ARISTOTLE’S FUNCTION

ARGUMENT

Goods are ends/goals. Two ways of thinking about ends:Subjective aim. What one pursues/aims at is typically

what one values most. What is taken to be good.Objective point. When we ask what the point of

something (e.g. an activity) is, we are asking about its value. What good it is.

Aristotle is thinking of goods as ends in both ways. His hope is that we can make some progress in thinking about goodness if we think carefully about the ends of human action.

Note: in I.7 Aristotle will move to a different way of thinking about goodness.

GOODS AS ENDS

Sometimes an end is simply an activity; other times an end might be a product distinct from the activity that gave rise to it.Examples of each?

NOT ALL ENDS ARE THE SAME

When the end is some product distinct from the activity, Aristotle tells us that the product is better (more good) than the activity.Why is the product better?

PRODUCTS AS BETTER

When the end is some product distinct from the activity, Aristotle tells us that the product is better (more good) than the activity.Why is the product better?

Distinguish the means to some end/goal from the goal itself. Aristotle is assuming that the value of the means depends on the value of the goal.

The objective point of the means is derivative; accordingly, it is less valuable than the goal itself.

PRODUCTS AS BETTER

When one art/technology/science is subordinate to another, the superordinate is better than the subordinate.Examples?

A COROLLARY THESIS

Political science

Technology Science Art

Ethics

A HIERARCHY OF ENDS

Note that knowledge of the good life is supposed to be a central concern of the legislator.

ARISTOTLE’S PATERNALISM

“Suppose, then, that the things achievable by action have some end that we wish for because of itself, and because of which we wish for the other things, and that we do not choose everything because of something else—for if we do, it will go on without limit, so that desire will prove to be empty and futile. Clearly, this end will be the good, that is to say, the best good.” (I.2)

THE BEST GOOD INTRODUCED

Suppose nothing is desired for its own sake—everything is desired for the sake of something else. Would all desire—not to mention human existence itself—be empty/vain?

Are there things desired for their own sake? Do they succeed in making life meaningful?

Aristotle concludes that our actions are aimed at THE GOOD (just one thing, the best good). Suppose we concede Aristotle’s premise that life is not empty. Does his argument establish the existence of some one thing (the best good)?

FOR DISCUSSION

Ethics/political science are inexact sciences. The nature of the subject matter is such that generalizations will hold/be valid only FOR THE MOST PART, not UNIVERSALLY.

So don’t expect the sort of precision and exactness that you’ve come to expect in, say, mathematics and geometry.

The difference stems from the object of inquiry: goods by their nature are much more messy/unstable and consequently less predictable than numbers and shapes.

METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS

Young individuals are not suited to ethical inquiry.

First, they lack the experience needed to grasp the generalizations upon which ethical inquiry depends.

Second, they have nothing to gain. The end of ethics/political science is action: practical knowledge rather than theoretical knowledge. But young people tend to be guided in action by feelings, not practical knowledge: “an immature person, like an incontinent person, gets no benefit from his knowledge.” (I.3)

METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS

Suppose that there is a hierarchy of ends and that there is a highest end. There is verbal agreement about what this end of human action is, namely, happiness. However, there is substantive disagreement about what happiness consists in.

The many say pleasure or wealth.The politically active say honor.The wise say virtue or the life of study.

What is wrong with these answers?

HAPPINESS THE HIGHEST GOOD

Pleasure: not the human goodWealth: not intrinsically valuableHonor: not inherent (because easily stripped away)Virtue: compatible with a life of inactivityLife of study: discussion postponed

INITIAL RESPONSES TOPROPOSED CANDIDATES

In his survey of prominent views, Aristotle devotes an entire chapter to discussion of Plato’s theory. One of his central complaints is that Plato gets the metaphysics & epistemology of goodness wrong.

THE FORM OF THE GOOD AS THE HIGHEST GOOD

Plato is assuming there is some one thing common to/shared by all things good—much the way all water has something in common.

Aristotle insists that goodness is more like being than water. There is no single answer to Socrates’ question “What is it?” that is true of all beings. A being might be a substance, a quantity, a quality, a relation… Goodness works similarly.

THE CATEGORIES OF BEING

Aristotle clarifies the epistemological role the Form of the Good is supposed to play:

“Perhaps, however, someone might think it is better to get to know the Idea with a view to the goods that we can possess and achieve in action; for if we have this as a sort of pattern, we shall also know better about the goods that are goods for us, and if we know about them, we shall hit on them.”

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ROLE OF THE FORM OF THE GOOD

Expertise in the sciences, technology, etc. does not work this way. Experts do not have knowledge of a singular science of the Good—there is in fact no such science and no one is seeking it!

After all, how would knowledge of something so highly general, encompassing all goods, be of use to, e.g., doctors, who need to know what is good for a specific patient at a specific time?

EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE GOOD

The most celebrated part of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle’s most influential work. In this chapter Aristotle develops his own positive view about the best good. The discussion has two main parts.

First, he wants to show that there is a best good, namely, happiness. (There are criteria that the best good must satisfy, and happiness alone satisfies them.)

Second, he defends a view about what happiness is. (In defense of his view about the nature of human happiness he offers his famous function argument.)

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS I.7

What is the best good there is? Aristotle thinks the best good is going to have certain features that mark it out as best. Roughly, it will be (1) a final end, (2) good by itself (not just a part of something better), and (3) not subject to improvement.

1. Most complete: an end which is choiceworthy for its own sake, not for anything further.

2. Self-sufficient: choiceworthy by itself and lacking nothing, an all-inclusive good.

3. Most choiceworthy: no addition could make it better.

Do you agree with these criteria for the best good?

FORMAL CRITERION FOR THE BEST GOOD

Why suppose that the best good will satisfy these criteria?

Most complete. This criterion is a consequence of thinking of goods as ends. The end of an activity is the source of goodness.

Self-sufficient & most choiceworthy. Suppose some good A were lacking some good B. In that case the sum of A and B would be better than A by itself. A would not qualify as the best good.

ARISTOTLE’S JUSTIFICATION

Why think that happiness satisfies these criteria?1. Most complete: an end which is choiceworthy for its

own sake, not for anything further.2. Self-sufficient: choiceworthy by itself and lacking

nothing, an all-inclusive good.3. Most choiceworthy: no addition could make it better.

HAPPINESS AS THE BEST GOOD

1. Most complete. We choose other things for the sake of happiness; we do not choose happiness for the sake anything further.

2. Self-sufficient (inclusive). When we call a life happy, we mean that it includes the things that make a life worthwhile.

3. Most choiceworthy (not subject to improvement). If you have happiness, then you have the best sort of life. The best life cannot be made better by the addition of further goods.

HAPPINESS AS THE BEST GOOD

At this point we have established that happiness is the best good. But in Aristotle’s view this is not a big accomplishment, for everyone is already in agreement with this point.

The real issue at hand is the following: What is the best kind of life? What is the happy life?

We will turn to Aristotle’s function argument in due course. But first: Is Aristotle right that the conclusion so far is a trivial

one? Is it even true that happiness is the best good?

SUMMING UP

Psychological egoism is a view about human psychology according to which the ultimate goal of all voluntary behavior in humans is in each case the agent’s personal happiness .

For discussion in groups:Do you agree with Aristotle that personal happiness is

the ultimate aim of human action? Do you think we are by nature selfish and incapable of genuinely altruistic behavior?

ARISTOTLE & PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM

A hedonist version of psychological egoism maintains that humans always aim at their own personal pleasure. Aristotle accepts some version or other of psychological egoism, but he is not a hedonist .

On Aristotle’s view, humans alone have the cognitive sophistication required to distinguish the apparent good (the pleasant) from what is in fact good for one. A pleasure is good only insofar as it is a consequence of some good activity (e.g. virtuous activity).

A happy human life will include pleasure as a kind of byproduct; pleasure is not the goal of a happy human life.

ARISTOTLE & HEDONISM

For humans there is an important distinction to be drawn between (i) how things seem qualitatively “from the inside” and (ii) how well things are in fact going.

Aristotle rejects a “life satisfaction” view of happiness. Human happiness is a matter of flourishing as a human being.

Animals & children cannot attain happiness, though they presumably possess some analogue of it. But even here “happiness” will be a life of thriving activity, not the sort of life possible in Nozick’s experience machine.

HAPPINESS VS. LIFE SATISFACTION

Aristotle thinks that many plausible explanations of human action invoke happiness as an ultimate aim/goal/end. Some actions (e.g. incontinent ones) do not seem to fit this model.

How might Aristotle respond to these sorts of cases?

ARISTOTLE & PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM

Aristotle thinks that many plausible explanations of human action invoke happiness as an ultimate aim/goal/end. Some actions (e.g. incontinent ones) do not seem to fit this model.

How might Aristotle respond to these sorts of cases?

One option is to insist that all rational human action aims at happiness. So Aristotle is not talking about irrational or non-rational behavior.

The behavior of children & non-human animals is not aimed at happiness. Is Aristotle committed to an implausible discontinuity between adult humans and all other agents?

ARISTOTLE & PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM

Aristotle’s claim that happiness is the ultimate goal of human action is compatible with two ways of thinking about happiness as an ultimate end of human action:1. We do everything solely for the sake of personal

happiness.2. We do everything also for the sake of personal

happiness (though sometimes for independent reasons as well).

We have strong reason to prefer 2 over 1 as an interpretation of Aristotle. Consider his view that a friend is another self!

A MODEST EGOISM

What’s more, it is likely that Aristotle acknowledges further exceptions, and is committed at most to:

We do most everything also for the sake of happiness.

He writes: “Honor, pleasure, understanding, and every virtue we certainly choose because of themselves, since we would choose each of them even if it had no further result; but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, supposing that through them we shall be happy. Happiness, by contrast, no one ever chooses for their sake, or for the sake of anything else at all.” (1097b)

EVEN MORE MODEST

In normal circumstances where our actions can impact personal happiness, our rational voluntary actions are aimed at personal happiness, but not to the exclusion of other goods. We can pursue the good of another for their sake and simultaneously pursue friendship as a component of our own happiness.

ARISTOTLE’S EGOISM REFORMULATED

So far we have been thinking of goods as the things intentional behavior is aimed at. Happiness is the best good when we are thinking of goodness in this way.

Aristotle hopes to make progress on the question of what human happiness is by focusing on a different way of thinking about goodness.

Sometimes we characterize something as good insofar as it performs its function well.Examples?

FUNCTION & GOODNESS

The ergon of x: x’s distinctive function/work

A good x: an x that performs its ergon well

The aretē of x: the excellence or virtue which allows x to perform its function well

Expressing aretē: functioning/working well

Illustration: the aretē of a pen is that in virtue of which the pen performs its ergon (writing) well and so counts as a good pen. Writing well is an activity that expresses the pen’s aretē.

THE ERGON ARGUMENT: RELEVANT TERMINOLOGY

1. There is a human function. Accordingly,

2. The good human is one who performs her function well. Accordingly,

3. The good human life (happiness) is a life of activity which expresses virtue.

What Aristotle needs to do:A. Establish that there is a human function.B. Show that performing the human function well is the

good for a human being (happiness).

THE ERGON ARGUMENT

Aristotle takes for granted that parts of animals have functions. He moves from this assumption to the conclusion that whole organisms have functions.

“As each of the parts of the body, like every other instrument, is for the sake of something, that is, for the sake of some activity, it is obvious that the body as a whole is composed for the sake of some complex activity.”

Do you agree? Is it “obvious” that whole organisms have functions?

FUNCTION: PARTS & WHOLES

What is the heart for? For pumping blood, so it circulates around the body.

And what about the circulation of blood? Does it have a function in turn?

Suppose it didn’t. If circulation of the blood were pointless, then presumably we wouldn’t say that a heart which pumps blood was for something, that it had an end or purpose.

FROM PART TO WHOLE

What is the heart for? For pumping blood, so it circulates around the body.

And what is the circulation of blood for? It distributes nutrition and oxygen around the body.

And what is this distributing for? It allows for things like muscle contraction.

And what is muscle contraction for?...

This and similar chains have to terminate somewhere. According to Aristotle, they terminate in one thing: the creature’s ergon, its specific way of life.

FROM PART TO WHOLE

Aristotle is taking for granted that teleological explanation has an important role to play in biology.

Teleological explanation: explanation of why something is the case by appeal to its promoting some end/purpose. For example, why does the teapot have a handle?

But if we are going to extend this sort of explanation to biological organisms, we seem to be committed to the idea that ends/purposes are present in nature.How might this work? Why might we think there are

ends/purposes in nature? (What’s the most obvious answer?)

TELEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

One traditional way of making sense of ends/purposes in nature is to invoke the supernatural.

A significant part of the scientific revolution was the rejection of the idea that “final causes” have a place in the natural sciences.

Descartes and others insisted that speculations about God’s designs lie outside scientific investigation of the world.How might we get ends/purposes in nature without

theism?

THEISM

Perhaps things have a function/utility relative to survival for reproduction.

Karen Neander: “It is a/the proper function of an item (X) of an organism (O) to do that which items of X’s type did to contribute to the inclusive fitness of O’s ancestors, and which caused the genotype, of which X is the phenotypic expression, to be selected by natural selection.”

This account was developed with functions in physiology in mind. The heart has the function of circulating blood—rather than, say, making a thumping noise—provided circulating blood contributed to the selection of hearts. In general, we identify the biological functions of X by asking what past instances of X did to cause that trait to be selected for.

EVOLUTION

“Why not suppose, then, that the same is true of the parts of natural organisms? On this view, it is of necessity that, for example, the front teeth grow sharp and well adapted for biting, and the back ones broad and useful for chewing food; this <useful> result was coincidental, not what they were for. The same will be true of all other parts that seem to be for something. On this view, then, whenever all the parts came about coincidentally as though they were for something, these animals survived, since their constitution, though coming about by chance, made them suitable <for survival>. Other animals, however, were differently constituted and so were destroyed; indeed they are still being destroyed, as Empedocles says of the man-headed calves.” (198b)What part of Darwin’s account is missing?

ARISTOTLE ON EMPEDOCLES

Core elements of Darwin’s theory:

Random variationSurvival of the fittest Inherited characteristics (not present in Empedocles)

DARWINISM

Function in God’s planFunction relative to survival for reproduction

Aristotle has a different takeFunction relative to an organism’s form/nature

ENDS/PURPOSES IN NATURE

Aristotle thinks there are four types of causes or forms of explanation (αιτίαι)

Material cause. Explanation that appeals to something’s material constitution.

Efficient cause. Explanation that appeals to the producer of some product/change.

Final cause. Explanation that appeals to ends/purposes.

Formal cause. Explanation that appeals to something’s nature or essence.

ARISTOTLE’S FOUR CAUSES

Functional explanations in biology have to end somewhere. Otherwise we would have a problematic regress or problematic circularity.

Aristotle insists that functional explanation terminates in an organism’s form understood as the way of life that make a species what it is.

For Aristotle these forms/natures have always existed, so there is no explanation in turn of why these natures exist. Formal explanation is bedrock.

FINAL CAUSES PRESUPPOSE FORMAL

Tyler Burge: “Functions of individuals are subcases of biological functions, subcases that contrast with functions of an organ or a sensory system… They are distinctive in being functions of the whole individual—not the individual’s subsystems…Whole animal function is exemplified by basic biological activities—eating, navigating, mating, parenting, and so on. These activities are functional in the most commonly cited sense of biological function. Roughly, their existence is explained by their contribution to the individual’s survival for mating, or perhaps in some cases the species’ survival… Fulfilling these functions—successfully pursuing these activities—contributes to the individual’s survival for mating.”(Origins of Objectivity)

WHOLE-ORGANISM FUNCTION

Tyler Burge: “There are, I think, further natural functions, other than the narrowly biological ones, that can be associated with whole organisms. There is a notion of a naturally flourishing life in which (beyond surviving long enough for mating) an animal lives out a life that realizes its natural capabilities, with relatively little misfortune.” (Origins of Objectivity)

Aristotle’s theory of the human good evidently rests on the idea that there are natural functions beyond the narrowly biological ones. What do you think of this idea?

BEYOND MERE BIOLOGICAL FUNCTION

So far we have seen support for two main claims:

1. Whole organisms like squirrels have functions. 2. A good squirrel existence is a life of activity that

excels with respect to the squirrels’ distinctive way of life.

Our next task is to understand what the distinctively human function is. This task takes us into Aristotle’s De anima, which explores foundational issues in the biological sciences and psychology.

THE DISTINCTIVELY HUMAN FUNCTION

The ψυχή (psukhḗ: soul or breath) is that in virtue of which living things differ from non-living things. It is the ἀρχή (arkhḗ: principle or source) of life. Even plants have souls.

A soul is not some sort of non-physical or non-natural thing. As the form of a living body, it is as much a part of nature as the matter which constitutes a living being.

Think of the soul as the organization of material stuffs in virtue of which a living body is able to fulfill the functions distinctive of living things.Should we expect the soul to be something that would

survive death, as Plato thought?

ARISTOTLE ON THE SOUL

In discussing the nutritive/reproductive capacities of plants, Aristotle writes: “Since, then, they cannot share in the everlasting and divine by continuous existence, because no perishable thing can persist numerically one and the same, they share in them insofar as each can some more and some less; and what persists is not the thing itself but something like itself, not one in number but one in species.” (De anima II.4)

Whether Aristotle allows for the survival of the (active) intellect in humans is somewhat doubtful. The key text (De anima III.5) is very brief and obscure.

DIGRESSION ON DEATH & SURVIVAL

Quick version: the soul is the form/essence of a living being (as opposed to its matter).

Longer version: the soul is the first actuality (ἐντελέχεια)of a natural body which has organs. Begin with an organ:

An eye (matter/potentiality) is what has the potentiality to see.Sight (form/actuality) is the first actuality of the eye.Seeing is the second actuality of the eye.

Think of the soul as the first actuality of the entire organic body.

ARISTOTLE’S DEFINITION OF SOUL

The soul is a principle in virtue of which an organic body possesses the capacities distinctive of living beings :ReasonLocomotion Hearing/Sight/SmellPerception/Desire Touch/TasteNutrition/Reproduction

Ladder of life: a creature with a capacity higher on the list must have all the capacities lower on the list. Likewise, anything with the “distance” senses must have the “contact” senses. (Notice that the latter distinction is grounded in a difference in objects of sense rather than a difference in stimuli.)Which creatures might Aristotle have in mind at each level of

the ladder?

FUNDAMENTAL LIFE CAPACITIES

Reason (humans)Locomotion (vast majority of animals)

Perception/Desire (sessile animals like barnacles and corals)

Nutrition/Reproduction (plants)

Notice that this list allows us to read off the distinctively human function, namely, reason.

Is Aristotle committed to an implausible discontinuity between cognition in humans and other animals?

ARISTOTLE’S HIERARCHY OF LIVING BEINGS

According to Aristotle, non-human animals lack belief (428a16 ff.). Belief requires conviction & susceptibility to persuasion, and these demand sensitivity to reasons, which in turn presuppose the capacity for reasoning. But what is the capacity for reasoning?

Aristotle distinguishes two forms:Induction is reasoning from particulars to generalizations, from observation of particular instances to a conclusion like:All men are mortal.Deduction is reasoning from two (or more) generalizations to another generalization where the latter follows of necessity from the former.

THE CAPACITY FOR REASONING

Aristotle discovered the discipline of logic, and his views dominated until late in the 19 th century. Aristotle seems to think that all deductive inference can be reduced to syllogistic reasoning. A syllogism is an argument with a rather specific form. It includes three statements, each of which includes a subject & a predicate and is true or false. Two of the statements are premises, the other a conclusion.

The statements are generalizations which can take one of four forms:All S are P. (universal affirmation)No S are P. (universal negation)Some S are P. (particular affirmation)Some S are not P. (particular negation)

ARISTOTLE ON THE SYLLOGISM

All As are Bs. No Bs are As. All Bs are As.All Bs are Cs. All Cs are Bs. Some Cs are Bs.All As are Cs. No Cs are As. Some Cs are As.

No Bs are As. No Bs are As. No Bs are As.Some Cs are Bs. All Cs are As. Some Cs are As.Some Cs are not As. No Cs are Bs. Some Cs are not Bs.

All Bs are As. All Cs are As. No Cs are As.Some Cs are not As. All Cs are Bs. All Cs are Bs.Some Cs are not Bs. Some Bs are As. Some Bs are not As.

SOME CONFIGURATIONS THAT YIELD DEDUCTION

Aristotle seems to think that human action is sometimes the conclusion of a syllogism. In this context it seems that we need premises drawn from perception and these premises will not be generalizations (in the sense above).

All cats are in need of petting.This is a cat.[action]

PRACTICAL REASON

What does Aristotle mean when he denies that non-human animals can reason? Animals have memories and perhaps even form concepts for deployment in perception. Presumably they do not form the sorts of generalizations involved in syllogism, i.e.All S are P. (universal affirmation)No S are P. (universal negation)Some S are P. (particular affirmation)Some S are not P. (particular negation)

Their actions seem to be explained by their perception of things that are in fact pleasant/painful or by their perception of things previously found to correlate with the pleasant/painful.

ABSENCE OF REASON IN ANIMALS

“Now we take the human function to be a certain kind of life, and take this life to be the soul’s activity and actions that express reason. Hence, the excellent man’s function is to do this finely and well. Each function is completed well when its completion expresses the proper virtue. Therefore the human good turns out to be the soul’s activity that expresses virtue.”

“OUTLINE” ACCOUNT OF HAPPINESS

Let’s grant that Aristotle has identified what makes someone a good specimen of the kind human.

What, exactly, does being a good specimen have to do with happiness? Can’t one of these be present without the other?

A QUESTION ABOUT ARISTOTLE’S APPROACH

Recall that Aristotle does not identify the good life (εὐδαιμονία) with life satisfaction.

Consistently playing the flute well is what thriving qua flute player is all about. Likewise, consistently excelling as a rational agent is what thriving qua a human being is all about.

Thriving/excelling as a human being = leading a good human life = a happy existence.

EUDAIMONIA

A moral skeptic like Callicles will have doubts about Aristotle’s claim that our human nature is to strive for something more than survival for reproduction.

Does Aristotle have a response to someone who insists that there is in the nature of things no other standard of excellence/thriving for a human existence other than survival for reproduction?

A FINAL WORRY: CALLICLES AGAIN