audience and message: assessing terrorist wmd potential

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Audience and Message: Assessing Terrorist WMDPotentialD. Gressang IVPublished online: 08 Sep 2010.

To cite this article: D. Gressang IV (2001) Audience and Message: Assessing Terrorist WMD Potential, Terrorism and PoliticalViolence, 13:3, 83-106, DOI: 10.1080/09546550109609691

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Audience and Message:Assessing Terrorist WMD Potential

DANIEL S. GRESSANG IV

One of the more debated aspects of the study of terrorism over the last fewyears has been the likelihood of terrorists using weapons of massdestruction (WMD).1 The immediacy of the question has been broughthome by a rash of terrorist spectaculars, pushing as never before thepossibility of WMD use by non-state actors into the spotlight. The February1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City forcedAmericans to realize committed adversaries could strike in the UnitedStates as easily as they could abroad. Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin gas attack onthe Tokyo subway in March 1995 represnted the first large-scale use ofmass-casualty weapons by a non-state actor for the express purpose ofcausing large numbers of deaths and injuries. Only weeks later, the bombingof the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City underscored forAmericans the potential for large-scale attacks by domestic groups orindividuals. The attacks on Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and on theUnited States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania likewise demonstrated thesophistication, coordination and dedication expected of today’s terrorists.

These attacks make the question of potential WMD use by terrorists animportant and timely one, especially when considered in light of theexplosion in information availability and growing concerns overproliferation and material control issues. The possible level of physicaldestruction, injury and loss of life from these weapons is so great in and ofitself that the potential for terrorist acquisition and use warrants seriousconsideration. Jessica Stern, Walter Laqueur, and others have presentedchilling scenarios for terrorist WMD use,2 directing our attention to theunparalleled devastation which could result. Such ‘what if’ visions providea valuable service in directing inquiry both to the critical necessity ofeffective prevention and deterrence and to the attendant consequencesshould those efforts fail.

By the same token, the specter of WMD use, or the credible threat ofuse, conjures deeply held fears and insecurities. With the exception of

Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.13, No.3 (Autumn 2001), pp.83–106PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy orposition of the Department of Defense or the US Government

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Tokyo, the application of chemical, biological or radiological weapons hasbeen generally limited to either state actions or to relatively isolated andlimited applications against specific individuals, or select groups, or withinlimited locales.3 Offensive nuclear weapons use, similarly, has been limitedto state application for over 50 years. The limited use of these weaponssuggests there is a widely shared reluctance to use them, so much so thatserious large-scale application against a general population is seen asbeyond the pale of tolerable behavior. A decision to use these weaponsmight then indicate the existence of an actor with little or no regard for thelarger social structure such that the range of potential acts they might initiatewould truly be unpredictable.

Adding to these perceptions are the present realities of access andproliferation concerns. The breakup of the Soviet Union, particularly inlight of press reports of alarming degradation of security associated withWMD stocks, raises concern over terrorist access to either completeweapons or component materials. Persistent media reporting of proliferationconcerns, echoed by the intelligence community,4 heightens emphasis on thepossibility of easier acquisition by terrorists. We seem to see relatively laxsecurity, greater availability of arms and component materials, and arelaxation of effective state control over those materials and weapons andwe wonder how hard it would be for a terrorist group to put those weaponsto use. We see a tremendous growth in dual use technologies and quitenaturally wonder how difficult it would be to divert those technologies forillicit application. That ambiguity is mirrored in considerations of weaponsuse, particularly with respect to biological weapons: How do we know, forexample, that an outbreak of cholera or anthrax is not a natural outbreak?How do we identify transgressors, assign blame and seek retribution? Bythe same token, how would we determine the credibility of simple threats tounleash such weapons?

Recent publications tend to agree that the expected consequencesdemand serious consideration of the potential for WMD use by terrorists.Identifying and accurately addressing the threat potential have becomeimportant components of planning, prevention, and consequencemanagement efforts.5 Yet many of those same assessments seem either totreat all terrorist organizations and motives as essentially equivalent or toseek to differentiate terrorist groups by sometimes tenuous ideological ortheological categorizations. As a result, competing assessments of terroristWMD potential often appear to address different topics. In one sense, manyof these competing assessments speak past each other, rather thanaddressing the same fundamental issue. In much the same way that ThomasKuhn addressed the inability of proponents of competing paradigms toeffectively speak to and understand each other,6 proponents of different

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visions of the terrorist WMD potential appear to have reached something ofa stalemate in the ongoing dialogue.

This article broadly outlines the competing themes in the debate,demonstrating in the process the dialogic disconnect, then offers apreliminary model for reassessing the terrorist WMD potential. The modelseeks to incorporate salient features of each perspective while addressingunderlying motivational factors and the dynamic interaction betweenterrorist and society. A fundamental tenet adopted in this effort is the beliefthat all terrorists are alike in at least one important way: they seek to acquireand maintain some degree of influence over an identifiable audience. Whilethat audience may vary widely, the desire to have and exercise influence isseen as the most basic driving motivation of terrorists, regardless ofadditional motivational, ideological or theological imperatives.

Nature and Source of the Threat

In the literature on terrorism, the question of potential for WMD use hasgenerated considerable attention and disagreement. Through a series ofarguments, rejoinders, rebuttals, and alternatives, two principal orientationsto the question have emerged. On the one hand, some analysts maintain thatterrorist use of mass-casualty weapons is unavoidable. One interpretation ofthe Aum Shinrikyo case suggests that now the barrier between conventionaland non-conventional weapons has been broken, further consideration ofthe question becomes a matter of assessing when, where, and by whom thenext attack will come. An alternative interpretation is that Aum Shinrikyowas an aberration, a unique example unlikely to be repeated. Given theoutcry and reaction to Aum’s acts, this interpretation suggests, otherterrorists are likely to learn valuable lessons about the weight ofdisproportional response and revise their own plans and aspirationsaccordingly. Others suggest that the terrorist will understand that WMD hasnever offered sufficient tactical or strategic advantage, even for states,7 andwill likely moderate actions to reflect a rather sophisticated understandingof cost–benefit assessment with respect to weapons selection. Thepossibility of WMD use by terrorists then becomes a mostly moot question.

Given the wide divergence between these two perspectives, it may beinstructive to highlight several of the major sub-themes operative in each.Belief that terrorists will likely use mass-casualty weapons, on a large scale,frequently leads to considerations of the ideological motivations of theterrorist. Often, the motivational imperative tied to expectations of WMDpotential revolves around religious themes or orientations. A common viewis that religious imperatives or motives, particularly when associated withapocalyptic beliefs or visions, makes the group or individual more prone to

85ASSESSING WMD TERROR

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accept violence as an acceptable mechanism for action.8 Here, terrorists’guiding philosophies are seen informing their judgments in severalimportant ways. For some, the religious outlook determines degrees of guiltand appropriate levels of retribution. The terrorist may see himself as God’sinstrument, carrying out divinely inspired or demanded punishment for realor perceived infractions. Since the attack and resulting destruction aredirected or expected by the Deity, the terrorist effectively shifts blame, atleast in his mind, to the Deity. By the same token, apocalyptic orientationsmay direct the terrorist toward believing that the end times are at hand, andattacks will either reflect the Deity’s desires or will serve to hasten thecoming apocalypse and subsequent establishment of God’s kingdom onearth, or similar envisioned paradise. Other religious traditions are seen,from this perspective, as having similar visions, interpretations andimperatives which loosely parallel or presage those from a Christianorientation.

Other observers see a distinctly secular motivation in the terrorist. Onemajor argument stems from the growth of information availability,9

suggesting that the more widely knowledge has been disseminated the moreeasily radical groups have found the information they would need todevelop and implement their own WMD capability. Knowledge, from thisperspective, is power and when that power is coupled with materialsaccessibility, the likelihood of terrorists gaining and employing mass-casualty weapons rises. Also, terrorists are held to have many moreopportunities to gain access to previously denied weapons and weaponscomponents. Then-Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch raised thispossibility,10 although neither he nor others have claimed that this would bethe sole reason for the greater threat.

A third major sub-theme envisions a greater likelihood of terrorist WMDrooted in frustration and desperation that build until mass-casualty weaponsare seen as a preferable alternative.11 In this assessment, the terrorist seeshimself facing insurmountable odds, with no other options available. Insuch a case, the terrorist would lash out as a last act of desperation with anyand all means available to him, including mass-casualty weapons. Othershave suggested that desperation may play a part, but that the decision wouldbe less emotional and more methodically reached.12 One common argumentholds American military superiority on the battlefield to be sooverwhelming that terrorists could quite naturally come to see weapons ofmass destruction as strategic and tactical equalizers.

But not all observers are convinced that terrorist use of mass-casualtyweapons is likely or even possible. The most frequently cited deterrent toterrorist use of WMD is the sheer weight of technical demands and materialneeds required of such an undertaking. Nuclear weapons development and


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manufacture would likely require significant outlays of capital, significanthigh technology machining equipment and facilities infrastructures, andspatial presence. Each of these, in turn, imposes considerable limitations ona non-state group. Similarly, the suggestion that a rogue state might providea nuclear device is often dismissed with the suggestion that a state whichtakes the time and energy to construct its own weapon is not likely to offer itto a group over which it may not have absolute control. The likelihood of thesponsoring state becoming the target, aside from the possibility of retaliationby the terrorists’ victim, is seen as offering a significant deterrent. By thesame token, the threat of retaliation for chemical, biological or radiologicaluse is judged high enough to discourage state sponsorship of WMDterrorism. Like the technical and physical difficulties presented by nucleardevices, radiological weapons offer significant hazards for terrorists unableto contain radiation until employment; biological agents are not as easilyweaponized as often imagined nor are they as predictable as the terroristmight desire; and chemical weapons are relatively difficult to apply on alarge scale, without advantage of a confined space.

Others have suggested that deep-running psychological barriers arelikely to prevent most groups from ever seriously considering large-scaleWMD use. From this perspective, the terrorist wants a lot of peoplewatching, as Jenkins indicated,13 not a lot of people dead. The dead audiencecan do little for the terrorist, particularly if the intent is to compel somespecified action, and going beyond the limits of toleration destroys anygood will and support previously gained and limits his ability to act.Additionally, some contend that terrorists are not great weapons innovatorsand tend to use tried and true methods. The image then emerges of terroristsmuch more comfortable with known, proven and predictable weapons.

Building on the notion of rationality, Rapoport added another level ofconsideration in arguing that terrorists are quite capable of realisticcost–benefit calculations.14 In this view, terrorists understand quite well thelimits of WMD, even when those weapons have been employed by statemilitaries in the course of conventional warfare. Arguing that even the mostegregious application of mass-casualty weapons have proven to berelatively ineffective in bringing about the desired tactical or strategicadvantage, Rapoport notes that such lessons are not likely lost on today’sterrorists. If terrorists do, indeed, understand the relationship between thecosts of acquisition and employment of such weapons, the limitedeffectiveness of even large-scale use and the likelihood of state responsewould lead the terrorist to conclude that the attendant risks of WMD use aresimply too high to accept.

We are left, then, with two competing perspectives, each of which offercompelling arguments for or against the likelihood of terrorists employing


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mass-casualty weapons. Accepting the contention that WMD use is likely,however, leads to questions about how assessments are subsequentlyframed. The notion that a religious imperative offers a greater propensity forviolence and a greater likelihood of WMD use is problematic, sincereligious motivation explanations may not explore the dynamic in sufficientdepth. The resulting danger lies in the potential to overgeneralize andstereotype motivations. Emphasizing the religious imperative could alsolead to the unintended incorporation of biases against differing religiousorientations. We assume the worst, in such instances, based more on ourinterpretation of the group’s core beliefs than their motives and outcomeexpectations. But denying the potential for terrorist WMD-use outrightseems equally problematic in that such assessments would either discountexisting evidence or assume a degree of rationality which might not, in fact,be present. Assuming the rational terrorist might lead to an assessmentbased more on observer notions of rationality and less on the perspectivesand cognitive processes of the terrorists themselves.

The reality may fall somewhere between the two competingperspectives, with the potential for terrorist use of mass-casualty weaponsexistent, but unlikely for most groups. Not all terrorist groups are likelyWMD candidates, as the religious imperative argument holds, but thedetermining factor may be something subtler than gross ideology. Tosuggest that the Irish Republican Army, the Basque ETA, or the Red ArmyFaction would be unlikely to seriously consider WMD use strikes us asintuitively acceptable. The suggestion that groups such as Hamas,Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, various Christian Identity groups in theUSA, or Osama bin Laden’s al-Qa’ida would seriously consider WMD usestrikes many as equally acceptable intuitively. Some may see advantage forthese groups in using mass-casualty weapons, either in ideology ordesperation, but the more important issue lies in determining those forwhich such a choice is realistic. All groups could be considered candidates,but we would waste considerable time and energy assessing manyorganizations which would not see value in WMD use.

The challenge, then, is to move beyond simple considerations of accessand capabilities. The degree of sophistication and depth of ability may varyconsiderably from group to group, but from the victim’s standpoint there islittle to distinguish a crude, but functioning, device from a sophisticatedone. We must also move beyond surface considerations of ideological ortheological imperatives so as to avoid stereotyping, overgeneralization, andunintended biases.

How might we do this? Motives drive terrorists. Each terrorist who takesup arms has a reason. To observers, the reasoning may seem just or unjust,sensical or nonsensical, reasonable or unreasonable, rational or irrational.


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But the reason nevertheless exists and the words and the deeds of theterrorist are likely to reveal what those reasons are, at least at theorganizational level.15 The words and deeds of the terrorist offer a uniqueglimpse into his cognitive decision-making.

Elevating the perspectives of the terrorist to prominence is the first step.First is the identification of the terrorists’ audience. Here, however, we mustcontinually bear in mind that the terrorists’ perspective is preeminent,directing analysis toward considering the terrorist’s own understanding ofaudience. Determining who the apparent audience of the act of terror is,from this analytic standpoint, is not as germane as asking who the terroristbelieves his message is directed towards. The two may not be the same.Terrorists ‘speak’ through their acts, a point acknowledged and driven homeby anarchists’ ‘propaganda of the deed’ in the late nineteenth century. Bythe same token, terrorists speak to multiple audiences beyond theirimmediate victim, both internal and external to the group, and the messagemay differ for each,16 even in the context of a single act.17 At the same time,the content and context of the terrorist’s message to his primary audience isa critical component for understanding the linkage between motive andaction. Since the terrorist exists and functions within the larger society, theway in which the terrorist interacts – and sees himself and his organizationinteracting – with society speaks to the role the terrorist sees for himself andhis organization.

Underlying Framework

Inherent in this approach to the assessment of terrorist WMD potential areseveral assumptions. First among these is that terrorists are, in their ownfashion, rational actors. By this, terrorists are seen as having a specified andidentifiable set of preferences which can be ordered from most preferable toleast preferable. This preference order is seen as driving cost–benefitcalculations such that the terrorist acts in ways generally in accordance withhis established preference order. Terrorists are likely to be preferencemaximizers, acting in ways expected to lead to realization of the highestpreference possible given existing circumstances. That is not to say thatterrorists are expected to adhere rigidly and blindly to that preference order,but that given the choice and the opportunity to seek satisfaction of apreference, the natural choice would be the preference cognitively assignedthe greatest worth. Preference orders and their associated weights are notstatic, but are expected to change as the prevailing situation changes and asthe terrorist’s understanding of his alternatives and options changes. As longas the terrorist acts to the extent possible in accordance with his particularpreference set and preference order, his behavior can be considered rational.


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A second assumption is that the terrorist has both motivation andoutcome expectation. Something is wanted, and actions are taken in pursuitof that goal. The relative realism of the goal is not, however, nearly asimportant as the existence of the goal itself and the desire to bring that goalto fruition. These goals shape, in turn, the terrorist’s perspective and it isfrom that perspective that the terrorist acts. Despite the multiplicity of goalswhich might be identified, terrorists share an outcome expectation – gainingand exercising influence. Whether the more tangible outcomes expected arepolitical, social, or religious, all terrorists seek to influence an audience.Their efforts may center around persuasion, in which the target audience isasked to accept and adopt the terrorist’s vision of the future, or coercion, inwhich the terrorist seeks to compel desired actions by force or threat.Influence bridges the gap between persuasive efforts and coercive efforts toaffect, in one way or another, a given outcome.

To gain and exercise that influence, the terrorist must also direct hismessage, whether in words or deeds, to an appropriate audience. The deadamong the terrorist’s victims are not the core audience, since their deatheliminates their ability to act in accordance with the terrorist’s wishes. Theterrorist’s core, or primary, audience is that group or entity which theterrorist believes he is ‘speaking’ to. Osama bin Laden might, for example,refer to Allah’s will and the need to liberate holy Muslim lands fromoccupation by infidels in justifying an attack on American facilities. Whileit is easy to think his audience is Allah, bin Laden is addressing the USgovernment and the American people, telling the former to leave SaudiArabia and telling the latter to pressure the government into compliance.More important, however, is bin Laden’s effort to reach the Islamiccommunity and to persuade them the ‘crusaders’ can be expelled.18 In asingle act and statement, bin Laden reaches three audiences.

A Preliminary Model

Consideration of ideology and its role in shaping and directing terroristsactions often seems inadequate. It is easy and convenient to lump togethera number of groups into loosely-defined and organized conceptualconglomerates. Consequently, terrorist groups within a common ideologicalframework are treated as almost interchangeable units, suggesting that thebasic content of the ideology sufficiently defines the perspective andmotivations of distinct organizations. That summary understanding of thegroups’ operative ideological framework, in turn, colors observerperceptions by obviating the need to delve further into the specifics of thoseideological roots. Yet a more detailed and context-sensitive examinationseems almost intuitively warranted, since there are frequently vast


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differences between ideological kin. The depth, strength and source ofreligious beliefs, for example, speaks volumes of the degree of tolerance forviolence, the shape and context of violence acceptance, and the overallwillingness to consider violence as inherently justified.19 Rapoport’s note onthe role of religion in terrorism is instructive in reminding us that not allreligious traditions are alike, offering an incredible variety of belief andoutlook, each with implications for violence. There is reason to believe thesame types of cognitive and perceptual differences similarly affect thesecular terrorist.

In the end, terrorist actions are purposive acts, designed to produce,directly or indirectly, expected outcomes. Terrorist attacks are not randomand senseless acts of brutality designed for no overt purpose. Each actserves a purpose, whether the audience understands that purpose or not. Thepurpose may be quite obvious or more subtle, ranging from theassassination of a hated adversary in order to eliminate a real or perceivedthreat, to a wave of attacks exhibiting no easily discernible pattern, designedto sow fear and uncertainty in the target population.

Emphasizing the purposive aspect of each terrorist act, andconsolidating that understanding across the range of attacks and non-violentcommunications, allows for the development of a more sophisticatedunderstanding of the terrorist’s decision-making calculus. To begin thatdevelopment, three aspects of the communicative dynamic between terroristand audience are posited as critical facets for analysis and successfulassessment of terrorists’ WMD potential.

Audience Identification

The first aspect suggested is a determination of the terrorist’s core audience.Verbal and written communications are offered by terrorists to explain andjustify their actions and existence,20 with imagery and phraseology designedto attract and engage a particularly oriented audience, whether religious orsecular. They typically seek to cast themselves as saviors, leaders, ormartyrs for some noble cause, be it liberation from an oppressor, heraldinga newer and more equitable social and political order, or attainment of somereligious condition. These messages offer an understanding of how theterrorist sees his actions as contributing to a greater good while alsopersuading the audience that the terrorists’ goals are, in fact, desirable. Suchclaims often fall on deaf ears, since the rhetoric can be dense and the logicconvoluted. Nevertheless, such communications are the concretemanifestation of the group’s efforts to force by proclamation its ideologyand objectives onto center stage in public attention.

By the same token, the terrorist’s actions, particularly violent actions,serve as an important adjunct to written and verbal communications. The


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means by which the target was selected, the weapons chosen for the attack,21

the identity of the victim of violence, and the location of the attack all speakof the motives and the desires of the terrorists. The bombing of the WorldTrade Center, for example, by followers of Sheikh Abdul Rakhman, reflectshis earlier calls for destruction of the ‘twin pillars’ of western decadence.The symbolic nature of the victims, or of attack timing, offers additionalinsight into the terrorist’s objectives by highlighting critical aspects of theterrorist’s message.

The actual and symbolic nature of the message suggests that audienceidentification can be quite subtle. Looking beyond the immediate victim toidentify the terrorist’s core audience is not a new notion; it forms asignificant basis for much terrorism-related analysis of the last severaldecades. Rather than consider a single audience beyond immediate victims,however, greater insight may be possible by asking what message andaction, in combination, say about primary and secondary intendedaudiences. The core audience is the single most important recipient of themessage, and it is the attempt to reach this audience that remains the singlemost important driving force for the terrorist. When we assess from ourobserver’s standpoint, we too often assign meaning to terrorist acts based onour interpretation of the event rather than on what the terrorist attempts tosay. To better understand the terrorist’s intentions and primary audienceidentification, considerations of motive, audience, and expectation arenecessary. The bombing of the Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, forexample, is often blamed on Osama bin Laden. Many observersimmediately took the United States to be the intended recipient of themessage the bombers sought to send. It seemed clearly to say ‘leave’.Observers also suggested that the message, taken a step further, was tellingthe Saudi regime to expel the Americans.

If bin Laden was responsible, that interpretation would overlook hisprimary intended audience, especially when his ‘Declaration of War’ is alsoconsidered.22 In that declaration, bin Laden makes clear his core audience isthe Islamic community, whom he expects to lead to a return to the purity andsanctity he envisions in a united Islamic community free of corrupt andcorrupted Arab regimes, like the Saudis, and free of occupation by infidels.Khobar Towers could be seen as an act directed at influencing the Islamiccommunity, first and foremost, in promoting a particular brand of belief andin promoting a particular view of the righteousness and efficacy of violentaction against unwanted invaders. A secondary message would be to theUnited States, demanding withdrawal or suffer the continuance of violent andcostly opposition. The Saudi regime would, by the same token, be bin Laden’stertiary audience for a message warning of continued retribution on behalf ofthe faithful as long as foreign occupation and corruption are tolerated.


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We might, then, consider the identification of a terrorist’s audiencelargely in terms of their expectations, rather than our observations. Butsome terrorists have a target audience rather difficult to grasp. For thosegroups which seem to address a deity rather than a worldly audience, thedetermination can become problematic with respect to separating intent ofthe group from observer interpretation. Rhetoric which promotes a religiousimperative adds to this problem in making the intent of the group difficultto isolate. Was the Khobar Towers bombing truly a political act, or was it areligious act, as bin Laden’s declaration might have us think? Does thesuicide bomber in Israel act for political or religious reasons? How are weto distinguish between the two, separating the rhetoric from the message?By incorporating the ideological writings and pronouncements, thencoupling them with an assessment of the act and history of thoseresponsible, we might begin to make such a determination. Whencombined, the religious motivation tends to give way to an underlyingpolitical or social motivation. Similarly, it is equally important todistinguish between the motivations of the individual and of the group itself,for it is the group which provides the overall direction and delineates theultimate objectives for action. In short, it is necessary to look beyond themotives of the suicide bomber, who may very well act individually becauseof religious beliefs, and examine the group itself, which may be motivatedby more prosaic and secular motives.

By keeping the motivational assessment at the group level we can posita simple dichotomy in intended core audiences. Since it is from thisaudience that the group expects to gain satisfaction of demands, positivelyor negatively, or gain additional support and sympathy, this audience playsa critical role in determining the degree and scope of violence tolerable. Ifthe terrorist’s principal purpose was to garner support and sympathy, or atleast passive neutrality, there would be a level of violence anddestructiveness beyond which the terrorist likely understands that actionswould prove counterproductive. This human audience is tangible and reactsin physically manifested ways to the messages and acts of the terrorist. Inmost cases, the human audience is worldly, identifiable, concrete, andgenerally secular, although it does not necessarily have to be the latter.

A human audience can be a religious audience. The terrorist may havereligious goals and motives, and may seek to persuade a community ofbelievers or co-religionists, for theological reasons. Neither the selectioncriteria employed by the terrorist, nor system of shared belief betweenterrorist and audience, is as important as the nature of the terrorist’sexpected primary correspondent. Most of the groups usually labeled‘religious’ terrorists are animated by belief, at least in part, and theirinterpretation of theology informs and shapes the way in which they act. Yet


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almost all of these groups maintain a primary dialogue with a humanaudience often to persuade or convert, even when that audience is definedand selected or limited by religious criteria. The terrorist who truly holds adeity as his primary audience is rare, with the Thugs perhaps the last well-known group fitting that category. The ethereal is hard to pin down, sinceany understanding or expectation of message acceptance andacknowledgment is predicated on the belief of the human communicant.Whereas the human audiences’ receipt of the terrorist’s message can be seenand measured, the ethereal audience’s acceptance of a message can not.Distinguishing at the most basic level between those terrorists who believethey are addressing a human audience and those who believe they areaddressing an ethereal audience, is a first step.

Addressing a human audience suggests that the terrorist seeks topromote change. He may want a change in policy, to compel a certain actionor set of actions, to delay or prevent implementation of policy, to generatesupport or sympathy, to persuade someone to behave in certain ways, or toparalyze them into inaction. Messages to a human audience carry anexpectation of physically manifest outcomes, whether positive, neutral, ornegative. The terrorist addressing a human audience has a positivist outlookin that he expects his message to be heard, understood, and acted upon. Forthis, he needs interaction.

Terrorists addressing an ethereal audience, on the other hand, may bequite acceptant of one-way communications since it would be the ethereal‘recipient’ that decides if and when, and by what means, to respond. Theresulting communication with the deity would likely be a form of praise, arequest for acknowledgment and later reward for acts undertaken in thephysical world. The emphasis in messages to an ethereal audience is lessconcrete, more nebulous, extolling the virtues, needs, or desires of a deityor belief set. Response might be desired, but not necessarily required, giventhat the response sought may be available only in an afterlife or nextincarnation. Worldly concerns are of lesser consequence and importancethan the philosophical and theological.

Given such a dichotomy, and the associated levels of importance toworldly and other-worldly matters, those groups which actively seek toaddress an ethereal audience may be more prone to accept greater levels ofviolence and, perhaps, see considerable utility in the use of mass casualty-weapons.23 A greater emphasis on a deity may suggest a greater propensityto mass casualties, but does not guarantee use of such weapons. There maybe, however, fewer cognitive barriers to creating mass casualties since anethereal primary audience allows the terrorist to rationalize and justifyexceeding existing behavioral and social barriers by citing divine will orother unverifiable criterion. Those groups which, on the other hand, seek to


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establish a dialogue with a human audience are more likely to accept self-imposed limits to the level of violence used to further their ends. Theexistence of such limits has been a hard lesson to learn, but remains onewhich has helped determine the ultimate effectiveness and longevity ofmore than one group.24 For these, the defining limits on casualties andweapons lies in the reaction and tolerance levels of the human audience.Cognitive barriers to WMD-use are tied to public reactions, and to expectedreactions, limiting the terrorist’s perceived range of available choices.

Message Content

A second aspect for determining the likelihood of terrorist use of mass-casualty weapons lies in the content of the message the terrorist group seeksto bring forward through words and deeds. The message directed towardsthe group’s primary audience holds the greatest importance. The content ofthis message needs to be taken as a combination of rhetoricalcommunications and attack ‘content’ in order to afford a clearer, morenuanced understanding. The content of the terrorist’s message, however, isoften taken to be the surface rhetoric and overt rationalization withoutconsidering the underlying reasoning. But the underlying core message iscritical, since it addresses most accurately the objectives and motivations ofthe group. The rhetorical window-dressing serves a purpose, but thispurpose lies more in making the act of violence more palatable to a generalaudience.25 By explaining its actions in terms expected to have emotionalrelevance to the general public, the group heightens the chances that theoverall message will be received, understood and acknowledged in afavorable manner. The act of violence itself also sends a message,reinforced by the rhetorical. Through target selection,26 weapon selectionand timing, the act of violence demonstrates in very real and concrete waysthe objectives and determination of the terrorist.

Given the rhetorical and symbolic messages transmitted, it is possible todraw distinctions between the content of the messages. Assessing specificreferences and demands of distinct groups, however, can easily result invery narrowly defined, group and event-specific analyses. Despite thespecific set of objectives and motives each group holds, the generalizedclaims and demands fit well in broad terms with those of other groups.Maintaining this broader perspective allows for a division of messagecontent into a generalized dichotomy, based on the essential direction andscope, or theme, of the message transmitted.

Most terrorists advocate social or political change, a new form ofgovernment, perhaps, or a reordering of social institutions. They may wantpower, to be the government, to set the rules of social and politicalinteraction. They could demand adherence to certain policy guidelines,


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abandonment of others, a shift in policy or the adoption of a new set ofpolicies. They may demand justice, social equity, greater governmentalemphasis on basic human needs such as education, fair wages, lifting theyoke of oppression. They might call for class struggle, calling on theoppressed to rise up and overthrow the oppressors. Or they may demandself-determination and independence. All these carry with them a commontheme – that of political or social change. The target of change may begovernments or people, policies or institutions, relationships or methods,structures or conditions of existence, but each seeks some form ofreordering political or social relationships.

Alternatively, some terrorists call for the destruction of their enemy, forthe elimination of a people, a nation or a state. Such calls frequently focuson destruction without specifying envisioned outcomes. Early Palestiniancalls for the destruction of Israel27 have been taken by some at face value,yet the message directed to the Palestinian people was not so much Israel’sdestruction as it was the need to liberate Palestinian lands. The message tothe secondary Israeli stressed destruction, but the primary message ofliberating Palestine was directed more toward stirring the aspirations of thePalestinian people. In this light, the original PLO charter was directed moretoward cultivating Palestinian aspirations for statehood and, consequently,can be taken as more of a call for change. Determining which messages aretrue calls for destruction may be more difficult, but when actions and wordsare combined with a sensitivity to primary audiences being addressed, thedistinctions between calls for change and calls for destruction becomesevident.

A dichotomy of message content can be one of change versusdestruction. Those terrorists seeking change want a reordering of socialand political structures rather than destruction. To affect change, there mustbe something surviving the violence, something, in effect, to change.Because the outcome expectations of those seeking change rest on afoundation of what already exists and on the need for some degree of socialcontinuity, the change-demanding terrorist would seem less likely toconsider seriously the large-scale use of weapons of mass destruction.Terrorists seeking destruction without precondition, on the other hand,would be unmoved by considerations of social survivability. For thisterrorist, destruction is the end, the objective, the goal, and it would notmatter whether any element of social structure – including the people –survives a WMD attack. Eliminating the possibility of social continuanceis the goal for these terrorists and those seeking to convey a message ofdestruction, without consideration or exception, may well be predisposedto use mass-casualty weapons.


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Social Interaction

The third aspect for considering the likelihood of mass casualty weapons userevolves around the group’s perceptions and understanding of its interactionswith the larger society within which it operates. For groups seeking politicalor social objectives, interaction with other members of society is a necessity.It is this larger social structure which is either the primary audience, containsthe primary audience, or offers the transformational object. Regardless ofspecific group goals, society forms an important message-recipient for theterrorist since it is the principal entity to which the message of violence isdelivered. There is, consequently, an expectation of reciprocity in which theterrorist communicates his desires, expectations, demands and goalidentification and then anticipates in return some form of popular response.

Expected responses, like the terrorist’s message, can be positive ornegative. Terrorists seeking to promote an idea which they consider a publicgood may seek acceptance, support and sympathy. They work to promotethemselves and their cause as beneficial, just, desirable or needed.Liberation, freedom from oppression and self-determination are expected toreceive positive public response. Terrorist’s expectations can also emphasizeand promote the negative, generating in turn a negative response from thepublic. Messages of ethnic, religious or racial intolerance and hatred, vowsto eliminate or destroy a specified group, and calls for retribution for somereal or perceived wrong are examples of negative messages, considered fromthe perspective of those targeted. Faced with a call for its destruction, thataudience would quite naturally react negatively even if secondary andtertiary audiences are more tolerant and supportive of the message.

In either case, the series of interactions between terrorist and societyconstitute a ‘dialogue’. Often bloody, this ‘dialogue’ nevertheless forms theunderlying basis for what the terrorist seeks to do or say. Violence isundertaken purposively in order to bring about an expected response or tocreate a necessary precondition for the realization of expectations. Thenature and focus of the attack, then, reflects the terrorist’s expectation ofresponse. Those promoting self-determination or freedom from oppression,for example, would be more likely to direct their violence against the agentsor symbols of oppression and subjugation than against the individuals,institutions or symbols of the people on whose behalf they claim to operate.Groups espousing extreme hatred or other negatively oriented messages, incontrast, would be more likely to stage seemingly indiscriminate andunrestrained acts of violence.

In sharp contrast to most terrorists, who maintain some form ofreciprocal relationship with the society around them, some may act to avoidany meaningful and lasting relationship with society. Fringe religious cults


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sometimes practice extreme self-isolation, but a religious imperative isneither a necessary nor sufficient condition for engaging in violent acts.Nevertheless, the examples set by the Branch Davidians, Heaven’s Gate, theSolar Temple, and other religious groups which chose relative isolation andwhich largely severed ties to society, have been used in popular debate toillustrate the presumed danger posed by religious isolationists. Terroristswho act similarly could be said to have an inapposite, or non-existent,relationship with society. Reality, however, often intrudes on desires anddemands minimal interactions. The purchase of food or crop seeds, neededequipment or weapons, acquisition of other goods and services the groupcan not produce internally yet need nevertheless, as well as recruiting newmembers, offer clear examples of necessary, if unwanted, interactions. Withan understanding of minimal necessities in mind, an inapposite relationshipcan be taken as the predominate desire to eliminate all non-essentialinteractions with society. The group seeking to affect an inappositerelationship with society does not strive to influence society and does notcare, in return, what the members of society think of it.

Given the dichotomy between reciprocal and inapposite relationships,groups can be categorized by the extent to which their actions andstatements reflect a desire for and degree of severance and isolation fromsociety. The likelihood of WMD-use would logically be greatest for thosemost committed to the inapposite relationship. Most terrorists, though, wanta live audience paying attention to their message and this observation is noless applicable today than it was 30 years ago. Most terrorists maintain areciprocal relationship, positive or negative, with society and are much lesslikely to seriously consider WMD-use due to that relationship. A terroristindifferent to public reaction would be less psychologically or cognitivelyinhibited in weapons selection and targeting. The lack of social inhibitionsmay allow those seeking to disconnect from society a greater propensity forserious WMD consideration. But like the audience and message aspects, agreater likelihood or potential based on expected societal relationships doesnot necessarily translate into action.

Synthesis

Combining audience, message, and social relationship offers an opportunityto distinguish between terrorist groups which are most likely to consider thelarge-scale use of mass-casualty weapons and those which are not. These donot offer an avenue for definitively determining if, when, or under whatconditions a group would in fact resort to the use of mass-casualty weapons,nor is it intended to. It is, rather, a framework for narrowing the range ofpossibilities such that further observation, study and emphasis can bedirected where it would be most appropriate.


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For a terrorist group to seriously consider WMD use for the purpose ofkilling or injuring hundreds or thousands in a single act, the greatestlikelihood conditions associated with each aspect would need to be metsimultaneously. Groups can fluctuate between extremes, meeting all threelikelihood criteria during their organizational lifetime, but it is only when allthree reach the critical stage together that the threat would become real.Failure to meet any one of the criteria would suggest significant barriers toimplementing any existing desire for WMD use. Lacking sufficiency in anysingle area also suggests the group would place enough importance onmaintaining organizational viability and continuity while simultaneouslypreserving avenues for message transmittal. The terrorist’s cost-benefitcalculations would result, in these instances, in more limited activities.

To influence a human audience, some sensitivity to audience perceptionsand reactions is necessary. Successfully relaying a message requires that theaudience receive the message, understand it, be capable of weighing itsoptions, consider potential outcomes of each response and make a choice ofresponse. Crossing the bounds of acceptable action, whatever society definesthat to be, serves to alienate that audience. Germany’s Red Army Faction(RAF) and 2 June Movement, and Iran’s Mojahedin-e Khalq, for example,failed to incorporate their audience’s needs and expectations and,consequently, lost or failed to garner significant support from the very groupswhich they claimed to represent. For the RAF and the 2 June Movement,indiscriminate violence which had little obvious relationship to existingsocial, economic, or political concerns of the German people, or with littleapparent connection to the groups’ claimed social and political agendaslimited meaningful dialogue between the groups and their intended audiences.Even the fundamental constituency of the RAF and 2 June Movement, radicalstudents in the German universities, abandoned the groups as the clearcriminality of attacks outweighed political objectives.28 While indiscriminatecriminal acts were the ultimate downfall of the German groups, the IranianMojahedin failed to consider the sensitivities of its primary audience, theIranian people, by siding with Saddam Hussein and Iraq during the Iran–Iraqwar. Rather than crossing unacceptable limits associated with proportionalityand appropriateness, the Mojahedin demonstrated their disdain for Iranianpublic opinion by assisting Iran’s chief enemy during open hostilities. Suchinsensitivity seems astonishing given the extent of support the Mojahedinenjoyed immediately after the Shah’s fall from power.29 Similarly, the moreactive American extreme right organizations appear to alienate most of theirintended audience in part through the unending viciousness and naked hatredof their exclusionary message.30

Combining relationship characteristics, audience identification, andmessage content (Figure 1) allows one to visualize a confluence of factors


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indicative of a potentially greater disposition for serious WMDconsideration. Groups which see themselves speaking to a human, ratherthan ethereal audience seek the observable reaction found in humanaudiences rather than being content to rely on a belief that the message wassuccessfully received. Where there is a human audience, there is anexpectation of tangible reciprocity. Groups maintaining a reciprocalrelationship with society seek to coerce, intimidate or otherwise influenceand have little reason to resort to mass-casualty weapons. The survival andprosperity of the group depends on its continued ability not only to recruitnew members, but to exert a degree of influence. At the opposite extreme,groups which maintain an inapposite relationship with society, who seek toaddress only an ethereal audience, and whose message is focused ondestruction, can more easily envision a purposive utility in realizing theirobjectives through WMD use. For these groups, the ‘biggest bang for thebuck’ may hold the greatest ideological and operative relevance.

The ‘New’ Terrorist?

Much recent debate on potential WMD use has emphasized that groups witha religious imperative are more prone to a propensity for lethality.31 Thesearguments have considerable merit, particularly when it is understood that


FIGURE 1CONVERGENCE OF ASPECTS

EtherealAudience

Change

HumanAudience

DestructionMessage

Reciprocal Relationship

Inapposite Relationship

Convergence Area(indicative of greatestWMD potential)

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the only group which has, to date, used such weapons on a large scale –Aum Shinrikyo – fits that description. A religious purpose, however, is notan exclusive or necessarily adequate determinant of WMD potential,evidenced by the vast majority of religious groups which have not engagedin violence, and the overwhelming number of religiously-inspired terroristswho use conventional weapons. Many terrorist groups which use thelanguage of religion are, despite outward appearances, addressing humanaudiences more than an ethereal one. Osama bin Laden calls for jihadagainst the United States and corrupt Arab regimes, but in doing so clearlyindicates he is speaking to the Muslim umma:

The latest and the greatest of these aggressions [of the USA, Israel,the UN and corrupt Arab regimes] incurred by the Muslims since thedeath of the Prophet (ALLAH’S BLESSINGS AND SALUTATIONSON HIM) is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places [SaudiArabia], the foundation of the house of Islam, the place of therevelation, the source of the message ... by the armies of the AmericanCrusaders and their allies ...

From here, today we begin the work, talking and discussing theways of correcting what had happened to the Islamic world in general,and the Land of the two Holy Places in particular. We wish to studythe means that we could follow to return the situation to its normalpath. And to return to the people their own rights, particularly after thelarge damages and the great aggression on the life and the religion ofthe people. And injustice that had affected every section and thegroups of the people ... 32

Similarly, Hizballah’s message is directed at the Palestinians displacedand/or oppressed by the Israelis, calling for the liberation of Palestine sothat an Islamic state, governed by God’s law, can be established.33 Even inthe language of Islam, the goal of political and national liberation remainsclear, as is the understanding that this is a goal of the Palestinian people:

The Islamic Resistance Movement is a distinguished Palestinianmovement, whose allegiance is to Allah, and whose way of life isIslam. It strives to raise the banner of Allah over every inch ofPalestine, for under the wing of Islam followers of all religions cancoexist in security and safety where their lives, possessions and rightsare concerned. In the absence of Islam, strife will be rife, oppressionspreads, evil prevails and schisms and wars will break out.34

Other groups, most notably Aum Shinrikyo, call for completedestruction as a necessary precondition for achieving objectives. For Aum,salvation lay in reincarnation in the next world. Yet the philosophy of Aum


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is clearly distinct from other violent groups motivated by religion. For Aumand its leader, Shoko Asahara, death was a welcomed and sought-afteravenue to a higher state of being. Destruction of the world was,consequently, necessary in order to bring about the next stage in the cycleof death and rebirth.35 Death, for Asahara, is inevitable but the enlightened,those who followed his path, could ‘completely surpass death’. In that case,the enlightened need not worry about death, with Asahara asking thefaithful ‘if we have a goal close to ourselves and attain it, if we couldcompletely surpass death by it, don’t you think that the coming of WorldWar III would be a great thing for us?’36

Do such distinctions explain an inclination, a propensity, a likelihood forthe use of mass-casualty weapons? Perhaps not as much as we would like,since the question begs for a more complete and assured answer than we areable to give. Psychological studies suggest the disaffected, the alienated andthe lonely may accept or seek entry into a terrorist group and, once there,become even more susceptible to complete subordination of personal interestsand inhibitions to those of the group. The organization replaces family, withthe subsequent development of strong bonds between the individual and hisor her comrades, shaping and directing the behavior of the individual inaltogether different directions than might otherwise be expected.37 By muchthe same token, students of religious cults have offered convincing argumentssuggesting psychological processes and intra-group dynamics help determinethe way in which religious belief might be directed. Belief may manifest itselfpassively or violently, inwardly or outwardly, as proselytizing or asmeditation, as witnessing to the masses or as violence, as suicidal tendenciesor as homicidal tendencies.38 Addressing the psychological and organizationalcharacteristics offer part of the answer to the nagging questions of whether ornot a sub-state group will again use mass-casualty weapons for political,social, or religious purposes and, if so, when.

It may be possible to offer more useful insights, and offer greaterunderstanding, if the conventional wisdom was more rigorously challengedand, where appropriate, addressed under new analytic frameworks.39 We maydo that by asking if we might better address the likelihood of terrorist use ofmass-casualty weapons by shifting focus from questions of ideologicalunderpinnings or access and capabilities toward the dynamics of the dialoguebetween terrorist and audience. Emphasizing that dynamic may offer asubtler and more utilitarian approach unencumbered by emotion and rhetoricof claim and counterclaim by terrorist and their opponents. Terror does nottake place in a vacuum. It seeks to levy demands and, in return, seeks togenerate a response. That on-going dynamic colors and shapes the actionsand reactions of both sides, offering a continuing cycle of give and take, calland response dynamic that limits analytic and predictive opportunities.


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The model outlined here is incomplete and without limitation. Morework is needed, including empirical testing. But it may offer a starting point,one that can stimulate new research and testing which could ultimately leadto a greater capacity to predict, and prevent, terrorist spectaculars. Willterrorists again use mass casualty weapons on a large scale? No one knows.At best we can guess, and hope that those guesses are based on reasonableand appropriate criteria. We hope we ask the right questions, generate theright data, and interpret those data accurately. Proof, in a sense, is the non-event, for if we can understand the dynamic well enough to predict andprevent, we have succeeded.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments and criticisms from David C.Rapoport, Gavin Cameron, Mark Kauppi, Sean Lynn-Jones, and anonymous reviewers.

NOTES

1. For the purposes of this article, ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD) and ‘mass-casualtyweapons’ are used to denote the same class of weapons. In each, the terms are taken to meanchemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons which are intended to create hundredsor thousands of casualties in a single event or application. They are weapons of immediacy,with death and destruction at or shortly following weapon use.

2. See, for example, Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress 1999) pp.1–2; Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorist: Fanaticism and the Arms of MassDestruction (New York: Oxford University Press 1999) pp.49–53, where he outlines severalpublished fictional scenarios; and Joseph W. Foxell, Jr., ‘The Debate on the Potential forMass-Casualty Terrorism: The Challenge to US Security’, Terrorism and Political Violence11/1 (Spring 1999) pp.100–104.

3. Excellent compendia can be found in Jonathan B. Tucker (ed.), Toxic Terror: AssessingTerrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Cambridge: MIT Press 2000) andLt.Col. George W. Christopher (USAF) et al., ‘Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective’,JAMA 278/5 (6 Aug. 1997) pp.412–17.

4. Examples available on the Internet include John M. Deutch, ‘Speech Presented at theConference on Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Weapons Proliferation and Terrorism, 23 May1996’, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public affairs/speeches/archives/1996/dci speech 052396.html>; Deutch, ‘Fighting Foreign Terrorism’, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public affairs/speeches/archives/1996/dci speech 090596.html>; John A. Lauder, ‘Statement by SpecialAssistant to the DCI for Non-Proliferation John Lauder on the Worldwide Biological WarfareThreat to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as prepared for delivery on3 March 1999’, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public affairs/speeches/lauder speech 030399.html>;and Lauder, ‘Unclassified statement for the record on Worldwide WMD Threat to theCommission to Assess the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction as prepared fordelivery on 29 April 1999’, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/public affairs/speeches/ lauder speech042999.html>.

5. An overview of US government initiative can be found in Government Accounting Office(GAO) publications Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National


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Policy and Strategy, report GAO/NSIAD-97-254 (1997); Combating Terrorism: Threat andRisk Assessments can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments, report GAO/NSIAD-98-74 (1998); Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues, reportGAO/TNSIAD-98-164 (1998); and Combating Terrorism: Issues to Resolve to ImproveCounterterrorism Operations, report GAO/NSIAD-99-135 (1998); and Deputy Chief, DCICounterterrorism Center, ‘International Terrorism: Challenge and Response’,http://www.ia.gov/cia/di/speeches/ intlterr.html. Non-government contributions includeGavin Cameron, ‘The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism’, Journal of Conflict Studies 18/2(Fall 1998) pp.5–28; Foxell (note 2); and Ian Lesser et al., Countering the New Terrorism(Santa Monica: RAND 1999) pp.34–35, 74–80, and 85–144.

6. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed., (Chicago: University ofChicago Press 1996) pp.148–52.

7. David C. Rapoport, ‘Terrorism and Weapons of the Apocalypse’, National Security StudiesQuarterly 5/3 (Summer 1999) pp.49–67 and Ehud Sprinzak, ‘The Great SuperterrorismScare’, Foreign Policy 112 (Fall 1998) pp.110–24.

8. Bruce Hoffman’s argument in ‘“Holy Terror”: The Implications of Terror Motivated by aReligious Imperative’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 18/4 (Oct.–Dec. 1995) pp.273, isone of the most widely cited references. Examples which incorporate Hoffman’s argumentinclude Cameron (note 5) pp.19, 23; Joel Dyer, Harvest of Rage: Why Oklahoma City is Onlythe Beginning (Boulder: Westview Press 1998) pp.75–106; Hoffman, ‘Enter the NewTerrorist, Mute and Bloodthirsty’, The Baltimore Sun (18 Aug. 1998) pp.9A; and Foxell(note 2) p.97.

9. See, for example, Stern (note 2) pp.138–9, 151–4; Lauder, March and April 1999 speeches(note 4).

10. Deutch, May and September 1996 speeches (note 4).11. Dyer (note 8) pp.27–71, provides an extensive argument on this point.12. Richard K. Betts, ‘The New Threat of Mass Destruction’, Foreign Affairs 77/1 (Jan.–Feb.

1998) pp.27–9 and Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, ‘Catastrophic Terrorism:Tackling the New Danger’, Foreign Affairs 77/6 (Nov.–Dec. 1998) pp.81–94.

13. Brian Jenkins, ‘Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?’, Orbis 29/3 (Fall 1985) p.511.14. Rapoport, ‘Weapons of the Apocalypse’ (note 7).15. See C.J.M. Drake, ‘The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection’, Terrorism and

Political Violence 10/2 (Summer 1998) pp.53–85 and Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection(London: MacMillan 1998).

16. See, for example, David C. Rapoport, ‘The Politics of Atrocity’, in Yonah Alexander andSeymour Maxwell Finger (eds.), Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York: JohnJay Press 1977) pp.46–61, especially pp.51–3 and Joanne Wright, Terrorist Propaganda: TheRed Army Faction and the Provisional IRA, 1968–86 (New York: St Martin’s Press 1991)pp.4–7, 35–7.

17. Message effect on multiple audiences parallels the terrorist’s effort to solve his collectiveaction problem. For a detailed discussion of efforts and efficacy in addressing thoseaudiences, see Mark I. Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of MichiganPress 1995) especially pp.111–27.

18. Osama bin Laden, ‘Expel the Mushrikeen from the Arabian Peninsula’ (1996),<http://www.webstorage.com/~azzam/html/declaration_of_war.html> and as ‘MSANEWS:The Lebanese Epistle: Declaration of War, parts I through III’, <http://msanews.mynet.net/MSANEWS/199610/19961012.3.html>.

19. David C. Rapoport, ‘Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions’,American Political Science Review 78/3 (Sept. 1984) p.674.

20. Bonnie Cordes, ‘When Terrorists do the Talking: Reflections on Terrorist Literature’, TheJournal of Strategic Studies 10/4 (Dec. 1987) pp.150–51.

21. Drake (note 15).22. bin Laden (note 18).23. Hoffman, ‘Holy Terror’ (note 8); Bruce Hoffman, ‘Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary


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Hypotheses’, The Nonproliferation Review 4/3 (Spring–Summer 1997) p.48; Hoffman,Inside Terrorism (note 8) pp.94–5, 201; Hoffman, ‘Enter the New Terrorist’ (note 8); JamesK. Campbell, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (Seminole: Interpact Press 1997) pp.5,143–4; and Foxell (note 2) p.97 are noteworthy examples in which religious imperative islinked to propensity for violence.

24. See, for example, National Council of Resistance of Iran web pages, <http://www.iran-e-azad.org/english/ncri.html>.

25. Cordes (note 20).26. Drake (note 15).27. Palestinian Liberation Organization, ‘The Palestinian National Charter’, Resolution of the

Palestine National Council (July 1–17, 1968). Those portions of the charter specificallycalling for Israel’s destruction have since been amended.

28. Michael Baumann, Terror or Love? Bommi Baumann’s Own Story of his Life as a WestGerman Urban Guerrilla (New York: Grove Press 1977) pp.86, 106–10; Jillian Becker,Hitler’s Children: The Story of the Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Gang (Philadelphia: LippincottCo. 1977) pp.12, 260–61, 268–71; and RAF, ‘The Urban Guerrilla is History… FinalCommuniqué of the Red Army Faction’ (March 1998).

29. See, for example, John D. Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution (Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press 1981) pp.300, 320; Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounterwith Iran (New York: Penguin Books 1985) pp.232–8; and Ervand Abrahamian, The IranianMojahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press 1989) pp.187–9, 198, 206–23.

30. See, among others, Lyman Tower Sargent (ed.), Extremism in America: A Reader (NewYork: New York University Press 1995) pp.137–59, 176–90; Jeffrey Kaplan, ‘Right-WingViolence in North America’, in Tore Bjørgo (ed.), Terror from the Extreme Right (London:Frank Cass 1995) pp.44–95, especially quotes; Rafael S. Ezekiel, The Racist Mind: Portraitsof American Neo-Nazis and Klansmen (New York: Viking Books 1995) pp.184, 310–19 forexample; Andrew MacDonald [pseud. William Pierce], The Turner Diaries (New York:Barricade Books 1996); and Thomas E. Nelson, Rosalee A. Clawson, and Zoe M. Oxley,‘Media Framing of a Civil Liberties Conflict and its Effects on Tolerance’, AmericanPolitical Science Review 91/3 (Sept. 1997) pp.567–83.

31. Betts (note 12) pp.29, 39–41; Cameron (note 5) pp.19–23; and Hoffman ‘Holy Terror’ (note8) p.273 are examples.

32. bin Laden, ‘Mushrikeen’ (note 18).33. Khalid Mish’al, ‘Interview: Occupation should not feel like stability’, Palestinian Times

(Sept. 1997), <http://members.tripod.co.uk/alquds/ptimes_mishal.htm>.34. Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), ‘The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance

Movement’ (1988), article six. Posted to newsgroup ‘talk.politics.mideast’, 21 Dec. 1992.35. Shoko Asahara, ‘Rebirth in a Higher World’, <http://www.aum-shinrikyo.com/english/

teaching/rebirth.htm>; Asahara, ‘How to Live during the Time of Radical Change’,<http://www.aum-shinrikyo.com/english/teaching/changes.htm>; and Asahara, ‘World WarIIIis Coming Soon! The Control of Plasma’, <http://www.aum-shinrikyo.com/english/teaching/ plasma.htm>. See also Manabu Watanabe, ‘Religion and Violence in Japan Today:A Chronology and Doctrinal Analysis of Aum Shinrikyo’, Terrorism and Political Violence10/4 (Winter 1998) pp.84–7.

36. Asahara, ‘Plasma’ (note 35).37. Jerrold Post, ‘Prospects for Nuclear Terrorism: Psychological Motivations and Constraints’,

in Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (eds.), Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Reportand Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism (Lexington:Lexington Books 1987) p.93.

38. See, for example, Charles B. Strozier, Apocalypse: On the Psychology of Fundamentalism inAmerica (Boston: Beacon Books 1994) pp.89–92; Michael Barkun, ‘Millenarians andViolence: The Case of the Christian Identity Movement’, in Thomas Robbins and Susan J.Palmer (eds.), Millenium, Messiahs, and Mayhem: Contemporary Apocalyptic Movements(New York: Routledge 1997) pp.247–60; Dick Anthony and Thomas Robbins, ‘Religious


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Totalism, Exemplary Dualism, and the Waco Tragedy’, in Robbins and Palmer (eds.)pp.261–84; John R. Hall and Philip Schuyler, ‘The Mystical Apocalypse of the SolarTemple’, in Robbins and Palmer (eds.) pp.285–311; Mark R. Mullins, ‘Aum Shinrikyo as anApocalyptic Movement’, in Robbins and Palmer (eds.) pp.313–24; and Dyer (note 8)pp.211–13.

39. David C. Rapoport, ‘To Claim or not to Claim: That is the Question – Always!’ Terrorismand Political Violence 9/1 (Spring 1997) p.12 and Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology ofTerrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century’, Political Psychology 21/2 (June 2000)pp.405–20.


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audience and message: assessing terrorist wmd potential

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