat arrangement null and void.Accordingly, Moray and Douglasrenewed their operations. Robert mayhave hoped that Isabella andMortimer, preoccupied with their owndifficulties, might be brought to thepeace table. Arguable, but they simplyproved to have the same attitude toScotland as Edward and wereprepared to ignore the plight of thenorthern counties. However, since partof the rationale offered for forcingEdward II to abdicate had been thefact that he had failed to conquerScotland, they could hardly affordsimply to surrender to Robert’sdemands for recognition of his kingshipand a full and lasting peace.Additionally, abandoning the conquestof Scotland might further alienate theyoung Edward III, since he – and, bythis time, quite a sizeable proportion ofthe political community and the people

as a whole – had come to seeScotland as part of the birthright ofEnglish kings. Accordingly, they raisedan army and sent it north with theyoung Edward at its head.

The campaign was a disaster. TheScottish and English armies traipse upand down Weardale in the rain. Therewas very little actual fighting and theScots had the better of what therewas. At one particularly dispiritingjuncture, Edward III was very fortunateto avoid capture. The Weardalecampaign was a humiliation for Edwardand for the English army in general; italso emptied the treasury anddissipated what little political capitalIsabella and Mortimer still had.

The moment had come to makepeace. King Robert’s health was failingand he was anxious to reachagreement; his terms were generous,including a payment of £30,000 – anabsolutely gigantic sum for those days

– for the construction of an abbeydedicated to praying for the souls ofthose who had died on both sides. Hemay or may not have been aware thatthe money would go straight intoIsabella and Mortimer’s pockets, buthe had made the right sort of gestureby providing the money for the statedpurpose.

THE LEGACY Victory in battle – and on such adramatic scale – enhanced Robert’sprestige and credibility to an enormousdegree, though strictly speaking hewas still a usurper. There remained aconsiderable sympathy throughoutScotland for the Balliol party, butRobert was now clearly seen as beingthe best bet for defending Scottishinterests against English occupation.Whether any real sympathy had evertruly existed for the Plantagenets asrulers of Scotland in the years after1296 is highly questionable, but by theend of June 1314 it had utterlyevaporated and would never be aserious factor in Scottish political lifeagain, though it would enjoy a brief,superficial and highly localised

resurgence in 1333–35.Robert had hoped that the peace of

1328 would be secured through themarriage of his son to Edward II’sdaughter, but Edward III was quitewilling to put aside the interests of hissister if it meant the conquest of evenpart of Scotland, and gave support,initially covertly, to Edward Balliol, who,not unreasonably, was prepared togive homage to Edward III in exchangefor being put on the Scottish throne.’

Angus Og MacDonald

One of King Robert’s most importantfollowers, his support was especiallysignificant in the early stages ofRobert’s campaigns to make himselfking. It is not clear that he was presentat Bannockburn; only Barboursuggests that he was. He may insteadhave been deployed to the west coastto prevent Irish troops from joining theEnglish army.’

44. The Pilkington Jackson statue ofRobert I at the National Trust forScotland’s Bannockburn Visitor Centre.

The treaty of 1328 utterly forbadeEdward II from giving support toanyone who might contest the kingshipof Robert I; nevertheless, the onlypossible candidate, Edward Balliol, wasnot mentioned by name. By July 1332,Balliol had raised a small armyconsisting of English mercenaries andthose men (collectively known as theDisinherited) who had lost lands andtitles by opposing King Robert. Thearmy seems to have numbered lessthan 2,000 men and it took more thaneighty ships to carry them to Scotland,but the real leader of the expeditionwas not Edward, but Henry deBeaumont. The expedition initiallyenjoyed great success. The Scots hadlost their most experienced leaders:Moray had died, possibly poisoned byan English spy, and Douglas had beenkilled in battle on crusade in Spain.The new leaders failed to co-ordinatetheir efforts and for a few months

Balliol faced limited opposition;however, at Christmas he was drivenout of Scotland and was lucky toescape with his life.

45. The nineteenth-century brass effigy of KingRobert from his burial place at Dunfermline Abbey; in

the 1330s the tombs of both King Robert and hisqueen – Elizabeth de Burgh – were destroyed byEnglish troops.

Edward III now took a hand in thebusiness and endeavoured to putEdward Balliol on the Scottish throneas a client king in exchange for mostof the southern counties of Scotland,which were to be ceded permanentlyto the English Crown. Despite initialsuccess and a massive military effort,which would be a drain on Englishresources for decades, the twoEdwards failed to make muchheadway. On 30 November 1335, theScots scored a major victory atCulblean and, although they sufferednumerous setbacks, the war continuedto run their way. By 1340, if notbefore, Edward III had effectivelyabandoned any hope of achieving theconquest that had eluded his fatherand his grandfather, and had resorted

to an outpost policy of maintaining amodest number of garrisons inScottish castles as a means of keepingthe Scots occupied and preventingthem from making a more substantialcontribution to the French side of whatwe now call the Hundred Years War.

This, then, was the sour fruit ofEdward I’s ambition. Only a fewdecades previously the plan to marryEdward I’s son to Alexander III’sgranddaughter and bring about adynastic union had not been met withdisapproval among the Scottishpolitical community, though inevitably itwould have led to a diminution of theScottish state. By choosing a policy ofarmed occupation, Edward haddestroyed the healthy relationshipbetween the two countries that hadexisted before the Great Cause orCompetition of 1291–92 and had laidthe foundations for a bitter enmity onboth sides built on an unbounded

suspicion of all things English amongthe Scots and a condescendingresentment of all things Scottishamong the English.

ORDERS OF BATTLE

The Scots

Commander: Robert I

King Robert

First spear formation: possibly inexcess of 2,000 spearmen

Edward Bruce, Earl of Carrick

Second spear formation: at least1,500–2,000 spearmen

Thomas Randolph, Earl ofMoray

Third spear formation: c. 1,500–2,000men

Robert Keith Earl Marischal

500 men-at-arms (Barbour)

Sir James Douglas

Commanded the pursuit of Edward IIto Dunbar

Archers

No information about their commander500–1,000 men

The English

Commander: Edward II

Cavalry

2,500 men-at-arms divided into fourseparate commands, one – ratherlarger than the others – nominally ledby the king, and three under seniornobles

Infantry

Writs for conscription requested:21,000 infantry; it is reasonable toconclude 12,000–17,000 men in total

FURTHER READING Ayton, A., Knights and their

Warhorses.Barrell, A.D.M., Medieval Scotland.Barrow, G.W.S., Robert the Bruce.Brown, C., Bannockburn 1314.Coss, P., The Knight in Medieval

England.Gardiner, S.R., Atlas of English

History.Keene, M., Chivalry.MacNamee, C., Robert Bruce.Oman, C.W.C., A History of the Art of

War in the Middle Ages.Prestwich, M., Armies and Warfare in

the Middle Ages: The EnglishExperience.

———, The Three Edwards.

COPYRIGHT

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