analysis of integration of ertms system final … final...tender era/2006/ertms/op/01 survey of...

Tender ERA/2006/ERTMS/OP/01

Survey of Safety Approvals for the first ERTMS implementations

Analysis of Integration of ERTMS system Final Report WP3

Subcontractors:

Survey of safety approvals for the first ERTMS implementations WP3 Final Report Analysis of integration of ERTMS systems – 14 September 2007

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Reference: JP-LZ-FW/KRTC316/WP3

14 September 2007 From the following organisations, the following persons contributed to the study:

• KEMA Rail Transport Certification: o F. Walenberg, Project Manager o L. Zigterman, WP1-leader o R. te Pas

• RINA: o F. Caruso, Technical Manager o B. Vittorini, WP2-leader

• Cetren: o J. Figuera, WP4-leader o M. Carvajal o G. Moreno

• Attica Advies: o J. Postmes, WP3-leader o H. Vas Visser o W. Oskam o J. Rimmelzwaan

• EBC: o C. Glatt o H. Müller

• Arsenal Research: o G. List

Document Approval Author Checker Approval

H. Vas Visser, F. Caruso, C. Glatt, J. Figuera, G. List, W. Oskam, R. te Pas, J. Rimmelzwaan

J. Postmes F. Walenberg


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Contents Contents ................................................................................................................................... 3 1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 5

1.1 Background.............................................................................................................. 5 1.2 Goal ......................................................................................................................... 5 1.3 Scope of Work Package 3 “Analysis of Integration of ERTMS system”. .............. 6 1.4 Approach ................................................................................................................. 6

2 Description of relevant ERTMS projects in Europe........................................................ 7 2.1 Austria – Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project ......................................................... 7 2.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf................................................................................. 8 2.3 Belgian projects ....................................................................................................... 9 2.4 France: LGV-Est ................................................................................................... 10 2.5 Berlin-Leipzig-Halle (BHL) .................................................................................. 10 2.6 Italian projects: Rome – Naples, Torino - Novara................................................. 11 2.7 Dutch Projects ....................................................................................................... 12 2.8 Spanish projects..................................................................................................... 15

3 TSI CCS requirements and TSI operations ................................................................... 17 3.1 Austria – Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project ....................................................... 17 3.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf............................................................................... 17 3.3 Belgian projects ..................................................................................................... 17 3.4 France: LGV-Est ................................................................................................... 19 3.5 German projects..................................................................................................... 19 3.6 Italian projects ....................................................................................................... 19 3.7 Dutch Projects ....................................................................................................... 20 3.8 Spanish projects..................................................................................................... 20

4 System description and Interfaces with National Trackside systems............................ 22 4.1 Austria & Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project...................................................... 22 4.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf............................................................................... 22 4.3 Belgian projects ..................................................................................................... 23 4.4 France: LGV-Est ................................................................................................... 23 4.5 German projects..................................................................................................... 24 4.6 Italian projects ....................................................................................................... 24 4.7 Dutch projects........................................................................................................ 24 4.8 Spanish projects..................................................................................................... 26

5 Interface Train to Track................................................................................................. 27 5.1 Austria & Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project...................................................... 27 5.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf............................................................................... 27 5.3 Belgian projects ..................................................................................................... 27 5.4 France: LGV-Est ................................................................................................... 27 5.5 German projects..................................................................................................... 28 5.6 Italian projects ....................................................................................................... 28 5.7 Dutch projects........................................................................................................ 28 5.8 Spanish projects..................................................................................................... 29

6 Interface between ERTMS Onboard Unit and national ATP systems .......................... 30 6.1 Austria & Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project...................................................... 30 6.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf............................................................................... 30 6.3 Belgian projects ..................................................................................................... 30 6.4 France: LGV-Est ................................................................................................... 31


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6.5 German projects..................................................................................................... 31 6.6 Italy: Rome – Naples, Torino– Novara ................................................................. 32 6.7 Dutch projects........................................................................................................ 34 6.8 Spanish projects..................................................................................................... 35

7 Operational interfaces.................................................................................................... 36 7.1 Austria & Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project...................................................... 36 7.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf............................................................................... 36 7.3 Belgian projects ..................................................................................................... 37 7.4 France: LGV-Est ................................................................................................... 37 7.5 German projects..................................................................................................... 38 7.6 Italian projects ....................................................................................................... 38 7.7 Dutch projects........................................................................................................ 39 7.8 Spanish projects..................................................................................................... 41

8 ERTMS Border crossing ............................................................................................... 43 8.1 Austria & Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project...................................................... 43 8.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf............................................................................... 43 8.3 Belgian projects ..................................................................................................... 43 8.4 France: LGV-Est ................................................................................................... 44 8.5 German projects..................................................................................................... 44 8.6 Italian projects ....................................................................................................... 44 8.7 Dutch projects........................................................................................................ 44 8.8 Spanish projects..................................................................................................... 46

9 Test activities................................................................................................................. 47 9.1 Austria & Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project...................................................... 47 9.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf............................................................................... 47 9.3 Belgian projects ..................................................................................................... 47 9.4 France: LGV-Est ................................................................................................... 48 9.5 German projects..................................................................................................... 48 9.6 Italian projects ....................................................................................................... 49 9.7 Dutch projects........................................................................................................ 50 9.8 Spanish projects..................................................................................................... 51 9.9 Operational experiences ........................................................................................ 53

10 Analysis and Conclusions.......................................................................................... 55 10.1 Technical issues..................................................................................................... 55 10.2 Operational issues – harmonisation of cross border international lines ................ 57

List of abbreviations and acronyms....................................................................................... 59


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1 Introduction

1.1 Background The history of the European Train Control System (ETCS) dates back 15 years. Over the years, various organisational structures have been engaged in creating and improving the specifications of the system. Today the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) Specifications (Subsets) are established and their applicability and completeness have been analysed in order to respond to possible critical situations. The legal framework for the introduction of ERTMS was formed by the European Directives for the High Speed railway system (96/48/EU) and the Conventional Railway System (2001/16/EU). These Directives were produced by the issuing the so-called TSIs (Technical Specifications for Interoperability). For ERTMS, the TSI Control Command and Signalling is of immediate relevance. However, the TSIs Rolling Stock and Operations are also relevant to the application of ERTMS. Based on the system definitions, applications all over Europe emerge. Initially, trial sections were equipped with ETCS and/or GSM-R in Italy, Austria, France, Spain, and Germany. Today, complete new lines are in operation or are in advanced implementation phases and will be put into service with ERTMS equipment. The implemented Level is 1 or 2 or both (Level 1 acting as fall-back mode in the event that Level 2 fails), depending on the decision of the national Infrastructure Managers.

1.2 Goal Based on the above-mentioned Directives and TSIs, responsibilities for the various European Member States were defined. Ultimately the responsibility for putting into service a new line or an existing line newly equipped with ERTMS is with the Member State. Furthermore, in order to implement ERTMS in the context of existing infrastructure, specific national solutions are unavoidable. From this perspective, it might be the case that national solutions chosen might lead to non-interoperability. In order to investigate whether this problem is a real problem and to assess the severity of this problem, ERA commissioned the study:

Survey of safety approvals for the first ERTMS implementations.

The goal of the study (ERA/2006/ERTMS/S/01) is to provide insight into the European Rail Agency with regard to the way in which ERTMS has been integrated in the railway systems in terms of safety approval. Of special interest are the possible problems for interoperability arising from the integration. The results from the study will be used by ERA to identify and plan activities to solve existing open points. This document presents the results of Work Package 3 (WP3) which aims to provide information about the integration of ERTMS into the railway systems, including operational aspects. This includes a description of the allocation of safety responsibilities between technical system and operations.


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1.3 Scope of Work Package 3 “Analysis of Integration of ERTMS system”. The scope of Work Package 3 is limited to the ERTMS projects which are in an advanced state of deployment or which are already in operation. To analyse the integration aspects of the ERTMS system in the projects, the Technical Group responsible for this work package mainly focussed on the internal and external ERTMS interfaces. A simplified generic architecture (see Figure 1) has been used to identify and define the relevant interfaces which were within the scope of Work Package 3.

In the above figure, the main components of the ETCS systems have been indicated in their technical and operational context. The numbers next to the interfaces refer to the chapters in this report in which the characteristics of each interface can be found. The uninterrupted lines represent the technical interfaces; the dotted lines represent the operational interfaces

1.4 Approach The research for this study was undertaken by a number of parties, each with great experience with one or more implementations of ERTMS. In order to generate the required information, each of these parties contributed their own knowledge to the group. Specific questions were then formulated to the outside world to collect information to fill in the gaps. The following organisations, as a part of the consortium or as a sub-contractor, were involved in the activities of Work Package 3: • Arsenal Research • Attica Advies (WP3 leader) • Cetren (Certification Asociacion de Accion Ferroviaria) • EBC (Eisenbahn-Cert) • KEMA Rail Transport Certification, • RINA

Interlocking Interlocking

National BorderEVC DMI

CommandCommand

RBCRBC

STM

GSMRConv.ATP

GSMR

Detection

Figure 1 Generic Architecture


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2 Description of relevant ERTMS projects in Europe This chapter briefly describes the ERTMS projects which were identified as relevant for the ERA study Survey of Safety Approvals for the first ERTMS implementations. These projects are in an advanced status of implementation or commercial operation has already started.

Austria & Italy: o Brenner Basis Tunnel project (BBT)

Austria: o Vienna – Nickelsdorf

Belgium: o Liege – German/Belgian border (Line 3) o Antwerp – Dutch/Belgian border (Line 4) o Belgian conventional network

France: o LGV-Est

Germany: o Berlin-Halle-Leipzig (BHL)

Italy: o Rome – Naples o Torino – Novara

The Netherlands: o Amsterdam – Utrecht o BetuweRoute o HSL-Zuid

Spain: o Madrid – Zaragoza – Lleida o La Sagra – Toledo

Spain & France: o Perpignan – Figueras

2.1 Austria – Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project The Project is governed by the High Speed European Directive 96/48/EC and by Austrian and Italian laws and norms for all aspects not included in the scope of the European Directive. In particular, the Italian Ministerial Decree of 28 October 2005 which provides mandatory requirements for the structural design of long tunnels and for all the related technical and security facilities must also be fulfilled. There is a special inter-governmental agreement between Austria and Italy that sets the basic political issues of the Project.


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MFS Umfahrung Innsbruck

MFS Steinach MFS Wiesen/Prati

Umfahrung Innsbruck

CirconvallazioneInnsbruck

Bf Innsbruck StazioneFortezza

25 kV 50 Hz15 kV 16 2/3 Hz

3 kV =MFS Umfahrung

InnsbruckMFS Steinach MFS Wiesen/Prati

Umfahrung Innsbruck

CirconvallazioneInnsbruck

Bf Innsbruck StazioneFortezza

25 kV 50 Hz15 kV 16 2/3 Hz

3 kV =

2.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf The Wien-Nickelsdorf project is part of the line between Vienna and Budapest. The line between the Viennese central shunting station (Wien-Zentralverschiebebahnhof, ZVBF Wien) and Nickelsdorf station before the border with Hungary (at Hegyeshalom) is approximately 64 km in length. The line is equipped with Indusi/PZB. The ETCS Level 1 system is an overlay to the existing signalling system. The line is electrified (15kV 16 2/3Hz), double track, mixed traffic and has a maximum speed of 140 km/h. At the Hungarian border, a Level 1 to Level 1 transition is planned in the future. The interconnections to the other lines as shown in the figure above are transitions from Level 1 to PZB/Indusi.


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2.3 Belgian projects

Line 3 Liege – German/Belgian border / Line 4 Antwerp – Dutch/Belgian border The Belgian high speed lines L4 and L3 are built to achieve a performance of up to 300 km/h and 3-minute headway under continuous speed supervision provided by ERTMS/ETCS level 2. ERTMS/ETCS level 2 is supplemented with ERTMS/ETCS level 1, which takes over in case the former experiences a failure while offering parallel operations in a mixed level application. These two separate lines are divided into three structural and two functional subsystems. These subsystems are subject to EC verification against their respective Technical Specifications of Interoperability (TSI) of Directive 96/48/EC. L4 has a length of 35 km, L3 36 km.

Belgian Conventional Network The implementation of ERTMS for the conventional network concerns the roll-out of ETCS level 1. The infrastructure manager is Infrabel, which is part of the NMBS (SNCB) holding. Within the Ministry of Transport a (Railway) Safety Authority is currently being organised. The main train operator involved is NMBS (SNCB), which is the other entity under the NMBS (SNCB) holding. In the figure below the lines to be equipped with ERTMS Level 1 are indicated. These lines form part of international Corridor C.

TBL2TBL2

Basis=crocodile

TVMTVMTBL2TBL2

L4(ETCS2)

L3(ETCS2)

TVMTVM

ETCS1


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2.4 France: LGV-Est The entire project includes 406 km of new line between Vaires (Seine et Marne) and Vendenheim (Bas Rhin). The first stage includes 300 km of line from Vaires to Baudrecourt (Moselle), plus new links to the existing network in order to serve as many destinations as possible. The project also includes modifications to connecting lines and installations, in particular between Paris Gare de l’Est and Vaires sur Marne and on the Strasbourg-Kehl line in order to improve the link with the German network. The lines to Épinal and St. Dié in the Vosges will be electrified to allow the towns to be served by TGV.

2.5 Berlin-Leipzig-Halle (BHL) The line is about 145 km long, starting at Teltow in the south-west of Berlin, ending before Leipzig, via Ludwigsfelde, Jüterbog, Wittenberg and Bitterfeld. The Berlin-Halle-Leipzig relation was upgraded to a high speed line with mixed operation of passenger trains travelling at a maximum speed of 200 kilometres per hour and freight trains travelling at a maximum of 100 kilometres per hour. The main driving direction is 'right'. Trains run on double rails with crossovers at defined transfer points.

RBC RBC RBCRBC-BereichBitterfeld RBC-BereichWittenberg JüterbogWittenb ergBitterfeld Wittenbe rgRadisBurgkemnitz Zahna NiedergörsdorfB ergwitzMuldenstein ElbePratauGräfenhainichen km 69,2km 84,0km 94,8 km 98,3km 104,2km 112,5km 116,1km 121,5km 126,2

km 62,8Blönsdorfkm 75,1Mulde

LuckenwaldeTrebb inLudwigs feldeBirkengrund-SüdBTeltowJüterbogScharfenbrü ckkm 3 4,3km 39,5km 50,0Ludwigfe lde

RBC RBC RBCRBC-BereichBitterfeld RBC-BereichWittenberg JüterbogWittenb ergBitterfeld Wittenbe rgRadisBurgkemnitz Zahna NiedergörsdorfB ergwitzMuldenstein ElbePratauGräfenhainichen km 69,2km 84,0km 94,8 km 98,3km 104,2km 112,5km 116,1km 121,5km 126,2

km 62,8Blönsdorfkm 75,1Mulde

LuckenwaldeTrebb inLudwigs feldeBirkengrund-SüdBTeltowJüterbogScharfenbrü ckkm 3 4,3km 39,5km 50,0Ludwigfe lde

RBC-Bereich Bitterfeld

RBC-Bereich Wittenberg

RBC-Bereich Jüterbog

RBC

RBC

RBC

RBC

RBC

RBC

Bitterfeld

Wittenberg

Radis

Burgkemnitz

Zahna

Niedergörsdorf

Bergwitz

Delitzsch

Rackwitz

Roitzsch

Landsberg

Ab

Muldenstein

Leipzig

Halle

ElbePratau

Gräfenhainichen

km 69,2

km 84,0

km 94,8

km 98,3

km 104,2

km 112,5

km 116,1

km 121,5

km 126,2

km 131,6 / 48,5

km 60,4

km 138,7

km 146,5

km 156,0

km 70,0

km 62,8

km 81,3

Blönsdorfkm 75,1

Mulde

Luckenwalde

Trebbin

LudwigsfeldeBirkengrund-Süd

Berlin

Teltow

Jüterbog

Scharfenbrück

km 34,3

km 39,5

km 50,0

Ludwigfelde

Bitterfeld

Wittenberg

Radis

Burgkemnitz

Zahna

Niedergörsdorf

Bergwitz

Delitzsch

Rackwitz

Roitzsch

Landsberg

Ab

Muldenstein

Leipzig

Halle

ElbePratau

Gräfenhainichen

km 69,2

km 84,0

km 94,8

km 98,3

km 104,2

km 112,5

km 116,1

km 121,5

km 126,2

km 131,6 / 48,5

km 60,4

km 138,7

km 146,5

km 156,0

km 70,0

km 62,8

km 81,3

Blönsdorfkm 75,1

Mulde

Luckenwalde

Trebbin

LudwigsfeldeBirkengrund-Süd

Berlin

Teltow

Jüterbog

Scharfenbrück

km 34,3

km 39,5

km 50,0

Ludwigfelde

km 152,003, Po 160 km 151,545 Po 159

UZ Bitterfeld/DelitzschSteuerbezirk 6 Leipzig

UZ WittenbergSteuerbezirk 6 Leipzig

UZ JüterbogSteuerbezirk 1 Berlin

LZB-Bereich Bitterfeld

LZB-Bereich Wittenberg

LZB-Bereich Jüterbog 40 km

250 Balisen

90 km795 Balisen

15 km160 Balisen

RBC-Bereich Ludwigsfelde

LZB-Bereich Ludwigsfelde

ETCS Referenzstrecke Berlin-Halle/LeipzigStreckenübersicht


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The line has two legacy (national) signalling techniques: linear LZB and intermittent PZB train protection systems. The Berlin-Halle-Leipzig line is equipped with ETCS Level 2. There are plans to connect the route to a Level 1 section in the north. The line was initially intended to be operated as a "Test Site" during the consolidation phase of the European ETCS specifications.

2.6 Italian projects: Rome – Naples, Torino - Novara To achieve interoperability of the Italian HC/HSLs in the context of the European HS Network and the international corridors, the command and control system ERTMS will be applied. The national aim is to develop railway network capacity to increase freight and regional traffic in traditional lines.

Rome – Naples The Rome – Naples line is new high speed/high capacity line specially built for speeds equal to or greater than 250 km/h (TSI Category I). The maximum speed of the line is 300 km/h. A mixed traffic typology (passengers and freight) is planned. The commercial speed is 300 km per hour. The line is 184 km long. Today the high speed line starts at Roma Termini station and ends at the Gricignano interconnection where it joins the Foggia Naples line. The line is double track (minimum distance 5 meters) with left main running direction and the possibility of double directivity.

There are a total of 40 kilometres of bridges and 38 kilometres of tunnels, the tunnel being 6,628 km (Colli Albani). The minimum curve radius is 5450 m. The maximum slope is del 21 ‰. The power supply is AC 2x25 kV 50 Hz. There are three interconnections with traditional lines: Frosinone, Cassino and Caserta. At each interconnection and in Salone and Gricignano, there are Neutral sections which are managed by ERTMS. The signalling system is ERTMS Level 2 with no fallback system. The interconnected traditional lines have a BACC/SCMT signalling system. Train entrance and exit to and from interconnections are managed as normal Level transition to Level STM for trains equipped with an STM, or to Level 0 for the trains which are not equipped with an STM.

Torino – Novara Torino-Novara is an 84 kilometre section of the Milan – Torino line. The functionality is the same as the Rome – Naples line. The line is new high speed/high capacity line of category 1. A mixed traffic typology (passengers and freight) is planned. The commercial speed is 300 kilometres/hour.


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There are two interconnections with traditional line: Stura and Novara, which are equipped with Italian SCMT system. The line is double track (minimum distance 5 meters) with left main running direction and the possibility of double directivity. The maximum slope is del 15 ‰. The power supply is AC 2x25 KV 50 Hz.

.

2.7 Dutch Projects

Amsterdam – Utrecht The Amsterdam – Utrecht line is a 30 km, four track section of the TEN network Amsterdam – Frankfurt. International and domestic trains and freight trains run on the line. The maximum speed on the four tracks has been restricted by the existing signalling system and ATP to 140 km/h. The civil engineering maximum speed is 200 km/h for the outside tracks and 160 km/h for the inner tracks. The line has 4 stations, no Level crossings, one aqueduct, two bridges with a length of 238 meter and 32 viaducts. The traction voltage is 1.500 Volt DC with a capacity of 6 Mega Watts per train. The catenaries have been prepared for a switchover to 25 kV ac 50 Hz. The signalling system is ERTMS Level STM. In 2008 the signalling system will be extended to a Dual Signalling system ERTMS Level STM / Level 2. The hardware platform has already been prepared for this extension. The Level STM can be used as a fallback mode. The domestic trains have an ATP train born equipment only (ATB first generation).


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BetuweRoute The BetuweRoute is a new International and Domestic line designed for freight transport only. It has a length of 160 km and connects Europe’s biggest harbour, Rotterdam, with the German border. It is equipped with a ERTMS level 2 system only (no fall back). Some area’s, Kijfhoek en Zevenaar are equipped with ATB, the Dutch Legacy system, because in this area the BetuweRoute is integrated in the national system. Until now, there is no operational experience. The line has been put into operation officially on June 16th 2007 by the Dutch Queen. The train-infrastructure integration tests will then not be finished completely. At the moment immediately after the official opening of the line, trains were only allowed to enter the line after the previous train had cleared the same. Only the A15 section from Kijfhoek to Zevenaar (107 km) is equipped with ERTMS at this moment. The Western part (West of Rotterdam/Kijfhoek) will be equipped later. The number of trains per day will be limited heavily by the capacity of the German lines that connect the Dutch BetuweRoute with the Corridor Rotterdam-Genoa. All trains will at least have to be equipped with ERTMS as there is no other system installed on the BetuweRoute. About ten Freight Operating Companies such as Railion, by far the biggest operator and about 10 other companies will operate freight trains on the BetuweRoute. Keyrail is a new company, established to manage the exploitation and maintenance of the BetuweRoute, separately of the rest of the Dutch Infrastructure, managed by ProRail. ProRail however, still plays an important role in the transition of construction and tests to regular operating.

The BetuweRoute overview


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The BetuweRoute, Western part

The BetuweRoute, Middle part

The BetuweRoute, Eastern part


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HSL-Zuid: Amsterdam – Belgian Border The HSL-Zuid runs from Amsterdam via Schiphol and Rotterdam to the Belgian border, with connections to The Hague and Breda. Along the HSL track, spanning around 100 kilometres, no less than 170 civil engineering structures such as viaducts, flyovers, dive-unders, bridges and tunnels have been built. On the HSL route, the high-speed trains run on newly laid HSL double tracks wherever it is possible to travel at such high speeds. However, from Amsterdam to just beyond Schiphol Airport and at the other HSL stations, the high speed trains travel on existing tracks. Accordingly, the HSL track connects with existing tracks in five locations: Hoofddorp, Rotterdam-West, Rotterdam-Lombardijen, Zevenbergschen Hoek and Breda. Regular trains in the Netherlands run under 1.500 Volts (1,5 kV) DC and have a capacity of 6.000.000 Watts (6 Megawatts). However, high speed trains require a much greater capacity. The High speed trains on the HSL-Zuid are fed with 25.000 Volt (25 kV) AC (50 Hz). Trains using both the regular Dutch network and the new European network must be able to switch between the two systems. The signalling system is the ERTMS Level 2, with a Level 1 fallback system. At the connecting locations with the existing tracks, a transition from Level STM to Level 2 is made, or from Level STM to Level 1 in fallback mode.

2.8 Spanish projects In geographical terms, it must be emphasised that the Spanish railway network essentially has a radial structure, with Madrid at the centre. Besides this structure, there is an important line along most of the Mediterranean coast from the French border to Valencia, Alicante and Murcia. Since 1992 there has been intensive development of new high speed lines using standard gauge and 25 KV AC power supply. The structure of this high speed network will follow the same radial principle. The main high speed lines are:


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• Madrid - Sevilla, built in 1992 to foster the development of a wide region which had not been well served until then, equipped with LZB as the ERTMS had not yet been developed. Maximum speed: 300 km/h.

• Madrid - Zaragoza - Lleida - Roda de Bara (Barcelona), serving the two biggest Spanish cities (> 4,000,000 inhabitants each), will be extended up to the French border. Equipped with ERTMS. In service from Madrid to Roda de Bara, will be completed by the end of 2007. Current maximum speed is 300 km/h. Planned maximum speed: 350 km/h.

• Madrid - Valladolid, under construction, will open the high speed railway to the north and northwest at the end of 2007. Maximum speed planned: 350 km/h.

• La Sagra - Toledo: Small branch unusually equipped with LZB + ERTMS Maximum speed: 300 km/h.

• Córdoba - Málaga branch also equipped with LZB + ERTMS. Maximum speed: 300 km/h.

• Zaragoza-Tardienta-Huesca: Interesting experience with ERTMS over hybrid line Spanish Broad Gauge + UIC gauge. Maximum speed: 300 km/h.

In the medium term, the high speed network will be completed with the Madrid-Valencia (in 2010) and Madrid-Lisbon lines to achieve a network as presented in the map:

The high speed network, (with the exception of the Madrid-Sevilla line) is being equipped with ERTMS. The conventional railway lines will be progressively upgraded to ERTMS. All Spanish lines have been equipped with the national system ASFA as a back-up system. In the future, ERMTS Level 1 and Level 2 will also be implemented on the mixed traffic line Perpignan – Figueras. By this moment, the project is in the he design phase and no detailed information of ERTMS is available. No national system will be implemented.


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3 TSI CCS requirements and TSI operations The early ERTMS implementations which have been studied started at the beginning of this decade. ERTMS Version 2.0.0 was just available and it could not yet be planned that it would take some time before a real interoperable ERTMS version would be available. This chapter shows that each project had to create its own approach to implement ERTMS and eventually to migrate to an interoperable version to be successful.

3.1 Austria – Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project Current status (Feb. 2007): Final project delivered for CE conformity verification based on TSI 2002/731/EC and its amendment 2004/447/EC. The part of design verification is foreseen by Austrian rules for the approval of the system according to §31a of the Austrian railways law (allowance for building of a system = "Baugenehmigung"). For this first step an intermediate report of the Notified Body is required (outside, i.e. additional, to the scope of the EC-verification).

3.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf When the project was launched in 2001, the applicable ETCS version was V2.0.0. Because of the long duration of the project, it was decided to change to V2.2.2 with application of Subset 108. Legally, the directives 96/48/EC with the change 2004/50/EC and the TSIs 2002/731/EC with amendment 2004/447/EC are applicable. The applicable Operations TSI is that of 2002. Derogations will probably have to be reported as there were specification changes in the 2004/447 TSI, but this depends on how the project continues. For the trackside system, it would be necessary to have a derogation for the Eurobalise with respect to salt water. This has no consequences for the line in Austria as it is not likely that a balise will be covered with salt water. For a LEU, there could be a derogation issue concerning the changed specification of the return loss. This would not be a matter for the project as the used LEU and balise are from the same manufacturer and are designed to work together. The certificate has been issued by EBC. The certificate is valid only for balises which have been produced or installed before the date of issue of the certificate. The balise is compliant with the requirements, but with restrictions. As the transmission frequency for the Euroloop will be changed, the installed Euroloop will not be valid for the current valid specification. For real interoperability, the Euroloop system for the line will therefore have to be changed in future. With regard to the train-side subsystem, there is currently no certificate available and therefore no derogation is necessary. Currently there are no trains running.


Line 3 Liege – German/Belgian border / Line 4 Antwerp – Dutch/Belgian border Signalling system overview

The signalling system in which the ERTMS/ETCS functions are incorporated comprises the Traffic Control Centre, the interlocking and linked trackside objects, the GSM-R system, the


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Radio Block Centre, the Lineside Electronic Units, and Eurobalises. These constituents are integrated with the transmission functionality of the overall trackside subsystem of the lines.

Functional requirements The requirements for ETCS level 2 and ETCS level 1 trackside assemblies were to comply with the high speed control-command TSI, Subset 026 V2.2.2 (plus a set of CRs - Subset 108 - in leading to SRS V2.3.0) and CENELEC norms (EN 50126, EN 50129, EN 50159, EN 50125-1), and with the national technical and operational rules applying to high speed lines. The ETCS based signalling system is expected to provide the following main features in either application level: • Automatic train protection and speed control; • Enforcement of temporary and permanent speed restrictions; • Train radio communication between driver and control centre; • Train approach warning to staff working at site.

Performance requirements The requirements of the signalling system were to allow high speed train traffic at 300 km/h and 3-minute headway under ERTMS/ETCS level 2 supervision and 160 km/h and 6-minute headway under ERTMS/ETCS level 1 supervision while permitting mixed level operations. Should the GSM-R radio communication system or the Radio Block Centre experience a disturbance, then ETCS level 1 can be enforced on the line.

Interface requirements There is a need to interface the ETCS high speed signalling system at the border of the lines L4 and L3 with the existing signalling systems of the conventional rail network. ETCS level 1 is installed on track sections connecting L4 (via L25 and L12) and L3 (via L37) to the conventional rail network where it operates in parallel with the existing lineside signalling systems and with the operational requirements to exchange the traffic between HS and CR.

Safety requirements The TSI requires the project to put into effect the measures necessary to demonstrate that the level of risk of an incident occurring that is within the scope of the control-command systems is not higher than the objective required for the service, and to use, for that purpose, Annex A, index 1. The project adopted the apportionment of safety targets set out in Subset 91 for the “ETCS core hazard” (exceeding of the safe speed/distance). The manufacturer was required to draw up a safety plan that makes appropriate use of CENELEC standards (EN 50126, EN 50129, EN 50125-1) to achieve these targets. The Infrabel safety plan requires a HAZOP study of the signalling system functioning to be conducted by an ad hoc working group (Technical and Operational Migration Working Group) and to determine what would happen if the system were to operate in degraded situations. The safety plan also requires HAZOP studies to be carried out by a group of signalling specialists to assess the modifications made to existing subsystems which have been incorporated in this ETCS based signalling system.


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Availability requirements The system reliability targets set out in the tender specification were based on the existing high speed signalling systems of line L1 (French border – Brussels) and line L2 (Leuven – Liège) as regards delay and interruption to traffic.

GSM-R requirements The GSM-R radio communication system has to comply with the mandatory specifications laid down in EIRENE FRS V7.0 and SRS V15.0, GSM-R Interfaces Class 1 Requirements (Subset_093), Radio Transmission FFFIS for Euroradio (A11T6001 V12, - MORANE) and ERTMS QoS Test specification (EEIG O-2475 V1.0).

GSM-R quality of service ETCS Level 2 relies on GSM-R and Euroradio for the transfer of data between the ETCS trackside assembly and the ETCS onboard assembly. GSM-R QoS is of prime importance. Hence, the “ETCS/GSM-R QoS Operational Analysis, EEIG/O4E117 v1.0” was added as an informative document providing appropriate values that can be assigned to Subset_093.

Belgian ETCS level 1 lines ETCS level 1, according to the latest specifications (Commission Decision 2006/860/EC of 7 November 2006 concerning a technical specification for interoperability relating to the control-command and signalling subsystem of the trans-European High Speed rail system and modifying Annex A to Decision 2006/679/EC of 28 March 2006 concerning the technical specification for interoperability relating to the control-command and signalling subsystem of the trans-European conventional rail system. Notified under document number C(2006) 5211) – Official Journal of the European Union L 342/1 of 7.12.2006.)

3.4 France: LGV-Est The actual version which has been implemented is V2.3.0, plus additional “DC” Change Requests according to the C2007 ERTMS Referential. It is an advice of the Infrastructure Manager RFF to implement the CRs

3.5 German projects The line is currently operated based on a national specification (“Rahmenlastenheft”), and on Subset 026 version 2.2.2. plus some additions. Change Requests had to be notified, where additional safety features needed to be amended to the EC-specs and implemented in the BHL system, e.g. CR 212, 301, 302. Migration from LZB to ETCS is a costly long-term enterprise, since the German network is well equipped with modern, safe and effective automatic train protection systems for the main and high speed lines. A period of double equipped lines and traction units are planned by the German railway net and rolling stock operators. The BHL line was not initially equipped with any type of LZB so that the specific migration at the pilot line became an “inversion of the usual migration situation” (Kollmannsberger/Kilian/Mindel, Signal & Draht, 2003-03): On the BHL pilot line, ETCS was installed 3 years before LZB was added.

3.6 Italian projects The actual version of the implemented SRS is the 2.2.2 + CRs 66, 88, 94, 417, 481, 499 and 508 [see Subset 108 v. 1.0]


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A migration to ERTMS Version 2.3.0 is already planned. All new high speed line applications will be compliant with Version 2.3.0. The migration of on-board subsystems will be carried out in accordance with the preservation of interoperability during the operations. The 2002/731/CE updated 2004/447/CE version of the TSI Operation will be implemented.

3.7 Dutch Projects

Amsterdam – Utrecht The commissioned system is currently the ERTMS STM functionality only. The contracted Dual signalling system is based on ETCS specifications version 2.2.2. The negotiations have been started to upgrade the system to version 2.3.0.

BetuweRoute Although the contract between Alstom and ProRail requires Alstom to build the system according to ERTMS SRS 2.2.2 there are NoBo statements available declaring the status of implementation of the CRs in subset 108. The trackside system can therefore be viewed as 2.3.0 compatible. The original plan for a fall back system on the basis of ATB-NG (Simple ATB NG system with signals and very large sections, only allowing limited capacity) is not implemented on A15, because there was enough confidence in ERTMS.

HSL-Zuid The applicable CCS TSI is the 2006 version including Subset 108. The contract was initially based on TSI 2002. The actual version which has been implemented is Version 2.2.2 plus some additional Change requests. At a later stage it was decided to add subset 108 Version 1.1.0. Migration to Version 2.3.0 will be based on the C2007 ERTMS Referential which means that some additional “DC” Change Requests will be implemented. It is an advice to implement the CRs. Implementing the CRs can be arranged in a contract with the TOC. The applicable Operations TSI is the 2002 version No derogations have been reported.

3.8 Spanish projects EC Directives 96/48/CE + 2004/50/CE TSI Decisions 2002/730, 2002/731, 2002/732, 2002/733 The current ERTMS version which is applicable for the Spanish projects is ERTMS Version 2.2.2., although the initial contracts were based on Version 2.0.0. Migration to Version 2.3.0 is being considered. Due to concern about the backwards compatibility between Version 2.3.0 and Version 2.2.2., some mitigation measures were taken: some additional functions of Version 2.3.0 will not be implemented (CR 458 is not implemented) and additional engineering rules will be applied. Several national functions for Trainborn Equipment have been implemented, regarding: • Emergency alert • Separate management of temporary speed restrictions according to level


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• Multiple revocation of LTV • Eurobalise default message management • Data input • ERTMS management of independent ASFA equipment • Station stopping suggestion • Door control supervision • Tilting • Automatic train operation (ATO) • Degraded transition from Level 2 to Level 1 due to loss of contact with RBC when

running on track with Level 1 equipment • Degraded transition from Level 1 to STM ASFA Level, running on track with ASFA

equipment • Degraded transition from Level 2 to STM ASFA, running on track with ASFA

equipment • Degraded transition from Level 1 to Level 0 + ASFA, running on track with ASFA

equipment • Degraded transition from Level 2 to Level 0 + ASFA, running on track with ASFA

equipment • Inhibition of available levels • Link response management Also for ERTMS Level 1 trackside equipment, National Functions have been implemented regarding: • Tunnel management • Viaduct and bridge management • ZN management • Gauge changer management • Managing passing trains in tunnels • ERTMS/ETCS level transitions • LTV management • SR speed changes • Balise default message management • Detector management


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4 System description and Interfaces with National Trackside systems This chapter presents a general overview of the system architecture and describes the interfaces between ETCS subsystems (balises and RBC) and the National Trackside (non-ETCS) systems. For each interface, consequences for interoperability will be assessed.



CommandCommand

RBCRBC

STM

GSMRConv.ATP

GSMR

Detection

For each project, the following aspects will be highlighted (if applicable):

• The applied ERTMS Level and use of fall-back systems.

• The application of Infill functionality

• The interface between Interlocking and RBC

• The interface with the Maintenance Centre

4.1 Austria & Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project In the Austria – Italy Brenner Basis Tunnel project, an ERTMS Level 2 system is planned. No fall back system will be installed. The redundant ERTMS Level 2 system will fulfil the high level availability requirements. GSM-R is installed for data and voice communication purposes. The interlocking and signalling system, which covers the line between Innsbruck and Fortezza, will be based on Austrian-German regulations and technology. The main Control Centre will be located in Innsbruck. An auxiliary Control Centre is planned in Verona or Bologna.

4.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf In the Vienna – Nickelsdorf project, a dual signalling ERTMS Level 1/Level STM system has been implemented. The dual signalling system consists of a conventional system with wayside signals and PZB (Level STM) and an ETCS Level 1 overlay system. The fallback mode is the conventional PZB system. The PZB systems are thus installed on existing locomotives which are used as fall-back system.


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The interface between the interlocking and trackside system has been implemented via the LEU. A LEU gets the information from the national interface by monitoring the current of all signal lamps. The corresponding telegram is derived from the combination of possible lamp currents. The LEUs send the information to the balises or Euroloops. The standard system with balises is supplemented by infill functionality with loops. The infill information is mainly used in stations where the danger points are too near the signal. Currently there is no train to track communication, except the standard analogue radio transmission for voice communication. GSM-R for voice communication is intended to be applied in the future.


Line 3 Liege – German/Belgian border / Line 4 Antwerp – Dutch/Belgian border ERTMS/ETCS level 2 is supplemented with ERTMS/ETCS level 1, which takes over in case the former experiences a failure while offering parallel operations in a mixed level application. In case of Level 1 operation, Infill information is supplied by balises. A gateway between interlocking and RBC is supplied. There is no communication between the maintenance centre and RBC. Temporary speed restrictions are send to the RBC by the operator. The RBC is not connected with the Control Centre; this is done via the Interlocking.

Belgian ETCS level 1 lines An ERTMS Level 1 system is planned for the Belgian conventional network. Besides trains with an ETCS Onboard Unit, trains with existing TBL equipment will also be able to run on the Level 1 tracks. For this purpose, the national Packet 44 will be implemented which enables rolling stock with existing TBL equipment and a reverse STM-TBL to read the contents of the balises. The interlocking is connected via LEU to the Eurobalises. The Belgian interlocking installations are either relay based for which the LEU is connected to contacts, for data gathering (the parallel interface) or electronic based so-called PLP-interlocking. The latter interfaces via the TFM-serial interface. Infrabel required that the LEU will survive a power failure lasting for 500 ms. As a consequence both suppliers had to make adaptations to their existing LEUs. These have been realised in the recent years, and the LEUs are now certified.

4.4 France: LGV-Est The LGV-Est architecture consists of a dual signalling ERTMS Level 2/TVM430 implementation. Trains with TVM430 equipment will be able to run on the LGV-Est as well as trains which have installed an ERTMS Onboard Unit with a STM-TVM430 (Bi-standard). For LGV-Est TVM is not mandatory, but for interconnections it is necessary. The TVM430 system and PRCI interlocking architecture (Poste à Relais à Commande Informatisée) has been extended with an interface between TVM430 and RBC. The LEUs which are necessary for the balises located in the transition zones have an interface with the PRCI interlocking. For the LGV-Est, seven RBCs have been installed, seventeen interlocking systems, seventeen TVM systems and eleven LEUs. TVM430 can be used as a fall back for ERTMS Level 2. For switching over to TVM430, communication with the traffic controller is required. A special procedure must be applied.


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4.5 German projects In the Berlin-Halle-Leipzig project, ERTMS Level 2 is applied. Since June 2006, the track has been double-equipped with LZB/PZB and ERTMS. PZB is used as fall back mode, using line-side signals, in case of total ETCS failure. A dynamic transfer to LZB at ETCS failure has not been implemented. The connection between the four RBCs and their respective national interlocking is achieved by a local closed network. Bitterfeld, Wittenberg and Jüterbog are equipped with "L90" (Alcatel, now: Thales Group) electronic interlocking systems. Ludwigsfelde is controlled by Siemens "SIMIS C" electronic interlocking. This proprietary (national) interface is also used to connect the LZB centres. The RBCs are given the status of the changeable yard elements (e.g. points and signals) from the interlockings for the creation of the MA. Track occupancy information is not necessary for the RBC. The borders of interlockings and RBCs are congruent for reasons of technical (logical) simplification and operational clearness.

4.6 Italian projects The Italian ERTMS application for high speed lines is a Level 2 system with no fall back option. The high speed line interlocking systems have interfaces for transferring data regarding the wayside objects status to the RBC and to exchange block information with the following and previous interlocking. All the information related to the status of wayside objects required for the RBC to elaborate the Movement authority is sent by the interlocking. The protocol used to create the link between RBC and Interlocking is “Euroradio plus”. This protocol is based on the Euroradio protocol, with some additions currently being standardised, and is compliant with EN 50159-2. Temporary Speed Restrictions are managed by the RBC. A Register of Infrastructure will be available within short time.

4.7 Dutch projects

Amsterdam – Utrecht The line has been equipped with conventional signalling system ATB-EG. A dual signalling architecture with ERTMS Level 2/ATB-EG is planned. Trains equipped with ATB-EG or ERTMS trains with an Onboard Unit and an STM-ATB will be able to run on the Amsterdam-Utrecht Line. Eight interlocking computers and two RBCs have been installed.

BetuweRoute The applied level of ERTMS is Level 2 and there is no fall back solution. An original plan for ATB-NG (Simple ATB NG system with signals and very large sections, only allowing limited capacity) is not implemented. The system interfaces on Level 2 with the national system ATB near Rotterdam (Kijfhoek) and near the German border (Zevenaar) Entrance: ATB-ERTMS L2; Exit: ERTMS L2-ATB.


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The switchable balises near the entrance will be controlled by LEU by the adjacent interlockings (VPI at Meteren or Elst and EBS at Kijfhoek and Zevenaar) The Havenspoorlijn (West of Rotterdam) will be equipped with ERTMS Level 2 in future. Implementation has been postponed so far because of the lack of ERTMS-equipped trains. The interface between interlocking and RBC has been realized by Alstom, as both constituents are supplied by Alstom. There is no connection with a maintenance centre; the necessary maintenance related actions will be taken by the traffic control centre. A special problem has been encountered concerning Speed adaptation on entry transition. After having solved the basic transition problems, a new issue was discovered. When designing the signalling schemes for the transition from the ATB area to the ERTMS area, it was the goal of the designers to find a sequence of signal aspects that would support the maximum allowed track speed of 80 km/h in the connecting curves. A speed of 80 km/h would be achievable from the legacy ATB-system point of view, however it had to be checked how the ERTMS system would react in this particular situation. Beforehand one would not expect a problem, because the general mind setting is that ERTMS is an improvement compared to older systems. But in fact ERTMS can also be characterized as being more conservative and the fact that the BetuweRoute has to deal with freight trains, having poorer braking performance than passenger trains, is compounding this issue (Note: For BetuweRoute the End Of Authority is always the same as the Supervised Location). The ERTMS brake intervention curve for trains with poor brake performance is much more restrictive than the (fictive) curve that would apply in an ATB area. This results in a “supervised speed jump” at the moment the train borne equipment switches from Level STM to Level 2, which could cause the train to be stopped by an emergency brake intervention. This can only be avoided by lowering the entrance speed, resulting in a serious performance reduction for all trains. In order to reduce these negative effects on the performance of the BetuweRoute a procedural solution has been chosen. At the most critical locations an additional “speed advice signal” will be placed well before reaching the transition border. This signal will show a speed limitation in case the Movement Authority towards the BetuweRoute ends at the CS signal and is only applicable to trains with poor brake performance. Thanks to the joint effort of all parties involved, on 22 August 2006 for the first time ever a successful transitions Level 2 ATB-EG v.v. took place, using an STM ATB.

HSL-Zuid For performance reasons the HSL-Zuid Line is equipped with a Level 2 in combination with a Level 1 fall back system. ERTMS Level 1 has been installed as a fall back. HSL-Zuid line does not support mixed Level1/Level2 traffic. If the line is in Level2 (standard mode) trains can only run in Level 2 with a maximum speed of 300 km/h. When the whole line is switched to Level 1; trains can only run in Level 1 at a maximum speed of 160 km/h. Level 1 fall back is based on Eurobalises as spot transmission devices. The Eurobalise groups located at the Block Markers can only send information to the train when the train passes the Eurobalise group. Some Block Markers are therefore equipped with an overrun


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light to inform the driver - waiting in approach of a Block Marker - that the balise group contains a Movement Authority. Infill balises are placed between SMBs to transmit infill information at specific danger points. The balises on the high speed track are connected via a specific device (MSTT) to the electronic interlocking to provide the adequate information. The balises on the conventional track are connected via a LEU to the conventional signals. With regard to the Interface between RBC and Interlocking, no technical details are available since this is a dedicated Siemens/Alcatel interface. The interface between RBC and Interlocking is completely within the scope and design responsibility of the Infraspeed consortium. In due time, after the 25 year concession has ended, the State of the Netherlands will become the owner of all assets including this interface. A Register of Infrastructure is not publicly available, since the line is not in the exploitation phase yet.

4.8 Spanish projects ERTMS Level 1 is in commercial operation and will remain as a fall-back system when ERTMS Level 2 comes into service. ASFA has been implemented as a secondary fall back system. The interface with ERTMS is specified as National Function. Interfacing with interlocking and conventional signalling system: Level 1 balises are driven by the Interlocking system via LEUs. The LEUs are concentrated in the interlocking buildings. Interface between RBC and interlocking is the responsibility of the manufacturer and is proprietary


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5 Interface Train to Track



CommandCommand

RBCRBC

STM

GSMRConv.ATP

GSMR

Detection

Some functionality has been implemented besides ERTMS, often necessary for operational or safety requirements, e.g. hot-box detection, train detection, wind detection, etc. This chapter provides an overview of additional functions related to the track-to-train interface.

5.1 Austria & Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project Hot Box detectors are installed. Moreover, a number of additional security systems are planned: Axial Load Monitors, Train Gabarit Monitors, Security Access Control systems etc.

5.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf On the current line there are installed hot-box detectors with distances of about 50km. This is existing installation and independent from the ETCS covered in the project.


Line 3 Liege – German/Belgian border / Line 4: Antwerp – Dutch/Belgian border There are Track Circuits for train detection and there is Hot Axle Box Detection as opposed to the Dutch side of L4 (HSL-Z), where this system is not applied. This posed a problem for the Belgian side considering trains coming from the Netherlands; as a solution, hot box detection was placed in the Netherlands.

5.4 France: LGV-Est Track circuits are used, one on each block section. Those track circuits are connected to the interlocking system, the RBC gets this input also for managing Movement Authorities. There are today 24 hot-box detectors on the East European high speed line, 12 on each track, so each 25 km in average. A French directive imposes the headway between to hot-box detectors:

• for HSL with speed < 270km/h: maximum headway of 45 km between two hot-box detectors.

• for HSL up to 320 km/h: maximum headway of 30 km between two hot-box detectors


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It is allowed to have one hot-box detector in failure with no consequence for the maximum speed of the trains. Road bridges have been equipped with detectors able to prevent crashes with cars or trucks fallen on the track. Those detectors are directly linked to the interlocking system and the RBC can manage a Conditional Emergency Stop in order to stop trains that are coming in the dangerous area. The management of such detectors had a consequence on the value of the parameter T_NVCONTACT which is fixed to 20 seconds in order to be able to stop a train even if the radio communication is lost. Wind detectors have been installed in order to prevent over speed in case of cross wind. Each station will impose speed restrictions to trains running in its area in case of excessive wind.

5.5 German projects No loops are installed.

5.6 Italian projects The adopted signalling system is based on Solid State Interlockings supplemented by joint-less, audio-frequency track circuits. In Rome-Naples, the track circuit is supplied by Alstom; in Torino-Novara by Ansaldo. Hot box detectors are installed every 24 kilometres. If a high temperature is detected, the speed of the train will be automatically reduced by means of a temporary speed restriction in the case of a Hot Temperature alarm. In the case of a Very Hot Temperature alarm, the train will stop automatically in a predefined position from where it is possible to control the train axles and transfer the passengers. The alarms are sent from the hot box detector to the interlocking and to the train via a Eurobalise.

5.7 Dutch projects

Amsterdam – Utrecht No hot box detectors are installed on the line.

BetuweRoute No hot box detectors are installed on the line. Jade Track Circuits of Alstom are applied. This system is unique in the Netherlands because it is able to cope with the 25kV Catenaries. Only the BetuweRoute and HSL-Z are equipped with 25kV because the required power for freight trains and High Speed Trains could not be supplied by the existing 1500 V DC system.

HSL-Zuid Hot Box detectors are installed at the beginning and end of the line, approximately every 40 kilometres. They are not connected to the interlocking Connection between interlocking and wind detection systems is planned at two locations where wind gusts are expected, e.g. Bridge Hollands Diep. The connection of interlocking with flood doors is also realized, avoiding collision of a train and a flood door in case of emergency closure.


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For safety reasons, a system has been installed in the tunnels to detect trains with a very low speed. These trains will be treated as a train on fire: emergency procedures will be started automatically unless suppressed by the signalman. In general the interlocking will prevent trains entering a tunnel in calamity mode and will facilitate trains to exit that tunnel at the same time. Axle counters are used for train detection.

5.8 Spanish projects Hot box detectors are installed along the track, approximately every 40 kilometres. They are not connected to ERTMS. Track circuits are used for train detection.


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6 Interface between ERTMS Onboard Unit and national ATP systems



CommandCommand

RBCRBC

STM

GSMRConv.ATP

GSMR

Detection

The general description in the previous chapters shows that each ERTMS implementation must fit into the national network with existing legacy systems. The transition between national and ERTMS system is the main subject of this chapter. Trackside implementation and Onboard configuration will be described.

6.1 Austria & Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project The line is connected with the Italian network (SCMT) at the Fortezza Station (v<80 km/h) and with the Austrian network (LZB/Indusi) at the Innsbruck Station (v<60 km/h). In the future Italian and Austrian HSL lines at Fortezza and Innsbruck: ETCS/Lev. 2.

6.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf The ETCS track to train interface replaces the traditional PZB/LZB interface for trains equipped with an ETCS Onboard Unit and STM. The traditional interface can still be used for trains with the legacy system PZB and LZB. The ETCS _driver machine_ interface replaces the traditional interface for trains equipped with an ETCS Onboard Unit and STM. The existing PZB system can be used as fall back system for the case that the EVC must be taken out of operation due to an error. The following transitions (both directions) are implemented on the train (locomotive):

• ERTMS Level 1 Indusi/PZB • ERTMS Level 1 LZB (only on the train, not on the line Vienna - Nickelsdorf) • ERTMS Level 1 ERTMS Level 0 • ERTMS Level 1 EVM (only in Hungary, not on the line Vienna - Nickelsdorf)


Line 3 Liege – German/Belgian border / Line 4: Antwerp – Dutch/Belgian border The High Speed Train (Thalys), running on this track will be equipped with the so called “Bi-standard”, an onboard unit specially developed for the TGV-Est in France. This unit is


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able to run on TVM as well as ERTMS. The other systems, necessary for running form Paris to Amsterdam will not be replaced

Belgian ETCS level 1 lines The on-board assembly is outside the actual scope for the Infrabel-project. For the ETCS level 1, the on-board assembly should be realised with ERTMS on-board assembly. As on the rest of the Belgian network TBL is implemented, trains should also be fitted with an STM-TBL. This STM-TBL is in development, specifically for the use in the Thalys trains that will run on L3 and L4. An important issue has been the reaction of Thalys trains, equipped with KVB, that reacted to passing a Eurobalise. The KVB-system reported a “track-side failure”. Detailed investigations have shown that:

• The KVB 27 MHz signal (“non-toggling”) is outside the specifications as provided in SUBSET-036.

• As a consequence, the Eurobalise (“if no decision can be taken”) responded.

• The response from the Eurobalise is interpreted by the KVB-system as a “non-valid KVB-response”.

• As a consequence a failure is reported to the train-driver.

The balise involved is adapted to be less susceptible for KVB-signals. In order to handle this subject in a formal, correct way, the Belgian Ministry should inform EU via a derogation: a deviation from the European specifications is required, in order to resolve the problem detected.

6.4 France: LGV-Est At the borders of the LGV-Est, trains which are equipped with an ERTMS Onboard Unit and the right STM will make a transition from ERTMS STM ERTMS Level 2. In the direction Strasbourg, the interconnected lines are equipped with KVB; in the direction Paris and Lyon the interconnected lines are equipped with TVM430. An STM-TVM430 and an STM-KVB are required in ERTMS trains. During the transition from ERTMS towards TVM430, the national packet 44 is used in order to select the right TVM frequency. Trains equipped with only TVM430 system will not make a transition at the LGV-Est borders but will continue to run under the TVM430 system.

6.5 German projects A major problem was identified with regard to the interface ETCS <-> LZB and its transitions. ETCS was assigned the system master function by the UNISIG specification, i.e. the established national ATP (LZB) lost its autonomy. This was a functional problem; for intelligent ATP systems like LZB it becomes a challenge if they are to take over the protection of the train ordered by the master at any arbitrary local or time point. Respecting the prevailing LZB takeover and end procedures, this may not happen at any arbitrary point. With the five BR101 trains currently available, automatic transitions ETCS – LZB and vice versa have not been implemented. ETCS (or LZB/PZB) protected trains cannot be divided into an LZB/PZB and an ETCS part. No external LZB/PZB STM is available on the market


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at the moment. The locomotives already fitted with LZB/PZB onboard equipment were retrofitted by ETCS, connected to the conventional Multi Functional Bus (MVB). LZB/PZB and ETCS units address their own particular braking units and odometry pulse generators. LZB and PZB needed to be implemented in one technical unit. The reason for the integration of the two national protection systems in one item is the historic functional hierarchy with PCB as fall back Level in the case of LZB failure. Hence for the ETCS component, the LZB/PZB unit acts as one logical entity. This type of “STM” not only receives the track data, it also fully computes and outputs them as a stand alone train protection system. The only allowed way to come into the protection of ETCS is to start in PZB mode, for regulatory and operational reasons, not for technical reasons. The system will be transferred automatically into ETCS at defined way points (signals). On the German network no train is allowed to be run without PZB or PZB/LZB for regulatory reasons. In the moment 5 BR 101 locomotives are tested and allowed to run on the BHL track. Apart from ETCS and LZB they are equipped with both PZB and level 0. The only allowed way to come into the protection of ETCS is to start in PZB mode, for regulatory and operational reasons, not for technical reasons! On the German network no train is allowed to be run without PZB or PZB/LZB. And up to the present there is no exemption for BHL. Technically any train equipped with ETCS could also start in level 0.

6.6 Italy: Rome – Naples, Torino– Novara The interconnected conventional lines are equipped with the Italian BACC/SCMT signalling system. This requires the on-board train control system to be equipped with an STM BACC/SCMT. Train entrance & exit to the interconnections are managed as normal Level transition:

STM L2 or L2 STM for the train equipped by STM or: L0 L2 or L2 L0 for those not equipped with the STM.

At the national borders, the ERTMS system is interfaced with the national systems, SCMT and BACC. At the moment there are two on-board configurations:

• ETCS and national systems, with only cabled relations (ETCS is the master that commands transitions, intermediate step of development)

• ETCS with an STM, which is the target configuration.


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Border Traditional line ERTMS Line ERTMS/SCMT

Balise group

Italian Light Signal

Traditional line

High Speed line

Interconnection

Border Traditional line ERTMS Line

ERTMS/SCMT Balise group

Italian Light Signal

Traditional line

High Speed line

Interconnection

ENTRANCE to HSL from Traditional line

The switching balise group is a mixed ERTMS and SCMT balise group. The SCMT message contains the signal aspect (switching message); the ERTMS message (fixed message) contains the Level transition order. The Electronic Interlocking controls the light signal (green aspect when the interconnection is free and the route is locked). The electronic interlocking is developed by Ansaldo. Further conditions are necessary to permit the entrance of the train (green aspect of the train signal):

• The train must be connected to the RBC;

• The MA sent by RBC must be acknowledged by EVC.

EXIT FROM HSL line to traditional line. All data regarding the traditional line are sent by Relays interlocking to RBC by means of the electronic interlocking. The RBC sends the MA based on the received data. The balise group is a mixed SCMT and ERTMS balise. The SCMT message contains the signal aspect (switching message); the ERTMS message contains the Level transition order and the stop order in stuff responsible if the light signal aspect is red. Overlapping of systems in the boundary area guarantees the correct management of all restrictive conditions related to safety and availability. The technical interfaces are managed to guarantee a safe transition between National and European CCSs. The configuration of the boundary area has been designed to avoid any intrusive behaviour of any system over the other. Maintenance staff and signalman have procedures to manage all the information about configuration at the boundaries (TSRs and others). Regarding the On Board Assembly, there are different solutions due to different product releases in different development stages. At the beginning on the trains there have been both ETCS and BACC (STM) on board system totally different. Nowadays the on board systems have achieved the complete integration between the STM (SCMT) and ETCS with both the Juridical recorder (European and national).

Relays Interlocking Electronic Interlocking RBC

Relays Interlocking Electronic Interlocking RBC


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6.7 Dutch projects

Amsterdam – Utrecht The trains running on the Amsterdam – Utrecht line must have onboard the ATP systems ATB-EG for the conventional network or an ETCS Onboard Unit with an STM-ATB. A transition ERTMS Level 2 ERTMS Level STM-ATB is planned to be implemented.

BetuweRoute Most trains will be equipped with the so called USSB of Alstom so that, depending on the track side system, the correspondent on-board system can be switch on or off. It is self understood that any train entering the BetuweRoute has to be equipped with an ERTMS on-board system, as no other track-side system than ERTMS Level 2 is installed.

HSL-Zuid The HSL-Zuid infrastructure can be accessed via the Dutch conventional network and via the Belgian Line 4. Consequently, trains running on the HSL-Zuid must have onboard the ATP systems ATB-EG for the conventional network and ERTMS for the HSL-Zuid. The following transitions related to HSL-Zuid and the conventional network have been implemented:

Entrance HSL-Zuid: Level STM- Level 1 – Level 2 The procedure is as follows: First the train running on conventional infrastructure in the direction to the HSL-Zuid receives an order from the ‘session balise group’ to establish a connection with the RBC At the last conventional signal, the train receives a Level 1 Transition order and a Movement Authority (MA) valid beyond the signal. The train is driving in Level 1, but at this stage the train driver is not yet operating under CAB signalling. In this stage of the transition, ERTMS is used as an ATP system, under the Dutch National Rules; The Dutch line side signalling system applies since only one signalling system may apply. Strictly speaking there is no Cab-signalling at this stage. This situation exists on a very short piece of track, roughly between 50 and 100 meter, just long enough to make the transition. After passing the Cab board the Cab signalling is leading. By means of a CAB board located beyond the Level1 Transition spot a train driver gets the order to change from Line Side Signalling into Cab Signalling. At the first SMB, the train receives a Level 2 Transition order.

Entrance HSL-Zuid (fall back mode): Level STM – Level 1 Exit HSL-Zuid: Level 2 – Level STM Exit HSL-Zuid (fall back mode): Level 1 – Level STM Regarding the conventional network between the Netherlands and Belgium, a Level STM – Level STM will be designed. To facilitate these transitions, two STMs have been developed by the industry.


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The STM from Alstom uses already existing ATB-EG and ATB-NG equipment. The so-called USSB connects the ATB equipment with the EVC. The behaviour is compliant with the ERTMS STM specifications. The STM from Bombardier is an external STM, only able to run on ATB-EG infrastructure. The behaviour is compliant with the ERTMS STM specifications.

6.8 Spanish projects Several onboard configurations are available:

• ERTMS with an STM

• ERTMS with ASFA as a standby system. ASFA becomes active when ERTMS is not available

• ERTMS with STM-LZB

• ERTMS with stand alone LZB equipment


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7 Operational interfaces This chapter describes the relevant operational interfaces:

• Train driver – DMI • Train driver - wayside signals • Train drive - signalman.

The allocation of safety responsibilities between technical systems and operation will be addressed by indicating the general strategy followed to determine which safety responsibilities are imposed on operation (the rest will be technical).



CommandCommand

RBCRBC

STM

GSMRConv.ATP

GSMR

Detection

7.1 Austria & Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project Wayside signals will only be installed at the interconnections with the conventional lines. Virtual signals with external marker boards will be located at the border of the block sections along the line. A GSMR (plus TETRA) mobile telecommunication system is planned for all mobile telecom duties from a single GSMR Operator. Additional redundancy is ensured by public GSM managed by Austrian and Italian commercial providers. The extension of the Austrian GSMR network is planned to cover the whole line up to the technical border in Fortezza.

7.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf The operation of the ETCS system, especially the data for the transparent balises or Euroloops cannot be changed by any duty operator or similar person. In any case of failure of the normal railway system, the already approved regulations for the national railway system will be applied. In the case of failure of a balise or Euroloop, the driver will be informed via the DMI. He must follow the operational rules laid down in the manual for the ETCS system and the operating rules manual for ETCS Level 1. The manuals are based on national rules. The old TSI OPE has not been taken into account. The protection of track workers should be solved by inserting temporary balises in the track, but the procedures etc. have not yet been fixed.


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All conventional national rules apply when the ETCS system is out of service. The driver – traffic control voice connection is ensured by a conventional train radio communication system; GSM-R is planned.


Line 3 Liege – German/Belgian border / Line 4: Antwerp – Dutch/Belgian border There is no info about the DMIs that will be used by the Train Operating companies, other then mentioned in the HSL-Zuid part of this chapter. The same Thalys trains, using the so-called “Bi-standard” (TVM and ERTMS) will run on these lines. Infrabel is aware of the fact that the specs for the DMI are not yet quite finished and that there are differences between the different suppliers. There are procedures (part of the operational rules) that apply in case of fall back from Level 2 to Level 1. There is a limited number of national signalling lights (white/red signal) where shunting is possible. National boards are applied. There is a possibility moving points locally by train driver and maintenance employees with a key in case the electrical motor drive of the point is not functioning. The motor is the uncoupled. Some special light signals are equipped with telephones. The Train driver can (outside ERTMS) occupy a track by using a wayside switch. The driver can communicate with the dispatcher, using the GSM-R network that will be installed completely on 3000 of the 3400 km Belgian network by 2008.

7.4 France: LGV-Est Operational rules are implemented according to the ERTMS Operational Rules.

Driver – Signalman Driver has direct contact with signalman by means of GSM-R mobile phone or fixed phones installed along the line.

Driver – Train-borne systems The DMI used for the LGV-Est trains has a redundant architecture. The planning area has not been implemented. A special function is available for the workshop maintenance process. A so-called jockey mode can be selected before the Start of Mission process which enables running below 15 km/h.

Driver-Trackside systems Marker boards are positioned at each end of a block section. No lateral signals are used. A CAB board will be installed to indicate the use of cabin display at the beginning of the high speed line.


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System for Temporary speed restriction A special system (GEST), connected to all RBCs, has been developed to implement the TSR functionality to ensure a safe process.

7.5 German projects

Driver – Signalman There is no operational rule for shunting speed, since “shunting mode” is not implemented.

Driver-Trackside systems Whereas the line has been equipped with wayside signals the following applies: In regular procedures no preference has been given to the wayside signals or the cab-signalling. The way-side signals are not darkened in sight of a train driving on ETCS. A theoretical rule exists that in case of a discrepancy between the CAB-signalling and the wayside signalling, the driver should stop. ETCS specific operational rules, e.g. for passing signals at danger have not been implemented. Conventional national rules are valid and adapted as far as necessary.

Driver – Train-Borne systems Since ETCS and LZB are applied, two sets of train data have to be keyed in by the driver, in order to properly configure the systems.

7.6 Italian projects When the ERTMS works in Full Supervision, the communication between ERTMS and the outside world is managed wholly in technical mode (without human actions). When a degraded situation occurs, the staff have to manage the train or shunting movements without the help of signalling system. No lateral signals are used. Only Marker Boards are used at the borders of each Block Section. There is no fall back signalling system. The signalman is responsible for recognising the position of other trains and communicating orders to the driver authorising train/shunting movements from one point to another on the line in a safe way. The driver is responsible for recognising the freedom of the path ahead of the train during train/shunting movements.

Driver – Signalman Driver has direct contact with the signalman (who manages the Traffic Control System, SCC-AV) by means of GSM-R mobile phone or fixed phones installed along the line. The communication is necessary to manage any irregularity in railway traffic. GSM-R on-board (cab-radio) and dedicated phone lines along the track allow the driver to contact the signalman and receive orders. All communications between the driver and signalman are registered to avoid the necessity of completing paper forms. On-sight train movements are managed with rules related to general principle applied on the entire Italian railway network. There are innovations regarding new CCS functions related to safe train movement supervision (possibility to increase on-sight movement at a maximum speed up to 60 km/h in open line).


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Temporary speed restrictions are managed by the system but when all related data are deleted by the on-board subsystem (i.e. EoM), the management is in charge of the signalman (who has to provide the driver with all the TSR information relating to the route ahead of the train by means of paper forms) and driver (who has to control train speed in respect of the received paper forms).

Driver-Trainborn systems Data entry procedure by the driver is described in the on-board user manual (different from data entry procedure of national CCS SCMT). There are also rules related to the manual management of change power traction and CAMBIO FASE by driver in degraded situations (train movement without management of track conditions by system supervision). DMI are developed by the on-board system supplier according to CENELEC specifications. No national items have been introduced on the DMI to preserve interoperability of the on-board subsystem.

Driver-Trackside systems Fixed signals (no light signal) are positioned at every EoA (in open line and in station). They are not relevant during a mission under the complete supervision of the CCS. They provide a reference point during degraded situations with on-sight train movement. Kilometric marks are other essential signs to manage train movement by driver in open line. All HC/HSLs adopted signs are collected in a dedicated section in the National Signalling Book.

7.7 Dutch projects

Amsterdam – Utrecht The trains run on the Amsterdam – Utrecht on lateral signals and ATB EG. Trains must have onboard the ATP systems ATB-EG for the conventional network or an ETCS Onboard Unit with an STM-ATB. When the line is equipped with ERTMS Level 2 as an overlay system, a transition ERTMS Level 2 ERTMS Level STM-ATB is planned.

Driver – Signalman All driver-signalman interface related communication is conducted through GSMR. In the case of GSM-R voice failure, a procedure will be implemented. The language will be Dutch. The existing way of working by Traffic Control has remained unchanged as far as possible; no fundamentally new safety critical activities for the signalman have been introduced. No changes were therefore necessary in the existing safety management system of Traffic Control. In general the signalman has no role in implementing measures altering the system configuration (e.g. keying in a Temporary Speed Restriction or performing a system reset).


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BetuweRoute The BetuweRoute is equipped with work zone management, a dedicated Dutch development within the ERTMS signalling system (Called Bev 21)

HSL-Zuid The allocation of responsibilities to technical systems and operation is based on a set of jointly drafted Signalling Scenarios in close cooperation with operational parties and the supplier of the signalling system. New ERTMS related procedures mainly support the degraded modes of operation in Level 1. In a set of documents (Customer Rules, Safety Related Application Conditions), the supplier of the signalling system has listed actions to be undertaken by system users, including those that are safety related. These rules indicate how the system has to be used by the customer in order to ensure safe operation. These rules comply with the applicable TSIs. Specific operational scenarios for tunnel calamities have been defined. No additional ERTMS functionality is required. One speculative conclusion: the reaction that is required from the driver following an alarm call is a crucial element in the tunnel procedures. This reaction has not been standardised on the corridor. Drivers and signalmen receive a specific training to become certified for driving on / operating a specific line. Regarding the signalmen the examination is conducted by the safety department of ProRail/Traffic Control. Specific examples are:

• The ERTMS emergency stop functionality will not be used. In specific circumstances the driver will be informed via an alarm call and the MA will be revoked.

• Staff protection is guaranteed by the implementation of working zones that are switched through local key boxes according to a joint procedure between Traffic Control and the maintenance company. Through the interlocking / ERTMS it is ensured that no normal route setting is possible into the working zone. A special procedure applies for entering and exiting the working zone.

• Unauthorised access to the track is prevented through fences. The residual risk has to be mitigated through incidental observation, mainly by the driver.

No detection of broken rail is implemented. Sweeping runs are only required after maintenance activities. No systems are installed to detect the collision of a ship with a bridge to detect ice, excessive snow or freezing rain. The residual risks must be mitigated through incidental observation by maintenance company and driver.


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Driver – Signalman All driver-signalman interface-related communication is conducted through GSMR. In the case of GSM-R voice failure, a procedure will be implemented. The language will be Dutch. The existing way of working by Traffic Control has remained unchanged as far as possible; no fundamentally new safety critical activities for the signalman have been introduced. No changes were therefore necessary in the existing safety management system of Traffic Control. In general the signalman has no role in implementing measures altering the system configuration (e.g. keying in a Temporary Speed Restriction or performing a system reset). Driver-Train-borne systems The driver-DMI is largely determined by the choice of the supplier for the trains. ERTMS Onboard Units will be supplied by Bombardier and Ansaldo (CSEE-Transport).

Driver-Trackside systems The driver-wayside interface requires several new signs to be used that will be incorporated in the Railway Act/Signalling book before the start of commercial operations. These will include the Stopmerkbord, Cab signalling, end of Cab Signalling and signs related to the implementation of the 25kV catenary system on the line.

7.8 Spanish projects The DMI differs according to the train borne equipment manufacturer. Five versions are currently installed in different rolling stock:

• Siemens

• Ansaldo (CSEE)

• Alstom

• Invensys

• Bombardier Specific instructions describe the signalling and procedures related to the driver interfaces. Specific instructions describe the ERTMS operation on the Madrid-Lleida line for Level 1, Level 0 and line application of Level 0 + ASFA. The following points are specified: • Operating Levels • Train protection functions • Operating • Line-side signal orders related to operations with ETCS L1 • Connection and disconnection • Data entry • Modes:

o SR train operation mode o FS train operation mode o SH train operation mode o UN train operation mode o OS train operation mode on entering occupied track


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o EOA train operation mode • Areas supervised by the train-borne equipment

o Supervision of end of movement authority o Section validity supervision o Standstill supervision o Roll away supervision o Reverse supervision o Release speed supervision o Train speed supervision o Temporary speed limit supervision o Supervision with service brake malfunctioning or deactivated o Supervision to buffers o Protection in case of extended stops

• Change of ERTMS Level of application • Malfunctions ADIF has also incorporated “national functions”, which include special features exclusive to Spanish lines. Operation under ERTMS mainly affects the driver, with regard to his responsibility and driving style, so as the Signalman, given that itinerary preparation (one additional block section in conventional signalling) and the maximum speed (200 km/h conventional, 300 km/h in ERTMS) differs from the conventional signalling operation


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8 ERTMS Border crossing



CommandCommand

RBCRBC

STM

GSMRConv.ATP

GSMR

Detection

Implementation of border crossing functionality on ERTMS lines is currently relevant for some Austrian, Belgian, Dutch and French projects. For non-ERTMS infrastructure, too, some ERTMS border crossing functionality might be necessary. Due to the fact that transitions between two different STM areas must be supported, ERTMS balises may be required in conventional infrastructure.

8.1 Austria & Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project For long tunnel hazards mitigation, the technical border (for the CCS and Operation sub-systems) has been moved from the political border down to the Fortezza station.

8.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf As the project Vienna-Nickelsdorf is a purely national project; no border transitions have been made. As ETCS will also be used in Hungary, a direct Level 1 Level 1 transition is envisaged at the border between Austria and Hungary.


Line 3 Liege – German/Belgian border / Line 4: Antwerp – Dutch/Belgian border There is no border crossing foreseen for L3, because the line stops before the border. Then there will be ERTMS Level 1 to Aachen. As the L3 line supports mixed traffic Level 2/Level 1 and thus can fall back to Level 1, both transitions to the Level 1 line leading to Aachen will be supported. For the transition at the Dutch-Belgian border is referred to the HSL-Zuid section in this chapter. From Infrabel the following additional points were mentioned: Harmonizing the interlockings caused problems; there was a discussion about announcements. TSRs had also to be harmonized.


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It was a problem that at the Belgian side in a degraded mode trains can run Level 2 as well as Level 1, whereas the Dutch side can only completely degrade to Level 1. In that case, the Belgian side will have to offer all trains in Level 1 mode. Problems can arise when the track is in maintenance; special provisions have to be taken in order to prevent unfitted working trains from “escaping” from the maintenance area. A simple solution is to put two locomotives as protection of the borders.

Belgian ETCS level 1 lines Beside the border crossing between Belgium and Germany at the L3 interface, the first border crossing will be with Luxemburg, where ETCS level 1 is already implemented. No detailed information is available, yet. On the conventional network currently the border crossing with NL is of relevance: Essen – Roosendaal will be equipped with balises, in order to realise the transition from TBL to ATB for trains equipped with ETCS. The actual trains are the Thalys train, which may use this route as a deviation route, after L4+HSL-Zuid will be in service. Essen-Roosendaal will not be upgraded to ETCS in the near future.

8.4 France: LGV-Est During the first phase of the LGV-Est project, ERTMS will be installed between Vaires and Baudrecourt. Trains running to Germany and Luxembourg will use conventional ATP systems to make a transition at the border. The border crossing between France and Germany is equipped with KVB on French side and PZB on German side. Between France and Luxembourg, the border crossing is equipped with KVB on the French side and Memor 2+ on the Luxembourg side. The ETCS onboard system (the one of POS train) will manage this transition via STM mode like it is required in the SRS.

8.5 German projects No border crossing

8.6 Italian projects No border crossing

8.7 Dutch projects

Amsterdam - Utrecht No border crossing

BetuweRoute No border-crossing necessary as the line segment near the German border is equipped with ATB.


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HSL-Zuid At the Dutch-Belgian border, the Dutch and Belgian high speed tracks are connected to each other. On the Belgian side as well as on the Dutch side, the signalling solution is based on ETCS Level 2 and ETCS Level 1 as fall back. Both Belgian Line 4 and Dutch HSL-Zuid high speed lines have been tendered separately and are being built by different consortiums.

Technical Harmonisation Dutch and Belgian ERTMS implementation During discussions between the Belgian Infrastructure manager and the Dutch Safety Authority (IVW), it became clear that it was necessary to harmonise the use of Level 1. In Level 1, the use of (conventional) signals in combination with Level 1 is permitted. This could lead to different Level 1 implementation on both sides of the Dutch-Belgian border, because the conventional signals differ between the two countries. The aim was to find a harmonised solution, taking into account the use of the national Signalling systems and the available solutions in the Signalling books of NMBS and IVW. Possible alternative solutions have been compared with each other, ultimately leading to the chosen solution: The use of “Stopmerkborden” – as used with the Line 2 in Belgium - equipped with overrun lights (or Crown only in Belgium). These Stopmerkborden (SMBs) are used as block markers. The Overrun light or Crown is used when the MA has ended at a certain SMB. A white Overrun light or Crown tells the train driver that there is MA information available in the balise located at the SMB and that the train can therefore pass the SMB at release speed. The chosen Level 1 implementation does not conflict with interoperability requirements.

RBC-RBC interface At the border, an ERTMS Level 2 and ERTMS Level 1 interface was required. This will be supplied by two suppliers: Alstom is responsible for the Belgian ERTMS Level 2 implementation and Alcatel is responsible for the Dutch ERTMS Level 2 implementation. Both suppliers have based the RBC developments on the RBC-FIS. Due to the fact that these specifications could be interpreted in separate ways, the developments of the two suppliers were in line with the specifications. However, it was clear that neither RBC could exchange information at border crossing Level correctly. It was necessary to develop a dedicated solution, enabling the necessary communication between the Dutch and Belgian RBC. This so-called Gateway was developed by a consortium of Alstom and Alcatel. Interoperability and 300 km/h border crossing were important requirements for the Gateway. But also the Level 2 – Level 1 and Level 1 – Level 1 transitions at the border in all relevant modes (Full Supervision, Staff Responsible, On sight) had to be supported by the Gateway development.

GSM-R interface At the Dutch-Belgian border, the two GSM-R networks have been connected by an interPLMN interface. This has no consequences for interoperability. Trains crossing the border at 300 km/h must have at least two GSM-R channels available.

Operational harmonisation Dutch and Belgian ERTMS procedures A joint document written by the infrastructure managers ProRail and Infrabel (“grensbaanvakovereenkomst”) includes a detailed analysis about procedures which are applicable with respect to the border crossing. Discussions on possible harmonisation regarding operational procedures on the Amsterdam-Brussels-Paris corridor have not been fully concluded. Several issues might be harmonised, e.g. response on GSMR alarm call, system response after failure by the driver to give confirmation on TAF request.


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Also the harmonisation of the translation of ERTMS terminology into Dutch has not been finalised. Slight but relevant differences exist between the Dutch language spoken in Belgium and that spoken in the Netherlands. For interoperable lines, a common solution is not available. A shift was made in technical border versus geographical border necessitating an agreement on maintenance procedures.

ERTMS border crossing conventional network To support ERTMS trains running between the Netherlands and Belgium on the conventional network, a transition from Level STM-ATB to Level STM-MEMOR/TBL1 for trains equipped with a STM-MEMOR/TBL1 and a Level STM-ATB Level 0 will be performed by trains which do not have a STM-MEMOR/TBL1 onboard. ERTMS balises are installed to make this transition.

Key Management Two RBCs control the HSL-Zuid line, one for the Amsterdam-Rotterdam section and one for the Rotterdam-Belgian border section. For each train running on the HSL-Zuid, a key (KMAC) has to be implemented in the RBCs and in the OBU. The HSL-Zuid line Maintenance Company will carry out Inserting/Deleting keys in the RBC: Infraspeed. Rolling Stock Suppliers will carry Inserting/Deleting keys in the OBUs of the trains on behalf of the train operating companies. ProRail (= Dutch Infrastructure Manager and responsible for Key management in the Netherlands) will reach agreement with each party capable of inserting/deleting keys about a number of procedures/condition in order to cover the following Key Management functions: Key Generation, Key Validation, Key Storage, Key Distribution, Key Installation, Key Deletion. Special regulations, procedures and requirements have been defined by ProRail for the Key management process. For each new train, the Key Management Centre (KMC) of ProRail will generate the key (KMAC) on request of the Train Operating Company. Before distributing these keys by e-mail to Infraspeed and the relevant Rolling Stock supplier, the keys will be encrypted by means of Transport Keys. Each party capable of installing KMACs has its own Transport Key. To allow foreign trains onto an ERTMS Level 2 line, procedures to exchange keys between national Key Management Centres are being developed. Thus foreign trains can implement keys which allow communication with foreign RBCs.

8.8 Spanish projects With ETCS Level 2, transition between Madrid and Lleida and Lleida-Roda de Bará is made through Level 1 at a maximum permitted speed of 300 km/h. No RBC-RBC connection has been implemented. A technological border exists between the Madrid-Lleida and Lleida-Roda de Bará sections of the Madrid - Barcelona HSL. Both sections have been supplied by different manufacturers. In the future, the transition between neighbouring RBCs will take place automatically. Currently, the transition from one section to another takes place at a reduced speed in Level 1.


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9 Test activities

9.1 Austria & Italy: Brenner Basis Tunnel project Test activities have been planned in the future, but have not been performed up till now.

9.2 Austria: Vienna – Nickelsdorf The test activities are currently limited to validation tests for the train-side system. These have now largely been concluded. The test activities were also used as tests for the validation of the balise telegrams. Additionally special trackside related functional tests have been carried out. They were meant to test the system behaviour of the specific Austrian constellation during practical operation. Limited cross tests have been performed with a DB ETCS test train and with a Hungarian locomotive with an Alcatel Level 1 implementation of Alcatel.


Line 3 Liege – German/Belgian border / Line 4: Antwerp – Dutch/Belgian border A comprehensive test program has started as a preparation for the operational services of L4. This test program comprises:

1. ERTMS cross tests with onboard units from Alstom, Bombardier, CSEE and Siemens.

2. ERTMS transition tests between L4 and conventional infrastructure.

3. ERTMS transition tests between HSL-Zuid and Line 4 at the Dutch border.

4. ERTMS transition tests between Dutch and Belgium conventional network.

5. ERTMS operational tests

6. ERTMS endurance tests (also with the purpose to make the train drivers familiar with ERTMS)

These tests are performed in three steps:

1. Trackside implementation ERTMS V2.2.2

2. Trackside implementation ERTMS V2.2.2+

3. Trackside implementation ERTMS V2.3.0 Corridor

Belgian ETCS level 1 lines At earlier stages of the project, only testing with the reverse STM-TBL has been executed. Testing is foreseen for early 2008 on the test trajectory Ath-Silly. The test plans are in progress, but not completed yet.


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9.4 France: LGV-Est A comprehensive test programme was started as preparation for the operational services. This test programme comprises:

1. Cross tests are planned with ICE trains in future when the ICE will be equipped with ETCS. No cross test have been performed for the moment.

2. Transitions between ETCS, KVB and TVM are tested firstly in laboratory (in Valenciennes at CEF premises) for a functional validation and secondly on the real line for integration and performances validation.

3. ERTMS driver rules have been tested on a driver simulator. The driver behaviour has been validated during operation including human factor point of view. In this way, the rules book to be applied in France on the ETCS HS network was validated.

4. Shadow runs in commercial configuration are planned without passengers in order to stress the system in real operational conditions and in particular degraded situations regarding operation (not nominal operation where the train is only running at full speed along the all line). A distance of 60 000 km has been defined to run for, reaching a first evidence of the availability of the system (trackside plus onboard).

9.5 German projects After comprehensive testing in the suppliers´ laboratories, integrative and field testing - mostly started in 2003 - both net operator and railway operator performed various system test runs. 260 operational test scenarios have been derived from the national functional specification (LH) and the European specifications in order to demonstrate correct concurrence of rolling stock and network in both regular and fall back mode. For the purpose of evaluation and faults documentation, an integrated fault database was set up, depicting and classifying all faults and open points from suppliers´ tests, DB testing, as well as from risk and hazard analysis and rules frameworks. Safety related topics have been extracted to a hazard log. Suppliers and operators assessed, corrected and decided on the findings at periodical reviews and finally closed the faults and open points before the start of the safety probation period. Safety cases have also been finalised and assessed before starting the probation. Cross exchange tests on other member states lines or by other member states trains on the BHL line were not performed. Before starting full service on the line, qualification testing was conducted in several steps, accompanied by a theoretical verification of the safety cases. Test classes were defined and performed: a) verification of functional requirements on components level and components interfaces; b) common testing for principal system interrelations; c) acceptance of balise assembly, route atlas, RBC projection and onboard equipment (distribution of roles acc. to national regulations. For every train route - signalling, locations of speed changes - a separate acceptance procedure was performed); d) system validation of overall system requirements; e) safety probation/safety testing of the overall system (track and train) after successful theoretical safety case verification; performing step-by-step speed enhancements up to 160 and 200 km/h.


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9.6 Italian projects

ERTMS Functional tests Functional tests and robustness tests had been performed before the start of the probationary period.

ERTMS operational tests Targets of operational tests during probationary period:

• the applicability of the expected rule procedures o rules easy to apply: yes/no

• the good behaviour of each actor involved o more teaching: yes/no

• the time needed o slow /speedy procedure

• operational safety o everything is covered by the rules / comprehensiveness: yes/no

• applicability of the procedures o rules easy to keep in mind by actors: yes/no) o time needed: too much yes/no.

At the end of the probationary period, RFI sent a report to “Ministero dei Trasporti” named 'Pre esercizio linea AC AV Roma Napoli Reapporto finale sulla esaustività ed idoneità del sistema regolamentare' with the evaluation of operational rules and a proposal for improvement.

ERTMS cross tests No cross tests between ETCS devices and subsystems of different suppliers were performed before the revenue service activation of Rome-Naples High Speed Line because at that moment there was only the Alstom onboard subsystem. During the assessment of the Torino Novara line, because the RBC had been supplied by Ansaldo and the onboard subsystem supplied by the Alstom, several cross test sessions were performed in the laboratory and on the Torino Novara line to achieve complete functional and safety interoperability. Today, a new on board subsystem (Ansaldo subsystem) has been authorised by the railway authority to run on the Italian High Speed Lines. To obtain authorisation, the same Torino Novara cross test sessions with several additional scenarios were performed in the laboratory and on the Rome-Naples line.

ERTMS Endurance tests During the probationary period, a daily programme of trips on the line was developed to increase confidence in the behaviour of the system. For example, during the first two months of the probationary period, 209 train runs from Rome to Naples or vice versa plus 109 incomplete runs were carried out.

• 21% trains were on time


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• 29% trains were delayed by a maximum of 15 minutes

• 50% trains were delayed by more than 15 minutes.

9.7 Dutch projects

Amsterdam – Utrecht The test programme was based on the standard method of testing a conventional system. The upgrade of the ERTMS with ERTMS Level 2 will be tested during normal operation. A migration strategy has been set up to guarantee the safe running of the conventional equipped trains.

BetuweRoute ProRail is performing integration effort running rented trains. This is done in a project called “Systeem Integratie Test” which contains several phases. Based on the list of items to be validated by integration a joint team, now also containing specialists on testing, will create a test plan. In doing this they will make use of previous experience where ever possible, such as:

• Results of tests with train borne performed to validate trackside

• Results of tests with train borne on the BetuweRoute to validate train borne

• Cross exchange tests performed to demonstrate interoperability

• Integration testing performed on similar equipped trackside elsewhere (i.e. Mattstetten Rothrist, Roma Napoli, HSL Line 2/3)

The test plan shall clearly indicate which tests are required to be played on site. Integration testing is performed, results are processed into a type integration test report. Wherever necessary an in depth analysis involving specialist technicians on trackside- and train borne equipment will be undertaken to analyse all findings. Test runs can be made under the regime of the earlier agreed operation under limited conditions

HSL-Zuid A test programme was started as a preparation for the operational services. This test programme comprises:

1. ERTMS cross tests. An extensive test programme with several onboard units from different suppliers (Alstom, Bombardier, CSEE and Siemens) is performed to check the interoperability of the line.

2. ERTMS transition tests. The following transitions, which are related to the HSL-Zuid are tested:

• The transition between the ATB system of the conventional infrastructure and ERTMS Level 1 and Level 2.

• The transition between the Dutch and Belgian ERTMS system at the border. The test programme includes the following transitions: Level 2 – Level 2, Level 1 – Level 1, Level 1 – Level 2 and Level 2 – Level 1 in Full Supervision, Staff Responsible and On Sight modes.


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• The transition between Dutch and Belgium conventional network. Between Roosendaal (NL) and Essen (B), which is a deviation route for the HSL-Zuid and Line 4, the STM-STM transition is tested for switching from the Dutch national system ATB to the Belgian national system Krokodil.

3. ERTMS operational tests Specific operational procedures which have been developed for the HSL-Zuid, (e.g. tunnel procedures, switching to the ERTMS Level 1 Fall back system, border crossing in several modes (Full Supervision, On Sight and Staff Responsible) are tested.

4. ERTMS endurance tests This programme consists of a test period of several months. These tests are meant to check robustness and availability of the line under normal operating conditions. After this comprehensive test programme, integration tests are to be performed with each train type which will run on the before starting commercial service. During the tests, some findings were related to the freedom of the interpretation of specifications e.g. regarding the interface OBU – RBC. It might be possible that this will result in additional change requests. These tests were performed in three steps:

1. Trackside implementation ERTMS V2.2.2+

2. Trackside implementation ERTMS V2.3.0-

3. Trackside implementation ERTMS V2.3.0 Corridor

9.8 Spanish projects

ERTMS functional tests Validation tests were performed by the manufacturers. Complementary tests were then performed by an independent laboratory (Cedex) under the surveillance of an independent assessor (Tifsa) as required by ADIF. Besides the tests performed by the manufacturer, the Ministry of Transport together with Adif and Renfe, prepared so-called “Complementary tests”. These tests supplemented those already carried out by the manufacturer and figure in the verification and validation dossier. Tests were specially designed for the new Madrid-Lleida line to check the functionality of the new train-borne equipment. They mainly cover the following topics:

1. Speed and braking curve supervision

2. Transitions between ERTMS application Levels

3. Mode transitions

4. Management of Temporary Speed Restrictions

5. Failures in balise detection

6. Management of timing in Movement Authorisations


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7. Odometry

8. Train Interface

9. ATO and pre-fixed speed

10. DMI

11. National functions

12. Signal balise group reading in PT mode This is an additional requirement from the Ministry of Public Works for authorising the commissioning of rolling stock.

ERTMS cross tests Functional cross test (Madrid-Lleida/Lleida-Roda de Bará) performed by the manufacturers, as first step.

ERTMS endurance tests Endurance tests were performed by the operating company according to ADIF to achieve a number of train hours per operator without failures The specification of these endurance tests have not yet been consolidated. A number of kilometres must be negotiated for the whole train before being accepted. During this period the majority of specific ERTMS tests can be completed . At the moment there is no consolidated policy related to the endurance tests. As an example, for ERTMS Level 1, the trains series 102 have had to run 100,000 km without incidents before being authorised to operate (the trackside equipment was verified at the same time). But for trains series 103 this requirement was reduced to 50,000 km. And the criteria currently applied to other trains is to complete 30,000 km under ERTMS plus 10,000 with STM, without incidents. A specific question concerns the monitoring of tests by suppliers and authorities.

Malfunctions

Failures in the telepowering of the toggling function of Eurobalises The problem has been temporarily solved by installing a second balise holding identical information, mounted in an adjacent sleeper. At present, the origin of this malfunction is still unknown. The laboratory tests have always been satisfactory, and an on line test performed during several months with balises from several manufacturers proved that every balise, including the new one developed by the manufacturer of the faulty ones, work satisfactorily. Once the tests have been completed, it is very probable that ADIF will decide to remove the duplicated balises. In any case, this is not a safety or an interoperability problem, but an operational inconvenience. If a train fails to read a balise, the only consequence is an unwanted stop.

Failures of the Odometry The odometry fails when there is snow in the track. This malfunction seems to have its origin at the radar speedometer. Here again there is no safety or interoperability problem, but an operational nuisance. The study of the problem is the manufacturer’s responsibility.


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Failures in the management of text messages In the Lleida-Tarragona section, the text messages do not fulfil the deletion condition. When the receiving buffer becomes full, an “error in text message” appears in the DMI. This is an ergonomic problem that does not compromises safety or interoperability.

GSM-R Failures Some initial problems (EMC compatibility, SIM cards programming) that appeared at the beginning of the process have been satisfactory solved.

9.9 Operational experiences Due to the fact that most of the projects analysed are still in the final phase of commissioning, not much information is available concerning the behaviour of the ERTMS system during commercial operation. With the exception of the following projects, no detailed information of operations with ERTMS is available.

German projects: Berlin-Halle-Leipzig The Berlin-Halle-Leipzig line is in revenue service, based on a national allowance for qualification testing (“Zustimmung zur Erprobung”). The safety authority limited the validity of the national allowance for qualification test runs on the line until December 2007.

Italian projects During the operation of the line Rome – Naples, the suppliers and the RFI maintenance department have monitored the performance and the faults of the system. The results have been collected. The chart below shows the train punctuality graph for the revenue service in 2006 (delay less than 5 minutes). The delays are on the whole line including the conventional section. Calculating the delay on the only high speed line, the percentage of the punctuality was over 95% which is in line with the RFI target for ERTMS System.

Punctuality HS Rome Naples - Year 2006

80828486889092949698

100

Jan

'06

Feb

Mar

Apr

May Ju

n

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

'07

months

%

%goal


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Dutch projects No lines are actually in full operational service, yet.

BetuweRoute Until now, there is no operational experience. The line has been put into operation officially on June 16th 2007 by the Dutch Queen, but further tests will continue for some time. At the moment (immediately after the official opening of the line), trains were only allowed to enter the line after the previous train had cleared the same.

Spanish projects Entering into service with ERTMS Level 1, two trains per hour per direction, has resulted in a maximum line speed of 280 km/hour. The maximum speed was gradually increased from 200 km/h to 250 km/h and at a later stage to 280 km/h.


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10 Analysis and Conclusions Based on the information gathered for the ERTMS interfaces, an analysis was made regarding the issues which could affect interoperability in corridors. The following categories were distinguished:

• Technical issues

• Operational issues international lines

10.1 Technical issues

Applicable ERTMS version Most ERTMS implementations analysed are based on the ERTMS Version 2.2.2, but often some additional Change Requests had to be implemented before opening the line. The LGV-Est and HSL-Zuid projects are already implementing ERTMS Version 2.3.0. plus some additional Change Requests

Integration train-to-track The ERTMS Specifications allow for different interpretations by the Railways and the suppliers, which results in solutions which are not fully compatible. Extensive testing is required.

RBC-RBC Functional Interface Specification leads to different RBC implementations Due to a gap in the RBC-RBC Functional Interface Specifications, suppliers have developed their own interface with a neighbouring RBC. As there is no common interpretation of the specifications regarding this subject, dedicated solutions had to be designed for the ERTMS implementations.

Example 1: German project Berlin – Halle - Leipzig The line is currently operated based on a national specification (“Rahmenlastenheft”, [and on Subset 026 version 2.2.2. plus some additions. Change Requests had to be notified, where additional safety features needed to be amended to the EC specs and implemented in the BHL system, e.g. CR 212, 301, 302. Example 2: Spanish projects Current system version status: SUBSET026 Version 2.2.2 is applied. Due to concern about the backwards compatibility between 2.3.0 and 2.2.2., some mitigation measures were taken, e.g.: not using some additional functions on 2.3.0 (CR458 has not been implemented), applying additional engineering rules. Example 3: Italian projects The actual version of the SRS implemented is the 2.2.2 + CRs 66, 88, 94, 417, 481, 499 and 508 [see Subset 108 v. 1.0]


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2 GSM-R units required on board to ensure availability of transitions at 300 km/h

Fall back implementation Each country has designed its own fall back strategy:

• Several countries implement a fall back system in combination with the national system (France, Germany, Austria)

• ERTMS Level 1 is implemented as a fall back system (HSL-Zuid, Spain)

• No fall back is implemented (Italy)

1. System transitions between ERTMS and legacy systems. Each ERTMS project has its own implementation of transitions depending on the concept of the legacy systems (onboard and trackside). It seems that the implementations are compliant with the ERTMS specifications.

Example 1: Dutch-Belgian Border At the Dutch-Belgian border, an ERTMS Level 2 interface was required, to be supplied by two suppliers. Both suppliers based the RBC developments on the RBC-FIS. Due to the fact that these specifications could be interpreted differently, the developments of the two suppliers were in line with the specifications but it was clear that neither RBC could exchange information at border crossing Level correctly. It was necessary to develop a dedicated solution, enabling the necessary communication between the Dutch and Belgian RBC, a so called Gateway was. Example 2: Spanish projects A technological border exists between Madrid-Lleida and Lleida-Roda de Bará sections of the Madrid-Barcelona HSL. Both sections were supplied by different manufacturers. In the future, the transition between neighbouring RBCs will take place automatically. Currently, the transition from one section to another takes place at a reduced speed in Level 1.

Example 1: LGV-Est The LGV-Est architecture consists of a dual signalling ERTMS Level 2/TVM430 implementation. Trains with TVM430 equipment will be able to run on the LGV-Est as well as trains which have installed an ERTMS Onboard Unit with a STM-TVM430 (Bi-standard). Example 2: HSL-Zuid For performance reasons the HSL-Zuid Line is equipped with a Level 2 in combination with a Level 1 fall back system. ERTMS Level 1 is installed as a fall back. The HSL-Zuid line does not support mixed Level 1/Level 2 traffic. If the line is in Level 2 (standard mode) trains can only run in Level 2 with a maximum speed of 300 km/h. The whole line is currently switched to Level 1; trains can only run in Level 1 with a maximum speed of 160 km/h. Example 3: Italy The Italian ATP is implemented to run on the conventional Italian lines.


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System testing During the tests, several findings were related to the freedom of the interpretation of specifications regarding the interface OBU – RBC. So, an extensive interoperability testing process is required for all relevant combinations of track and train assembly of different suppliers.

10.2 Operational issues – harmonisation of cross border international lines

Various ERTMS implementations cause a huge range of degraded situations at the border

Response to alarm calls is not harmonised With regard to the decision by several countries not to use the Emergency Stop function, this could lead to faulty responses of drivers in the case of an emergency (example Dutch-Belgian rules) (this is already in study: HAROP) Blocking harmonisation is the Stand-Still principle in relation to safety (or in French GAME principle) since optimisation of a general rule and thereby overall safety is not permitted if the level of safety in a specific hazardous situation is reduced. In essence, this is the responsibility of NSAs.

Key management

Example 1: Dutch-Belgian border During discussions between the Belgian Infrastructure manager and the Dutch Safety Authority (IVW), it became clear that there was a need to harmonise the use of Level 1. In Level 1 (conventional) signals may be used in combination with Level 1. This could lead to different Level 1 implementation on both sides of the Dutch-Belgian border, because the conventional signals differ between the 2 countries. The aim was to find a harmonised solution taking into account the use of the national Signalling systems and the available solutions in the Signalling books of NMBS and IVW. Interoperability and 300 km/h border crossing were important requirements for the Gateway. Example 2: Dutch-Belgian border Also the transitions Level 2 – Level 1 and Level 1 – Level 1 transitions at the border in all relevant modes (Full Supervision, Staff Responsible, Onsight) had to be supported at the border crossing.

Example 1: Dutch-Belgian border For each new train, the Key Management Centre (KMC) of ProRail will generate the key (KMAC) on request of the Train Operating Company. Before distributing these keys by e-mail to Infraspeed and the relevant Rolling Stock supplier, the keys will be encrypted by means of Transport Keys. Each Party capable of installing KMACs has its own Transport Key. To allow foreign trains onto an ERTMS Level 2 line, procedures to exchange keys between national Key Management Centres are being developed. In this way, foreign trains can implement keys, which allow communication with foreign RBCs.


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Due to border crossings, drivers must communicate with signalmen in different languages This leads to various translations of ERTMS technical jargon e.g. even in Dutch as spoken in the Netherlands and in Belgium.

Differences between National Values which can be confusing in border crossing zones Examples are: different maximum speeds in SR and OS modes in the Netherlands and Belgium.


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List of abbreviations and acronyms AC Alternating Current ACS Apparato Centrale Statico (Italy) ADIF Administrador de Infrastructuras Ferroviarias (Spain) ADL Arthur D. Little AEIF Association Européenne pour l’Interopérabilité Ferroviaire AF Alstom Ferroviaria (Italy) APR Analyse Préliminaire des Risques (Preliminary Risk Analysis) ASF Ansaldo Segnalamento Ferroviario (Italy) ASFA Anuncio de Señales y Frenado Automáticoe (Spain) ATB Automatische TreinBeïnvloeding ATO Automatic Train Operation ATP Automatic Train Protection B Belgium BACC Blocco Automatico a Correnti Codificate (Italy) BBT Brenner Basis Tunnel BHL Berlin Halle Leipzig BMB Bombardier BSC Base Station Controller BTM Balise Transmission Module BTS Base Transceiver Station CCS Command, Control and Signalling CERTIFER French Notified Body Cetren Spanish Notified Body CIRCA Communication & Information Resource Centre Administrator CR Change Request CSI Concentrateur de Systèmes Informatiques (IT Systems Hub) CTT Condiciones Tecnica de los Trenes (Spain) DB Deutsche Bahn (German Railways)

DC Direct Current Designers choice

DMI Driver Machine Interface DPS Dossier Préliminaire de Sécurité (Preliminary Safety File) DS Dossier de Sécurité (Safety File) DTS Directives pour Travaux de Signalisation (Signalling Works Directives) DTT Direction des Transports Terrestres (Land Transport Division) DV Dienstvorschrift (Service order)


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EBC German Notified Body EC European Commission EEIG European Economic Interest Group EIRENE European Integrated Railway radio Enhanced NEtwork ENCE Enclavamiento Electrónico (Electronic interlocking) EOA End Of movement Authority

EOQA Expert ou Organisme Qualifié, Agréé (Qualified Approved Expert or Organisation)

ERA European Railway Agency ERTMS European Rail Traffic Management System ETCS European Train Control System ETG Elément à Turbine à Gaz (Gas Turbine Element)

ETH Especificacion Técnica de Homologación (Technical Specification for Homologation)

EU European Union EVC European Vital Computer

FDMS Fiabilité, Disponibilité, Maintenabilité, Sécurité (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety)

FFFIS Form Fit Function Interface Specification FIS Functional Interface Specification FMEA Failure Mode Effect Analysis FN Funcion Nacional (National Function) FS Full Supervision mode FTA Fault Tree Analysis GAMAB Globalement Au Moins Aussi Bon (Overall At Least As Good) GAME Globalement Au Moins Equivalent (Overall At Least Equivalent) GASC Generic Application Safety Case GAT Gestione ATtuatori (Italy) GdV Gestione della Via (Italy)

GEST Poste de Gestion des Signalisations Temporaires (Temporary Signals Management Station)

GSM-R Global System for Mobile Communications - Railways HA Hazard Analysis HABD Hot Axle Box Detector HC/HSL High Capacity/High Speed Line HSL High Speed Line IC Interoperability Constituent ICE 3 Inter City Express – 3rd generation


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IM Infrastructure Manager IS Impianto di Segnalamento (Italy) ISA Independent Safety Assessor IVW Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat (Dutch Safety Authority) IXL Interlocking KMAC Authentication Key KMC Key Management Centre KVB Contrôle de Vitesse par Balise (Balise Speed Control) LAV Línea de Alta Velocidad (High speed line) LC Level crossing LD Long Distance LEU Line side Electronic Unit LGV-Est Ligne à Grande Vitesse Est (French High Speed Line to the East) LTV Limitation Temporaire de Vitesse (Temporary Speed Limit) LZB Linien ZugBeeinflüssung (German ATP-system) MA Movement Authority

MISTRAL Modules Informatiques de Signalisation, de Transmission et d’Alarmes (Signal, Transmission and Alarm IT Modules)

MSC Mobile-services Switching Centre MTBF Mean Time Between Failures MTTR Mean Time To Repair NL The Netherlands NMBS Nationale Maatschappij der Belgische Spoorwegen (Belgian Railways) NoBo Notified Body NSA National Safety Authority NVP Nucleo Vitale Periferico (Italy) OBB Österreichische Bundesbahn (Austrian Railways) OBU On Board Unit ON Organisme Notifié (Notified Body) OS On Sight mode

OSTI Organisme ou Service Technique Indépendant (Independent Technical Organisation or Service)

PCS Posto Centrale Satellite (Italy)

POS Paris-Ost-Frankreich-Süd-Deutschland (Paris – Eastern France – Southern Germany)

PPF Posto Periferico Fisso (Italy) PRCI Poste a Relais a Commande Informatisée (France) PSC Project Safety Case


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PZB Punktförmige ZugBeeinflüssung (German ATP-system) QoS Quality of Service RA Risk Analysis RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety RBC Radio Block Centre RENFE Red Nacional de Ferrocarriles Españoles (Spain) RFF Réseau Ferré de France (French Infrastructure Manager) RFI Rete Ferroviaria Italiana (Italian Infrastructure Manager) RFIG Red Ferroviaria de Interes General (Main Railway Network of Spain) RFU Recommendation For Use RTB Rilevatore Temperature Boccole (Hot Axle Box Detector) SAM Système d’Aide à la Maintenance (Maintenance Support System)

SCC-AV Sistema Controllo e Comando - Alta Velocità (Control-Command System – High Speed)

SCMT Sistema Controllo Marcia Treno (Italian ATP-system) SDT Sistema Distanziamento Treni (Italy) SEI Système d’Enclenchements Intégrés (France) SH SHunting mode

SIST Sécurité des Infrastructures et des Systèmes de Transport (Infrastructure and Transport Systems Safety)

SMB StopMerkBorden (Marker Boards) SNCB Société Nationale des Chemins de fer Belges (Belgian Railways) SNCF Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer (French Railways)

SNCF IES SNCF Direction Déléguée Système d’Exploitation et Sécurité (SNCF Operational and Safety System Delegated Division)

SNCF IG.SF SNCF Direction de l’InGénierie - Signalisation Ferroviaire (SNCF Engineering Division – Rail Signals)

SNCF IG.T.ERTMS

SNCF direction de l’InGénierie – Projet ERTMS (SNCF Engineering Division – ERTMS Project)

SNCF IG.T.SE

SNCF direction de l’InGénierie – Systèmes et Exploitation (SNCF Engineering Division – Systems and Operation)

SR Staff Responsible mode SRAC Safety Related Application Condition SRFN Sécurité du Réseau Ferré National (France) SRS System Requirement Specification SSB Sottosistema di Bordo (On Board assembly) SST Sottosistema di Terra (Track side assembly) STM Specific Transmission Module


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STTE Signalisations Temporaires propres à la Traction Electrique (Electronic Traction Temporary Signals)

TAF Track Ahead Free TBL Transmission Balise Locomotive (Belgian ATP-system) THR Tolerable Hazard Rate TIRF Tolerable Individual Rate of Fatalities TIU Train Interface Unit TLC Telecommunication TOC Train Operating Company TSI Technical Specification for Interoperability TSI CR Technical Specification for Interoperability Conventional Rail system TSI HS Technical Specification for Interoperability High Speed Rail system

TSI OPE Technical Specification for Interoperability of the subsystem Traffic Operation and Management

TSR Temporary Speed Restriction TVM430 Track to Train Transmission 430 (French ATP-system) UN UNfitted mode UNISIG UNion Industry of SIGnaling WP Work Package ZN Zona Neutra (Neutral Zone in catenary system)

analysis of integration of ertms system final … final...tender era/2006/ertms/op/01 survey of...

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