american military power: future needs, future choices

American Military Power: Future Needs,Future Choices

October 1991

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Recommended Citation: ‘U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, American Military Power: Future Needs,Future Choices-Background Paper, OTA-BP-ISC-80 (Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, October 1991).

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Foreword

America’s global security environment is changing profoundly, pushing the countrytoward a fundamental reevaluation of its military requirements and those of the supportingdefense technology and industrial base. If U.S.-Soviet relations do not deteriorate, defenseprocurement could accelerate its present decline through the end of the decade. The Office ofTechnology Assessment has been asked to conduct an assessment of what form the futuredefense technology and industrial base might take. An essential first step in any evaluation ofthe defense base is understanding what military forces it will support and what those forcesmay be called upon to accomplish. Many of the characteristics of the U.S. military forces andthe defense industry that supports them arose because of the unique security requirements ofthe last 40 years. Given the extraordinary new environment, the assumptions that led to today’smilitary and industrial structure requires careful and continuing review. What threats theNation faces, the role of force, the context of regional conflict, even the definition of‘‘security,’ must be reevaluated.

This background paper, part of OTA’s ongoing assessment of the future defensetechnology and industrial base, outlines some of the issues of importance for making choicesabout the future nature and role of U.S. armed forces, and suggests how these choices willaffect defense base requirements. The final report of the assessment, to be delivered in thespring of 1992, will address specific policy options arising from the strategic choices andtactical decisions discussed here.

In preparing this background paper, OTA sought information and advice from a broadspectrum of knowledgeable individuals and organizations whose contributions are gratefullyacknowledged. As with all OTA studies, the content of the background paper is the soleresponsibility of the Office of Technology Assessment and does not necessarily represent theviews of our advisers and reviewers.

JOHN H. GIBBONSDirector

.,.

Managing the Nation’s Defense Industrial Strengthin a Changing Security Environment

Advisory Panel

Walter B. Slocombe, ChairCaplin & Drysdale Chartered

Richard BohlenSenior Vice President, OperationsRockwell International Corp.

Robert CalawayPresidentResource Management International, Inc.

Gordon CorlewVice President, ProductionAIL Systems Inc.

Jacques S. GanslerSenior Vice PresidentThe Analytic Sciences Corp.

Julius HarwoodConsultant

William W. KaufmannProfessorJohn F. Kennedy School of GovernmentHarvard University

Gen. P.X. KelleyUSMC (Ret.)

James L. KoontzPresident & CEOKingsbury Machine Tool Corp.

Thomas L. McNaugherSenior FellowThe Brookings Institution

William McNeillProfessor EmeritusDepartment of HistoryUniversity of Chicago

John MearsheimerChairmanDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of Chicago

Joseph NyeDirectorCenter for International AffairsHarvard University

William J. PerryChairman & CEOTechnology, Strategies and Alliances

Donald W. PutnamCorporate DirectorContracts and Technical AnalysisGeneral Dynamics Corp.

Jack RuinaProfessor of Electrical EngineeringCenter for International StudiesMassachusetts Institute of Technology

Howard D. SamuelPresidentIndustrial Union Department AFL-CIO

Wickham SkinnerProfessor EmeritusBusiness AdministrationHarvard University

Gen. William Y. SmithUSAF (Ret.)

James SolbergProfessorEngineering Research CenterPurdue University

Leonard SullivanConsultantSystem Planning Corp.

Adm. Harry Train USN (Ret.)Division ManagerStrategic Research and Management

Services DivisionScience Application International Corp.

Gen. John W. Vessey, Jr. USA (Ret.)

Albert WheelonConsultant

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members. The panel doesnot, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of itscontents.

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OTA Project Staff-American Military Power:Future Needs, Future Choices

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTAEnergy, Materials, and International Security Division

Alan Shaw, International Security and Commerce Program Manager

Jack H. Nunn, Project Director

Ivan Oelrich

Jonathan B. Tucker

Christopher Waychoff

Administrative Staff

Jacqueline Boykin

Louise Staley

ContractorMadeline Gross

Richard BarnetSenior FellowInstitute of Policy Studies

Conventional Forces Workshop, Aug. 7, 1990

Ivan Oelrich, ChairOffice of Technology Assessment

Richard BettsSenior FellowMassachusetts Institute of Technology

Stephen BiddleResearch Staff MemberInstitute for Defense Analyses

Seymour DeitchmanSenior Research AssociateInstitute for Defense Analyses

Col. Marvin Floom, USMCWarfighting Center

Randall ForsbergExecutive DirectorInstitute for Defense and Disarmament Studies

Robert JohnsonSenior FellowNational Planning Association

Gen. Frederick KroesenUSA (ret.)

Barry PavelConsultantPrinceton University

Barry PosenAssociate ProfessorMassachusetts Institute of Technology

Col. John WardenHeadquarters, USAFThe Pentagon

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the workshop participants. The workshopparticipants do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this background paper. OTA assumes full responsibility for thebackground paper and the accuracy of its contents.

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ContentsPage

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ixIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1The Post-War Security Environment and Evolution of U.S. Military Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1U.S. National Security Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3The Future Security Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Outside Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5The Continuing Nuclear Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Four Choices About How To Reach Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Size of Contingency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Readiness of U.S. Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Interdependence With Allies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Performance of Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

FiguresFigure PageI. Major National Military Budgets, 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112. Active Armed Forces Personnel, 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113. Gross Domestic Products, 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

TablesTable Pagel. Countries Producing Weapons—Now Through 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72. Force-Structure Choices Affecting the Defense Technology and Industrial Base . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

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OVERVIEWAmerica’s international security environment is

undergoing profound changes. The Office of Tech-nology Assessment has been asked to evaluate theeffects of these changes on the future requirementsof the defense technology and industrial base,possible changes in management required by asmaller base with new missions, and options formoving from the current cold-war configuration ofthe base to a streamlined but still robust future base.

An essential first step in any evaluation of thedefense industrial base is understanding what mili-tary forces it will support and what those forces maybe called on to accomplish. This background paperoutlines the major issues in the ongoing debate aboutthe future nature and role of U.S. armed forces. Thepaper starts with a review of post-World War IIdevelopments and then summarizes U.S. nationalsecurity objectives, possible future policies, andcurrent trends in world security. The paper ends witha discussion of the choices to be made about thenature of future U.S. forces and how these choiceswill affect the defense technology and industrialbase.

During the First and Second World Wars, theUnited States mobilized its industrial potential tomeet the material challenge of war and, when thefighting stopped, quickly demobilized. In 1950,following the North Korean invasion of the Southand the Berlin crisis, the United States entered aperiod of tense peace or “cold war’ with the SovietUnion that required a state of continuous partialmilitary mobilization. Today the cold war is overand a substantial part of the associated defense-industrial mobilization can be reversed. At the sametime, however, the United States remains a militarysuper-power with global responsibilities that mustnow be reexamined in a broader context than theU.S.-Soviet competition.

Fundamental U.S. national security objectiveswill probably change very little. These objectivesinclude guaranteeing the physical security of theUnited States, maintainingg a wide range of foreign-policy options, improving the country’s prosperity,ensuring a stable international environment, andpromoting democracy throughout the world. But thepolicies that the Nation pursues to meet theseobjectives may change significantly with the end ofthe cold war. In particular, the use of military forceto meet U.S. objectives must be reexamined. In some

cases, such as Europe, deterrence through thepotential use of force will become less important. Inother cases, such as the recent Gulf War, the politicalcontext for the use of force has changed radically.

The security of Europe is as vital to the UnitedStates as it has always been, but the militarychallenge is now much reduced. Soviet forces arebeing pulled back to the Soviet Union, some beyondthe Ural Mountains, and their overall numberreduced. The Warsaw Pact has been dissolved andformer Soviet allies now provide an important bufferbetween the Soviet Union and the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO). However, ethnic con-flict in Eastern Europe (e.g., Yugoslavia) is on therise and the ultimate nature of the Soviet Union isunclear.

The security situation outside of Europe is morecomplex and ambiguous. Although there is muchconflict throughout the “Third World,” in only afew cases do regional hostilities threaten U.S.security interests, now that they have been removedfrom the context of the superpower competition. TheUnited States can therefore concentrate its militaryplanning efforts on the few countries of the worldthat have significant military resources and directlythreaten some U.S. interest or ally, rather thanplanning for a “generic” Third World threat.Fortunately, current U.S. military capabilities dwarfthose of nations other than the Soviet Union and avery few others. Moreover, most of the militarypowers in the second tier are close U.S. allies.Although the Soviet nuclear arsenal is still capableof destroying the United States, the diminishedthreat of escalation from conventional war in Europehas made any intention by the Soviets to use nuclearweapons even more remote than in the past.

There are four primary policy decisions aboutfuture U.S. military forces that will affect thedefense technology and industrial base. They are:

1. the expected size and type of the threat orcontingency that available U.S. and alliedforces are expected to meet,

2. the desired rate at which forces would becommitted and the length of time they need tobe sustained,

3. the degree of autonomy desired for U.S. forces,and

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4. the expected performance of U.S. weaponscompared to those of potential adversaries.

Each of these choices will affect the requirementsplaced on the defense technology and industrialbase. The size of the force will determine the overallsize of the base. The readiness of forces should beroughly matched with the responsiveness of thebase. The desired autonomy of U.S. defense technol-ogy will determine the extent of dependence on andcooperation with allies and, in an era of increasingglobalization of technology, the degree of integra-

tion between civil and defense industry. Finally, theperformance of U.S. weapons will determine the sizeand intensity of the Nation’s defense research anddevelopment effort.

Whatever choices the Nation makes about itsfuture force requirements, the defense technologyand industrial base that served so well during thecold war is no longer appropriate. Careful attentionmust be given to the restructuring of the base toassure its ability to support the Nation’s defenseneeds well into the next century.

American Military Power: Future Needs, Future Choices

INTRODUCTIONAmerica’s international security environment has

changed profoundly and the change continues. Theprimary engine of change is the political revolutionin the Soviet Union and the consequent revolutionsallowed in its former satellite nations. The Office ofTechnology Assessment has been asked to evaluatethe effect of these changes on the future require-ments for the defense technology and industrialbase, possible changes in management required bythe smaller size of the base and its changing mission,and means of evolving from the current cold-warconfiguration of the base to the future streamlinedbut still robust base.

An essential first step in any evaluation of thedefense industrial base is understanding what mili-tary forces it will support and what those forces maybe called on to accomplish. This background paperoutlines a cluster of issues of importance to theongoing debate about the future nature and role ofU.S. armed forces. It takes a traditional approach toforce planning by discussing near-term (10 year)options against more traditional threats. OTA is alsoconducting a separate assessment of longer term (25year) options and a broader array of potential threats.

Designing a military structure is a complexprocess. An idealized approach would start fromscratch with a statement of national military objec-tives. These objectives could be based on consensus,or tradition, or they could be considered axiomatic.Policies would then be developed to promote thechosen objectives, and military forces would then bedesigned to serve those policies. In fact, however,practice is well removed in many ways from thisidealized approach. Even in a rapidly changingworld, the Nation must consider existing forcestructures and inventories of weapons, organiza-tions’ traditional approaches, and domestic andinternational precedent. Nevertheless, many of thecharacteristics of the U.S. military forces and theirsupporting defense industry arose in response to thespecial security requirements of the last 40 years.Given the profound security changes that haveoccurred, the assumptions that led to today’s mili-tary and industrial structure warrant review.

The next section briefly covers the post-wardevelopments that led to the current U.S. militaryforce structure and the supporting industrial base.The following sections review the Nation’s securityobjectives and the military policies designed toachieve those objectives. There follows a descrip-tion of the new security environment and theforeseeable trends. Finally, the paper concludes witha discussion of how force-structure decisions willaffect the defense technology and industrial base.

THE POST-WAR SECURITYENVIRONMENT ANDEVOLUTION OF U.S.

MILITARY DOCTRINE

Immediately after the victory of the Allied Powersin the Second World War, the United States per-ceived few security threats. The Allies had defeatedthe Germans and Japanese and the United States wasstill hopeful that the wary wartime alliance with theSoviet Union would continue. While the U.S. publichad seen the military and industrial mobilization forthe war as necessary, it was never popular, and fulldemobilization was expected immediately after thewar. U.S. strategy at the end of the war appeared assimplistic as “bringing the boys home’ and return-ing quickly to business as usual. But the emergenceof the United States as the world’s preeminenteconomic and military power opened new opportu-nities, as well as new peacetime responsibilities.

Soon after the end of the Second World War,events combined to create new security challengesfor the United States and the world. The SovietUnion, by its coercive actions in Eastern Europe,quickly came to be seen as a military threat. Thesharp and apparently irreconcilable ideological dif-ferences between the communist countries and theliberal democracies tended to force nations into oneof the two camps, forming a ‘‘bipolar’ world. TheUnited States tended to define conflicts large andsmall around the world in a context of this ideologi-cal superpower rivalry. Finally, nuclear weapons, bytheir very existence, hung over every calculation ofwar and gave Americans an unprecedented sense ofnational vulnerability.

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2 ● American Military Power: Future Needs, Future Choices

The North Korean invasion of the South deci-sively reversed the post-War dismantling of the U.S.military and its supporting industry. Defense spend-ing between 1950 and 1953 shot up from $78 to$331 billion (in FY90 dollars). The United Statessaw a Soviet Union intent on expansion, believed aworld war was imminent, and feared that such a warmight be nuclear and devastating. The United Stateshoped that the strategy of “containment” wouldattain the objective of preventing Soviet dominationof Europe by conquest or intimidation while avoid-ing nuclear war.l

This state of continual tense, alert peace came tobe called the “cold war,” and it required somethingnew of the United States. Because Soviet conven-tional capabilities in Europe were so formidable, andthe destruction from a nuclear surprise attack wouldbe so devastating, the Nation would not be able torecover from a sudden blow and mobilize over a yearor more, as it had in World War II. Thus, highlyready forces were deployed both at home and farfrom the United States to counter similarly readySoviet forces. This task in turn required a level ofmilitary operations that was unprecedented for theUnited States in peacetime, and the Nation settledinto a state of continuous military alert and partialindustrial mobilization.

The military threat from the Soviet Union, inparticular the threat from Soviet nuclear weapons,has dominated U.S. strategic thinking for the past 40years. 2 Although some argued that atomic weaponsmade war too horrible to consider as a policy option,even a U.S. monopoly on atomic weapons did notdeter the Soviets in the 1948 Berlin crisis nor, later,the North Korean invasion of the South. In partbecause of the frustrating failure of nuclear deter-rence in Korea, the United States explicitly pre-sented, in a 1954 speech by Secretary of StateDunes, a policy that became known as “massiveretaliation.” In its most extreme form, this policythreatened a U.S. nuclear attack against the Soviethomeland in response to conventional attack bycommunists anywhere.

Finances were a prime motivation for the policyof massive retaliation. The United States, and evenmore its European allies, were convinced that theycould never match the Soviets man-for-man andgun-for-gun. (This judgment was based on the size

of a standing army thought to be politically accepta-ble in a democracy; a comparison of economies andpopulations reveals no inherent inferiority.) Nuclearweapons seemed to offer a cheap way to counter thehuge communist land armies. Western conventionalforces, and specifically U.S. forces in Europe,needed to be only large enough to demonstrate U.S.commitment and serve as a “tripwire’ to triggernuclear war.

Massive retaliation was a plausible strategy onlyas long as the Soviets did not have an atomic bombwith which to retaliate or to deter a Western nuclearattack in the first place. Since Dunes’ speechoccurred after the Soviet’s first test of a hydrogenbomb, massive retaliation was recognized at the timeto be an interim policy. The next year MaxwellTaylor introduced the strategy of “flexible re-sponse,’ which envisioned using only the amount offorce necessary and appropriate to counter anaggression. The capability to respond proportion-ately to any of a wide spectrum of possible attacksrequired more powerful and versatile conventionalforces.

Once the Soviets had acquired a substantialarsenal of nuclear weapons, the United States’objective was to minimize the chance of all-outnuclear war, which would most likely start from aconventional conflict. Initially, nuclear weapons hadbeen intended to deter conventional attack, relegat-ing U.S. conventional forces to the almost tokenrole. By the early 1960s, however, Secretary ofDefense McNarmara was urging European allies toincrease spending on conventional forces to fore-stall, or at least delay, the resort to nuclear weaponsshould war break out. Thus deterrence relied less onthe nuclear threat, and the relation of nuclear andconventional weapons almost reversed itself. To-ward the end of the cold war, NATO forces weremeant to provide a credible conventional defense or,at the very least, a coherent defense lasting weeks toallow a deliberate decision to use nuclear weapons.

Conventional forces in Europe have receivedvarious amounts of attention since McNamara’stenure. The war in Vietnam was a purely conven-tional conflict in which the threat of nuclear useplayed no real part, yet the United States has neverallowed nuclear weapons to lose their critical role inEurope as the fina1 recourse if attacked. Indeed,

l,tx~ J (~rge Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduc4° Foreign Aflairs, vol. 25, No. 4, July 1947, pp. 566-582.~or a good history of nuclear strategy, see Lawrence Frexxhm@ The Evolution of NucZear Strategy (New Yorlq NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1981).

American Military Power: Future Needs, Future Choices ● 3

along with continued improvements in conventionalforce capability, a great deal of effort during the coldwar went toward developing procedures and weap-ons that would “couple” the conventional defensesin Europe to increasingly powerful nuclear forces,culminating with the intercontinental nuclear forcesof the United States.

Throughout the cold war, the United Statesviewed most regional conflicts outside of Europe asbeing at least partially in the context of a globalstruggle between the United States and Soviet-aidedcommunist aggression. This perception gave somelocal conflicts in small countries, such as Angolaand Nicaragua, an importance out of proportion tothat they would have received if viewed in isolation.Even when local animosities were adequate toproduce conflict, for example in the Middle East, theSoviets often tried to exploit such conflicts to thedisadvantage of the United States. The United Statesplayed the same game, supporting groups whosemain qualification was opposition to whatever groupthe Soviets were supporting. In only a few cases suchas Panama, because of the importance of the Canalto U.S. commerce, did the United States perceivesecurity interests wholly independent of the super-power competition.

The cold war affected every aspect of U.S. forcestructure to some extent: forward deployment offorces; reliance on allies; maintenance of large,highly ready forces; and emphasis on high-performance weapons. The continuing changes inthe Soviet Union and east-central Europe are of thesame magnitude as those that brought on the coldwar, only in the direction of diminished threat.Before discussing changed policies, however, thenext section reviews U.S. objectives.

U.S. NATIONAL SECURITYOBJECTIVES

The stated national security objectives of theUnited States are simple, although not consistentlyobserved in real-world politics. According to recentstatements by the President, the United States hasfour basic objectives:

1. ensuring the survival of the Nation as apolitically independent entity;

2. promoting economic prosperity for Americansand the world;

3. maintaining a stable world order conducive toliberty; and

4. forging strong ties to allies and like-mindednations throughout the world.3

For the foreseeable future, pursuing these objec-tives will require military forces to supplementeconomic and diplomatic tools.

Maintaining a political identity and the ability toact as a political entity is the foremost objective ofany state. Indeed, pursuing this objective could beused to define the purpose of a “nation-state.”Beyond this fundamental goal, the United States hasthe power and resources to pursue other objectives.

First, the U.S. Government maintains the objec-tive of promoting its own and the world’s prosperityby pursuing policies it believes will contribute to astable international environment. Other countriesmay share this view but the United States is foremostin being able to effect it on a global scale, and theonly nation with the required force even to attemptit militarily.

Second, stated U.S. foreign-policy objectiveshave an ideological content. The United States is aliberal democracy and officially supports liberaldemocratic governments around the world, as wellas movement toward democracy among those gov-ernments that have not yet achieved it. The historicalrecord here is mixed, however, and the United Stateshas not always lived up to its rhetoric. During thecold war, for example, the United States supportedautocratic regimes in Iran, Iraq, South Korea, andthroughout Central and South America simplybecause they were anticommunist or were perceivedto promote regional stability. Nevertheless, nocountry, except the Soviet Union, has even at-tempted on a global scale such support based onideology.

POLICIESPlanning for future military force structure re-

quires some vision of the mission of the militaryforces. The country needs very different forces tointervene in other countries than it does just to keephostile military forces off its own shores. And nomilitary force alone will be able to guarantee that afuture government, for example in Iraq, is stable,democratic, and friendly to the United States.

3National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington DC: The White House, March 1990), PP. 2-3.


There was never much question of whether theUnited States should defend vital interests chal-lenged by the Soviet Union. Instead, the debateconcerned how to do it best, how much militaryforce was needed, and how that force ought to bedeployed.

U.S. policymakers have recognized that in themodern era, economic and industrial power createmilitary potential. Thus, during the cold war, theUnited States considered the potential Soviet domi-nation of Europe’s industrial power-and hence itsmilitary potential-to be a long-term threat toAmerican security. The security of Europe remainsvital to the United States. The difference now is thatthe Soviet challenge is much reduced and the newsecurity equation much more complex. The threat ofoverwhelming surprise attack is gone. Estimates ofwarning time have increased from 2 weeks to asmuch as 2 years, and the Soviet Union is muchweakened. This change is now believed irreversible,in the strict sense that the Soviets will not be able toreturn to the situation they once enjoyed and animportant buffer of Eastern and Central Europeanstates now exists between the Soviets and NATOEurope.

Military security cannot be measured on anabsolute scale, but comparing the situation today tothe past suggests that the relative likelihood of amajor war in Europe involving the United States hasfallen to its lowest level since the 1920s. Yet, evenwithout a threat of short-term surprise attack, Europemay still need the American long-term potential forreinforcement and mobilization to counter the com-parable Soviet potential, and some European nationsmay still want the U.S. nuclear guarantee againstSoviet nuclear coercion.

Instability in Eastern Europe, or in the SovietUnion itself, while not a “threat” in the normalsense, could pose a potential danger to U.S. andNATO security. Since wars can expand in unpredict-able and seemingly irrational ways, President Bushcan say with some reason that the enemy is‘‘instability.’ Having intervened in two WorldWars in Europe, the United States clearly has aninterest in maintainingg stability on the continent.

Aside from the Soviet threat, the United States,thanks to its size, power, and geography, facesexceedingly few threats to its survival. Nevertheless,the United States has been willing to fight forinterests that cannot in the strictest sense be called

“vital” in that they affect national survival. Theintervention in Grenada is a recent example. Theseinterventions were officially justified in part by theU.S. objective of promoting international stability.Of course, great care must be exercised in the use ofmilitary force because it is a blunt instrument withmany unpredictable consequences and often leads toless rather than more stability.

In the future, the United States must continue tobalance costs and benefits when calculating whetherand when to involve itself militarily around theworld. Furthermore, if military planning is notdominated by the need to meet the Soviet threat, theUnited States must make difficult tradeoffs whendeciding on the military forces (and supportingindustrial base) needed to maintain the capability tointervene around the world.

THE FUTURE SECURITYENVIRONMENT

If the United States chooses to remain a greatpower, even if not a “superpower,” then it musthave military resources that make it a serious playeralong with other large nations on the world stage.Comparisons of military power between any twocountries should not imply that the potential forconflict exists. Indeed, part of the ongoing debateabout the appropriate size of U.S. forces in Europeinvolves the perceived need to have forces compara-ble in size to the those of allies so the United Statescan remain a major player in NATO policymaking.

Europe

Europe continues to hold the greatest concentra-tion of conventional military power on Earth. ForU.S. military force planning, it also holds thegreatest number of ironies. Since the end of theSecond World War, the Soviet Union and theSoviet-dominated Warsaw Pact have been the domi-nant threats to security in Europe. The Warsaw Pactis now defunct, but Soviet military power, whilereduced, is still formidable. NATO has done well atdeterring the military threat to the security ofWestern Europe but is now uncertain of its futurerole. The future role of U.S. forces in particular isunclear.

American forces have been integral to the defenseof Europe. They represented both significant mili-tary power in their own right and the commitment ofthe balance of American power should war break


out. The United States could judge the size of itsmilitary requirements by the force needed to bringNATO’s overall strength up to the challenge pre-sented by the Soviet threat.

This NATO military shortfall is much reducedwith the reduction of Soviet forces and theirwithdrawal from Eastern Europe. The dissolution ofthe Warsaw Pact, and the loss of East Germany toNATO, represent a greater loss of military power bythe Soviet side than the withdrawal from Europe ofU.S. forces would be for NATO. If trends inreduction of the Soviet conventional threat toEurope continue then very little of the militaryjustification for U.S. forces in Europe will remain.European NATO countries ought to be more thancapable of providing for their own security, espe-cially if backed by the potential for U.S. reinforce-ment.

Without an immediate Soviet threat, the militarymission of U.S. forces in Europe has become lessclear, and the lack of a clear mission means that nosimple yardstick is available to judge the appropri-ateness of any particular level of U.S. military force.The European countries have significant armedforces of their own, and almost any U.S. militaryaction in Europe would require the cooperation ofallies. This fact requires estimating U.S. militaryneeds within the context of a total allied force.

Even though the military mission of U.S. forces inEurope has become less clear, few Europeans areclamoring for a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces.One reason is that the U.S. military presence has apolitical function to perform by demonstrating theUnited States’ continuing commitment to the secu-rity and stability of Europe. Ultimately, this missionmight require little more than a military liaison andlogistics support on the ground. If warning time ofa resurgent Soviet threat really is 2 years or more,then U.S. military potential plays as great a part asimmediate capability in the deterrence calculation.

U.S. forces may be useful for a variety of possiblenonmilitary NATO missions. They could serve toenhance stability, as a sign of U.S. political commit-ment to European affairs, as insurance or reassur-ance, or in a future European arms control regime.None of these missions alone would justify a U.S.

presence, however, and each has limitations. Forexample, although instability could spill over intoNATO areas, it is most likely to arise in southeastEurope-Bulgaria, Romania, or Yugoslavia-or inthe realigned republics of the Soviet Union itself,where U.S. forces could not realistically be de-ployed. Alternatively, U.S. forces may reassure thePoles and the Russians about German intentions, butexplaining this mission to the Germans would bevery delicate indeed. Finally, U.S. forces might finda role in a future European arms control regime ifnon-European forces are needed to serve as moredisinterested observers or referees. They could helpmonitor military movements and count treaty-limited weapons, and act as inspectors or adjudica-tors.

Outside Europe

Until recently, the Warsaw Pact threat to Europewas so challenging that it alone could provide mostof the context for planning U.S. military forces. Ifthe United States could meet the threat in Europe,then other, lesser contingencies would be coveredmore or less automatically. This will not be the casein the future.

The importance to U.S. security of areas outsideof Europe and Japan, often lumped together as the“Third World,” has been much debated. There aretwo basic schools of thought.4 One school arguesthat the United States should concentrate almostexclusively on the security of the world’s industrialcenters and the oil-rich areas that fuel them, becausethey are the source of military power. Since theThird World’s economic power is very limited anddiffuse, the Third World is of limited securityinterest to the United States except for such specialcases as Panama, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.5

Members of the opposing school contend thatstraightforward calculations of industrial power aretoo simplistic. They argue that much of the import-ance of the Third World depends on geography andthat, while no single country maybe vital, aggregateloss of access to resources and bases could affect theglobal balance of power. Moreover, some observers,seeing the Third World’s growing populations,rising religious fundamentalism, and expanding

dFor a good comparison Of the main arguments on both sides, see Michael C. DesclL ‘‘The Keys That Lock Up the World: Identifying AmericanInterests in the Periphery,’ International Security, vol. 14, No. 1, summer 1989, pp. 89-121.

SFor a ~sc~ct exwsition of fis view, see stephenv~Ever% ‘ ‘American strategic ~terests: J$@rEuN)pe Matters, why the Thkd World DOem’t”hearings before the Panel on Defense Burdensharing, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Mar. 2, 1988.


arsenals, argue that it is becoming increasinglyunstable, and that threats to U.S. interests in theThird World are increasing in number and degree. Insuch a view, even if conflict in Europe would bemore damaging, Third World conflict is so muchmore likely that it should receive greater attention. G-

In contrast, a longer term view suggests reasons whyThird World stability may increase: the long post-war decolonization and its destabilizing effects arebehind us, Third World nation-building is wellalong, and the Soviet’s ideologically driven inter-vention has ended. Thus, whether the world outsideEurope and North America will become less stablein the future is uncertain. Whatever the future oflevel of instability, where Third World conflictpersists today, it is most often due to long-standinglocal animosities and does not automatically implythreats to Western security.

Much of the past argument about the importanceof the Third World concerned its effect on the globalbalance of power between the Soviet Union and theUnited States. Since the Soviets have essentiallywithdrawn from that competition, however, balance-of-power arguments supporting involvement in theThird World are no longer relevant and the postu-lated military threats to U.S. interests are substan-tially reduced. Other considerations supporting ThirdWorld involvement will survive the end of the coldwar, but they also may be weakened. Geography willremain the same: the United States will inevitably beconcerned about what goes on in Mexico and othernearby states. Although threats to straits and othertransportation choke-points are possible because ofThird World geography, they were most significantwithin the context of potential global conflict withthe Soviet Union. Moreover, it is easy to exaggeratethe significance of these threats, since there arealways alternatives.8 For example, anyone with amap can point out the “vital” importance of theSuez Canal, yet it was closed for years after the 1967Arab-Israeli War without disastrous effects.

Regardless of the extent of U.S. interests, the largemajority of nations of the world have such limitedmilitary capability that even a small force by U.S.standards would be adequate to handle most contin-

gencies. Moreover, the majority of the world’snations are poor and thus have a limited militarypotential. This is not to say that the poorest parts ofthe world, such as Africa, are or will be peaceful.Precisely because they are poor, they may experi-ence civil and interstate conflict, but they areunlikely to pose a traditional overt military threat toU.S. security interests.

The types of potential U.S. military interventionin the poor Third World could require more tailoredforces. One would have to postulate some type ofextended guerrilla war involving the United Statesbefore the military requirements would be taxing.But forces used for intervention may need specialequipment and training, and may be only part of acoordinated program of economic development,police training, education, and so on.

Other than the Soviet Union, only a handful ofnations have substantial military capability and alsocontrol a vital resource (in practice, this means oil)or threaten a U.S. ally or important U.S. interests.The number of potentially serious threats is smallenough that instead of planning for a “generic”Third World threat, specific cases can be considered.North Korea and a few countries in the Middle Eastare the challenging potential threats, providing ayardstick for future U.S. force requirements.

Only a handful of Third World nations have anysignificant domestic weapons production and nonehas a broad, comprehensive military industrial base.Still, Third World weapon production capability isincreasing, often with Western help.9 (See table 1.)A few countries have tried to leapfrog their defenseindustry into production of weapons such as ballisticmissiles, although those available so far are bettersuited for terrorizing civilians than for achievingmilitary objectives.

The problem is not just the proliferation ofmilitary technologies but the widespread availabilityof weapons on the open market. Other than nuclearweapons, there is very little that any country with themoney cannot buy. Thus, some Third World nations,especially those with oil reserves, have been able toacquire substantial arsenals. Several nations have

GSee Steven R. David, “why the Third World Mtters, ” International Security, vol. 14, No. 1, summer 1989, pp. 50-850.%Liot CoheU “Distant Battles: Modem War in the Tbird World,” International Security, vol. 10, No. 4, spring 1986, pp. 143-171.gRob~ H. Jo~on, ‘‘Exaggerating America’s Sties in ~d World CO~C@” International Security, vol. 10, No. 3, winter 1985-86, pp. 32-68.

%J.S. Congress, OffIce of Technology AssessrnenL GlobalArms Trade: Commerce in AdvancedMilitary Technology and Weapons, OTA-ISC-460(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Oftlee, June 1991).


Table l-Countries Producing Weapons—Now Through 2000

Major independent Indigenous production of Limited production of Limited production of Minimal weaponweapon production a wide range of weapons many types of weapons a few types of weapons production capability

United States Brazil Chile Argentina AlgeriaSoviet Union India Greece Egypt IraqFrance Israel Indonesia North Korea LibyaGermany South Korea Iran Taiwan MoroccoUnited Kingdom Yugoslavia Malaysia Canada* SyriaChina South Africa SingaporePoland Spain* PakistanCzechoslovakia ThailandItaly TurkeySwedenJapan*‘Additional estimates by OTA.

SOURCE: Briefing by David Louscher, “Patterns of Demand and Supply of Weapons.”

bought sophisticated types of weapons that, even ifnot possessed in large numbers, can severely com-plicate U.S. defense plans. Antiship cruise missilesare an example. Although some defense contractorshave suggested promoting arms sales to support theU.S. defense base, this policy makes little sense if itencourages sales of weapons to countries that maybecome America’s enemies.

The Continuing Nuclear Threat

Soviet intercontinental-range nuclear weaponscontinue to pose a direct threat to the United States.Although the threat from Soviet conventional forcesis much reduced and the Warsaw Pact threat hasdisappeared, there has been no comparable reduc-tion in the capability for destruction from Sovietcentral nuclear systems. But even though Sovietnuclear capabilities are practically undiminished,there is still a reduced risk to the United States, forseveral reasons.

First, although military planners often say thatone should disregard intentions and concentrate onlyon capabilities, that is too simplistic. Both theBritish and the French have nuclear arsenals thatcould destroy the United States as a modern society,yet Americans do not worry about those capabilitiesbecause of their confidence in the intentions of thesetwo allies. The Soviet Union clearly has become lessbelligerent over the last several years and anyintention to use nuclear weapons is certainly evenmore remote than in the past.

Second, nuclear war would be so horrendous thatno one could easily imagine incentives strongenough to start one. Most military planners havejudged that the most probable route to nuclear warhas been escalation from conventional war. With the

diminished probability of conventional war betweenthe United States and the Soviet Union, the riskposed by the Soviet nuclear arsenal has beenindirectly reduced.

Finally, the recently completed START armscontrol negotiations offer hope that the future threatto the United States from Soviet nuclear weaponswill be reduced through further cuts in numbers andtypes of weapons (particularly heavy ICBMs). Eachside’s modernization drives the other’s to someextent and requires costly countermeasures, forexample, to maintain survivability. Even if the twosuperpowers remain wary of each other, changes inthe Soviet Union are such that it is now at leastconceivable that retaliatory security can be assuredby cooperatively refraining from deploying counter-force weapons.

Perhaps the greatest potential for an increase inthe threat from Soviet nuclear weapons wouldfollow from instability in, or a breakup of, the SovietUnion. In that case, nuclear command-and-controlcould pass to untested, perhaps unstable govern-ments. The Soviet coup and its aftermath forcefullydemonstrated the potential dangers. However, thebreakup of the Soviet Union could also lead to therapid dismantling of its nuclear forces particularlywith encouragement from the United States, such asthe recent unilateral reductions in the number andreadiness of its nuclear weapons. The events unfold-ing in the Soviet Union at this time carry both risksand opportunities.

U.S. policy of extended deterrence has assigned tostrategic nuclear systems in the United States somerole in defending Europe. Nuclear weapons weremeant to weigh in the final balance as a deterrent toconventional aggression. As the conventional threat


to Europe is reduced, nuclear weapons need to keeponly their purer deterrent function of deterring theother side’s use of its own nuclear weapons, and thefurther deterrent provided by nuclear weaponswould become redundant. As a result, the nuclearforce intended to deter conventional attack could beproportionately reduced.

Although the Soviet nuclear threat may be dimin-ishing, there is the continuing worry about thesecond tier of nuclear powers, particularly China,and the additional concern about the spread ofnuclear weapons to other nations. In the past, theSoviet nuclear arsenal has been so huge that China’sweapons seemed insignificant. If large Soviet reduc-tions occur, then more attention must be given toChina and other nuclear states.

The nuclear club has grown very little over thepast 10 years but other nations are trying to developnuclear weapons or are on the verge of having them.Nuclear weapons are so destructive that possessionby even one hostile nation could be a significantthreat to the Nation’s physical security. This makesdefense difficult; for example, a weapon could becarried in a single ship into any of dozens of harbors.Moreover, deterrence by the threat of retaliation,which seems to have worked in the past, may not beeffective against irrational leaders who may acquirenuclear weapons.

Another strategy is to prevent the spread ofnuclear weapons. Here there is some room for hopesince the existing nuclear powers cooperate fairlywell to discourage further proliferation and mostnon-nuclear states with a nuclear weapon potentialhave chosen to forego the option.10 The problem,then, is not a general worldwide rush to go nuclearby every country that is technologically capable ofit, but rather a few nations, such as, Pakistan, Libya,and Iraq, that appear intent on acquiring nuclearweapons. Although these cases present a challenge,isolation, persuasion, coercion, and sanctions workbetter against a few renegades than against a generaltrend and they are far less costly than deploying astrategic defense system.

Summary

The global security environment has becomemore favorable to the United States over the last fewyears and the trends point toward continuing im-

provement. The Soviet threat is reduced, while themilitary threat from Third World conflicts hasdiminished now that these continuing conflicts havebeen removed from the superpower context. U.S.force planners must not assume that military forcesor conflict around the world are necessarily a threatto U.S. interests.

Those Third World crises that do flare up will bemuch easier to handle in the absence of the threat ofSoviet intervention hanging over every move. Imag-ine the recent war against Iraq if it were still a Sovietclient state. Each U.S. action would have beenjudged against the risk of Soviet involvement, andthe Syrians and several other Arab states most likelywould have withheld support from the United Statesor even sided with Iraq. The Europeans, worriedabout antagonizing the Soviets on their own front,would have been much less forthcoming. What wasalready a formidable task might have becomeparalyzingly complex.

The change in the nature of the military threat willresult in changes in the required military forcestructure, creating new needs for the supportingtechnology and industrial base. But competingrequirements for military forces create conundrumsfor defense base planning. With the sharp decline inthe Soviet threat, the large increase in warning timeavailable before it could launch a credible conven-tional attack, and anew buffer of independent statesbetween NATO and the Soviet Union or its succes-sor states, the challenge of meeting a future majorthreat involves reconstituting a huge U.S. militarycapability at least as quickly as the new threatemerges. That period of competitive rearmamentcould take years. On the one hand, no one proposesthat the United States should maintain a standingarmy sized to meet a reconstituted Soviet militarycapability or some other great-power threat. On theother hand, there are many lesser contingencies thatrequire forces-in-being, and the defense base re-quirements of those forces will be very differentfrom those needed to reconstitute forces to meet anew superpower threat. How to allocate limitedresources between these two requirements will beone of the important policy questions concerning thedefense industrial base in the coning decade.

1OJoseph Nye, “Nonproliferation: A Long-Term Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 56, No. 3, April 1978, pp. 601-623.


FOUR CHOICES ABOUT HOW TOREACH OBJECTIVES

Desired characteristics of the Nation’s futuremilitary forces will result primarily from politicalchoices, assumptions, and judgments; few decisionswill fall out from objective calculation. Neverthe-less, these decisions should be based on a fewimportant policy choices.

There are four primary policy decisions that willaffect the defense technology and industrial base.They are:

1.

2.

3.

4.

the expected size and type of the threat orcontingency that available forces will be ex-pected to meet,the desired rate at which forces should becommitted and the length of time the forcesneed to be sustained,the autonomous capability for unilateral actiondesired for those forces, andthe expected performance of U.S. weaponscompared to those of potential adversaries.

These choices are summarized in table 2.

These force-structure choices should not bethought of as independent parameters in an equationbut as different perspectives from which to examinea very complex problem. The options are closelyinterrelated. For example, the size of the Navy, andspecifically the number of aircraft carriers, is deter-mined in part by the total force capability requiredand in part by the desired reaction time of thecarriers.

The United States still has to decide whichcontingencies it wants to handle with forces-in-being. There will always be hypothetical contingen-cies that would require a national mobilization andgeneral expansion of the military, for example,against countries the size of the Soviet Union, India,or China. On the other hand, operations smaller thandefending against an all-out Soviet attack on Europe,such as the ones in Grenada, Panama, and the PersianGulf, could be handled with plausible levels ofactive forces. Since none of these lesser casespresent immediate threats to the fundamental secu-rity of the country, U.S. defense planners must usesomewhat subjective judgment in choosing whichcontingencies to handle with available forces.

Whatever the size of any particular military force,the Nation must decide on the readiness of that force.Very different readiness levels are required if thePresident wants U.S. forces to occupy Panamawithin 24 hours as compared with taking 6 to 12months to do the same thing. Readiness is reflectedmost explicitly in the ratio of standing to reserveforces but also in the training time of standingpersonnel, the stock of spare parts, and the level ofmaintenance of weapons.

Since the beginning of the Second World War, theUnited States has relied on allies to help protect evenits most vital interests. Although the Nation hasmaintained an autonomous nuclear retaliatory force,the United States has chosen to forego the ability toconduct major military operations without allied orhost-nation cooperation. Interdependence with alliesaffects industrial-base needs in two ways: first,directly by influencing the size and composition of

Table 2—Force-Structure Choices Affecting the Defense Technology andIndustrial Base

National security policy choice Military force implications DTIB implications

Size and nature of contingency Size and capability of overallplanned for force

Urgency of dealing with Readiness of force, active/contingency reserve ratios, training tempo,

war reservesAutonomy of action Degree of integration with allied

forces, size and readiness offorces, composition of force

Qualitative or quantitative Performance and number ofemphasis in weapons weapons

Size of sustaining base, surgeand mobilization capacity

Responsiveness, lead times

Use of foreign technology, use offoreign production, coopera-tive logistics planning

Sophistication of supporting tech-nology base, allowed depend-ence on global commercialtechnology

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.


the forces needed for various contingencies and,second, by determining the extent to which theUnited States allows itself to rely on foreign supplyof weapons and components.

The fourth force structure decision that will affectstrongly the requirements of the industrial base is thedesired performance of U.S. weapons. The UnitedStates has made a policy of having weapons ofsuperior performance to those of potential adversar-ies, even if that has required sacrificing quantitativesuperiority. Producing weapons with high perform-ance at acceptable cost has required maintainingtechnological superiority over potential enemies.This policy is not written in stone. Indeed, during theSecond World War, the United States was renownednot just for the quality of its weapons but for theiroverwhelming numbers. Even if the Nation contin-ues to pursue a policy of maintaining qualitativesuperiority, the question of trades between qualityand quantity will remain.

Each of these policy choices is expanded below.

Size of Contingency

The size of the threat that U.S. forces must becapable of handling, that is, the overall capabilityand power of the Nation’s military force, is the mostimportant single choice to be made about them. Thissection discusses some of the considerations thatwill go into making that choice.

Measuring military power is extremely difficult,and several units of measure are commonly used.Perhaps the best overaIl comparison of capability inmodern conventional war is total resources ex-pended for military forces, as measured by dollarsspent. Total resources corresponds to the investmentin modern weaponry and the sidled manpower torun it. Measures of capability used by militaryplanners include total number and quality of peopleunder arms, and the firepower, mobility, and vulner-ability of major weapons (tanks, planes, and ships).Total resources invested is another rough, aggregatemeasure of overall capability.

Using any measure for a relative comparison oftwo military forces can be even more problematic.Furthermore, static comparisons of today’s forcesmay tell us little about the military potential of anation. For example, the existing military power ofJapan measured by its deployed tanks and planes ismuch less than the military potential that Japancould achieve after a few years’ mobilization. In

contrast, some oil-rich countries may have hugeinventories of modern weapons but may lack theindustrial infrastructure to support them, a profoundweakness in any long-term conflict. Simple compar-isons of industrial capability alone are also inade-quate. Again using Japan as an example, because itis an island-nation short of natural resources, Japan’smilitary potential is vulnerable to disruption bynaval blockade. Clearly, measuring military require-ments will always be difficult and neither com-pletely quantitative nor precise.

The size of future U.S. forces will be determinedby judgments about the size of contingencies to behandled, the likelihood of those contingencies, andthe risks of not being able to handle them. Figures 1and 2 provide some global perspective on themilitary challenges confronting the United States.Figure 1 shows military spending of those nationswith the largest military budgets. What stands outstarkly from the figure is that the United States andthe Soviet Union do not just outspend other coun-tries but overwhelm every other nation’s militaryspending.

In fact, other than the Soviet Union, no othernation spends on its military as much as one-eighthas much as the United States does. This distantsecond tier of nations with significant militaryspending is made up overwhelmingly of America’sclosest allies: the United Kingdom, France, Ger-many, Japan, Italy, and Saudi Arabia. As measuredby spending, there is little competition other than theSoviet Union; if the United States were to halve itsdefense budget, it would still outspend the nearestcompetitors by a factor of 4. (The ratio of spendingwill hold steady with many of the European coun-tries even after U.S. budget reductions because they,too, will be reducing their spending after the CFETreaty goes into force.)

Again with the exception of the Soviet Union, nolarge nation spends as great a fraction of its grossdomestic product (GDP) on its military as does theUnited States, even though it has the largest GDP inthe world. The other countries that spend a greaterfraction of GDP on the military than the UnitedStates are a few oil-producing states with valuable,easy-to-seize assets and small populations to defendthem (e.g., Oman), face perceived immediate threats(e.g., Israel), are involved in hostilities or insurrec-tion (e.g., Angola), or are militarized societies (e.g.,North Korea).


Figure l—Major National Military Budgets, 1988

United States / / / / / / / / / m / / / / / / e / / / / / / / / H / / / / ASoviet Union

FranceWest Germany

United KingdomJapanChina

ItalyPoland

Saudi ArabiaIraqIran

CanadaCzechoslovakia

IndiaRomania

South KoreaSpain

Bulgaria 10 100 200 300

Billions of 1988 dollars

SOURCE: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Figure 2 shows another measure of a nation’smilitary power, total personnel in the armed forces.By this measure, the United States does not standoutso clearly, nor is there a sharp cut-off that divides thegreat from the small. Yet even if the United Stateshalved its total number of personnel, it would stillcount among the largest forces in the world. (Notethat by halving the force the United States wouldonly lose relative rank with India and Vietnam.) Ifthe United States halved its current personnelstrength and maintained its current quality of troops,training, and equipment, it would still have both oneof the largest and best militaries in the world.

Although not a perfect measure, total nationalresources are a good frost cut at military potential.Figure 3 shows GDP for the largest economies of theworld. Again, the United States stands out from therest of the world and the nearest competitors arecounted among America’s military allies. Thus, byany measure—spending, major weapons, total menunder arms-only a few nations are in the sameleague as the United States. This suggests that ananalysis of future military force requirements couldprofitably concentrate on comparison to a fewspecific nations—for example, Syria, Iran, andNorth Korea.

Readiness of U.S. Forces

After deciding the size of U.S. forces, the nextmost important policy decision to be made concern-ing them is their state of readiness. According to the

Figure 2—Active Armed Forces Personnel, 1988

Soviet UnionChina

United StatesIndia—

VietnamIraq

TurkeyNorth Korea

IranSouth Korea

FranceWest Germany

Pakistan

Egypt/Italy

o 1 2 3 4Millions of persons


Figure 3-Gross Domestic Products, 1988

United StatesJapan

Soviet UnionGermany France:

United KingdomItaly

ChinaCanada

BrazilSpain

IranIndia

AustraliaNetherlandsSwitzerland/Sweden

MexicoSouth Korea

Belgium1 I 1 I

o 1 2 3 4 5Trillions of 1988 dollars


Department of Defense definitions, readiness as amilitary term refers to the fraction of a force that canbe committed to a fight without unacceptable delaysand acquit itself well. Factors determining readinessinclude: the quality, training, and reaming levels ofmilitary personnel; the condition and maintenanceof equipment; the state of collective training of unitsand crews; the quality of command, control, commu-nications, and intelligence (C3I) support; the loca-tion and mobility of forces; and logistics support.ll

When a force is “ready” is, of course, partly ajudgment. On the one hand, any force can be throwninto combat without training, but disaster may awaitthem. On the other hand, any force would probably

llFrank Carlucci, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1990, P. 7.


benefit from additional training and attention toweapons. Overall readiness of the total militaryforces is affected primarily by the ratio of active toreserve forces, but any particular reserve unit can beat varying levels of readiness (where ‘readiness’ isdefined by how long it would take to get prepared tofight). Readiness is also affected by the deployment,the training tempo, and the support of active forces,particularly the transport planes and ships requiredto get them where they are needed.

Decisions about maintainingg readiness will in-clude calculations about both the costs of stayingready and the costs of not being ready. The costs ofreadiness are clear.requires high levelspersonnel, which inequipment, fuel forpeople. Maintainingfull of spare parts

To maintain ready personnelof realistic training for activeturn means wear and tear onvehicles, and salaries for theready equipment means binsand aggressive maintenance

schedules, all of which costs money.

Estimating the costs of not being ready is moredifficult. The greatest danger would arise if a hostilepower could attack so quickly and so severely thatthe victimized state could not recover to defend itselffurther. This situation characterizes the vulnerabilityof many small nations, and that of the United Statesto intercontinental nuclear weapons. Fortunately,the United States is large, militarily powerful, andseparated from potential enemies by great oceans, sothat its homeland and military industrial potentialcould not be overrun in a conventional (i.e., non-nuclear) surprise attack. The United States may paya price for not being ready, but its survival will notbe in jeopardy.

Nevertheless, wars and threats can flare upquickly in places where the United States hasinterests, and sometimes costs can be incurred bydelaying a military response. The North Koreanattack on the South in 1950 provides an example.Had the United States completely lost its foothold onthe peninsula, then the cost—both in materiel andlives-of later having to make a “forcible entry”could have been much higher.

Against a giant adversary like the Soviet Unionwith its huge mobilization potential, the best allocat-ion of resources will result almost certainly in a“total force” made up of a combination of highlyready active forces and reserve forces at variouslesser levels of readiness. The best ratio of active toreserve forces for secondary contingencies is contro-

versial, and will be determined by a judgmentcomparing recurring costs to potential risks. Be-cause of the United States’ power and distance fromenemies, however, it will always have some time toprepare for a major non-nuclear war. Thus, U.S.military forces can be composed of a limited numberof active troops to deal with quick flare-ups or to‘‘hold the fort’ until successively less ready catego-ries of forces are brought up to combat strength.Others argue that any U.S. intervention must bequick and decisive, as much for domestic political asmilitary reasons, and thus must be carried out withforces-in-being. This view implies that reserveforces will not be used to their full potential exceptin cases of total war.

Like force size, future force readiness decisionsare still unresolved. Given the choice between sizeand readiness, most military planners today seem toprefer a smaller, highly ready force to a larger, lessready force. There are a variety of reasons for thispreference but one is the perception cited above thatonly ready forces are usable. Others counter thathighly ready forces make military involvement tooeasy. Indeed, several recent Presidents have arguedthat, as Commander-in-Chief, they can commitactive forces as they see fit, even to the extent ofengaging in combat. Once active forces have beenraised, congressional control becomes more diffi-cult, but Congress could put a ceiling on the extentof future U.S. involvements by limiting the size ofthe ready forces.

Interdependence With Allies

Since the beginning of the Second World War, theUnited States has often operated militarily in coop-eration with allies, but it has also sought to preservethe option for independent military action. Alliancesobviously can bring to bear greater military powerthan any one nation alone could produce. But theUnited States has sought to act within a group asoften for political as for military reasons. The crisiswith Iraq is a good example of how the United Stateshas sought to forge an international consensus forthe use of military power. Operating within analliance can be frustrating, but it can be a moderatinginfluence as well.

The United States is allied with Japan, SouthKorea, Australia, and New Zealand, but the NATOalliance has dominated. With the collapse of theWarsaw Pact and the continuing diminution of theSoviet threat against Europe, the NATO alliance will


certainly change. NATO could be weakened by thelack of a clear, unifying threat. However NATOevolves, the United States cannot avoid reexaminingits most important alliance relationship and itsattitude to alliances in general. The allowed degreeof interdependence with allies is the third importantpolicy decision affecting the nature of the futuredefense technical and industrial base, and will affectthe required size of U.S. forces, their level ofreadiness, and their composition. Moreover, a con-sistent policy would match the degree of militaryand industrial interdependence.

The size and capability required of U.S. forces isrelated to their autonomy. The U.S. forces stationedin Germany or South Korea would have no hope ofdefending those countries alone and were neverintended to. Clearly, if allies are fighting alongside,the requirement for U.S. forces is reduced. Thelogistical burden on U.S. forces is also reduced byhost-nation support and the existence of secure linesof resupply. Required readiness levels are alsoaffected by the degree to which the United States iswilling to depend on allies to defend commoninterests. A rational division of responsibilitiescould leave quick response to those allies nearer thethreat, while the United States maintains its hugereserve potential.

The composition of U.S. forces will depend on thedegree of allied cooperation. In many cases, effi-ciency calls for specialization. NATO is an exampleof how individual nations in a group have-to alimited extent-divided up military responsibilitiesso that each can become more expert at their tasks orgeographic areas. For example, Denmark has specialresponsibilities to maintain control of its straits,which are important to all of NATO; the UnitedStates has a disproportionate responsibility in airpower because it can be reinforced across theAtlantic quickly; and Belgium and the Netherlandshave special logistical responsibilities in their har-bors. The division of these tasks maybe obvious andstraightforward, but no nation’s forces could do itsjob smoothly without the other nations’ doing theirs.The disadvantage of such a division of labor is thatwithout the cooperation of the other members of thealliance, any single member may become vulnera-ble. As a simple illustration, if one navy were goodat protection against submarines and the other atprotection against missiles, then the two may be ableto work together but each would face major prob-lems working alone.

To the extent that the United States pursues apolicy of military autonomy, it will require acomplete and diverse military force. If the UnitedStates is willing to forego some autonomy, in somecases giving up the option of acting without alliedsupport, it could specialize to a greater degree. Forexample, some military analysts have suggested thatground forces in South Korea could be supplied bythe host nation while the United States invests itsresources in tactical air power capable of rapidreinforcement. This opton would result, however, ina U.S. force that might not have adequate groundpower to act independently elsewhere.

The capability, readiness, and composition ofU.S. forces will have indirect effects on the defenseindustrial base, but decisions about allied depend-ence will affect the base directly. The United Stateshas depended on allies to help defend Europe fromthe Soviets. It also buys from these allies criticalcomponents of U.S. weapons. While these two typesof dependence are different, they should be roughlyconsistent. Depending on a nation for a computerchip should not cause excess alarm about military(as opposed to commercial) vulnerability if thatsame nation is being depended on to provide combatforces when the need arises. Finally, the chosenextent of interdependence with allies will affect thedegree to which some allies may depend on the U.S.defense base to supply them with weapons andlogistical support.

Performance of Weapons

Throughout the cold war, the United States soughtto match greater Soviet numbers with fewer buthigher performance weapons. This approach hasbeen followed for so long that today it has becomenearly axiomatic. One should not forget, however,that this approach is a policy choice and not aninevitable result of circumstances. A comparison ofpopulations and productive capacity reveals that theWestern allies certainly have had the option ofmatching the Warsaw Pact man-for-man and tank-for-tank if they had so desired.

The future choices about the performance of U.S.weapons relative to that of potential enemies willhave significant long-term effects on the defensetechnology and production base supporting U.S.military forces. These choices will determine howmuch effort is devoted to research for new technol-ogy, what the sources of that technology will be, andhow it will be paid for.


The United States has, in general, sought weaponsof higher performance than those of potentialadversaries, even if the higher costs have requiredsmaller numbers of weapons and smaller forcesoverall. The debate about the optimal allocation ofresources between numbers and performance isperennial. Often the debate seems to be between twodistinct camps, but in fact the positions are not asextreme as may frost appear. Everyone agrees thatperformance is important. Would the Royal AirForce have had an easier time in the Battle of Britainif they had been flying F-15s armed with missiles?Of course. But wouldn’t they have had nearly asmuch of an advantage with Korean War vintageF-86s armed with guns? The question is not whetherperformance is important but the proper tradeoffbetween performance and numbers (e.g., the choiceis between hundreds of Spitfires or just one F-15),and where one should stop when pursuing perform-ance (against propeller-driven airplanes, an F-86 isprobably good enough and an F-15 is overkill).

The reduced intensity of the U.S.-Soviet militarycompetition will have an important effect on thedevelopment of U.S. weapons. Since the end of theSecond World War, the Soviet Union has been theyardstick against which U.S. weapon performancehas been measured. The United States will continueto develop new weapons. But if the pace of Sovietweapons development slows down dramatically,then the development of countering U.S. weaponscan follow suit.

In the future, improvement in weapon perform-ance may be harder to achieve because the totalnumber of each type of weapon will probably besmaller, and smaller production runs do not justifyas large investment in development (and, in the longrun, research). Greater time between procurementcycles will increase the problem of holding designteams together or, in the extreme, maintaining thedesign ‘‘culture’ of a particular type of weapon.Nevertheless, the weapons of the United States, itsallies, and the Soviet Union far outclass those of anyother producers. Indeed, most nations of the worldhave armed themselves with sophisticated weaponsby buying them from members of NATO or theWarsaw Pact. Although a few countries view armsexports as economically important, the originalmotivation for most of the weapon development was

the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation. Thus, withthe fading of the cold war, the rate of all weapon development could be reduced.

In fact, the engine of U.S. weapons developmentof the future may be the performance not of Sovietweapons but those of our allies, or at least thoseweapons they are willing to sell abroad. Nationsoutside of NATO and the Soviet Union are generallynot capable of broad-based defense production andwill continue to purchase most of their weaponsystems from U.S. and European producers. Thetrend today is a widening military technical gapbetween the United States and most nations of theThird World, although a few oil-rich countries canafford to buy some of the world’s best performingweapons.

In sum, the international arms market may changethe benchmark by which the United States measuresthe performance of its weapons. Foreign marketsmay help support the U.S. defense industrial base,but selling weapons to nations that may later usethem to fight against the seller is clearly counterpro-ductive in the long term. The solution, a sellers’cartel, seems obvious in principle but may bedifficult to arrange in practice. In any case, a verycareful cost/benefit analysis must precede any deci-sion to support the U.S. defense industrial base byencouraging arms exports.12

Choices about the performance of future weaponswill affect, and be affected by, the other policychoices outlined here about size, readiness, andindependence of U.S. forces. On the one hand, if theNation decides to reduce military personnel to levelsmuch smaller than today’s, then high-performanceweapons may be needed to maintain military capa-bility. On the other hand, depending on smallernumbers of high-performance weapons would exac-erbate the problems and costs caused by very limitedproduction runs.

Future weapon-performance goals will affect therequirements for the underlying defense technolo-gies. At any given level of technology, betterperformance is available by paying more, althoughsome performance levels are not possible at anyprice. If the policy decision is made to continue topress weapon performance to ever-increasing levels,then new technical capabilities will be required, in

12U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Arming Our Allies: Cooperation and Competition in Defense Technology, OTA-ISC-449(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1990).


turn requiring a continuing robust research anddevelopment effort.

Moreover, defense technologies must be pro-tected to prevent other nations from using them forweapon production. Some analysts have suggestedgreater use of civilian, or ‘dual use,’ technology formilitary purposes at the same time that civiliantechnology is becoming evermore internationalized.But the objective of superior weapons performanceplaces limits on the degree to which the UnitedStates can pursue a policy of depending on civiliantechnology for military purposes. To maintain anunmatched performance lead will require the UnitedStates to protect and nurture some specificallymilitary technologies.

SUMMARYThe cold war, which lasted 40 years, provided a

whole generation of military planners with a basicparadigm that now must be reexamined. The coldwar is over, the Warsaw Pact has disbanded, and theSoviet threat has been substantially reduced. Whilemany places in the world, especially among the leastdeveloped nations, continue to be racked by armedconflict, only a very few of these trouble spots posesecurity threats to the United States in the absence ofthe U.S.-Soviet competition.

The immediate threat of a short-warning Sovietattack against NATO has been transformed into along-warning threat of a reconstituted Soviet force.The goal of the United States is to be able toreconstitute military power at least as fast as theSoviets (or any other emerging great power). Thepotentially short-warning threats are from lessercontingencies, none of which present immediatechallenges to the core power of the United States norare capable of irretrievably damaging the U.S.capability to respond. Meeting the materiel require-ments of the large immediate threat from the SovietUnion was difficult, but at least the threat was clear.Meeting the materiel needs of lesser threats will bemuch easier, but the Nation is faced with difficulttradeoffs between the costs of maintaining a readymilitary force and risks of not being able to meet aregional military threat in a timely manner.

Whatever choices the Nation makes about itsfuture force requirements, those choices will haveimplications for the defense technology and indus-trial base. The base that served so well during thecold war is no longer appropriate. Careful attentionmust be given to the currently evolving base toassure its ability to support U.S. national-securityneeds well into the next century.

Other Related OTA Reports

● Arming Our Allies: Cooperation and Competition in Defense Technology

OTA-1SC-449, May 1990; 124p.GPO stock #052-003-01189-1 $5.00 per copyNTIS order #PB90-254 160

● Adjusting to a New Security Environment: The Defense Technology and Industrial Base

OTA-BP-ISC-79, February 1991; 24p.GPO stock #052-003-01225-l; $1.50 per copyNTIS order #PB91-163 261

● Global Arms Trade: Commerce in Advanced Military Technology and WeaponsFree summary available from OTAOTA-ISC-460, June 1991; 192p.GPO stock #052-003-01244-8; $9.00 per copyNTIS order #PB91-212 175

. Redesigning Defense: Planning the Transition to the Future U.S. Defense Industrial Base.OTA-lSC-500, July 1991; 128p.GPO stock #052-003-01249-9; $5.50 per copyNTIS order #PB91-220 012

NOTE: Reports are available from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Dept. 33, WashingtonDC 20402-9325, (202)783-3238; and/or the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield,VA 22161-0001, (703) 487-4650.

u. s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1991 0 - 297-948