Royal Institute of PhilosophyModern Moral PhilosophyAuthor(s): G. E. M. AnscombeSource: Philosophy, Vol. 33, No. 124 (Jan., 1958), pp. 1-19Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749051 .Accessed: 05/02/2014 22:09Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp .JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. .Cambridge University Press and Royal Institute of Philosophy are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to Philosophy.http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsPHILOSOPHY THEJOURNALOFTHEROYALINSTITUTE OFPHILOSOPHY VOL.XXXIII.No.I24JANUARY1958 MODERNMORALPHILOSOPHY" G. E.M. ANSCOMBE I WILL beginby statingthreetheseswhichI presentin thispaper. The firstis that it is not profitableforus at presentto do moral philosophy;that shouldbe laid aside at any rate untilwe have an adequate philosophyof psychology,in whichwe are conspicuously lacking.The secondis that the conceptsof obligation,and duty- moralobligationand moralduty, that is to say-andof what is morallyrightand wrong,and ofthemoralsense of "ought," ought to be jettisonedif this is psychologicallypossible;because they are survivals,or derivativesfromsurvivals,froman earlierconceptionof ethics which no longergenerallysurvives,and are only harmful withoutit. My thirdthesisis that the differencesbetweenthe well- knownEnglishwriterson moralphilosophyfromSidgwickto the presentday are of littleimportance. Anyonewho has read Aristotle'sEthicsand has also read modern moral philosophymust have been struck by the great contrasts betweenthem.The conceptswhichareprominentamongthemoderns seem to be lacking,or at any rate buriedor farin the background, in Aristotle.Mostnoticeably,theterm"moral"itself,whichwe have by directinheritancefromAristotle,just doesn'tseem to fit,in its modernsense,intoan accountofAristotelianethics.Aristotledistin- guishesvirtuesas moraland intellectual.Have someofwhathe calls "intellectual"virtueswhatweshouldcall a "moral"aspect?It would seemso; thecriterionis presumablythata failurein an "intellectual" virtue-like that of having good judgmentin calculatinghow to bringaboutsomethinguseful,say in municipalgovernment-maybe blameworthy.But-it may reasonablybe asked-cannot any failure be made a matterof blame or reproach?Any derogatorycriticism, say of theworkmanship ofa productor the designofa machine,can be calledblameor reproach. So we wantto put in theword"morally" 1 This paper was originallyread to the Voltaire Society in Oxford. I This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsPHILOSOPHY again: sometimessucha failuremaybe morallyblameworthy,some- timesnot.Now has Aristotlegotthisidea ofmoralblame,as opposed to any other?If he has, whyisn't it morecentral?Thereare some mistakes,he says,whichare causes,notofinvoluntarinessin actions, but ofscoundrelism,and forwhicha manis blamed.Does thismean that thereis amoralobligationnot to make certainintellectual mistakes?Why doesn't he discuss obligationin general,and this obligationin particular?If someoneprofessesto be expounding Aristotleand talksin a modernfashionabout"moral"such-and-such, he mustbe veryimperceptiveifhe doesnotconstantlyfeellikesome- one whosejaws have somehowgot out of alignment:the teethdon't cometogetherin a properbite. We cannot,then,lookto Aristotleforanyelucidationofthemodern way of talkingabout "moral"goodness,obligation,etc. And all the best-knownwriterson ethicsin moderntimes,fromButlerto Mill, appearto me to have faultsas thinkerson thesubjectwhichmakeit impossibleto hope forany directlighton it fromthem.I will state these objectionswith the brevitywhich their charactermakes possible. Butler exalts conscience,but appears ignorantthat aman's consciencemay tell himto do the vilestthings. Humedefines"truth"in sucha wayas to excludeethicaljudgments fromit, and professesthathe has provedthattheyare so excluded. He also implicitlydefines"passion" in such a way that aimingat anythingis havinga passion.His objectionto passingfrom"is" to "ought"wouldapplyequallyto passingfrom"is" to "owes" or from "is" to "needs." (However,becauseofthehistoricalsituation,he has a pointhere,whichI shall returnto.) Kant introducesthe idea of "legislatingforoneself,"whichis as absurd as if in these days, when majorityvotes commandgreat respect,one wereto call each reflectivedecisiona man made a vote resultingin a majority,which as a matterof proportionis over- whelming,forit is always i-o.The conceptof legislationrequires superiorpowerin thelegislator.His ownrigoristicconvictionson the subjectof lyingwereso intensethatit neveroccurredto himthata lie couldbe relevantlydescribedas anythingbut just a lie (e.g. as "a lie in such-and-suchcircumstances").His rule about universalizable maximsis uselesswithoutstipulationsas to what shall count as a relevantdescriptionofan actionwitha viewto constructinga maxim about it. Bentham and Mill do not notice the difficultyof the concept "Pleasure." Theyare oftensaid to have gonewrongthroughcommit- tingthe "naturalisticfallacy";but thischargedoes not impressme, because I do not findaccountsof it coherent.But the otherpoint- about pleasure-seemsto me a fatalobjectionfromthe veryoutset. This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMODERNMORALPHILOSOPHY The ancientsfoundthisconceptprettybaffling.It reducedAristotle to sheerbabble about "the bloomon the cheekof youth"because, forgood reasons,he wantedto make it out both identicalwithand differentfrom the pleasurable activity. Generationsof modern philosophersfoundthisconceptquiteunperplexing,and it reappeared in theliteratureas a problematiconeonlya yearortwoagowhenRyle wroteabout it. The reasonis simple:sinceLocke,pleasurewas taken to be somesortof internalimpression.But it was superficial,if that was therightaccountofit,to makeit thepointofactions.One might adaptsomethingWittgensteinsaidabout "meaning" andsay "Pleasurecannotbe an internalimpression,forno internalimpression couldhave the consequencesof pleasure." Millalso, like Kant, failsto realizethenecessityforstipulationas to relevantdescriptions,if his theoryis to have content.It did not occur to him that acts of murderand theftcould be otherwise described.He holdsthatwherea proposedactionis ofsucha kindas to fall undersome one principleestablishedon groundsof utility, one mustgo by that;whereit fallsundernoneor several,theseveral suggestingcontraryviewsoftheaction,thethingto do is to calculate particularconsequences.But prettywell any action can be so des- cribedas to makeit fallundera varietyof principlesof utility(as I shall say forshort)if it fallsunderany. I will now returnto Hume. The featuresof Hume's philosophy whichI have mentioned,likemanyotherfeaturesofit,wouldincline me to thinkthat Hume was amere-brilliant-sophist;and his proceduresare certainlysophistical.But I am forced,not to reverse, but to add to, this judgmentby a peculiarityof Hume's philoso- phizing:namelythatalthoughhe reacheshisconclusions-withwhich he is in love-by sophisticalmethods,his considerationsconstantly open up verydeep and importantproblems.It is oftenthe case that in theact ofexhibitingthesophistryonefindsoneselfnoticingmatters which deservealot of exploring:the obvious stands in need of investigationas a resultof the pointsthat Hume pretendsto have made. In this,he is unlike,say, Butler.It was alreadywell known thatconsciencecoulddictatevile actions;forButlerto have written disregardingthisdoes not open up any new topicsforus. But with Hume it is otherwise:hence he is avery profoundand great philosopher,in spiteofhis sophistry.For example: SupposethatI say to mygrocer"Truthconsistsin eitherrelations of ideas, as that 2os. = fi, or mattersof fact,as that Iordered potatoes,you suppliedthem,and you sent me a bill. So it doesn't applyto sucha propositionas thatI oweyou such-and-sucha sum." Now if one makesthiscomparison,it comesto lightthatthe rela- tion of the factsmentionedto the description"X owes Y so much money"is an interestingone,whichI will call that of being"brute 3 This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsPHILOSOPHY relativeto" that description.Further,the "brute" factsmentioned herethemselveshave descriptionsrelativelyto whichotherfactsare "brute"-as, e.g., he had potatoescartedto myhouseand theywere leftthereare brutefactsrelativeto "he suppliedme withpotatoes." And the fact Xowes Ymoneyis in turn "brute" relative to other descriptions-e.g. "Xissolvent." Now the relation of "'relativebruteness"is a complicatedone. To mentiona fewpoints: ifxyz is a set of factsbruterelativeto a descriptionA, thenxyz is a set out of a rangesome set amongwhichholdsif A holds; but the holdingof some set among these does not necessarilyentail A, becauseexceptionalcircumstancescan alwaysmakea difference;and whatare exceptionalcircumstancesrelativelyto A can generallyonly be explainedby givinga fewdiverseexamples,and no theoretically adequateprovisioncan be made forexceptionalcircumstances,since a furtherspecialcontextcan theoreticallyalwaysbe imaginedthat would reinterpretany special context.Further,thoughin normal circumstances,xyz wouldbe a justificationforA, that is not to say thatA just comesto the same as "xyz"; and also thereis apt to be an institutionalcontextwhichgivesits pointto thedescriptionA, of whichinstitutionA is of coursenot itselfa description.(E.g. the statementthat I give someonea shillingis not a descriptionof the institutionofmoneyor ofthecurrencyofthiscountry.)Thus,though it wouldbe ludicrousto pretendthat therecan be no such thingas a transitionfrom,e.g.,"is" to "owes,"thecharacterofthetransition is in factratherinterestingand comesto lightas a resultofreflecting on Hume's arguments.' That I owe thegrocersuch-and-sucha sumwouldbe one of a set of factswhichwouldbe "brute"in relationto thedescription"I am a bilker.""Bilking"is of coursea speciesof "dishonesty"or "in- justice." (Naturallythe considerationwillnothave any effecton my actionsunlessI wantto commitor avoid acts of injustice.) So far,in spiteof theirstrongassociations,I conceive"bilking," "injustice"and "dishonesty"in a merely"factual"way. That I can do thisfor"bilking"is obviousenough;"justice"I have no idea how to define,except that its sphereis that of actionswhichrelateto someoneelse, but "injustice,"its defect,can for the momentbe offeredas a genericname coveringvariousspecies.E.g.: "bilking," "theft" (whichis relativeto whateverpropertyinstitutionsexist), "slander,""adultery,""punishmentof the innocent." In present-dayphilosophyan explanationis requiredhow an unjustmanis a bad man,or an unjustactiona bad one; to givesuch an explanationbelongsto ethics;butit cannotevenbe begununtilwe are equippedwitha soundphilosophyof psychology.For the proof I The above two paragraphsare an abstract of a paper "On Brute Facts" forthcomingin Analysis. 4 This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMODERNMORALPHILOSOPHY thatan unjustman is a bad man wouldrequirea positiveaccountof justice as a "virtue."This part of the subject-matterof ethicsis, however,completelyclosed to us untilwe have an accountof what typeof characteristica virtueis-aproblem,not of ethics,but of conceptualanalysis-and how it relatesto the actionsin whichit is instanced:a matterwhichI thinkAristotledid notsuccedin really makingclear.For thiswe certainlyneed an accountat least ofwhat a humanactionis at all, and howits descriptionas "doingsuch-and- such" is affectedby its motiveand by the intentionor intentionsin it; and forthisan accountof such conceptsis required. The terms"should"or "ought"or "needs" relateto goodand bad: e.g.machineryneedsoil,orshouldoroughtto be oiled,in thatrunning withoutoil is bad forit, or it runsbadly withoutoil. Accordingto this conception,of course,"should" and "ought" are not used in a special"moral"sensewhenone says thata man shouldnotbilk. (In Aristotle'ssenseof the term"moral" (q'COucK'S), they are being used in connectionwith a moralsubject-matter:namelythat of human passionsand (non-technical)actions.)But theyhave nowacquireda specialso-called"moral"sense-i.e. a sensein whichtheyimplysome absoluteverdict(likeone ofguilty/not guiltyon a man) on whatis describedin the "ought"sentencesused in certaintypesofcontext: not merelythe contextsthatAristotlewouldcall "moral"-passions and actions-but also some of the contextsthat he would call "intellectual." The ordinary(and quite indispensable)terms"should," "needs," "ought," "must"-acquired this special sense by beingequated in therelevantcontextswith"is obliged,"or "is bound,"or "is required to," in the sense in whichone can be obligedor boundby law, or somethingcan be requiredby law. How did this come about? The answeris in history:between Aristotleand us came Christianity,withits law conceptionof ethics. For Christianityderivedits ethicalnotionsfromthe Torah. (One mightbe inclinedto thinkthat a law conceptionofethicscouldarise only amongpeople who accepted an allegedlydivinepositivelaw; that thisis not so is shownby the exampleof the Stoics,who also thoughtthatwhateverwas involvedin conformityto humanvirtues was requiredby divinelaw.) In consequenceof the dominanceof Christianityformany cen- turies,the conceptsof beingbound,permitted,or excusedbecame deeply embeddedin our language and thought.The Greek word taicapcL'ELv,the aptest to be turnedto thatuse, acquiredthesense "sin," fromhavingmeant "mistake,""missingthe mark,""going wrong." TheLatinpeccatumwhich roughly correspondedto ayzapnra was evenapterforthesense "sin," because it was already associatedwith "culpa"-"guilt" -ajuridicalnotion.The blanket 5 This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsPHILOSOPHY term"illicit,""unlawful,"meaningmuchthe same as our blanket term"wrong,"explainsitself.It is interestingthatAristotledid not have such a blanketterm.He has blankettermsforwickedness- "villain," "scoundrel";but of course a man is not a villain or a scoundrelby theperformanceofone bad action,or a fewbad actions. And he has termslike "disgraceful,""impious";and specificterms signifyingdefectof the relevantvirtue,like "unjust"; but no term correspondingto "illicit."The extensionof thisterm(i.e. the range of its application)could be indicatedin his terminologyonlyby a quitelengthysentence:thatis "illicit"which,whetherit is a thought or a consented-topassionor an actionor an omissionin thoughtor action,is somethingcontraryto one of the virtuesthe lack ofwhich showsa man to be bad qua man. That formulationwould yield a conceptco-extensivewiththe concept"illicit." To have a law conceptionof ethicsis to hold thatwhat is needed forconformitywiththevirtuesfailurein whichis the markofbeing bad qua man (and not merely,say, qua craftsmanor logician)-that whatis neededforthis,is requiredby divinelaw. Naturallyit is not possibleto have sucha conceptionunlessyoubelievein God as a law- giver;like Jews,Stoics,and Christians.But if such a conceptionis dominantformanycenturies,and thenis givenup, it is a natural resultthat the conceptsof "obligation,"of beingboundor required as by a law, shouldremainthoughtheyhad losttheirroot;and ifthe word"ought"has becomeinvestedin certaincontextswiththesense of"obligation,"it toowillremainto be spokenwitha specialemphasis and a specialfeelingin thesecontexts. It is as if thenotion"criminal"wereto remainwhencriminallaw and criminalcourtshad been abolishedand forgotten.A Hume discoveringthis situation might conclude thatthere wasa special sentiment,expressedby "criminal,"whichalone gave the wordits sense.So Hume discoveredthesituationin whichthenotion "obligation"survived,and the notion"ought" was investedwith that peculiarforcehavingwhichit is said to be used in a "moral" sense,but in whichthebeliefin divinelaw had longsincebeenaban- doned: forit was substantiallygivenup amongProtestantsat the time of the Reformation.'The situation,if Iam right,was the interestingone ofthesurvivalof a conceptoutsidetheframeworkof thoughtthatmade it a reallyintelligibleone. When Hume producedhis famousremarksabout the transition I They did not deny the existence of divine law; but their most charac- teristicdoctrinewas that it was given,not to be obeyed, but to show man's incapacityto obey it, even by grace; and thisapplied not merelyto the ramified prescriptionsof the Torah, but to the requirementsof "natural divine law." Cf. in this connectionthe decree of Trent against the teaching that Christ was only to be trustedin as mediator,not obeyed as legislator, 6 This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMODERNMORALPHILOSOPHY from"is" to "ought,"he was, then,bringingtogetherseveralquite differentpoints.One I have triedto bringout by myremarkson the transitionfrom"is" to "owes" and on the relative"bruteness"of facts.It wouldbe possibleto bringout a differentpointby enquiring about the transitionfrom"is" to "needs"; fromthe characteristics ofan organismto theenvironmentthatit needs,forexample.To say thatit needsthatenvironmentis not to say,e.g.,thatyouwantit to have that environment,but that it won't flourishunlessit has it. Certainly,it all dependswhetheryou wantit to flourish!as Hume wouldsay. But what"all depends"on whetheryouwantit to flourish is whetherthe factthatit needsthat environment,or won'tflourish withoutit,has theslightestinfluenceon youractions,Now thatsuch- and-such"ought"to be or "is needed"is supposedto have an influence on youractions:fromwhichit seemednaturalto inferthatto judge thatit "oughtto be" was in factto grantwhatyoujudged"oughtto be" influenceon youractions.And no amountof truthas to whatis thecase couldpossiblyhave a logicalclaimto have influenceon your actions.(It is not judgmentas suchthat sets us in motion;but our judgmenton how to get or do somethingwe want.)Hence it mustbe impossibleto infer"needs" or "oughtto be" from"is." But in the case of a plant,let us say, the inferencefrom"is" to "needs" is certainlynot in the least dubious. Itis interestingand worth examining;but notat all fishy.Its interestis similarto theinterestof the relationbetweenbruteand less brutefacts:theserelationshave been very little considered.And while you can contrast"what it needs" with "what it's got"-likecontrastingde facto and de iure-that does not make its needingthis environmentless of a "truth." Certainlyin thecase ofwhattheplantneeds,thethoughtofa need will onlyaffectactionif you want the plant to flourish.Here, then, thereis no necessaryconnectionbetweenwhatyoucan judgetheplant "needs" and what you want. But thereis some sort of necessary connectionbetweenwhat you think you need,and what you want. The connectionis a complicatedone; it is possiblenotto wantsome- thingthat you judge you need.But, e.g.,it is not possibleneverto want anythingthatyou judgeyou need. This,however,is not a fact aboutthemeaningoftheword"to need,"but aboutthephenomenon of wanting.Hume's reasoning,we mightsay, in effect,leads one to thinkit mustbe about the word"to need," or "to be good for." Thuswe findtwoproblemsalreadywrappedup in theremarkabout a transitionfrom"is" to "ought";nowsupposingthatwe had clarified the "relativebruteness"of factson the one hand, and the notions involvedin "needing,"and "flourishing"on the other-therewould stillremaina thirdpoint.For, followingHume,someonemightsay: Perhapsyou have made out yourpointabout a transitionfrom"is" This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsPHILOSOPHY to "owes" and from"is" to "needs": but onlyat thecostofshowing "'owes" and "needs" sentencesto expressa kindof truths,a kind offacts.And it remainsimpossibleto infer"morallyought"from"is" sentences. Thiscomment,it seemsto me,wouldbe correct.Thisword"ought," havingbecomea word of meremesmericforce,could not, in the characterof havingthat force,be inferredfromanythingwhatever. It may be objectedthat it could be inferredfromother"morally ought"sentences:but thatcannotbe true.The appearancethatthis is so is producedby the factthatwe say "All menare i"and "Soc- ratesis a man" implies"Socratesis O." But here "i"is a dummy predicate.We mean that if you substitutea real predicatefor "O" theimplicationis valid. A real predicateis required;not just a word containingno intelligiblethought:a wordretainingthesuggestionof force,and apt to have a strongpsychologicaleffect,but whichno longersignifiesa real conceptat all. For its suggestionis one of a verdicton my action,accordingas it agreesor disagreeswiththedescriptionin the"ought"sentence.And whereone does not thinkthereis a judge or a law, the notionof a verdictmayretainits psychologicaleffect,but not its meaning.Now imaginethat just thisword"verdict"wereso used-with a charac- teristicallysolemnemphasis-as to retainits atmospherebut not its meaning,and someonewereto say: "For a verdict,afterall, youneed a law and a judge."The replymightbe made: "Not at all, forifthere werea law and a judgewhogave a verdict,thequestionforus would be whetheracceptingthatverdictis somethingthatthereis a Verdict on." This is an analogue of an argumentwhichis so frequently referredto as decisive:If someonedoes have a divinelaw conception ofethics,all thesame,he has to agreethathe has to have a judgment thathe ought(morallyought)to obeythe divinelaw; so his ethicis in exactlythesamepositionas any other:he merelyhas a "practical major premise"': "Divine law oughtto be obeyed"wheresomeone elsehas,e.g.,"The greatesthappinessprincipleoughtto be employed in all decisions." I shouldjudge thatHume and our present-dayethicistshad done a considerableserviceby showingthatno contentcouldbe foundin thenotion"morallyought";ifit werenotthatthelatterphilosophers try to findan alternative(veryfishy)contentand to retain the psychologicalforceof the term.It wouldbe mostreasonableto drop it. It has no reasonablesenseoutsidea law conceptionofethics;they are not goingto maintainsuch a conception;and you can do ethics withoutit, as is shownby the exampleof Aristotle.It wouldbe a I As it is absurdlycalled. Since major premise=premise containing the term which is predicatein the conclusion,it is a solecismto speak of it in the con- nection with practical reasoning. 8 This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMODERNMORALPHILOSOPHY greatimprovmentif,insteadof "morallywrong,"one alwaysnamed a genussuch as "untruthful,""unchaste,""unjust." We shouldno longerask whetherdoingsomethingwas "wrong,"passingdirectly fromsome descriptionof an action to this notion;we should ask whether,e.g.,it was unjust;and theanswerwouldsometimesbe clear at once. Inow come to the epoch in modernEnglish moral philosophy markedby Sidgwick.Thereis a startlingchangethatseemsto have takenplace betweeenMill and Moore.Mill assumes,as we saw, that thereis no questionof calculatingthe particularconsequencesof an actionsuchas murderor theft;and we saw too thathis positionwas stupid,becauseit is not at all clearhowan actioncan fallunderjust one principleof utility. InMoore and in subsequentacademic moralistsofEnglandwe findit takento be prettyobviousthat "the rightaction" is the actionwhichproducesthe best possibleconse- quences(reckoningamongconsequencestheintrinsicvaluesascribed to certainkindsofact by some"Objectivists"I).Now it followsfrom thisthata mandoeswell,subjectivelyspeaking,ifhe acts forthebest in theparticularcircumstancesaccordingto hisjudgmentofthetotal consequencesof this particularaction. I say that this follows,not that any philosopherhas said preciselythat.For discussionof these questionscan of courseget extremelycomplicated:e.g. it can be doubtedwhether"such-and-suchis therightaction"is a satisfactory formulation,on thegroundsthatthingshave to existto have predi- cates-so perhapsthebestformulationis "I am obliged";or again,a philosophermaydenythat "right"is a "descriptive"term,and then take a roundaboutroutethroughlinguisticanalysisto reacha view whichcomesto thesamethingas "therightactionis theoneproduc- tive of the best consequences"(e.g. the view that you frameyour "principles"to effectthe end you chooseto pursue,the connexion between"choice" and "best" beingsupposedlysuch that choosing reflectivelymeansthat you choosehow to act so as to producethe best consequences);further,the roles of what are called "moral principles"and of the "motiveof duty" have to be described;the differencesbetween"good" and "morallygood" and "right"need to be explored,the specialcharacteristicsof "ought"sentencesinvesti- gated.Suchdiscussionsgeneratean appearanceofsignificantdiversity ofviewswherewhatis reallysignificantis an overallsimilarity.The overallsimilarityis made clearifyou considerthateveryone of the I Oxford Objectivists of course distinguishbetween "consequences" and "intrinsicvalues" and so produce a misleadingappearance of not being "con- sequentialists." But they do not hold-andRoss explicitlydenies-thatthe gravityof,e.g., procuringthe condemnationof the innocentis such that it can- not be outweighedby, e.g., national interest.Hence theirdistinctionis of no importance, 9 This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsP H I L O S O P H Y best known English academic moral philosophershas put out a philosophyaccordingto which,e.g.,it is notpossibleto hold that it cannotbe rightto killtheinnocentas a meansto anyendwhatsoever and thatsomeonewhothinksotherwiseis in error.(I have to mention bothpoints;becauseMr. Hare, forexample,whileteachinga philo- sophy whichwould encouragea personto judge that killingthe innocentwouldbe whathe "ought"to chooseforover-ridingpurposes, wouldalso teach,I think,thatifa manchoosesto makeavoidingkill- ingtheinnocentforanypurposehis "supremepracticalprinciple,"he cannotbe impugnedforerror:that just is his "principle."But with thatqualification,I thinkitcanbe seenthatthepointI havementioned holdsgood of everysingleEnglishacademicmoralphilosophersince Sidgwick.)Now thisis a significantthing:forit meansthatall these philosophiesare quiteincompatiblewiththe Hebrew-Christianethic. For it has been characteristicof that ethicto teach that thereare certainthingsforbiddenwhateverconsequencesthreaten,such as: choosingto killtheinnocentforanypurpose,howevergood;vicarious punishment;treachery(by whichI mean obtaininga man's confi- dence in a gravematterby promisesof trustworthyfriendshipand then betrayinghim to his enemies);idolatry;sodomy; adultery; makinga falseprofessionof faith.The prohibitionof certainthings simplyin virtueof theirdescriptionas such-and-suchidentifiable kindsof action,regardlessof any furtherconsequences,is certainly not the wholeof the Hebrew-Christianethic;but it is a noteworthy featureof it; and if everyacademicphilosophersince Sidgwickhas writtenin sucha wayas to excludethisethic,it wouldarguea certain provincialityof mind not to see this incompatibilityas the most importantfactaboutthesephilosophers,and thedifferencesbetween themas somewhattriflingby comparison. Itis noticeablethat none of these philosophersdisplays any consciousnessthat thereis such an ethic,whichhe is contradicting: it is prettywelltakenforobviousamongthemall thata prohibition suchas thaton murderdoesnotoperatein faceofsomeconsequences. But ofcoursethestrictnessoftheprohibitionhas as itspointthatyou are notto be temptedbyfearor hopeofconsequences. If you noticethe transitionfromMill to Moore,you will suspect thatit was madesomewhereby someone;Sidgwickwillcometo mind as a likelyname;and youwillin factfindit goingon,almostcasually, in him.He is rathera dull author;and the importantthingsin him occurin asides and footnotesand smallbits of argumentwhichare notconcernedwithhisgrandclassificationofthe"methodsofethics." A divinelaw theoryofethicsis reducedto an insignificantvarietyby a footnotetellingus that "the best theologians"(God knowswhom he meant)tellus thatGod is to be obeyedin his capacityof a moral being. ' 0OpTLKos o'C'Wcavoso; one seems to hear Aristotlesaying: IO This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMODERNMORALPHILOSOPHY "Isn't the praisevulgar?",-But Sidgwickis vulgarin that kindof way:he thinks,forexample,thathumilityconsistsinunderestimating your own merits-i.e. in a speciesof untruthfulness;and that the groundforhavinglaws againstblasphemywas that it was offensive to believers;and thatto go accuratelyintothevirtueof purityis to offendagainstits canons,a thinghe reproves"medievaltheologians" fornot realizing. Fromthepointofviewofthepresentenquiry,themostimportant thingabout Sidgwickwas his definitionof intention.Hedefines intentionin such a way thatone mustbe said to intendany foreseen consequencesof one's voluntaryaction.This definitionis obviously incorrect,and I daresay thatno onewouldbe foundto defendit now. He uses it to put forwardan ethical thesiswhichwould now be accepted by many people: the thesis that it does not make any differenceto a man's responsibilityforsomethingthat he foresaw, thathe feltno desireforit, eitheras an end or as a meansto an end. Using the language of intentionmore correctly,andavoiding Sidgwick'sfaultyconception,we maystatethethesisthus:it doesnot make any differenceto a man's responsibilityforan effectof his actionwhichhe can foresee,thathe doesnotintendit.Nowthissounds ratheredifying;it is I thinkquitecharacteristicofverybad degenera- tionsofthoughton suchquestionsthattheysoundedifying.We can see what it amountsto by consideringan example.Let us suppose that a man has a responsibilityforthe maintenanceof some child. Thereforedeliberatelyto withdrawsupportfromit is a bad sortof thingforhimto do. It wouldbe bad forhimto withdrawits mainte- nancebecausehe didn'twantto maintainit any longer;and also bad forhimto withdrawit becausebydoingso he would,letus say,compel someoneelse to do something.(We may suppose for the sake of argumentthat compellingthat personto do that thingis in itself quite admirable.)But nowhe has to choosebetweendoingsomething disgracefuland goingto prison;if he goes to prison,it will follow that he withdrawssupportfromthe child.By Sidgwick'sdoctrine, thereis no differencein his responsibilityforceasingto maintainthe child,betweenthe case wherehe does it forits own sake or as a meansto someotherpurpose,and whenit happensas a foreseenand unavoidableconsequenceofhis goingto prisonratherthando some- thingdisgraceful.It followsthat he must weigh up the relative badness of withdrawingsupportfromthe child and of doing the disgracefulthing;and it mayeasilybe thatthedisgracefulthingis in fact a less vicious action than intentionallywithdrawingsupport fromthe childwould be; if thenthe factthat withdrawingsupport fromthechildis a side effectofhisgoingto prisondoesnot make any differenceto his responsibility,thisconsiderationwill inclinehimto X E.,N. I I78bi6, II This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsP H I L O S O P H Y do thedisgracefulthing;whichcan stillbe prettybad. Andofcourse, once he has startedto look at the matterin this light,the only reasonablethingforhimto considerwillbe theconsequencesand not the intrinsicbadnessof this or that action.So that,giventhat he judgesreasonablythatnogreatharmwillcomeofit,he can do a much moredisgracefulthingthan deliberatelywithdrawingsupportfrom thechild.Andifhis calculationsturnout in factwrong,it willappear thathe was not responsibleforthe consequences,becausehe did not foreseethem.For in fact Sidgwick'sthesisleads to its beingquite impossibleto estimatethebadnessofan actionexceptin thelightof expectedconsequences.But if so, thenyou mustestimatethebadness in thelightoftheconsequencesyou expect;and so it will followthat you can exculpateyourselffromthe actualconsequencesofthemost disgracefulactions,so longas youcan makeout a case fornot having foreseenthem.WhereasI shouldcontendthata manis responsiblefor the bad consequencesof his bad actions,but gets no creditforthe good ones; and contrariwiseis not responsibleforthe bad conse- quencesof good actions. The denial of any distinctionbetweenforeseenand intendedcon- sequences,as far as responsibilityis concerned,was not made by Sidgwickin developingany one "methodof ethics"; he made this importantmoveon behalfofeverybodyand just on its ownaccount; and I thinkit plausibleto suggestthat thismove on the part of Sidgwickexplainsthedifferencebetweenold-fashionedUtilitarianism and that consequentialism,as I name it,whichmarkshimand every Englishacademicmoralphilosophersince him. By it, the kind of considerationwhichwouldformerlyhave beenregardedas a tempta- tion,thekindofconsiderationurgeduponmenbywivesand flattering friends,was givena statusby moralphilosophersin theirtheories. It is a necessaryfeatureof consequentialismthat it is a shallow philosophy.For thereare alwaysborderlinecases in ethics.Now if youare eitheran Aristotelian,ora believerin divinelaw,youwilldeal witha borderlinecase by consideringwhetherdoingsuch-and-suchin such-and-suchcircumstancesis, say,murder,or is an act ofinjustice; and accordingas you decideit is or it isn't,you judgeit to be a thing to do or not.Thiswouldbe themethodofcasuistry;and whileit may lead you to stretcha pointon the circumference,it will not permit you to destroythe centre.But if you are a consequentialist,the question"What is it rightto do in such-and-suchcircumstances?" is a stupidone to raise.The casuistraisessucha questiononlyto ask "Would it be permissibleto do so-and-so?"or "Would it be permis- siblenotto do so-and-so?"Onlyif it wouldnotbe permissiblenotto do so-and-socouldhe say " Thiswouldbe thethingtodo."I Otherwise, I Necessarily arare case:for the positive precepts, e.g. "Honour your parents," hardly ever prescribe,and seldom even necessitate,any particular action. I2 This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMODERNMORALPHILOSOPHY thoughhe mayspeakagainstsomeaction,he cannotprescribeany- forin an actualcase, the circumstances(beyondthe ones imagined) mightsuggestall sortsofpossibilities,and youcan'tknowin advance whatthepossibilitiesaregoingto be. Nowtheconsequentialisthas no footingon whichto say "Thiswouldbe permissible,thisnot"; because by his ownhypothesis,it is theconsequencesthatare to decide,and he has no businessto pretendthathe can lay it downwhatpossible twistsa man couldgivedoingthisor that; themosthe can say is: a man mustnot bringaboutthisor that;he has no rightto say he will, in an actualcase,bringaboutsuch-and-suchunlesshe does so-and-so. Further,the consequentialist,in orderto be imaginingborderline cases at all, has of courseto assume some sort of law or standard accordingto whichthisis a borderlinecase, Wherethendoes he get the standardfrom?In practicethe answerinvariablyis: fromthe standardscurrentin his societyor his circle.And it has in factbeen the markof all these philosophersthat theyhave been extremely conventional;theyhave nothingin themby whichto revoltagainst the conventionalstandardsof theirsort of people; it is impossible thattheyshouldbe profound.But the chancethata wholerangeof conventionalstandardswillbe decentis small.-Finally,thepointof consideringhypotheticalsituations,perhapsveryimprobableones, seemsto be to elicit fromyourselfor someoneelse a hypothetical decisionto do somethingof a bad kind.I don't doubt thishas the effectof predisposingpeople-who willneverget intothe situations for which they have made hypotheticalchoices-to consentto similarbad actions,or to praiseand flatterthosewho do them,so long as theircrowddoes so too, whenthe desperatecircumstances imagineddon'thold at all. Thosewhorecognizetheoriginsofthenotionsof "obligation"and oftheemphatic,"moral,"ought,in thedivinelaw conceptionofethics, but whorejectthenotionofa divinelegislator,sometimeslookabout for the possibilityof retaininga law conceptionwithouta divine legislator.This search,I think,has someinterestin it. Perhapsthe firstthingthatsuggestsitselfis the "norms"ofa society.But just as one cannotbe impressedby Butlerwhenone reflectswhatconscience can tellpeopleto do, so, I think,onecannotbe impressedby thisidea ifone reflectswhatthe "norms"ofa societycan be like.That legisla- tion can be "foroneself"I rejectas absurd;whateveryou do "for yourself"maybe admirable;but is notlegislating.Onceone seesthis, one maysay: I have to framemyownrules,and theseare thebest I can frame,and I shallgo by themuntilI knowsomethingbetter:as aman mightsay "Ishall go by the customsof my ancestors." Whetherthisleads to good or evil will dependon the contentof the rulesor of the customsof one's ancestors.If one is luckyit willlead to good. Such an attitudewould be hopefulin this at any rate: it I3 This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsPHILOSOPHY seemsto have in it some Socraticdoubtwhere,fromhavingto fall back on such expedients,it shouldbe clear that Socraticdoubt is good; in factrathergenerallyit mustbe good foranyoneto think "Perhapsin someway I can't see, I maybe on a bad path,perhapsI am hopelesslywronginsomeessentialway".-The searchfor"norms" mightlead someoneto lookforlaws ofnature,as iftheuniversewere a legislator;but in the presentday thisis not likelyto lead to good results:it mightlead one to eat theweakeraccordingto the laws of nature,butwouldhardlylead anyonenowadaysto notionsofjustice; thepre-Socraticfeelingaboutjusticeas comparableto thebalanceor harmonywhichkeptthingsgoingis veryremoteto us. Thereis anotherpossibilityhere:"obligation"maybe contractual. Justas we look at the law to findout what a man subjectto it is requiredby it to do, so we lookat a contractto findoutwhattheman whohas madeit is requiredby it to do. Thinkers,admittedlyremote fromus, mighthave theidea ofa foeds rerum,oftheuniversenotas a legislatorbut as the embodimentof a contract.Then if you could findout what the contractwas, you would learn your obligations underit. Now,you cannotbe undera law unlessit has beenpromul- gatedto you; and thethinkerswhobelievedin "naturaldivinelaw" heldthatit was promulgatedto everygrownmanin his knowledgeof good and evil. Similarlyyou cannotbe in a contractwithouthaving contracted, i.e. given signs of enteringupon the contract.Just possibly,it mightbe arguedthattheuse oflanguagewhichonemakes in the ordinaryconductof lifeamountsin somesenseto givingthe signsof enteringintovariouscontracts.If anyonehad this theory, we shouldwant to see it workedout. I suspectthat it would be largelyformal;it mightbe possibleto constructa systemembodying the law (whosestatusmightbe comparedto thatof "laws" oflogic): "what's sauce forthe goose is sauce forthe gander,"but hardlyone descendingto such particularitiesas the prohibitionon murderor sodomy.Also,whileit is clearthatyou can be subjectto a law that you do not acknowledgeand have not thoughtof as law, it does not seemreasonableto say that you can enterupon a contractwithout knowingthatyou are doingso; such ignoranceis usuallyheld to be destructiveof the natureof a contract. It mightremainto lookfor"norms"in humanvirtues:just as man has so manyteeth,whichis certainlynottheaveragenumberofteeth menhave,but is thenumberof teethforthe species,so perhapsthe speciesman, regardednot just biologically,but fromthe pointof view of the activityof thoughtand choicein regardto the various departmentsoflife-powers and facultiesand use ofthingsneeded- "has" such-and-suchvirtues:and this"man" withthe completeset ofvirtuesis the"norm,"as "man" with,e.g.,a completeset of teeth is a norm.But inthissense"norm"has ceasedto be roughlyequivalent '4 This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMODERNMORALPHILOSOPHY to "law." In thissensethenotionofa "norm"bringsus nearerto an Aristotelianthana law conceptionofethics.Thereis, I think,no harm in that; but if someonelooked in this directionto give "norm" a sense,thenhe oughtto recognizewhat has happenedto the notion "norm,"whichhe wantedto mean"law-withoutbringingGod in" it has ceased to mean "law" at all; and so the notionsof "moral obligation,""themoralought,"and "duty"arebestputon theIndex, if he can manageit. But meanwhile-isit notclearthatthereare severalconceptsthat need investigatingsimplyas part of the philosophyof psychology and,-asIshould recommend-banishingethicstotallyfromour minds?Namely-to beginwith: "action," "intention,""pleasure," "wanting." More will probablyturn up if we start with these. Eventuallyit mightbe possibleto advanceto consideringtheconcept "virtue";withwhich,I suppose,we shouldbe beginningsomesortof a studyof ethics. I willendby describingtheadvantagesofusingtheword"ought" in a non-emphaticfashion,and not in a special "moral" sense; of discardingthe term"wrongsin a"moral" sense, and using such notionsas "unjust." It is possible,ifone is allowedto proceedjust by givingexamples, to distinguishbetweenthe intrinsicallyunjust,and what is unjust giventhecircumstances.To arrangeto geta manjudiciallypunished forsomethingwhichit can be clearlyseen he has not done is in- trinsicallyunjust.This mightbe done,of course,and oftenhas been done,in all sortsof ways; by suborningfalsewitnesses,by a ruleof law by whichsomethingis "deemed" to be the case whichis ad- mittedlynot the case as a matterof fact,and by open insolenceon the part of the judges and powerfulpeoplewhentheymoreor less openlysay: "A figforthe factthat you did not do it; we mean to sentenceyou forit all the same." What is unjustgiven,e.g.,normal circumstancesis to deprive people of their ostensibleproperty withoutlegalprocedure,not to pay debts,notto keepcontracts,and a hostofotherthingsofthekind.Now,thecircumstancescan clearly make a greatdeal of differencein estimatingthe justiceor injustice of such proceduresas these;and thesecircumstancesmay sometimes includeexpectedconsequences;forexample,a man's claim to a bit of propertycan becomea nullitywhenits seizureand use can avert someobviousdisaster:as, e.g.,if you could use a machineof his to producean explosionin whichit wouldbe destroyed,but by meansof whichyou could diverta floodor make a gap whicha firecould not jump. Now thiscertainlydoes not mean thatwhatwouldordinarily be an act of injustice,but is not intrinsicallyunjust,can alwaysbe renderedjust by a reasonablecalculationofbetterconsequences;far fromit; but theproblemsthatwouldbe raisedin an attemptto draw '5 This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsP H I L O S O P H Y a boundaryline (or boundaryarea) hereare obviouslycomplicated. Andwhilethereare certainlysome generalremarkswhichoughtto be made here,and someboundariesthatcan be drawn,the decision on particularcases would forthe most part be determinedKac-a TOv 3pOpov Voyov"accordingto what's reasonable."-E.g. that such- and-sucha delay of paymentof a such-and-suchdebt to a personso circumstanced,on the part of a personso circumstanced,would or wouldnotbe unjust,is reallyonlyto be decided"accordingto what's reasonable";and forthis therecan in principlebe no canon other than givinga fewexamples.That is to say, whileit is because of a big gap in philosophythat we can give no generalaccountof the conceptof virtueand of the conceptofjustice,but have to proceed, usingthe concepts,onlyby givingexamples;still thereis an area whereit is not because of any gap, but is in principlethe case, that thereis no accountexceptby way ofexamples:and thatis wherethe canonis "what'sreasonable":whichof courseis nota canon. That is all I wishto say aboutwhatis just in somecircumstances, unjustin others;and about theway in whichexpectedconsequences can playa partin determiningwhatis just. Returningto myexample oftheintrinsicallyunjust:ifa procedureis oneofjudiciallypunishing a man forwhathe is clearlyunderstoodnot to have done,therecan be absolutelyno argumentabout the descriptionof this as unjust. No circumstances,and no expected consequences,which do not modifythedescriptionoftheprocedureas one ofjudiciallypunishing a manforwhathe is knownnotto have donecan modifythedescrip- tion of it as unjust.Someonewho attemptedto disputethiswould onlybe pretendingnot to knowwhat "unjust" means:forthisis a paradigmcase of injustice. And here we see the superiorityor the term"unjust" over the terms"morallyright"and "morallywrong."For in the contextof English moral philosophysince Sidgwickit appears legitimateto discusswhetherit mightbe "morallyright"in somecircumstancesto adopt that procedure;but it cannotbe arguedthat the procedure wouldin any circumstancesbe just. Now I am not able to do the philosophyinvolved-and I think thatno one in thepresentsituationofEnglishphilosophycan do the philosophyinvolved-but it is clearthat a good man is a just man; and a just manis a manwhohabituallyrefusesto commitor partici- pate in any unjustactionsforfearof any consequences,or to obtain any advantage,for himselfor anyone else. Perhaps no one will disagree.But, it willbe said,whatis unjustis sometimesdetermined by expectedconsequences;and certainlythat is true.But thereare caseswhereit is not:nowifsomeonesays,"I agree,but all thiswants a lot ofexplaining,"thenhe is right,and,whatis more,thesituation at presentis thatwe can't do theexplaining;we lack thephilosophic This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMODERNMORALPHILOSOPHY equipment.But ifsomeonereallythinks,in advance,ithatit is open to questionwhethersuchan actionas procuringthejudicialexecution of the innocentshouldbe quite excludedfromconsideration-Ido not wantto arguewithhim;he showsa corruptmind. In such cases our moralphilosophersseek to imposea dilemma upon us. "If we have a case wherethe term'unjust' appliespurely in virtueofa factualdescription,can't oneraisethequestionwhether one sometimesconceivablyoughtto do injustice?If 'whatis unjust' is determinedby considerationofwhetherit is rightto do so-and-so in such-and-suchcircumstances,then the question whetherit is 'right'to commitinjusticecan't arise, just because 'wrong'has beenbuiltintothedefinitionofinjustice.But ifwe have a case where the description'unjust'appliespurelyin virtueof the facts,without bringing'wrong'in, thenthe questioncan arisewhetherone 'ought' perhapsto commitan injustice,whetherit mightnot be 'right'to? And of course 'ought' and 'right'are being used in theirmoral senseshere.Now eitheryou mustdecidewhat is 'morallyright'in the light of certain other'principles,' or you make a'principle' about thisand decide that an injusticeis never'right';but even if you do the latteryou are goingbeyondthe facts;you are makinga decisionthat you will not,or that it is wrongto, commitinjustice. But in eithercase, if the term 'unjust' is determinedsimplyby the facts,it is not the term'unjust' that determinesthat the term 'wrong' applies, but adecision that injusticeis wrong,together withthe diagnosisof the 'factual'descriptionas entailinginjustice. But the man who makes an absolute decision that injustice is 'wrong'has no footingon whichto criticizesomeonewho does not make that decisionas judgingfalsely." Inthis argument"wrong" of course is explained asmeaning "morallywrong,"and all theatmosphereofthetermis retainedwhile its substanceis guaranteedquite null. Now let us rememberthat ''morallywrong''is thetermwhichis theheirofthenotion"illicit,"or "whatthereis an obligationnotto do"; whichbelongsin a divinelaw theoryor ethics.Here it reallydoes add somethingto thedescription "unjust" to say there is an obligation not to do it; for what obliges I If he thinksit in the concretesituation,he is of course merelya normally temptedhuman being. In discussionwhen this paper was read, as was perhaps to be expected, this case was produced: a governmentis requiredto have an innocent man tried, sentenced and executed under threat of a"hydrogen bombwar."Itwouldseemstrange to me to havemuch hopeof soaverting a war threatenedby such men as made this demand. But the most important thingabout the way in whichcases like this are inventedin discussions,is the assumption that only two courses areopen:here, compliance andopen defiance.No one can say in advance of such a situationwhat the possibilities are going to be-e.g.that there is none of stallingby a feignedwillingnessto comply,accompanied by a skilfullyarranged "escape" of the victim. B I7 This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsPHILOSOPHY is the divinelaw-asrules obligein a game. So if the divinelaw obligesnot to commitinjusticeby forbiddinginjustice,it reallydoes add somethingto the description"unjust" to say thereis an obliga- tionnotto do it,Andit is because"morallywrong"is theheirofthis concept,but an heirthatis cut offfromthefamilyofconceptsfrom whichit sprang,that "morallywrong"bothgoes beyondthe mere factualdescription"unjust"andseemsto have no discerniblecontent excepta certaincompellingforce,whichI shouldcall purelypsycho- logical.And such is the forceof the termthat philosophersactually supposethat the divinelaw notioncan be dismissedas makingno essentialdifferenceeven if it is held-because they thinkthat a "'practicalprinciple"running"Iought(i.e. am morallyobliged)to obeydivinelaws" is requiredforthemanwhobelievesin divinelaws. But actuallythisnotionofobligationis a notionwhichonlyoperates in the contextof law. And I shouldbe inclinedto congratulatethe present-daymoralphilosopherson depriving"morallyought"of its nowdelusiveappearanceof content,if onlytheydid not manifesta detestabledesireto retainthe atmosphereof the term. It maybe possible,ifwe areresolute,to discardthenotion"morally ought,"and simplyreturnto the ordinary"ought",which,we ought to notice,is suchan extremelyfrequenttermofhumanlanguagethat it is difficultto imaginegettingon withoutit. Now ifwe do returnto it, can't it reasonablybe asked whetherone mightever need to commitinjustice,or whetherit won't be the best thingto do? Of courseit can. And the answerswill be various.One man-aphilo- sopher-may say that sincejusticeis a virtue,and injusticea vice, and virtuesand vices are builtup by the performancesofthe action in whichtheyare instanced,an act of injusticewill tendto make a man bad; and essentiallythe flourishingof a man qua man consists in his beinggood (e.g. in virtues);but forany X to whichsuchterms apply,X needswhat makesit flourish,so a man needs,or oughtto perform,onlyvirtuousactions;and even if,as it mustbe admitted may happen, he flourishesless, or not at all, in inessentials,by avoidinginjustice,his life is spoiled in essentialsby not avoiding injustice-so he still needs to performonly just actions.That is roughlyhow Plato and Aristotletalk; but it can be seen that philosophicallythereis a hugegap, at presentunfillableas faras we are concerned,whichneedsto be filledbyan accountofhumannature, humanaction,the typeof characteristica virtueis, and above all of human"flourishing."Andit is thelast conceptthatappearsthemost doubtful.For it is a bit much to swallowthat a man in pain and hungerand poor and friendlessis "flourishing,"as Aristotlehimself admitted.Further,someonemightsay that one at least neededto stay alive to "flourish."Anotherman unimpressedby all thatwill say in a hard case "What we need is such-and-such,whichwe won't i8 This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMODERNMORALPHILOSOPHY getwithoutdoingthis(whichis unjust)-so thisis whatwe oughtto do." Anotherman,whodoesnotfollowtheratherelaboratereasoning ofthephilosophers,simplysays "I knowit is in anycase a disgraceful thingto say thatonehad bettercommitthisunjustaction."The man who believesin divinelaws will say perhaps"It is forbidden,and howeverit looks,it cannotbe to anyone'sprofitto commitinjustice"; he liketheGreekphilosopherscan thinkin termsof "flourishing."If he is a Stoic,he is apt to have a decidedlystrainednotionof what "flourishingconsists"in; ifhe is a Jewor Christian,he neednothave any verydistinctnotion:the way it will profithimto abstainfrom injusticeis somethingthathe leaves it to God to determine,himself onlysaying"It can't do me any goodto go againsthis law." (But he also hopesfora greatrewardin a newlifelateron,e.g. at thecoming of Messiah;but in thishe is relyingon specialpromises.) It is leftto modernmoralphilosophy-themoralphilosophyofall thewell-knownEnglishethicistssinceSidgwick-toconstructsystems accordingto whichthe man who says "We need such-and-such,and willonlygetit thisway" maybe a virtuouscharacter:thatis to say, it is leftopen to debate whethersuch a procedureas the judicial punishmentof the innocentmay not in some circumstancesbe the "right"one to adopt; and thoughthe presentOxfordmoralphilo- sopherswould accorda man permissionto "make it his principle" not to do such a thing,theyteach a philosophyaccordingto which the particularconsequencesof such an action could "morally"be takeninto accountby a man who was debatingwhat to do; and if theyweresuchas to conflictwithhis "ends,"it mightbe a stepin his moral education to frame amoral principleunder which he "managed" (to use Mr.Nowell-Smith's phrase') to bringthe action; or it mightbe a new "decisionof principle,"makingwhichwas an advancein the formationof his moralthinking(to adopt Mr.Hare's conception),to decide:in such-and-suchcircumstancesone oughtto procurethe judicial condemnationof the innocent.And that is my complaint. SomervilleCollege,Oxford. I Ethics,p.308. I9 This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Wed, 5 Feb 2014 22:09:18 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions