Amitai Etzioni

Communitarian antidotes to populism

To be published by Society, March/April 2017

Waves of populism are threatening the institutions of democratic societies in

many countries. They reflect the widespread sense that the governments that are

being challenged are taking the nations involved in the wrong direction. In the US

(on which this article focuses), a large majority of the citizens has expressed this

sense of alienation for years. According to cumulative data from a Gallup poll

which asked respondents whether they were “satisfied or dissatisfied with the way

things are going in the United States at this time,” for the last ten years, at least

60% of Americans (and often many more) have reported being dissatisfied. The

same is true for the years 1992-1995, and between 1979 and 1982.1 Many

commentators, one might call them inadvertent Marxists, attribute the rise of

populism to the Great Recession, to years of slow economic growth and high

unemployment, and little increase in real wages since the 1970s. They point to

arguments, such as the one put forth by Benjamin Friedman in his book The Moral

Consequences of Economic Growth, that state when living standards are

increasing, tolerance and generosity also increase. The cure to populism, these

1 Gallup, “Satisfaction with the United States,” available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/1669/general-mood-country.aspx

commentators hence conclude, is a return to the path of high economic growth, say

of 4 percent per annum.

It is far from clear that one can find public policies that would ensure a

return to high growth. Moreover, one must wonder if the concentration of the

benefits of such growth will continue in be in the hands of a small sliver of the

population (as statistics about rising inequality suggest), and if so, whether a good

part of the democracy-sustaining effects of higher growth would be negated.

Most relevant to this examination is that a whole slew of sociological

challenges have combined to cause a perfect storm of threats to the prevailing

communities—both local and national—of the people involved. Understanding

these challenges is essential if one seeks to find ways for the legitimate concerns of

large segments of the public to be addressed by democratic institutions and means.

In addressing this core question I am guided by one overarching principle:

liberal communitarianism. It assumes that societies cannot and should not be

designed to maximize one value; that we are entitled to a long and important list of

individual rights but also that our flourishing requires that we develop and nurture

lasting, meaningful interpersonal social relationships. These in turn are found

mainly in communities as small as families and as large as the nation. And, we had

better take into account that there is unenviable tension between these two core

values—our rights and the communal good—and that we tend to become too self-

centered or too community–bound. We hence must correct our course accordingly.

Finally and most relevant: communities are currently under threats which

open them to mass appeals and to demagogues. Hence community rebuilding is

what the sociological doctor calls for. The rational, reasonable citizens who pay

attention to facts and who draw logical conclusions from them, rather than being

swayed by fake news and emotional appeals, are individuals who are well

anchored in communities that provide protection from the Siren calls of social

media and demagogues. I turn next to examine three areas in which this issue must

be faced, drawing on American experience. They concern free trade, immigration,

and cultural changes driven by the extension of individual rights.

1. Globalism should not exceed what TAA can cope with

If one seeks to reduce populism, violence, prejudice, and xenophobia, then

communities must be nurtured as they must change, rather than be overridden. This

thesis can be tested by examining the arguments for free trade. When globalists

champion free trade, they stress that it enriches all those involved, making for less

costly consumer products as each nation focuses on what it is best equipped to

produce, a win—win. Actually the ethical situation that free trade entails is

illustrated by a familiar challenge raised in reference to utilitarianism, i.e. when

one asks how many Christians one may throw in the arena to contend with lions, if

a very large number of Romans are going to enjoy the spectacle. The point is that

sacrificing even a small number of lives cannot be justified even if it enhances the

happiness of a much large number. The Christians of free trade are the tens of

thousands of workers, in coal, steel, and elsewhere, who lose their jobs as a result.

Free traders do not deny this loss but respond that it can be handled through Trade

Adjustment Assistance (TAA), which uses public funds to retrain the displaced

workers and find them new jobs.

This response fails on two accounts. First of all, so far TAA has been unable

to handle most of these displaced people. Many of the new jobs available are low

paying, with few or no benefits, especially when compared to the jobs lost. And

flipping hamburgers at McDonald’s or selling T-shirts at Target does not provide

the meaningful jobs coal miners, steel workers and others previously took pride in.

Moreover, many of those involved cannot be retrained; it is hard to make steel

workers into computer programmers.

Furthermore, free trade champions ignore the effects of free trade on

people’s essential communitarian needs. They often fail to understand people who

are reluctant to move from West Virginia to Montana, say, when the coal industry

is declining but the gas industry is growing. They do not take into account that

people lose their communal bonds when they move— that they leave behind

friends they can call on when they are sick or grieving. Their children miss their

friends and everyone in the family is ripped away from the centers of their social

lives: school, church, social club, union hall, or American Legion post. And when

these people finally bring their families along and form new communities, changes

in free trade often force them to move again. Thus, after a boom in Montana, prices

of oil and gas fall, and so many of the workers who moved there now need to

relocate again. In this way, free trade churns societies, exacting high social costs

by undermining communities.

These high social costs do not mean that nations should stop trading with

one another; rather, it means that those who are concerned about the social effects

of new trade treaties are not know-nothing, white trash, rednecks but people with

valid concerns. These need to be addressed by much greater investments in TAA.

It should provide those who cannot be retrained—often the older workers— early

retirement (much less costly than government-driven “job creation”) or jobs in an

infrastructure corps. At best, ramped up TAA programs should not require workers

to relocate, because relocations increase costs and undermine communities. To

ensure that social costs are not ignored, new free trade agreements should be

limited to the level at which the social costs they engender can be effectively

absorbed.

2. Immigrants need accelerated acculturation

Liberals tend to characterize anyone who calls for fortifying borders and

limiting immigration as prejudiced and remind us that the US is a nation of

immigrants. These liberals strongly supported the Schengen Agreement, which

removes border controls among many European countries. They cheered Angela

Merkel, the German chancellor, for welcoming millions of immigrants to

Germany. And they view Trump’s call for building a wall on the Mexican border

and restriction on immigration from Muslim countries as typical right-wing,

xenophobic, reactionary policies.

However, very few call for truly open borders, for unlimited immigration.

Logically, once one concedes that there must some kind of limit on immigration,

one cannot avoid the question of what one must do to ensure that this number will

not be exceeded and—who will be welcomed in and who will be left out.

Moreover, there is a tension between unlimited immigration, especially of

people from different cultures, and sustaining communities. Communities benefit

from a measure of stability, continuity, and a core of shared values. The highly

regarded social psychologist Jonathan Haidt views mass immigration as the trigger

that set off the authoritarian impulses of many nations. He concludes that it is

possible to have moderate levels of immigration from “morally different ethnic

groups”—so long as they are seen to be assimilating into the host culture—but

high levels of immigration from countries with different moral values, without

successful assimilation, will trigger an authoritarian backlash. Haidt suggests that

immigration policies ought to take into account three factors: the percentage of

foreign-born residents at any given time; the degree of moral difference between

the incoming group and the members of the host society; and the degree to which

assimilation is being achieved by each group’s children. Globalists do not approve

of this approach.

In a recent Wall Street Journal editorial, Brookings’ William Galston cited

public opinion polls that show that Americans have become more concerned about

the United States becoming a majority non-white country; in 2016, 21% of

Americans said this would “bother” them, up 7 percentage points from 2013.

Furthermore, “fifty percent of all Americans acknowledged being bothered when

they came into contact with immigrants who spoke little or no English.” He

reminds us that in an earlier era, when the United States implemented immigration

restrictions and caps, immigration fell significantly and “‘ethnics’ from central and

southern Europe were gradually assimilated into white America, a process that

many scholars believe contributed to the relatively placid and consensual politics

of the postwar decades.”

A communitarian response calls for insistence that new immigrants will

accept core American values, and on the society to provide for accelerated

acculturation. This thesis is best understood within the context of a “diversity

within unity” (DWU) strategy, rather than one of assimilation. Assimilation

requires that immigrants abandon their distinct values, habits, and connections to

their country of origin in order to integrate fully into their new country. France

stands out as an archetype of this approach. This approach is prone to failure

because immigrants are required to give up values and behaviors that are central to

their identity. Furthermore, such excessive homogenization is not necessary to

obtain a sound state of community.

In contrast, diversity within unity is a combination of partial assimilation

and a high level of tolerance for differences in others. It insists that all immigrants

will respect and adhere to core values and institutions that form the basic shared

framework of the society, the unity component of DWU. At the same time,

immigrants are free to maintain their distinct subculture—those policies, habits,

and institutions that do not conflict with the shared core, the diversity component

of DWU. Respect for the whole and respect for all are the essence of this approach;

when these two come into conflict, then respect for the national community (which

itself may change over time) is to take precedence.

Among the core values are adherence to the law, acceptance of democracy

as the way to resolve differences and create public policy, and belief in civility in

dealing with others. Religion, a core value for many European societies, need not

be a unity value. However, a measure of patriotism should be expected, especially

when loyalty to the new, host nation clashes with commitments to the nation of

origin. (Thus, if the United States were to go to war with another country, our

immigrants from that country would be required to support our effort.) Under

diversity within unity, all immigrants are expected to learn the national language

but are welcome to keep their own and speak it with their children as a secondary

language. Immigrants can celebrate their own holidays (Chinese New Year, say)

but are expected to participate in the national ones, such as the Fourth of July.

In recent years much attention has been paid to the number of immigrants in

the United States, which many of Trump’s supporters see as far too large and as

overwhelming their communities and core values. In response, more attention

should be paid to accelerating acculturation. To illustrate, there is a great shortage

of English classes for immigrants. Obviously a strong command of the language is

an essential element of acculturation. Moreover, language classes also serve as

opportunities to introduce immigrants to American values and folkways, as well as

to form personal contacts between immigrants and old timers who teach these

classes.

One could call for a new massive federal program to provide English and

civics classes to immigrants. However, it is hard to imagine a topic more suitable

for volunteers. To teach English, to share values, does not require a degree from a

teaching college. Almost anyone can do it. The main element that is missing is an

organization that will make acculturation by volunteers one of its key missions.

In short, high levels of immigration, especially by those who bring with

them very different values and habits than those of the communities they join, pose

a sociological challenge. There is no reason to seek to assimilate them, but there is

reason to insist that they buy into core American values. They can be helped in this

process by voluntary associations and communal bodies.

3. Legal rights and moral voices

A third sociological challenge many communities face, coming on top of

those posed by free trade and large scale immigration, is the march of individual

rights. Many of these communities had not yet fully accepted a woman’s right to

choose when the Court legalized marriage between two people of the same sex,

quickly followed by the federal government’s promotion of new rights for

transgender people. The extension of rights is not the issue; the question is how to

assist the cultural adjustments of those who hold that these values violate their

beliefs. I illustrate this next, first by discussing gay marriage, then free speech, and

then gated communities.

In 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that the right to marry applied to same-sex

couples. A few clerks refused to issue marriage licenses to gay couples because

they felt that such acts violated their faith and that God’s law takes precedence

over human law. Many liberals held that these clerks should be fired. Instead,

liberals might have shown empathy for the strong beliefs of such people, without

accepting this or any other violation of individual rights. These people need time

to adapt to a fast-changing new world. Meanwhile, other clerks could issue the

licenses. Justice does not always demand the last ounce of flesh.

Liberals may also do well to pay more attention to a crucial difference that

exists between the right to say the most awful things—to use the N-word, deny the

Holocaust, or to advocate for the Islamic State—and the rightness of saying these

things. It is the difference between a constitutional right to free speech and what

we consider morally appropriate speech. All of us are not only citizens, with a

whole array of rights, but also members of various communities made up of people

with whom we reside, work, play, pray, take civic action, and socialize. These

communities, in effect, tell us that if we must engage in offensive speech—which,

granted, is our right—we must understand that one or more of these communities

to which we belong might in turn express its dismay. Members of these

communities might even decide to have nothing more to do with us, much less lend

a hand in a time of need. Nothing in the First Amendment promises that free

speech will be cost-free.

The efforts to nurture individual rights and at the same time shore up

communities can be highlighted by looking at the gated communities in which

many millions of Americans live. Scorned and criticized by many liberals, these

places nevertheless offer their members social bonding, solace, and comfort. Once

again, a two-layered approach is called for: gated communities should not be

allowed to discriminate, ban books, suppress speech, infringe upon the freedom of

religious expression, or violate anyone’s rights. But in other matters, these

communities should be welcome to form their own policies, to create rules for the

appearance of their communities (homes, lawns), restrict certain types of behavior

in its members (loud music after midnight), and address scores of other matters,

expressing the distinct collective preferences of the members of these

communities.

4. Delegate and opportune communities: the third sector

The public discourse is focused on, indeed dominated by, a century’s old,

very familiar debate between the advocates of the private sector and the advocates

of the public sector. Lost in the debate is the very important role played by the

third sector: the communities. Included in it are the families, which raise children,

and in which people find a major source of their mental well-being. The third

sector also includes thousands of voluntary associations and ethnic and racial

associations that provide child care, education, health care, and welfare.

Immigrants are settled largely by being attended to by their own kind. The best

American universities, hospitals, and schools are in the third, so-called not-for-

profit sector. Above all, communities provide informal social controls that keep

most of their members from violating laws and social mores. And, to reiterate, they

are the best protection against runaway populism and demagogues.

Yuval Leven puts it as follows in his book The Fractured Republic:

“There is an alternative to this perilous mix of over-centralization and hyper-individualism. It can be found in the intricate structure of our complex social topography and in the institutions and relationships that stand between the isolated individual and the national state. These begin in loving family attachments. They spread outward to interpersonal relationships in neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, religious communities, fraternal bodies, civic associations, economic enterprises, activist groups, and the work of local governments. They reach further outward toward broader social, political, and professional affiliations, state institutions, and regional affinities. And they conclude in a national identity that among its foremost attributes is dedicated to the principle of the equality of the entire human race.”

Communities are challenged, as we have already seen, by globalism and high

levels of immigration, particularly from diverse groups. They are also challenged

by government agencies and private businesses taking over missions that

communities are most suitable to carry out and leaving them without a function. To

shore up communities, a considerable measure of devolution of missions and funds

to communities (rather than to states) is what is called for. Levin, who calls this

approach “communitarian liberalism,” explains it as “putting power, authority, and

significance as close to the level of the interpersonal community as reasonably

possible.”

Tony Blair, speaking at a No Labels conference, expressed similar

sentiments. His remarks, as summarized by William Galston, follow:

“we must return to the first principles of liberal democracy, which draws a line between the public and governmental, on the one hand, and the private and communal, on the other. On one side of the line is the ‘space of legitimate diversity,’ and on the other side, the ‘common space.’ In the common space are our core values—democracy, individual liberty, and the rights of women, among others. We have a right to expect that anyone coming to a liberal democracy will respect them, and we have a right to use government to enforce them. Diversity cannot mean that anything goes, even in the name of religious liberty.”

To give but two examples, take immigration resettlement. Jews arriving

from Russia, boat people from Vietnam, refugees from Somalia, and those of many

other ethnic groups, have through US history been settled by Americans of the

same background, who know their culture and language. The US Office of

Refugee Resettlement does best when it cooperates with and supervises those

hosting ethnic groups and organizations, but does not usurp their functions.

Another example is firefighting. As of 2014, there were 1,134,400

firefighters in the United States (not including firefighters who work for the state

or federal governments or in private fire departments). Of these, 346,150 (31%) are

career and 788,250 (69%) are volunteers. For local governments to replace these

volunteers with professional, paid firefighters may increase the efficiency of these

operations. However, it would not only greatly increase public costs but also

deprive communities of one of the most meaningful missions of their members.

Communities are fostered by public spaces, such as parks, promenades,

pedestrian malls, and wide sidewalks. They benefit when local institutions are

maintained, such as public libraries and schools and even post offices, even when

regionalizing them saves some funds.

In short, when local and national communities are weakened by global

forces, limiting the side effects of these forces (even if doing so entails curbing

some of their sway) is not enough—policies that build up communities must also

be embraced. There is no shortage of these, as we have just illustrated.

Amitai Etzioni is a University Professor and Professor of International Relations at

The George Washington University. His latest book, Foreign Policy: Thinking

Outside the Box, was recently published by Routledge. You may follow him on

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