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The Philosophy of GenerativeLinguisticsAndrei Nasta aa University of East Anglia, School of Philosophy , 14 NeedhamPlace, St. Stephen's Square, Norwich , Norfolk , NR1 3SD , UKPublished online: 03 May 2013.

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Book Review

The Philosophy of Generative Linguistics

Peter Ludlow

New York: Oxford University Press, 2011

240 pages, $55.00, ISBN: 0199258538 (hbk)

The work under review develops numerous traditional philosophical themes such as

externalism, skepticism, color, and simplicity as they arise in theoretical linguistics,

especially in linguistic syntax and semantics. With an important exception

(the externalist metaphysics), the thrust—perhaps the strength—of the book is

broadly methodological. The book purports to motivate the generative linguistic

enterprise and to fight some potential misconceptions such as the claim that linguistic

intuitions are unreliable sources of data or that certain linguistic proposals are lacking in

formal rigor or simplicity. In the present review, I shall focus on two important themes

of the work, one pertaining to the metaphysics of linguistics (covered in chapters 5

and 6) and the other pertaining to themethodology of linguistics (treated in chapter 7).

After dealing with certain worries about linguistic intuitions (chapters 2 and 3),

Ludlowdiscusses two types of skeptical claims that linguistics is facedwith. The first one

is inspired byQuine’s indeterminacy of translation argument. The worry is roughly that

grammar, i.e., the competence system mentally realized by competent speakers, is

underdetermined by the data. The second worry is that grammar is a system of rules

whose explanatory status is problematic because, as Kripke (1982) argued in developing

a Wittgensteinian line, there is no fact of the matter as to which rule is being followed.Let us focus on the so-called determination question of the Kripke–Wittgenstein

skeptical argument. Kripke’s skeptic invites us to assume the intuitive view that we

know the rule of addition and that we have a past history of successful additions (or of

addition rule following). Then he asks us to invoke a fact that determines that what we

took to be addition in the past is actually addition and not an anomalous operation

that resembles addition on a given domain (of past applications) but differs from it on

an arbitrary extension of that domain (the domain of future applications). But, the

skeptic argues, no matter what fact we invoke—dispositions to add, platonic entities,

addition machines—there is still a way in which we didn’t determine the rule of

addition. Therefore, rule following is problematic. Since generative linguistics assumes

that linguistic structures are generated by applications of rules (cognitively realized),

generative linguistics has a foundational problem.Ludlow endorses an argument (due to Soames, 1998) according to which the

skeptical reasoning is not sound. The mistake is that the skeptic equivocates between

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an epistemic and a metaphysical understanding of determination (see pp. 115–117 fordetails). Ludlow further suggests that the anti-skeptical solution supports externalism

about the individuation of (linguistic) syntactic facts. However, it is not clear to methat anti-skepticism supports externalism, since the internalist may avail herself of the

same anti-skeptical strategy.Syntactic externalism is the thesis that the environment partly determines the

syntactic (and computational) structure of linguistic utterances via a causal link(pp. 117–118; see also pp. 47–48). Ludlow proposes that syntactic externalism has a

useful application to the problem of empty proper names. Empty proper names are avexed problem in philosophy of language: utterances containing such names do not

seem to have truth-conditions, because there is no object serving as semantic value forempty names. Since truth-conditions are the basis for assigning meaning to such

utterances, it follows that they are meaningless. But we can avoid this problematicconsequence. Pace Ludlow, if syntax supervenes in part on the environmental

conditions, it is plausible that the missing bit of syntax, which contributes in part theneeded truth-conditions of utterances containing empty names, is determined by the

environment. Thus, whether the speaker/hearer realizes it or not, the environmentdetermines the syntactic structure of a definite description in the logical form of the

utterances containing empty names. The utterances of non-empty names will have thesimpler syntax specific to referential expressions.

Now this kind of externalism, Ludlow acknowledges, is an extremely bold thesis(several objections are answered on p. 117). I shall mention two additional worries.

I find the account of the syntax of empty names problematic on two counts. First, itimplies that the syntactic structure of expressions of the same type (i.e., what we

usually call “proper names”) can be realized in two ways, internally in the grammar,and externally by the intervention of the environment. But, after all, we can make the

(syntactic) distinction between names and definite descriptions on independentgrounds, and this presumably is not due to the environment (otherwise any bit of

syntactic structure would depend on the environment). Why should the syntax ofnames and descriptions supervene sometimes on external facts and sometimes on

internal facts? Instead of accepting this complication in the account of grammaticalcompetence, it would be more plausible to adopt another solution to the empty names

problem, a solution that assumes a uniformly realized grammar and gets the truth-conditions right at the same time. Ludlow mentions two such plausible solutions: the

gappy proposition view and the non-existent objects view.Second, and more importantly, the problem with syntactic externalism is its lack of

empirical motivation. Ludlow mentions that the syntactic distinction between empty

proper names and non-empty ones may affect “the predictions about entailmentrelations, the modal profile of these sentences” (p. 125) that an omniscient agent may

have access to. However, no linguistic argument has been provided for the claim thatsentences involving proper names have the special syntactic modal profile postulated

by syntactic externalism. It’s worth stressing that the problem is not about extra-grammatical factors having effects on grammar. Indeed, the claim that there is some

sort of dependence of logical forms on extra-syntactic factors is not new to linguistics

2 Book Review

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(see especially work within the Minimalist Program: Chomsky, 1995; Reinhart, 2006).The trouble with syntactic externalism is that no linguistic phenomenon seems to

support it. So, what has yet to be shown is that the (externalist) syntax of proper namescan be tracked by the usual linguistic tests.

Let us turn next to themethodological discussion, whose aim is to formulate adequatetheory choice criteria for linguistics. I shall focus on simplicity. The absolute notion of

simplicity, I take it, is something akin to the “less is more” principle, paired with theclaim that there are objective ways of determining what “less” means (i.e., what is the

quantity to beminimized). Ludlow argues (p. 152) that the usage of the absolute notionof simplicity, also cast as aiming to reduce the theoretical machinery, is hopelesslyindeterminate and context sensitive. Simply put, a reduction (of the theoretical

machinery) in one part of the theorymay lead to an augmentation in another part. Then,depending on how we fix the background of evaluation, simplicity will recommend

contradictory decisions about the preferable linguistic hypothesis. In contrast, Ludlowargues, the notion of simplicity as “ease of use” is less restrictive than the absolute one,

and less prone to misfire. Rephrasing somewhat Ludlow’s characterization of simplicity(pp. 161–162), we may state his more liberal notion as follows:

Ease of Use Simplicity: Simplicity varies both with the theorist or researchcommunity and with time. Rational theorists will gravitate towards simpler theoriesbecause they are easier to use (formulate, calculate, understand, and communicate).

Thus stated, the notion seems to be fairly commonsensical. But it is also prettyindeterminate for theoretical purposes. In particular, this notionmakes it obscure whatsimplicity is and inwhichways it can play a normative role in theory choice. Thismay be

consistentwith Ludlow’s intent, since he seems to think that there is noway to spell out auseful principle of simplicity that normatively guides theory construction and theory

choice.Otherwise put, there is no interesting theoretical notion of simplicity beyond theliberal one. Note that it is this latter assumption (argued for on p. 152) that is

inconsistent with the notion of absolute simplicity, not the liberal “ease of use” notion.A more serious worry is that “ease of use” notion has a relativist flavor. For various

psychological and sociological reasons, the theory that a scientist uses at a certainmoment may be classified as the easiest to use and thus the simplest, even if the theory

may otherwise be unnecessarily complicated. It is only the assumption of rationalitybuilt into the liberal notion of simplicity that rules out such a possibility. But then thenotion turns out to be trivial. In either case, the “ease of use” notion of simplicity misses

(or simply glosses over) the normative aspect of simplicity, which seems essential to atheoretical virtue. Let me sketch a perspective that does not have this problem. The

absolute notion of simplicity, seen as a function that minimizes some quantity (e.g.,axioms, strings of symbols, etc.) gives us a concrete way to think about simplicity. In

particular, it makes it clear why we should prefer a theory to another in certain cases.It is true that the assessment of simplicity (i) may change with what we contextually

take to be the relevant quantity, and that (ii) assessing the simplicity of whole theoriesis very often intractable. However, beginning with (ii), the relevance of the notion of

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simplicity does not depend only on the tractability of inter-theoretical comparisons.The apparent intractability does not mean that efforts to reach simpler theories are not

legitimate, or, further, that they are not causally efficient in determining simple results,over time. On the liberal view, simplicity is something to be found over time, without

seeking for it, as if by magic. Moreover, regarding (i), context sensitivity is a problemonly if we assume that linguistic hypotheses should be simple in all respects; but this

should not be so: a hypothesis can be simple in some respects important to the scientist,and it can be absolutely so, even if it is not simple in other respects. Thus the relevant

background of evaluation of absolute simplicity may also be fixed relative to thetheorist (for an attempt to capture the normativity of simplicity within the generalphilosophy of science see Kelly, 2007; for a different take on simplicity within the

philosophy of linguistics see Collins, 2012).In closing, I hasten to mention that the book contains several other interesting

themes: the epistemic role of linguistic intuitions, the externalist semantics, and thenotion of formal rigor are cases in point. There aremany novel discussions (like the one

on the normativity of grammar). I found Ludlow’s epistemological discussion (nottouched on here) particularly convincing. However, I think that Ludlow’s syntactic

externalist thesis suffers from lack of empirical motivation. Finally, the discussion oftheory choice criteria made a prima facie case for a liberal understanding of simplicityand formal rigor in linguistics that further studies should build on or compete with. In

conclusion, I think this is a valuable addition to the philosophy of linguistics literature,and philosophers interested in linguistics would surely benefit from reading it.

References

Chomsky, N. (1995). The minimalist program. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Collins, J. (2012). The unity of linguistic meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Kelly, K. (2007). A new solution to the puzzle of simplicity. Philosophy of Science, 74(5), 561–573.Kripke, K. (1982). Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press.Reinhart, T. (2006). Interface strategies. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Soames, S. (1998). Skepticism about meaning: Indeterminacy, normativity, and the rule-following

paradox. In A. Kazmi (Ed.), Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Suppl. Vol. 23. Meaning andreference (pp. 211–250). Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

Andrei Nasta

University of East Anglia, School of Philosophy14 Needham Place, St. Stephen’s Square, Norwich

Norfolk NR1 3SD, UK

Email: A.Nasta@uea.ac.ukq 2013 Andrei Nasta

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