art and the mind || development of photogenic comprehension

7
National Art Education Association Development of Photogenic Comprehension Author(s): Harry Beilin Source: Art Education, Vol. 36, No. 2, Art and the Mind (Mar., 1983), pp. 28-33 Published by: National Art Education Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3192658 . Accessed: 14/06/2014 08:21 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . National Art Education Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Art Education. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 195.34.79.176 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 08:21:42 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Upload: harry-beilin

Post on 22-Jan-2017

216 views

Category:

Documents


3 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Art and the Mind || Development of Photogenic Comprehension

National Art Education Association

Development of Photogenic ComprehensionAuthor(s): Harry BeilinSource: Art Education, Vol. 36, No. 2, Art and the Mind (Mar., 1983), pp. 28-33Published by: National Art Education AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3192658 .

Accessed: 14/06/2014 08:21

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

National Art Education Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to ArtEducation.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.176 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 08:21:42 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 2: Art and the Mind || Development of Photogenic Comprehension

"Children become increasingly knowledgeable of the properties of photographs and how they are distinguished from the objects they represent."

NW b m

Development of Photogenici Development of Photogenic ? Comprehension' Harry Beilin

M uch effort is expended, and rightfully so, in the attempt to understand how reading

skill is acquired, but little is devoted to whether children understand what they see in pictures and how they acquire the competence needed to understand in particular the intentions or even content of photographs. One possible reason for the lack of interest in photographic com- prehension is the assumption that photographs are directly and immediate- ly understood and require no skills com- parable to those in reading. Although this assumption may be intuitively reasonable, I will try to show that it is only in part true. J.J. Gibson put the situation nicely, "most people think they know what a picture is, anything so familiar must be simple. They are wrong (1980, p. xvii)."

Despite the relative poverty of data on children's understanding of photo- graphic information, there is no lack of explanations of the nature of pictorial processing. Attempts at characterizing picture perception and comprehension divide into two groups: theories of direct perception and cognitive theories. Theories like J.J. Gibson's consider pic- ture processing to depend on the way any other aspect of the world is perceiv-

ed, that is, directly. "A picture," Gib- son says, "is a surface so treated that a delineated optic array. . . is made available that contains the same kind of information that is found in the ambient optic array of an ordinary environment (1971, p. 31)." "Even a photograph records a field of vision, a sample of am- bient light, and is thus analogous to looking with the head . . . (p. 274)." The surface of the picture is said by Gib- son to yield two kinds of information: information of the thing pictured and information of the picture as an object itself. By virtue of the latter, no one, says Gibson, will mistake the picture for the thing being pictured. We will ques- tion this assertion later.2

The principal alternative to theories of direct perception is a group of cognitive theories, of which Hochberg's (1972) is an example. He cites a variety of pictures, involving figure distortion, for which some form of compensation must be made in order to correct for deviations from the viewer's expecta- tion. Hochberg argues further that without intention, saccadic movement, the small-size movements of the eye that lead to the construction of a percept would be random. Instead, peripheral vision establishes a context of expecta-

tions of what will be found if the image is brought into foveal view. Thus, view- ing the still picture is the intentional for- mulation and testing of sensory expec- tations. Further, " . . . pictures therefore draw on mental structures nor- mally developed in the service of seeing the real world (1980, p. 59)." "... eye movements and head movements. . . are elective . . . what is done with it [stimulus information] depends on the viewer's perceptual purpose or intention (1980, p. 59)." Expectation and world knowledge also enter into Gombrich's conception of pictorial representation. He says, "What a picture means to the viewer is strongly dependent on his past experience and knowledge." "In this respect the visual image is not a mere representation of reality but a symbolic system (1974, p. 241)." The beholder of the picture contributes his share "to bring the picture to life (1969, p. 72)." "It is, I am afraid, the disappointing truth, contrary to our wish, that pictures don't tell their own story (p. 89)." Evidence for this observation is readily available, as others have pointed out, in any collection of newspaper photo- graphs where without written captions the meaning of the photograph is com- pletely lost or incomprehensible. The

Art Education March 1983

I ,A 4,

INq

-mI

28

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.176 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 08:21:42 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 3: Art and the Mind || Development of Photogenic Comprehension

dramatic picture of a body in mid-air may be a person jumping up or a per- son falling down. Every picture then is in some sense ambiguous.

Gombrich goes further in stating that photographs are not simply a means of recording reality. "Not one square inch in a photograph corresponds to reality, because the black and white photograph reproduces only gradations in type bet- ween the very narrow range of grays, not one of these tones corresponds to what we call reality (1969, p. 36)." The symbolic nature of pictures is also allud- ed to by the philosopher Nelson Good- man. " . . . one plain fact is that a pic- ture to represent an object must be a symbol for it, refer to it, and no degree of resemblance is sufficient to establish the requisite relation of reference. Nor is resemblance necessary for reference; almost anything can stand for anything else." Like Gombrich, Goodman holds "there is no innocent eye (1976, p. 7)," rather, the eye selects, organizes, discriminates, and constructs. He pro- poses also that all symbolization, in whatever medium, requires the imposi- tion of conventions that are arbitrary and not required by the independently existing reality that is to be copied or im- aged (Black, 1971). The conventionalist aspect of picturing and perceiving is much disputed by Rudolf Arnheim, among others. Taking a modified gestaltist view, Arnheim says, "Visual perception is pattern perception: it organizes and structures the shapes of- fered by the optical perceptions in the eye. These organized shapes, not sets of conventional ideographs, yield the visual concepts that make pictures readable (1974, p. 159)."

The conventionalist aspect of pictorial representation is a central feature of most semiotic theories of pictorial representation, particularly in the assumption that pictorial representation requires some kind of code for represen- tation and without knowledge of such codes the messages implicit in any sym- bolic form are incapable of being com- municated or understood. The codes are socially shared, conventional norms and rules by which artists and photographers detail their intentions. In Roland Bar- thes' (1977) analysis of photographic codes, two types of message are delineated; one is a message without a code, the denoted message, in which the photographer provides an analogue to reality, and second is the connoted

message, which is reflected in the photographer's style and is designed to impart his intentions.

These different theoretical accounts of the nature of pictorial perception sug- gest that an adequate psychological ac- count of pictorial representation re- quires a resolution of the controversy between theories of direct perception and cognitive theories based on the pro- cessing of pictorial conventions of representation. In direct perception theories, development entails a construc- tive process, based either on experien- tial learning or the reciprocal interaction between subject capacities and represen- tational objects.

Evidence in respect to this and related issues that I will now cite derives from studies by others and from a research program conducted by my students and myself.

Studies that bear on nativist origins of picture perception derive principally from investigations of infants and of subjects in picture-free cultures. The data from these studies suggest that at least for the recognition and identifica- tion of objects in color photographs, a basic human competence is evident, one that requires minimal prior experience with pictures, although in nonin- dustrialized societies, the black/white convention of representation may have to be learned (Hagen & Jones, 1978). Some of the earliest evidence that primates respond to the photographs of objects was provided by Gestaltists (Kohler, 1925). Recent evidence con- firms that even lower forms are able to respond veridically to objects in pictures (Hernstein & Loveland, 1964), although Cabe (1980) in a review of the relevant literature feels that only a qualified "yes," can be given to the question as to whether nonhuman subjects recognize objects and events in pictures. Thus, there is compelling evidence that some forms of picture perception are defined by native ability in both human and nonhuman species. A report by Ninio and Bruner (1978) describes an observation of an infant who grasped for a picture as though it were the real object. This would appear to be evidence in favor of the Gibsonian direct perception thesis, except that at the same time it is a denial of Gibson's claim that the picture also offers information about itself as a picture and not just of the object it depicts.

In a preliminary study to a more ex-

tensive investigation still underway, Pearlman and Beilin (1979) found, in a sample of 140 children between three and five years of age, that when presented with color photographs of ob- jects varying in sensory qualities, some of the children believed the photographs possessed properties unique to the ob- jects themselves. Thus, a photograph of a rose was thought to smell like a rose, a photograph of an ice cream cone would be cold, etc. This type of belief, which we refer to as "iconic realism," when scored showed that 80%o of 3-year- olds gave at least three such iconic realism responses, whereas only 40%7o of the 4-year-olds and 11 o of the 5-year- olds did. In the main investigation, which is now being analyzed, under- taken with 2-year-olds as well, Pearlman observed more attempts to physically engage the pictures, to lick the ice cream cone picture, grab the orange juice glass in the picture, etc. What these results show is that the surface or material pro- perties of photographs are not known by young children. Instead, very young children believe photographs share distinctive features with the objects depicted. Only gradually do children ac- quire knowledge of representational ob- jects, that pictures for example have defined boundaries, that they have dif- ferent surface textures, etc. so that they can be differentiated from the objects they depict.

What of information in pictures beyond that of object identification and recognition? The perception of pictorial depth information in photographs and slides, for example, has been shown by Hagen to be consistently inferior to the perception of comparable depth infor- mation in real scenes (Hagen, Glick & Morse, 1978).

Further, in the representation of perspective in photographs, one faces a peculiar fact that embarrasses the direct perception view. Photographers have long known that when photographs show buildings with converging lines up- ward, similar to railroad tracks converg- ing on the horizon, they are experienc- ed as strange, even though the principles of perspective work equally in both cases. Hagen tested the assertion that such information of perspective in spatially correct geometric figures does not look natural to the average adult and child. She obtained a series of com- puter generated drawings of geometric solids varying from conical to parallel

Art Education March 1983 29

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.176 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 08:21:42 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 4: Art and the Mind || Development of Photogenic Comprehension

perspectives. The parallel (and un- natural) perspective was consistently judged as the most natural (Hagen & Jones, 1978). The results support a con- ventionalist, or at the least, a cognitive interpretation of picture processing, although Hagen interprets these data within a theory that holds that the mean- ing of perceptual experience resides in the relation between what is in the stimulus and what is in the head (1980).

Other examples of processes that go beyond object recognition are those that bear on interrelations among objects, an instance of which is the perception of motion. In Freidman & Stevenson's (1975, 1980) study of the development of motion perception in still pictures, the different ways in which movement is represented in paintings, drawings, car- toons, and photographs was in- vestigated. A continuum underlying the categories of motion cues was derived that ranged from cues that correspond to environmental information (e.g., white water) to metaphorically related cues (e.g., wavy lines in cartoons). They report that knowledge of motion cues is an age-related acquisition and is a func- tion of either "cognitive maturity" or "increased opportunity to learn associa- tions." This theoretical neutrality toward the development of pictorial comprehension is not shared in I. Sigel's (1978) characterization of pictorial development. Sigel emphasizes that a number of transformations are involv- ed when a scene or object is represented pictorially. Size is usually reduced, or with very small objects, may be greatly enlarged. Three-dimensionality is trans- formed to two-dimensionality, and col- or may be rendered in black/white, etc. The perceived is thus required to establish equivalence between the representational object and the reality depicted. This "conservation of mean- ing" in the face of the described transformations parallels the Piagetian conservations of quantity, and by im- plication should require comparable competencies in development. Sigel reports that young children and low in- come level subjects do have greater dif- ficulty classifying pictures of objects than classifying the objects themselves, although the latter facts are not necessarily accounted for by Sigel's theory alone.

How children undergo change in their knowledge of the photographic medium and the way in which meaning is

represented in photographs has been the subject of our own investigations, as the Pearlman and Beilin (1979) study already cited indicates. Even if one ac- cepts that the ability to perceive and recognize objects is an essentially unlearned competence, the question is still open as to how everything else is understood, since most other informa- tion in photographs is relational or bears upon knowledge of the world and re- quires some inferential process to discern. This is the case with motion cues, as the Friedman and Stevenson study demonstrates. We were interested also in how motion is understood in photographs, and a series of studies was undertaken to explore this question. One study (Kose, Beilin, & O'Connor, 1980; in press), concerned the ability to perceive and comprehend the depiction of arrested human action. Eighty sub- jects, 3 through 6 years of age were ask- ed to describe the poses of a child model shown in a set of 12 black/white photographs. They were also asked to imitate the poses of a live model. The poses were unusal but within the capabilities of the child to both describe and imitate (e.g., hands on hips, stan- ding on one leg with the other raised and flexed at the knee). With a maximum score of 2 possible, 3-year-olds had a mean score of .36 and 6-year-olds a score of 1.86 for photographic imita- tions. Live model imitations, on the other hand, were 1.27 at 3 years and 1.97 at 6; a nonsignificant difference for the live models and a significant one for the photographs. To see if the same dif- ficulty appears in the imitation of poses depicted in other representational media, a comparable group of children imitated the same poses, this time shown in line drawings and dolls. The imita- tions of both drawings and dolls were superior to those of photographs and approximated those of the live model. The data of this study show that the comprehension of certain types of ac- tion in photographs undergoes change with age. In this case, the transforma- tion of unusual human postures to the photographic medium is apparently a difficult one to comprehend. It is more difficult than drawings, probably because drawings concentrate on the representation of critical or distinctive features. Dolls, on the other hand, represent human action in most all features and do so in a three- dimensional space. The principal

transformation involved is that of size, and as other data show the size transfor- mation is not critical. Two further in- vestigations bear on the comprehension of motions.

We were interested to see, in one of these studies, whether more usual representations of action, not confined to human postures, would be equally difficult to process. In a pilot study by Margo Morse (Morse & Beilin, 1982) 10 children between 3 and one-half years and 4 and one-half years were presented with 45 experimental photographs that varied in size, color, and whether they contained still or movement cues. (They had previously been identified as such by adult judges.) Neither color nor size affected the results, but in respect to the identification of movement and the lack of movement, the results, considering prior research, were unexpected: .76 of the pictures were labeled correctly (still, .72; moving, .79). The pictures with movement contained four types of cues: postural, context (e.g., suspension cues, pathmarks, etc.), metaphor (blurring and multiple images), and real-world knowledge (white water). Were it not for the relatively poor performance on those motion cues that depend on real-world knowledge (.59), overall performance would have been even higher (posture = 97; context = .86; meta- phor = .87). Thus one sees in this three- to-four year-old group the ability to ex- tract motion information from most photographs.

A study by Schwartzman (Schwart- zman & Beilin, 1982) with a small group of subjects also shows that first grade children (6-years-old) and fourth grade (10-years-old) respond to motion cues when shown photographs in which blur as cue to motion was varied (object blur and/or background blur). Although both grades responded well to the mo- tion cues, first grade children respond- ed principally to postural cues and fourth graders to blur cues.

From these studies we are not certain, however, of the minimal age at which motion in photography is comprehend- ed. What is apparent, however, is that certain cues are accurately processed earlier than others. Those least likely to be known are those most particular to the medium (blurring, for example) and most likely to stand in a symbolic rela- tion to their referents. In these studies, as is the case generally, there is an assumption that a photograph provides

Art Education March 1983 30

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.176 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 08:21:42 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 5: Art and the Mind || Development of Photogenic Comprehension

a true picture of that aspect of the world it depicts. At the same time, most adults understand that photographs can be faked. The question we posed was when and how the belief in photographic fidelity develops in children and whether this belief is unique to photographs. In our initial study (O'Connor, Beilin & Kose, 1981) 200 6-year-old children who were classified as operational and preoperational by Piagetian criteria were shown either a series of color photographic slides or a series of line drawings depicting a classic conserva- tion of liquid task. The last slide of each series showed a fake ending. Each child also saw an actual conservation task car- ried out by the experimenter with stan- dard materials that ended in the usual logical outcome, although in one con- trol series it ended in an illogical out- come. After viewing both the standard materials and either the photographic or drawing series, they were asked which way the water in the jars should really look. The results showed that the stan- dard materials were more believable than the photographs and drawings, but in this experimental context, in which believability was stretched to the ex- treme with the photographs, a surpris- ing proportion of subjects believed the illogical photographic series was how the water in jars should look, despite what they had observed in actual physical manipulation. A second study by O'Connor (1980) involved transitive relations in blocks ordered by size, and depicted in photographs as before. The results were essentially the same. The se- cond study revealed, however, that when children responded correctly as to whether photographs or the standard materials were the true depictions, they explained their judgments as a perceiv- ed "trick" or gave a logical explanation. When they judged incorrectly, they responded with a reason equivalent to "photographs do not lie." Both fideli- ty studies reveal again children's limited knowledge of the properties of the photographic medium, as well as the generally compelling influence of photographs upon beliefs about reality.

The studies presented thus far con- cerned the representation of physical reality. The evidence collected in another study reveals developmental dif- ferences in the perception of photographs that bear upon one's self image. In this study (Pazer & Beilin,

age were shown 4 x 5 black/white photographs taken of each subject in a variety of views. A week later, subjects were shown 14 sets of photographs in- cluding their own. Each set was ranked from least to most attractive, and sub- jects were then questioned as to their feelings of personal attractiveness. Coef- ficients of concordance between each subject's ranking of his own photo and the groups' ranking, ranged from .007 at 7 years to .59 at 75 years, suggesting increased objective self awareness with age. Responses to the photographs themselves were of even greater interest in showing developmental differences in self perceptions. At 7 years, 93% of the subjects thought they usually look at- tractive in photographs, whereas only 53Wo of adolescents and young adults thought so. From adolescence to adulthood there is either increased discrimination among photographic portrayals, because of the development

of critical faculties, or because of in- creasing distance between ego ideals and perceived reality. Only 13% of the mid- dle group (50 years), however, thought they were attractive in photographs, suggesting that aging had increased the distance between reality and a sustain- ed ego ideal. Most senior citizens (the 75 year group) did not see themselves any longer as attractive, but 82%7o of them felt they were as attractive (or unattrac- tive) in photographs as they were in reality, suggesting a change in ego ideals and a reduction in distance between those ideals and the evaluation of reality.

This series of studies underscores two significant generalizations. The first distinguishes photographs from other forms of representation in indicating its special qualities. The second indicates that the comprehension of photographic imagery undergoes developmental change. The foregoing theoretical and

1979 Scholastic/Kodak Photography Awards. Honor Award. Photo

1981), 75 subjects from 7 to 75 years of

Art Education March 1983

I? I ?~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.

I

31

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.176 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 08:21:42 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 6: Art and the Mind || Development of Photogenic Comprehension

empirical considerations have led us to formulate a tentative theory of photographic cognition, only parts of which we are able to present in this limited space.

We start with the assumption that the relationship between the perceiver and photograph involves a number of com- ponent processes that vary depending on whether the perceiver is producing the photograph or attempting to understand it. Relations among the components bear on the perceiver's world knowledge, knowledge of the camera, beliefs concerning how the camera represents the world and the intentions of the photographer, as well as the perception of photographs as represen- tational objects.

We assume further that the processes of perception and cognition that result in photographic understanding are con- structive. The process of picture percep- tion results in organized perceptual units, namely perceptual schemata created from the integration of saccadic movements. Comparably, cognitive schemata result from an active en- counter with photographic objects, as well as the social and linguistic characterization of those objects, together with their use. The latter schemata undergo progressive develop- ment with age and experience, based in part on increasing knowledge of the in- terrelations among objects themselves and from the child's own actions on them. Children become increasingly knowledgeable of the properties of photographs and how they are distinguished from the objects they represent. Particular properties of the medium are progressively related to physical knowledge, as is evident in understanding that specific information in a photograph denotes movement of objects and is distinguished from movements of the camera itself.

Increasingly the content of the photograph is understood in symbolic terms as their contents become associated with the perceived intentions of their producers. The intentions of producers in turn take on two aspects. They reflect social conventions and styles of depiction (e.g., soft focus vs. straight photographs), and are coded in standardized ways (soft = romantic). Secondly, they reflect personal modes of depiction that communicate individual and meanings (as in personal snap- shots). In a more general sense, the

development of representational com- petence maps onto more abstract logical and operational systems by virtue of which the child is increasingly able to deal effectively with a constantly transformed physical and social reality.

So much for the theory; now, what about its educational implications?

Jean Piaget, on many occasions, was asked how his theory could be applied to education. He consistently begged off answering, claiming he knew little about education. He would only assert that teachers should have knowledge of how the child develops, and argued against the evils of didactic methods. Many psychologists and educators, however, have offered their own versions of how to apply his theory. As one would ex- pect, the results in most cases were either platitudes or contradictions. I draw a particular moral from this. Develop- ment theory, or more generally, any psychological theory, can be used to buttress any educational policy, although some theories may lend themselves more easily than others to particular practices. I believe further that it is an error to look to developmen- tal theory for models of educational design. Rather, education, including art education, should develop its technology in its own terms, from tested educa- tional practice, from subject matter with which it is concerned, as well to what the child is capable of comprehending and producing, but the latter is only one component in the system and not necessarily the most important. I am reinforced in this view by the point made by Ernest Gombrich that a disservice has been done in art education by rejecting copying and imitating as a method of learning to draw and paint, a method us- ed in the training of some of the masters of the past. The change in practice had come about not as a result of demonstrated superiority of other methods but from changes in educa- tional and social philosophy-in recent years exemplified by the so-called human potential movement.

The lessons from our research in photography suggest to me only that educators consider photographs as they would all representational objects, not merely as recreational devices, but as in- struments for aesthetic experimentation; to see photographs as symbolic in- struments for the purpose of metaphoric as well as "realistic" representation and to see that photography provides a

means of entry into what the producer is capable of constructing and the con- sumer is capable of beholding. U

Harry Beilin is professor in The Graduate School of the City University of New York, in New York City.

Footnotes

'An earlier version of this paper was presented in the symposium, "Developmental theories: what do they say to the art educator?," American Educational Research Association An- nual meeting, New York, March, 1982.

2More recently, Gibson appears to equivocate on this point. "The various affordances of surfaces, substances, layouts and events get perceived in the course of development of the young animal by maturation and learning taken together, by encountering the surfaces in the habitat, without schooling. On the other hand, the referential meanings of marks on a surface get apprehended by children in ways that differ from the preceding, and also differ from one another (1980, xiii)." Further, "surfaces and what they afford are actually perceived. Pictured surfaces, objects, places, persons and events are not actual- ly perceived in the proper meaning of the term. Photographic pictures can at best provide a sort of partial second-hand perception for stay-at-home observers (Gibson, 1954)" (1980, p. xiii).

References

Arnheim, R., "On the Nature of Photography," Critical Inquiry, 1974, Vol. 1, pp. 149-161.

Barthes, R., "Image-Music-Text," Essays selected and translated by S.H. Heath, London Fontana/Collins, 1977.

Black, M., "The Structure of Symbolic Systems: A Review of Nelson Good- man's Languages of Art," Linguistic In- quiry, 1971, Vol. 2, pp. 515-538.

Cabe, P.A., "Picture Perception in Nonhuman Subjects," in M.A. Hagen, ed., The Perception of Pictures, Vol. 2, Durer's Devices: Beyond the Projective Model of Pictures, New York: Academic Press, 1980.

Friedman, S.L. & Stevenson, M.B., "Developmental Changes in the Understanding of Implied Motion in Two-Dimensional Pictures," Child Development, 1975, Vol. 46, pp. 773-778.

Friedman, S.L. & Stevenson, M.B., "Perception of Movement in Pictures," in M.A. Hagen, ed., The Perception of Pictures, Vol. 1 Alberti's Window: The

Art Education March 1983

.

32

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.176 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 08:21:42 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 7: Art and the Mind || Development of Photogenic Comprehension

Projective Model of Pictorial Informa- tion, New York: Academic Press, 1980.

Gibson, J.J., "The Information Available in Pictures," Leonardo, 1971, Vol. 4, pp. 27-35.

Gombrich, E., "The Visual Image," in D.R. Olson, ed., Media and Symbols: The Forms of Expression, Communication and Education, 73rd Yearbook, NSSE, 1974.

Gombrich, E., Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representa- tion, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1969.

Goodman, N., Languages of Art: An Ap- proach to a Theory of Symbols, In- dianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1976, orig. edit., 1968.

Hagen, M.A., "Generative Theory: A Perceptual Theory of Pictorial Represen- tation," in M.A. Hagen, ed., The Perception of Pictures, Vol. 2. Durer's Devices: Beyond the Projective Model of Pictures, New York: Academic Press, 1980.

Hagen, M.A., Glick, R. & Morse, B., "Role of Two-Dimensional Surface Characteristics in Pictorial Depth Perception, Perceptual and Motor Skills,

1978, Vol. 46, pp. 875-881. Hagen, M.A. & Jones, R.K., "Differential

Patterns of Preference for Modified Linear Perspective in Children and Adults," Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1978, Vol. 26, pp. 205-215.

Hernstein, R.J. & Loveland, D.H., "Com- plex Visual Concepts in the Pigeon," Science, 1964, Vol. 146, pp. 549-551.

Hochberg, J., "The Representation of Things and People," in E. Gombrich, J. Hochberg & M. Black, Art, Perception and Reality, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1972.

Kohler, W., The Mentality of Apes, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1925.

Kose, G., Beilin, H., O'Connor, J., "Children's Comprehension of Actions Depicted in Photographs," Paper presented at The Sixth Biennial Con- ference in Human Development, Alex- andria, Va., 1980.

Kose, G., Beilin, H., O'Connor, J., "Children's Comprehension of Actions Depicted in Photographs," Developmen- tal Psychology, in press.

Morse, M.M. & Beilin, H., "Preschool Children's Comprehension of Depicted Movement in Photographs: An Ex-

ploratory Study, unpublished report, CUNY, 1982.

Ninio, A. & Bruner, T., The Achievement and Antecedents of Labelling," Journal of Child Language, 1978, Vol. 5, pp. 1-15.

O'Connor, J., Beilin, H. & Kose, G., "Children's Belief in Photographic Fidelity," Developmental Psychology, 1981, Vol. 171, pp. 859-865.

O'Connor, J., "Transitivity and Represen- tation," unpublished doctoral disserta- tion, City University of New York, 1980.

Pazer, S. & Beilin, H., "The Relationship Between Photographs and Self Image," presented at Eastern Psychological Association, New York, April, 1981.

Pearlman, E. & Beilin, H., "Iconic Realism: A Study of Photographs as Symbolic En- tities," unpublished manuscript, CUNY, 1979.

Schwartzman, J. & Beilin, H., "Movements: An Exploratory Study," unpublished report, CUNY, 1982.

Sigel, I.E., "The Development of Pictorial Comprehension," in B.S. Randhawa & W.E. Coffman, eds., Visual Learning, Thinking and Communication, New York: Academic Press, 1978.

Art in Venice

Summer Study 1983 New York University's Graduate Study Abroad Program provides artists, art teachers, and pro- spective art teachers with an opportunity to do serious creative work within the rich artistic milieu of Venice and other nearby art centers. Earn 12 credits each summer and complete your M.A. in three summers: two in Venice and one at New York University's Washington Square Center. Credits may be applied toward the doctorate.

Dates: July-August 1983-8 weeks Tuition: $1-392 for 12 credits Travel and housing assistance available

For applications and further information, write:

School of Education, Health, Nursing, and Arts Professions New York University 64 Press Annex, Washington Square New York, N.Y. 10003 Attn.: Office of International and Overseas

Programs

A e Yok UnrIVERSMit IN THE PUlLIC SErVICE

New York University is an affirmative action/ equal opportunity institution.

the price is right!

Nasco's newly expanded 'ii. '83 Arts & Crafts Catalog

contains everything imaginable in the way of arts & crafts supplies and materials. Products for printing, painting, weaving, ceramics, pottery and you name

Il ...it. But the best thing is, our new catalog is free for the asking. And you can't beat a deal like that. Order yours today. Just call or write Dept. EE-833.

Free Phone Order Service fl 1-800-558-9595 / In Wisconsin 1-800-242-9587 / / /

Visit us at NAEA / 'UA'

L Booth No. 54 ^ "J. ~~\^^~~~~ ~ ~Fort Atkinson, Wl 53538 * Modesto, CA 95352

_s------------------^

Art Education March 1983

)

I I _ II ,~~~~~~

I 'L~~- 1

-I I . . .

33

This content downloaded from 195.34.79.176 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 08:21:42 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions