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ARISTOTLK

DE ANIMA

CAMHRIDOK UNIVKKSITYC.I\s

1'RKSS \VAKK!1< il"MMANAU*:**,

Cl.AY,

KKTTKR

J,ANK,

K.i,\KI- r.

:

F.

A.,

MIT NAM'S SXS*

ARISTOTLE

DE ANIMAWITH TRANSLATION, INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

R.

D.

HICKS, M.A.

FELLOW AND LATK LECTURER OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

CAMBRIDGE AT THE UNIVERSITY:

PRESS

1907

1MUNTKI) BY

JOHN t:i,AY, M.A. AT THIS UNIVERSITY I'KKSS.

TO HENRY JACKSON WHO HAS INSPIRED MANY WITH HIS OWN LOVE OFGREEK PHILOSOPHY

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.Page,,

15, critical notes, line 2,

after iclicjui codcl.

add

lick.

Trend.r

,,

3, 48, critical notes, line ^for appenclicem read Fiagmenta i., II. 56, critical notes, line 12, after Bek. Trend. Torst. add Kodier.

p. 10*4 infra.

,,

56, critical notes,

line 13, after Sitnpl.

Soph.

||

add $&vruv V

.\\

i

57* translation, line 7,

for body read

rest,1.

64, critical notes, line 9, for append, read Fragment a n.,,,

61, p.\ctt6.

166 infra,

114, critical notes, line 6,

n6,,,

critical notes, last

for TOT,..$I. ytvcrcu read line, for 162 read 160.

roVe.. 31.

145, critical notes, line 12,150,critical notes,

for Ilayduck read540 read 140. after ap. crit. ad

Ileinze.

,,

line 7, for

150, critical notes, line 13,

loc.)

add Nek. Trend.Itiehl.oi

152,,,

critical notes,

last line, after

Bek. Trend, add

204, end of note on 403 b 8, add A similar confusion of roiV \6yovs may be noticed 407 b 13 17.351, end of fust note on 406 b 13, add so far as

334^8 a

5,

g 7

24.

45k

I

4

Theophrastus,

Dt Sensibtts,

*,,

INTR OD UCTION.

I

xx v

the other constituent of the universe, which alone is pure and unmixed and has nothing in common with anything else. This is Nous 1 The part it played was to communicate the first impulse to that rotatory motion which ultimately evolved from the chaos in which all things were mixed the present order and regularity of the universe. Nous is in all living beings, great and small, in We fortuIt governs and orders and knows. varying degrees. the account which Anaxagoras himself gave of Nous, nately possess and upon the evidence the reader must decide for himself what was 2 its nature Plato and Aristotle construed it as immaterial reason and censured the philosopher for not making more thoroughgoing use of its mighty agency. Returning now to sense, the contrast to perception Anaxagoras found most clearly in touch, necessary We for our perception of temperature depends upon contrast. know the taste of sweet and bitter only by contrast. Seeing, again, takes place by the reflection of an image in the pupil, but in a part of it which is of a different colour from the object seen. Eyes that see in the daytime are, generally speaking, dark, while.

.

animals with gleaming eyes see better by night. In the Atomists the tendencies of earlier Greek thinkers reach mature development. The problem hitherto had been t-eucippus Dtfn,c..i.iu*. to determine what matter is, and Leucippus proa working hypothesis which has ever since been sufficient pounded for the purposes of science. Though this theory is derived from it departs very widely from the evidence of the senses. sense, Knowledge, said Democritus, is of two kinds, genuine knowledge that there are atoms and void and nothing else, and knowledge which is dark or obscure, by which he meant the information given

by the

senses*.

The

vation, experiment

fails

existence of void apparently contradicts obsereven now to obtain an absolute void. The

The Atomists accepted properties of body are all given by sense. for resistance, extension and weight (perhaps the evidence of sense Democritus was unaware of this last quality), but rejected it forOut of impenetrable atoms colours, sounds, odours and flavours. of different shapes and sizes the whole universe is built up, and thedifferent qualities in things are due either to difference of shape or 4 size, or to different arrangements, of the atoms composing them.

The1

soul

is

no exception.

It is a

complex of atoms within the20,

*

9 4

at, 405 b 19 2f, 429 a 18 5, 405 a 13 sqq., 404 b i Frag. 12 D, quoted entire on p. 229 infra* aj>ud Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathematieos, vir. 138 sq. Frag- ii De A. 404 a r 4, De Gen. et Corr. I. 2, 315 b 6 sqq.

404a 25

b 23

sq.

D

xx vibody.

INTRODUCTION.1.

I

Soul-atoms are spherical in shape, extremely minute and In thus postulating a mobile. They resemble the atoms of fire for vital and intellectual functions, body within the body to account Democritus reverts more consistently and systematically than any previous philosopher to the standpoint of the savage who, when he sees an animal move, is unable to explain the fact except by But supposing" that there is a little animal inside to move htm. little animal is imagined to be ulivc, there is this difference, that the Tints to push the the soul-atoms of Democritus are mere matter*. implicit assumptions of their predecessors to their logical con* sequences and make the half-conscious hylozoism of the early lonians blossom forth in materialism is the jjreat merit of Leucippus and Democritus. All processes of sensation* then, are instances of the contact 3 between bodies. They are caused by "idols" or films which are constantly streaming off from the surface of bodies, of inconceivable thinness, yet preserving the relative shape of the parts. So far this agrees with Knipcdoclrs ; but the latter made his emanations enter the body through channels, while the Atomists conceived them as entering by the void between the atoms. The same explanation would apply to thought, which is excited when the material image of an object enters the equally material mind. All the senses are thus but modifications of touch. This was made out satisfactorily for taste, and Democritus attempted to determine the shapes of the atoms which produce the different varieties of taste 4 Things made of atoms angular, winding, small and thin, have an acid taste, those whose atoms are spherical and not too small taste sweet, and so cm. His four simple colours, white, black, red and green, are accounted for by the shape and disposition of atoms, but a similar analysts was.

not attempted for the objects of sound and smell. In marked contrast with the attempts which the Atomists and even Empedocles made to bring physics and physioof i gy j nto s hape is the retrograde system of Diogenes of Apollonia, whose fantastic absurdities have been immortalised for us by Aristophanes, He was not satisfied with the resolution by Anaxagoras, himself a reactionary in physics, of bodies intoinfinitesimal particles possessing definite qualities,jr6\ 405 a 5 13. A. 4$6b 15 zs, 409b 7 n. 8 2)e Sffisu 4, 443 a 39 sqq. For what 83, who treats of Democritus very fully.

though he was

1

403 b

314048.

tt

Cf. JDf

folio

w

see TheophnwtttK, /)* AVw/Awr, (&

49

4

Theophrastus,

De Smtibwt

\

64 qq*

INTR OD UCTION.

I

xx vii

more attracted by the supposition of unmixed Nous, which is the But he supplemented this theory by reverting seat of intelligence. to the position of the lonians, one of whom, Anaximenes, had chosen air for his primary element. Diogenes endowed air withsentience and intelligence. "All creatures," he says, "live and " " by the same thing (viz. air), and from the same 1 thing all derive their intelligence as well ." He thus made the air in us play an important part in the processes of perception and thought. From Alcmaeon he must have borrowed the idea that the brain is the central organ the air in the sense-organs, the eye, the ear, the nostrils, transmitted the impression to the air in or near the brain. The common view that seeing takes place by the reflection of an image in the pupil he supplemented by postulating that this image must be blended with the internal air otherwise, though the image is formed, there is no seeing. He pointed to the fact that, when the optic nerve is inflamed,see and hear;

;

blindness ensues because, as he thought, the admixture with the His account of hearing may be cited internal air is prevented. "The animals for the likeness it bears to that given in DeAnima. which hear most acutely have slender veins, the orifice of the ear (like that of the nose) being in them short, slender and straight, and the external ear erect and large. For movement of the air in the ears sets in motion the internal air" [in or near the brain], " Whereas, if the orifice be too wide, the movement of the air in the ears causes a ringing in them, and what is heard is indistinct noise, because the air upon which the audible sound impinges is

not at rest 9 ."In the fifth century the evolution of successive systems came The progress of enquiry had been marked by the to a halt. of new sciences like geometry and astronomy, both in foundation

a flourishing condition, and new arts, like rhetoric and dialectic. The bustle and unrest of the times was attended by a growing mistrust, not only of the old traditional religious and moral beliefs, but of the bewildering intellectual movement which in so short a space of time had put forward so many brilliant and contradictoryspeculations.

The

professional educators,

whom we know

as the

Sophists, turned as a rule to practical interests andism, literary criticism, erudition their

made human-

main themes. the greatest of them, adopted a sceptical Protagoras,p.cf,

1

See Simplicity in Physica^Tbeophr*

151,

14

153, 24,3 sqq.

Theophrastus,

De

3943.*

De Senf&uS)

41

:

JDe

A* 4*0 a

xxviii

INTRODUCTION.

I

and maintained that man was the measure of all things, as interpreted by Plato, means that, as things appear to mc which, so they are to me, or the denial of objective truth. There wereattitudef

manyhad

which Greece sceptical currents in the sea of speculation on embarked. The followers of Hcraclitus pushed the doctrine of

they have no fixed

but are always beromin;.;, say that a thing is, we must In the same breath pronounce that it is not. There are always two of these fluxes, one the movement or change producing sensations, flux outside, the other the movement which receives The result of the contact the sensations, the flux of our senses. between them is that, for example, wood becomes white wood and When the flux of Socrates well the eye becomes a seeing eye. comes in contact with wine, the wine will be sweet, but, if he is Both these statements will be true: in fact, ill, it will be soun What wine is depends entirely on the all statements are true. man perceiving it. There is no criterion of truth in external On the other hand, Gorgms of things, they change so rapidly. Leontini in his essay on Nature or the Non-existent hanlly caricatured the position of the younger Kleatics when he put forward the thesis that, if anything existed, it could not be known, and, if anything did exist and was known, it could not be communicated. Such views as these or that of Kuthydenuis that falsehood is impossible are by no means universal among the Sophists, many of whom had no psychological or epistinnologiYal theories at all; and, where their views were sceptical, it was the Aristotle justifies the scepticism not of one school, but of many* revolt of the Sophists against philosophy, he holds that most of the leading Pre-Socratic systems tend implicitly or explicitly toflux to an extreme.

Things never

are,

attributes.

When we

1

the doctrine of Protagoras. Protagoras first called attention to the importance of the knowing mind in every act of kno\vlxlj;r. In the view of a plain man like Socrates all the systems were discredited and the question, what is knowledge, was for the time more urgent than the ambitious problems proposed by those who had sought to know the nature of the universe. Psycholo^y can glean nothing from the ethical discussions of the historical SocratesWhen he declared that virtue is knowledge, he was confessedly using the latter term as one which neither he nor his interlocutors could adequately define. Plato in his writings is always talking about the soul, but not a^ t * Lat ** e sa ys * s Bended to be takenpiato

We

serknutly*

must allow

for

the mythical element, and in

INTRODUCTION. Iparticular for his imaginative

xxix

sympathy with the whole mass of and dogma, of a partly religious, partly floating legend, myth ethical character, which, as was stated above, found a wide but not universal acceptance at an early time in the Orphic and The Platonic myths Pythagorean associations and brotherhoods afford ample evidence that Plato was perfectly familiar with all1.

the leading features of this strange creed. The divine origin of the soul, its fall from bliss and from the society of the gods, its long pilgrimage of penance through hundreds of generations, its task of purification from earthly pollution, its reincarnations in successive bodies, its upward or downward progress, and the law of retribution for all offences, these and kindred subjects the fancyof Plato has embellished with all the beauty and sublimity which the art of a lost poet could bestow upon prose. Such themes stir of ethical fiction is attested by his his imagination. His approval own words, but it would be the height of imprudence to infer that any part of his philosophy is bound up with his gorgeous poetical imagery, Plato never set about writing a treatise De Artima. In each find anticipations of a science, but not the science itself.

We

dialogue he has a particular end in view. He proposes to examine the doctrine of Protagoras or, it may be, the import of predication. Incidentally in the course of a long controversy we corne across models of psychological analysis which for subtlety and insight have never been equalled. Such an analysis was something absolutely new. The psychical or mental states on which Plato fixed his attention had hitherto, when they were not ignored altogether, been confounded with their bodily concomitants: a mistake not unnatural, so long as both sensation and thought were regard cil as changes in the body. In the Tkcaetctus* we find the following argument. do not perceive by but through the senses. What we perceive through one sense we cannot

We

perceive through another. Consequently, if we know something about both a sound and a colour, it cannot be known through Now we do know many such things that they are, that sense. they are different from one another, that both are two things and How do we know such facts? The soul apprethat each is one.;

hends them through itself without any sense-organs. Being and Not-Being, likeness and unlikeness, number, identity and diversity are not apprehended through sense, but through the soul alone. The soul apprehends the noble and the base, the good and the1

See Cornford,184

**

Plato and Orpheus*" in Clans.

Rw. xvn.

pp.

+&

445.

tt

xxx

INTRODUCTION.

I

bad, not through the senses, but by calculating in herself the past or present in relation to the future. All men and animals from

of birth have by nature sensations which pass through the body and reach the soul, but to compare these sensations in relation to Being and expediency comes with difficulty and reIt is impossible quires a long time, much trouble and education. to attain truth and know it without attaining Being knowledge does not consist in affections of sense because we cannot by them attain Being. It is by reasoning about sensations that this is alone possible. In the Phaedo^ the Platonic Socrates undertakes to prove thatthe1

moment

;

reminiscence, which indeed is implied by the fact that, questions are properly put, the right answers are elicited, showing that the knowledge sought, the knowledge, e.g. of geometry, existed previously in the mind of the respondent This proof is as follows. The picture of a lyre reminds us of the person who used the lytv, a picture of Simmias may remind us of Kebes or of Shntuiuslearningifis

himself, so that the reminiscence may be brought about either inIf it is effected directly and the object seen directly or directly. is similar to the object it recalls, we cannot fail to see how tar

the

remembrance

is

exact

For instance, we affirm thut there

is

an idea of equality which is called to our minds by our purcoptinn of sensibles which arc equal That this idea is something distinct from the equal sensibles is clear; for the sensible* may appear equal to one observer, unequal to another; but about the idea ofequality no difference of opinion is possible. Now we are to observe that all sensible equals appear to us as falling short of the standard of absolute equality, which plainly shows that our knowledge of absolute equality is prior to our perception of the sensiblcs. And whereas (i) this sense of deficiency in the .sensible* has been present so long as we have had any perceptions of them, (2) our perceptions of them date from the moment of our birth, it inevitably follows that our knowledge of the idea must have been acquired before our birth. Now this of course applies to all ideas as well as to that of equality. Since, then, we have obtainedthisfull

knowledge, two alternatives are open: either we are born it and retain it through life, or we lose it birth and gradually regain it. The first must be dismissed this ground: if a man knows a thing, he can give an account it, but we see that men cannot give an account of the ideaspossession of1

in

ut

on ofiti*y J

;

Mr

76 Archer-Hind,1>.

72 B

In thep. 77.

summary

of the ai-gumcnt

I

have mainly follow*! thai

trtvcm **

INTR OD UCTION.follows then that the second alternativeis

Itrue;

xxxi

we

lose this

know-

but the recovery of it. And since our learning souls certainly did not acquire it during their human life, they must have gained it before our birth and at birth lost it. Many more passages might be cited to prove that Plato kept the mental process distinct from the bodily process and that it is the former which he sought to explain. Though the various mental operations are often discussed and e distinguished, yet we find no exhaustive classification te J Classification of mental m any dialogue. The reason is obvious. The vanaopera ions. ^.^ g ^^ ^ ct #&& each attempt at partial classification is made, as above stated, for a special purpose, to prove a particular conclusion in a particular dialogue. Thus in theledge andallis. .

*

.

^^ ^

the tripartite division into reason, passion and appetite brought in to show the relation of justice to the other virtues, and this, again, whether subordinate to, or coordinate with, the analogy between the individual and the state, is a means to the

Republicis

1

determination of a perfect political constitution, which is said in the Timaetts* to have been the chief subject of the dialogue. Nor does this tripartite division itself tally either with that into know3 or again, ledge, opinion (or sense-presentation) and ignorance with the fourfold division into thinking, understanding, belief and,

conjecture (an expansion probably of the distinction between knowledge and opinion), which we find in other parts of the Repiiblic*. In the Sophist* discursive thought is a dialogue of the soul with herself, opinion is the silent assertion of the soul in which this In results, imagining is a combination of opinion and sensation. and distinguishes senthe Philebus* Plato goes more into detail When the affections sation, memory, imagination and recollection. of the body do not reach the soul, the state of the soul is said When the affections of to be insensibility or unconsciousness. the body are communicated through the body to the soul, there is sensation. The retention of such a sensation is memory, its the fading of memory, is forgetfulness. The recovery non-retention, of lost memories by the soul without the aid of the body is Later in the dialogue 7 the relation of memory to recollection. imagination is illustrated the former is a scribe or recorder, what It records being propositions, opinions; the latter is a painter,:

1

434 C171*, r.

445

K. *

3ft

477 A sqq.7

4

51

1

JD,

R,

533 K, 534 A.

16% K sqq,

Cf

Tfoaefcttts, 189*;, Phtttb, 38 D.

*

330-34 C.

38E~408,

xxxii

INTRODUCTION.all

I

whose glowing pictures excite hope.is

a practical end, the classification of pleasures as true or false. Similarly in a memorable passage of the Ttoactetus* the introduction of two illustrations, one from a waxen block and the other from a dovecot

these distinctions

In this dialogue also there being subservient to

or aviary, is incidental to a refutation of the thesis that knou'Icd^cBut the similes in themselves are contributions true opinion. of permanent value. That of the waxen block to psychology presents in its sum and substance the entire theory of sensation conceived as an impression from without, like the print of a seal upon wax, and the theory of memory as the retention of suchis

impressions, the different degrees of retentiveness in individuals being ascribed to the size of the block, the quality of the wax: and the number of impressions crowded together in small compass".other, that of the aviary, conveys in a striking manner the relation between memory and reminiscence, the latter bcing the

The

deliberate recovery of lost impressions at the same time it shows the relation between the mere possession of knowledge and its actual application or exercise. The most comprehensive view of Plato's psychology is to be;

foundSensation.

in

the Timaeits.

lie starts with reason or with

the operations of intellect. The soul thinks. This process is first described as it goes on in the soul of the universe or universal soul and, because it is an activity, is omened with circular motion. The revolution of two circles, that of the Same and that of the Other, gives judgments of identity and difference,*,

the two most important relations, and without such jud^im-nt^ there can be no knowledge. But this ceaseless activity of thought

from time to time suffers disturbance, and the interference results in sensation. In the allegory the creation of particular souls follows

upon the creation of universalsouls,

soul,

and

it

is

to those particular

each united to a body, that the following desnipfinn applies. When the revolutions of the immortal soul had thus been confim*cl in a body, a body, as Plato says, "in-flowing and out-flmvm;;continually," these revolutions,1

"being confined

in

a great

river,

191 c sqq., 197

e

De Part. An, Anima at

i.

r,

least

64 x a 17 *e J'art.

An.

i.

i,i

641 a 143.

b io

* 3

Meta$h. ioi61>

in

two5

Biological writers now avoid the ambiguity attaching to the use of the term "body** distinct senses by means of the term "organism*"

4 Cf. Mttttfh.

iO45b izsqq.

412 b 10 sqq.

xliv

INTR OD UCTION.is

I

not predicable of the soul, \ve cannot explain the soul In terms of body or make it a material thing, however fine the materials. On the contrary, we must explain body in terms of soul. It is form which determines and we only know a thing; as determined. Primary matter, the absolutely indeterminate, is in itself unknowable Therefore, if we would know the living body, we must study its activities and operations and all the attributes which it acquires in virtue of soul. Soul and body, then, arc not

body

1

.

one thing presenting two distinct it is not not body, but belongs to body 8 itself a concrete particular, although its presence in the body makes a concrete particular it resides in a body and, what is more, in a body of a particular kind, furnished with the means whereby the functions of the soul can be exercised The relation of matter to form in the particular thing is one instance of a relation of higher generality, that between potenco and act** between the power to become and the realisation of that power in Before it is, a thing may be or may not be, and when actuality. it is, if it has the power to act, it may act or it may not actNow body stands to soul, and matter to form in general. *is the! potential to the actual which has reached the first sta^c and already is. In other words, the soul is the power which the living body possesses and the lifeless body lacks. This is first actualisation or first entelechy. Again, the actual possession of faculties unused still stands to the exercise of these faculties in the relation of potcnce to act Life itself* the use of actual power, is the second stage, energy. The actual use must be prrccdrel by actual Soul is actual power to live but is not life. In Plato power. is opposed to soul. The body could be trainee! to obey the body soul by gymnastic and music. In Aristotle the body is the natural instrument of the soul, and so the body into which a parttYubr soul enters must be adapted to its use. This fact renders the Soul is likewise Pythagorean idea of transmigration absurd 4 both the final and efficient cause of the body*. It t's the final cause, because the soul is merely means to vital power and life; it Is the efficient cause not only in the obvious case of j;mj.;ri^>ivimotion, but also in all the various changes which the body undergoes In the exercise of vital functions, including nutrition, growth, twodistinct things, they are

aspects.

The

soul

is

;

;

y

.

sensation.3

*4

Met&ph. 036 a 9* 413 a 9 sqq., a 12 qq. ? 407 b ao 26.

a

411}) 64 r$

&m^

41 4 a

bay

qc^*

INTR OD UCTION.Such, inclassification of vital

I

xlv

brief, is

the description of soul considered in and by ^self, including the various separate powers, which are assumed to account for the varieties of vital and,.

psychical operations. The great problem is how this Plato in multiplicity of acts or operations should be classified. some dialogues divides soul into parts, an immortal part, reason,

powers.

,

.

His pupil is more parts, passion and appetite. does not go beyond the supposition of certain In one sense, he says, this division into powers or faculties. powers is illusory, for the powers of soul are really infinite in number 1 But he contends that his own groups are convenientcautious.

and two mortal

He

.

Faculties, like every other basis of classification, are groups. means to an end. Plato, he thinks, should have added the only nutritive and sensitive faculties. Desire, again, runs through all there is the rational wish, the angry impulse and the operations instinctive appetite. Here at least it is clear that the different powers are but different capacities of the single soul. Yet his ignorance of the bodily conditions of thought and his consequent assumption of a separable and immortal part of soul leave ArisIn order to get a clear totle much in the same position as Plato. stress must be laid upon the statement that the view, special 2 In mortal powers of soul are arranged in an ascending scale creatures, at all events, the higher faculty always presupposes the lower, without which it cannot exist*. The lowest power, that of nutrition and propagation, is common to animals with plants; in Animals have sensitivity in addition of plants it exists alone.: . :

the senses they must possess at least touch. So far we are on safe ground. From this point we may simplify in one of two In the third Book the two faculties, sense and intellect, ways. tend more and more to be conjoined as the judging faculty, while appetency, which in its lowest form is implied by sense*, is made the principle on which progressive motion depends". These considerations lead to the following scheme:

r.

Nutritive

2.

Discriminative

3.

MotiveFaculty of locomotion

Sense

Intellect

Appetence

the other hand, intellect is said to be the highest of all our powers, and the lower forms of appetency, as well as the power1

On

*

432 a 11 sqq. t 433 b 415 a x -I I.

I

*

5-

414 b 28c

4

414 b

i

sqq.

415 a i. 433 a ** sqq-

xlvi

INTRODUCTION.

I

of progressive motion, are associated with sense, while an intermediate place must be found for the imaginative facult}'. These considerations suggest the following table of faculties I. Nutritive; 2. Sensitive, which is also appetitive; (this is in most animals joined with) 3. Locomotive; 4, Imaginative; 5. In:

tellective.

In the ascending series of vital functions we start with the lowest, which constitute the sole life of plants and The soui of the plant. are an indispensable element in the life of animals. Their isolation from all others in the vegetable kingdom facilitates 1 their study. accordingly assume a power of self-nourishment, But we must be careful to remember that the nutritive faculty.

We

this faculty has also to account for growth, decay and reproduction by which last it partakes, so far as it can, of immortality,;

the species of plants, as well as of animals, being imperishable, though the individual members of the species perish. If we arc to define things by their end, the primary soul, the soul of the But plant, is that which is capable of reproducing the species. if the individual plant or animal is to be capable of this, it must

be kept alive. Hence in a certain sense the subsidiary functions of nourishment and growth are even more important than the end to which they are means. Food or nutriment is the correlative object of the nutritive faculty, and we must determine how, It was a common opinion that contraries things are nourished. are nourished by contraries. This is generally, but not always, true of the elements or simple bodies. Fire, Aristotle points out, is nourished by water, but not water by fire. Others said like was nourished by like. These two views can be reconciled, I "indigested food is unlike, but food, when digested, has been assimilated to that which it nourishes, and then like is nourished by like* Nutrition, then, is motion or change, and it is easy to discm*cr the movent, the instrument and the moved* Soul is the nouri.shrr, food the instrument of nutrition, body the nourished. Vital heat, as well as food, is employed by the soul in the process, and we have an analogy in the steersman, who employs his hand to move the rudder with which he steers the ship. Little suspecting what advances botanical science was to make, Aristotle denied that plants have sensitivity- He admits that they are affected by heat and cold, but only, he argues, as inanimate that is, they are simply heated and cooled. things are affected;

1

nM

c- 4.

Cf. also 411stj.

b 1930, 413 a 35

sqq., 43 4 a 3* sqq.,

as

30, 435 a 25

43* b i?

wjfj,,

434 a

INTRODUCTION.They cannotthis

I

xlvii

receive the form of objects without the matter, and because they have no organ in which the elements are so blended as to give the means of discriminating, say, cold and When a plant touches an object, there is merely physical heat.as Aristotle supposed, of plants precludes sensation, because it precludes the proper blending of the elements, which would be necessary to make organs of sense. The insensibility of certain tissues of the body, e.g. bones, sinews, hair, he explained in a similar way as due to the pi-esence in them of too much earth and in this erroneous view he followed Plato. The characteristic of animals when contrasted with plants is that they not only live, but have the power to perSense . perception. ccivo, which the Greeks regarded as essentially a cognitive power. They thought that we cannot perceive by sense without perceiving something, and interpreted this something The distinction so imobjectively, as something which exists.

contact."

Thus the excessive preponderance,"

of

earth

in the structure

:

portant for modern psychology between sensation and perception had not yet received much attention. For Aristotle, as for his the main question is, in what does this operation of predecessors, perceiving consist and how does it take place? We must describe the various kinds of perception and determine how perceiving isrelated

mark

much

One distinctive thinking, since both are cognitive. But we have that by sense we perceive individuals 1 of individuals which the five senses cannot give. knowledgetoin.

Does, then, all this knowledge come from sense, or must it be referred in part to intellect, or must we invent new faculties or powers to account for it? Suffice it to say that, whenever perception takes place, an universal is perceived, but not directly and fer se, only per accidens*. Directly sense perceives only "this," The operation just as directly sense perceives it here and now. of perceiving something existent is made by Aristotle to depend on his own physical theories of motion, of efficient cause and of essential form. One species of motion he defines as the production of an effect in matter by an efficient cause, as, e.g,, the production of an impression upon wax by a seal or of an image in a mirror by a candle. Motions may be classified according to the categories as qualitative, quantitative or spatial, and the species of motion to which sense-perception is referred is the first species or qualitative

change, the alteration or transformation which a thing undergoes1

417 b ipsqq.Atutl. Pest.

*

L

31, 87

b 28

sqq.,

n.

19,

tooa

17

;

Met&ph. xoSya 19 sqq.

xlviii

INTRODUCTION. Iit

whenitself

and acquires new ones, remaining The form or essence without the the same. numerically matter is transmitted by the efficient cause or agent to the patient upon whom it acts, as when fire transmits heat to fuel. The formloses certain qualities

The one universal is one in all the things thus affected. heat is the same wherever actually found, in fuel ignited, in water heated or in molten iron. Applying this physical theory, we should define the particular motion or qualitative change which we call perceiving by sense as the production of an effect in a particular part of the body, which we call a sense-organ, by a But particular external thing, which we call the sensible object. this is inadequate. Plants receive heat and cold and the air It is not enough, then, receives odour, but they do not perceive 1 to say that perceiving is undergoing some affection or being acted upon. Besides, what is affected ? Not the single organ, but the and we have seen that the animal is a percipient as a whole particular case of composite substance, the body being matter, Now it is with the soul that we perceive, the sentient soul form. as it is with the soul that we live and think 2 Let us, then, amend the definition. It consists is an alteration in the soul. Perception in the production by an external object of an effect in the sensitive This effect is the reception of the form, without the faculty. of the external thing perceived matter, Thus Aristotle is able to decide between the conflicting views of his predecessors, according to some of whom like acts upon like, while Heraclitus and Anaxagoras insisted that for any change to be perceived object and percipient must be unlike. As we saw about nutrition, both are right and both are wrong. The per4 cipiendum is unlike, the perception is like, that which perceives it when the process of perceiving takes place, both the external for, thing which causes it and the percipient affected by that cause have in the very act one common form which, like every universal, is the same wherever it is found. That which sees is in the act of vision in a way coloured 5 for it receives the same one form of colour which existed and exists in the coloured object perceived,or essence.

;

.

!)

.

,

,

further. Where one thing acts upon anboth the action and its effect reside in the patient, in that other, which is acted upon. Previous to their interaction, if they are physical bodies, the one is merely a potential agent, the other is3 4

But we may go a step

414 a 12 sq., 408 b 4 r* See Jan, Muski Vfw//ww Andibtti&w, probably by Heraclides, bears testimony. pp. 50 57, who also traces (pp, 130 sqq.) to Archytas some of the theories found in For the helplessness of the Greeks in empirical science cf. teller, Plato's Ttmaeits. From our superior knowledge we can afford to smile Aristotle, j. p. 443* Eng. Tr. at the naive simplicity, the sheer audacity, which professes to explain growth, while knowing nothing of cells, discusses sensation and movement without understanding the nature and functions of the nervous system, and treats fire as an element in blissful ignorance of the chemical changes which go on during combustion* If Aristotle had been in possession of a microscope, it is probable that he would have made no better ue of it than did Huxley's unsophisticated correspondent (see Life of /fttjctey, vol. n*,correct doctrine

pp. 365u

qq-)25.9

4*3 b 23

416 b 8 sqq, 422 b 19 sqq*

INTR OD UCTION.tended by perniciousto look at the.

J

li

when we try to see in the dark or sun or to plunge the hand in boiling warer noonday or to touch the air 1 Now what is it which justifies our expectation that in normal cases a sensible object, when present, will be perceived ? What are the physical or physiological grounds on which, with the science of his day, Aristotle based this belief? He accepted from Empedocles the false physics which resolved alleffects,

bodies into four elements,

air,

earth,

fire,

qualities, hot, cold, wet, dry.

These elements

water, with four primary arc found in their

compounds in the outside world. They are also found all four mixed (we might say, chemically combined) in the tissues oranimal bodies, of which, again, the heterogeneous parts or organs of animal bodies are composed. Hence there is a new application of the old maxim that like is known by like. The characteristic of each object perceived depends not so much upon the materials which enter into its composition as upon the combining ratio of those materials, which constitutes its form. When Kmpedocles resolved bone into definite proportions of his four elements, he was not far from realising that this com3 So, too, bining ratio is the form which makes bone what it is with the sense-organ. It also has its combining ratio which constitutes its form, and this form, again, is the faculty residing in the organ. Hence sense as u whole, and each special sense, is a because it is the determining; proportion or combining ratio form, In perceiving, form receives of the tissues composing the organ 8 and apprehends form. In order that it may j>erceive all the qualities which come within its range, the sense must be neutral or indifferent to all, must be a mean between the opposite extremes In the which it can perceive and be actually neither of them 4 of sense the constituent elements are blended in a certain organ But, as by the way, e.g, the finger has a certain temperature.lumioLiiMU'inis parts of..

.

is qualitative change, this temperature must be capable of variation in the direction of cither extreme or of any grade intermediate to the extremes, and the constituent elements of the organ of sense must be blended in such a way as to allow of this. This possibility of variation serves to explain the discriminating power which attaches both to sense as a whole

definition perceiving

and to the single1

special senses.

Whatever

is

intermediate be-

**

4

494 a x r Jtfjrj. 408 a 13 Hqq. f 410 a i MI* ; Mttoph, 993 a 15 sqq. 4*9 b 14 xtf, 436 b fa 43* a fl M*J. 433 b 30 434 a 10, 426 a 7~b 7*

lii

INTRODUCTION. Itheline

is differently related to the one and to In Aristotelian language, any point in the middle of a is the beginning of the line in relation to one extremity, the of the line in relation to the other. The single sense sight It is in a certain relation to criminates two shades of colour.

tween two extremesother.

enddis-

the

when it perceives the first, it is in a different relation to the second when it perceives the second. The discrimination measuresfirst

the difference between these two relations. The parallel between sense as a whole and the separate special The objects which senses extends to the objects directly perceived. the special senses directly perceive are known by two marks they cannot be perceived by another special sense and the appropriate The objects not special sense cannot be mistaken about them:

1

.

exclusively belonging to this or that special sense, but perceived by two or more special senses, are referred to sense as a whole, oftencalled scnsits coinmnnis*

Such percepts are shape and magnitude, unity and number, motion, rest and time. They include what Democritus considered and Locke called the primary qualities of body. About this common function of sense as a whole there hasbeen much needless mystification. The sentient soul is one, ant! the more important and more intellectual of its functions belongit

all

As one, it perceives the common of this unity. as one, it pronounces judgments of identity and difference between sensibles as a single faculty attendant upon each and every special sense, it is self-conscious*. That to sense as atoin virtue;

sensibles

;

whole, the so-called scnsits commnnis^ should be assigned functions in degree, if not in kind 8 exceed those of the separate special For in sense we have a whole which senses, need not surprise us*

whichis

,

something more than the sum of its different parts. Analysis its elements does not completely explain it, nor will the simple addition of these elements reproduce what was subjVcti'e Somno 455 a 11 sqq. 3 Some of these functions appear to be delegated by S&ISMS tommunis to the s|iecta! senses, if we interpret strictly the statements that each special sense discriminate* the objects within its own province (4*6 b to), and that it is by sight that we perceive that we see (445!) 13 sqq ). Probably, however, both statements require careful qualification, which the latter receives from >& Somno a, 455 a i a .sqq. Cf. Beare, Greek * 377. PP- *33*, k

1

INTRODUCTION.Sensationimages andSleep'

I

liii

defined as the production of an effect in the senseIt organ, a part of the body, by an external object.isis,

then, a movement or impression affecting the body we are conscious of it, the sensitive soul as well. Now this movement does not always vanish with the disappearance of Instances may be given of its the object which caused it as our inability at first to see in a darkened room if we persistence, have just left the sunlight or what is known as the after-image (more correctly, the after-percept) when, if we close our eyes after looking at the sun, we see a succession of images of it in different

and, so far as

1

.

;

It is by facts like these that Aristotle explains He defines it as a motion generated by actual perimagination. ception, a motion distinct from, yet similar to, the motion which constituted the original sensation 3 or, as Hobbes translates, " All fancies are motions within us, reliques of those made in the sense." In order to learn how wide is the range of the imaginative faculty we must turn to the tracts on Sleep and Memory. Sense itself is often mistaken in regard to the common sensibles and the things to which sensible qualities belong, for example, as to what the coloured or sonorous body is and where it is 4 and these errors of sense arc shared in and increased by imagination, especially when the .sensible object is perceived from a distance. Illusion in.

colours 2

,

:

due to the difference between imagination and judgment It may sometimes be and between the standards they employ corrected by one sense coming to the aid of another, as when the object perceived as double by crossed fingers is seen to be single The illusion that objects seem to move past us, when we in fact aregeneralis15

.

.

travelling past them, implies that a

of the same kind as would occur objects themselves were in motion.cause.

movement is set up in the eye if we were stationary and the In fact, the bodily movement

induces a picture of the very object which might have been its It is to the imaginative faculty that dreams must be ascribed 7 Sleep is the arrest of the sensitive faculty as a whole or seiisus communis^ by which when awake we are conscious that.

we

are

awake and have1

sensations 8

.

Plants, havinga,

no sensation,28,

3

*4ft

b 18, 425 b 34 sq., 429*1 4? De Iitsomn* In$omn. 2, 459 b 5 ao 438 b ro 439 a 5. 418 a 15 q,, 48l> 20 sqq. De Insomn* a, 460!) i6qq., i, 458!) 9 sqq.Cf. 408

459 a 24

De

* ib. i, 469!) 7 Insomn,

soz,

27,,

Dt

H

JD*

Somno

r,

459 a 14 aa. 454 b 25 27, a, 455 a ia

b

a.

liv

INTRODUCTION.

I

do not sleep\,

In order that sense, which is charged with motive as well as perceptive functions, may recover from fatigue, sleep is 2 the process of necessary' and it is brought about ultimately by 3 An evaporation from the food in the stomach rises to nutrition the head 4 is there cooled and descends, causing a feeling of drowsiness. The surface of the body is cooled and what heat there.

,

It is clear that dreaming the system collects about the heart whole nor to any special is not a function proper to sense as a Yet the images sense, much less to understanding or opinion".is in1

"'.

It only remains to refer seen in dreams have sensible qualities. to the same faculty as illusions in our waking hour*. dreaming The residual movements in the organs arc no doubt present in the daytime, but at night, when the action of the special senses is 7 suspended and the environment is peaceful, the imagination is most active 8 Then #t* /lypot/iesi these persistent effects reach ant are most Habit* to stimulate the central organ of sense. illusions when labouring under emotion or morbid states'*, as, for example, when a patient in sickness mistakes figures on the wall.

I

We

and even makes bodily movements to escape from is weak owing to tin: 4 There are, of increasing pressure of blood around the heart course, cases in which dreams are the result of semi-conscious sensations, half-heard sounds or half-seen lights \ which would have escaped attention in our waking hours: and reflections anil ideas But in itself dreaming is simply the arc often added to them 14for real

an

i

trials'10

them.

In sleep, again, the judging faculty

11

,

'

1

.

|:

.

result of the

as such".

movement of our sensations during the period of sleep Dreams are movements which give rise to images within1

our sense-organs ". The most important of all our images are those: of memory, If imagining is consciously referred to an earlier JKTMemoryimage. ceptioti of which the image is a copy, then we. call tt

memory1 afi

17.

For memory there are two conditions,r,

tin;

affection

now

>t

Somno

#Z>*

454 b 27

455 a

3,

* /&, 2,4

3s 45a 32 sqq.3,

ib* fa

455 b \& -ja* 456 b 17 **jq,461 a4,

c8 1012

#- 3 457ft ,$3 sqq* /> Insomn. Insomn. r, 458 b 9 45 9 a 9, ib. 3, 461 a 14 b$o.M.,

461 a 3 sqq*7 tf. 3, 9 ib.

a,

mean "inference."

li ///. 460 b II sqq. w /& 3> 461 R *y Mjq. l > i* q f i-> *6 i#. T, 458 b 15 sqq., 3, 463 a 57, /*. 3, 4/5ia 1931. *J 1 \*7. 3, 462 a 8qq, 17 tye Mt*w. r, 449 b 4 q* t 450 b 31 451 a a, 15 ^ard 45

b

tl

20 >3 ib, I,6* s* Mjq, 419 a 48,

INTRODUCTION. I

Ixi

the functions of the nervous system Aristotle and his contemIt contains a divine element, which is poraries had no idea. of the body and immortal. This independent summary tells us

hardly any more than we have collected from the casual or But polemical remarks in the previous part of the treatise. Aristotle might fairly claim to have set before us his view both of (i) the difference between intellect and sense, and (2) the way in which thinking comes about and this is all he promised at the:

outset 1(i)

.

an analogy between sense and intellect, there is Both furnish knowledge, both pass judgments, both are intermittent, sometimes in act, sometimes not. When in activity both have an object, the transition from the dormantis

There

also a difference.

power to its actual exercise does not depend upon sense alone or upon thought alone, and, when the activity is over, the alteration thus undergone leaves intellect absolutely, and sense to a greatSensitivity in the abstract is "a form which degree, unaffected. knows or apprehends sensible forms. Similarly intellect is a form

which knows or apprehends intelligible forms 2 Moreover, in both sensation and intellection alike at the moment of apprehension, there is identity between the form which apprehends and the form which is apprehended. Again, sense-perception is always true of its own appropriate object, and similarly thinking is always true in 3 On the other hand, the external object which respect of quiddities stimulates the sense-faculty to activity is an individual, a particular, and it is external to the percipient; whereas the universals, the forms which we think, are present in the understanding, at any rate, of the mature man. Sensation cannot dispense with a bodily organ, a part of the body appropriated to its special 'functions. For intellect no such organ can be discovered. Yet, when a sense-organ is wanting, the action of intellect is impeded, for all knowledge through that..

Moreover, excess in the sensible fatigues or the organ of sense, but the activity of thinking cannot destroys be thus impaired. Again, intellect is the higher faculty of the two and implies the lower the lower does not imply the higher. For actual thinking the indispensable condition is the presence of a mental image, for, as we saw above, we think of nothing apart from continuity. Even when the object conceived is not itself a quantum, we nevertheless think of it as such. And we neversenseis

cut off4

.

;

think of objects without thinking them in time 5X

.

429at2sq.432 a 7sq.

a

431 b 20

432 as

3.>e

4

Mem.

r,

43 b 450 a 7

3

9.

Ixii

INTRODUCTION. I(2)

The

process of thinking an object

is

explained in

much

the

same way

as the process of perceiving an object by sense. In spite of the differences stated above, both, as acts of apprehending, are assimilated to the process of reciprocal action between physical

Apprehension is reception of form. If the mind knows objects by receiving them, since nothing receives what it already has, it must be assumed to be at first without them and further, so long as it remains capable of thinking, the same condition must be Hence intellect must be impassive, fulfilled for every fresh act. suffering in no way by the change from power to act and, since itbodies.;

thinksit*4

things or, in other words, is capable of receiving all forms, be devoid of any form, though at the same time it room for forms." It may be called* then, a mere provides Until it actually thinks them, it is aptitude or capacity to think. none of its objects, but becomes each object in turn when it thinksall

must

in itself

that object. In physical action there is a transference of essence or form in combustion the form of heat is transferred from fire:

When a white object is to combustible fuel. the form of whiteness is transferred from the object to perceived, the eye and, as there is but one such form, is the same in the And so when we think percipient sense as in the external object. a stone, a horse, a triangle, the form or essence in our mind, theactuallyalight

one with the form or essence outside a contribution to the theory of knmvlr6. pev otiv] additamentum 384, sqq.

n

II

Soph., &TTW in paraphr. Philop.

90

DE ANIMA

II

CH. 9

9

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8er

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(WCTTe

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Philop. et ap. Philop. Alex., qui etiam

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el/tei'||

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23. rotfrwy

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rQvBe Bek. Trend.

Torst. Biehl in ed. pr., etiam

Them.

||

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ab

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