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© 2011 Mark Kozak-HollandTitanic Lessons for Modern Projects www.lessons-from-history.com

Titanic Lessons for Modern Projects

Presentation to APM London and South East branchesMarch 16/17th 2011Mark Kozak-Holland

Avoiding Project Disasters

“Lessons From the Past that Assist the Projects of Today to Shape the World of Tomorrow”

www.lessons-from-history.com

http://www.lessons-from-history.com/





© 2011 Mark Kozak-Holland

Objectives: Analyze Titanic‟s construction project and voyage

It uses lessons learned to understand key project issues.

It looks at key decisions that led to project compromises.

It questions why captain was unable to prevent disaster.

It makes a step by step comparison to today‟s IT projects.

Please prepare questions for the end of the presentation.

Titanic Lessons for Modern Projects www.lessons-from-history.com


The success rate of Projects is stubbornly low as first shown by the “Chaos” reports from Standish Group

PMI reports $15 trillion in 2010 spent worldwide on projects, 20% of world’s GDP.

$260 billion wasted due to project failures in US in 2009.

Hypothesis:

– Projects set seeds for future operational failures.

– Problems attributed to poor decisions making in the project.

Check www.lessons-from-history/Project Success or Failure/

Source: “Chaos, a

recipe for success,”

Standish Group,

280,000 projects

evaluated

1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Succeeded 16 27 26 28 34 29 35 32

Failed 31 40 28 23 15 18 19 24

Challenged 53 33 46 49 51 53 46 44

0

10

20

30

40

50

60


Through 2010, government agencies will

cancel 30% of the IT projects that they

initiate, including at least 10% of projects

budgeted at more than $200,000 (0.7

probability).

Source: Garner Group


Some notable project failures during the project implementation or into operation

Oct. 2009, eHealth Ontario, 30 full-time employees and 300 consultants many in senior positions.

Aug. 2009, Digital trunked radio system failures Public-Safety Radio, Technology in Government

May 2009, Google suffers major failure, various Apps kicking back in after widespread outage

Sep. 2008 London Stock Exchange failed for 7 hours hurting clients who trade $17.5 bn a day.

February 2008 - American LaFrance (ALF), “leading brand of custom-made fire fighting, rescue vehicles, and ambulances,” declared bankruptcy, blaming IBM and failed ERP implementation.

Nov. 2007, passengers lineup terminal length (1 km), after glitch in Air Canada resv. system.

January 2007, Sweden's largest Bank, Nordea, the biggest heist of customer accounts on record more than $1m was stolen.

2006 LCH.Clearnet shut down its Generic Clearing System (GCS) project at a cost of EUR67.9 m.

2006 Maine Medicaid Claims System project 1 year on “is a disaster of major proportions. Since the new system went live, it has cost the state of Maine close to $30 million.”

Hershey‟s ERP implementation failure ($112m), distribution problems, 27% marketshare loss.

The FoxMeyer Drug ERP system implementation failure led to collapse of entire $5 bn company.

June 2004, RBC fell behind processing salary deposits thousands of Canadian workers as millions of transactions were affected by a computer glitch that caused payroll delays.

June 2004, an air traffic control computer failure saw massive air disruption across the UK. All flights from UK airports were grounded after a problem at the National Air Traffic Service.




Notable project failures during projects. Why do problems still occur and IT projects fail catastrophically?

August 2008 Unencrypted memory stick lost with names/dates of birth of 84,000 inmates, England 's entire prison population. Home addresses of 33,000 who had six convictions.

Feb. 2007 £20bn UK NHS computer system 'doomed to fail„a senior insider has warned.

2007 laptop with records of 600,000 recruits was stolen from Royal Navy recruiter's car

2006 Department of Homeland Security scuttles its $229m Emerge2 program (new financial IT system).

2005 US Justice Department stated $170m FBI Virtual Case File project a failure, after 5 yrs & $104m. In a 18-month period, FBI gave contractor 400 requirements changes.

2005 UK Inland Revenue gave $3.45 bn of tax overpayments because of software errors.

April 2005 Australian inter-departmental warfare resulted in failure of $64m federal project.

2005 British food retailer J Sainsbury wrote off $526m in automated supply-chain system.

IRS project on taxpayer compliance took decade to complete and cost $50 bn.

Oregon DMV conversion to new software took 8 years and public outcry killed the project.

State of Florida welfare system plagued with numerous errors & $260m in overpayments!

May 2005 major hybrid car manufacturer installed software fix on 20,000 vehicles. The automobile industry spends $2 to $3 bn per year fixing software problems.

July 2004 new welfare management system in Canada costing $200m unable to handle simple benefits rate increase. Contract never tested this in 6 weeks of acceptance tests.



© 2011 Mark Kozak-HollandPage 8

Bad IT service performance, IT project success rates, & IT investments are not a CIO problem affect all c-levels

Most project management mistakes are either lack of adequate planning or

communications breakdown (among project team or with project sponsors).

• Source: Chaos, a recipe for success, Standish Group, 2008

“…serious deficiencies in senior executive skills with IT projects. Lack of PM

skills cut benefits of IT projects by 25%.”

“Executives are involved in selecting and approving projects, but rarely

delivering them. 49% experienced one project failure in past 12 months.”

• Source: KPMG's Global IT Project Management Survey, July 2005.

C-levels need to understand:

– Relationship IT projects / on-line operations

– What can go wrong in complex on-line operation?



To understand relationship between operations & IT projects imagine yourself in 1912 in a Titanic lifeboat being rescued.



In 1907 White Star Project Sponsor (Bruce Ismay) responded with a strategy that leveraged emerging technology

Invest in technology - 3 new super liners to sweep Atlantic. First new ships for a dozen years

Push emerging technology to limits.

– Steel production

– Propulsion system (steam turbine)

– Communications (phone and wireless telegraph)

– Automated control systems (mechanical)

40% larger than anything else available.

Displacement - 52,310 tons

Length - 882 feet 6 inches.

Beam - 92 feet 6 inches

Draft - 34 feet 6 inches.

Height - 175 feet from keel to stack (the boat

deck was 60 feet above the waterline).

Decks - 9 total, A through G with the boilers

below.

Page 10


Focus on luxury through increased space and capacity

Address all three passage

classes, priority on first-class.

Quality of crossing, customer

experience.

Built for a Wednesday ship (7

versus 6 days).

OlympicMauretania

15% faster23% greater capacity

Page 11


White Star‟s strategy (and business case) were based on priority for first class space allocation

White Star‟s class segregation =

today‟s customer segments.

Passenger space allocated:

– 60% for 905 first-class.

– 7% for 1134 third-class.

Crew

quarters

1st class quarters, staterooms, berths2rd class quarters, berths

Bridge

Engine rooms/Coal bunkers/Boiler rooms 3rd class dining/kitchen Cargo hold

3rd class

berths

Page 12


Project Integration Management - Project Charter

Developed by Project Sponsor Ismay, and Pirie

– Business reasons for project

• Transform White Star’s business model & replace aging fleet

– Luxury drives customers back, rather than speed of crossing

– Project objectives (purpose)

• Deliver 3 super liners over 7 year period

– Staggered delivery so revenue from first two ships can fund the third

– Principal considerations for ships were safety, comfort and luxury, with a

reasonably fast speed.

– Project’s criteria for success (must be measurable)

• Each ship is in operation within 4 years

• Meets terms and standards of contract

Change Control performed

– Through contract

Titanic Lessons for Modern Projects www.lessons-from-history.comPage 15


White Star‟s initial Business Case was driven by revenue and cost savingsPage 22, Fig 2.1

Case based on 70% capacity

Increase

margin

Increase

revenue

Decrease

costs

Increase

customer

revenue

Increase

cargo

revenue

Decrease

marketing

costs

Second class

First class

PR around

largest ship

Fewer larger

ships

More passenger

classes

Equivalent to

1st class on

other ships

Equivalent to

2nd class on

other ships

More efficient

More media

coverage

Publicity stunt

Lower build

costs

Decrease

operational

costs

Decrease

manufacturing

costs

More efficient

labor, lower

wage bill

More efficient

use of total fuel

Lower provisions

bill

Third class

Fewer larger

ships

More superior

service classes

Greater

capacity

Economy

of scale

More frequent

service

Lower

maintenance

costs

More space &

luxury in cabins

Page 17


The strategy required new technology investments but the business case was really solid

Profitability analysis breakeven 2 yrs.

6 year construction project.

75% of revenue first-class.

– 1st class suite - $4,350,

– 2nd class suite - $1,750,

– 3rd class ticket - $30-46

• Titanic‟s class segregation = today‟s

customer segments.

• Passenger space allocated: – 60% for 905 first-class.

– 7% for 1134 third-class.



Project Scope Management

Collect requirements (business)

– Deliver 3 identical super liners

– Focus on luxury (especially in first class) and

size

– Improve the current levels of service for all 3

classes

• Second equivalent to first on other lines

• Third equivalent to second on other lines

Ismay stayed fully involved in design

development

– He played a major role in the final project

specification.




Define scope

– Based on previous ships but scaled up

• Tried and tested approach of keel and ribs

– Scope affected by the introduction of new emerging technologies




(WBS) Work Breakdown

Structure subdivision of effort

– For all 3 ships

• Design <6 months

– For each of the ships

• Construction ~ 3 years

– Launch/Internal fitting 12 months

• Sea trials < 2 months

• Maiden voyage = 1 week

• Total effort ~ 4 years



Project Time Management

Timeline

– For 3 ships

– Each delivery took waterfall approach

– First 2 ships built almost in parallel delivered 11 months apart

– Activities tried and tested over time

Rolling workforce

– Use of industrial practices to build two ships in parallel

– Most effective use of workers time

Gantt Charts

– Gantt had used his charts first time to build dreadnoughts in

1907



The project timeline was extensive, but it had a solid ROI and was well funded

1907 - Vision/strategy for White Star Line

1907 - First public announcement in September

1908 – Design approved & Olympic's construction begins

1909 - Titanic's construction begins

1911 - Olympics maiden voyage in June

1912 - Titanic's maiden voyage in April

1913 – Britannic completed •ROI – year two from construction.

Staggered launch off set investments.

Page 23


Project Schedule (High level)


H 1 H 2 H 3 H 4 H 5 H 6 H 7 H 8 H 9 H 10 H 11 H 12 H 13

Design

Construction

Sea

Trail

s

Olympic

Titanic

H 14

1907 1908 1911 19131909 1910 1912

Sea

Tr

ail

s

Construction

Construction

Gigantic

1914

H 15

Launch

Launch

Gantry

Idea

Page 24


Project Cost Management

Most expensive activities

– Propulsion systems

• Turbines

– First and second class quarters

• Required craftsmanship of highest level

– Communications

• Marconigram equipment

Estimated Budget

– Final cost a fixed price of £3 million for the pair was agreed at

the time of signing ($7.5 million dollars per ship)

Control costs

– Regular audits

– Budget tracked



Project Quality Management - Harland and Wolff

Premium world ship builder

– Best reputation for quality

– Perceived as craftsmen

Workforce operated within trades

– Trades based on system of guilds

Quality control through

inspections

– Internally, within trades

• Ship builder’s model used

– Externally through Board of Trade inspectors

• with several thousand visits

Quality Assurance

– Throughout and sea trials with final acceptance of deliverables



Project Human Resource Management - White Star

Sponsors

– Ismay representative

of Board of Directors

– Role to define vision

and requirements

Operations Team

– Captain and senior

officers

– Role to complete

testing, acceptance of

deliverables and sign

off

– Crew



Project Human Resource Management - Harland and Wolff

Design Team

– Lord Pirrie interface to White Star

– Thomas Andrews, managing director of

design dept (responsible every drawing)

– Edward Wilding, Andrews' deputy

(responsible for design calculations)


– Laying of ships lines in mould loft



Construction Workforce

– Total of 15,000 organized into system of

trades, simultaneously working on six

other liners, and two White Star tenders

(Nomadic and Traffic) use at Cherbourg

– 3,000 working on project any time ~ 49

hours per week, for 50 weeks

– Alexander Carlisle managing director

shipyard




Construction Workforce

– Hired men – little security

• 25 shillings per week

– Established men

• 24 shillings per week

– Elite - Shipwrights (boat builders) had 7 year

apprenticeship

– Trades (skilled) - Platers, rivetters, drillers, pattern

makers, fitters, founders, smiths, boilermakers, and

electricians

– Trade laborers



Project Human Resource Management - White Star

Operations Team

– Captain

• Paid £1250 pa, plus £200 pa non-collision bonus

– Senior officers

• Paid £100-500 pa

– Crew - role to run ship

• Stewards, bell boys, housekeepers, maids

• Paid £3 15, and relied on tips

• Engineers, firemen, stokers, coal porters

• Paid £5

• Slept in 40 to a dormitory

• Paid only when ship sailing



Project Communication Management

Communication

– Project based at Harland and

Wolff shipyards in Belfast

– White Star offices in

• London,

• Southampton,

• Liverpool (headquarters),

• New York

– Key decisions made with

sponsors

• Finalization of design



Project Communication Management identifies and manages Project Stakeholders – Executive Sponsor

1891- Bruce Ismay becomes partner in White Star.

1899 Ismay takes over on his fathers death.

1869-70- Harland & Wolff build first ships for White

Star.

1894- William J. Pirrie becomes chairman of Harland

& Wolff.

1902- White Star purchased by International

Mercantile Marine (IMM) headed by J.P. Morgan.

– IMM allows White Star to fly Union Jack, and man

ships with British crews.

1904- Bruce Ismay becomes president of IMM, with

complete control over operation.

– William J. Pirrie also becomes a director within IMM.

– Captain EJ Smith becomes Commodore of the fleet.

Page 33


Project Stakeholders, and the roles in the project

Project Sponsor - Bruce Ismay

– Experience in projects and operations, marketing

Project Integrator - Lord Pirie

– Experience in projects, expert in ship building and emerging

technologies

Project Financier/Chief Executive - JP Morgan

– Experience in financing projects (1902 - purchased White

Star Line)

Project Manager/Chief Architect - Thomas Andrews

– Experience in projects expert in integration of

emerging technologies

Chief of Operations - Captain EJ Smith

– Experience in operations, accepts the deliverables

Page 34


Project Risk Management

Plan covered risks

– In project

• Define inaccurate scope (includes functional and non-functional

requirements), financials (costs/return), schedule and resources

• Select wrong integrator to meet contractual obligations

• Poor communication in project team and externally

• Integration to a single point

• Use of unproven emerging technology

• Long construction project 6 years. Changes in business model,

technology, or events

• Inadequate sea trials and failure to test

• Not transferring track record between ships



Project Risk Management

Potential risks

– In operation

• Not meeting Government regulations

• White Star may accept delivery although it does not meet goals

• Operational readiness and preparedness of officers and crew

• Risk in the Atlantic, storms, traversing “Iceberg Alley”

• Certain months like April worst month for icebergs



Project Procurement Management - contract between White Star and Harland and Wolff

Contract for a project to deliver two Olympic Class Liners

Contract is delivery oriented

– Based on a cost-plus basis

• No matter how high project costs (specification changes or

increases in material costs), Harland & Wolff guaranteed 5% profit

on contract.

– Contains penalties and fees

– Standard practice in the industry



Project Procurement Management

Harland and Wolff

procured

– Large gantry

• Cost of £100,000

• Over 6,000 tons,

supported complicated

crane system to reach

every part of the ship

largest built in length,

height, capability.

– 200-ton floating crane

from Germany

• Cost of £30,000

• To lower ships’ massive

engines.



Harland & Wolff had to create a new dry dock to complete ships

Page 39


In comparison for an IT project today the project team can minimize risks with the following techniques:

Ensure business justification is completed.

Ensure project charter, stakeholders are in place.

Due diligence in business problem, competitive

services, potential costs, and risk.

Determine by segments customer/target audience, value

propositions, create profiles and scenarios for these.

Determine integration to existing services & data

dependencies.

Establish service level targets to guide architect.

Assess solutions driven by new emerging technology.

B EST

PRACTICES



In Titanic‟s architecture stage like in IT projects, Architects faced many investment options

Harland and Wolff most expensive

craftsmen in Europe.

Created luxury liner priority first-class

functional requirements (What).

Lavish attention implied equivalency

in non functional requirements (How).

Designers choice in safety technology

– Old

• lifeboats

– New

• bulkheads,

• double-skin hull,

• electric doors,

• automatic fog warning.

Thomas

Andrews



Meet certain Government regulations

Relative to ship crossing Atlantic (3200 miles)

Seaworthy

Machinery (within specifications)

Safety

– Protect all on board

Provisioning

– Food

– Water

– Fuel

Page 44


White Star invested in ship-builder‟s model (IT pilot). Used to analyze all exposures to the possibility of loss.

Flow analysis,

“static testing” to

review ship

characteristics,

test design, and

identify

vulnerabilities.

Sound strategy

with limited

testing options

available,

identified

problems.

Atlantic risks 400

years of travel.



The Architects were well aware of the risks in crossing the Atlantic. The model tested worst case failure scenarios.

Running aground

Collisions

Crumple zone

Front-end

collision60 feet

Side-on collision -

flooding contained

Double skin hull

60 feet

7 feet Hull bottom

Tank top

Waterline

Within hull 73 watertight

compartments

15 Bulkheads

Grounding - flooding

contained


•1910 White Star's

'Baltic' and the

'Standard' had been in

a head on collision the

result of an eastbound

ship cutting too far to

the north.


Examples of where the bulkhead design worked. The Guion Line "Arizona" hit iceberg going 15 knots in heavy fog 1879.

It telescoped 25 feet of her bow.

She had 7 transverse bulkheads up to the top deck.

The collision bulkhead held, letting them make Halifax.

Increased public perception that iron liners were unsinkable.

Increased industry traffic in general, and Arizona's ticket sales.

Page 47


Mitigating risks within the design of the ship

60 feet

48 main lifeboats

Waterline

Evacuation with lifeboats

– The British Board of Trade Rules antiquated regulations were based on cubic feet of lifeboat space per ton of ship not on the number of people aboard.

Page 48


Mitigating risks with visibility into the environment

Visibility through lookouts in crows nest

– Back up lookouts on the forepeak and bridge wings

– Phone systems, telegraphs

– Submarine bells

– Main steam whistles

Wireless Marconigram

– Ships sending/receiving telegrams from other ships 100s of miles away

Page 49


In the architecture stage the project team can minimize risks with the following techniques

Walkthrough the design, to catch problems early.

Walk along critical transaction paths end-to-end.

Complete “component impact analysis” - single failure points.

Build security zones for access.

Avoid under-investing in non-functional requirements.

Avoid one technology, lack of diversity increases susceptibility.

Avoid complexity, strive for simplicity, design for manageability,

operability, scalability, performance, security, and ease of use.

Check http://lessons-from-history.com/node/83

B EST

PRACTICES



Titanic‟s construction stage integrated many complex technologies and selected safety features to reduce risks

Disparate technologies integrated to single

point.

Finalized non-functional requirements.

Invest in expensive safety features (new

technology).

Over confidence in ship safety.

Perception Titanic was unsinkable.



Decisions with esthetic factors compromised individual safety features and escalated the level of risk

No construction dollars diverted from

safety to enhance first-class.

Lifeboats - 16 single vs 48 triple

stacked, uninterrupted 1st-class view.

The double skin not continued up, only

7 feet deep, below waterline.

15 Bulkheads/16 Compartments



Location of dining room - 15 Bulkheads (every 60 feet)two were compromised.

54 Titanic Lessons for Modern Projects www.lessons-from-history.com3/21/2011

1st Class Dining Saloon

and Reception Room

(200 ft)

Total ship length 900 ft

Deck D dining saloon

over 100 ft (10,488 sq

ft), seating 554

Waterline


By end of construction Titanic‟s safety compromised severely. But White Star believed it safest ship ever built.

Safety regulations for lifeboats, outdated technology.

Titanic sold at highest safety level, but really passenger safety low.

Expensive construction effort incorporated mistakes of earlier stages.



Publicity continued to push the message that Titanic was designed to be unsinkable

White Star Line publicity brochure produced in 1910 for Olympic and Titanic –

– “these two wonderful vessels are designed to be unsinkable.”

On June 1, 1911, the Irish News and Belfast Morning News contained a report on the launching of Titanic's hull.

– System of watertight compartments and electronic watertight doors and concluded that Titanic was practically unsinkable

In 1911, Shipbuilder magazine published an article on the White Star Line's sister ships Titanic and Olympic

– described the construction and concluded that “Titanic was practically unsinkable.”

Page 56


Ismay‟s had another message in his marketing effort – “largest, most luxurious, and SAFEST liners in the world.”

Page 57


In the construction stage the project team can minimize risks with the following techniques:

Identify building blocks (components vs prefab) and

solution alternatives (build versus buy).

Identify non-functional alternatives (safety features).

Build in cycles. Start small (prototypes), and scale up.

Tier solution, scale independently, and create redundancy.

Review Government regulations that may impact.

Ensure execs/sponsors involved through construction.

B EST

PRACTICES



Risks in operation - faith in Olympics track record (in service June 1911), and mitigating Titanic‟s risk - first incident

Maiden voyage on June 14, 1911,

onboard Bruce Ismay and Thomas

Andrews.

Olympic docked by 12 tugboats

June 21st Hallenbeck (198 tons) sucked

under Olympic resulting in badly

damaged sternframe.

Olympic unscathed except for some

scratches in the paint.

Blame shifted on tugboat operator

Page 43, Fig 4.2

Page 59


Risks in operation, Olympic‟s most serious incident, with HMS Hawke on 20th September 1911

Huge 45,000-tonner sucked smaller 7,350-

ton Hawke towards her with such power the

warship had no chance to steer away.

Two of her aft compartments

were flooded. She was down by

the stern.

Her starboard main engine was

out of commission.

Page 60


Olympic‟s most serious incident with HMS Hawke resulted in a 20‟ x 15‟ gash.

Harland & Wolff's repair yard took 2

weeks to patch Olympic up to even

attempt the voyage back to Belfast.

A gigantic patch, a big sticking

plaster, made of heavy timbers above

the waterline and steel plates below

it, was placed over the damaged hull

plating to seal up the hole.

By the time the ship made it back to

the Belfast yard the patch on her hull

had failed and two aft compartments

were once again flooded.



Once back at Belfast , with the water pumped out of her, she could be properly examined.

Repairs were costly (17% of original cost)

– Huge hour glass shaped hole in plating,

– Starboard propeller was damaged and

unserviceable,

– 18 feet of outer steel propeller shaft

covering was crushed,

– Propeller shaft was bent,

– Crankshaft of the starboard engine was

badly damaged,

– Stern propeller shaft bearings damaged.

Frames intended to last lifetime with no

provision for replacement.

Repairs take 4 weeks.


© 2011 Mark Kozak-Holland63 Titanic Lessons for Modern Projects www.lessons-from-history.com3/21/2011

October 1911 Titanic's maiden voyage is rescheduled from March 10 to April 10, 1912.

Page 44, Fig 4.3Page 44, Fig 4.3


Risks in operation, Olympic‟s third incident on 24th February 1912

Lost propeller-blade during eastbound crossing, return leg of roundtrip. Knocked-off by well-known wreck in the Grand Banks floating beneath surface.

Olympic sailed to Belfast for repairs and Titanic switched out of dry dock March 2nd

Olympic hauled out of dry dock, and turned 180 degrees where her port side bow was grounded. Put back in dry dock for examination.

Back in service March 7th

Page 64


Business pressures for Titanic to go live were enormous with large investments tied up in four-year construction.

Questioning of

extensive sea trials

and testing were

not considered

critical partly

because Olympic

was established in

service.

Change-

management

theory not

established.

Too much faith in

Olympic.

Page 65


Level of testing typically required by Harland and Wolff before a ship was passed over to White Star

Both organizations needed to be assured that Titanic would meet

the conditions in the contract.

Testing gave shipbuilder opportunity for adjustments and avoid

financial penalties or having ship sent back to the shipyards.

To fulfill contract terms of ship:

– operationally tested for seaworthiness,

– checked for stability,

– assessed for weight and loading particulars,

– check on earlier manual calculations,

– main and auxiliary machinery tested,

– Formal speed trials required achieving a certain speed under specific

conditions of draft and deadweight.

Page 66


Titanic‟s testing was very brief for a number of reasons . Page 48, Figure 5.1

Olympic was a test bed or yardstick for Titanic. Debatable how well Olympicexperiences were transferred.

Page 67


Titanic‟s testing (sea trials) was cut down to 1 day, started on April 2nd

One day of sea trials with focus on engine & speed, turning with rudder, and propellers.

Lowering of both anchors.

Fine tuning of radio equipment

No s-turns.

No incline

Page 68


Titanic‟s passes testing (sea trials) and gets a certificate

Board of Trade surveyor Carruthers issued the safety certificate and declared her “Good for one year.”

Titanic sails for Belfast

Page 69


In the planning stage the project team can minimize risks with the following techniques:

Review existing/previous projects with PMO for commonality.

Follow a change-management process, use risk assessments.

Plan level of testing, select right tests, and acceptance criteria.

Assign operations services ownership and control of process.

Define alternatives to launch (withdrawal), and back-out plans.

Create a test environment that mirrors live environment.

Prepare for increase in frequency of changes with the Internet.

Deploy in test environment, run parallel to live environment.

Ensure testing is broad not just on functions.

B EST

PRACTICES



Accepted by White Star on April. 2, 1912, Titanic raced from Belfast to Southampton

April 2nd at 8pm (same day as sea trials) rushed to make second tide into Southampton

– Chaotic 24 hours Officer Murdoch was quoted

• “took days to get acclimatized to the layout of the new ship.”

April 4th arrived at White Star dock berth #44 midnight.

April 6th general cargo and rest of crew are added.

April 8th fresh food arrives, final preparations over seen by Thomas Andrews.

April 10th Titanic departs on her maiden voyage at 12:00.

Page 71


Titanic‟s testing consisted of maiden voyage cross the Atlantic fully loaded with passengers.

Architect on board to

collect feedback

Hand picked 8 workers

to accompany him

Called Guarantee

Group to tend to any

teething problems

Only the best

employees would make

the grade and make the

voyage.

Page 72


Titanic‟s captain and officers were well aware of “Iceberg Alley” and the associated risks.

North Atlantic features, mild Winter,

April worst month Sailing path moved.

Fate of French liner Niagara.

Cunard liner Carmania felt her way

through ice dead slow for 2 hours.




French liner Niagara ran headlong into the ice on Thursday evening, April 11, 1912



J.P. Morgan Owned White Star

Richest man in world

His passage reinforced confidence in Titanic

Backed out last minute due to illness, as did

the general director of Harland & Wolff.

Page 75


Ismay‟s marketing effort was to create the “event” of 1912. If you were of importance you had to be on board

Page 76


Olympic‟s prestige

Between May 1911-April 1912 100 articles on Olympic, 30 articles on Titanic,

mentioned in connection to Olympic. Interest in Olympic largest ship in the

world and called „a floating palace,‟ and the new „Queen of the Seas.‟

Much comment about UK‟s need to maintain maritime supremacy, and

optimism about British shipbuilding.


Seen as ushering new

class of large ocean

liners

After maiden voyage

Olympic became popular

& successful

Described by Bruce

Ismay as „a marvel‟

Titanic seen as similar

but moderately improved

version of Olympic.

Page 77


Bruce Ismay compromised the project Service Level Agreements shipping announcement in NY Times.

Passengers “who‟s who” public life 300 very

famous people, 53 millionaires collective

worth $500m.



The business pressures and pressing economic needs pushed Titanic into service with limited testing completed.

On leaving port, Titanic (1) nearly collided with the steamer New York

(2) coming within four feet (3) indicating the challenges in operating a

very large ship.

The tug Vulcan (4) and quick thinking of Captain Smith prevented the

accident.


Page 79


“Suction of Giant Liner Breaks Hawsers of the New York, Which Floats Helpless” Source: The New York Times, 11 April 1912


Page 80


The wake off to starboard confirms Frank Brown's description of the 'winding pathway 'eor the waters'

An irregular course

was being taken in

order to test the

compasses.

Page 82


In Cork Ireland the British board of inspectors came on board taken out by tenders

Board of Trade

inspector Carruthers

visited Titanic almost

2,000 times during

construction.

Checked for adequate

– Provisions

– Water

– Fuel (coal)

Page 83


Only one lifeboat drill was performed to satisfy the British board of inspectors.

No time was spent in preparing the crew

for the maiden voyage.

The crew of 900 had 83 mariners.

The crew was unprepared to handle a

disaster and the launch of all lifeboats.

Page 84


In the testing stage the project team can minimize risks with the following techniques:

Undertake business and technical risk assessments.

Ensure independent test teams - incentives to test objectively.

Establish the ability to stop an implementation if testing fails.

Ensure that major testing, once under way, can be halted.

Ensure change process strategies for rapid implementation.

Avoid change process that lacks support and “teeth.”

Avoid giving developers rights to live environment.

Refine your service level objectives and agreements.

B EST

PRACTICES



Risks in operation – Ismays presence increases risk as he overshadows Captain Smith‟s leadership

Why was Ismay on board?

– Ensure ultimate customer experience.

– Beat Olympic’s best crossing time.

– Shipping announcement in NY Times.

Relationship boss to employee

Smith showed Niagara telegram to Ismay

Did Smith restrain himself?

Why was Smith so intimidated by Ismay?

Page 87


The operating stage required the deployment of the ship into production and her maiden voyage.

Titanic had a number

of built-in feedback

mechanisms that were

discounted, fudged

(ice bucket test), or

just ignored.

The officers kept their

binoculars and did not

share them with the

lookouts, limiting

operations to provide

any early warning.

Page 88


The third feedback mechanism was wireless, up to 400 miles range

Page 89


The operating stage saw Titanic‟s built-in feedback mechanisms compromised on her maiden voyage

Titanic‟s built-in feedback mechanisms

– Marconigrams Operators overloaded by commercial traffic (noise) did

not pass the ice warnings (signal) along in a timely fashion.

– In the 36 hours between leaving Southampton and the collision, the

Titanic's received and sent 250 passenger telegrams.

Page 90


Risks in operation - False sense of security general overconfidence in the ship

Capt. Smith not posted additional

lookouts on forecastle/bridge wings.

Conditions

– Air temperature 33 degrees F or 1 degree

C.

The captain very resistant to technology

relied on “gut” feel and experience.

He undermined the significance of

Marconigram information.



Bruce Ismay determined to prove Titanic superior to Olympic changed the SLO, dramatically increasing risks

Ismay overrode Smith

Pushed crew to limits.

Captain succumbed to pressure.

Operations mandate overriden.

Stringent guidelines broken.

Everything put in jeopardy.



At 7.50 PM the MV Mesaba of the Atlantic Transport Line sent the following telegram to the Titanic

" In lat 42N to 41.25N long 49W to long

50.30W saw much heavy pack ice and

great number of large icebergs also

field ice. Weather good, clear."

This telegram gave precise details of

the massive icefield already in the path

of the TITANIC.

Page 93


The two lookouts, without binoculars, hesitate on sounding the alarm.

No extra lookouts posted.

Very hazy atmospheric conditions common to

large sheets of ice.

The lookouts confused in what they see ahead.

At least 7 minutes pass between spotting and

reporting a “dark mass” and raising alarm.

Page 94


The collision was inevitable and Murdoch almost succeeded pulling off a brilliant maneuver.

Feedback systems compromised.

Ship reached peak speed 22 knots, 3 additional boilers lit.

Californian‟s last radio message ignored.

Lookouts gave 37 seconds warning.

Murdoch tried to dodge iceberg and decelerate ship “S turn.”

Ice Shelf

Iceberg



Close examination of inquiries shows officer and passenger testimonies differed greatly.

Sharp side-swipe against ice

spur causes 300 foot gash. Ship

bumps along the side to a stop.

Water pumps could not keep

pace with flooding.

Gradual deceleration and grinding

noise like a thousand marbles.

A “grounding” from the bottom of

the ship.

Officer Passenger

Page 96


The ship grounded itself on the ice shelf and consistent testimonies of the collision describe it as innocuous.

“I heard this thump, then I could feel the boat quiver and could feel a sort of rumbling..”

– Joseph Scarott Seaman

“... It was like a heavy vibration. It was not a violent shock.”

– Walter Brice Able Bodied Seaman

“…I felt as though a heavy wave had struck our ship. She quivered under it somewhat.”

– Major Arthur Peuchen First Class Passenger

“I was dreaming, and I woke up when I heard a slight crash. I paid no attention to it until the engines stop.”

– C E Henry Stengel First Class Passenger

“We were thrown from the bench on which we were sitting. The shock was accompanied by a grinding noise….”

– Edward Dorking Third Class Passenger

“It was like thunder, the roar of thunder…”

– George Beauchamp Fireman



Unperturbed the bridge sends two assessment groups to survey the ship for damage.

No sharp jolt of ship slamming immovable object.

No rebound effect.

Breakfast cutlery in dining rooms barely rattled.

No injuries or broken bones, no deaths.

Ship quivered for several seconds.



Passenger descriptions of QEII‟s grounding 1992 parallel Titanic‟s

QEII grounding (Cuttyhunk Island Vineyard

Sound, Ma)

– August 7, 1992 vessel sustained $13.2 million in

damages, and leaked 50 gallons of fuel oil from

empty fuel tank ruptured in incident.

Soft landing

– At the time of the accident, the ship was making

about 18 knots.

– Her bottom was ripped open by large boulders,

but there was no violent impact.

– Just as in Titanic, the passengers of QE2 were

not thrown about by the accident.

– The lesson - grounding of a large liner over a hard

object at speed produces only a relatively mild

impact.

Page 99


U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Tarawa 1951 CRASH STOP ("reverse engines") in Straits of Messena

Passenger ferry suddenly cut across

the warship's bow.

"All back emergency!“

The stern of the ship began jumping

up and down 6 feet.

The collision was avoided.

Next morning, dozens of crew were

sporting slings, casts and neck braces

from being flung to the deck.

So much china was broken ship put

into port to buy more.

In few weeks, ship drydocked to repair

damage propeller shaft.

displacement: 27,100 tons

length: 888 feet beam: 93 feet; width

flight deck: 147 feet

draft: 28 feet speed: 32.7 knots

complement: 3,448 crew



Titanic did not run into an iceberg; it ran over an iceberg.

An iceberg that has a length of 100 feet above the waterline can be

expected to be 120 to 130 feet wide under the water.

The sloping ice shelves that extend outward beneath the water

pose a significant threat to ships operating near icebergs.

Titanic's fragile underbelly scraped across an underwater shelf

called an "ice ram."

Icebergs are typically 20% to 30% longer under the water than

above


Page 101


Unperturbed at 11:42 the bridge sends two assessment groups to survey the ship for damage.

First group returns with inaccurate

report.

– Pumps where put into place to offset

minor flooding.

– Boxhall's visit to the Third Class berths

and scanty information about the extent

of damage and the ability of the pumps

to cope with the flooding.

Page 102


Bruce Ismay made fateful decision to prove Titanic could save herself.

At 11:50 Titanic had lost 3 holds.

Ismay and Smith assumed their ship

was safe to steam again at 11:51.

Ismay was not noted for his

patience.

Ismay‟s dilemma and options.

At 8 knots ship would arrive in

Halifax (450 miles away) on

Wednesday.

Page 103


Further evidence of restarting engines and the ship moving after the grounding.

First wireless to White Star office in NY.

– “TITANIC PROCEEDING TO HALIFAX. PASSENGERS WILL PROBABLY

LAND THERE WEDNESDAY; ALL SAFE. SMITH,” True at 11:53 pm.

White Star had dispatched trains to Halifax, but these were

cancelled well after the ship had foundered.

Wireless Radio Operator

Philips sent a message to

his parents 12 minutes

after the grounding

“Making slowly for

Halifax. Practically

unsinkable. Don‟t worry.”

Hitchens was kept at the

wheel for more than 40

minutes after the

accident.

Page 105


Second assessment group returns.

Second group returned

– (architect and carpenter).

At 12:00 Captain makes an

inspection.

Pumps not keeping up with

flooding.

Architect predicted 2 hours.

Engines stopped at 12:09.

Ship was hogging, and

tearing itself apart.

Page 107


In the operating stage the project team can minimize risks with the following techniques:

Ensure the business/operations refine SLAs,

and adhere these.

Structure support for holistic client view of

service, avoid technology silos, assign

operations sole responsibility.

Build problem-management processes around

recovery clock.

Base proactive problem-avoidance around early

warning system.

Synthesize/route timely feedback to decision-

makers.

B EST

PRACTICES



And take a comprehensive approach to organization, processes, and tools, a basis for continuous availability:

Monitor strategic components critical to availability.

After implementation monitor whole environment.

Investigate environmental anomalies quickly.

Identify meaningful metrics “User outage minutes” vs 99.999%.

Re-evaluate initial business case with returns and metrics.

Avoid claiming a project success too soon.

B EST

PRACTICES



Officers and crew operated in state of disbelief unable to perform effective recovery. Panic ensued amongst passengers.

Disaster assessment - 20 mins

65 mins before lifeboats ordered filled.

Hierarchical structure, physical segregation,

skeptical crew impeded information flow.

Passengers got up, went back to bed.

First life-boat left half full reluctance to get in.

Launching 16 lifeboats took over 90 minutes.

Recovery plan would have been poorly

executed.



Evacuation in lifeboats (#s) many of the early launched lifeboats were half empty

Boat

#

Time of

launch

Total

People

6 12:55 28

8 1:10 39

10 1:20 55

12 1:25 42

14 1:30 63

16 1:35 56

2 1:45 26*

4 1:55 40

D 2:05 44

B Floated off

Boat

#

Time of

launch

Total

People

7 12:45 27

5 12:55 41

3 1:00 50

1 1:10 12*

9 1:20 56

11 1:25 70

3 1:35 64

4 1:35 70

C 1:40 71

A Floated off

* Emergency boats with 40 person capacity

The last 2 Englehardts were floated off

upside down.



In the operating stage the project team can minimize risks with the following techniques:

Ensure disaster recovery enacted according to plan and

without hesitation.

Ensure disaster recovery plans accessible to organization.

Nominate 1 group guardian (ops) of disaster recovery plan.

Ensure staff adequately trained to follow disaster recovery

plans.

Practice and rehearse disaster recovery plans regularly.

B EST

PRACTICES



U.S. and British Titanic inquiries were set up in competition to each other

President got no response from Carpathia, sent navy

which failed to get further information

U.S. Inquiry set up when disaster numbers known

– Started one day after ship landed, Friday 19th April, 1912

British Wreck Commissioner‟s Inquiry

– Set up to start Monday, 22nd April, 1912

Competition between two which more thorough

http://www.titanicinquiry.org/


http://www.titanicinquiry.org/


Following disaster U.S. and British authorities conducted post-mortems. The U.S inquiry came close to uncovering cover up.

US inquiry 82 witnesses, specialists,

technical experts.

Determined ship reached top speed,

no attempt to slow down.

Forced Bruce Ismay to stay in U.S. &

grilled over role.

Recommended

British inquiry saved White Star from

bankruptcy.

European war looming.

Condemned Captain Lord for not

responding to flares.

Criticized British Board of Trade for

lifeboat regulations.

Titanic unnerved western society‟s

faith in technology.

Olympic, served 24 year career.

• Lifeboat space for

every person on all

ships from U.S.

ports;

• lifeboat drills;

• adequate manning

of boats;

• 24-hour operation

of radiotelegraph.



Fate of Olympic – went through a refit

Already in service for 10 months

difficult to modify

Provided with full compliment of

lifeboats

Dry-docked for installation of inner

watertight skin

Watertight bulkheads extended up to

"B" deck

Ready by the spring of 1913 & back in

service

Olympic, served distinguished 24

year career before being scraped.

Evaded torpedoes in WW1



Fate of Britannic – went through a refit, with substantial increase in lifeboats

Britannic, served as hospital ship

and sunk by mine in 1916

New giant sized lifeboat davits

capable of holding 3 lifeboats

Full compliment of lifeboats

Bulkheads top to bottom



Lessons learned - what can you take from all this. Your IT project is little different to Titanic‟s project.

Roots of Titanic‟s disaster in project, compromises to safety features and elevation of expectations allowed business pressures to override operational procedures.

• This lead to numerous violations of the “rules of good seamanship”. Probability of failure very high because of inability to recognize introduced risks.



Mitigate risk from the project outset through the application of best practices at each IT project stage

100s of best practices listed by project stage:

1. Project life cycle, deliverables and iteration

2. Business case for an online operation

3. Mission critical application dependencies

4. Architectural models and frameworks

5. Enterprise application integration and interdependency

of data

6. Organizational and process elements

7. Change and problem management

8. Use of metrics, service levels objectives and

agreements

9. Use of automation and Early Warning Systems

10. Disaster recovery & business continuity plans

Implementation of one best practice can save

thousands of pounds

Project Team

Executive Sponsor

Thomas

Andrews

Bruce

Ismay

B EST

PRACTICES



Questions

This presentation will be available on-line

Mark is available to work with you and your

organization (PMs and Executives), speak

or run workshops.

Sign up for a lessons-from-history newsletter (subscribe/unsubscribe).



What is Lessons From History?

Lessons From History is a publishing imprint for a series of

publications for today‟s business world.

This series of business publications is based on historical

case studies.

122 Overview of Lessons From History www.lessons-from-history.com


What does Lessons From History do?

The series uses relevant historical case studies

to examine how projects and emerging

technologies of the past solved complex

problems

The series then draws lessons for today‟s world

The series is designed to inspire people

The historical case studies are significant,

unique and inspirational

It makes the whole learning experience more

memorable.

The series should inspire the reader as these

historical projects were achieved with a lesser

technology.



What is Lessons From History based on?

In 1978 James Burke showed an alternative way to view

history

Connections was the weaving path through history to 8

of the most significant inventions

It describes a process

– Where ideas are developed but then put on the shelf.

– The time is not right or the technology required for further

evolution not available.

– At a future the ideas are picked up again and reused.

– This time it succeeds into a stupendous result.

Lessons From History uses a similar approach

– It connects today’s project with historical projects and best

practices that permeate across projects



How did Lessons From History originate?

In the aftermath of a major project disaster trying to convince a senior

executive in a bank to make the right decisions and investments

The use of a story set the project on the right path to success


“Whilst recovering a failed

Financial Services project I first

used the Titanic analogy to

explain to business executives

why the project had failed.

The project originally cost $2m

and took 1 year.

The project recovery cost $8m

and took 2 years.” 1994

The business executive was

flabbergasted that the project

had failed in operation.


Why was Lessons From History evolved?

The story became a powerful learning lesson

It resonated with people

Lessons From History provided a vehicle for

individuals to have discussions about the

intangibles of projects and business, things

difficult to classify and talk about

It made it safe way to talk about issues without

disclosing an organizational name or

individuals

People enjoyed the stories



Who is Lessons From History for?

Business organizations and people

– For example, profits, NPO, private, public

Universities and colleges

Professional Associations

– Project Management Institute

– Association of Project Management

– Professional Engineering Organization

– Certified Information Professionals

– British Computer Society PROMSG

– Data Architects Management Association

– International Institute of Business Analysts

– APICS

– CSCMP



The Lessons From History series is part of the Project Management course

Project Lessons from the Great

Escape is integrated into:

– ICT 4115 Project Management

Dynamics

– It has been used in 5 classes to date

– 2009 to 2011

– Over 80 students

Course Instructor

– Raymond Kaufman

– [email protected]


mailto:[email protected]


Ray Kaufman talks about how the Great Escape book helps students learn?

“The book is a quick read and the

movie paints a visual story. We

can identify with the characters

and understand their plight and

struggles. That frames the need

for project management. It

provides motivation to find out the

ending. While they are on that

journey they read examples of

problems and how they were

overcome using the project

management framework. They can

judge if they would make the same

mistakes or could fix the

problems.” RK



The team

Growing group of authors

All business people

– project managers and architects

All share common passion for history

Much collaboration



The Lessons-from-History series

Available at http://www.mmpubs.com/catalog/lessons-from-

history-c-4.html

Or call 1-866-721-1540

Please contact MMPUBS



Where is Lessons From History going?

LFH is developing into a series of books and presentations

that are the foundation to learning experiences

Future catalogue

Lessons in Project Leadership from the Manhattan Project

by John Byrne

Governance in Times of Challenge

by Glenn Le Clair and Mark Kozak-Holland

ITIL Case Study: The Launch of the Titanic

by Glenn Le Clair and Mark Kozak-Holland

Legendary Leaders: Project Management Case Studies

by Joe Luttrell and Mark Kozak-Holland



Quotes

Quotes on events

– "This was one of the most enjoyable professional events I've attended in a long time. It was

fascinating to learn that the problems involved in working with new technology haven't

changed much over the years."

– Brian Baskerville, OSQA Logistics

Quotes on books– If we could somehow get this type of writing about history into the public schools I think that

children would only learn facts about significant events, but would also retain it because all the wonderful examples. I really feel that I learned not only some history about the great escape, but also see the PMBok applications that were used. This is a great method of teaching and learning!!

– by Eric Peterson, January 17, 2009

Publisher is MMPUBS

– An ideal publisher with a very strong track record in project

management



Wrap up

“What Mark has done with The Great Escape is transform it

into a brilliant case study of how PMBoK can be applied to

almost every sort of venture,”

– said David Barrett, ProjectWorld organizer and executive

director of the Schulich Executive Education Center.

“This year he conducted a seven hour marathon workshop

that was not only an incredible dissection of history, but it

addressed the most pressing problems confronted in

business operations today. How to be innovative and

survive. How to draw maximum output from talented staff.

Managing impossible obstacles. The parallels are all there.”



Credits and Sources

1998 MERIT Project. Best Practices in Enterprise Management.

Bonsall, Thomas E. Great Shipwrecks of the 20th Century. New York: Gallery Books.

Bristow, Diana. Titanic: Sinking the Myths.

Brown, David. The Last Log of the Titanic. McGraw-Hill.

Davie, Michael. The Titanic: The Full Story of a Tragedy. The Bodleyhead Ltd.

Hyslop, Donald, Alastair Forsyth, and Sheila Jemima. Titanic Voices. New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1998.

Lord, Walter. A Night to Remember. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1955.

Lord, Walter. The Night Lives On. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1985.

Spignesi, Stephen. The Complete Titanic. Birch Lane Press Group, 1998.

Thompson, Harvey. Customer Value Management. McGraw-Hill, 2000.

Wade, Wyn Craig. The Titanic: End of a Dream. New York: Rawson, Wade, 1979.

Wels, Susan. Titanic: Legacy of the World‟s Greatest Ocean Liner. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 2000.

Illustrations were used courtesy of the Ulster Folk & Transport Museum


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