another look at crito

Citation: 41 Am. J. Juris. 103 1996

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ANOTHER LOOK AT THE CRITO

PHIIP SOPER

I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE PUZZLE OF THE Crito

If we measured the difficulty of a text by the conflictinginterpretations it inspired, the Crito would qualify as one of the leastcomprehensible of the Platonic dialogues. By any other measure, itis not clear why that should be so. The text is short and easy toread, and the argument seems relatively straightforward. No mythsrequire interpretation, no allegories veil hidden meanings, no subtledialectical distinctions obscure the discussion. The dialogue couldalmost pass for a contemporary treatment of the problem of politicalobligation except that the context makes the discussion anything butacademic: Socrates will go to his death, despite the chance for escapeoffered by his friend, if he decides that he is morally obligated toobey the law.

The surface simplicity of the text supports the conclusion that thepuzzle of the Crito-the puzzle that generates the conflictingcommentary-is one of appreciation rather than comprehension. Howis it possible for Socrates to have held views about the basis andextent of political obligation so at variance with modern views? It isnot just that Socrates seems to accept and act on an almost unlimitedduty to obey the law, however unjust; more puzzling is why he actsas he does. The reasons he gives for his action, in the famous speechof the Laws, embrace each of the three major arguments for politicalobligation-consent, fair play, and the harmful consequences ofdisobedience-that are familiar today, mainly as examples of badarguments: none of these arguments are thought today to establisha general obligation to obey the law.'

1. For two, widely cited contemporary discussions of the obligation to obeythe law, see A.J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (1979); andM.B.E. Smith, "Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?," 82 YaleL.J. (1973), p. 950. Each of these authors concludes that classical arguments fromconsent, fair play, and consequentialism fail to ground even a prima facie duty toobey law. See also J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1988), p. 97 (the claim thatthere is a general obligation to obey the law has "been refuted by various writersin recent years"). For the contrary view, see Soper, "The Moral Value of Law,"84 Michigan L. Rev. (1985), p. 63.

104 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE (1996)

B. INTERPRETING VENERABLE TEXTS

In this essay, I defend an interpretation of the Crito that supportsthe claim Socrates makes concerning the universal moral force oflaw-an interpretation that does not, however, rely on the dubiousarguments advanced by the Laws. In offering this interpretation, Iconfess to some doubt about the point of continuing to argue aboutthe meaning of venerable texts. I am also aware that it is not alwayseasy to distinguish "interpreting" a text from simply using the textas a pretext for expounding one's own views. But this essay is notabout "interpretation," and so I shall say no more about that thanthis: First, I concede at the outset that the interpretation I offer hereis "personal" in the sense that it reflects my own views about thebest argument that can be made for the moral force of the State.At the same time, however, I defend the view developed here as an"interpretation" of the Crito on the ground that it is more consistentin many respects with the text than other, standard interpretationsin the existing literature. These remarks will, I hope, become clearerafter a brief review of some of the major attempts to "reconcile"the Crito with modern views.2

II. STANDARD INTERPRETATIONSA. "EXPLAINING AWAY" WHAT THE LAWS SAY

Most contemporary explanations of the Crito, uncomfortable withthe endorsement of a broad duty to obey law,3 distinguish what

2. I make no attempt here to cite, much less summarize, the extensive com-mentary on the Crito. (A computer search of the Philosopher's Index under theterm "Crito" will quickly generate abstracts of more than 30 articles since 1940.)For a listing of representative samples from this literature see Weinrib, "Obedienceto the Law in Plato's Crito," 27 Am. J. Juris. (1982), p. 85, 86 (listing 21 recentdiscussions).

3. The duty to obey has two dimensions: The scope of the duty refers to thefrequency with which obligations arise just because of the law. A broad scopeimplies that all laws, or almost all, create moral duties to obey. The force of theduty refers to the strength of the resulting obligation. The duty may be universalin scope, but weak in force-capable of being easily outweighed by countervailingduties. This view accords with the common suggestion that the duty is prima facieonly.

I am mostly concerned in this paper, as Socrates is in the Crito, with the scopeof the duty: if the Crito is taken at face value, the scope is very broad indeed,maybe universal. It is important to remember that establishing such a broad dutyis consistent with admitting that the duty can be outweighed on occasion by othermoral duties. Conscientious citizens who think the duty is universal in scope, butmay be outweighed in appropriate cases, will reveal a significant difference in theirpractical deliberations when compared to those who think that law does not imposeeven a prima facie duty to obey: the former will need to "justify" a decision todisobey in a way that would not be necessary if law imposed no moral duty toobey. See generally "The Moral Value of Law, pp. 66-69.

PHILIP SOPER

Socrates does from what he says. In the language of the lawyer,viewing the dialogue as if it were a judicial opinion, one distinguishesthe "holding" from the various "dicta" that appear in therationalization of that holding. Here are some common examples:

1. THE PRUDENTIAL EXPLANATION

The minimum "holding" that is necessary to explain Socrates'action is that he does no moral wrong in choosing to obey the lawby drinking the hemlock; Socrates' further claim that he is morallyobligated to take such action is dictum.

This interpretation, which I shall call the "prudential" explanation,begins at the right point: the claim that what one does is morallypermissible is the minimum claim implied in the action of anyconscientious agent. Socrates must explicitly make at least this claimbecause Crito, at the outset, raises the possibility that Socrates'failure to escape might itself be immoral (you do wrong to abandonyour children or to aid your enemies [54d]). 4 In responding to thischallenge, Socrates, according to the prudential explanation, goesfurther than is necessary to ward off Crito's suggestion. The decisionto drink the hemlock is not morally wrong (as Crito suggests), butneither is it morally required (as Socrates suggests). Either action-escape or compliance with the law-is morally permissible, and thusSocrates' choice between these morally neutral alternatives can bejustified on purely prudential or non-moral grounds.5

One advantage of this view is that it helps explain Socrates'apparent concern in the dialogue with his own reputation. 6 Thatconcern, seemingly out of place if a serious moral issue were at

4. All references in the text are to the standard page and paragraph numbersof the Crito. For quoted passages, I have used the translation by Tredennick in TheCollected Dialogues of Plato (E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, eds. 1961). I do notbelieve that the interpretation I develop here depends on which translation is used,though I can appreciate that other interpretations, more dependent on the preciselanguage of the text, might. See R. Kraut, Socrates and the State (1984) p. 57 n.10 (suggesting a critical difference created by a mistake in Tredennick's translation).

5. The conclusion that no moral issue is at stake also requires one to assumethat Socrates is not choosing to commit suicide or, at any rate, that such a choiceinvolves no moral issue. For Socrates' views on suicide (which help support theconclusion that the "amoral" interpretation of the Crito should be rejected), seeThe Phaedo; for general discussion, see A. Woozley, Law and Obedience: TheArguments of Plato's Crito (1979) pp. 57-58; Horowitz, "The Morality of Suicide,"3 J. of Critical Analysis (1972), p. 161.

6. As discussed below, the Laws taunt Socrates (53d) with the claim that hewill suffer ridicule and humiliation if he escapes-an argument that Socrates seemsto take seriously. See text at note 29 infra.


stake, is fully appropriate if only prudential considerations areinvolved. Socrates, after all, is an old man. His life and reputationare largely behind him. Even if he does no wrong in escaping, manymay think that he does, and then "where will your discussions aboutgoodness and uprightness be?" (54d). Similarly, even if compliancewith the law is not morally obligatory, many may think that it is-after all, even Socrates seems to think it is. Under this interpretation,then, Socrates, however unwittingly, caps his career in martyr-likefashion by acting on apparent principle, reaping rewards for hisreputation that far exceed any personal benefits that might attendlife in exile. He made, in short, the right decision (on prudentialgrounds), but for the wrong reasons (the moral reasons suggested bythe Laws).

If the goal of the prudential explanation is to find a way ofinterpreting the Crito without endorsing that dialogue's broad viewof political obligation, the best one can say is that the explanationsucceeds by half. It certainly avoids endorsing the Crito's views onpolitical obligation, but only by abandoning any plausible claim tostill count as an "interpretation" of the text. The prudentialexplanation requires one to consign most of the dialogue, includingall of the Laws' speech, to dicta. It also leaves Socrates in theposition of either completely misunderstanding the issue himself ordeliberately misleading Crito and subsequent readers. These featuresmake one reluctant to accept the explanation as the best interpretationof the text, however sympathetic one may be with the generalconclusion.

2. DISTINGUISHING THE PARTICULAR FROM THE GENERAL

A second strategy for limiting the scope of the duty to obey inthe Crito is the argument that the Laws' claims are overbroad: theyapply at best to Socrates' own particular circumstances, but they donot establish a general obligation on the part of all citizens to obey. 7

This explanation is easier to defend than the preceding one anddoes considerably less violence to the text. It also fits comfortablywith the views of many modern theorists who are skeptical aboutthe scope of law's moral force. The contemporary skepticism is not

7. For interpretations of the Crito that rely on this distinction between thegeneral obligation to obey all laws, and the particular obligation that Socrates maybe under, see G. Vlastos, "Socrates on Political Obedience and Disobedience," 63Yale Review (1974), p. 517; Dyson, "The Structure of the Laws' Speech in Plato'sCrito," 28 Classical Quarterly (1978), pp. 427-36.

PHILIP SOPER

about the possibility that some people might, for example, cbnsentto obey the law; rather, the skepticism is about the ability of anargument from consent to generate an obligation to obey on the partof most citizens: most citizens simply do not consent, tacitly orotherwise.

As applied, however, to Socrates' particular position in the societyof fifth-century B.C. Athens, each of the theories advanced by theLaws plausibly grounds a prima facie obligation for him to obey.Thus, Socrates may well have assumed special roles and positions inAthens that make the inference of consent in his case more plausiblethan in the case (ridiculed by Hume) of someone who has simplyrefused to leave the country.' And the special benefits Socrates mayhave derived from his position could generate a duty of fair play,requiring him to obey the law, even if no such duty applies toordinary citizens who enjoy no special privileges or roles. 9 Finally,though most philosophers today reject the argument that disobediencewill always have worse consequences than obedience, in the case ofone as prominent as Socrates in a community as small and close asthe Athens of this period, it is not so easy to quarrel with the Laws'concern that Socrates' example could lead to a general disregard forState authority whose consequent bad effects would outweigh thebenefits of escape. 10

The above interpretation, in short, preserves much of the dialogue'scentral thrust by accepting Socrates' claim that he is morally obligatedto obey the law as well as the central arguments of the Laws. Theinterpretation also receives some support in the speech of the Laws,where repeated reference is made to special arrangements and benefitsbetween Socrates and the State. Still, it must be admitted that theexplanation requires one to ignore dicta that suggest, under any fairreading, that the reach of the moral claim is not intended to belimited to Socrates alone. The duty to obey may have special weightin his case, but the scope of the duty extends to all. Socrates,

8. Compare Hume, "Of the Original Contract," in David Hume's PoliticalEssays (H. Hendel, ed. 1953), p. 51, with Crito 52b: "[T]here are few people inAthens who have entered into this agreement with [the Laws] as explicitly as Ihave."

9. For the suggestion that a duty to obey the law may exist for those whoaccept special roles and benefits within a legal system, but not for citizens generally,see Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), pp. 113-16.

10. See, e.g., Farrell, "Illegal Actions, Universal Maxims, and the Duty to Obeythe Law: The Case for Civil Authority in the 'Crito'," 6 Pol. Theory (1978), p.173.


certainly, does not suggest otherwise to Crito; if anything, the senseis the opposite-these arguments of the Laws apply to subjectseverywhere, and Crito, as well as Socrates, is supposed to acknowledgetheir force."

3. REDEFINING SOCRATES' ACTION

Those who advance the preceding explanations assume that whatSocrates does is obey an unjust law; they then purport to show thatthe reasons for his action do not entail a general prima facieobligation to obey all such laws. The current explanation disputesthe description of what Socrates does. The typical case in whichunjust laws raise serious questions about the duty to obey are thosein which an injustice is about to be done to someone else: the lawcommands one to participate in an unjust war, or the law givesprivileges to one group that are unjustly denied to another and, inprotest, one disobeys that law or some other law. In Socrates' case,however, the only "victim" of the unjust sentence is himself. Bychoosing to comply with the sentence, Socrates need not be seen asendorsing an obligation to obey the law at the expense of doinginjustice to others. Even if one thinks that Socrates has "duties tohimself;" such duties, arguably, are weaker than duties to others.Thus, the fact that Socrates chooses to follow the law rather thanpreserve his own life has little or no precedential value with respectto more typical clashes between law and morality.' 2

Like the preceding interpretation, this one too is likely to find asympathetic modern audience. Those who argue for the morality ofcivil disobedience in appropriate cases so long as the civil disobedientis willing to accept the punishment for the act,' 3 will observe that

11. Among the passages that suggest the obligation is universal, rather thanlimited to Socrates, are those that rely on the mere fact that Socrates has hadchildren or received an education in the State, as well as the rather bluntly statedclaim that failure to leave the country is tantamount to agreeing to obey:

[Ilf any of you stands his ground [instead of leaving the state] when he cansee how we administer justice and the rest of our public organization, we holdthat by so doing he has in fact undertaken to do anything that we tell him.And we maintain that anyone who disobeys is guilty of doing wrong ... (51e).

12. For examples of this interpretation, stressing the distinction between doinginjustice and suffering injustice, see R.E. Allen, "Law and Justice in Plato's Crito,"69 J. of Phil. (1972), p. 557; Wade, "In Defense of Socrates," 25 Rev. ofMetaphysics (1971), pp. 311-25; Bertram, "Socrates' Defense of Civil Obedience,"24 Studium Generale (1971), pp. 576-82. For criticisms of the interpretation, seeMomeyer, "Socrates on Obedience and Disobedience to the Law," 8 PhilosophyResearch Archives (1982), pp. 21, 42-43.

13. See, e.g., A Theory of Justice, p. 366.

PHILIP SOPER

the interpretation not only accords with that view; it also offers hopeof reconciling the Apology and the Crito. Socrates, after all, is undersentence of death because he refuses at his trial to cease hisphilosophizing-refuses, that is, to obey the law. Now, however, heaccedes to the judgment and accepts the legal consequences of thatrefusal. So interpreted, the Crito is not about the duty to obey atall, but about the duty to accept the legal consequences of civildisobedience.' 4

Unfortunately, this explanation once again ignores a good deal ofwhat the text actually says. The speech of the Laws is unambiguouslyaddressed to the duty to do whatever the State says, not simply theduty to accede to the punishment when one disobeys. 5 That, at least,is the fairest reading if one takes the Laws' speech at face value,and it is this reading that leads some to conclude that Socrates issimply inconsistent in what he says here and elsewhere.16

4. INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS WITHIN THE CRITO

One final explanation of the Crito deserves mention because it isoften made and because it will figure again in the present essay. Thisexplanation skirts the problem of reconciling what Socrates does withwhat he says by denying, in essence, that he "says" any one thing.The most frequently encountered such argument focuses on the"persuade or obey" language which appears on more than oneoccasion in the dialogue: Socrates' duty is not to obey simpliciter,but to "persuade or obey."'' 7 At one extreme, this might mean that

14. See, e.g., Law and Obedience The Arguments of Plato's Crito, pp. 56-58(discussing Wade, "In Defense of Socrates," 15 Rev. of Metaphysics (1971).

15. The Laws do, at times, refer to the duty to accept one's punishment, but inthe same passage indicate that the duty extends to other acts commanded by thelaw as well:

Do you not realize that . if you cannot persuade your country you must dowhatever it orders, and patiently submit to any punishment that it imposes,whether it be flogging or imprisonment? And if it leads you out to war, to bewounded or killed, you must comply, and it is right that you should do so.You must not give way or retreat or abandon your position. Both in war andin the law courts and everywhere else you must do whatever your city and yourcountry command, or else persuade them in accordance with universal justice.... (51c).

16. See Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato's Crito, p. 60; James,"Socrates on Civil Disobedience," 11 So. J. of Phil. (1973), p. 119; "Socrates onObedience and Disobedience to the Law."

17. One version of the "persuade or obey" language is not that it is inconsistentwith other arguments for obedience in the Crito, but that it is the argument ofSocrates and thus the most "consistent" interpretation of the dialogue. See, e.g.,Socrates and the State.


Socrates can continue to disobey as long as he thinks that he may,in the end, eventually persuade the State to change its mind and itslaws ("obey or keep-on-trying-to-persuade-while-disobeying").' 8

Somewhat less extreme is the view that Socrates may disobey a lawand later try to persuade the court at the trial or sentencing stagethat the law is unjust, failing which, Socrates must then and onlythen submit to the punishment. This latter view collapses, in substance,to the previous one: citizens do no wrong in disobeying laws theysincerely believe to be unjust so long as they submit to the punishmentif they fail subsequently to persuade courts to let them off.' 9

I suppose that if Socrates (Plato) had been accustomed to the waysof modern logicians in guarding against the ambiguities of language(is the "or" in "persuade or obey" inclusive or exclusive?), he couldhave avoided the problems associated with this particular phrase. Onthe other hand, one may doubt that he would have substituted moreprecise language any more than modern writers, aware of latentambiguity, substitute wooden formulae for common sense, context,and natural language. The natural reading of the "persuade or obey"language is that Socrates, like any citizen in democratic Athens, mustrecognize that he has, at least, been given the opportunity to"persuade" the State that its laws should be changed or should notbe interpreted to apply to his case. 20 He is thus not totally withoutinput in the substantive debates about "justice" that determine thecontent of the State's laws, as he might be under an arbitrarydictatorship. 2' Having given him an opportunity for such input, the

18. of this interpretation, Woozley comments that:It is too easy, too permissive; it makes any disobedience at all to a lawlegitimate, only so long as it is a sincere and principled attempt to change theminds of those who have the authority to alter or repeal the law. A morallicense to break the law can hardly come at as low a price as that. Law andObedience: The Arguments of Plato's Crito, p. 32.

19. This interpretation seems to be Woozley's. See ibid., pp. 30-31. For thecontrary view, supporting the more "extreme" version, see Socrates and the State,pp. 76-77. For criticism of Kraut's view as "an end run around the 'obey' horn ofthe dilemma," see Luban, "Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King," 87Mich. L. Rev. (1989), pp. 2152, 2208.

20. Luban describes this (modest) interpretation as:The unhelpful thought that the citizen may try to get a law changed or repealed,but if he fails he must obey. Since in practice one will seldom be able to get alaw repealed, this suggestion amounts to precisely the encomium to absoluteobedience. Ibid., p. 2208.

21. For the suggestion that Socrates had no chance to persuade the State or thecity, but, at best, only a chance to persuade his fellow citizens at his trial, see

PHILIP SOPER

State has done all that can be expected, and Socrates, having failedto "persuade," must obey.

There are other apparent inconsistencies within the dialogue, notablythe contrast between what the Laws say and what Socrates himselfsays when he first responds to Crito before the Laws appear. Becausethis contrast bears directly on the argument of this essay, I shallconsider it only after first introducing another approach to theproblem of interpreting the Crito that differs sharply from all of thepreceding approaches.

B. THE "RHETORICAL" INTERPRETATION: THE LAWS Do NOTSPEAK FOR SOCRATES

Despite their differences, all of the preceding examples are alikein one respect. Each assumes that the arguments made by the Lawsrepresent views that Socrates himself accepts. Operating under thisassumption, each interpretation suggests a way to justify and explainSocrates' decision without, however, similarly endorsing the Laws'broad claims of political obligation.

There is, however, another approach to explaining the Crito thathas recently received renewed attention in the literature, even thoughit remains to date a minority view. This approach, which has beencalled "the rhetorical interpretation," 22 does not view the Laws asspeaking for Socrates: the Laws are speaking for themselves, as anindependent character in the drama. Their arguments and views arenot necessarily arguments that Socrates himself accepts.

The rhetorical interpretation, of course, avoids entirely the problemof explaining how Socrates could endorse arguments from consent,fair play, and consequentialism that appeal to few today; but it doesso at the cost of introducing another problem: If the Laws' argumentsare not Socrates' arguments, then what is Socrates' theory about theextent and basis of political obligation? On this question, two recentadvocates of the rhetorical approach, Gary Young and Ernest

Young, "Socrates and Obedience," 19 Phronesis (1974), pp. 1. 21. Young's viewseems to require that "persuasion" be direct, almost confrontational. A more modestreading would require only the kind of participation, emphasized in democratictheory, that ensures that competing viewpoints are brought to light and fairlyconsidered before legislation is passed. See the additional discussion in the text atnotes 41-42, infra.

22. See Momeyer, pp. 22, 23.


Weinrib ,23 reach dramatically different conclusions. Young concludesthat Socrates does indeed accept a nearly universal duty to obeyevery law of the State-with the single possible exception of thecommand that Socrates give up philosophizing. 24 Weinrib, in contrast,gives the impression that Socrates' action can be explained withoutresolving the question of the extent and basis of the duty to obey,almost as if the decision rested entirely on non-moral grounds. 25

It is easy to see what the problem is. Having removed the obstacleof the Laws' weak explanation for the grounds and extent of theduty to obey, very little is left in the dialogue to provide a Socraticpolitical theory. Young simply announces a conclusion of politicaltheory that is, at least, consistent with Socrates' action and generalclaim-the duty to obey is nearly universal-but now there are noreasons (not even bad ones) to support that claim. Weinrib takes noposition-and ascribes none to Socrates-on the general question ofpolitical theory, explaining Socrates' decision instead in terms thatdo not involve the application of any general theory about the dutyto obey the law. The result is that the dialogue, with the core politicaltheory removed, hardly seems to be about the obligation to obey thelaw at all but about something else-friendship, perhaps, or how to

23. In this paper, I focus mainly on the interpretations offered by Gary Youngand Ernest Weinrib; see, "Socrates and Obedience"; "Obedience to the Law inPlato's Crito." Both papers are examples of the "rhetorical" interpretation. SeeMomeyer, ibid., (identifying Young's article as the "seminal" piece in the category).Of course, long before Young's article, skepticism about the relationship betweenthe Law's views and Plato's own views had been expressed. See G. Grote, Platoand the Other Companions of Socrates (1885), pp. 428-34 (arguing that the Laws'speech was invented by Plato to give a better press for Socrates). Nor are Youngand Weinrib the only recent commentators to argue for the rhetorical approach.See Quandt, "Socratic Consolation: Rhetoric and Philosophy in Plato's 'Crito,"'15 Phil. Rhet. (1982), pp. 238, 252 n.4 (listing at least five other recent commentatorsin this category, of whom only Young argues that the Laws' views are actuallycontradictory to Socrates' own). See also J.B. White, Acts of Hope (1994), ch. 1,and pp. 310-11 (endorsing Weinrib's general approach, while offering a differentexplanation of the point of Socrates' attempt to reconcile Crito to his decision).

24. "Socrates and Obedience," pp. 28-29.25. See "Obedience to the Law in Plato's Crito," p. 108:

[T]he expectation of the many that Socrates would flee was the very factorwhich made flight impossible. The many would see in Socrates' escape, not thejudgment of the moral expert but the verification of their own assumption thatself-interest has priority over law.

Compare this explanation with the discussion in part II (A) (1) of this essay:Socrates' action can be explained in terms of his own prudential interest in preservinghis reputation, rather than as an instance of fulfilling a moral duty to obey the law.See also note 35, infra.

PHILIP SOPER

help a friend accept the distressing news of the decision to choosedeath over the viable alternative of escape. 26

In the remainder of this essay, I follow the lead of those whosuggest that the Crito is best understood by not ascribing to Socratesthe Laws' arguments for the duty to obey. I propose, however, tofill the gap that results by showing how the Crito, even under thisapproach, remains first and foremost a dialogue about the obligationto obey the law. I also suggest a different explanation from the oneadvanced by both Young and Weinrib for why Socrates makes theLaws appear to speak for him. Socrates is not resorting to the onlyexplanation (knowing it to be false) that he thinks Crito willunderstand. Rather, Socrates is illustrating in the speech of the Laws(rather than expressing through that speech) his theory of politicalobligation. The reason Socrates has a duty to obey is not becausethe arguments of the Laws are correct, but because the Laws sincerelybelieve they are correct. The duty to obey the law is an instance ofa general duty to respect the sincere beliefs, however erroneous, ofcertain persons in certain contexts. Which persons, which contexts?The Crito illustrates the two most plausible answers: in the case offriends, and in the case of the State, what counts is not only whatis right, but also what one's friends and lawmakers think is right.

III. USE AND MISUSE OF THE RHETORICAL INTERPRETATION

A. SUPPORT FOR THE RHETORICAL INTERPRETATION

The evidence for the rhetorical interpretation is both stylistic andsubstantive. The stylistic evidence begins with the oddity of havingthe Laws appear just at the critical stage in the argument. Manycommentators have noted that the Crito is unusual in this respect,and some have concluded that this is just a rare example of Socrateshimself giving the answers instead of leading the participant to"discover" them.27 But this view-that Socrates is answering-his ownquestion-ignores the fact that it is not literally Socrates who answers,but the personified Laws. The dialogue is, in short, at least two steps

26. For a similar explanation, see Acts of Hope, pp. 36-37, 311 (the Critoactually has little or nothing to say about the authority of the law; its subject is,instead, "the meaning of Socrates' situation"-his life, his death, as evidenced inpart by the kind of friendship Socrates manifests here toward Crito.)

27. For an example of the easy assumption that the Laws are simply Socrates'way of giving his own answers, see Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato'sCrito, p. 4.


removed from other dialogues in eliminating the role of both theparticipant and Socrates in responding to the issue at hand. To thisdoubly unusual manner of proceeding, add the jarring impressioncreated by the emotionally charged speech of the Laws and theconclusion seems easy: it just does not sound like Socrates. No onehas made the point better than Professor Vlastos:

[I]n a curious act of self-abnegation-an act without parallel inthe Platonic corpus- [Socrates] yields the floor to a majesticsurrogate, the personified "Laws and Community" of Athens,and they go on to deliver so unsocratic a speech that George Grotecalled it a "discourse of venerated commonplaces." There is nodialectic here; no definition of terms, no facing up to obscuritiesand perplexities, no consideration of counter-examples. Time andagain we see the diction running to hyperbole and the thoughtblown about by gusts of feeling. 2

Almost as noticeable as the stylistic shift when the Laws appearare the substantive changes in the arguments the Laws make comparedto what Socrates says in his initial reply to Crito. Socrates beginsthe dialogue by reminding Crito that what counts in moral mattersis what is right rather than what people might think. In contrast,the speech of the Laws relies in at least two respects on what peoplemight think. First, the Laws taunt Socrates repeatedly with the claimthat Socrates' reputation-what others will think of him-will sufferif Socrates escapes. 29 Second, despite casting their argument in generalphilosophic terms (consent, fair play, consequences of disobedience),the Laws rely heavily on appeals to Socrates not to turn on hisguardians and "true friends" (the State).3 0

28. "Socrates on Political Obedience and Disobedience," p. 519; quoted in"Obedience to the Law in Plato's Crito," pp. 28,102.

29. "And will no one comment on the fact that an old man of your age,probably with only a short time left to live, should dare to cling so greedily to life,at the price of violating the most stringent laws? Perhaps not, if you avoid irritatinganyone. Otherwise, Socrates, you will hear a good many humiliating comments. Soyou will live as the toady and slave of all the populace, literally 'roistering inThessaly,' as if you had left this country for Thessaly to attend a banquet there.And where will your discussions about goodness and uprightness be then, we shouldlike to know?" 53d-54a.

30. Young and Weinrib both build on this latter fact to suggest that the Lawsare primarily urging obedience, not on the high ground of philosophic principle,but on the very appeal to the opinion of the many that characterizes Crito's owninitial arguments. Whether Young and Weinrib are correct in this explanation is lesscritical at this point (it will be critical in the next section) than the one point onwhich I agree with both Young and Weinrib: the Laws are speaking for themselves,not (necessarily) for Socrates. But see Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato'sCrito, p. 29 (mentioning Young's thesis, but dismissing it without discussion as"implausible").

PHILIP SOPER

The stylistic and substantive evidence for the rhetorical interpretationseems to me fairly strong, even though the only way to convinceoneself of that conclusion is by re-reading and confronting thedialogue in its entirety. Reading the dialogue with this interpretationin mind makes the Laws' appearance very much like the appearanceof a new, third character in the drama; Socrates stands apart fromthat character in both what he says and how he says it. As any goodplaywright might, Socrates (Plato) leaves the audience to decide howto fit together the views of Crito, the Laws, and Socrates. That the"moral" of the drama should prove to be the literal claim about thebasis for political obligation shrilly voiced by one of the actors is,at best, only one of several possible conclusions; aesthetically it isthe least pleasing interpretation, the least consistent with the seriousnessof the issue and the attempt of a good playwright to make theaudience feel the point, as well as simply hear it announced.

B. MISUSE OF THE RHETORICAL INTERPRETATION

It is one thing to show that the Laws speak for themselves, ratherthan for Socrates. It is another to show how this view of the dialoguehelps one understand the Crito. Why might Socrates put into themouths of the Laws arguments he did not himself accept, and whywould he invite Crito, apparently, to think that he does endorsethose arguments?

Young and Weinrib give essentially identical answers to thisquestion:3' Crito, who lacks great intelligence or philosophicalsophistication, would be incapable of understanding the true,philosophical principles that explain why Socrates must obey the law.

31. Young's claim that Crito cannot be expected to understand the true principlesbehind Socrates' action is the central argument of his essay. See "Socrates andObedience," p. 6, passim. Weinrib's thesis is virtually identical to Young's. (Inter-estingly, Weinrib does not acknowledge the similarity of his argument to Young's,nor does he credit Young with the thesis. His sole reference to Young's article occursin an initial "string cite," listing some 21 recent discussions of the Crito. See"Obedience to the Law in Plato's Crito"). Weinrib's main addition to Young'sthesis consists of a somewhat clearer account of the connection between the kindof arguments the Laws are making (a version of the opinion of the many) and thekind of argument that Crito can be expected to understand. Both scholars reachthe same conclusion concerning Socrates' motivation: Socrates wants to persuadehis friend to accept his action and is more worried about Crito's feelings than aboutgiving Crito the true philosophic explanation. In contrast, J.B. White's suggestionis less condescending and more appealing: the reason Socrates casts his response inthe speech of the Laws in the same terms as Crito (the voice of the many) is not"to give arguments of a lesser kind to a person of lesser capacity ... [but] to movehim to the point where the issue disappears." Ibid., p. 311.


Therefore Socrates, whose main concern is to reconcile his friend tohis death, makes the Laws advance an argument in terms that Critocan understand-the opinion of the many. Crito, after all, began hisown entreaty with arguments that were no doubt popular among theunsophisticated: friends, and the preservation of one's own life, aremore important than obeying the orders of the State, particularly ifone can easily escape the penalty. Instead of explaining why thisunreflective, common view must yield to higher philosophicalreasoning, Socrates decides to argue from the same "popular"viewpoint, but manages now to make the argument yield the oppositeconclusion: the State is the larger "friend" to whom Socrates owesloyalty, and Socrates' self-interest (in terms of his reputation) lies incomplying with the wishes of this particular Friend. Crito is hoistwith his own petard:

The Laws are not engaging in a philosophic critique of Crito'sposition. They are rather stretching the values revealed in Crito'sspeech so as to secure for themselves priority over the moreentrenched relationships of friendship and family. The Laws areclaiming that they are the ultimate and fundamental friends, thatthey are in the relationship which is the sine qua non of the morefamiliar relationships, that they are truly those who ought least tobe harmed.32

If the suggestion that the Laws are not speaking for Socratesseemed plausible, this suggestion about what Socrates is up to doesnot. So many objections spring to mind it is difficult to know whereto begin. Perhaps the most obvious objection is that the image thatresults of Socrates' relationship to Crito is so condescending andpatronizing that it is almost a parody of, rather than a paean to,friendship. 33

Second, there is no reason to think that Crito is any less sophisticatedthan other participants in other Platonic dialogues who do not,because of their unsophistication, get watered-down Socratic treatment.Socrates may well have believed that only "experts," and philosophersat that, can penetrate to ultimate truth, but that view never led himto treat participants in other dialogues as unworthy of even theattempt at enlightenment. Indeed the point of many such dialoguesis to show even the unsophisticated that "the unexamined life" is

32. "Obedience to the Law in Plato's Crito," p. 104.33. See "Socrates' Defense of Civil Obedience," p. 25. But see "Socratic

Consolation: Rhetoric and Philosophy in Plato's 'Crito'," pp. 248-49 (suggestingthat the apparent condescension to Crito is tempered by an interpretation that seesSocrates also being consoled at the end by the rhetoric of the Laws).

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not worth living. It is hard to believe that the emotion that surroundsSocrates' impending death is so great that Crito must be treateddifferently in this respect from Euthyphro, Laches, or Ion.34

Third, the suggestion that the Laws are only giving voice to theinstinctive reactions of the crowd overlooks the major thrust of theLaws' speech. The Laws do give philosophical arguments-the samephilosophical arguments (consent, fair play, consequences ofdisobedience) that have dominated political theory ever since. Theyjust happen to be (many think) flawed arguments. That they areflawed arguments, incapable of grounding a universal duty to obey,may be a reason for disagreeing with the Laws; it is not a reasonfor charging the Laws with appealing solely to the opinion of themany, urging pursuit of one's own prudential interest in aiding friendsand harming enemies.

Fourth, the proffered interpretation explains Socrates' motives inmisleading Crito, but gives no explanation for the true reasons forhis decision. Why does Socrates drink the hemlock? What does hethink about the scope of the duty to obey? If the answers to thesequestions are not those advanced by the Laws, then Socrates, afterhis initial insistence that what counts is what is right, has yet toexplain what is right. With no explanation for the critical decision,one can only guess whether Socrates really means what he seems tosay about the duty to obey being almost universal, or whether he isgoing along With the death sentence for other, perhaps prudential,reasons."

34. This point is made with considerable force in R. McLaughlin, "Socrates onPolitical Disobedience: A Reply to Gary Young," 21 Phronesis (1976), pp. 185,188. See also Congleton, "Two Kinds of Lawlessness: Plato's Crito," 2 Pol. Theory(1974), pp. 432-46 (arguing for a rhetorical interpretation of the Laws' speech thatexaggerates their moral authority for Crito in light of a variety of defects in Crito'scharacter).

35. As noted earlier, Young concludes that Socrates endorses a nearly universalobligation, though the reasons for that position are not to be found in the Crito.Weinrib seems to think that the dialogue is mostly about friendship, not politicalobligation, and that Socrates is really acting out of recognition that his escape willbe misconstrued:

The many would see in Socrates' escape not the judgment of the moral expertbut the verification of their own assumption that self-interest has priority overlaw .... Only through obedience to the law could Socrates secure the futureof philosophical reflection on justice. Only the self-abnegation involved indeciding to remain in prison and drink the hemlock could bring home thesignificance of the enterprise on which Socrates was engaged. Otherwise Socrates'accomplishment would have been washed over and absorbed by the traditionalconceptions of excellence which he was seeking to transform. "Obedience tothe Law in Plato's Crito," p. 108.


Finally, in addition to the condescension shown toward Crito, theproffered interpretation portrays a Socrates acting inconsistently withmuch that he stands for elsewhere. Socrates at the end of his lifebecomes, under this view, the master rhetorician, able to use thetechniques of persuasion to accomplish whatever ends seemappropriate. He attends to Crito's grief as a parent might to achild's, telling stories that dispel the fear but avoid the truth. 36 Havingspent so much of his life resisting this art of the rhetorician's,Socrates now goes to his death reconciling Crito by abandoning hisprinciples.17 If the point of drinking the hemlock was to ward offthe popular misconception that he would simply be saving his ownskin by escaping, the proffered interpretation suggests that Socratesmade a mistake: his reputation as standing for principle must giveway when one sees what he is in fact doing. In short, if the profferedinterpretation is correct, better that we had never chanced upon it,for it sullies Socrates' reputation in exactly the way that led him todissemble in the first place.

Again, it is easy to see what has happened. The stylistic andsubstantive arguments for concluding that Socrates wants readers todistinguish his views from the specific arguments advanced by theLaws are so persuasive that one is inclined to seek any explanation,however weak, to explain why the Laws speak at all. If Socratesdoes not subscribe to the content of the Laws' speech, he must beusing the speech only rhetorically. Since he is obviously concernedabout his friend Crito, what other explanation is there but the oneoffered: this is a device to help console, not to help educate, hisfriend.

But there is another explanation, one that avoids most of theproblems of the current one. Moreover, it is an explanation thatboth takes seriously what Socrates seems to say about the universalscope of the duty to obey and preserves the central thrust of the

36. This conclusion is explicitly embraced by one commentator who actuallydraws an analogy to Socrates' prescription in the Phaedo of a lullaby for childrenwho are plagued by dreams of hobgoblins. See "Socratic Consolation: Rhetoric andPhilosophy in Plato's 'Crito'," p. 248.

37. This particular criticism of the standard "rhetorical" interpretation is per-suasively developed by "Socrates on Obedience and Disobedience to the Law," p.25. For a brief and insightful explanation of Socrates' antagonism toward rhetoricbecause of its indifference to truth, see Kronman, "Foreword: Legal Scholarshipand Moral Education," 90 Yale L.J. (1981), pp. 955, 959-61 (discussing the relevanceof Socrates' hostility to rhetoric, as illustrated in the Gorgias, to the training of lawstudents in the art of advocacy).

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dialogue as an explanation of the grounds of that duty. Since theexplanation cannot be the one offered by the Laws who, I amassuming, do not speak for Socrates, and since Socrates himselfoffers none other explicitly, the explanation must be illustrated bythe dialogue as a whole. The answer to Crito's initial appeal "I willlose a friend" and the answer to the question "Why should I obeythe law?" are both revealed in the drama, rather than stated in thespeeches of any of the participants. Moreover, they are in structurethe same answer. To that we now turn.

IV. A NEW INTERPRETATION

A. TRUTH AND OPINION

The central intellectual puzzle of the Crito that underlies many ofthe above interpretations is the clash between mere opinion andmoral truth. Socrates stands for and defends the latter, while theLaws, it is claimed, rely heavily on the former.

What if, however, Socrates were not quite so hostile to the opinionsof others as the preceding interpretations assume? Suppose that whatSocrates wanted to demonstrate in the Crito is that the right thingto do is sometimes determined, at least in part, by the opinions ofothers: that those opinions, reached in a good faith effort to discovermoral truth, deserve respect in a sense that requires one to weighthem and the action they counsel against one's own view about whatis right.38 If this were the case, the opinions of others about what isright would create countervailing, prima facie duties to act in accordwith those opinions, even if the opinions were wrong as measuredby one's own assessment of moral truth. Where the action counseledby others is sufficiently unjust, the prima facie duty presumablywould be outweighed, but at least we would now have a plausiblebasis for understanding, in this prima facie sense, the claim aboutthe universal obligation to obey the law.

Note that if this interpretation is plausible, it solves virtually allof the problems just discussed in the preceding section. (I considerin the next section some of the new problems created by this view.)First, the lesson of the Crito is one that is offered to Crito for hisunderstanding, just as much as it is offered to the more philosophically

38. I do not mean simply that one takes opposing views into account as a wayof considering whether one's own views are correct. That much is easy. I mean tomake the stronger claim that even if one is sure about the "right" action, the law,even if mistaken, creates a countervailing duty. The "right" action in the ultimatesense will be the action that survives the balancing of these conflicting duties.


sophisticated reader of the dialogue. In both cases, to be sure, thelesson must be inferred from the drama, rather than simply pickedout of the mouth of one of the actors, but that still leaves Crito inthe same position as any other reader of the dialogue-there is noneed for condescension.

Second, since Crito under this view is being offered the samechance as anyone else to understand Socrates' true explanation forthe grounds of political obligation, we avoid the need to explain whySocrates would make Crito the one exception to his usual tactic oftreating participants as capable of handling the truth. The truth hereis presented indirectly for reasons, discussed below, that do not applyto Crito alone.

Third, we are no longer in the embarrassing position of concludingthat the Crito, which purports to be about political obligation,actually has nothing to say about the matter; the dialogue does havesomething to say about the extent and ground of the duty to obeythe law, though it says it indirectly-as good dramas often do-rather than directly.

Fourth, this interpretation no longer ignores the central argumentsmade by the Laws. Instead of characterizing the Laws as simply thevoice of the many, we recognize that the Laws are trying to advancephilosophical arguments that many people, even today, continue totake geriously. The arguments may, in the end, fail to satisfy modernphilosophers, but at least they are capable of filling the role assignedto them in the current interpretation: these arguments are standard,common arguments for the duty to obey, supporting the conclusionthat their proponents-in this case the Laws-are sincerely andplausibly claiming a moral right to allegiance, rather than resting thedemand for obedience on power alone.

Finally, there is the matter of Socrates' general approach to moralinquiry in the Crito compared to his approach in other dialogues. IfSocrates means to suggest that the Laws deserve obedience, in part,because of their sincere attempt to act justly, however wrong theState's laws (or arguments) may be in fact, we rescue the dialoguefrom the view that Socrates is engaged in the art of persuasion forits own sake and restore it to what it purports to be: a sketch of asubstantive political theory. On the other hand, many will objectthat it is even more inconsistent with Socrates' general position inother dialogues-as well as with what he says here-to suggest thatmere opinion can ever displace "truth" in moral inquiry. Becausethis objection points to what is, no doubt, the most troublesomeaspect of the present interpretation, most of the rest of this essaywill be devoted to it.

PHILIP SOPER

B. EVIDENCE FOR THE NEW INTERPRETATION

1. TEXTUAL SUPPORT

I begin again with stylistic or textual evidence for the possibilityunder consideration: that Socrates sometimes permits the opinionsof others, even when false, to play a role in moral decision. For thispurpose, it will help to recall the basic structure of the dialogue.Crito has come to visit his imprisoned friend, bringing with him thebad news that the event that will set the time for Socrates' executionis only a day away. After an opening exchange in which Socratestells Crito of the dream he has just had,39 Crito explains that he caneasily arrange an escape; he then presents four arguments for whySocrates should take advantage of this chance:

(1) If Socrates does not escape, Crito will lose a friend;(2) If Socrates dies, Crito's reputation will suffer because eve-ryone will think that Crito could have saved him but didn't;(3) Socrates, by going to his death, will be achieving exactly theresult that his enemies want and thus be an accomplice to evilhimself;(4) Socrates has an obligation to preserve his life for the sake ofhis children.

Socrates responds in some form to each of these arguments exceptthe first: no reply to Crito's appeal from friendship appears. Thefact that the appeal from friendship is Crito's very first argumentmakes the failure to reply even more noticeable than might otherwisebe the case and provides an early hint that at least some of Socrates'responses to Crito are to be illustrated by the dialogue as a whole,rather than expressed within the dialogue.

Socrates' initial response to Crito consists of a lengthy reminderof what I shall call, for purposes of this essay, Socrates' "moralabsolutism"-what counts is not what people think, but what is infact right:

What we ought to consider is not so much what people in generalwill say about us but how we stand with the expert in right andwrong, the one authority who represents the actual truth (48a).

This reply is a response to Crito's concern for his own reputation.It is also a response to the argument that Socrates will be aiding hisenemies. If escaping is wrong, then it does not matter that Socrateshimself has been wronged or that his enemies will derive satisfaction

39. For an intriguing discussion of the relevance of the dream to an interpretationof the Crito see "Obedience to the Law in Plato's Crito," p. 2.


from his death, for "it is never right to do a wrong or return awrong or defend oneself against injury by retaliation . . . ." (49e).Finally, Socrates brushes aside Crito's appeal to consider his childrenalmost as if he viewed the argument as an appeal to Socrates' self-interest rather than to a moral duty;40 in any event, the answer hereis the same as the answer to the other two arguments: if it is wrongto disobey the law, then neither children nor life nor anything elsecan play a role in his decision (54b).

This review of the structure of the dialogue, though brief, providesevidence for the interpretation under consideration. Note that Socrates'initial response to Crito, in which he insists that what counts is whatis right, is in many ways at odds with much of the rest of thedialogue. In the first place, it is hard to understand why Socratesgoes on at such length with what is at best only the preface to thecritical question. The entire passage, which occupies almost as muchspace as the speech of the Laws, has something of the air of one"protesting too much," as if Socrates is himself uncomfortable withthe idea that the opinions of others never count.

Second, if opinions do not matter, why does Socrates even presentas a serious argument the Laws' repeated claims about his reputationif he escapes? If escaping is morally justified, why should he carethat the masses may ridicule him? If others fail to perceive that thedecision is justified on moral principles and mistakenly assume he issimply saving his skin, why not fall back confidently on the openingrefrain of his response to Crito (what we ought to consider is notwhat people will say but how we stand with regard to the actualtruth [48a]). That Socrates can even pretend to take seriously theconcern for what others will think if he escapes, after having firmlydeclared it to be irrelevant, suggests that maybe he is himself uncertainabout the strictness of his moral absolutism. Maybe, in some contexts,the opinions of others do count.

Third, recall again the one argument of Crito's that Socrates neveranswers: Crito will lose a friend. It is not hard to see Socratesreplying to this argument, not directly, but indirectly, illustratingthrough the course of the entire dialogue the form and content ofthe appropriate response to such an appeal. The answer to Crito'sappeal, I suggest, is this: Socrates will take Crito's opinion seriously,even if that opinion is wrong, and may even act against his own

40. For the suggestion that Socrates too casually dismisses the possible moralduty he owes his children, see Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato's Crito,pp. 10-11.

PHILIP SOPER

view of what is right if he cannot persuade Crito. Friends are in thesame position as the State, though for different reasons: their sincereopinions matter and must be given prima facie weight in moraldecisions that affect common interests.

Because this analogy to friendship is so important in the dialogue,it is worth pausing to identify separately those passages that supportthis interpretation. At least three passages lend weight to the currentsuggestion about how friends, with different opinions about seriousmoral issues, are to be treated:

(1) After Crito has pleaded his case, Socrates reaffirms the moralabsolutist's view that requires him "never to accept advice from anyof my friends unless reflection shows that it is the best course thatreason offers" (31b). At the same time, however, he admits thateven if Crito's strong feelings are not justified, the stronger thefeelings, the "harder to deal with" (ibid.). Several exchanges later,Socrates repeats this suggestion that his action may well depend, inpart, on Crito's opinion, even if that opinion is not justified:

Let us look at it together, my dear fellow; and if you can challengeany of my arguments, do so and I will listen to you; but if youcan't, be a good fellow and stop telling me over and over againthat I ought to leave this place without official permission. I amvery anxious to obtain your approval before I adopt the coursewhich I have in mind. I don't want to act against your convictions(48e).

(2) At the conclusion of the argument of the Laws Socrates doesnot say that what the Laws say is true; he says something else:

That, my dear friend Crito, I do assure you, is what I seem tohear them saying, just as a mystic seems to hear the strains ofmusic, and the sound of their arguments [emphasis added: note-not the truth of their arguments] rings so loudly in my head thatI cannot hear the other side (54d) . 4

41. The significance of this passage has been noted by others. Weinrib, forexample, focuses on the reference to mystics who are in a Corybantic frenzy andsuggests that the passage supports his interpretation in three respects: (1) Socratesis pointing to the status of the Laws as an hallucination; (2) Socrates is indirectlysuggesting that Crito's grief has made him, like the mystics, incapable of reasonand thus in need of the therapy administered by Socrates through the device of theLaws; (3) Socrates is indicating his own disagreement with the reasons offered bythe Laws. See "Obedience to the Law in Plato's Crito," p. 101. (A similar accountof this "Corybantic Consolation" may be found in "Socratic Consolation: Rhetoricand Philosophy in Plato's 'Crito'," pp. 248-52.) Only the last of Weinrib's sugges-tions is consistent with the interpretation offered here. Socrates is indicating that hedoes not necessarily agree with the reasons given by the Laws. But he is not


(3) Finally, Socrates turns back to Crito and the initial appeal tofriendship is indirectly confronted again:

I warn you that, as my opinion stands at present, it will be uselessto urge a different view. However, if you think that you will doany good by it, say what you like (54d).

Fortunately, Crito has nothing more to say-controlled in his responsejust at the crucial point in a manner familiar to readers of Platonicdialogues. Had Crito not been persuaded, is it so clear that Socrateswould have proceeded nonetheless to act on his own lights? Isn't itpossible that Socrates here illustrates the dilemma of one confrontedwith conflicting prima facie moral duties: he has moral responsibilitiesto his friend Crito not to "act against his convictions" even if thoseconvictions are wrong; he has similar duties to the State to obey itslaws, even if those laws are unjust. It may well be that this conflictwould still have been resolved in favor of the action Socrates took.The important point is that both duties share a similar structure andstand as sources of obligation independent of one's own view of thetruth of the matter.

A fourth source of textual support for the present interpretationis the notorious "persuade or obey" doctrine. Interpreted by someas a significant qualification on the absolute duty to obey, its morenatural interpretation is far weaker. "Persuade or obey" points tothe primary, reciprocal obligation that the State has in return forthe ability to create moral obligations to obey even bad laws: theState must in good faith believe that it is pursuing justice and thecommon good, which means that the State must be prepared to listento arguments about the injustice of its laws, just as Socrates isprepared to listen to Crito's arguments. Socrates must persuade Critoor respect his convictions-possibly to the point of acting againstSocrates' own views. Similarly, Socrates must persuade the State(which he has failed to do) or obey. "Persuade or obey" is simply

suggesting that Crito is in a grief-induced trance. Rather, he is emphasizing thatwhat the Laws say and believe, however wrong, turns out to have moral value thatoutweighs the "truth" of the matter in this case, thus requiring Socrates to heedthe Laws regardless of his own view of the merits of the law that has condemnedhim or the reasons offered by the Laws for obeying. The emphasis of the currentinterpretation, in short, is on the fact that Socrates says he "hears" these arguments,not that he accepts them as true, or that he (or the Laws, or Crito) is in a trance.And on this point, Socrates is surely correct. Ask any ordinary person who urgesobedience to controversial laws why one should obey and the response is likely tobe exactly the response of the Laws. Only philosophy, and recent philosophy atthat, reveals the limitations of the common sense answer.

PHILIP SOPER

a reference to the minimal requirement that the State, or friend, besincere in the attempt to reach the right conclusions about the actionto be taken.

Finally, consider again the central device of the dialogue-thepersonification of the Laws. That device performs several functions.First, it emphasizes the parallel between the response that friendsdeserve and the response to which the State is entitled and alerts thereader to seek the answer to Crito's appeal, as well as to the Laws',indirectly in the action rather than in the speech. Second, though wehave not yet said anything about the substantive arguments forrespecting the opinions of others, it is unlikely that one can makethe transition from friendship, where the argument may have aninitial appeal, to the anonymous State unless the State appears asmore than a faceless bureaucracy. It may well be, in short, that thesubstantive theory that underlies the current interpretation requiresthat the State, at least ideally, approximate the personal confrontationbetween ruler and ruled that Socrates makes visible in the dialogue-a relationship between citizen and State that is perhaps easy to seein Socrates' Athens, harder to see in the modern world. Third,personifying the Laws makes vivid the essential point that underliesthe arguments advanced by the Laws: the point is not that these aregood arguments, but that they are the common, standard argumentsthat one is likely to encounter even today if one asks an ordinarycitizen who supports the law why someone who disagrees with thelaw should obey. The answers provided by the Laws still "ring"loudly today, even if the reasons, on reflection, seem as unpersuasiveas "your country-love it or leave it" did during the Vietnam War.42

2. SUBSTANTIVE SUPPORT

There remains the substantive issue: what reasons support the viewthat the sincerely held opinions of friends and the State create evenprima facie moral duties to act in accordance with those opinions,however wrong? What reason is there to think that Socrates heldsuch a view?

The latter question, about Socrates' own view, is the moreproblematic and touches once again on issues about the nature ofinterpretation that I shall not attempt to broach in this essay beyondthe following disclaimer. I do not view the above interpretation asan historical claim about Socrates' (or Plato's) actual or subconscious

42. See the discussion in the preceding note and the accompanying text.


state of mind at the time of these events or when writing the dialogue.It may well be that the view I am defending here is too much atvariance with what Socrates represents in other dialogues to bepersuasive as an empirical claim about his actual thought. Thatempirical claim is not the point of this essay. The point, rather, isan aesthetic/moral one: what is the best possible case one can makefor the position advanced in the Crito? What interpretation, if any,preserves the maximum amount of the text (counts less of the textas a "mistake"), while still remaining sufficiently plausible to havesome appeal to modern views about the duty to obey the law? 43 Of

course if modern views begin with the assumption that no plausibletheory can establish a nearly universal duty to obey the law, muchof the Crito must inevitably be counted a mistake, and that is thedominant attitude of the contemporary scholarship. If, however, onetakes seriously Socrates' apparent claim in the Crito, then the problemof constructing a plausible political theory to support that claim,while still remaining maximally consistent with the text, must lead,I suspect, to something like the present effort.

But is the present suggestion plausible? Is there more appeal tothe theory that friends and States can create prima facie moral duties,despite erroneous moral conclusions, than theories based on consent,fair play, and straightforward consequential arguments?

Support for an affirmative answer, at least in the case of closerelationships, is easy to find in ordinary experience as well as moralphilosophy. The fact that people consistently give special attentionto loved ones despite the greater utility that can arguably be realizedby sharing wealth with strangers has enough persistence to causeutilitarians to go to some lengths to reconcile that settled practicewith their moral theory. (By attending to the needs of those closest,I am more likely to maximize utility in the long run than bydissipating energy among all claimants, etc.) Of course, this particularproblem, as it is usually rehearsed in debates between utilitarians andKantians, involves the question of whether one who chooses to favorloved ones commits moral error in a world where strangers might

43. As will be evident, I do not attempt in this essay to reconcile the Crito withthe Apology, or to compare the views of Socrates in other dialogues with theinterpretation offered here. My interest is in the Crito alone and the interpretationmost consistent with that dialogue's general claim about the obligation to obey thelaw. Thus, though I attempt a substantive defense of the interpretation in termsthat I believe to be mostly consistent with Socratic principles, I do not offer thedefense as an exegesis of Socratic philosophy. To do so would require a far moreextensive examination of other aspects of his life and thought.

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benefit more from the same attention. The current suggestion assignsan even stronger role to friends: it is not just permissible to favorloved ones; it is prima facie wrong not to take into account (and toact on, if no greater countervailing duties exist) the convictions ofthose in certain cases of close relationships (henceforth"friendships"44).

Examples used to test the plausibility of this hypothesis must bechosen with some care. I am not suggesting that one has a duty tofollow a friend's advice, contrary to one's own opinion, just in orderto please the friend. Going along with advice one thinks wrong justin order to please a friend is, no doubt, a double insult rather thana requirement of friendship. 4 But that is not the present case. Critois doing far more than just advising. He cannot, like the State, issuea "command" to Socrates-not because he doesn't have the powerto enforce it, but because friendship is not that kind of relationship.But Crito has "convictions" about what Socrates should do thatmake clear that his own interests are intricately connected withSocrates' decision in a way that is not true of one who is merelygiving disinterested advice.

I suspect that with the right examples in mind, it will be easy toaccept-and to explain-the hypothesis I have in mind. If caringspouses differ over serious matters-ranging from child-rearing issues,to questions of family planning, to more routine problems of equityin allocating daily tasks-one thing that counts in deciding what todo is the intensity and conviction of one's spouse in comparison tothe strength of one's own convictions. In such cases, there is, ofcourse, an easy, consequential explanation for why the opinions ofothers count. The "right" action requires sensitivity to context; inaddition to the values implicated by the action one takes, there isanother value to consider-that of the relationship itself. Compromise,even to the point of acting against one's own view of the matter,may be the "best" thing to do in light of the resulting effect on thelarger value represented by the relationship, with the question ofwho is to yield determined by some fair method or by rough estimatesof comparative strength of feeling.

44. I use the term "friendship" to designate the kind of relationship I have inmind, recognizing that the term is wide enough to include relationships that areprobably too weak to generate the moral duty under discussion. Close, intimaterelationships are, no doubt, the best candidates for testing intuitions about thehypothesis under discussion.

45. See Raz, "Authority and Justification," 14 Phil. and Pub. Affairs (1985),pp. 7, 19; Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1988), pp. 35-37.


All of this is familiar enough, I assume, at least in the context offriendships, to give content and plausibility to the notion that opinionsshould and do sometimes count in deciding what to do. What aboutthe commands of the State? The consequential argument just offeredin the case of friends is not so clearly available here: there is no"personal" relationship that may suffer if, disagreeing with theState's judgment about the law, I refuse to obey. That is whyconsequential arguments seem to most people unable to ground theobligation to obey: if the law commands an unjust act, no largervalue seems at risk if I choose to disobey. The legal system, whichI may in general value, will not collapse, and no persons will "care"in the way that might require compromise in order to preserve thelarger values of a personal relationship.

These disanalogies between States and friends indicate that a fullexplanation of the political theory is likely to be different from thesimple "consequential" argument in the case of friends. Note,however, that the State, unlike the friend, is in the position of issuingcommands. It does not just express its strong convictions that I obeythe law; it claims the right to enforce its view of the action to takeregardless of dissenting opinions. If this claim about the State's rightto decide can be rationally supported, then it is easy to see whymany have thought that there is a connection between the conceptsof political obligation and "legitimate authority. ' 47

In the centuries since the Crito, political theory may not havemade arguments from consent, fair play, and consequentialism muchmore appealing as bases for grounding the obligation to obey thelaw. But political theory has by and large shown that there is noalternative to giving the State the relative monopoly on force thatunderlies its claimed right to decide. If I acknowledge this muchauthority of the State, then obeying the law may be an example ofthe same type of respect for the necessity of compromise that onerecognizes in friendship-in this case the necessity of allowing asingle voice to determine how State power shall be used in pursuitof justice where people disagree about the content of justice. 48 The

46. For a fuller discussion of the State's "right to decide," see Soper, "Law'sNormative Claims," in The Autonomy of Law (R. George, ed. 1996), p. 215.

47. See H. Arendt, On Violence (1970), pp. 44-45.48. Analogies between friends and the duty to obey the law are also to be found

in contemporary discussions. See Raz, The Authority of Law (1979), pp. 253-61(rejecting a duty to obey law, but endorsing a right to respect law in an analogy tofriendship); R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986), pp. 195-206 (developing an argumentfor the obligation to obey law as a species of "associative" obligation, akin to theobligations that arise in close relationships based on mutual respect).

PHILIP SOPER

duty to obey results, not from considering the "consequences ofdisobedience" on the existence of the State or on my relationshipwith identified officials, but from the fact that I acknowledge thatthe State has no choice but to issue enforceable directives (not justadvice) with respect to action it believes to be just.

I shall not attempt further substantive defense in this essay of thepolitical theory implicit in the current interpretation. 49 For presentpurposes it may be enough to suggest why one need not be distressedat an interpretation that suggests that even Socrates, the spokesmanfor reason and objective truth in moral thought, might have beenable to accept that the practical business of living with friends andwithin the law requires at least some qualification of the absolutist'sposition.

First, note that the exception for doing what is right is narrow-only friends (intimates) and the Law may be able to affect thedecision otherwise to follow one's own lights, regardless of theopinions of others.

Second, it is critical to remember that the decision to respect theopinion of others even in these cases follows a good faith effort, bythe friend, by the State, to reach the correct result. We' are notembarked on an enterprise completely at odds with Socrates' insistencethat reason can guide moral inquiry. Quite the contrary. It is theassumption that reason can distinguish truth from error, appearancefrom reality, opinion from fact that characterizes the good faithattempt to find answers to difficult moral questions in the case ofboth friends and the State. The duty to respect the convictions ofothers is not a response to the emotional appeal of friendship or thepower of the State to punish; it is a response to the commitment toa shared search for truth that typifies most of the Socratic dialogues.The only qualification to Socrates' absolutism that results arises outof the practical observation that action must sometimes precede finaljudgment about who is right in cases of honest disagreement overdifficult moral questions.

Finally, the universal duty to obey that this interpretation of theCrito supports remains only prima facie. In egregious cases of moralerror, the duty to the State must be weighed against the duty to dowhat is right. That too is arguably consistent with Socratic doctrine50

49. For additional discussion, see "The Moral Value of Law"; Soper, A Theoryof Law (1984).

50. The classic example, in the Republic, is Socrates' claim that it is right tobreak a promise to return a weapon where the owner, who asks for its return, has


and with the present interpretation of the Crito: what Socratesendorses is a universal duty to obey the law that is, however, notabsolute in force. In the Crito, as it turns out, the only countervailingduty Socrates has (having persuaded Crito to give up his claim fromfriendship) is mainly to preserve his own life and that duty, if it isone, is not outweighed by the duty to obey. 5

V. A FINAL PROBLEM: SOCRATES' MOTIVATION

I have described one of the admitted gaps in the interpretation Iam offering: much still needs to be said about why it is that closefriends and States are in the position of being able to affect correctmoral action, despite unjust laws and erroneous opinions. But I shallleave this gap in the argument for now. If the current interpretationis plausible, it is clear that the rest of the argument must be filledin, rather than extracted from the Crito. This gap, in short, is aninevitable consequence of the view taken here that Socrates isillustrating, rather than expounding, a political theory.

If, however, we explain the existence of the above gap as due toSocrates' illustrating, rather than explaining, we are left with anothergap involving, once again, Socrates' motivation. Why might Socratesleave Crito-and readers-to discover the theory suggested here ratherthan announce it directly? Why doesn't he explain to Crito that heand the State both have the power to affect Socrates' moral dutiesby their sincere, if erroneous, beliefs?

There is, I believe, an answer to this question that actually helpsreenforce the present interpretation. Of course, one might suggestthat Socrates, who has just reiterated in his opening response toCrito his well-known moral absolutism, would fear beingmisunderstood if he now tried to explain and defend what appear tobe exceptions to that doctrine for friends and the State.12 But thisexplanation is little different from the previous, unappealing one.Socrates is not afraid that he will be misunderstood; rather, it is part

since gone mad. Republic 331c. One interpretation of this passage is that the dutyto keep a promise, though universal in scope, is not so strong as to outweigh otherduties on appropriate occasions. The Crito can be viewed as making the same claimfor law: duties created by law are universal in scope, though not absolute in weight.

51. See Dyson, "The Structure of the Laws Speech in Plato's Crito," 28 ClassicalQ. (1978), pp. 427-36.

52. There is no ultimate inconsistency, of course. Socrates would still be de-fending as objectively "right" (supported by the reasons hinted at in, the precedingsection) the view that sometimes the opinions of others count in determining whatone should do.

PHILIP SOPER

of his theory that the truth here is best illustrated, rather thanannounced, for a very simple reason. If one is told that what countsis sincere opinion, there is a danger that one stops thinking aboutthe merits of the issue and simply announces one's opinion. Thatdanger is particularly apparent in the case of the State. The politicaltheory that gives the State the power to create moral obligations toobey even unjust laws depends on the State trying to enact justlaws-and believing that it has succeeded. The surest sign of badfaith in this context involves leaping over the difficult question ofcontent directly to the conclusion supported by the political theory:since content does not matter, anything the State says creates a dutyto obey. Thus fiat, not reason, determines moral duty.

Fiat does determine moral duty, but only after reasoned argumenthas failed to produce agreement. The interpretation underconsideration does not displace the belief that there are objectivevalues, accessible to reason; on the contrary, it requires faith in thatprocess and good faith efforts to determine what is right.

It is always tricky business to suggest that, in the end, faultycontent may be compensated for by process. Parallels may be foundin other areas of the law. Even if we think that jury nullification isa good thing, it may be that we do not want to advise juries that itis available. Or even if we think that mitigation should be availableif homicide is committed under duress, we may be uncertain aboutthe effect on the calculations of potential criminals if we make thatdefense generally known.53 Socrates is in a similar position. The bestway to explain that he might have to follow Crito's convictions, ifhe can't persuade him, and the best way to illustrate that what countsis that the Laws' convictions are sincere, rather than right, is not tocloud the issue of sincerity by calling attention to the theory. Sincerityrequires belief in the correctness of the conclusion; the politicaltheory being illustrated makes the correctness of the conclusionirrelevant to the resulting duty. Though one can try to explain all ofthis (as I am here), one can easily sympathize with the decision thatthe best way to make the point is to illustrate it. To do so is not somuch an act of condescension as it is a case of emphasizing, throughindirection, the importance of sincerity in the debate about value.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Crito is a drama, a drama of far more powerful effect thanone is likely to realize if it is treated simply as a "mini-treatise on

53. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, "Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: OnAcoustic Separation in Criminal Law," 97 Harv. L. Rev. (1984), p. 625.


legal obligation." '5 4 Part of that drama lies in seeing that the politicaltheory works best when illustrated, rather than openly acknowledgedand discussed. Whether the theory is in the end persuasive will, ofcourse, depend on considerable further discussion, far more than onecan find in the Crito alone. But that, too, is characteristic of thePlatonic corpus: no one has suggested that Socrates' thought put anend to philosophy, though some have suggested that it provides thetext, along with Aristotle, to which all subsequent philosophy is afootnote. In the present case, the footnote that would complete theargument would have to be considerably longer than the text itself,but, if successful, it would at least have the advantage of preservingas much of the sense of the Crito as possible, while at the same timereducing the distance between modern and classical views about themoral value of the law.

54. "Obedience to the Law in Plato's Crito," p. 87.

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