Amerika između imperije i hegemonije, između globalne dominacije i globalnog vođstva

Сједињене Америчке Државе као светска империја

Empires, more than nation-states, are the principal actors in the history of world events. Much of what we call history consists of the deeds of the 50 to 70 empires that once ruled multiple peoples across large chunks of the globe.

Officially, there are no empires now, only 190- plus nation-states. Yet the ghosts of empires past continue to stalk the Earth.

“Imperije su oblici političke kontrole nad efektivnim suverenitetom nekih političkih društava koje im nameću druga politička društva” (Majkl Dojl)

Sve imperije koje su tokom vekova uspostavljene imale su tri zajednička obeležja: jedno se očituje u podređivanju, svaka imperija je nejednak odnos, pri čemu je jedna strana superiorna a druga inferiorna. Drugo se ogleda u prinudi. Iako veliki broj imperija uključuje i saradnju, katkad ekstenzivnu saradnju između onih koji vladaju i onih kojima se vlada, iza toga odnosa uvek stoji pretnja silom, koja se katkad i realizuje, od strane imperije u cilju održavanja vlastite kontrole. Treće određujuće obeležje sastoji se u etničkoj, religioznoj ili rasnoj razlici – ili u nekoj njihovoj kombinaciji – izemđu imperijalne sile i društva koje ona kontroliše. Imperija je oblik diktature, ali osobenog tipa: diktature koju sprovode stranci?

Pojam “vlada” koji potiče od grčke reči za krmaniti, stariji je nego termin imperija koji se izvodi iz latinske reči “komandovati”… Vlada je opštiji pojam; imperija je samo jedna od mnogih oblika vladavine. (Majkl Mandelbaum)

Naglasak na kvalitetu odnosa između političkih jedinica a ne samo na kvantitetu. Imperija može biti i regionalna po svom obimu

“Empire is the rule exercised by one nation over others both to regulate their external behavior and to ensure minimally acceptable forms of internal behavior within the subordinate states. Merely powerful states do the former, but not the latter.” (Stephen Peter Rosen)

The central--one may say the necessary but not sufficient--imperial task is the creation and management of a hierarchical interstate order.

From that key task of regulating the external behavior of other states proceeds the imperial problems of maintaining a monopoly on the use of organized military power, and of using its monopolistic but still finite military power efficiently--a problem captured in the military concept of "economy of force."

But an empire must also ensure the security and internal stability of its constituent parts, extract revenue to pay the costs of empire, and assimilate the elites of non-imperial societies to the metropolitan core, tasks that presuppose influence over the internal affairs of other societies.

Today, the picture for the United States is mixed. It exercises effective, if less than formal, hierarchical authority in the Western Hemisphere, in the Asian rimland, on the Arab side of the Persian Gulf and in the NATO area. At the start of 2003, it was trying to extend its hierarchical interstate order to the Balkans and Afghanistan, and was preparing to intervene in the internal affairs of Iraq. China, Russia and India cooperate opportunistically with the United States, but have been willing to challenge American dominance when possible. They certainly reject the right of the United States to intervene in their internal affairs, and thus remain the major countries outside the U.S. hierarchical order.

The organizing principle of interstate relations, Kenneth Waltz famously wrote, is anarchy: In the absence of an overarching power that creates and enforces rules for interstate behavior, states help themselves by "balancing" against other centers of power that could hurt them--either by building up their own forces or by joining with other states. The organizing principle of empire rests, in contrast, on the existence of an overarching power that creates and enforces the principle of hierarchy, but is not itself bound by such rules. In turn, subordinate states do not build up their own capabilities or join with others when threatened; they call instead on the imperial power for assistance. In so doing, they give up a key component of state sovereignty, which is direct control of their own security. This condition is the result of two sets of factors: the ability and willingness of the imperial power to acquire and maintain something close to a monopoly on the organized use of military power, and the abdication of states within the empire of responsibility to build their own effective military capabilities. How does such overarching power come to exist?

The formation of a monopoly on military power is greatly facilitated by the decision of other potential powers not to compete. The Roman Empire effectively had two components, one in the west and one in the east (centered on Byzantium). As is well known, the eastern empire persisted long after the sack of Rome in 476 CE. Less well known is the fact that the internal factors associated with the fall of the Roman Empire--the rise of Christianity, increasing social rigidity and the bureaucratization of imperial governance--were just as powerful in the east as they were in the west. The difference was that there were fewer organized military challenges in the east, and the one potential challenger to Byzantium, the Parthian Empire, chose to accept Rome's dominant role.(n3) Similarly, the British monopoly on seapower began to emerge in the early 18th century, when French Continental concerns led to the virtual disappearance of the French battle fleet. The withdrawal of competitors was even more marked following the wars of the French Revolution, at which time British naval mastery rested, according to Paul M. Kennedy, on the "simple wish of other nations not to spend the time or energy to challenge the British.“

The same phenomenon is at work today. The American empire did not emerge simply as the result of the growth of American power, but as a result of the collapse of Russian power, the decline of European and Japanese military spending relative to the United States, and the unwillingness of those countries to take military action or make military preparations in response to a host of security problems. A surprising number of major states are not now engaging in the self-help that Waltz says is at the heart of interstate relations, but are relying instead on the United States for their security.

The ability of republican Rome to develop military power from a population of free adult males from Rome and its Italian allies (totaling approximately 2.75 million men) was the basis of Roman expansion. From this base it built an army that controlled an imperial population of approximately fifty million people. Rome's ability to develop more military power than its rivals rested primarily on the organizational practices of the Roman Legions, which created a unified and coordinated fighting force that could routinely defeat opposing armies five times its size. Drill and discipline produced formations that could withstand uncoordinated infantry and cavalry attacks mounted by less well-organized adversaries. The internal divisions and lack of social cohesion among the rivals of Rome, with the exception of the armies of Hannibal, created an enduring military advantage that cascaded overtime, for as Rome's area of control expanded, the population base from which it could draw military recruits expanded, too.

The Roman Empire in the West can be dated from 27 B.C., when Octavian became Caesar Augustus and emperor in all but name. It ended when Constantinople was established as a rival capital with the death of the Emperor Theodosius in 395, making a total of 422 years.

The Roman Empire in the East can be dated from then until, at the latest, the sack of Byzantium by the Ottoman Turks in 1453, a total of 1,058 years.

The Holy Roman Empire—the successor to the Western empire—lasted from 800, when Charlemagne was crowned emperor of the Romans, until Napoleon ended it in 1806. The “average” Roman empire therefore lasted 829 years.

The three Roman empires were uncharacteristically long lived. By comparison, the average Near Eastern empire (including the Assyrian, Abassid, and Ottoman) lasted a little more than 400 years; the average Egyptian and East European empires around 350 years; the average Chinese empire (subdividing by the principal dynasties) ruled for more than three centuries. The various Indian, Persian, and West European empires generally survived for between 200 and 300 years.

The empires created in the 20th century, by contrast, were comparatively short. The Bolsheviks’ Soviet Un ion (1922–91) lasted less than 70 years, a meager record indeed, though one not yet equaled by the People’s Republic of China. Japan’s colonial empire, which can be dated from the acquisition of Taiwan in 1895, lasted barely 50 years. Most fleeting of all modern empires was Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich, which did not extend beyond its predecessor’s borders before 1938 and had retreated

Moreover, many of today’s most important states are still recognizably the progeny of empires. Look at the Russian Federation, where less than 80 percent of the population is Russian, or Britain, which is, for all intents and purposes, an English empire. Modern-day Italy and Germany are the products not of nationalism but of Piemontese and Prussian expansion.

Today’s world, in short, is as much a world of ex-empires and ex-colonies as it is a world of nation-states.

The United Stes of America as country in position of primacy

The U. S. Position in the current World order is best understood as one of primacy. The United Stets is not a global hegemon, because it cannot physically control the entire globe and thus cannot compel other states to do whatever it wants… Nonetheless, the United States is also something more than “first among equals” …If primacy is defined as being “first in order, importance or authority” or holding “first or chief place”, then it is an apt description of America’s current position.” (Stephen M. Walt)

Kao posledica rata u Iraku 2003.godine, drugi analitičari opisuju međunarodni poredak kao Američku svetsku imperiju. Na mnogo načina metafora o imperiji je privlačna. Američka vojska ima globalni domašaj, sa bazama širom sveta i njihovim regionalnim komandantima koji ponekad deluju kao prokonzuli. Engleski je lingua franca kao što je to svojevremeno bio Latinski jezik. Američka ekonomija je najveća na svetu, a američka kultura je magnet drugim kulturama. Ipak, pogrešno je pomešati politiku prvenstva sa politikom imperije. Sjedinjene Američke Države zasigurno nisu imperija na način na koji mi mislimo o evropskim prekomorskim imperijama iz devetnaestog i dvadesetog veka, jer je suštinska osobina takvog imperijalizma bila politička kontrola nad ostalim delovima planete. Iako odnosi u kojima postoji nejednakost zasigurno postoje između Sjedinjenih Država i slabijih sila i lako mogu dovesti do jednog eksploatatorskog odnosa sa američke strane, odsustvo formalne političke kontrole nad tim državama, čini termin "imperijalna" ne samo nedovoljno tačnim, nego i potpuno pogrešnim...

Sjedinjene Američke Države imaju više izvora moći nego što ih je imala Velika Britanija na vrhuncu svoje imperijalne moći, ali Sjedinjene Države imaju manje moći u smislu kontrole nad ponašanjem i unutrašnjom politikom drugih zemalja, nego što je to imala Britanija u doba kada je vladala četvrtinom Planete. Na primer, škole u Keniji, izbori, proces donošenja zakona i ubiranje poreza - da ne pominjemo spoljnu politiku zemlje - bili su pod kontrolom britanskih zvaničnika. U poređenju sa tim, Sjedinjene Države imaju malo takve kontrole u današnje vreme. Tokom 2003. godine Sjedinjene Države nisu čak uspele da zadobiju glasove Meksika i Kine za drugu rezoluciju o Iraku u Savetu bezbednosti Ujedinjenih Nacija. Analitičari imperije odgovaraju da je termin "imperija" samo metafora. Ipak, problem sa tom metaforom jeste da ona podrazumeva kontrolu iz Vašingtona koja se teško uklapa sa složenim načinom na koji je moć u svetu danas raspodeljena...

U globalnom informatičkom dobu, moć je među državama raspodeljena po obrascu koji podseća na složenu trodimenzionalnu šahovsku tablu, na kojoj se igra odvija i horizontalno i vertikalno. Na vrhu šahovske table gde su političko-vojna pitanja, vojna moć je uglavnom unipolarna sa Sjedinjenim Državama kao jedinom supersilom, ali u sredini table gde su ekonomska pitanja, Sjedinjene Države nisu hegemon ili imperija, i moraju da se cenjkaju sa Evropom sa jednakih pozicija kada Evropa deluje kao ujedinjena celina. Na primer, povodom antimonopolskih ili pitanja koja se odnose na privredu, one moraju naći kompromis, da bi postigle sporazum. I na dnu table transnacionalnih odnosa koji prelaze granice van kontrole vlada država i tako uključuju raznovrsne aktere kao što su bankari i teroristi, moć se haotično raspršava. Uzmimo kao dodatak pitanjima terorizma samo nekoliko primera; privatni akteri na globalnom tržištu kapitala ograničavaju način na koji se kamatne stope mogu koristiti za upravljanje američkom ekonomijom, a trgovina droge, AIDS, migracija stanovništva, i globalno zagrevanje koji imaju duboke društvene korene u više od jedne zemlje, izvan su kontrole američkih vlasti. U takvoj jednoj situaciji čini se da nema baš puno smisla koristiti tradicionalne termine poput unipolarnost, hegemonija ili imperija s ciljem da se opišu takvi problemi. (Džozef Naj)

Сједињене Америчке Државе као светски хегемон

Americans, in short, don't "do" empire; they do "leadership" instead, or, in more academic parlance, "hegemony."

According to S. Ryan Johansson, the word "hegemony" was used originally to describe the relationship of Athens to the other Greek city-states that joined it in an alliance against the Persian Empire. "Hegemony" in this case "mean[t] that [Athens] organized and directed their combined efforts without securing permanent political power over the other[s].“

By contrast, according to the "world-system theory" of Immanuel Wallerstein, "hegemony" means more than mere leadership but less than outright empire. A hegemonic power is "a state ... able to impose its set of rules on the interstate system, and thereby create temporarily a new political order." The hegemon also offers "certain extra advantages for enterprises located within it or protected by it, advantages not accorded by the 'market' but obtained through political pressure."

Yet another, narrower definition is offered by Geoffrey Pigman. Pigman describes a hegemon's principal function as underwriting a liberal international trading system that is beneficial to the hegemon but, paradoxically, even more beneficial to its potential rivals. Pigman traces this now widely used definition of the word back to the economic historian Charles Kindleberger's seminal work on the interwar economy, which describes a kind of "hegemonic interregnum." After 1918, Kindleberger suggested, the United Kingdom was too weakened by war to remain an effective hegemon, but the United States was still too inhibited by protectionism and isolationism to take over the role. This idea, which became known, somewhat inelegantly, as "hegemonic stability theory," was later applied to the post-1945 period by authors such as Arthur Stein, Susan Strange, Henry Nau, and Joseph Nye.

The very concept of "hegemony" is really just a way to avoid talking about empire, "empire" being a word to which most Americans remain averse. But "empire" has never exclusively meant direct rule over foreign territories without any political representation of their inhabitants.

There is an important and now widely accepted distinction between "formal" and "informal" empire. The British did not formally govern Argentina, for example, but the merchant banks of the City of London exerted such a powerful influence on that country's fiscal and monetary policy that its independence was heavily qualified.

“Broadly speaking, two kinds of change can be conceived in relation to the exercise of power by states in the global system. The first involves shifts along a dimension from the highly centralized to the highly diffuse: that is, from a situation in which the actual and threatened use of force is carried by out by one political actor to a situation in which more states participate actively in deterrence and are prepared to intervene militarily abroad. Of course, it is also conceivable that the international system will maintain the current level of centralization for a long time. The second type of change involves movement along a dimension in which the exercise of power may become more discretional, or more constitutionalized. (David Held)

Great Britain and United States: Anglophone Empires? Comparative analysis A century ago, the United Kingdom's formal empire was very large

indeed, covering nearly a quarter of the world's surface and ruling roughly the same proportion of its population. Today, on the other hand, the United States' formal empire includes just 14 dependencies (of which the largest is Puerto Rico) and covers less than 11,0000 square kilometers. A century ago, the United Kingdom could draw wealth and personnel from the 15 million of its subjects who had settled in the temperate zones of the empire. Today, by contrast, fewer than four million Americans reside abroad, and nearly all of them live in Canada, Mexico, or Western Europe. A century ago, the United Kingdom was a net exporter of capital, on such a scale that it truly deserved to be called "the world's banker." Today, the United States is a net importer of capital on almost as large a scale. A century ago, British leaders could devote the lion's share of their attention and taxpayers' money to imperial defense and grand strategy, since before 1910, government provided only minimal care for the sick and elderly, and most of that was local. Today, Washington spends its money on social security, defense, welfare, and Medicare - in that order.

Imperial denial in United States The distinction between hegemony and

Empire would be legitimate if the term Empire did simply mean, as so many American commentators seem to assume, direct rule over foreign territories without any political representation of their inhabitants.

With a broader and more sophisticated definition of empire, it seems possible to dispense altogether with the term hegemony. Instead, it can be argued with some plausibility that the American Empire has up until now, with a few exceptions, preferred indirect rule to direct rule and informal empire to formal empire.

Cold War – USA as an “Empire by Invitation”

Да ли Америка може и хоће да буде светска империја? „Tри дефицита“ са којима се Сједињене Америчке Државе данас

суочавају, а све у вези са евентуалним покушајем ове земље да постану светска империја. Он сматра да Америка „пати“ од gефицита војних трупа, буџетског gефицита и gефицита пажње (мисли се на слабу заинтересованост самих Американаца за тако нешто и за светске послове уопште).

На пример Велика Британија је 1920. године (у време гушења тадашње побуне у Ираку) имала једног војника на 23 становника Ирака, данас један војник америчке војске долази на 210 Ирачана. Проблем није у томе да Американци немају довољан број младих људи (САД имају већи број становника између 15 и 24. године него Ирак или Авганистан), већ је проблем у томе, тврди он, да САД преферирају да ниво својих војних снага држе на нивоу релативно малог процента становништва.“

Најал Фергусон, тврди да се због недостатка воље и капацитета, али и огромних унутрашњих проблема изазваних пре свега енормним трошковима око пензионог и социјалног осигурања (рачуна се да ће у годинама које долазе), Америка бити „кратка“ за неких 45 000 милијарди долара, колико износи разлика између оног што треба исплатити у корисницима тих осигурања и оног што ће бити државни приходи

Према најновијем истраживању јавног мњења спроведеног од стране Асошиејтед преса (Associated Press-Ipsos poll), „иако 6 од 10 Американаца подржава Бушове поступке у вези са самим нападом (мисли се на терористичке нападе од 11. септембра 2001 – прим. Д. Ж.), половина од њих сматра да су трошкови бробе против тероризма превисоки, док 6 од 10 испитаника верује да ће рат у Ираку призвести само још више антиамеричког тероризма... Такође, и Пју (Pew) истраживање проналази да „већина Американаца верује да набољи начин да се умањи опасност од терористичких напада на Сједињене Америчке Државе није да се повећа већ да се смањи америчко војно присуство у иностранству, што представља оштар заокрет у односу на слично истраживање из 2002. године.“

“Немогућ је покушај да се далеке провинције држе у пoкорности” (Едвард Гибон)

Myth of Empire (Myths of Security Through Expansion) – OFFENSIVE ADVANTAGE, POWER SHIFTS, PAPER TIGER ENEMIES, BANDWAGONS , BIG STICK DIPLOMACY, FALLING DOMINOES, EL DORADO AND MANIFEST DESTINY, NO TRADEOFFS, - Jack L. Snyder

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Nacionalizam kao “rak rana imperija” Imperije su iščezle zato što su postale preskupe – (Majkl

Mandelbaum) Hierarchy is usually costly. Dominant states can offer

concessions to induce subordinates to give up their valued freedom. The Soviet Union rejected this course, at first, electing to extract resources from Eastern Europe rather than share its benefits from cooperation. Indeed, by one estimate, Moscow withdrew nearly $1 billion per year from the region until 1956. By the late 1950s, however, the flow of resources reversed, and by the 1980s the Soviet Union was subsidizing Eastern Europe to a total of about $17 billion per year. (David Lake)

“ДЕМОКРАТИЗАЦИЈА НАСИЉА” (Fareed Zakaria) “Једанаести септембар 2001. био је значајан догађај у

историји политике моћи (Power Politics). Деветнаест фанатика, од којих нико није имао западно образовање, са оскудним финансијским средствима, гурнули су најмоћнију и технолошки најнапреднију светску силу у панику и довели Планету у стање политичке кризе.

Никада раније толико много бола није било нането тако моћном мноштву од тако немоћне неколицине. Ту лежи дилема за једину светску суперсилу: Како се борити са непријатељем који је физички слаб али који поседује фанатичну мотивацију.” (Zbigniew Brzezinski)

Aмерика јесте данас можда неупоредиво најснажнија сила по својим глобалним досезима, но њена је територија исто тако много више изложена различитим изазовима, него што је то био случај са прошлим империјалним сила,а. А сасвим је вероватно да живот у несигурности за Американце од сада представља трајно стање.

Могу ли Американци научити да живе у једном несигурном свету? (Збигњев Бжежински)

Парадокс америчке моћи – зашто једина светска суперсила не може сама? (Џозеф Нај)

Може ли се достићи апсолутна безбедност?

“As we work our way through this seemingly intractable problem in Iraq, we must constantly remember that this is not just a troublesome issue form which we can walk away if it seems too costly to continue. What is at stake is not only Iraq and the stability of the Middle East, but the global perception of the reliability of the United States as a partner in a deeply troubled world. We cannot afford to fail this test… And this is why America can’t just walk away. (Brent Scowcroft, The International herald Tribune, Thursday, January 4, 2007, p. 6)

However, if the United States was not an Empire, then what was it?

(Niall Ferguson)

ЛИТЕРАТУРА: Charles Crauthammer, “Unipolar moment”, Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990/1991, pp. 23-33. David Held, Mathias Koenig – Archibugi, „Introduction: Whither American Power?“, in: David Held, Mathias Koenig –

Archibugi, Eds., American Power in the 21st Century, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2003, pp. 1- 20; Niall Ferguson, Colossus – The Price of America’s Empire, The Penguin Press, New York, 2004, pp. 1-29; Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power – The Global Response to U. S. Primacy, W. W. Norton, New York, 2005, pp.

11 – 61 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment Revisited”, The National Interest, Winter 2002/03, pp. 5 – 17; Niall Ferguson, “A World Without Power”, Foreign Policy, July / August 2004, pp. 32 -39; Michael Mandelbaum, „David’s Friend Goliath“, Foreign Policy, January / February 2006, pp. 50 – 56 Niall Ferguson, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, “Going Critical– American Power and the Consequences of Fiscal Overstertch”, The

National Interest, Fall 2003, pp. 22- 32. Brian Knowlton, “In America, a Day to reflect on impact of 9/11”, International Herald Tribune, Tuesday, September 12,

2006, p. 4. Niall Ferguson, Empire – The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for a Global Power , Basic

Books, New York, 2002 Francis Fukuyama, “The end of history”, The National Interest, No. 16, Summer 1989, pp. 3-18. Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1994 Џозеф С. Нај, Како разумевати међунароgне сукобе, Стубови кулуре, Београд, 2006 Stephen Peter Rosen, “An Empire, If You Can Keep It” ,  The National Interest, Spring 2003, pp. 51-61. Jack L. Snyder, “Imperial Temptations”, The National Interest, Spring 2003, pp. 29-40. Niall Ferguson, “Empires with Expiration Dates”, Foreign Policy, September/ October 2006, pp. 46-52. Niall Ferguson, “Hegemony or Empire”, Foreign Affairs, 2004 Мајкл Манделбаум, Треба ли свету голијат, Филип Вишњић, Београд, 2006

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