automatic emoction regulation during anger provocation

8/12/2019 Automatic Emoction Regulation During Anger Provocation

1/14

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 (2007) 698711

www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp

0022-1031/$ - see front matter 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.07.003

Automatic emotion regulation during anger provocation

Iris B. Mauss a,, Crystal L. Cook b, James J. Gross b

a Department of Psychology, University of Denver, 2155 South Race Street, Denver, CO 80208, USAb Jordan Hall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA

Received 16 December 2005; revised 27 July 2006Available online 20 September 2006

Abstract

Individuals frequently have to regulate their emotions, especially negative ones, to function successfully. However, deliberate emotionregulation can have signiWcant costs for the individual. Are there less costly ways to achieve emotion regulatory goals? In two studies, wetest the hypothesis that more automatic types of emotion regulation might provide the beneWts of deliberate emotion regulation withoutthe costs. Study 1 introduces a priming technique that manipulates automatic emotion regulation. Using this priming technique, we showthat relative to priming emotion expression, priming emotion control leads to less anger experience in response to a laboratory angerprovocation. Study 2 examines the experiential and physiological consequences of automatic emotion regulation. Results suggest that rel-ative to priming emotion expression, priming emotion control reduces negative emotion experience without maladaptive cardiovascularresponding. Together, these Wndings suggest that automatic emotion regulation may provide an eVective means of controlling powerfulnegative emotions.2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Emotion regulation; Control; Anger; Experience; Priming; Physiology; Automatic emotion regulation

Introduction

Emotional impulses, especially potentially destructiveones such as anger, regularly present us with the question ofhow we ought to respond to them. Should we openlyexpress them or attempt to control them? On the one hand,frequent expression of anger has costs for individuals well-being, social functioning, and physical health (Baumeister& Exline, 2000; Booth-Kewley & Friedman, 1987; Mayer &Salovey, 1995; Tavris, 1984), suggesting that it is important

to regulate negative emotions. On the other hand, emotionregulation often seems to come at a price for individualswell-being, social and cognitive functioning, and even phys-ical health (e.g., Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, &

Coifman, 2004; Gross & John, 2003; Muraven, Tice, &Baumeister, 1998; Polivy, 1998), suggesting that emotionregulation may not be a satisfactory solution either. Ideally,there would be a way for individuals to exert the emotioncontrol that they need without paying a price. Is that pos-sible?

One way to address this question is to re-examine howemotion regulation has been conceptualized in the past. Thusfar, interest in emotion regulation has centered principally ondeliberate, response-focused emotion regulation (e.g., Bon-

anno et al., 2004; Gross & Levenson, 1997; Muraven et al.,1998; Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993), whose costs mayarise from the conscious eVort involved in suppressing emo-tion-related responses. Less attention has been given to auto-matic (largely unconscious) regulatory processes such asthose involved in overlearned habits or culturally transmittednorms (e.g., Cohen, 1997; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004; Gollw-itzer, 1999). This is unfortunate, because such automatic reg-ulatory processes might operate with less cost to theindividual, as they are executed relatively eVortlessly, andmight thus provide a solution to the dilemma of how

This research was supported by Grant MH58147 to the last author.The authors thank Serena Borja, Jennifer Cheng, Tania Davila, RebeccaRay, Frank Wilhelm, Chien-Ying Yu, Robert Zajonc, and members of theStanford Psychophysiology Laboratory for their help with this research.

* Corresponding author.E-mail address:[email protected](I.B. Mauss).
mailto:%[email protected]:%[email protected]:%[email protected]


2/14

I.B. Mauss et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 (2007) 698711 699

negative emotional impulses can be managed. However, atpresent, only correlational evidence is available to supportthis hypothesis (Jackson et al., 2003; Mauss, Evers, Wilhelm,& Gross, 2006). In the present studies, we use an experimen-tal manipulation to test whether automatic emotion regula-tion is an eVective means of reducing anger.

Because the literatures on emotion regulation (e.g.,Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000; Gross, 1998; Thompson,1994) and on automaticity (e.g., Bargh, 1994) are bothfraught with conceptual complexities (e.g., Cole, Martin, &Dennis, 2004; Gross, 1998), it is essential to clarify ourterms at the outset. We use the term emotion regulationto refer to the modiWcation of any aspect of an emotionalresponse, including experience, physiology, and expressivebehavior (cf. Eisenberg & Spinrad, 2004; Goldsmith &Davidson, 2004; Gross, 1998; Gross & John, 2003). In thepresent context, our focus is on processes that reduce oneor more aspects of emotion. Automatic emotion regula-tion includes two types of processes: Wrst, implicitly (largelyunconsciously) represented ideas or goals that individualshave regarding emotion regulation, and, second, automatic(largely unconscious and eVortless) emotion regulationbehaviors that individuals engage in during emotionalsituations (cf. Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Bargh, Gollwitzer,Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Troetschel, 2001). It is likely thatemotion regulation goals prompt emotion regulationbehavior (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001; Shah & Kruglanski, 2003).However, because this cannot be presumed, we empiricallytest whether our priming manipulation is associated withobservable responses to an emotional situation.

To set the stage for our studies, we Wrst review the

repressive coping literature and the automaticity literaturewhich, as we will see, oVer contradictory perspectives on thelikely impact of automatic emotion regulation. This reviewsuggests a number of limitations in the existing researchthat make it diYcult to come to Wrm conclusions about theconsequences of automatic emotion regulation. These limi-tations motivate two studies, in which we experimentallymanipulate automatic emotion regulation using a primingtechnique, and then assess aVective responses during anexperimental anger provocation. Results from these studiesraise the intriguing possibility that automatic emotion con-trol relative to emotion expression leads to eVective reduc-

tion of feelings of anger but is not accompanied by theexperiential cost of negative emotion experience (e.g.,shame or sadness) or the cardiovascular cost of height-ened levels of maladaptive cardiovascular activation.

The repressive coping literature: Automatic emotion

regulation is costly

As formulated by Freud, defensive inhibition of negativeemotional experiences, or repression, is a form of automaticemotion control that is motivated by the individuals needto remain unaware of emotions that are intolerably painfulor incompatible with the ideal self (Freud, 1930/1961).

Freud took a negative view of this type of emotion regula-

tion, postulating that this defensive work would come atthe cost of expenditure of psychic energy.

More recently, repression has been examined empiri-cally, and quantitative measures of repressive tendencieshave been developed (e.g., Byrne, Golightly, & SheYeld,1965; Erdelyi, 2001; Paulhus, Fridhandler, & Hayes, 1997;

Weinberger, 1995). When tested in laboratory inductions ofnegative emotions such as stress or frustration, participantshigh in repression tend to report experiencing lesser nega-tive emotion, but exhibit impaired cognitive and socialskills, as well as greater physiological reactivity (e.g., Ase-ndorpf & Scherer, 1983; Brosschot & Janssen, 1998; Sch-wartz, 1995; Weinberger, 1995). Together, these studiessuggest that automatic emotion regulation is associatedwith lesser negative emotion experience, but that this reduc-tion in negative emotion comes at a cost.

The automaticity literature: Automatic emotion regulation is

cost-free

In contrast with the literature on repressive coping,recent research on automaticity suggests that automaticemotion regulation may operate at little cost. These studieshave shown that complex judgments, social behaviors, andeven the pursuit of higher-level goals (e.g., to cooperatewith another person in a competitive game) can be executedautomatically (e.g., Bargh et al., 2001; Bodenhausen, Mac-rae, & Hugenberg, 2003; Kihlstrom, 1987; Nosek, Green-wald, & Banaji, 2005).

Three features of automatic goal pursuit suggest that ifautomatic emotion regulation operates in a similar fashion to

automatic goal pursuit, one would expect it to be eVective forcontrolling feelings and behaviors, and to occur with little orno psychological and physiological cost. First, automaticgoal pursuit can occur without subjective awareness, andthereby may consume little or no attentional capacity or sub-jective eVort (Bargh et al., 2001; Chartrand & JeVeris, 2003;Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004; Koole & Jostmann, 2004). Sec-ond, automatic processes presumably are activated quicklyand operate eYciently (Bargh, 1994; Kihlstrom, 1987; Webb& Sheeran, 2003; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Automatic emo-tion control might thus be antecedent to the emotionalresponse, eVectively interrupting the development of an emo-

tional impulse before it unfolds and resulting in adaptiveexperiential and physiological responding (Gross, 1998).Third, automatic emotion control might avoid some of theside eVects of deliberate emotion control that result fromones conscious awareness of controlling ones emotions.Such side eVects of conscious emotion control might emergefrom individuals feeling inauthentic (not expressing feel-ings goes against North American notions of expressing one-self; Gross & John, 2003), or from ironic eVects of control(consciously focusing on the anger to down regulate it mightmake it more salient, leading to more anger; Wegner, 1994).By avoiding conscious awareness of emotion control, thus,automatic emotion control should presumably also avoid its

negative concomitants.


3/14

700 I.B. Mauss et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 (2007) 698711

Automatic emotion regulation: Costly or cost-free?

While the literature on repressive coping suggests thatautomatic emotion regulation should be costly, the literatureon automaticity predicts that automatic emotion regulationshould be cost-free. How can we explain these two literatures

opposite conclusions? One explanation is that both literaturescontain limitations that make it diYcult to come to anyWrmconclusions about automatic emotion regulation. Three suchlimitations of prior studies stand out. First, automatic emo-tion regulation mainly has been investigated in correlationaldesigns (e.g., Jackson et al., 2003; Koole & Jostmann, 2004;Mauss et al., 2006; Weinberger, 1995). This makes it diYcultto derive causal accounts about the eVects of automatic emo-tion regulation. Second, evidence from the correlational stud-ies is tentative, because it has been diYcult to validly andreliably measure individual diVerences in automatic emotioncontrol. Existing measures that tap automatic emotion regu-lation and related constructs (e.g., repression, defensiveness,or alexithymia) (1) often rely on explicit self-reports, whichmight be inappropriate to assess automatic processes (e.g., inthe case of alexithymia; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994), and(2) often have relatively low face validity (e.g., in the case ofrepression, a combination of high social desirability and lowself-reported trait anxiety; cf. Holmes, 1990). Third, few stud-ies have assessed the eVects of automatic emotion control inintense, ecologically valid emotional situations, while measur-ing key aVective responses (including experience, behavior,and physiological responding).

The present research

The limitations outlined above draw into sharp relief howlittle is known about automatic emotion regulation. In thepresent studies, we sought to address two key questions.First, can automatic emotion regulation be experimentallymanipulated? Second, what are the aVective consequences ofautomatic emotion regulation? In Study 1, we experimentallymanipulated automatic emotion regulation by priming emo-tion control versus emotion expression with an adaptation ofthe Sentence Unscrambling Task (Srull & Wyer, 1979). Afterthe priming task, anger was induced in the laboratory, andparticipants anger experience was measured to assess the

extent to which the primes inX

uenced anger experience. InStudy 2, we used a similar anger provocation to assess theeVects of priming emotion control versus emotion expressionon anger experience, more general negative emotion experi-ence, and cardiovascular responses. The goal of Study 2 wasto establish whether automatic emotion regulation wouldreduce anger experience without the cost of greater negativeemotion or maladaptive physiological responding.

Study 1: Assessing eVects of priming emotion regulation on

anger experience and behavior

An adaptation of the Sentence Unscrambling Task

(Srull & Wyer, 1979) was chosen to manipulate automatic

emotion regulation for two reasons. First, it implicitlyacti-vates (primes) concepts and goals, a feature important tothe conclusion that automatic rather than deliberate emo-tion control was manipulated. Second, this task seemed tobe a promising candidate for manipulating a quite abstractgoal such as emotion regulation, because versions of this

task have been used to prime other types of high-levelgoals (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Bargh et al.,2001). Careful debrieWng allowed us to conclude that par-ticipants were not aware of the nature of the primes, ensur-ing that the regulatory goals were really activatedimplicitly. Together, these features make the SentenceUnscrambling Task an ideal candidate for priming emotionregulatory goals.

An anger provocation was chosen as the emotional con-text in which to examine the eVects of automatic emotionregulation for two reasons. First, anger is an emotion thatfrequently arises in everyday life (e.g., Stearns & Stearns,1986). Second, anger is seen as a negative emotion thatmust, at times, be controlled (e.g., Ayduk, Mischel, & Dow-ney, 2002; Davidson, MacGregor, Stuhr, Dixon, &MacLean, 2000; Timmers, Fischer, & Manstead, 1998) andat times be expressed (Stearns & Stearns, 1986; Tiedens,2000). Anger thus seems to be an ideal context for studyingthe activation of emotion regulatory processes. To mini-mize confounds due to the inXuence of impression manage-ment, limited introspective insight, and memory biases (e.g.,Feldman Barrett, 1997), we chose a standardized labora-tory anger provocation rather than descriptions of anger-provoking events. Because anger-related emotionregulatory goals appear to apply with particular force to

women (anger expression is seen as more inappropriate forwomen than for men; Kring, 2000; Timmers et al., 1998),and to eliminate variance due to gender diVerences, onlyfemale participants were used. To assess the eVects of theprimes, anger experience was assessed via self-reports. Ourgoal was to test whether emotion regulation primes wouldaVect emotional responses to an anger provocation.

Method

Participants

Thirty-four female students (mean ageD 20.6, SDD5.6)

participated in this study. The ethnic composition of thesample was mixed: 2% African-American, 5% Asian-Amer-ican, 58% Caucasian-American, 18% Latino-American, and17% with multiple ethnic identities.

Priming stimuli

To manipulate automatic emotion regulation, weadapted the Sentence Unscrambling Task, in which partici-pants have to construct grammatical four-word sentencesfrom Wve-word jumbles. Embedded in 19 of the 42 sen-tences were either emotion control (e.g., restrains, sta-ble, covered) or emotion expression terms (e.g.,impulsively, volatile, and boiled) to prime partici-

pants. These words were arrived at by asking two groups of


4/14


undergraduate students (34% male, 66% female) to list the20 words that come to your mind when you think of theconcepts emotion control (ND90) or emotion expres-sion (ND105). From the resulting lists, words wereselected that could be arranged in sentences matched withrespect to the other words in each sentence (see AppendixAfor all words used in the priming tasks).

Procedure

Participants were recruited for a one-hour study onmood and cognitive performance. In the beginning of thelaboratory session, participants watched an emotionallyneutral Wlm for 5min, and then reported on their angerexperience (embedded in a set of distractor terms) using aLikert scale ranging from 0 (none at all) to 10 (extremely).The stem for these ratings was Please use the followingscale to indicate the amount of each feeling you were expe-riencing during the Wlm you just watched (for the baseline)and during the cognitive performance task you justcompleted (for the anger provocation).

Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the

Sentence Unscrambling Tasks described above. Seventeenparticipants were in each condition, and the experimenterwas blind as to which condition participants were in. Onaverage, participants in the emotion expression primegroup took 562s, SDD114, and participants in the emotioncontrol prime group took 501 seconds, SDD209,pD .31, tocomplete this task. After this priming task, participantsagain rated their anger experience.

Anger was then induced by having participants performa tedious task that was based on the d2 concentrationendurance test (Spreen & Strauss, 1991), requiring partici-pants to quickly count letters with minor diVerences on ablurry copy. The experimenter interrupted the participantmultiple times with scripted remarks on the participantsperformance and cooperation, delivered in an increasinglyimpatient tone of voice. Participants were told that theywere working too slowly and were eventually told to juststop with the task in an irritated tone that implied that thewhole session had not gone properly. Participants thencompleted another anger experience questionnaire. At thispoint, participants were informed that the experiment wasover.

A funneled debrieWng procedure was used to assess theextent to which participants were aware of the true natureof the linguistic task (the priming task) and the cogni-

tive performance task (the anger provocation). Of the 34

participants, none had any suspicion about the primingtask. In regards to the anger provocation, 16 (47.1%) didnot report any suspicion at all, 14 (41.2%) reported somesuspicion, and 4 (11.7%) reported strong suspicion. In sec-ondary analyses, we examined the eVects of participantsreported suspicion about the nature of the anger provoca-tion by (1) assessing the correlations between suspicion andanger experience, and (2) entering suspicion as a covariatein analyses. These analyses indicated that (1) anger experi-

ence was not signiWcantly associated with suspicion (rD .06,pD .76), and (2) signiWcance of results when controlling forsuspicion was comparable to primary analyses. Therefore,results presented are based on all participants. After thefunneled debrieWng questions, participants were thankedand fully debriefed.

Results and discussion

The following sections (a) show the eVectiveness of ouranger provocation, (b) establish that there were no diVer-ences between experimental groups before the anger induc-

tion, and (c) address our hypothesis regarding automaticemotion regulation.

EVectiveness of the anger provocation

To assess whether the anger provocation was success-ful in inducing anger relative to the neutral baseline andthe non-provocative priming task, an ANOVA with taskas a repeated measures factor (baseline, priming task,anger provocation) was conducted. This test revealed asigniWcant eVect of task, F(2, 31)D 53.88,p < .001, 2D .64.Pairwise t tests indicated the anger provocation led togreater experience of anger than the baseline and thepriming task, ps.43.1 There were no diVer-ences between priming task and baseline, pD .71, 2


5/14


Randomization check

As Table 1indicates, the two priming conditions did notdiVer after the baseline or the priming task with respect totheir anger experience,ps>.45.

EVects of priming emotion regulation

To test the hypothesis that the emotion control primewould lead to lesser increases in anger experience than theemotion expression prime, we conducted an ANCOVAwith priming condition as a group factor. To control forindividual diVerences in baseline anger experience, baselineanger experience was entered as a covariate. This testrevealed a signiWcant main eVect of priming condition, F(1,33)D5.38, pD .03, 2D .15, on self-reported anger experi-ence such that participants primed with emotion controlreported less anger experience than participants primedwith emotion expression (see Table 1).2

Study 2: Assessing the emotional cost of automatic emotion

regulation

Study 1 suggests that emotion regulatory goals can beimplicitly activated in a laboratory setting. Participantsprimed with emotion control reported less anger experienceafter the anger provocation than did those primed withemotion expression. Importantly, the goal to regulate emo-tions was not operative in an emotionally neutral situation(the priming task itself), but only in an emotional situation(the anger provocation). This is consistent with researchindicating that concepts, once activated, lead to corre-sponding behaviors and feelings only in applicable situa-

tions (e.g., Higgins, 1996).The goal of Study 2 was to address whether automatic

anger regulation would be associated with a cost. Twotypes of cost were considered: Wrst, negative emotions otherthan anger,3 and second, maladaptive physiologicalresponding. It is possible that automatic emotion regula-tion leads to lessened anger but greater negative emotionsuch as shame, sadness, or anxiety, as is suggested by psy-choanalytically based notion of anger turned inward(Freud, 1917/1984; cf. Johnston, Rogers, & Searight, 1991).Likewise, it is possible that automatic emotion regulationleads to maladaptive physiological responding, similar to

that associated with emotion suppression (e.g., Gross, 1998)and repression (e.g., Weinberger, 1995).In Study 2 we employed the same general design as

Study 1, again using a Sentence Unscrambling Task to

prime emotion control versus emotion expression in thecontext of an anger provocation. Three domains of aVectiveresponding were measured, including anger experience,negative emotion experience, and cardiovascular responses.Study 2 more broadly sampled emotion experience thanStudy 1, including sadness, anxiety, guilt, shame, worry,

fear, nervousness, as well as reverse-scored happiness, joy,pleasantness, and amusement. This broad measure ofglobal emotion experience allowed us to more broadlyindex potential eVects of automatic emotion regulation.Measures of cardiovascular responding broadly sampledindices of cardiovascular activation, allowing us to (1) max-imize chances of uncovering potential deleterious eVects ofautomatic emotion control, (2) diVerentiate not just activa-tion from deactivation (cf. Lacey, 1967) but more versusless adaptivepatternsof cardiovascular responding, includ-ing (more adaptive) challenge versus (less adaptive) threatpatterns (Mendes, Reis, Seery, & Blascovich, 2003;Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, & Leitten, 1993), as well as thedegree of parasympathetic withdrawal (Porges, 1995).

As in Study 1, we examined participants responses to ananger-provoking interaction. A diVerent anger provocationwas used to assess whether Wndings from Study 1 wouldgeneralize to a more interactive context. In this provoca-tion, participants counted backwards by 7 or 13s from alarge number. Participants were instructed to count outloud and were interrupted more frequently than in Study 1,allowing for more interactions between participant and theannoying experimenter. Unlike Study 1, all instructionswere pre-recorded (they allegedly came over the intercomfrom the experimenter in the next room), rendering the pro-

cedure more standardized across participants. In addition,Study 2 included two separate anger provocations: onebefore the priming task, which functioned as the neutral(unprimed) control condition, and one after the primingtask, which allowed assessing the eVects of the primes.

Hypotheses

Based on results from Study 1, we predicted that theemotion control prime, relative to the emotion expressionprime, would lead to lesser self-reported experience ofanger. Our goal was additionally to test competing predic-

tions as to whether automatic emotion control would becostly (repressive coping literature) or cost-free (automatic-ity literature) in terms of self-reported experience of nega-tive emotions and cardiovascular responding during theanger provocation.

Method

Participants

Participants were 114 female college students (meanageD20.8, SDD 3.2). The ethnic composition of the samplewas mixed: 52.2% Caucasian, 22.6% Asian-American,11.3% Hispanic, 3.5% African-American, and 0.9% Native

American, with 6.1% of participants coming from mixed

2 Preliminary analyses were conducted in which ethnicity was entered asan additional factor. Ethnicity did not interact with priming condition andthus was not considered further. The same results were obtained in Study2.

3 While Study 1 had not found eVects of emotion regulation primes onnegative emotion experience, it did not present an optimal test of this hy-pothesis, because it had relatively small sample sizes and did not samplenegative emotions very broadly. Negative emotion terms assessed in Study1 included sad, anxious, guilty, happy (reverse scored), joyful (reverse

scored), and pleased (reverse scored).


6/14


ethnic backgrounds, and 3.4% of participants electing notto declare their ethnicity. Three participants decreased (asopposed to increased or stayed at the same level) in angerexperience from the neutral baseline to the anger provoca-tion and were excluded from subsequent analyses. This left111 participants for analyses, 55 in the emotion control

condition and 56 in the emotion expression condition.4

Procedure

Participants were recruited for a one-hour study onmood and cognitive performance. Participants were greetedby a female research assistant, who attached a series ofphysiological sensors to the participant and then stated shewould send the experimenter in. While the participant waswaiting, an emotionally neutral, Wve-minute nature Wlm wasshown to induce relatively neutral mood across partici-pants and to establish baseline cardiovascular activation.Once the video was over, participants rated their currentemotional experience and the experimenter (a diVerent per-son from the research assistant) entered the room. Theexperimenter was brisk with all participants and made littleeye contact. She informed participants that theyd be par-ticipating in two cognitive tasks, one linguistic and onemathematic, and that the two would be communicatingthrough an intercom system.

At this point, the anger provocation began. Pre-recordedquestions and directions were played over the intercom tothe participant. Participants were asked to count back-wards quickly in increments from a large number (e.g.Count backwards in steps of 7 from 18,652). Betweeneach counting task, they were told that they were moving

too often, producing physiological artifacts and renderingthe data useless, and that they were not speaking loudlyenough. After three counting tasks (each lasting one min-ute), the experimenter informed the participant that theywould have to return to the task later. Then, participantsagain rated their emotion experience.

After the Wrst anger provocation, participants wereshown a second Wve-minute neutral Wlm to allow them toreturn to more neutral mood before receiving their secondcognitive task, the same Sentence Unscrambling Tasks asin Study 1. Assignment was done randomly, and the experi-menter was blind as to which condition participants were

in. Once participants wereW

nished, they again rated theiremotion experience. The experimenter then announced thatthey would continue with the other task to begin the sec-ond anger provocation. Participants then were brusquelyinstructed to continue the earlier counting task, which was

stopped after two one-minute long counting attempts.Again, participants rated their emotion experience.

Then, sensors were removed and the same funneleddebrieWng procedure as in Study 1 was used to assess theextent to which participants were aware of the true natureof the linguistic task (the priming task) and the cogni-

tive performance task (the anger provocation) (Bargh &Chartrand, 2000). Of the 111 participants, none had anysuspicion about the priming task. About the anger provo-cation, 83 (74.8%) did not report any suspicion, 26 (23.4%)reported some suspicion, and 2 (1.8%) reported strong sus-picion. After the funneled debrieWng, participants werethanked and debriefed.

To examine the eVects of participants reported suspi-cion, we (1) assessed the correlations between suspicion andemotion experience, and (2) entered suspicion as a covari-ate in analyses. These analyses indicated that (1) emotionexperience was not signiWcantly associated with suspicion(all rs were < .08, allps>.41), and (2) signiWcance of resultswhen controlling for suspicion was comparable to primaryanalyses. Therefore, results are based on all participants.

Measures

Emotion experience. Anger and other emotions wereassessed after the baseline, the Wrst anger provocation, thepriming task, and the second anger provocation with rat-ings on 11-point Likert scales, ranging from 0 (none at all)to 10 (extremely). Anger experience was measured usingone item. A global emotion experience composite wasformed using the terms sad, anxious, guilty, ashamed, wor-ried, afraid, nervous, happy (reverse scored), joyful (reverse

scored), amused (reverse scored), and pleased (reversescored) (Cronbachs D .83). To control for individualdiVerences in baseline emotion experience, all analyses wereperformed on change scores from the baseline.

Cardiovascular responding. Six measures of cardiovascularresponding were sampled at 400Hz using laboratory soft-ware. Measures were selected that would allow us tobroadly sample sympathetic and parasympathetic inXu-ences on various aspects of the cardiovascular responseknown to be relevant to anger responding (e.g., Herrald &Tomaka, 2002; Stemmler, 1997). These measures included:

heart rate (beats per minute), mean arterial blood pressure(MAP), total peripheral resistance (TPR), peripheral sym-pathetic responding (as indexed by a composite of Wngerpulse transit time, Wnger pulse amplitude, ear pulse transittime, and Wnger temperature), central sympatheticresponding (as indexed by pre-ejection period, PEP), andparasympathetic activation (as indexed by heart rate vari-ability). In addition, somatic activity was assessedthrough the use of a piezo-electric device attached to theparticipants chair, which generates an electrical signalproportional to the participants overall body movementin any direction. This measure of activity was then used tocontrol for the eVects of body movement on cardiovascu-

lar activation.

4 Technical problems led to faulty ECG measurements in six cases (threein each condition), to faulty blood pressure readings in ten cases (four inthe emotion control condition and six in the emotion expression condi-tion), to faulty ZCG readings in nine cases (six in the emotion control con-dition and three in the emotion expression condition), and to faultysomatic activity measurements in nine cases (four in the emotion control

condition and six in the emotion expression condition).


7/14


Heart rate (HR; beats/Min) was calculated from RRintervals in the electrocardiogram. Mean arterial blood pres-sure(MAP; mmHg) was obtained from the third Wnger ofthe non-dominant hand by means of the Finapres 2300(Ohmeda, Madison, WI) system. From this signal, beat-to-beat stroke volume was measured using Wesselings pulse-

contour analysis method (BEATFAST, TNO-BiomedicalInstrumentation, Amsterdam). Cardiac output(CO; l/Min)was calculated as stroke volumeheart rate. Total periphe-ral resistance(TPR) was calculated as (MAP80)/CO. Fin-

ger pulse amplitude(FPA; A-D units) was assessed using aplethysmograph transducer attached to the tip of the par-ticipants second Wnger. Finger pulse transit time (FPTT;msec) was indexed by the time (in ms) elapsed between theclosest previous R-wave from the ECG and the upstroke ofthe peripheral pulse at the Wnger. Ear pulse transit time(EPTT; ms) was determined similarly using a UFI plethys-mograph transducer attached to the participants left ear.Finger temperature(degrees Fahrenheit) was measured witha thermistor attached to the palmar surface of the tip of thefourth Wnger.

Peripheral sympathetic activation was assessed with acomposite used previously (Gross & Levenson, 1997) con-sisting of reversed and z-scored FPA, FPTT, EPTT, andWnger temperature (Cronbachs D .49 for the baseline, .58for the Wrst anger provocation, and .64 for the second angerprovocation). Central sympathetic activation, as indexed bypre-ejection period (PEP; with smaller values of pre-ejec-tion period indexing greater central sympathetic activa-tion), was derived from the ECG and the ZCG waves. TheZCG signal was obtained with an HIC-2000 Bio-Imped-

ance Cardiograph (Bio-Impedance Technology, Inc.) usinga set of four spot electrodes, applied at the front of the neckabove the collar bone, the nape of the neck, the xiphisternaljunction, and the lower back. A 4 mA AC 400 kHz currentwas sent through the two back sensors and transthoracicimpedance as well as the Wrst derivative of basal impedance(or the change of impedance over time), were obtainedfrom the two front sensors. Pre-ejection period is identiWedas the time (in ms) elapsed between the Q point on the ECGwave (the left ventricle contracting) and the B inXection onthe ZCG wave (the opening of the aortic valve). Parasym-

pathetic activation was indexed by heart rate variability

(ms

2

), a measure derived from the ln-transformed high-fre-quency (0.130.5 Hz) RRinterval power from the ECG.Customized analysis software (Wilhelm, Grossman, &

Roth, 1999) was used for physiological data reduction, arti-fact control, and computation of average physiologicalscores for each participant for the initial 5-min baseline,across the three 1-min counting tasks for the Wrst angerprovocation, for the priming task (average time for emo-tion expression primeD 510s, SDD171; average time foremotion control primeD534s, SDD235; pD .55), andacross the two 1-min counting tasks for the second angerprovocation. To control for individual diVerences in base-line activation, all analyses were performed on change

scores from the baseline.

Data analysis

The following data analytic strategy was used. (a) Weconducted omnibus ANOVAs for each DV, with primingcondition (emotion control versus emotion expression) as agroup factor and task (baseline, anger provocation 1, prim-ing task, anger provocation 2) as a repeated-measures fac-

tor. (b) To assess the eVectiveness of the angerprovocations, we followed up on main eVects of task byusing paired ttests. (c) To ascertain that randomization wassuccessful, groupwise t tests comparing the two primingconditions were performed. (d) To test our hypotheses, wefollowed up on priming condition by task interactions withANCOVAs for each DV, with priming condition (emotioncontrol versus emotion expression) as a group factor, task(anger provocation 1 versus anger provocation 2) as arepeated-measures factor, and baseline responding as thecovariate. Priming condition by task interactions in theseANCOVAs were followed up on with focused univariateANCOVAs.

Results and discussion

The following sections show (a) results of omnibusANOVAs, (b) tests for the eVectiveness of the anger provo-cation, (c) randomization checks, and (d) tests of ourhypotheses.

Results of the omnibus ANOVAs

For anger experience, the ANOVA revealed no signiW-cant eVect of priming condition,pD .91, a signiWcant eVectof task, F(3, 330)D 38.78,p


8/14


Randomization check

To ascertain that randomization was successful, group-wise t tests were used to compare the two priming condi-tions before the second anger provocation. As Tables 2 and3indicate, none of the eVects of priming condition were sig-niWcant (all ps>.09),6 indicating that there were no groupdiVerences in emotion experience or cardiovascularresponding before or during the priming manipulation.

EVects of priming emotion regulation

To examine whether priming led to diVerences in emo-tional responding, we followed up on the priming conditionby task interactions from the omnibus ANOVAs by usingANCOVAs with priming condition (emotion control ver-sus emotion expression) as the group factor, task (angerprovocation 1 versus 2) as a repeated-measures factor, andbaseline emotion experience as the covariate.

Emotion experience. For anger experience, this analysisrevealed a signiWcant interaction between priming condi-

tion and task, F(1, 109)D5.23,pD .02, 2D .05 (see Fig. 1a).To follow up on this interaction, we conducted tworepeated-measures ANCOVAs (comparing anger provoca-tion 1 with anger provocation 2 for both priming condi-tions separately, using baseline anger experience as thecovariate) and one one-way ANCOVA (comparing theemotion control to the emotion expression priming condi-tion during anger provocation 2, using baseline anger expe-rience as the covariate). These tests revealed that there wasa signiWcant decrease in anger experience from anger prov-ocation 1 to anger provocation 2 in the emotion controlcondition, pD .05. There was no signiWcant increase inanger experience from anger provocation 1 to anger provo-cation 2 in the emotion expression condition, pD .16. Indi-viduals primed with emotion control reported lesser angerexperience during anger provocation 2 than those primedwith emotion expression,pD .04.

For global emotion experience, the ANCOVA alsorevealed a signiWcant interaction between priming condi-tion and task, F(1, 109)D4.25,pD .04, 2D .04 (see Fig. 1b).To follow up on this interaction, we used the same tests asfor anger experience. These tests revealed that there was asigniWcant decrease in global negative emotion experience

from anger provocation 1 to anger provocation 2 in the

6 The marginal eVect was in found for MAP for the Wrst anger provoca-

tion. All otherps are >.16.

a eMean emotion experience (SEM) for baseline, Wrst anger provocation, priming task, and second anger provocation by priming condition (emotion controlversus emotion expression; Study 2)

Note. abcdeWithin each measure, cells that do no share a superscript are signiWcantly diVerent from each other atp < .05, nsD 55, 56.

Measure Priming condition Task

Baseline Anger provocation 1 Priming task Anger provocation 2

Anger (010) Emotion control 0.57 (0.16)a 2.18 (0.37)b 0.84 (0.23)a 1.66 (0.36)c

Emotion expression 0.40 (1.15)a

1.93 (0.34)b

0.58 (0.22)a

2.29 (0.34)b

Negative emotion (010) Emotion control 2.80 (0.15)a 4.68 (0.22)b 3.02 (0.16)a,c 3.96 (0.20)d

Emotion expression 2.89 (0.14)a 4.58 (0.22)b,e 3.18 (0.15)c 4.40 (0.19)d,e

a eMean cardiovascular responses (SEM) for baseline, Wrst anger provocation, priming task, and second anger provocation by priming condition (emotioncontrol versus emotion expression; Study 2)

Note. abcdWithin each measure, cells that do no share a superscript are signiWcantly diVerent from each other atp


9/14


emotion control condition, p < .001. There were no diVer-ences between anger provocation 1 and anger provocation2 for the emotion expression condition, and the ANCOVAcomparing the two priming conditions during anger provo-cation 2 was not signiWcant,ps>.12.

Cardiovascular responding. Despite the fact that interactionsbetween priming condition and task were not signiWcant, weused the same more focused ANCOVAs to minimize type IIerror. These analyses again revealed no interactions betweenpriming condition and task (all ps>.43, all 2s


10/14


11/14


First, it will be important to assess the extent to whichautomatic emotion control has comparable eVects inother contexts. The words used in the Sentence Unscram-bling Task were not speciWc to anger, suggesting that thecurrent results might generalize to other emotional con-texts. Automatic emotion control may even share operat-

ing principles with other forms of self-regulation. Justlike anger, mental processes such as attention, and unde-sirable behaviors such as binge eating, are subject to theproblem of how they can be controlled without the oftenironic and deleterious eVects of attempted deliberate con-trol (e.g., Polivy, 1998; Wegner, 1994). The currentresearch dovetails with other research showing that auto-matic self-control might be a very eVective means ofreaching desired mental processes and behaviors (e.g.,Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000, 2003; Fitzsimons & Bargh,2004; Gollwitzer, 1999). However, this hypothesis needsto be formally assessed in future studies.

Second, it will be important to examine diVerences in theeVects of diVerent types of anger regulation as a function ofparticipants age, gender, and culture (e.g., Cohen et al.,1996; Evers, Fischer, Rodriguez Mosquera, & Manstead,2005; Seeley & Gardner, 2003). While ethnic backgrounddid not moderate the current results, small sample sizes didnot allow for formal tests of this Wnding. Thus, it will beimportant to systematically assess diverse samples of bothgenders in future studies.

Third, although we have argued that lower levels ofanger experience are adaptive in the present laboratorycontexts, future studies will be needed to directly speak tothe adaptiveness of automatic emotion regulation in vari-

ous types of anger-provoking situations. Awareness andexpression of anger, at least to a certain degree, are seenby some researchers as important to psychological health(e.g., Davey, Day, & Howells, 2005; Polivy, 1998; RoV-man, 2004), as motivators to achieve social change (e.g.,Campos, Frankel, & Camras, 2004; Tiedens, 2000), or asevolutionarily adaptive (e.g., Darwin, 1872/1965; Pank-sepp, 1994). Might the low anger levels associated withautomatic emotion control thus be a disadvantage ratherthan an advantage in some situations? It is important toemphasize that participants who automatically controlledtheir anger did not completely deny feelings of anger

even they reported some measure of anger during theprovocation. Furthermore, they did not report increasednegative emotionone of the predictions made by propo-nents of the expression is healthy argument. Together,these Wndings are consistent with the interpretation thatthe level of anger control achieved by automatic emotioncontrol is quite adaptive. However, future studies that sys-tematically manipulate the situational context are neededto test this conclusion, as are longitudinal studiesdesigned to understand the longer-term eVects of auto-matic emotion control for well-being, social functioning,and health.

Fourth, the present study did not provide a neutral (no

regulation) condition, which makes it diYcult to tell

whether the emotion control condition led to decreasedemotion, or whether only the emotion expression conditionled to increased emotion (or delayed habituation) while theemotion control condition was inactive. However, thefact that participants primed with emotion control exhib-ited a signiWcant decrease in anger experience while those

primed with emotion experience did not exhibit a signiW-cant increasefrom the Wrst to the second anger provocationsuggests that indeed the emotion control group wasactive in reducing anger experience. However, futurestudies that include a neutral condition will be able to moredirectly address this question.

Fifth, given how little is known about automatic emo-tion regulation processes, it will be important to assessadditional outcome measures (e.g., startle magnitude; facialEMG; brain activation; social functioning). Such measureswill allow a more conclusive assessment of which aspects ofan emotion are altered by automatic control (e.g., only self-reported versus experienced emotion). Further, such mea-sures will permit a clearer understanding of the mechanismsunderlying the present eVects. While existing research onautomaticity suggests some mechanisms such as the activa-tion of implicit goals, attitudes, and knowledge structures(e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Banaji, Blair, & Glaser,1997; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004; Gollwitzer, 1999; Shah &Kruglanski, 2003), more research is needed to clarify howsome people seem to be capablewithout consciouseVortof remaining calm, cool, and collected in a power-fully negative situation.

Concluding comment

Much hinges on individuals ability to regulate nega-tive emotions, especially potentially destructive onessuch as anger. Indeed, the control of anger is importantin many domains of functioning, including well-being,psychosocial functioning, and physical health. However,eVective anger control is diYcult to achieve, and seems tobe often associated with negative outcomes for the indi-vidual. The present results suggest that more auto-maticeVortless and largely unconscioustypes ofemotion regulation might present an eVective answer tothis problem. In intensely emotional situations, auto-

matic emotion regulation was associated with less feel-ings of anger, without the cost of greater negativeemotion or maladaptive cardiovascular activation.Extrapolating from these Wndings, it seems possible thatautomatic emotion control such as that engendered byhabitual responses might lead to greater well-being, bet-ter social functioning, and better physical health. If so, itmay help address the question as to how best to regulatepowerful negative emotions such as anger.

Appendix A

Words used in the Sentence Unscrambling Task (tar-

get words were not highlighted in participants forms)


12/14


References

Aarts, H., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2000). Habits as knowledge structures: auto-maticity in goal-directed behavior. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 78, 5363.

Aarts, H., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2003). The silence of the library: environ-ment, situational norm, and social behavior.Journal of Personality and

Social Psychology, 84, 1828.Asendorpf, J. B., & Scherer, K. R. (1983). The discrepant repressor: diVer-entiation between low anxiety, high anxiety, and repression of anxietyby autonomic-facial-verbal patterns of behavior.Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 45, 13341346.

Ayduk, ., Mischel, W., & Downey, G. (2002). Attentional mechanismslinking rejection to hostile reactivity: the role of hot versus coolfocus.Psychological Science, 13, 443448.

Bagby, R. M., Parker, J. D. A., & Taylor, G. J. (1994). The twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale: I. Item selection and cross-vali-dation of the factor structure.Journal of Psychosomatic Re search,38, 2332.

Banaji, M. R., Blair, I. V., & Glaser, J. (1997). Environments and uncon-scious processes. In R. S. Wyer (Ed.), The automaticity of everyday life:Advances in social cognition (Vol. 10, pp. 6374). Mahwah, NJ: Law-

rence Erlbaum Associates.

Bargh, J. A. (1994). The four horsemen of automaticity: awareness, inten-tion, eYciency, and control in social cognition. In R. S. Wyer & T. K.Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition(2nd ed., pp. 140). Hillsdale,NJ: Englandiates.

Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. (2000). The mind in the middle: a practicalguide to priming and automaticity research. In H. T. Reis & C. M. Judd(Eds.), Handbook of research methods in social and personality psychol-ogy(pp. 253285). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of socialbehavior: direct eVects of trait construct and stereotype activation onaction.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 230244.

Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M., Lee-Chai, A., Barndollar, K., & Troetschel,R. (2001). The automated will: nonconscious activation and pursuit ofbehavioral goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81,10141027.

Baumeister, R. F., & Exline, J. J. (2000). Self-control, morality, and humanstrength.Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 19, 2942.

Bodenhausen, G. V., Macrae, C. N., & Hugenberg, K. (2003). Social cogni-tion. In T. Millon & M. J. Lerner (Eds.), Handbook of psychology: Per-sonality and social psychology(pp. 257282). New York: Wiley.

Bonanno, G. A., Papa, A., Lalande, K., Westphal, M., & Coifman, K.(2004). The importance of being Xexible: the ability to both enhanceand suppress emotional expression predicts long-term adjustment.Psy-

chological Science, 15, 482487.

Emotion control condition Emotion expression condition

cool weather whenever was the hot weather whenever was the

drinking restrains she wine from she drinks from wine impulsively

picture herself framed she the picture herself framed she the

he none occasionally people watches he none occasionally people watches

saw over train he the saw over train he the

location limited there is access location unlimited there is access

prices she the compared none prices she the compared nonelife water plan one should life water savor one should

stable was although the stockmarket volatile was although the stockmarket

pot was although covered t he pot over although b oiled the

rode she bike her although rode she bike her although

locked brakes weather were the released brakes weather were the

money ago he the withheld money ago he the spent

pear he a picked were pear he a picked were

zoo animals confined throughout are zoo animals liberated throughout were

skied repeated alone downhill he skied repeated alone downhill he

ball the throw toss once ball the throw toss once

his opinion kind hides he action none she into burst

flowers had several once arrived flowers had several once arrived

today car think clearly I today car feel queasy I

send I mailed it over send I mailed it over

walk for go path a walk for go path a

what door closed is the what door open is thediscussion discipl ined far was the discussion animated far was the

used commonly it pantry is used commonly it pantry is

new was sudden movie the new was sudden movie the

file concealed fact was the file revealed fact was the

went the down when sun went the down when sun

somewhat prepared I was retired somewhat prepared I was retired

energy diet sugar restricts the energy diet sugar discharges the

the push wash frequently clothes the push wash frequently clothes

stifled the owner dog was unleashed the owner dog was

watch gone she a found watch gone she a found

the were beans none bottled the were beans none boiled

fleas ago cat had the fleas ago cat had the

better home were you go better home were you go

the street blocked was also the street exploded had also

haircut she over a got haircut she over a gotday all sat we grown day all sat we grown

curtain orange how was the curtain orange how was the

picture took she a close-up picture took she a close-up

file the contains bottle fluid file the spilled was fluid


13/14


Booth-Kewley, S., & Friedman, H. S. (1987). Psychological predictors ofheart disease: a quantitative review. Psychological Bulletin, 101, 343362.

Bosch, J. A., de Geus, E. J. C., & Veerman, E. C. I. (2003). Innate secretoryimmunity in response to laboratory stressors that evoke distinct pat-terns of cardiac autonomic activity.Psychosomatic Medicine, 65, 245258.

Byrne, D., Golightly, C., & SheYeld, J. (1965). The repression-sensitizationscale as a measure of adjustment: relationship with the CPI.Journal ofConsulting Psychology, 29, 586589.

Brosschot, J. F., & Janssen, E. (1998). Continuous monitoring of aVective-autonomic response dissociation in repressors during negative emo-tional stimulation.Personality and Individual DiVerences, 25, 6984.

Campos, J. J., Frankel, C. B., & Camras, L. (2004). On the nature of emo-tion regulation.Child Development, 75, 377394.

Chartrand, T. L., & JeVeris, V. E. (2003). Consequences of automatic goalpursuit and the case of nonconscious mimicry. In J. P. Forgas, K. D.Williams, & W. Von Hippel (Eds.), Social judgments: Implicit andexplicit processes (pp. 290305). New York: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Chemtob, C. M., Novaco, R. W., Hamada, R. S., Gross, D. M., & Smith, G.(1997). Anger regulation deWcits in combat-related posttraumatic stress

disorder.Journal of Traumatic Stress, 10

, 1736.Cohen, D. (1997). Ifs and thens in cultural psychology. In R. S. Wyer Jr.(Ed.), Automaticity of everyday life advances in social cognition(Vol. 10,pp. 121131). Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Pub-lishers.

Cohen, D., Nisbett, R. E., Richard, E., & Bowdle, B. F. (1996). Insult,aggression, and the southern culture of honor: an experimental eth-nography.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 945960.

Cole, P. M., Martin, S. E., & Dennis, T. A. (2004). Emotion regulation as ascientiWc construct: methodological challenges and directions for childdevelopment research.Child Development, 75, 317333.

DAndrade, R. (1984). Cultural meaning systems. In R. A. Shweder & R.A. LeVine (Eds.), Culture theory. Essays on mind, self, and emotion(pp.88119). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Darwin, C. (1872/1965). The expression of the emotions in man and animals .

Chicago: University of Chicago Original work published 1872.Davey, L., Day, A., & Howells, K. (2005). Anger, over-control and seriousviolent oVending.Aggression and Violent Behavior, 10, 624635.

Davidson, K., MacGregor, M. W., Stuhr, J., Dixon, K., & MacLean, D.(2000). Constructive anger verbal behavior predicts blood pressure in apopulation-based sample.Health Psychology, 19, 5564.

Davidson, R. J., Jackson, D. C., & Kalin, N. H. (2000). Emotion, plasticity,context, and regulation: Perspectives from aVective neuroscience.Psy-chological Bulletin, 126, 890909.

DeVenbacher, J. L., & McKay, M. (2000). Overcoming situational anger andgeneral anger: A protocol for the treatment of anger based on relaxation,

cognitive restructuring and coping skills training. Oakland, CA: NewHarbinger.

Demaree, H. A., Schmeichel, B. J., Robinson, J. L., & Berntson, G. G.(2006). Up- and down-regulating facial disgust: aVective, vagal, sympa-

thetic, and respiratory consequences.Biological Psychology, 71, 9099.Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: their automatic and con-trolled components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56,518.

Eisenberg, N., & Spinrad, T. L. (2004). Emotion-related regulation: sharp-ening the deWnition.Child Development, 75, 334339.

Erdelyi, M. H. (2001). Defense processes can be conscious or unconscious.American Psychologist, 56, 761762.

Evers, C., Fischer, A. H., Rodriguez Mosquera, P. M., & Manstead, A. S.R. (2005). Anger and social appraisal: A spicy sex diVerence?Emo-tion, 5, 258266.

Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cognitionresearch: their meaning and uses. Annual Review of Psychology, 54,297327.

Fein, M. L. (1993). I.A.M.: A common sense guide to coping with anger .

Westport, CT, US: Praeger Publishers/Greenwood Publishing Group.

Feldman Barrett, L. (1997). The relationships among momentary emotionexperiences, personality descriptions, and retrospective ratings of emo-tion.Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23 , 11001110.

Fitzsimons, G. M., & Bargh, J. A. (2004). Automatic self-regulation. In R.F. Baumeister & K. D. Vohs (Eds.), Handbook of self-regulation:research, theory, and applications (pp. 151170). New York: GuilfordPress.

Freud, S. (1917/1984). Mourning and melancholia. In The pelican freudlibrary, 11, on metapsychology: The theory of psychoanalysis(pp. 245268). London: Penguin.

Freud, S. (1930/1961). Civilization and its discontents. In J. Strachey (Ed.and Trans.), The standard edition of the complete psychological works ofSigmund Freud(Vol. 31). New York: Norton.

Gerzina, M. A., & Drummond, P. D. (2000). A multimodal cognitive-behavioural approach to anger reduction in an occupational sample.Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 73, 181194.

Goldsmith, H. H., & Davidson, R. J. (2004). Disambiguating the compo-nents of emotion regulation.Child Development, 75, 361365.

Gollwitzer, P. M. (1999). Implementation intentions: Strong eVects of sim-ple plans.American Psychologist, 54, 493503.

Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: atti-tudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes.Psychological Review, 102, 427.

Gross, J. J. (1998). Antecedent- and response-focused emotion regulation:Divergent consequences for experience, expression, and physiology.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 224237.

Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual diVerences in two emotion reg-ulation processes: implications for aVect, relationships, and well-being.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 348362.

Gross, J. J., & Levenson, R. W. (1997). Hiding feelings: the acute eVects ofinhibiting positive and negative emotions. Journal of Abnormal Psy-chology, 106, 95103.

Herrald, M. M., & Tomaka, J. (2002). Patterns of emotion-speciWcappraisal, coping, and cardiovascular reactivity during an ongoingemotional episode. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83,434450.

Higgins, E. T. (1996). Knowledge activation: accessibility, applicability,and salience. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psy-

chology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 133168). New York, NY,US: Guilford Press.Holmes, D. S. (1990). The evidence for repression: an examination of sixty

years of research. In J. L. Singer (Ed.), Repression and dissociation:implications for personality theory, psychopathology, and health(pp. 85102). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Howells, K. (2004). Anger and its links to violent oVending. Psychiatry,Psychology, and Law, 11, 189196.

Jackson, D. C., Mueller, C. J., Dolski, I., Dalton, K. M., Nitschke, J. B.,Urry, H. L., et al. (2003). Now you feel it, now you dont: frontal brainelectrical asymmetry and individual diVerences in emotion regulation.Psychological Science, 14, 612617.

Johnston, V. L., Rogers, B. J., & Searight, H. R. (1991). The relationshipbetween overt hostility, covert hostility, and depression. Journal ofSocial Behavior and Personality, 6, 8592.

Kihlstrom, J. F. (1987). The cognitive unconscious. Science, 237, 14451455.Kitayama, S., Karasawa, M., & Mesquita, B. (2004). Collective and per-

sonal processes in regulating emotions: emotion and self in Japan andthe United States. In P. Philippot & R. S. Feldman (Eds.), The regula-tion of emotion (pp. 251273). Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence ErlbaumAssociates.

Koole, S. L., & Jostmann, N. B. (2004). Getting a grip on your feelings:eVects of action orientation and external demands on intuitiveaVect regulation.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87,974990.

Kring, A. M. (2000). Gender and anger. In A. H. Fischer (Ed.), Gender andemotion: Social psychological perspectives (pp. 211231). New York,NY, US: Cambridge University Press.

Lacey, J. I. (1967). Somatic response patterning and stress: some revisions

of activation theory. In M. H. Appley & R. Trumbull (Eds.), Psycholog-


14/14

automatic emoction regulation during anger provocation

Documents