AN EVALUATION OF THE ARMOUR BATTLES DURING THE 1971 WAR OF

LIBERATION OF BANGLADESH

DISSERTATION

BY

BA-1488 COLONEL ABU MOHAMMAD ASLAM, ldmc, psc

DEFENCE SERVICES COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE, MIRPUR

A Dissertation Submitted to the National University in Partial Fulfillment of the

Curriculum of Master of Defence Studies Degree

December 1998

AN EVALUATION OF THE ARMOUR BATTLES OF THE 1971 WAR

DURING LIBERATION OF BANGLADESH

ABSTRACT

1. A very significant contribution was made by the armour troops of the Indian Army who

took part in the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971. The mixture of amphibious and medium

tanks proved to be very effective in breaking through the obstacle-ridden territory. The terrain

of Bangladesh, with water obstacles spread all over, is more suitable for the defenders than the

invaders. Even though the micro relief was unfavourable, the combination of the superior

firepower of T-55 medium tanks and the superior mobility of PT-76 light amphibious tanks

allowed a certain degree of freedom to the Indian Armour. The Pakistani armour deployed in

Bangladesh consisted of M-24 Chaffee tanks and a few PT-76 light amphibious tanks. These

elements were quite easily overpowered and made ineffective by Indian armour.

2. The terrain of Bangladesh can be divided into four sectors by the three major

riversystems which flow through the country. The north-western sector is demarcated by the

international boundary in the north and the west, river Jamuna in the east and river Padma in

the south. The south-western sector is bounded by river Padma in the north and the east, by the

Bay of Bengal in the south and by the international boundary with India in the west. The

eastern sector has the international boundary with India in the north and the eastern flanks. To

its south lies the Bay of Bengal and the western boundary lies along river Meghna. The central

sector is ‘Vee’-shaped, with the international boundary with India delimiting the northern part,

while rivers Jamuna and Meghna flow along its western and eastern flanks respectively.

3. The Pakistan army had five infantry divisions and one independent infantry brigade

inBangladesh before the war in 1971. Of the infantry divisions, two were ad hoc formations

and were raised to meet the needs of the prevailing circumstances. There was a lone armour

regiment, 29 Cavalry, stationed in Rangpur in the northwestern sector. The regiment was

equipped with light M-24 Chaffee tanks. Prior to the ourbreak of the war, two ad hoc squadrons

were raised with M-24 and PT-76 tanks. Both had two troops consisting a mixture of these

tanks. The deployment of the divisions and the allocation of armour resources were as follows.

9 Infantry Division was deployed in the southwestern sector with a squadron from 29 Cavalry

and the rest of the regiment was deployed with 16 Infantry Division looking after the north-

western sector. In the central sector, an ad hoc squadron was grouped with 36 Infantry

Division which was also responsible for the capital city of Dhaka. Finally, in the eastern sector

there were two infantry divisions. 14 Infantry Division was in the northern part with a troop of

PT-76 tanks, while 39 Infantry Division looked after the southern part and was provided with

an ad hoc squadron. In Chittagong, there was only an Independent Infantry Brigade without

any armour element.

4. The Indian army deployed a total strength of three Corps for the campaign in

Bangladesh In addition, .HQ 101 Communication Zone looked after the operations in the

central sector. A total of three armour regiments, three independent armour squadrons and an

ad hoc squadron were grouped with the deployed Corps. 45 Cavalry (PT-76) and a squadron

from 63 Cavalry (T-55) were grouped with 2 Corps operating in the south-western sector. 63

Cavalry (T-55) and 69 armour regiment (PT-76) and an ad-hoc squadron operated under the 33

Corps in the north-western sector. In the eastern sector, three independent armour squadrons

(PT-76) were given to 4 Corps,while no armour element was attached to 101 Communication

Zone in the central sector.

5. In the south-western sector, the battles started off quite early. In Garibpur, a Pakistani

Armour squadron lost about 11 tanks in November during 1971 the early lodgment operations.

Subsequently, 4 and 9 Divisions of 2 Corps entered Bangladesh through the Jibannagar and

Chaugachha approaches respectively. In both divisions,tank spearheaded the advance in close

support to the infantry. After the initial encounters 4 divisions dispatched a special task group

with armour to cut off the road Meherpur–Faridpur. Capture of Kaliganj and Meherpur was

executed with bold actions by tanks. Apart from a debacle in Kushtia, the division advanced up

to Kamarkhali and Faridpur with remarkable speed. 9 infantry division fought its way with

armour to get through the water-logged area at Afra and drove back the Pakistani troops to

Khulna until they surrendered. In almost all the actions, the armour troops displayed a

remarkable capability in clearing opposition through outflanking actions.

7. In the north-western sector, preparations for the war started off much earlier Intensive

training was given to tank crews in traversing long distances at night along with crossing of

obstacles. Conversion training on newly introduced T-55 medium tanks was also carried out,

but this remained somewhat incomplete. Subsequently. the crews had to go through live

practice during the combat. 33 Corps cleared off the Tetulia bulge well in advance and carried

out the task of punching a hole through the shoulder at Hilli with 20 division. The operation

met stiff resistance from the very beginning and the stalemate was broken with long

outflanking manoeuvers carried out by armour towards objectives in depth. These operations

were successfully carried out in darkness and the blocking positions played havoc with

movements of the Pakistan Army troops. Armour was also used for reconnaissance in force, as

advance guard in establishing contact with the deployed Pakistani troops, as well as in the role

of close support troops during the assaults. The bold use of armour resulted in the rapid fall of

Pakistani Army strongholds and its forces were divided and pushed back towards the two

extreme ends of the sector. There were also certain difficulties in the armour operations. One

pertained to the sudden disengagement of the regiment equipped with medium tanks, while the

other was the shortage of spares needed to repair tanks.

8. In the eastern sector, the contribution by the armour troops was not so outstanding. The

paucity of armour resources was a major reason (since the operating divisions had the support

of only a squadron each). The crews found difficulty in crossing the obstacles and the rate of

recovery problems had a greater frequency. In Sylhet, only a squadron of scout cars provided

support to the infantry of the deployed division. In Akhaura and Chandpur, the PT-76

squadrons fought their way through the terrain with the mountain divisions. The tanks

successfully provided the close support required by the infantry. They also dominated the river

banks at Chandpur and Ashuganj and destroyed the Pakistani troops when they were

withdrawing in river crafts. The Meghna could not be crossed by the PT-76 tanks during a

crucial stage of the war. The concerned squadron had to reconnoitre a suitable crossing site in

order to join up with 57 mountain division which was advancing towards the capital.

9. No armour was deployed in the central sector and this resulted in a slow pace in the

operations. The advance positions had to be reduced through a process of attrition by the

infantry and this took a great deal of time. In the last stage of the war, the paratroopers

dropped in this sector reached Dhaka through an approach march. A link up with armour could

have assisted them greatly to reach Dhaka at a faster pace. This sector had no remarkable

obstacle, excepting the old Brahmaputra river to hinder the movement of armour.

10. The lessons which can be drawn from the armour operations of the 1971 war are

many. The basic ones pertain to the innovative use of a mixture of different types of tanks,

early training to familiarise crews with the likely hazards of the terrain, as well as the bold use

of armour to cut off the enemy from the rear. Other lessons pertain to the need for gaining

timely information on the terrain, the rapid deployment of armour to meet contingencies, the

ill-effects of launching armour into a built-up area and the disengagement of armour from a

sector at a critical time. The bold use of long outflanking manoeuvre in the hours of darkness,

despite inadequate knowledge of the terrain, is possibly one of the most outstanding examples

of flexibility in the employment of armour. It worked so well that one would be forced to

revise the opinion that the terrain of Bangladesh is not suited to armour operations.

11. Apart from the above, paucity of armour resources in certain sectors, the shortage of

critical spares to repair tanks at crucial moments, as well as the inability to cross water

obstacles by amphibious tanks provide lessons on the need for adequate resource planning and

management.

12. Overall, the campaign in Bangladesh witnessed a large number of armour operations.

These underscore the fact that the terrain is not unsuitable for armour employment. The

mistake made by the Pakistan army lay in not deploying adequate armour forces. This resulted

in their defeat in a state of total unpreparedness, attributable to their inability to counter Indian

armour actions.

AN EVALUATION OF THE ARMOUR BATTLES DURING THE 1971

LIBERATION WAR OF BANGLADESH

CHAPTER – I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The lightning performance of the Armour Corps was dramatically stamped on the

battlefields of the second world war by the Panzer Divisions of the German Army. It was, in

particular, General Heinz Guderian who first envisioned putting armour and infantry together

in mobile warfare. This innovation led to such far-reaching effects that the concept still

intrigues the strategists and field commanders of modern warfare. Traversing difficult country

against all odds and making an unexpected appearance amongst enemy soldiers in trenches has

been one of the classic roles historically played by armour. Intelligent field commanders have

used this stratagem against enemy forces which had been overconfident or complacent in

fortified positions (trenches). Armour had begun playing such a decisive role since the last

days of trench warfare, inheriting the past traditions of the cavalry.

1.2. The performance of the Indian and the Pakistani armour forces during the 1971 war

were very different and provide distinct lessons. A very significant contribution was made by

the armour troops of the Indian Army who participated in the liberation war of Bangladesh.

Even though they accounted for a numerically smaller proportion compared to the other arms

and services, their contribution in the overall campaign was far greater than anticipated. Since

the terrain of Bangladesh was obstacle-ridden , the Pakistani defenders were misled by the

belief that certain approaches would not favour armour movements. However, an innovative

mixture of light amphibious and medium tanks by the Indians played havoc with their defence.

By the time this was realised by the Pakistani forces, it was too late.

1.3. The 14 days of war was full of armour actions, especially in the western part of

Bangladesh. The Indian tank crews braved the obstacle-ridden territory and achieved surprise

in almost all places where tanks were deployed during this brief war.

1.4 The terrain of Bangladesh is more suitable for a defending force and can be a potential

nightmare for invading forces. They are like to have to pay dearly for such an entry. Even

though the micro relief of the terrain can lead to disaster, the combined efforts of medium and

light tanks permitted a much wider degree of manoeuvre ability than expected.

1.5. The Pakistani Army Armour deployed in Bangladesh consisted of M-24 Chaffee tanks

and a few PT-76 light amphibious tanks. This was easily overpowered and made ineffective.

The terrain and the people were both hostile to the Pakistani troops. Furthermore, this inferior

capability led to even worse consequences.

1.6. Operations within Bangladesh were carried out by the Indian Army with three corps

supported by three armour regiments. The armour was distributed amongst different sectors

and used extensively to provide close support to the large number of troops involved in the

operations. The tanks not only provided close support, but also ferried the infantry and heavy

equipment across the rivers. The long outflanking actions, especially in the hours of darkness

demonstrated the potential, which the terrain offered in the execution of mobile actions by

armour. Overall, these actions proved that the terrain of Bangladesh was not unsuitable for

manoeuvre by armour.

AIM

1.7. The aim of this dissertation is to evaluate the armour battles of the 1971 war of

Liberation of Bangladesh.

SCOPE

1.8. The scope of the analysis will cover the battles fought in various sectors of Bangladesh,

particularly where armour led the advance. The lessons emerging from the discussion and

analysis will be drawn out and integrated wherever possible. The discussion below is laid out

in the following sequence :-

1.8.1. Topography.

1.8.2. Pakistani Forces and Armour.

1.8.3. Indian Forces and Armour.

1.8.4. .Battles in the South Western Sector

1.8.5. Battles in the NorthWestern Sector.

1.8.6. Battles in the Eastern Sector.

1.8.7. Battle in the Central Sector and the Fall of Dhaka.

1.8.8. Analysis of the Armour Battles.

1.8.9. Conclusions.

CHAPTER II

TOPOGRAPHY

2.1. General Overview of the Terrain

2.1.1. As shown in Map 2.1, Bangladesh is largely a flat, alluvial plain with about half

of the surface of the country lying below the 25 feet contour line. The confluences of

the three major river systems of the Padma, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna divide the

country into four distinct sectors. One of them, containing some green hills and the

coastal plain along the Bay of Bengal, is in the southeastern part of the country. These

sectors are contiguous and non-overlapping, and cover the entire country exhaustively.

2.1.2. Even though the terrain is termed as an alluvial plain yet its physiography

presents considerable regional variety. Geologically speaking, the land can be divided

into three broad categories of physiographic regions. These are the Tertiary Hills, the

Pleistocene Uplands and the Recent Plains. This tripartite division largely coincides

with the stratification of the terrain based on altitude or relief. The Recent Plains can be

further subdivided into Piedmont Plain, FloodPlain, Deltaic Plain, Tidal Plain and

Coastal Plain.

2.1.3. Tertiary hills are found in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region in the South-east,

formed mainly of sand-stones and shale. The average height of these hills is around

1000 feet, the highest being Mowduk Mual (3292’) on the Bangladesh-Myanmar

border. The Pleistocene Uplands consist of the Madhupur Tracts, north of Dhaka City

and the Brained Uplands in the north-west of the country. The Madhupur tracts is a

continuous area of about 1500 sq. miles with an altitude varying between 30 to 60 feet.

The tract rises in the form of an island surrounded by floodplains. The Barind Uplands

in the northwest on the other hand is discontinuous but extends over a much larger area.

It has an altitude of about 130 feet at certain places. Another site of Pleistocene

formation is located at the Lalmai Hills near Comilla in the eastern part of the country.

2.1.4. Besides the above, areas in the rest of the country consist of plain lands. The

piedmont plain to the north-west rolls down sharply from north to south with a gradient

of 3 feet per mile on the average. Floodplains made up of continental deposits, deltaic

plains built up by both marine and continental deposits, as well as the tidal plains

composed predominantly of marine deposits, are all of very low elevation with

considerable areas lying below the 10 feet contour line. All of these taken together

account for 90 per cent of the territory of Bangladesh. A narrow strip along the coast of

Chittagong constitute a coastal plain. Marshes are fairly numerous and are strewn over

wide areas of Bangladesh. The major concentration of marshes can be noticed in the

southwest, northeast and the northwest parts of the country.

2.1.5. Rivers are the most significant features of the physical landscape of Bangladesh.

Excluding the ones in the south-western parts of Chittagong and Chittagong Hill Tracts,

the remaining rivers belong to three major river systems: the Ganges or Padma, the

Brahmaputra – Jamuna and the Meghna. There is, however, a large network of hundreds

of minor rivers and canals criss-crossing the entire landscape of the country.

2.2. The Rivers

2.2.1. The Padma or Ganges. The combined flow of the Alakananda and the

Bhagirathi, known as the Ganges after their confluence at Devaprayang, traverses about

1500 miles over Indian territory before entering Bangladesh. The Ganges has only one

(major) tributary within this country, namely the Mahananda, joining it on its left bank

in the district of Rajshahi. All the other rivers of this system are distributors, mostly

taking off from the right bank. The principal distributors of the Ganges system in

Bangladesh are the Bhairab, the Gorai-Madhumati and the Arial Khan. These rivers

have built up the gangetic Delta of Bangladesh, covering a vast area in the southwest of

the country.

2.2.2. The Jamuna-Bramhaputra. The Bramhaputra takes its origin in the

southernslopes of the Kailas Range and flows east as the Tsang Po across 1100 miles of

Tibetan Plateau, then turns south entering Indian territory through the north-eastern

frontier where it becomes known as the Bramhaputra. After entering Bangladesh, the

river branches off into two. One, the Jamuna flows due south, meeting the Padma at

Goalanda. Then the combined flow heads southeast, joining the Meghna at Chandpur.

The other, the old Bramhaputra (which was the main course a century and a half ago)

flows southeast, meeting the Meghna at Bhairab. Most of the rivers of the northwestern

region of Bangladesh, namely the Teesta, the Atrai and the Karotoya, are tributaries of

the Jamuna. Both the Jamuna and the Bramhaputra have a number of distributors such

as the Dhaleswari and the Lakhya, etc.

2.2.3. The Meghna. The headwaters of the Meghna, coming from the Barak,

enter Bangladesh through two arms, the Surma and the Kushiyara. These assume the

name Kalni after their confluence and, further downstream, become known as the

Meghna. This river flows in a north-south direction in the eastern part of the country

and receives tributaries from the Shillong plateau in the north and the Tipperah Hills in

the east, the principal ones being the Baulai, the Titas and the Gumti.

2.2.4. The Karnaphuli, Sangu and Matamuhuri. The river system described

above constitute an interlocking network. In contrast, the rivers in Chittagong and the

Chittagong Hill Tracts are quite detached from this network. The Karnaphuli flows in a

north-south direction over most of its course, eventually turning west to meet the sea at

her estuary. The Sangu and the Matamuhuri arise in the Bangladesh-Myanmar border

areas and flow south to north before turning west to their estuaries in the Bay of Bengal.

2.3. Climatic Conditions: Heavy monsoon rainfall in Bangladesh coupled with its location

at the lowermost reaches of the three mighty river systems, which drain a vast wet basin and

low altitude of major parts of the country makes flood an annual phenomenon. The monsoon

continues from May to October and the weather gets dry and cool between December to March.

In this dry season, flood water recede, paddies are harvested and allows overland or cross-

country movements favourable to military manoeuvres. These movements are easier in the

northern part because of the higher altitude.

2.4. Various Sectors of Bangladesh. On the basis of the above, the terrain of Bangladesh

can be divided into four distinct sectors as follows. (See Map 2.2):

2.5. South Western Sector. This sector consists of the area south of the Ganges and west

of the Padma. It is connected to the northern part of the country through the Hardinge Bridge

at Paksey over the Ganges and to Dhaka by the Goalanda ghat ferry terminal near Faridpur..

The critical locations are: Kushtia, Jhenidah, Jesssore, Khulna, Faridpur and Barishal. A good

road network exists between the major townships with a railway track linking these places,

running mostly alongside the highways. There is a number of rivers, the major ones being the

Gorai-Madhumati, the Arial Khan, the Bhairab, the Chitra and the Kobadak.

2.2.4. North-Western Sector or the Barind Uplands. This sector consists of the area

bounded by the Jamuna in the east, the Ganges in the South and the Indian border in the west

and the north. It contains the Barind Uplands and is relatively less susceptible to floods

especially in the north and the western extremities. The major river systems are the Tista,

Atrai, Ghaghat and Bangali. The important towships are Thakurgaon, Dinajpur, Rangpur,

Bogra, Natore, Rajshahi and Pabna. A good road network exists between these townships and

these are also linked by railway tracks running north to south. This area is connected to the

southern part of the country by the Hardinge bridge over the Ganges at Paksey and to the east

towards Dhaka, through Nagarbari ferry ghat.

2.2.5. Central Sector. This sector consists of the area bounded by Jamuna in the west, the

Meghna in the east and the Indian border in the North. Being a “Vee” shaped sector, the apex

is located in the south in Dhaka. The major river systems are the Jamuna, Meghna, the Old

Bramhaputra, the Dhaleswari, the Buriganga, the Banar, the Turag etc. The important places

are Dhaka, Mymensing, Jamalpur and Tangail. The Madhupur Uplands with the remnants of a

reserve forest, are located in the central part of the sector. All the important localities are well

connected by rail and road networks.

2.2.6. Eastern Sector. This sector consists of the area bounded by the Meghna and the

Padma in the west, the Indian border in the north and the east and the Bay of Bengal in the

south. There is also a small stretch of common border between Myanmar and Bangladesh in

the southeast. The important localities are Sylhet, Brahmanbaria, Comilla, Chandpur, Feni,

Chittagong, Moulavibazar, Habiganj and Sunamganj. These places are connected by railways

and road networks. The green hills of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and Sylhet and the hillocks at

Lalmai in Comilla constitute the tertiary hills noted earlier.

CHAPTER III

PAKISTANI FORCES AND ARMOUR

Infantry

3.1. In the then East Pakistan (Bangladesh), there was only one infantry division with four

infantry brigades until February 1971. Just before the crackdown, during March 1971,

additional troops were flown in from West Pakistan. By the first weeks of April 1971, two

more infantry divisions arrived in East Pakistan.. In the intervening period up to December,

1971, prior to the war, another eight infantry battalions were brought in. Thus, in total, there

were 35 infantry battalions before the outbreak of hostilities in December. These resources

enabled another two ad hoc infantry divisions and four ad hoc brigade headquarters to be

raised. Apart from the regular infantry, 7 wings of the frontier scouts and rangers, 17 wings of

the East Pakistan Civil Armed Force (EPCAF) raised from amongst the bihari population in

East Pakistan, 50,000 Razakars recruited from amongst the population and a large number of

Mujahids made a grand total of 73,000 para-military personnel. With these resources, the

Pakistan Army mustered a total of four Infantry divisions and four ad hoc Infantry brigades by

the time the hostilities broke out.

Armour

3.2. Prior to March, 1971, a lone armour regiment, the 29 Cavalry, was stationed at

Rangpur in the north-western sector, equipped with M-24 Chaffee tanks. (See Fig 3.1.) The

regiment had a total of 4 squadrons. In March 1971, two ad hoc troops of armour were raised

with crews from 29 cavalry for deployment in Dhaka for internal security reasons.

Subsequently, in October 1971, an ad hoc armour squadron was also raised with two troops of

M-24 chaffee tanks from sector reserve and a captured troop of PT-76 tanks (captured during

the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 from the Khem Karan Sector). In total these made up the armour

resources available to the Pakistan Army in Bangladesh during the war of 1971.

Deployment of Pakistani Troops

3.3 The Pakistani high command expected the Indian threat to take the form of an attack

from either Hilli in the northwestern sector or Bangaon in the southwestern sector. It was

believed that the Indian objective would be to capture all territory west of the river Jamuna.

The Pakistanis also laid special emphasis on the defence of the capital city of Dhaka. The

overall plan was to fight along successive lines of defence from the border, subsequently

withdrawing to the capital in the final phase.

3.4. However, owing to the guerrilla operations carried out by the Mukti Bahini (Freedom

fighters from the Bengali civilians) and the presence of a hostile population, movements of the

Pakistani troops were often hindered. It was, therefore, decided to build a series of ‘fortresses’,

which could sustain themselves for 60 days in terms of ammunition and 45 days in terms of

ration. Troops initially defending the advanced outposts at the border would fall back to these

interior fortresses in order to defend them to the last. These designated fortresses were located

in Jessore and Jhenaidah in the south-western sector Rangpur and Bogra in the north-western

sector, Jamalpur and Mymensingh in the central sector, and Sylhet, Bhairab Bazar, Comilla and

Chittagong in the eastern sector. A series of ‘strong point’s were also selected in the various

sectors which were to be held in strength. The overall disposition of the Pakistani forces are

shown in Map 3.2. The composition of the forces in the various sector were as follows:

3.4.1, South Western Sector. The 9 Infantry Division, with its headquarters (HQ) in

Jessore/Magura, consisted of the following brigades and units :

(i) The 57 Infantry brigade - Jhenaidah

(ii) The 107 Infantry brigade - Jessore

(iii) The Ad hoc Infantry brigade - Khulna

(iv) One Squadron M-24 Chaffee tanks from 29th Cavalry

(v) One Reconnaissance and Support battalion

(vi) Two field regiments

(vii) One reconnaissance and support battalion

3.4.2. North Western Sector. The 16 Infantry Division, with its headquarters (HQ)

in Natore, consisted of the following brigades and units:

(i) The 23 Infantry brigade - Rangpur

(ii) The 34 Infantry brigade - Natore

(iii) The 205 Infantry brigade - Bogra

(iv) Ad hoc Infantry brigade - Pabna

(v) The 29th cavalry (three squadrons M-24 Chaffee)

(vi) One field regiment.

(vii) Two mortar batteries.

(viii) One reconnaissance and support battalion

3.4.3. Central Sector

(i) The Ad hoc 36 Infantry Division with its headquarters (HQ) in Dhaka,

consisted of the following brigades and units:

(ii) The 53 Infantry brigade Dhaka (moved to

Feni in November

1971

(iii) Ad hoc Infantry brigade Mymensingh

(iv) Ad hoc Armour Squadron (PT-76 and M-24) Dhaka

d. Eastern Sector.

(i) The 14 Infantry Division with its headquarters (HQ) in Ashuganj consisted

of the following brigades and units:

(a) The 27 Infantry Brigade with Brahmanbaria

one troop of PT-76 tanks

(b) The 212 Infantry Brigade Sylhet

(c) The 313 Infantry Brigade Maulavi Bazar

(d) One Field Regiment

(e) One Mortar Battery

(ii) The 39 (Ad hoc) Infantry Division, with its headquarters (HQ) in

Chandpur

consisted of the following brigades and units:

(a) The 53 Infantry Brigade with two troops of Feni

M-24 and Chaffee tanks

(b) The 117 Infantry Brigade Comilla

(c) The 93 Independent Infantry Brigade Chittagong

(d) Ad hoc squadron (two troops M-24)

(e) One Field regiment

CHAPTER IV

INDIAN FORCES AND ARMOUR

General

4.1. Prior to the launching of an all out offensive India had to carefully weigh the requirement

of forces in all her different fronts. These considerations included countering the threat from

Pakistan in the western front, actions against any potential military intervention by China in the

northern front and entering Bangladesh on the eastern front. Apart from these, the counter-

insurgency operations in Nagaland and Mizoram were to be continued as well.

4.2. Given all these varied considerations, a total strength of three Corps were mustered for

the operation in Bangladesh (East Pakistan). As for the western sector, Indian planners

concluded that the initiative should not be taken there; rather, this was to be left to Pakistan.

However, adequate deployment of forces was carried out along the western frontiers to counter

possible enemy moves in time. Thus, by early November 1971, both sides had deployed their

forces close to the border in order to carry out their plans.

Disposition

4.3 The Indian Eastern Command, with its headquarters in Calcutta, had two Corps namely,

the 4 corps and the 33 Corps. It was responsible for operations in the whole of north east India.

These troops were committed for actions along the borders and continuation of counter-

insurgency operations in Nagaland and Mizoram. Basically, the equipment and training of

these troops were suited to warfare in the mountainous areas, except for the division deployed

in West Bengal. This division had its required share of armour and artillery but the other

formations had very little armour and mostly towed artillery which was too light.

44. Besides these, heavy bridging and river crossing equipment were also an important

element. All these had to be mobilized before operations could be initiated. Furthermore,

roads and airfields in Tripura and Meghalaya were not good enough to sustain the envisaged

operations. Necessary works on these were taken up on a priority basis and completed before

the launching of the campaign in Bangladesh.

4.5. The Mukti Bahini, which had improved greatly in terms of its leadership and

operational effectiveness, begun to liberate small chunks of territory within Bangladesh from

October 1971. This tied down the Pakistan Army considerably. Moreover, the large numbers

of causalties borne by them had a great effect on the morale of the Pakistani troops.

4.6. The Indian Army had learnt its lessons from the debacle in the Indo-China war of

1962. Annual turnover of units was increased, reservists were called up for training;

deficiencies in the officers’ strength were made up by drawing upon the staff from the Army

Headquarters and static formations; and courses of instructions were postponed. Certain

measures were taken to raise the moral of the troops. These measures served to make the

preparation, and deployment of the Indian forces were carried out adequately. Various

operational plans were discussed and debated, making use of tools such as sand models and

war gaming.

4.7. The preparations made by the Pakistani high command, on the other hand, were

somewhat chaotic. The deployment of forces was mostly based on rigid assumptions which

remained questionable in terms of military expertise.

4.8. The overall deployment of Indian troops in the various sectors are shown in Map 4.1 and

specified further below.

4.8.1. South-Western Sector. This sector was placed under 2 Corps with its

headquarters at Krishnanagar. It had two divisions along with more than a regiment of

armour, and the requisite strength of artillery and engineers. The details are as follows :

(i) HQ II Corps - Headquarters(HQ) at Krishnanagar

(ii) The 4 Mountain Division

(iii) The 9 Infantry Division

(iv) The 50 Independent Para Brigade

(v) The 45 Cavalry (PT-76 Light Amphibious tanks) See

figure 4.2

(vi) The B Squadron of the 63 Cavalry (T-55 Medium tanks)See figure 4.3

(vii) The 9 Punjab Mechanised (SKOT wheeled armoured personnel carrier)

(viii) One Medium Regiment Artillery

4.8.2. North Western Sector: This sector was placed under 33 Corps with its headquarters

in Siliguri. It had two divisions, about two regiments of armour and the requisite strength of

artillery and engineers. The details are as follows:

(i) HQ XXXIII Corps - Headquarters (HQ) at

Siliguri

(ii) The 20 Mountain Division with an additional brigade (the 340

Mountain

Brigade)

(iii) The 6 Mountain Division (less one brigade).

(iv) The 71 Mountain Brigade

(v) The HQ Brigadier Armour XXXIII Corps

(vi) The 63 Cavalry lessits B Squadron (T-55 Medium tanks)

(vii) The 69 Armour Regiment (PT-76 Light Amphibious tanks)

(viii) The D Squadron of 69 Armour Regiment (Ad hoc) [8 x PT-76 Light

Amphibious tanks]

(ix) The 5 Marhatta Light Infantry (Mechanized, with SKOT wheeled APCs).

(x) One battery medium regiment artillery.

4.8.3. Central Sector: This sector was placed under a Static Formation Headquarters, the101

Communication Zone, with its Headquarters (HQ) in Shillong. The details are as follows :

(i) HQ 101 Communication Zone - Headquarters (HQ) in Shillong

(ii) The 95 Mountain Brigade

(iii) One regular Infantry battalion

(iv) One Brigade of East Bengal Regiment

4.8.4. Eastern Sector: This sector was placed under 4 Corps with its Headquarters (HQ) in

Teliamura near Agartala. It had three mountain divisions, two of which were strengthend with

one armour squadron each. In addition, one brigade of the East Bengal Regiment, the Kilo

force and the Border roads task force, operated under this Corps. The details are as follows :

(i) HQ IV Corps - Headquarters (HQ) in Teliamura

(ii) The 8 Mountain Division

(iii) The 23 Mountain Division

(iv) The 57 Mountain Division

(v) The K Sector

(vi) One Brigade of the East Bengal Regiment

(vii) No. 1 Independent Armour Squadron of the 7 Light Cavalry (PT-76 tanks)

(viii) No. 5 Independent Armour Squadron of the 63 Cavalry (PT-76 tanks)

(ix) No. 5 Independent Armour Squadron of the 63 Cavalry ( Ferret Scout Cars)

CHAPTER - V

BATTLES IN THE SOUTHWESTERN SECTOR

Terrain

5.1. From the Indian territory, approaches into Bangladesh existed in three different routes.

In the northern part a road led through Meherpur - Chuadanga - Jhenida - Magura - Faridpur

then crossing over Goalanda ghat ferry movement could be carried out towards Dhaka. From

Krishnariagar, another approach existed through Jibannagar - Kailiganj. In the South, road link

existed through Benapole Jessore and then towards Dhaka. There were also several tracks in

the southern part. These, however, did not have the bridges of the required classification for

crossing of armour over the water obstacles. The northern part of the sector was more suited

for armour actions. In the south, obstacles in the form of rivers and marshes were too many.

The major obstacle in the entire area was the river Gorai Madhumati which had a width of 400

metres. Apart from these, a series of rivers ran north to south along the routes already

described.

Pakistani Forces

5.2 9 Infantry Division of Pakistan Army was deployed in this sector with two infantry

brigades, one ad hoc infantry brigade and a Squadron of M-24 Chaffee tanks. 57 infantry

brigade had three infantry battalions and was responsible for the northern part of the area from

Jibannagar. It had its Headquarters at Jhenida. 107 Infantry brigade was responsible for the

southern part of the area from Jibannagan down to the seashores. It had five infantry battalions

and a Squadron from 29 Cavalry. Its headquarters was located at Jessore. 57 Infantry was

allotted one Squadron less a troop of 29 cavalry when the war broke out. Initially it had no

armour. The ad hoc brigade was deployed at Khulna. It had some regular troops besides the

large number of second line troops that comprised of its major part. Jessore and Jhenida were

designated as fortresses, Chuadanga was turned into a theatre strong point and the divisional

HQ was located at Jessore. As the war broke out, the HQ of 9 Infantry division withdrew, to

Magura, Pakistani troops deployed close to the border also fell back to the line of fortresses and

the predesignated strong points.

Indian Forces

5.3. Corps of the Indian Army had 4 Mountain Division, 9 Infantry Division and 50

independent Para Brigade in its orbat. Task allotted to 4 mountain division was to carry out

operations in the northern half of the sector, capture Magura and secure ferry sites over river

Madhumati. Following this, the division was designated either to capture Goalanda Ghat or to

secure Hardinge bridge at Paksey on orders. 9 Infantry division was tasked to capture Jessore

and dispatch forces to capture Khulna subsequently. HQ Calcutta area was given the task of

carrying out a subsidiary advance along Satkhira - Khulna with an infantry battalion and para

military forces. 50 Independent para brigade was in Corps reserve and given a be prepared

mission to clear Jessore after its capture.

4. Mountain Division's Operations alongwith A Squadron 45 Cavalry

5.4. Mountain Division had under its command A (ALFA) squadron of 45 Cavalry equipped

with PT-76 tanks having 76 mm guns. The division had three brigades namely, 62 brigade, 41

brigade and 7 brigade. The division planned to capture Magura in the first phase. Over the

month of November, operations in conjunction with the Mukti Bahini had already resulted into

occupation of several lodgements inside Bangladesh. 4 mountain division planned to advance

on two axes from these lodgements. Amongst its brigades, 62 brigade was ordered to advance

along road Jibannagar – Kotchandpur - Kaliganj, 41 brigade along track Uthali-Saudi-

Kotchandpur and 7 brigade was held in Crops reserve.

5.4.1. Capture of Darsana. The northern flank offered the first stiff resistance. It was

by 18 Punjab (Pakistan Army) holding the railway station and the rail track

embankment at Darsana. A Squadron participated in the attack with 41 Brigade.

Darsana was cut-off by a company of infantry supported by a troop of tanks of A

Squadron 45 Cavalry. The brigade attack was launched with A squadron less a troop in

close support to the infantry. Tanks moved out of Uthali at last light on 3 December 71,

destroying several bunkers. Railway station was captured quite easily but the area

behind the untankable embankment of railway track posed to be a difficult objective in

the depth. A lane had to be cut to let the tanks get through and head for the flank.

Darsana was captured by 11’0 clock on 4 December 1971.

.

5.4.2. Capture of Saudih. In the Southern flank, 62 Brigade advanced along track

Uthali Kotchandpur which passed through Saudih where extensive marshy area

provided the Pakistanis with the grounds required for a very strong defensive

position. The defense was outflanked by 5 Marhatta supported by a troop of tanks

which destroyed the bunkers at very close quarters. Saudih was captured by the

evening of 4 December 71. This assisted the division in delivering an unexpected

blow to the enemy in the next phase.

5.4.3. Road Block and Advance to Jhenidah. After consolidating at Saudih, a

special task group consisting of 5 Guards and A Squadron 43 Cavalry moved north

on 5 December 71 to cut off the road Meherpur-Faridpur in the form of a road block.

They crossed Chitra river by fording and established their position at Uttar

Narayanpur. A large number of Pakistani vehicles were destroyed by them at night.

This cross country movement to Uttar Naryanpur later proved to very successful.

Meanwhile, 41 Brigade moved towards Jhenidah on a track and sent 9 Dogra on

another route to close with Jhenidah from the west. After reaching Jhenidah, the

battalion received two troops of tanks from Uttar Narayanpur and captured Jhenidah

which was lightly held by the enemy.

5.4.4 Capture of Kaligani. In the Southern flank, 62 Infantry brigade advanced

towards Kaliganj with a troop of 45 Cavalry leading. Kaligani was held by a

mixture of regular and Para Military forces who were very quickly overpowered.

Having reached Kaligani, 62 Brigade switched towards North along the highway and

linked up with 41 Brigade at Jhenidah.

5.4.5. Capture of Magura. Thereafter, With the two brigades, 4 Mountain division

made an advance towards east to Magura. The advance was led by 62 brigade with

A Squadron less two troops acting as the vanguard. Magura was captured against

some opposition and a bridge over Muchikhal fell intact in their hands before it

could be blown off by the enemy.

5.4.6. Advance to Kushtia and Hardinge Bridge. At this stage, 7 brigade was

detached from the Crops reserve and ordered to advance to Hardinge bridge at

Paksey and capture it alongwith the township of Kushtia. Intelligence sources

indicated a weak disposition of Pakistani forces in that area. Meanwhile, Pakistani

57 brigade which had withdrawn from Chuadanga, had actually moved into Kushtia.

On 9 December 71, 7 Brigade led by two troops of A Squadron of 45 Cavalry

advanced towards Kushtia and the Hardinge bridge. Enroute, a large number of

Razakars (local militia raised by Pakistan Army) were captured and several ran away

to Kushtia and informed about the advancing column.

5.4.7. Debacle at Kushtia. 57 brigade of the Pakistan Army, reacted very

carefully on this information. A strong ambush was laid by a company and two

troops of tanks of 29 cavalry in the outskirts of Kushtia town to delay the advance

and assist in the withdrawal of 57 brigade. At about 2 o’clock in the afternoon on 9

December 71, leading tanks reached Kushtia. Infantry was ordered to enter the town

first, followed by the tanks. At this time, Lt Gen T N Raina, Corps Commander 2

Corps and Maj Gen M S Brar, GOC, 4 Mountain division arrived at the scenario by

a helicopter. The Corps Commander advised the Commanders leading the advance

to disregard undue caution and avoid wastage of time through battle procedures. He

suggested that the advancing columns should press the enemy on the run with tanks.

Everyone, thereafter, became quite careless and the two troops of PT-76

unknowingly closed with the ambush site. Infantry was casually following up. The

enemy ambush party opened up at almost point blank range and destroyed a troop of

tank in the first instance. The advance guard (22 Rajput) got reorganised and its

troops withdrew. The crews of the destroyed PT—76 tanks were killed with their

bodies badly mutilated and hands and feet tied up. The brigade advance was

severely jeopardised.

5.4.8 Switching of Forces. Corps Commander, 2 Corps upon receiving the news

as described above, stopped the advance of 4 mountain division towards Faridpur.

He ordered the division to fall back to Kushtia and capture the township along with

the Hardinge bridge. Meanwhile, it was ensured that Madhumati river on axis

Magura - Faridpur be guarded by a battalion strength. Two tank troops were

switched from 9 Infantry division to bring A Squadron 45 Cavalry to its full

strength. 4 Division concentrated near Kushtia by 10 December 71, but the Pakistani

57 brigade had then completely withdrawn. The town was found clear on 11

December 71, before the divisional attack was launched. On 12 December 71, 41

brigade led by A Squadron 45 Cavalry reached the southern side of the Hardinge

bridge. The 57 brigade troops by that time had already crossed over leaving behind

stray vehicles and other equipment. 41 brigade was left behind at Paksey (Hardinge

bridge) and the division returned to Magura to continue its advance towards

Faridpur.

5.4.9 Capture of Kamarkhali. Eastern banks of river Madhumati was held by a

Make shift Pakistani force from the remnants of two infantry battalions and other

troops. River Madhumati was a formidable obstacle with a wet gap of about 400

metres. 4 mountain division decided for crossing the river from both the flanks. In

this, 62 brigade with A Squadron less two troops were to cross from the north, with

7 brigade crossing from the south alongwith the other two troops of tanks. The

crossing operation was carried out on night 14/15 December 71 and Kamarkhali

ferry was captured by 15 December 71. On the southern flank, 22 Rajput established

a roadblock behind the enemy with two tanks at Gopaldi. Another roadblock was

established by 12 brigade in the north. The Pakistani troops were surrounded from

all three sides and they surrendered subsequently.

5.4.10. Advance to Faridpur. 62 brigade supported by A Squadron resumed its

advance to Faridpur. On 16 December 71, cease-fire was declared and GOC, 9

Infantry division of Pakistan Army surrendered with 3000 troops.

5.5. 9 Infantry Division's Operations alongwith 45 Cavalry. 9Infantry division had

under its command 45 Cavalry less A Squadron. The regiment was equipped with PT-76

tanks with 76 mm guns. In addition, B Squadron of 63 Cavalry (Equipped with T-55

medium tanks with 100 mm guns) was also placed under its command. The plan was to

establish bridgeheads with PT-76 tanks and transporting troops and equipment over water

obstacles. T-55 Medium tanks were to be used in close support during the advance. 9

Infantry division was ordered to conduct operations to capture Jessore followed by Khulna.

There were two approaches available, the Calcutta – Dhaka road leading from Bangaon to

Jessore and the Bagdaha-Chaugacha - Jessore track. The latter had less number of rivers on

it but contained a defile created by marshes at Afra. Jessore and Khulna were connected by

a road and a railway track. There was also a road leading to Jessore and Khulna via

Satkhira in the south. It had greater number of barriers in the form of water obstacles. The

initial plan of the 9 Infantry division was to advance along the first two approaches with a

brigade in each and to converge at Jhikargachha. Thereafter, advance would be first made

to Jessore followed by Khulna. (Reference Map 5.2F)

5.5.1. Earlv Lodgments. Prior to the out break of the war, hostile activities

between bordering troops were a regular affair. Some of these border clashes

developed into full scale local battles. At Boyra, a village northeast of Calcutta, a

notable action took place on 21 and 22 November 1971. 14 Punjab of 9 Infantry

division succeeded in capturing Garibpur. about six kilometres Within Bangladesh.

Pakistanis lost Eleven M-24 Chaffee tanks as compared to PT-76 tanks of the

Indians. 3 Sabres were also lost by the Pakistan air force in this action.

5.5.2. Battle of Garibpur . 42 Brigade was tasked to cross river Kabadak and deploy

a battalion group with armour at Garibpur to dominate the Chaugachha – Jessore

road. On 20 November 71, the advance was carried out by 14 Punjab who reached

the village before the last light. As it was getting dark, the battalion group

commander deployed his companies in a Vee shape and the Squadron made a league

at the rear. Pakistani 107 Brigade upon learning this decided to launch an attack

with two groups. One composed of two companies, the other with two companies

and an armour squadron. Eventually, the Indians got alert by vehicular movements

early in the morning at about 4 AM. It was very foggy and visibility was about 30

metres. C Squadron 45 Cavalry was quickly deployed short of the track

Chaugachha-Jhikergachha. The Pakistanis were not very sure of the Indian positions

and the pre H hour bombardment (Artillery fires carried out on the enemy positions

before launching of attack) had no neutralising effect. As the assaulting troops

broke cover they were merely going through the area without proper information.

The Pakistani armour squadron deployed four troops for attack and 11 of these tanks

were shot down. The attacking infantry also withdrew after suffering casualties.

The next attack came at about 9 AM and the surrounding area was still foggy. These

troops also met heavy casualties and retreated as the fog started to clear up. This

battle established 9 Infantry division to reach within 10 kilometres from its

objective.

5.5.3. Battle for Jessore. After the action at Garibpur,Pakistanis fell back to

general line Afra - Jhikergachha. As earlier described, the area had lots of marshy

areas and these were utilised as obstacles along with mine fields and anti-tank ditches.

As the hostilities broke out on 3 December 71, the earlier plan was changed. The new

plan envisaged an attack by 42 brigade to make a penetration through the defence

north of Afra and assist passage of 32 brigade to make a breakout. The special group

designated to carry out the break out was composed of a battalion group supported by

armour. This was to be followed by an advance by 32 brigade with B Squadron 63

Cavalry along Chaugachha - Jessore. 42 brigade with C Squadron 45 Cavalry would

track behind. 350 brigade with B Squadron 45 Cavalry would simultaneously advance

along axis Jhikergachha to Jessore. The penetration was carried out by 2 Sikh Light

Infantry with B Squadron 63 Cavalry (T-55 medium tanks) on 6 December 71. Some

of the medium tanks got bogged down or ran into mines. However, the objective at

Durgabakti was captured by 10 AM. The passage to Jessore became clear. Orders

were quickly issued to make an advance to Jessore airfield in the north west part of

the town. As the tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APC) rushed out, several

oppositions in the form of artillery shellings, mines and delay positions were

encountered by them. At Abdullpur Pakistanis were found vacating the positions and

withdrawing. On 7 December 71 at 8 AM, mechanised columns reached the Jessore

airfield. However, by then Pakistani 107 brigade had withdrawn on 6 December 71

and moved south towards Khulna. 7 Punjab supported by T-55 tanks of B Squadron

63 Cavalry entered the Jessore town on 7 December 71 and established a roadblock at

Khulna road. 350 brigade had attacked Brinda on 5 December and captured it. B

Squadron 45 Cavalry under the command of this brigade had advanced and reached

South of Jessore. C Squadron 45 Cavalry under the command of 42 Brigade had also

by then reached the north-west part of the town.

5.5.4. Advance to Khulna. 9 Infantry division (Indian Army) assumed that 107

Brigade(Pakistan Army) had withdrawn to Magura with some of its stray elements

moving to Khulna. The advance to Khulna was, therefore, made on 8 December 71

with only 32 brigade supported by B Squadron 63 Cavalry and C Squadron 45

Cavalry. The advance was punctuated by delaying actions offered at Ramnagar,

Changutia railway station, Siramani and Phultala. At all these places, T-55 tanks

successfully went behind the Pakistani postion, and cut them off from the rear. The

advance, however, was slow because of close country. Marshy areas and river Bhairab

in the eastern flank proved to be of considerable hindrance. After having cleared

Ramnagar, 32 Infantry brigade carried out an outflanking action by getting close to the

next delay position while continuing the advance along the main axis. In this 8

Madras and B Squadron 63 Cavalry (T-55 medium tanks) continued along the main

axis while the rest of the brigade with C Squadron 45 Cavalry moved along track

Manirampur Nawapara. It was expected this would reduce the time necessary for

outflanking after the contacts with the delay position. The outflanking did not prove

much successful due to bad going, poor terrain intelligence and the delay caused by all

these.

5.5.5. Action at Changutia. On 9 December 71, the advancing column contacted

another delaying position at Changutia railway station at 2 PM. The leading troops

with T-55 medium tanks shot down two antitank guns and got behind the Pakistani

position. The delaying battle was being carried out by a reconnaissance and support

company of the Pakistan Army. An attempt was made by them to hold the outflanking

tank troop, this resulted into the destruction of three anti-tank guns and several

machine guns. After clearing Changutia, the ground ahead was found to be more

open, permitting an advance with two troops up. At this stage, B Squadron 63 Cavalry

(equipped with T-55 medium tanks) was ordered to fall back for onward move to

Punjab. The Squadron handed over its responsibility to 45 Cavalry.

5.5.6. Action at Phultala. At Jafarganj, 8 Madras re-joined the 32 brigade on 10

December 71, after failing to cut off the enemy delay positions (ref sub para 5.5.3).

Pakistani resistance presently at Phultala was stiff and, it become evident that the entire

107 brigade (Pakistani Army) was behind the operations delaying the advance. 32

brigade outflanked the delay position with tanks and mechanised infantry and cleared

the enemy.

5.5.7. Action at Daulatpur. On 12 December, a battalion group consisting of 7

Punjab and a Squadron of 45 Cavalry advanced along track Phultala - Piprail to threaten

Daulatpur from the west. Enroute, the second delay position at Siramani was found to

be difficult and the attack proved unsuccessful at night. The terrain was extremely

marshy and movements off the track was impossible. The battalion group managed to

advance upto Arangahata 3 Kilometers west of Daulatpur. At Daulatpur, a strong

defensive position had been taken up by the elements of 107 brigade of the Pakistani

Army. The position was protected by river Bhairab in the east and marshy areas in the

west. A divisional attack was planned by 9 Infantry division to capture Daulatpur.

5.5.8. Battle of Daulatpur., The plan for the divisional attack envisaged the

provision of a firm base by 32 brigade, 42 brigade supported by a Squadron minus of

45 Cavalry would be crossing over river Bhairab and attack Daulatpur from the rear and

a frontal attack by 350 brigade would follow, supported by 45 Cavalry minus. The

attack had to be postponed a number of times due to limitations on ‘going’ imposed by

the terrain. On 15 December 71, attack was launched with 350 brigade which had

successfully crossed over the river. The attack was supported by a number of tanks

floating down the river and providing fire support from the flank while remaining

afloat. The remaining tanks provided close support to the assaulting infantry.

Syamganj and Siramani were captured through these actions. At this stage, cease-fire

was called and 107 brigade of the Pakistan Army surrendered to 9 Infantry Division on

16 December 71.

CHAPTER VI

BATTLES IN THE NORTH WESTERN SECTOR

6.1. Terrain. The unique features of this sector were its closeness to Siliguri

corridor,

the existence of the vulnerable shoulder of 65 kilometers from Hilli to Gaibanda and the dry

soil which permitted good use of mechanised forces. A road running north to south

connected Tetulia and Nagarbari ferry via Panchagarh, Nilphamari, Thakurgaon, Dinajpur,

Rangpur and Bogra. A lateral road running east to west connected Rajshahi, Natore and

Pabna. A Railway track ran north to south from Panchagarh to Hardinge bridge at Kushtia

and further beyond towards its south. The vulnerable shoulder was adjacent to Balurghat

district of India which jutted into the territory of Bangladesh. Track connecting Hilli with

Gaibanda was very important tactically. Any advance along this approach would cut this

sector into two halves. Another track existed from Samjia, which led to Pirganj situated on

the Rangpur-Bogra highway. There were few major obstacles, notable amongst these were

rivers Korotoya, Tista, Atrai, Tulshiganga and Jamuna. There were innumerable tracks

connecting the various communication centres. Bridges mostly were of poor classification

and lacked the capacity to bear heavy vehicles across.

6.2. Pakistani Forces. 16 Infantry Division was deployed in this sector which had an ad

hoc brigade, an armour regiment (29 Cavalry equipped with M -24 tanks) apart from the

three integral bridgades. 23 brigade was at Rangpur and tasked to defend Dinajpur and

Rangpur from any approach from the north and the west. 205 brigade was at Bogra for the

defence of the shoulder at Hilli. Both these brigades had a squadron of armour each. 34

brigade was at Natore and it was kept as reserve. The ad hoc brigade was at Pabna to defend

Rajshahi, Nawabganj and Pabna. The third squadron of 29 cavalry was in command

reserve. The Regimental Headquarters of 29 Cavalry was at Rangpur. 16 Infantry division

apprehended an Indian advance with two divisions in this sector. One along axes Domar-

Saidpur-Rangpur and the other along Hilli Ghoraghat axis. Pakistan Army plan envisaged

defence along Dinajpur-Rangpur for the northern and river Korotoya for the western thrusts

respectively.

6.3 Indian Forces. 33 Corps was tasked for operations in this sector in addition to its

responsibility for the northern frontier and the defence of the Siliguri Corridor. The Corps had 20 mountain

division (with four brigades), 6 mountain division, 71 Mountain brigade, 69 Armour Regiment (equipped

with PT-76 tanks), 63 Cavalry less B Squadron (equipped with T-55 medium tanks), and Marattha Light

Infantry (equipped with SKOT wheeled APCs) in its orbat(Order of battle or composition). By October 71,

20 Mountain division was concentrated at Balurghat. It was tasked to advance from Hilli to Palashbari with

one brigade and from Samjia to Pirgonj and Gaibanda with another and divide the entire sector of Pakistani

defence. The third brigade was to remain at Balurghat for the defence of Malda. The fourth brigade was

tasked to contain Dinajpur and also be available as reserve. Once the narrow shoulder was pierced through,

the division would either advance south to capture Bogra or head towards north for Rangpur. 71 Mountain

brigade was deployed for the security of the Siliguri corridor. It was tasked to enlarge the corridor and then

advance south along Panchagar, Thakurgaon and capture Dinajpur.

6.4. Preparation for Armour Operations. At 33 Corps preparations for the armour

operations began as early as September 71. The potential of PT-76 light Amphibious tanks

in traversing the marshy terrain of Bangladesh was fully exploited through intensive

training. The crews were given adequate practice in cross country movements, covering

about sixty kilometers at night and crossing at least two water obstacles enroute. Building

confidence amongst crews to drive through flooded fields became a primary consideration.

It was envisaged that in an advance by an armour regiment, the two depth squadrons

(Squadrons following behind the leading squadron) could carry a battalion less one

company. It was decided that such operations should be commanded by an armour

regimental commander except when in the fire support role (where tanks fire from static

positions and advance very little). Meanwhile, T-55 medium tanks were received in

September 71 and the conversion training of the crews was rushed. Capabilities of T-55

tanks interms of its mobility through soft terrain was also an unfamiliar issue. Eventually,

crews had to use this equipment with little training and its potentials could not be fully

realised. A very interesting decision was also taken to use a combination of T--55 with

PT76 tanks. It was intended that the T-55 medium tanks (36 tons) will lead the advance

along the main axis while PT—76 light tanks (14.4 ton) would carry out outflanking

manoeuvres in the wet terrain. It was assumed that the main axis would constitute of firm

ground conditions. At the sametime, bridges within the bordering districts of west Bengal

were mostly of lower classification. Construction works were rushed to improve and build

bridges. Railway tracks were specially laid for bringing forward the armour. The weakness

in the fire power of PT-76 tanks was overcome by introducing HEAT (High Explosive Anti

Tank) ammunition offering better penetration. Tracks of most of the PT-76 tanks were worn

out. These were replaced at the last minute in November 71. By then, the armour elements

were deployed in the forward concentration areas. The distribution of armour elements

were as follows:

(a) HQ Brigadier Armour at Balurghat with HQ 20 Mountain Division.

(b) 63 Cavalry (T-55 tanks) less B Squadron at Hilli.

(c) A Squadron of 63 Cavalry (T-55 tanks) with 202 Mountain brigade.

(d) C Squadron of 63 Cavalry (T-55 tanks) was kept at Balurghat for

employment under the command of 69 Armour Regiment.

(e) Squadron of 69 Armour Regiment (PT-76 tanks) was earmarked for

employment under command of 63 Cavalry.

(f) 69 Armour Regiment plus (PT-76 tanks) was grouped with 66 Mountain

brigade.

(g) Squadron minus of 6'3 Cavalry was grouped with 340 Mountain brigade

deployed south of Dinajpur.

(h) D Squadron was grouped with 73 mountain brigade.

6.5. Defence of Siliguri Corridor and Capture of Panchaqar 71 mountain brigade

with D Squadron of 69 Armour Regiment advanced at night on 28 November 71. The

brigade moved along the border towards Panchagarh which Panchagarh is a township about

30 kms south of the northern most point in Bangladesh. The town was cut-off from three

directions. Its capture did not require much effort as the Pakistani company defending it

withdrew. The next day, on 29 November 71, advance was made towards Thakurgaon with

the squadron leading under the command 12 of Rajput. Boda was cleared by 01 December

71. Approach to Thakurgaon was hindered by a blown off bridge. However, once

Thakurgaon was contacted, an attack made by an Infantry battalion supported by a troop of

tanks did not succeed. The Pakistani Army troops managed to get away once again.

Birganj was captured next on 5 December 71. Efforts to get across river Dhepa could not

succeed because of strong resistance put up by the Pakistani troops. At this point, 71

Mountain brigade revised its plan and bypassed Dinajpur through Khansama and moved

towards Saidpur. Enroute, Pakistani troops were deployed at the crossing site over river

Atrai. A quick out flanking done by armour and infantry could cut them off. A bridgehead

was established over river Atrai on 14 December 71. A counter attack was launched by

Pakistani Infantry supported by tanks. This was retaliated by the Indian Air force and

Artillery. Advance was resumed was 15 December 71 and Darwani railway station was

cleared the same day. Meanwhile, on 16 December 71, cease-fire was declared.

6.6. 20 Mountain Division Operation Supported by Armour 20 Mountain Division

was tasked to cut the shoulder by pushing through Hilli and make an advance towards

Ghoraghat in the east.

6.6.1. Initial Battle at Hilli. . Pakistan Army had deployed 4 Frontier Force at Hilli

since May 71. This infantry battalion had taken up defence east of the railway track

running from north to south. 33 Corps decided to go for an attack on Hilli with

infantry supported by armour. HQ Eastern Command had then imposed a restriction

on the use of tanks unless the Pakistani Army decided to employ armour. Day light

reconnaissance was also forbidden. 8 Guards attacked Hilli on night 23/24

November, with A squadron 63 Cavalry given the task of repelling any counter

attacks prevent Pakistani reinforcement from Panchbibi in the south. During the

attack, Naopara, the first objective, was captured easily but stiff resistance was

offered by the Pakistani troops at Morapara in the subsequent phase. Morapara was

later attacked by A squadron from Basudebpur in the morning hours of 24

November 71. The squadron attacked with two troops but as they closed towards

Morapara the tanks started getting bogged down. Thus, an attempt to employ T-55

medium tanks proved useless at the very beginning. Morapara could not be reached

as per the plan. This was solved by bringing. A (ALFA) squadron of 69 mountain

regiment (PT-76 tanks) from Patiram which reached Hilli within 3 hours by driving

down. Thereafter, it was given time to get familiar with the area before deployment.

In the initial stage, one of the PT-76 tanks also got bogged down; however, they

successfully engaged the Pakistan Army troops at a long range. At first light on 25

November 71, tanks closed near Morapara and got into the flanks and engaged a

Pakistani tank troop which was launching a counter attack. One of these tanks (M-

24) was shot by a PT-76 tank. Two of the Indian PT-76 tanks were damaged by

mortar fires and mines respectively. On 26 November 71, a troop of T.-55 tanks

once again attempted to get through. The first tanks had one of its tracks bogged in

the paddy field and was shot down by a Pakistani tank. The disabled tank was later

recovered. On 28 November 71, B Squadron 69 armoured regiment with a troop of

T-55 medium tanks of A squadron 63 Cavalry moved north to Dangapara railway

station and Debkhanda and shot up several bunkers of the deployed Pakistan Army

troops. One of the medium tanks got bogged down, but was recovered. Meanwhile,

20 Division reconsidered its plan and decided to contain Hilli with 202 mountain

brigade and advance along Samjia-Charkhai-Pirganj in the north with 66 mountain

brigade, and cut the shoulder north of line Hilli - Palashbari. 202 brigade would link

up with 66 Brigade subsequently after handing over Hilli to 165 brigade and advance

to Ghoraghat via Bhaduria. This plan was to totally isolate the enemy defence at

Hilli.

6.6.2. Advance to Charkhai. 66 Mountain Brigade with 69 Armour Regiment

less A Squadron (PT-76 tanks) and C Squadron 63 Cavalry (T-55 tanks) made an

advance on 2 December 71 from Samjia to Pirganj through Charkhai and Phulbari.

Charkhai was captured on 4 December 71 with infantry supported by T-55 tanks.

Pakistani troops were totally surprised to find armour in the most unexpected

approach. This was because the area was filled with bils and nullahs. Thereafter,

the initial foothold at Mohanpur was secured by C Squadron 69 Armour Regiment

and a troop of T.-55 medium tanks from C Squadron 63 Cavalry. 69 Armour

Regiment led the advance upto Bejai and it was captured on 3 December 71. The

next place to fall was Phulbari which was reached by PT-76 wading across Jumuna

nullah, the bridge over it had already been blown up by the Pakistani troops. C

Squadron 63 Cavalry cleared the town by providing close support to the infantry.

On 4 December 71, a combat group composed of 69 Armour Regiment, C Squadron

63 cavalry and 20 Maratthas made a move towards south west to Charkhai to link up

with 202 Brigade. Going was very difficult and a bridge had to be laid to cross

Jamuna nullah. The Pakistani position at Charkhai was outflanked from the south

and cleared by the afternoon. From Hilli, 202 Brigade had to first partially clear

Debkhanda by an infantry attack supported by T-55 tanks (A Squadron 63 Cavalry).

Close fire support was provide by PT-76 tanks of B Squadron 69 Armour

Regiment. 63 Cavalry, thereafter, moved a distance of 140 Kilometres at night and

reached by dawn on 5 December 71 . 66 Brigade made an attempted to link up with

202 bridge at Debkhanda but 205 brigade ( Pakisani Army) at Dangapara Railway

Station had a very strong position which prevented any kind of move towards track

Hilli-Ghoraghat. It was finally decided by 20 Mountain division to leave 202

Brigade at Hilli with A Squadron less two troops, 69 Armour Regiment (PT.-7'6

tanks) and a troop of T-55 tanks of A Squadron 63 Cavalry.

6.6.3. Advance to Phulbari. With the link up operation unsuccessful, 20

Division began its efforts to discover a different approach to Pirganj. The railway

track between Charkhai and Phulbari led to the solution of the problem. The railway

link was being improved with an additional railway track besides the existing one.

The steel tracks were not yet laid but the track bed was complete. This was turned

into a class 40 track with the engineers by 6 December 71. The advance was then

resumed by 66 brigade towards Phulbari once again with 69 Armour Regiment less

two Squadrons leading the advance. Phulbari was reached without any major

opposition and advance was continued through Nowabganj in the east and a

bridgehead was established over river Korotoya.

6.6.4. Capture of Pirgani and Advance to Bhaduria. A revision of the plans was

once again carried out by 20 Division. 340 brigade was tasked to capture Pirganj on

the Rangpur – Bogra highway and 66 brigade ordered to move to Ghoraghat via

Bhaduria on 7 December 71. 340 brigade was provided with 69 Armour Regiment

less one squadron and a squadron of 63 Cavalry for armour support. 66 brigade was

given 63 Cavalry less two squadrons for advance to Bhaduria. 340 brigade

commenced its advance to Pirganj by crossing over river Korotoya in the first stage.

Both PT-76 and T-55 tanks managed to wade across the river. Advance towards

Pirganj was led by 69 Armour regiment as the advance guard. The regiment

encountered recconnaissance and support elements of the Pakistan Army west of

Pirganj and shot up several anti-tank guns mounted on vehicles. Pirganj was

captured by last light on 7 December 71. The main north-south highway was

blocked at two places with an armour squadron group . The Pakistani troops were

taken aback by the speed with which this position was captured by the Indian Army.

The leading tank troops also unknowingly missed the chance of capturing the

Pakistani Divisional Commander, while shooting at his convoy which passed

through them. Meanwhile, on 8 December 71, 66 brigade made an advance towards

south to capture Bhaduria, a village lying on a track between Nowabgani and

Ghoraghat. C Squadron 63 cavalry (T-55 tanks) carried out a reconnaissance in

force at Bhaduria on 08 December 71. As it reached near Bajidpur, west of

Bhaduria, it was fired upon by Pakistani anti-tank guns. The Squadron, thereafter,

outflanked the village from the south and the Pakistani troops withdrew towards

Bhaduria. As the squadron closed nearer, more weapons opened up from Bhaduria

and it could be felt that the Pakistan Army troops were deployed in strength. The

squadron withdrew since it did not have the support of any infantry.

6.6.5. Action at Bhaduria. Bhaduria was attacked on 9 December by 17 Kumaon

with C squadron 63 Cavalry in close support. The Squadron initially cleared

Bajidpur and approached Bhaduria from the north, south, east and southeast

simultaneously. The tanks closed to a distances of 200 metres from the village and

shot up the Pakistani positions. The infantry, thereafter, failed to turn up for the

assault. The squadron had to withdraw in the afternoon and the opportunity to

capture Bhaduria was lost. In the evening, fresh orders were issued for an advance

towards south by 63 Cavalry to approach Hilli from the rear and capture a bridge at

Maheshpur. The advance begun on 10 December 71 and Maheshpur was cleared

with the bridge intact. Enemy initially offered some resistance but withdrew later to

Hilli under pressure. The bridge was of an inferior classification and engineers

effort was necessary to cross through the slushy bed. The regiment still continued

the advance towards Chhatni with a troop, which crossed over initially but later fell

back to Maheshpur. Next morning, as the advancing column was preparing to set

out, orders were received to return to Bhaduria for supporting a fresh attack on that

village. 17 Kumaon attacked Bhaduria on 10 December 71 with tanks in close

support and captured most of it. C squadron 63 Cavalry isolated Bhaduria from the

east on 11 December 71. It was discovered that Pakistani troops had withdrawn by

then.

6.6.6. Advance to Sadullapur and Palashbari. Having cut the main

highway, 340 brigade was ordered to move towards the south to capture

Sadullapur and Palashbari. The idea was to completely seal off the two halves of

the sector and make a bold move to Bogra. B squadron 69 armour regiment

provided close support to the battalion designated to capture Sadullapur. Some

minor opposition was encountered but the appearance of the tanks left very little

choice to the Pakistani troops but to withdraw. Sadullapur was cleared on 9

December 71. Meanwhile, the same day, 69 armour regiment less two squadrons

and A squadron 63 cavalry advanced towards Palashbari. T-55 medium tanks

led the advance with the infantry riding on the PT-76 tanks of the follow up

squadron. One of the T-55 tanks ran into a mine and damaged the No 1 boggie

wheel. This particular spare was not kept in sufficient quantity and scale to meet

the war requirement. It was a difficult situation. A troop of PT-76 tanks was

placed under command the leading squadron consisting of medium tanks to

reinforce their strength which had come down to six tanks only. As the squadron

reached close to Palashbari, the troop of PT-76 was dispatched to cut-off the

road to Gaibanda. The T55 tanks braved the artillery shelling by the Pakistan

Army and entered the township of Palashbari to clear it. The carried out this

action without the support of Infantry who had failed to cover up with the tanks.

After the capture of Palashbari, 340 brigade advanced towards Gaibanda in the

north-east with the support of two troops of C squadron 69 armour regiment.

Simultaneously, B squadron of the same regiment located at Sadullapur

advanced towards the same objective. Pakistan Army troops withdrew seeing

tanks appearing from two directions. After the capture of Gaibanda, C squadron

69 armour regiment made an advance from Palashbari to Ghoraghat and cleared

the road upto river Korotoya. Several M-24 Chaffee tanks of the Pakistan army

were encountered but none could be destroyed. By 9 December, the shoulder

running from Hilli to Gaibanda was effectively cut.

6.6.7. Disengaement Orders for 63 Cavalry. On 9 December 71,an order was

issued to 63 cavalry (T-55 medium tanks) to disengage from this sector and

proceed to Malda for onward move to Punjab. The regiment was at that time

deployed all over the sector, either engaged with the Pakistan Army or in need of

repair. It was a difficult decision for the regiment and 33 Corps. The Pakistan

army still had a reasonably strong armour regiment (29 cavalry) in this sector

and the situation was quite uncertain. The idea of reinforcing Punjab by this

regiment did not prove worthwhile later as it reached the destination too late for

any remarkable employment.

6.6.8. Capture of Hilli. With the capture of Palashbari on 9 December 71, it

become essential to clear the Pakistan Army position at Hilli for linking up the

route between Hilli and Palashbari. 202 brigade, with an additional battalion and

A squadron 63 cavalry in close support, launched an attack from the north on 11

December 71. Tanks initially secured the flanks and destroyed the bunkers and

later accompanied the infantry for the final assault on Hakimpara. Hilli was

captured the same day as most of the Pakistan Army defenders had withdrawn

the previous night. A quick pursuit was made by A squadron 63 cavalry to

contact the Pakistani troops withdrawing towards Ghoraghat. Enroute Pakistan

Army tanks and infantry acting as covering troops somehow managed to hold

their advance. The advance was again resumed on 12 December 71. 202 brigade

followed up behind and Ghoraghat was reached the same day in the evening.

The brigade was provided with 63 cavalry less two squadrons for a further

advance towards Bogra along track Ghoraghat-Khetlal. The advance was

resumed on 13 December 71.

6.6.9. Capture of Gobindaganj. On 10 December, A squadron 63 Cavalry

made an advance towards south from Palashbari with the infantry of 340

brigade. As they reached the northern bank of river Korotoya near Gobindaganj,

they were engaged by artillery fire. The leading troop leader’s tank was badly

damaged. The squadron had to disengage being unable to advance any further.

Meanwhile, they were ordered to rush to the road block at Laldighibazar which

was reported to be under attack by Pakistani troops. This was an incorrect

information as the road block was found firmly held by two Indian tank troops

and infantry. The squadron halted for the night and returned to Palashabari on

11 December traversing about 75 kilometres without any achievement. 340

brigade, at this time, decided for a very different technique to achieve surprise.

A task group was formed with 69 Armour regiment less one squadron (PT–76

tanks), a squadron from 63 cavalry (T-55 tanks) and an infantry battalion. The

task group was ordered to take a detour, cross river Korotoya from the eastern

flank and get behind the Pakistani troops holding the south bank of the river at

Gobindaganj. The operation was carried out by traversing about 55 kilometres.

Enroute B squadron 69 armour regiment grouped with an infantry company left

the task group for establishing a road block at village Kumar. The attack proved

to be very successful, as the T-55 tanks supported by infantry achieved a total

surprise. The Pakistani troops at Gobindaganj town did not put up much

resistance and withdrew towards village Kumar but were confronted by the

roadblock established by B squadron 69 Armour regiment. The defence of

Gobindagonj was attacked next. The T-55 tanks supported by infantry assaulted

on the Pakistani troops from the rear and as darkness fell, positions were picked

up by tanks with infra-red (IR) search lights and shot at. The Pakistani troops

began to withdraw and many surrendered. The advance was resumed towards

Bogra on 12 December 71 and enemy was contacted again upon reaching the

bridge over river Ichhamati. Several anti-tank guns were destroyed and an

infantry company infiltrated behind the Pakistani position and forced them to

decide for a withdrawal leaving the bridge intact on 13 December 71. The

advance was resumed by 305 brigade without any delay and it reached

Mahasthan in the afternoon with the armour leading. Thereafter, the country got

very close and the infantry was ordered to take the lead. The brigade captured

the bridge over river Korotoya intact before it could be demolished by the

Pakistani troops. There were no more water obstacles and Bogra was only 8

kilometres away.

6.6.10.. Capture of Bogra. On 13 December 71, all the brigades of 20

mountain division were engaged in operations simultaneously at different parts

of the sector. In this, 165 brigade moved from Hilli to Panchbibi and captured it

with two troops of A squadron 69 Armour regiment in support, 66 brigade was

on its way to Rangpur with two troops of A squadron 69 armour regiment. 202

brigade with A squadron 69 Armour regiment and a troop of A squadron 63

cavalry was advancing through Khetlal towards Bogra. 340 brigade was at

Mahasthan along the north-south highway with 69 Armour regiment in support.

For the capture of Bogra, 340 brigade envisaged a plan quite similar to the one

executed at Gobindaganj. The outflanking this time involved a longer detour to

be executed at night and establishment of two roadblocks on the approaches

leading out of Bogra town towards the south and the west. 69 armour regiment

less one squadron moved out accordingly in the dark night with an infantry

company under command. The tanks drove through the marshy areas and

successfully established the roadblocks after travelling a distance of 55

kilometers. On 14 December 71, the roadblocks ambushed a very large number

of Pakistan Army vehicles during the earlier part of the day. In the afternoon,

infantry supported by tanks entered the town for a systematic clearing of the

Pakistan Army positions. Several engagements with the Pakistani tanks took

place. A squadron 63 Cavalry attacked the town from the north, while 69

cavalry was forthwith the town by entering from the south. In the west of the

town, a Pakistani defence supported by tanks was contacted and captured. On 16

December 71, Pakistani troops began to surrender and it was discovered that a

brigade strength supported by a squadron of armour was holding the Bogra town.

6.6.11 Advance to Rangpur. On 14 December 71, 66 brigade with two troops

of B squadron 63 Cavalry while advancing towards Rangpur contacted Pakistan

Army position at mile stone 10 near Mithapukur. A squadron of 63 cavalry

joined the brigade at this stage. The squadron outflanked Mithapukur on 15

December 71 and established a road block at Mile stone 8 in the north.

Mithapukur was captured by forenoon the sameday. With the advance resumed

without delay, the leading element reached river Ghaghat south of Rangpur.

Meanwhile, 202 brigade was making an advance towards the same destination

along a track east of the highway. A troop of tanks was detached from 165

brigade at Panchbibi and placed under 202 Infantry brigade for armour support.

69 Armour regiment also detached C squadron and dispatched it to Mithapukur.

With two troops of PT-76 tanks, 202 brigade reached river Ghaghat along with

66 brigade in the morning hours of 16 December 71. A squadron of 29 Cavalry

(Pakistan Army) was deployed along the northern bank. The news of the cease-

fire was received at this stage and there were no significant actions after that. On

17 December 71, 29 Cavalry of the Pakistan Army surrendered to 69 Armour

Regiment of the Indian Army.

CHAPTER-VII

BATTLES IN THE EASTERN SECTOR

7.1. Terrain. The eastern sector of Bangladesh had a very long stretch of border.

The sector has a narrow width but spreads out much longitudinally. In the west, it was

bounded by the river Meghna and the estuary of river Padma. Surrounded by Indian

territory in the north and the east, the southern part has a long coastline with the Bay of

Bengal. There were many water obstacles in the area including bils and marshes. Hill

features existed at Sylhet in the north, Comilla in the centre and Chittagong Hill tracts in

the south. Approaches leading into Bangladesh from India were many. The major

approaches comprised of Jaintiapur – Sylhet, Kulaura – Fenchuganj – Sylhet and

Kamalpur – Srimangal – Maulavi bazar in the north; Agartala – Brahmanbaria –

Bhairab bazar, Sonamura – Bibirbazar – Comilla, Himmatpur – Bhuschi – Mudaffarganj

– Chandpur and Chauddagram – Laksham in the centre; and Belonia – Feni –

Chittagong in the South. A very important highway leading from Dhaka to Chittagong

passed through Comilla. Road link also existed between Sylhet and Dhaka. Railway

route existed between all major places and an important railway bridge (King George VI

bridge) spanned the river Meghna between Ashuganj and Bhairab bazar. Major

obstacles comprised of rivers Meghna, Titas, Kusiyara, Surma and Gumti. The shortest

route from Indian border to Dhaka existed in this sector. It followed the Dhaka –

Chittagong highway from Comilla and a good road link existed between Sonamura –

Bibirbazar – Comilla. The total distance Dhaka was only 80 kilometres. Road link also

existed from Agartala to Brahmanbaria and led towards Ashuganj – Bhairabbazar –

Narsingdi – Dhaka.

7.2. Pakistani Forces. There were two Infantry divisions and an independent

Infantry brigade group of the Pakistan Army defending this sector. These formations

had the support of only three troops of tanks, two of these consisted of M-24 Chaffee

tanks and the third was equipped with PT-76 tanks. 14 Infantry division was deployed

with its headquarters at Ashuganj for the defence of Sylhet and the Akhaura-

Brahmanbria approach to the railway bridge over river Meghna at Ashuganj – Bhairab

bazar. 39 Infantry division was deployed with its headquarters at Chandpur defending

approaches leading to Dhaka through Daudkandi and Chandpur ferries. In the south, 93

independent infantry brigade was deployed for the defence of Chittagong, its port and

the coastal area.

7.3. Indian Forces. 4 Corps of the Indian Army had three mountain divisions and

three Independent armour squadrons in its orbat. There were also a brigade size force

called K Force (Kilo sector), seven infantry battalions of the East Bengal Regiment and

the Mukti Bahini. Task allotted to 8 mountain division (two brigades) was to carry out

operations in Sylhet area, capture the air field at Shamshernagar, secure ferries at

Saidpur and Sherpur, and capture Sylhet if possible. In the central part of the eastern

sector, 57 mountain division was tasked to capture Akhaura, contain Brahmanbaria and

capture the ferry at Daudkandi. 57 Brigade of this division remained under the

operational control of headquarters 4 Corps to cut road Mynamati – Daudkandi on

orders and establish a firm base to assist capture of Daudkandi by 57 mountain division.

In the southern part of the sector, 23 mountain division was tasked to capture Lalmai

Hills and Chandpur. Kilo sector was tasked to capture Feni and advance towards

Chittagong. 8 mountain division had No 5 Independent armour squadron (Equipped

with Ferret Scout Cars) for armour support. 23 Mountain division and 57 mountain

division had the support of one squadron of PT-76 tanks each. No 1 Independent

Armour Squadron of 7th Cavalry (PT-76 Tanks) was with 23 Mountain division. 57

Mountain division had the support of No 5 Independent Armour Squadron (PT-76 tanks)

7.4. 8 Mountain Division’s Operations Supported by Armour. (Please refer to

Map 7.1) 14 Infantry division (Pakistan Army) had deployed two brigades for the

defence of the northern part of this sector. 212 Infantry brigade was at Sylhet guarding

approaches to the town. 313 brigade was deployed at Maulavi bazar defending Kulaura

and approaches to Maulavi bazar and Sylhet. 27 brigade was deployed at Akhaura for

the defence of Akhaura – Brahmanbaria axis. 8 mountain division of the Indian Army

decided for achieving surprise by advancing along the most unexpected approach from

the south. Indian 81 Mountain brigade was tasked to capture Shamshernagar and

advance towards Maulavi bazar. 59 Mountain brigade was ordered to capture Kulaura

and advance to Fenchuganj. 59 Mountain brigade was provided with a troop of Ferret

Scout Cars of No 5 Independent Armour Squadron and 81 Mountain brigade was

allotted with the Squadron less one troop. No armour element existed with 14 Infantry

Division (Pakistan Army) and the 8 Mountain division (Indian Army) had no tank

support other than the limited number of Ferret Scout Cars. Both the Indian Army

brigades fought its way through the sector and succeeded in reaching the southern bank

of river Surma on 15 December 71. Ferret Cars were mostly employed in close support

of the infantry and in limited tasks in the advance to contact operations

7.5. 57 Mountain Division’s Operations Supported by Armour. (Please refer to

Map 7.2) Akhaura and Brahmanbaria were situated on the road linking Agartala with the

Bhairab bazar bridge. Akhaura was very close to the border and was only 3 kilometres

from Agartala. The location was a very good defensive position having marshy areas on

its flanks. Brahmanbaria was a built up area and had approaches leading from

Gangasagar and Chandura converging on it. 27 brigade of Pakistan Army was

deployed in this part of the sector with its headquarters at Brahmanbaria. A battalion of

infantry support by a troop of PT-76 tanks was deployed at Akhaura, which had a

railway station and was protected by river Titas in the northwest. Another battalion was

deployed in the south to defend the approach leading from Gangasagar. A third

battalion was deployed in the north of the township. 57 Mountain division planned to

capture Akhaura at the initial stage with 311 brigade advancing cross-country and

isolating Akhaura from the south and the west along river Titas. No 5 Independent

Squadron equipped with PT-76 tanks was initially given the task of establishing the road

block with anti-tank support near river Titas. Later, the squadron was given the task of

supporting operations in Akhaura area and dispatch a tank troop to 12 Kumaon

operating in the northern flank. 73 brigade was ordered to deploy south of Akhaura to

isolate it from any reinforcement. ‘S’ Force, composed of 12 Kumaon, 2 East Bengal

(Bangladesh) and a troop of PT-76 tanks, was ordered to carry out a diversionary attack

from the north on Akhaura.

7.5.1. Capture of Akhaura. On night 1/2 December 71, the brigades

deployed themselves as per plan to the south, south-west and north of Akhaura.

Eight PT-76 tanks of 5 Independent Armour Squadron (5 IAS) got bogged down

in a nullah south of Akhaura, and were attacked on 2 December 71 by Pakistani

aircrafts. None of the tanks were hit and these were recovered on Night 2/3

December 71 by the squadron. The blocking position established west of river

Titas was also attacked by Pakistani tanks and infantry on 2 December 71.

Without any tanks or anti-tank weapons, 4 Guards holding the blocking position

fought back and repelled the attack. On 3 December, efforts to send across tanks

to the road block near river Titas was attempted, but it did not work out. The

tanks once again failed to get across. Meanwhile, 73 brigade managed to link up

with 311 brigade and cut the road leading southwards to Comilla from

Brahmanbaria. Akhaura was finally attacked on night 4/5 December and cleared

by 5 December 71. Two Pakistani PT-76 tanks were captured and the railway

bridge over river Titas could not be blown off by the Pakistan Army. In the

overall, 5 IAS had no remarkable contribution in the capture of Akhaura.

7.5.2. Advance to Brahmanbaria. At Akhaura, it was discovered that the

Pakistan Army troops have uprooted one of the tracks from the double railway

track route linking Brahmanbaria with Akhaura. Upon discovering this new

route which was already in use as a motorable track by the Pakistan Army, 57

division was ordered to advance along it and capture Brahmanbaria. On 6

December 71, 73 brigade marched towards Brahmanbaria on two axes. One of

its battalions supported by a troop of 5 IAS less one troop the advance. 73

brigade was held up near river Pagla on 7 December 71. Meanwhile, ‘S’ Force

was advancing along a track leading towards the northern part of Brahmanbaria

town. These movements prompted the Pakistani troops to abandon

Brahmanbaria on night 7/8 December and occupy the main defensive position at

Ashuganj along the eastern bank of river Meghna. After the fall of

Brahmanbaria, 311 brigade led the advance towards Ashuganj with armour

support from 5 IAS along the railway and road axes.

7.5.3. Advance to Ashuganj. On 8 December 71, while advancing toward

Ashuganj, leading tanks of 5 IAS supporting 311 brigade was fired upon by

Pakistan Army troops from Bhatpara. The culvert ahead was destroyed by the

Pakistan Army and a mine field was also discovered. One troop of 5 IAS

supported by infantry, thereafter, out flanked the position at Bhatpara and made a

block behind Talsahar. This was followed by an assault by infantry with armour

in close support. The Pakistani troops withdrew, but 311 brigade of the Indian

Army had to discontinue its advance due to heavy artillery fire. The advance

was attempted next morning and it was planned to make an approach across

country with infantry supported by 5 IAS and strike Ashuganj from the north-

east along the eastern bank of river Meghna. The squadron in the process got

held up near an unfordable nullah and three of the tanks were shot by the

Pakistani Army troops with antitank guns. These troops, thereafter, launched a

desperate counter attack to support the withdrawal of 27 brigade of the Pakistan

Army across river Meghna. They also succeeded in blowing up the railway

bridge (King George VI Bridge) over river Meghna before the withdrawal. On

10 December, 311 brigade advanced upto Ashuganj and found it has been

abandoned by the Pakistan Army troops.

7.6. 23 Mountain Division’s Operation Supported by Armour. (Please refer to Map

7.3). The southern part of this sector had several railway and road links passing through the

township of Comilla. The Dhaka-Chittagong highway leading to Daudkandi ferry for

crossing river Meghna and the road link between Chandpur and the rest of the country were

the notable ones. Furthermore, railway routes between Dhaka-Chittagong and Dhaka-

Chandpur passed through Comilla. All these important communication links could be

dominated from the Lalmai hillocks north of Comilla township. 39 Infantry division of the

Pakistan Army was responsible for this part of the sector and it deployed two of its brigades

at Mynamati located north of Lalmai hillocks and at Feni respectively. An ad hoc squadron

consisting of two troops of M-24 chaffee tanks were also available with this division. 117

Infantry brigade of Pakistan Army held Lalmai hillocks in strength with two battalions and

deployed an advance position at Kashinagar near the border. Another of its battalion

deployed along Chauddagram–Laksham axis. 53 Infantry brigade of the Pakistan Army was

deployed at Feni looking after the southern part of the sector. 23 Mountain division of the

Indian Army was tasked to capture the southern part of Lalmai hillocks and Chandpur. The

division decided to use the most unexpected routes to operate in this sector. 301 brigade of

this division was to advance along Himmatpur – Kashinagar – Bhuschi- Mudaffarganj axis

and 83 brigade along Chauddagram – Laksham axis. The third brigade, i.e, 181 brigade was

ordered to follow behind 301 brigade and isolate Laksham initially and later join in its

capture alongwith 83 brigade. 301 brigade would then proceed towards Chandpur.

7.6.1. Preliminary Operations at Belonia. In November 71, Belonia bulge

located north east of Feni was cleared by 83 brigade of 23 Mountain division for

eliminating any threat from this flank. 83 Mountain brigade was supported by

No 1 Independent Armour Squadron (1 IAS) of 7th Light Cavalry. PT-76 tanks

of this squadron provided close support to the infantry actions in clearing

Munshirhat and Fulgazi.

7.6.2. 61 Mountain Brigade’s Operations. 61 brigade of 57 Mountain

division had the task of containing the northern part of Lalmai hillocks at

Mynamati with a troop of 5 IAS in support. The brigade occupied a position

between Comilla and Mianbazar with a battalion strength before the operations

were carried out by 57 division. The battalion was relieved by 9 East Bengal

(Bangladesh Army), and the brigade was reverted to its original task of cutting

off Daudkandi and containing the defence at Mynamati.

7.6.3. Capture of Mudaffarganj. On night 2/3 December 71, 301 brigade

unleashed two of its battalions, cut the track between Mianbazar and Kashinagar

and established two road blocks in the north and south of Mianbazar

respectively. On 4 December, 1 Independent Armour Squadron (1 IAS)

advanced along track Kashinagar – Mianbazar and made contact with Pakistan

troops deployed at Mianbazar. By then, the two road blocks at Kashinagar and

south Mianbazar were already established. The Pakistan Army position was

assaulted and over run by the tanks. The Pakistan Army troops withdrew to

Kashinagar and were captured by the battalion deployed at the road block. The

action successfully drove a wedge between Lalmai and Laksham and the advance

was resumed without any delay. Enroute, 1 IAS encountered a minefield at

Bhuschi on 5 December 71. 181 brigade, therefore, bypassed the minefield and

established blocking positions in the north and west of Laksham. 301 brigade

resumed advance on night 5/6 December 71, and captured Mudaffarganj on 6

December 71. On 7 December 71, 1 IAS ferried artillery guns across Dakatia

nullah with PT-76 tanks. This greatly assisted in providing necessary artillery

support for the capture of Chandpur subsequently. At this time, 53 brigade of

the Pakistan Army was pulled back to Laksham from Feni on 6 December 71.

117 brigade (Pakistan Army) readjusted its position to Mynamati in the northern

end of Lalmai hillocks. 23 division quickly took the opportunity of capturing

Comilla and deployed on the southern part of Lalmai hillocks. Meanwhile, 83

brigade pushed through Chauddagram and isolated 57 brigade (Pakistan Army)

at Laksham on 7 December 71 by establishing blocking positions in the south

and the southwest.

7.6.4. Capture of Chandpur. On 7 December 71,301 brigade moved towards

Chandpur with tanks of 1 IAS leading the advance. Enroute, Pakistan Army

oppositions at Rajapur, Enayetpur and Hajiganj was outflanked by the squadron.

There were several counter attacks carried out by the Pakistan Army troops on

the advancing column but these were brushed aside. Chandpur was captured on

9 December 71. Pakistani troops at Chandpur attempted to withdraw in river

crafts but many of these were shot and sunk by the tanks. A large number of

troops surrendered but the Headquarters of 39 division (Pakistan Army) managed

to flee in a gunboat in the morning hours.

7.6.5. Fall of Mynamati Garrison. 63 brigade of 57 mountain division(Indian

Army) had established itself at Jafarganj north-east of Mynamati by crossing

river Gumti on 7 December 71. The brigade was being supported by a troop of

tanks of 5 IAS. The brigade made an advance towards Chandina along Comilla

– Daudkandi axis and contacted the Pakistan Army troops at Chandina at last

light on 7 December. On contact leading tanks were fired upon by anti-tank

guns. The position was found abandoned by the Pakistani troops the next

morning after it was outflanked and the advance was resumed. On 8 December,

contact was again established at Elliotganj and the position was quickly captured

by an outflanking action. The tank troop was dispatched to Mynamati at this

time for supporting an attack on the Pakistan Army position in that garrison.

Thereafter, on 9 December, 61 brigade captured Daudkandi and secured the ferry

site. On 10 December, an attack was launched on Mynamati Garrison by 7

Rajput Rifle with the troops of 5 IAS in close support. Tanks destroyed anti tank

guns at Dighalgaon and moved towards the ridges. Only one tank could join the

battalion and it fought back the counter attack launched by the Pakistani troops.

The troop repaired its tanks and carried out destruction of several bunkers on 11

and 12 December 71. 181 brigade joined 61 brigade on 13 December and

attacked the Pakistan Army defence with the troop of 5 IAS in close support.

Mynamati garrison held on to its positions and a fresh attack was planned on

night 14/15 December 71, but it was postponed subsequently. On 16 December

71 cease-fire was declared and the garrison surrendered.

7.6.6. Crossing of River Meghna. After the capture of Ashuganj, Daudkandi and

Chandpur, 4 Corps made a bold attempt in crossing river Meghna for making it

towards Dhaka. On 9 December, helicopters were used to lift troops and artillery

guns across the river to Narsingdi. By 12 December 71, 57 mountain division

commenced its advance towards Dhaka with five infantry battalions and two artillery

regiments. The armour squadron could not be heli-lifted but was needed badly to

counter the two troops of M-24 Chaffee tanks with the Pakistani defenders at Dhaka.

On 12 December 71, attempts were made to swim the tanks across Meghna. P-76

Tanks are equipped with hydro-propulsion jets and are capable of floating in water.

However, the hull seals of these tanks were found defective which resulted into

leakage of water into the tank. Only two tanks could manage to go about 3

kilometres down stream. On 14 December the squadron moved to Char Lalpur and

reached Narsingdi by crossing Meghna. Thereafter, 4 Corps begun its move towards

Dhaka with 57 division supported by armour.

CHAPTER - VIII

BATTLES IN THE CENTRAL SECTOR AND FALL OF DHAKA

8.1. Terrain. The central sector is bounded by river Jamuna in the west, river

Meghna in the east forming a ‘Vee’ shape with the Indian territory on the north. This sector

offered the most favourable land approach to Dhaka with the river “Old Brahmaputra”

posing as the only obstacle in the middle. Approaches into this sector ran through

Kamalpur, Haluaghat and Durgapur, from the state of Meghalaya. (Please refer to Map

8.1)

8.2. Pakistani Forces. Pakistan Army had attached very less importance to this sector

and deployed only 93 infantry brigade with two battalions to hold this sector. The battalions

were defending Mymensing and Jamalpur respectively with advance positions deployed

close to the border. No armour was available in this sector except for the two troops of M-

24 Chaffee tanks designated for the defence of Dhaka city.

8.3. Indian Forces. HQ 101 Communication Zone with 95 Mountain brigade was

responsible for the operations in this sector and there were no armour elements available

with this formation. Pakistan army apprehended an advance by the Indian forces towards

Mymensing but subsequently 101 Communication Zone carried out a subsidiary advance in

this axis.

8.4. HQ 101 Communication Zone's – Operations (Please refer to Map 8.1Advance

positions at Kamalpur and Bakshiganj was reduced by 95 brigade (Indian Army) on 3 and 4

December 71 and the Pakistan Army troops withdrew towards Jamalpur and Mymensing.

On 6 December 71, 95 brigade resumed its advance and outflanked Jamalpur on 9

December. On 11 December, both Jamalpur and Mymensing defences were pulled back by

93 brigade (Pakistan Army) for the defence of Dhaka. The same day, a para dropping

operation was carried out by 2 para battalion at Kalihati near Tangail. This battalion later

led the advance of 95 brigade towards Dhaka and reached 3 kilometres short of the bridge

over river Turag near Mirpur on 16 December 71. ). The demand for an unconditional

surrender was sent to the Pakistani forces from this location. 2 para battalion, thereafter,

entered Dhaka at 1130 on 16 December once the demand was accepted by the Pakistani

Army. Meanwhile, 57 division and 301 brigade of 23 division were in the outskirts of

Dhaka city with their troops.

CHAPTER - IX

AN OVERVIEW OF THE LESSONS LEARNT IN THE ARMOUR

BATTLES

9.1. General. The employment of armour by the Indian Army in the terrain of

Bangladesh demonstrates the practical outlook of the armour planners behind the scene.

They displayed a much longer-terms vision and foresight than their Pakistani counterparts.

Certain aspects of these behind the scene’ activities need special mention. They also provide

excellent lessons, which can be borne in mind by Commanders who are likely to be

involved in the employment of armour. The specific lessons, which deserve to be noted, are

spelt out below.

9.1.1. Mixture of T-55 Medium Tanks and PT-76 Light Amphibious Tanks.

Armour planners had cleverly grouped medium tanks with light ones in order to

strike a balance between the two. One fulfilled the need for the required

manoeuvrability, while having moderate firepower and armour protection. The

other possessed required firepower and armour protection while to a certain extent

lacking manoeuvrability. The mixture was based on the principle that medium tanks

would lead the advance and normally operate near the main axis where ground is

firm, while light tanks would out-flank the enemy by moving through marshy areas

as necessary. The principle worked in a splendid manner especially in the Southern

and the northWestern sector.

9.1.2 Pre War-Training for Armour Crews. The training carried out under HQ

Brigadier Armour in 33 Corps was also an outstanding example of preparing the

tank crews to meet the demands of the terrain. It helped them to gain the required

confidence on the equipment they would have to use. The movements carried out at

night covering long distances and the crossing of several obstacles, prepared the

crews very well for the operations within Bangladesh. The achievements in the

northWestern sector reflect the value of such training. The crews succeeded very

well in outmanoeuvring the enemy in depth during the hours of darkness.

9.1.3. Deployment of Armour. The deployment of maximum armour in the North

Western and the southWestern sector had led to the rapid capturing of objectives in

depth. However, inadequacy in terms of armour strength in certain sectors also

stands out clearly. Given that the Indian Army had to give priorities to the Western

and northern frontiers as well, the strength of armour for the war in Bangladesh was

just about adequate. Any further reduction in the armour strength would have

resulted a much slower rate of advance and the campaign could have possibly lasted

much longer.

9.1.4. Employment of Armour Through the Most Unexpected Routes Armour

is an arms of decision. One of the principles of its employment requires that it

should be used in the weakest hinge of the enemy where a decisive action is being

sought. The mixture of tanks and the pre-war training prepared the crews so well

that they outmanoeuvred the enemy in almost all places. This happened regardless

of their degree of unfamiliarity with the terrain and other uncertainties. More often

than not, these crews altered the entire course of the battle by deep outflanking

actions and suddenly appearing along approaches where the enemy did not even

expect them. Avoiding the most obvious routes in order to achieve surprise against

the enemy constitutes the valuable lesson from such manoeuvres.

9.1.4. Leading the Advance with Armour. The Indian commanders had always

been bold in using armour in sectors where these resources were made available to

them. The preceding description of the battles in the various sectors goes to prove

that adequately. Undertaking advance with tanks not only multiplied the speed of

actions, but also helped to achieve the desired level of shock effect over the enemy.

In sectors where armour had relatively less strength or was not available, the

operations took longer time to mature, as can be seen in the Central sector and the

fall of Dhaka.

9.1.5. Employment of Armour and Infantry. The joint employment of armour

and infantry and the principle of wresting the command with the armour counterpart

demonstrate the realistic attitude of the Indian Commanders. Due to its inherent

characteristic of mobility, armour endows its commander with a more flexible

outlook. This does not reflect any shortcomings of the infantry, since without

infantry no battle can be fought. The joint employment of armour and infantry, with

armour in close support and tanks frequently carrying the infantry across long

distances, demonstrated the excellent results, which can be achieved by combining

these teeth arms.

9.1.6. Introduction of HEAT Ammunition for PT-76 Tanks. The manoeuvring

ability of the PT 76 is greatly affected by its limitations in terms of firepower. With

a 76 mm canon, these tanks have to get relatively close to enemy positions before

any effective engagement. This increases its vulnerability greatly, especially

because of its deficiency in terms of armour protection. The introduction of HEAT

ammunition greatly enhanced their fire power, accuracy and stand off distance.

9.2 While bearing in mind the positive aspects noted above, certain shortcomings and

inadequacies in armour deployment also deserve to be noted. Indeed, these could well serve

as lessons for the commander:

9.2.1. Lack of Pre-War Training in Certain Sectors. The armour elements

deployed for operations in the South Western and Eastern Sectors were not given any pre-war

training before the operation .The resulting inadequacies in performance can be seen in the

actions in the eastern sector. The crews found difficult in crossing obstacles and traversing the

boggy terrain with amphibious tanks which had lower ground pressure than that of a standing goat.

9.2.2. Unfinished Conversion Training on T-55 -Tanks. The conversion training

on T-55 medium tanks was not adequate. The crews were not familiarised with the

capabilities of medium tanks and the first attempt to induct T-55 tanks in Hilli

proved disastrous. However, during the course of the war, the crews got sufficiently

hardened and realised the potential of T-55 tanks to a greater extent. It may be noted

here that T-55 tanks were inducted into operation as late as September 1971, and the

time available for the required conversion training was clearly not adequate.

9.2.3. Shortage of Spares of T-55 Tanks. In the course of any battle, damage to

equipment will almost invariably occur. Such contingencies necessitate an adequate supply of

likely spares at a war wastage rate. The non-availability of the No. 1 Boggie Station Assembly for

the T-55 tanks became a crucial issue in the NorthWestern Sector. Even though the problems were

successfully restored through innovative repairs, the necessity of maintaining an adequate reserve of

spares for a particular type equipment could not be better illustrated.

9.2.4. Last Minute Arrival of PT-76 Track Links. The tracks of PT-76 tanks

have a relatively narrow width. Moreover, worn out tracks will usually result in the

spreading of the tracks off the boggie wheels. This phenomenon would occur with

greater frequency when traversing through marshy terrain. The track links of most

of the PT-76 tanks were due for replacement before the war. This requirement,

however, was met through a successful last minute arrangement. A failure would

have resulted in damage the running gears during operation, with great hindrance to

mobility.

9.3. Lessons from the Battles of the SouthWestern Sector. A mixture of T-55 medium

tanks and PT-76 light amphibious tanks operated in this sector. The employment had been

very bold and innovative and surprise was achieved through most actions. The lessons of

these armour battles are as follows.

9.3.1. Battle of Garibpur. Quick deployment by C Squadron 45 Cavalry gave the

Indians freedom of action over the Pakistani Armour Squadron equipped with M 24

Chaffee quick-deployment fog tanks. The decision to make an assault through fog

against an enemy whose dispositions were not known was an improper action taken

by the Pakistani Army.

9.3.2. Road Block at Uttar Narayanpur. The road block established at Uttar

Narayanpurto cut off the road Meherpur-Faridpur was an incredible action that

paralysed the enemy’s withdrawl. The bold use of armour demonstrated the

flexibility inherent in the tank troops. The action was done in daylight with air

supremacy.

9.3.3. Selection of Unexpected Approaches. The most obvious route Benapole-

Jessore was not used for the major thrust. This assisted in bypassing strength and

achieving surprise.

9.3.4. Debacle in Kushtia. The debacle in Kushtia offers several lessons. The

decisions based on inaccurate information that Kushtia was not held in strength.

Had this been known, putting tanks into a built-up area could have been avoided.

Pressure from the high command to compress battle procedures and advance on the

enemy resulted in this debacle. The Pakistani ambush party displayed skill in

achieving surprise over the advancing tanks. One can draw the lesson from this

incident to not put tanks into a built-up area without accurate knowledge of enemy

positions.

9.3.5. Crossing of River Madhumati at Night. The crossing of river Madhumati

along both flanks with tanks goes to prove that no terrain is ‘untankable’ and

obstacles can usually be crossed.

9.3.6. Use of Armour in Advance. Regardless of the difficult terrain, tanks were

on the lead in most of the advance operations. Use of armour multiplied the rate of

advance, helped in outflanking the enemy and enabled capturing of objectives in

depth to block enemy withdrawals.

9.3.7. Lack of Effective Contact with the Enemy Through Armour. Even

though armour was used in most of the operations, effective contact with the

withdrawing enemy forces could not always be maintained. This was possibly due

to the need to retain the tanks for subsequent decisive actions. However, this

resulted in the achievement of surprise by the enemy in Kushtia and Khulna.

Adequate information on enemy dispositions was not available to the Indian forces

before launching their operations on these locations.

9.4. Lessons from the Battles of the North-Western Sector. Of all the sectors within

Bangladesh, the northwestern sector provided the largest stretch of land devoid of

significant river obstacles. Both Indian and Pakistani forces concentrated the major portion

of their armour in this sector. The preparations taken by the Indian 33 corps on the part of

the planners. The conversion training on newly inducted T-55 medium tanks and extensive

practice on long-range night movements with obstacle crossing goes to prove the utility of

such planning. There are many lessons which can be drawn from the battles subsequently

fought in this sector, as specified below.

9.4.1. Need for Proper Terrain Intelligence. Armour elements should preferably

not be deployed without terrain information, especially in terms. The induction of T-

55 medium tanks at Hilli proved disastrous in the initial stage only because of such

lack of information. The objective located at Morapara was filled with marshy areas

which hindered the mobility of these tanks. The armour commander was not

permitted to carry out day-light reconnaissance due to cartain restrictions imposed

by the High Command.

9.4.2. Rapid Reinforcement by Armour. The failure to induct medium tanks at

Hilli was resolved by bringing over PT-76 tanks from Patiram. The flexibility and

mobility inherent in armour elements was aptly demonstrated through this action..

9.4.3. Achievement of Surprise at Charkhai. The 140-Kilometre long night

movement By 63 Cavalry to Charkhai and its capture by infantry with armour in

close support achieved total surprise. Enemy forces had considered this to be an

‘untankable’ terrain and had no preparations in terms of anti-tank defence.

9.4.4. Out-Flanking of Hilli. Hilli was strongly held by the Pakistan army from

well-fortified positions. Several attempts had proven costly in terms of casualties.

Decision to contain Hilli and outflanking it by making an approach to Pirganj via

Charkhai was indeed a clear display of the bold use of armour. The tanks had moved

towards Pirganj in rapid succession and could cut off the highway linking Rangpur

and Bogra. The capture of this location in depth was an unexpected surprise to the

Pakistani forces. The armour elements almost succeeded in shooting down the

convoy carrying the Pakistani Divisional Commander.

9.4.5 Use of Armour in Reconnaissance in Force. Before the capture of

Bhaduria, Squadron 63 Cavalry equipped with T-55 medium tanks carried out a

reconnaissance in force on it and its surroundings. It not only helped gather

information, but also created great panic in the minds of the defenders. The position

was very strongly held but was abandoned when surrounded later through a planned

attack

9.4.6. Need for Adequate Repair Backup for Armour Operations. While

advancing towards Palashbari several T-5 tanks got disabled due to mines and terrain

conditions. Some of these tanks required the replacement of No. 1 Boggie station of

the running gears. The spares were not adequate in quantity and innovative methods

were used to repair these tanks. This instance proves the need for ensuring adequate

repair facilities to support a continuous armour operation.

9.4.7. Use of Armour in Swift Action to Clear Opposition. At Palashbari,

infantry forces were ordered to clear the built-up area but they were held up due to

heavy artillery shelling by the enemy. However, T-55 tanks could successfully brave

the artillery shells and clear the opposition within a short time.

9.4.8. Prevention of Withdrawing Troops Decisively Engaged in a Sector.

While operating on the Hilli-Palashbari axis, 63 Cavalry (T 55 tanks) while

operating at Hilli-Palashbari axis was ordered to disengage and proceed towards by

rail to reinforce that sector. The regiment was already engaged in various actions

and some of its tanks were in need of urgent repair. Even though, the regiment

moved to its destination after a few days of delay, too late for any remarkable

employment.

9.4.9. Pursuit of the Enemy with Tanks with Minimum Delay. Fresh attacks

were launched on the enemy at Hilli after the capture of Palashbari on 9 December

1971. Most of the enemy withdrew towards Ghoraghat before the attack and A

Squadron 63 Cavalry pursued the route with minimum delay. This disorganised the

enemy, resulting in its inability to reinforce other defended localities

9.4.10. Achievement of Surprise Through Road Blocks. During attacks on

Pirganj, Palashbari and Gobindaganj armour troops established road blocks on the

withdrawal routes of the Pakistani troops in conjunction with the task of providing

close support to the infantry. This action achieved surprise in almost all the

operations and the troops ran into the roadblocks while withdrawing.

9.4.11. Innovative Use of Armour. During the 1971 war, a number of incredible

night moves by armour across country were carried out in this sector. The first

involved the move of 69 Armour Regiment and a squadron of T-55 from 63 Cavalry

to outflank the enemy at Gobindaganj from the rear. The other move was also carried

out by the same regiment, advancing from Mahasthan to Bogra to cut off the two

major regiment from Mahasthan to Bogra, to cut off the two major approaches out of

the township before its capture. Both actions demanded a high degree of driving skill,

navigation and boldness. These were successfully carried out by 69 Armour Regiment

regardless of controversial opinions. This proved that innovative use of armour can

lead to greater degree of achievement.

9.5. Lessons from the Battles of the North-Eastern Sector. The north sector had much

less armour available with the operating divisions. Apart from this, the preparatory training

to meet the terrain conditions in the operational area was also not carried out to the required

level. In Sylhet, no armour was allotted to 8 Mountain Division apart from a squadron of

Armour Scout Vehicles. In Comilla and Akhaura, 23 and 57 mountain divisions were

allotted with a squadron of PT-76 tanks each. Lessons from the armour actions fought in

this sector are as follows :

9.5.1. Improper Pre-war Training. PT-76 tanks crews of these sectors were not

given adequate pre-war training to build up their confidence to able to operate in this

sector. This resulted in frequent recovery problems in terms of bogged down tanks,

inability to cross water obstacles and lack of confidence in movements through soft

terrain.

9.5.2. Dominating River Banks with Tanks. During the withdrawal of troops

from the Pakistan Army positions at Chandpur and Ashuganj, tanks succeeded in

shooting down the enemy withdrawing in river crafts. Comparable action in

Chandpur was even more successful as large numbers of river crafts were sunk.

9.5.3. Shortage of Armour and its limited use. The principle of employment of

armour state that the use of this arms should be done through timely concentration in

order to derive the best results. The shortage of armour led to the limited use of

tanks in both the Chandpur and Akhaura sub-sectors. The actions comprised mostly

of troop level outflanking operations.

9.5.4. Crossing of the Meghna. Having secured the road up to Daudkandi

and Ashuganj, 4 Corps had taken all preparations for a move towards Dhaka. A

division strength was lifted across the river Meghna through helicopters. However,

the PT-76 tanks required to lead the advance could not be heli-lifted. An effort to

swim the tanks with their hydro-propulsion jets also proved unsuccessful when the

hull seals were found defective. Later on the tanks managed to make it across the

rivers through a different approach and join the advancing column. Possibly there

could have been better preparation for utilising the amphibious capability of these

tanks.

9.6. Lessons from the Battles of the Central Sector. The Central Sector offered the most

unhindered approach from the southern border of Meghalaya up to Dhaka. The river

Brahmaputra was the only significant obstacle on this route. Both the Indian and Pakistani

forces had no armour in this sector. As a result, operations in this sector were slow and

prolonged. However, the final phase of the war, a Para dropping was carried out by the

Indian Army. This was at Kalihati with 2 Para battalion on 11 December 1971. This unit

marched towards Dhaka and was the first to enter the city on 16 December 1971.

Availability of an armour squadron regiment could have greatly assisted them to reach

Dhaka much earlier.

CHAPTER X

RECOMMENDATIONS

10.1. General. The lessons learnt from the armour battles of 1971 War of Liberation of

Bangladesh lead to the following recommendations which has implications on policy for

formulation :

10.2. Combination of Light and Medium Tanks. The topography of Bangladesh

presents considerable regional variety. In most of the military sectors, as described in the

text; marshy and boggy terrain exist. The paddy fields usually remain inundated due to

irrigation. It is, therefore, appropriate to have a mixture of medium and light tanks in any

offensive operation. This will ensure both firepower and manoeuvrability at all times. On

the other hand, for defensive operations; approaches through marshy terrain must not be

overlooked and should be covered by antitank measures.

10.3. Training Imperatives. Pre-war training should be given to armour crews before

engaging them in the operations. The training should include technique of negotiating

terrain hazards in the area where they will operate and details about the enemy they will

encounter.

10.4. Concentration of Armour. Tanks should be used in larger numbers rather than in

penny packets. Tendency to distribute tanks all over must be avoided and these should be

kept concentrated for employment at places where major decisions are sought.

10.5. Employment of Armour. The employment of armour within Bangladesh may have

the following considerations :

10.5.1. Armour should be employed through most unexpected routes, wherever

possible.

10.5.2. Offensive operations should be spearheaded by armour to speed up the pace

of favourable developments.

10.5.3. Armour should operate in conjunction with the infantry and follow an agreed

upon combined arms tactics.

10.5.4. Contact once gained with the necessary during any operation must not be

lost. As this may lead to uncertainty and enemy may successfully achieve surprise

over own forces.

10.5.5. River banks should be dominated by armour, wherever possible.

10.5.6. In offensive operations armour should be used for making road blocks to cut-

off withdrawal routes of the enemy.

10.5.7. Armour should be used for “Reconnaissance in force” operations.

10.5.8. Disengagement of armour from a sector should preferably be avoided if these

troops are decisively engaged.

10.6. Intelligence. Armour should preferably not be used without proper information on

the enemy and the terrain. The gathering of intelligence, therefore, has to be carefully done

before contemplating any operations with armour.

10.7. Adequate Logistics Support. Armour operations should be carefully provided with

an unfailing logistics support. This should include repair, recovery and maintenance

facilities with adequate supply of essential spares at a war wastage rate.

10.8. Major River Crossing Operations. River crossing operations with amphibious

tanks must be carefully planned with adequate technical preparations and checks.

10.9. Outflanking Manoeuvres At Night. Armour should be used for carrying out long

outflanking manoeuvres in the hours of darkness. This has to be practised regularly during

peace time manoeuvres and night training. Crossing of water obstacles should be included

in such exercises.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSION

11.1. A very significant contribution was made by the armour troops of the Indian Army

who took part in the Liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971. Although these troops

accounted for a smaller proportion numerically compared, to the other arms and services,

yet their contribution was to far greater proportions than what had been anticipated. The

mixture of amphibious and medium tanks provided an excellent combination of firepower,

mobility and armour protection to suit the terrain. The tanks proved very effective in

breaking through the obstacle-ridden territory. which had mostly been regarded as being

unsuitable for armour by the Pakistan Army defenders. The combined force of light and

medium tanks ensured an even balance for hitting the enemy frontally during contact as

well as manoeuvring on the flanks when a degree of mobility was desirable.

11.2. The Indian Army had employed a strength of three Corps for the campaign. Three

regiments of armour were deployed for the purpose of providing support to these

formations.

11.3. The Pakistan Army had been complacent with the view that Bangladesh did not

provide a suitable terrain for employment of armour. They had only one armour regiment,

consisting of M-24 Chaffee tanks, which had almost reached state of obsolescence. When

the war broke out, it was also not possible for the Pakistani army to bring any armour

reinforcement from the West Pakistan. A large proportion of the tanks of this regiment was

destroyed during the campaign. These tanks simply could not match the opposing Indian

armour, which had much better equipment in terms of mobility, firepower and armour

protection.

11.4. The lessons learnt from this campaign adequately supported the view that no terrain

is unsuitable for the employment of armour. Preparations for actions with armour were

taken well in advance and the training required to traverse long distances in the hours of

darkness was adequately provided. The efforts made through such training paid off very

well. The manoeuvres carried out later by these crews helped to execute the campaign at a

much faster rate than had been anticipated. In some of the sectors absence of armour, or a

deficiency in its strength, resulted in the advance taking place at a relatively slow pace. As

a result, actions were localised and manoeuvres depth to bypass enemy strongholds did not

take place.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. The Indian Armour, History Maj Gen Gurcharn Vision Books

of the Indian Armoured Singh Sandhu

Corps (1941-1971) PVSM (Retd)

2. The Lightning Campaign Maj Gen DK Palit

3. Victory in Bangladesh Maj Gen Lachman Natraj Pubs

Singh

4. Indian Sword strikes Major Gen Lechman Vikas

Singh

5. Indian Army after Maj K C Praval Lancer International

Independence

6. The Liberation of Maj Gen Sukhwant Vikas

Bangladesh Singh

7. Witness to Surrender Siddik Salik Oxford

University

Press

8. 'Operation Windfall' Brig H S Sodhi Allied

Emergence of Bangladesh Publishers

Private

Limited

DISSERTATIONS

9. An Armour Concept for Bangladesh Major Abu Commandants

Army Mohammad Papers 1988

Aslam Army

Staff

Course-13

10 Lessons from the Armour Battles Lieutenant Dissertation

of 71 War Colonel 1996

Abu Long

Defence

Mohammad

Management

Aslam,psc Course-26

M A P S

11. Bangladesh in Maps Dhaka Dhaka

University University

12.

Banglad

esh

Political

Govern

ment

Divisio

ns, 1971

of

Banglad

esh

13. The Oxford School Oxford

Atlas University

Press

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An evaluation of the Armour Battles of the 1971 War of Liberation of Bangladesh. Armour

Battles Encombers Actions Department of the 1971 War of Liberation of Bangladesh: A

critical Strategic Evaluation with policy implications.

Part I *Historical and Strategic Considerations

* Theoretical and Historical Aspects of the Department of Armour.

* Strategic aspects of Indo-Pakistan Relations Prior to the 1971 War India Political

objective of Dividing Pakistan.

Part II Arty.

As in the Dissertation. But written from a neutral/detached viewpoint i.e including look at

Pakistani achievements

Part III

Policy Implications

Lessons from 1971

Future Defence of Bangladesh

An evaluation/Analysis of the Armour battles of the 1971 War of Liberation of Bangladesh.