alternative coca reduction strategies in the andean region

Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in theAndean Region

July 1993

OTA-F-556NTIS order #PB93-218899

GPO stock #052-003-01329-1

Recommended Citation:U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Alternative CocaReduction Strategies in the Andean Region, OTA-F-556 (Washington,DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1993).

Foreword

c ocaine trafficking and abuse are formidable problems that disrupt social,economic, and political systems. Stopping the flow of cocaine throughinternational black markets has proven impossible despite nationalcommitments and international treaties. Strong demand continues to promote

coca production and cocaine processing in supplying nations. This Report identifiesopportunities for and constraints to reducing Andean coca production through: 1)improving U.S. alternative development efforts and 2) applying biological controltechnology (biocontrol) to eradicate illegally produced coca.

Coca has been important in South America for nearly 4,000 years and remains acritical element in traditional Andean culture. Today, coca dominates Andeaneconomies, in part due to long-term social inequities and political and economic unrest.The ecological and cultural complexity of the Andean region precludes simplealternative development or coca eradication approaches. In this unsettled milieu,development assistance activities have promoted alternative agricultural systemsincorporating high-value or multipurpose crops. Other interests have proposed that cocaeradication is a necessary precursor to successful development. Although biocontrolmay yield an undefined level of coca reduction, the technology is unlikely to result incoca eradication.

Several study conclusions have clear policy implications. First, development-oriented strategies for supply reduction have promise, but are unlikely to solve thecocaine problem without concomitant demand reduction efforts. Second, the extent andimportance of the coca economy mean that single-sector development alone isinsufficient to unseat Andean economic dependence on coca. Finally, the impact of asingle organization on coca reduction is likely to be small, thus, coordination of thenumerous bilateral and multilateral groups is a critical need.

The following congressional committees requested the Office of TechnologyAssessment to undertake a study of the potential for improving U.S. efforts to reducecoca production through development activities and biological control methods: theSenate Committee on the Judiciary and the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuseand Control; Senator Orrin G. Hatch requested OTA to examine coca eradication bybiocontrol. In addition, the House Committee on Agriculture endorsed the study.

OTA greatly appreciates the contributions of the workshop participants and authorsof commissioned papers. We are especially grateful for the time and effort donated bynumerous contributors who served as reviewers and as liaisons with the many groupsand organizations involved in this issue. The information and assistance provided bythose individuals proved invaluable to the completion of the assessment. As with allOTA studies, the content of the Report is the sole responsibility of OTA.

Roger C. Herdman, Director

iii

Walter E. Parham Patricia J. DuranaProgram Manager Project DirectorFood and Renewable Resources

Program Elizabeth TurnerAnalyst l

Catherine M. TorresResearch Analyst2

Jessica WolinResearch Assistant3

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

N. Ellis LewisOffice Administrator

Nellie HammondAdministrative Secretary

Carolyn SwarmPC Specialist

Project Staff

Thomas AdamczykDetailee4

Karen MarstonInterns

Susan J. WunderContract Editor

I From Feb~ 1991 through September 1991.2From J~e 1!)91 to present.3Fmm J~e 1990 ~ou@ August 1990 and from June 1991 ~ugh JUIY 1992.4Fmm J~y 1991 to September IW15Fmm J~n~ 1!)91 to WY 1991.

iv

1 Summary, Issues, and Congressional PolicyOptions, 1Introduction, 1Creating National Incentives for Coca Reduction, 10Information Needed to Support Alternative Development

Projects, 13

Donor Coordination, 16Integrated National Development, 17

Improving Crop Substitution Efforts, 18

Biological Control of Coca, 28References, 32

2 Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives, 35Geoecology of the Northern and Central Andes, 35Traditional Roles and Uses of Coca Leaf, 44Social, Economic, and Political Aspects of Coca Cultivation, 50The Coca Economy, 68Conclusion, 71References, 72

contents

3 History of Selected Narcotics Supply-ReductionEfforts, 81Introduction, 81Opium-Reduction Activities, 83Coca Reduction Efforts: The Andean Strategy, 84Concision, 96References, 97

.-

4 Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to CocaProduction, 99Introduction, 99Agricultural Resources, 101Forest Resources, 115

Wildlife and Wildland Resources, 122Aquatic Resources, 128Strategies to Enhance Coca Substitution Efforts, 133References, 142

v

5 Technologies to Support Alternative CropProduction, 149Introduction, 149Andean Agricultural Research and Extension Systems, 150Infrastructure to Support Agricultural Production and

Marketing, 180Agricultural Trade Policies, 171Strategies to Support Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives

to Coca, 177References, 180

6 Coca Biological Control Issues, 183Introduction, 183Manual Coca Control, 184Chemical Coca Control, 184Biological Control, 188Development Needs for Biocontrol of Coca 199Summary and Conclusions, 199References, 201

APPENDIXES

A Workshop Participants, 205

B List of Acronyms, 207

C List of Contractor Reports, 209

INDEX, 211

vi

Summary,Issues, and

CongressionalPolicy

Options

F or at least 80 years, control and abuse of importednarcotic substances, in general, have been public policyconcerns. International treaties have been largely inef-fective in controlling production and trafficking of

illegal drugs. The human “search for the high” fuels demand,and supply control has been nearly impossible. Cocaine abuseand its social and economic consequences have followed thislegacy and reached disturbing proportions in the last decade.

1

INTRODUCTIONNarcotics control strategies commonly are divided into

demand- and supply-reduction programs. Although controversyexists over which of the two is the most critical, a comprehensivenarcotics control strategy includes education, treatment andrehabilitation, development assistance, interdiction, and enforce-ment components (figure l-l). No single approach wilI solve theinternational narcotics problem, yet the proper mix of supply-anddemand-control programs has yet to be identified.

Although most coca currently is produced in the Andeanregion of Peru and Bolivia (87 percent) and Colombia (13percent) (59), it also has been produced in other South Americancountries (e.g., Ecuador, Brazil) and Central America. If cocaproduction is reduced in the Andean region, new productionareas would likely arise as long as cocaine and its derivativesremain attractive narcotics. Nonetheless, supply reduction couldhave a valuable role in an overall narcotics control strategy. Thetemporary disruption of supply could increase street prices andreduce accessibility. The time investment to re-establish aproduction and cartel system is likely to be large and could havea debilitating effect on the overall industry (10).

1

2 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

Figure l-l—Components of a Comprehensive International Drug Control Strategy

International Drug Control Policy

Education1

Enforcement 1

Treatment) Rehabilitatlon

Development Aid

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

One potential strategy for reducing the flow ofcocaine into the United States is to identify andsupport the development of alternative economicoptions for Andean producers of coca leaves andillegal coca-leaf products. This development-oriented strategy for supply reduction showspromise, but is unlikely to solve the cocaineproblem without concomitant efforts in otherareas such as drug law enforcement, interdiction,and education and rehabilitation of drug users.

Methods for coca eradication also are ofinterest in supply reduction strategies. Althougheradication technologies focus on herbicide use,there is increasing interest in applying biologicalcontrol methods to narcotic crop control. Someexperts believe eradication must precede alterna-tive development in the Andean nations. Othersview coca eradication as futile and a threat to theculture and traditions of native Andean popula-tions. Although key requirements, host countryconsent and cooperation currently are unlikely(57,58).

The economic, environmental, and sociocultu-ra1 features of coca-producing countries pro-foundly influence supply reduction efforts. De-veloping suitable and effective approaches willrequire significant cooperative and coordinatedeffort among all concerned parties.

I Cultural ContextCoca is a traditional Andean crop, with evi-

dence of cultural significance dating from 2100B.C. (11). Different coca-leaf varieties and asso-ciated chewing paraphernalia from succeedingcenturies have been excavated in such variedareas as northern Chile and Costa Rica (40). Cocaleaves are a critical element in the traditionalAndean patterns of production and exchangebetween highlands and lowlands. Communityand political solidarity were long maintainedthrough these exchanges.

Chewing coca leaves has been practiced forthousands of years in the Andes and is still apervasive cultural activity. Coca leaves are usedto relieve fatigue, hunger, and a variety of humanailments (e.g., 87 percent of Bolivia’s small townand rural population use coca leaf for healthreasons (28)). Coca leaves figure symbolically incultural and religious rituals and are an integralpart of many daily social routines.

Today, transformation of this resource into ahigh-profit cash crop and its resulting steep priceconstitute a cultural threat and personal hardshipfor many indigenous Andeans. This situation maybe exacerbated if coca eradication or substitutionprograms further restrict the availability of cocaleaf for traditional use. Coca reduction efforts,thus, will involve providing for traditional needs,while precluding illegal use (43).

l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options I 3

The Andean nations are increasingly con-cerned over the adverse impacts of cocaine ontheir societies. Pasta básica—an intermediateproduct of cocaine processing-generates effectssimilar to ‘‘crack’ and consumption increaseshave been noted in some Andean countries.Further, pasta básica contains significant impuri-ties (e.g., lead, sulfuric acid, kerosene) com-pounding adverse effects on users. In 1987 ,Colombia’s Health Ministry estimated that 2percent of the population were regular users anda United Nations report estimated Colombia mayhave one of the world’s worst drug problems (14).Recent surveys indicate similar figures may applyto Bolivia. Within this heightened awareness ofthe adverse effects of illegal narcotics, alternativedevelopment may find greater acceptance.

1 Environmental ContextThe Andean region is complex in terms of its

geology, ecology, and cultural history. Thiscomplexity precludes simple or broadly applica-ble coca substitution or eradication approaches.The natural environmental diversity results largelyii-em abrupt aptitudinal changes common in theAndes. The region consists of a vertical succes-sion of ecozones, ranging from rainforest anddesert at the lowest levels to mountain tundra,snow, and ice at the highest. The Andes enormouslatitudinal and longitudinal range also makes forconsiderable variations in climate, soil, vegeta-tion, and landuse (l).

The primary zones of illegal coca cultivationinclude the Chapare in Bolivia, the Alto Huallagain Peru, and a variety of areas around the CaucaValley in Colombia (figure 1-2). These areas arecharacterized by high rainfall, acidic soils, andaltitudes ranging between 200 and 1,500 metersabove sea level (masl). Many of these areas areinappropriate for agriculture, much less for char-acteristic coca cultivation (22). There are anumber of environmental concerns arising fromcoca production: deforestation to establish cocafields, soil erosion and associated fertility losses,

Steep topography characteristic of the Andes gives riseto significant climatic variations over short distances.

heavy pesticide use, and subsequent movement ofthese chemicals to soil and surface and ground-water resources (3,22,29).

Chemical wastes from cocaine processing (e.g.,kerosene, sulfuric acid, lime, calcium carbide,acetone, toluene, ethyl ether, and hydrochloricacid) also may impair terrestrial and riverinesystems. These wastes can increase water pH,reduce oxygen availability, and lead to acute andchronic poisoning of fish (e.g., liver, heart,kidney, and brain lesions, and possible geneticmutations). An estimated 150 Peruvian streamsand rivers have pollution levels exceeding thesafety standards set by the World Health Organi-zation (32).

Proposals for coca eradication using herbicideshave been criticized for environmental reasons.Environmental reviews elaborating the potentialenvironmental effects of chemicals have beenprepared for specific herbicides identified aseffective at eradicating coca species. However,the process has been less rigorous than thatrequired for domestic activities under the Na-tional Environment Policy Act (NEPA). Substan-tial Peruvian opposition to the use of herbicides inthe Amazon Basin resulted in cessation of U. S.-sponsored herbicide testing and data gathering inPeru (45). As a result, a complete analysis of the


Figure l-2—Primary Coca-Producing Zones in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia—

UYwnzazuux1-Ug

(nLLl(3za- J<m1-

$(J

—

dGuajira Region —

Cartagena ~

Region

&-&-., y [B

Region



potential impacts of herbicide use on future landand aquatic productivity is not available.

Biological control (biocontrol) has been identi-fied as an alternative to chemical control of coca.The United Nations International Drug ControlProgramme identified biocontrol as a possibleeradication method for narcotic crops nearly adecade ago, and interest continues in investigat-ing the potential for this technology to control avariety of narcotic crops (54). Biocontrol relies onthe use of biological agents to prey on anidentified target and reduce its prevalence in thetreatment area. However, some disagree about thepotential for biocontrol techniques to achieveeradication. Biocontrol may provide an environ-mentally benign way to reduce coca cultivation,yet there are considerable social and politicalconstraints to its implementation.

B Social, Political, and Economic ContextLong-term social inequities and political and

economic unrest contribute to coca’s dominantrole in the economies of Bolivia and Peru, theworld’s leading producers of coca leaf. Colombia,where a large cocaine trafficking industry hasemerged, also exhibits extreme social and politi-cal instability. It is in this unsettled milieu thatcoca-dominated economies have flowered. How-ever, each country has a unique set of contributingcircumstances.

The cocaine economy—including production,processing, and transport-is extensive in Bo-livia, Peru, and Colombia. The continuum fromcoca production to cocaine marketing involvesdifferent actors, with different values; their com-monality is that each finds coca a ready cashsource (35). Individuals deriving the greatesteconomic benefits from coca production (i.e.,narcotics traffickers) have gained political powerthrough a variety of mechanisms (e.g., bribery,land acquisition, farmer/cattlemen associations,assassinations) (14). The strong presence ofnumerous insurgency and terrorist groups com-pounds the difficulties Peruvian and Colombian

national governments face in drug crop controlefforts. As one analyst suggests:

. . .[the U.S. is] asking a country [Peru] that’sfighting the Civil War and going through theGreat Depression at the same time to suddenlytake on Prohibition as well (4).

BOLIVIAThe progressive impoverishment of Bolivia’s

rural upland population, dating from the colonialperiod, was accelerated in the 1980s by severedrought and by agricultural and trade policiesunfavorable to subsistence farmers. Many peas-ants were forced to migrate to other areas,including the Chapare--a center for coca cultiva-tion. This influx of labor, and a general economicdecline, affecting even middle-class Bolivians,helped spur a surge in coca-leaf production andprocessing as the only economic alternative formany financially-desperate Bolivians.

However, estimates of the population involvedin the coca trade vary widely. For example, 20percent of the Bolivian workforce was estimatedto be involved in the coca economy in the late1980s (24) whereas a 1990 report estimates only7 percent (19). Nevertheless, the Bolivian cocaeconomy annually generates as much foreignexchange (roughly U.S. $600 million) as all otherexports combined (5).

Social and political inequities persist in Bo-livia, such that peasant populations have meagereducational and development opportunities, whilean agrarian elite wields considerable politicalpower and monopolizes the country’s financialresources. This situation seriously constrainspossibilities for the country’s broad-based socio-economic development (27,30).

Although Bolivia operates under a democrati-cally elected civilian rule, and is somewhat morestable politically than Peru or Colombia, thepolitical situation is tenuous. Many nationalinstitutions, including judicial and law enforce-ment agencies, are weak, and the government hasnot been able to lift the majority of Bolivians outof poverty.


PERURecent peasant migrations from the Peruvian

highlands to the coca-growing Alto Huallaga isthe latest chapter in a long history of economically-induced migrations. Land shortages and/or lackof work in the highlands, as well as rapidpopulation growth (beginning in the 1940s), havefueled the latest population movements into theeastern valley systems.

Coca cultivation has expanded in the AltoHuallaga, in part as a result of these migrationsand in part due to the country’s failing economyand severe international debt crisis. Coca produc-tion expanded considerably as economic condi-tions worsened in the late 1980s, softening themost profound economic and employment crisisin the republic’s history. The coca economycontinues to increase proportionally to the declineof the nation’s legal economy (31).

Attempts at economic reform by the FujimoriAdministration are undermined by pervasivepolitical unrest, poverty, and an uncertain busi-ness environment. Alberto Fujimori ended 12years of democratic rule in Peru when, supportedby the army and police, he seized political powerin a “pseudo-coup’ (23). Peru’s current state ofextreme economic and political instability consti-tutes a domestic crisis that overshadows theimportance of counternarcotic efforts in theminds of most Peruvians. Moreover, strong guer-rilla movements in Peru’s coca-producing areasmake any counternarcotics initiatives extremelyhazardous. In recent years, 10 workers for theU.S. Agency for International Development (AID)have been killed here (34).

COLOMBIACoca production has not been as widespread in

Colombia as in Peru and Bolivia. Coca produc-tion, banned in 1947 after lengthy public debate,has re-emerged, however, paralleling the devel-opment of a large and lucrative criminal-runcocaine manufacturing industry, with exportsnetting close to U.S. $3 billion a year. The illegal

because State presence traditionally has beenweak; guerrilla movements are strong, and politi-cal “clientelism” rampant, with increasing con-centration of land, capital, and credit in the handsof an elite minority. As the gap between rich andpoor has widened, so has that between written lawand the economic behavior of the undergroundcocaine economy. Drug-related violence and

ed the country’s courts,corruption have underminand police and customs service, as well as themilitary (8).

Colombia has enjoyed positive economicgrowth overall in the past four decades, but drugmoney now spreads corruption throughout thecountry’s economy. Real estate and constructionhave been particularly heavily infiltrated bynarcotics investors, who have had technologicallymodernizing g but socially regressive impacts. Forexample, although they have introduced andfinanced new technologies for increasing eco-nomic productivity, they have also establishedparamilitary groups, discouraged peasant partici-pation in the political process, concentrated landownership, and laundered capital in investmentswith fast turnover rather than higher long-termyields (51).

Colombia’s growth record was much better inthe pre-cocaine era than it has been in thepost-cocaine era. The trend today is towarddeclining economic productivity and reducedgrowth. Domestic drug violence and terrorismfurther undermine the country politically andeconomically. Today, Colombia is one of themost violent countries in the hemisphere. Strength-ening and redefining the role of the State inColombian society is central to the success of anydrug-control policy.

I Development Assistance andCoca Reduction

Development assistance seeks to create andextend alternative livelihoods, build local institu-tions, provide education and training, promote

drug industry has flourished in Colombia in part infrastructure improvements, and provide social


services. The development goal in coca substitu-tion programs is to assist countries dependent ona black-market economy to move toward legiti-mate markets. In the coca-producing countries,the focus largely has been on developing alterna-tive agricultural systems incorporating high-value or multipurpose crops. However, existingnational agricultural policies do not favor small-holders—those most commonly involved in cocaproduct ion.1 Fiscal realities result in focusingresources on areas of high population density.Conversely, coca-producing regions tend to beremote and sparsely populated and, within thisenvironment, few opportunities exist for small-holders to be profitable in the legitimate agricul-tural market (2,27,34).

Early U.S. coca substitution efforts focused onproducing regions in the Andean countries (i.e.,Alto Huallaga in Peru, Chapare in Bolivia). Initialsubstitution efforts in Bolivia concentrated solelyon farmers in the Chapare region through theAgricultural Development in the Coca ZonesProject (ADCZP) and later under the ChapareRegional Development Project (CRDP). How-ever, it became apparent the combination of aneasily produced crop, stable market and market-ing charnels, and an abundant labor supply as aresult of population migration were all fundamen-tal to the increase of Chapare coca production.Thus, the CRDP was redesigned to includedevelopment in emigration zones through theAssociated High Valleys component. This efforthas been expanded further to encompass inte-grated regional development under the Coch-abamba Regional Development Project (COR-DEP) (figure 1-3). Similarly broad developmentefforts are likely to be needed in other coca-producing areas as well.

Numerous national and international organiza-tions have been actively involved in coca substi-tution projects in South America. Their activitiesinclude basic and applied research on potential

Small, remote landholdings characterize many coca-growing areas. Production units often are less than 2hectares in size, such as this minifundia.

alternative crops, demonstration and extension ofpromising technologies to farmers, agroprocess-ing, and infrastructure development. Crop substi-tution approaches sponsored through the UnitedNations International Drug Control Programmeare built on the concept of rural development thatcomplements substitution efforts. While cropdiversification alone may provide greater securityfor farmers compared with drug-crop monocul-ture, the transition to legal crops also requiresconcerted efforts in development of productionpractices, infrastructure, and markets (36).

The economics of coca is often seen as theprimary constraint to widespread adoption ofalternative crops. Coca profits are nearly twicethat of identified high-value crops (e.g., peachpalm) and at least four times greater than othertraditional crops such as pineapple or citrus (61).However, declining prices at the producer levelsuggest coca may no longer be the most lucrativecrop (18). Furthermore, such comparisons may bemeaningless: the nature of coca production defiestraditional methods of estimating profitability

1 There are exceptions to this statement, most notably the long-range Colombian coffee policy designed to stabilize the national productionsystem in light of the effects of the international market on prices and thus on producer earnings (18).


Figure 1-3-Evolution of the Cochabamba Regional Development Project (CORDEP)

Bolivia

SantaCruz

~

\’0’0’’l=2-bwJi-‘‘ - ‘‘ -~

Areas with coca n

Cochabamba Department

Punata

Areas covered underthe Chapare RegionalDevelopment Project(CRDP)

In

~ A r a n i / Carrasco I

(Bol ivar ’ ~.

.Capinota

Areas covered under ~ Additional areas to bethe High Valley Component covered under theof the CRDP Cochabamba Regional

Development Project(CORDEP)

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment adapted from Development

on certain commodities and tariff reductions on

(CORDEP)--Bolivia, technical proposal (Bethesda, MD: DAI, 1992).

because of its dependence on unpaid family labor(38).

A combination of legitimate crops suitable tothe environmental and sociocultural features ofthe production region, market assurance, accessto affordable credit, and a suite of social/humanservices (e.g., rural justice, school systems, healthcare) could be sufficient incentives for cocaproducers to adopt alternative systems (box l-A).Removal of U.S. trade barriers for certain SouthAmerican exports, for example, could promotecrop substitution and development of value--added industry (9,3). To some extent, this hasbeen accomplished under the recent AndeanTrade Initiative (ATI). Revision of import quotas

Alternatives, Inc., Cochabamba Regional Development Project

value-added products could complement the goalof the ATI.

In the past few years, crop substitution hasbecome a subset of alternative development in theAndean countries as attention to industrial andmarketing aspects has increased. Nevertheless,the focus remains on agriculture and relatedindustries. The alternative development problemis complex, requiring attention to numerousvariables, and not adequately addressed by anysingle approach. Long-term programs are neededthat provide a range of options for potentialparticipants.

l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options 19

Box I-A=High-Value Legal Alternatives to Coca: Sericulture in Colombia

The economics of coca prochtion has been perhap6 the single most widely articulated obstacle to successfulcrop substitution efforts. However, some disagree over the need for a doiiar-for-ddiar equivalent to coca or if anintegrated alternative development package based on legitimate crops, deveiopmentofproduction and marketinginfrastructure, and social service amenities is sufficient, However, combining a high-value, iow-voiume crop withdear market potential into an integrated development package may offer the greatest benefits.

Sencuiture (siikproduction) in Cofombiagrew in 1970 as part ofadiversification program sponsored by theColombian Coffee Grwers Federation (FEDERCAFE). By 1987, siik production was in progress in theDepartments of Caidas, Risarak@ Vafie, and Cauq with a totai production area of 124 hectares. A piiot plantwas established in Timbio (Cauca) to process highquaiity -ns into export products, however, the piantsubsequently dosed due to technical difficulties (15).

The Colombian sericuiture activities have been sponsored through a blend of national and internationalfunding sources, primarifythe Colombian Government and private sources and Korean investors. Currently, fivesiik-producing ventures exist in Colombia (i.e., COSEDA and COKOSiLK, joint ventures between Colombia andKorea; COSiLK, 100-percent Korean investment; and CAPULLOS and PROSEDA, 100-percent Colombianinvestrmnt). The Colombian Government promotes sericuiture by finandng aii technical assistance and providingcredit opportunities at 28 percent interest. in addition, credit is avaiiabie through FEDERCAFE and the ExportPromotion Fund (PROEXPO) at 18 and 32 percent interest respectively (15). The availability of sericuituretechnologies, technicai assistance, credit, and markets suggests siik production couid become an attractivealternative crop for some areas (15, 41).

A prqect currently underway in Colombia’s Cauca Department is attempting to promote sericuiture as analternative to coca production for nearly 300 farm famiiies in two smafi towns (Pan de Azucar and Santa Cruz).The project~iikfor Life-is sponsored by the Wisconsin Farmers Foundation, inc. and works with iocai farmersand siik weaving grwps and a weaving cooperative in Miiwaukee, Wisconsin. The project site is characterizedby smafi farms (about 8 hectares) and a iack of transportation and electrification systems. For at ieast a decade,coca has been incorporated in farmer’s prtiuction schemes as a cash source. Nevertheless, today 40 piiot siikfarms are operating under the Siik for Life prqect (16).

The prqect approach is based on basic rural economic development with goals of reducing coca productionin the region and reviving the associated rurai communities. The Siik for Life project offers a blend of technicaiassistance, credit and marketing opportunities to support the producers:

●

●

●

●

Trah@-Two modei farms exist in the are% one in Timbio and one in Santa Cruz, to demonstratesericuiture techniques for potentiai adopters.Technology-Technical assistance is offered in basic sericuitureteohniques, energy systems, and organicfarming.&farkef@-Centrai marketing is organized for iocaiiy-produced cocoons.Credi+tdateriais for sericuiture startup are avaiiabie thrwgh the project on a ‘barter’ basis whereby theborrower repays the ioan with cocoons after production has begun.

in addition to focusing on an economically attractive crop, this project has blended a variety of additionalfeatures into a singie package to promote sericuiture in Pan de Azucar and Santa Cruz, Cauca. The packageindudes generating support from iocai community ieaders and incorporating community development features(e.g., electrification, transportation) that may have benefits beyond sericuiture (16).SOURCE: office of Technology Aseeeement, 1993.


Opportunities exist to promote alternative de-velopment in the Andean region. Many of theseare technically based, as in developing sustain-able forestry practices suitable to current cocaproduction regions. However, broad opportuni-ties also exist for influencing the viability of cocareduction efforts more generally. These overarch-ing issues include creating national incentives forparticipation in alternative development, gather-ing and making available information needed tosupport alternative development, coordinatingdonor activities, and pursuing integrated nationaldevelopment.

CREATING NATIONAL INCENTIVESFOR COCA REDUCTION

Technical feasibility alone will not guaranteesuccess for coca reduction efforts. The politicalwill of Andean nations is critical, as is theacceptance and support of Andean peoples. TheAndean nations (Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia)operate with differing political agendas, anddriving social, cultural, and economic forces.Also complicating substitution efforts is the factthat coca cultivation has enormous cultural andeconomic significance for Andeans. The chewingof coca leaves for social, medicinal, and religious/spiritual purposes is an important and long-standing tradition that may inhibit acceptance ofcoca substitution programs.

Existing economic conditions in the Andeancountries profoundly influence national ability toundertake coca reduction programs, includingcrop substitution and eradication components.Coca production contributes heavily to the na-tional economies-in most cases comprising thegreatest share of export income. Developingmechanisms to improve national economies couldcontribute to greater ability to enter into cocareduction programs. Such an effort is likely torequire short-term economic relief and long-termeconomic development (58).

Another constraint to reduction efforts is thelack of governmental presence in rural areas,

Coca retains its cultural and social significance formany Andeans today. Here, coca leaf (hoja de coca) isbeing prepared for transport to legitimate markets tobe sold for traditional use.

including provision of basic human services, ruraljustice, and other needed institutions. Localgovernments with leaders elected directly andheld accountable by rural constituents couldincrease rural participation in the political proc-ess. Such efforts could reduce the environmentwhere insurgency and lawlessness flourish.

Local grassroots organizations have played alarge role in rural politics, particularly in Boliviawhere local unions--sindicatos-have provideda means for rural inhabitants to voice theirconcerns and desires to a centralist nationalgovernment. Nevertheless, assistance activitiesoften do not make use of these local avenues ofleadership and community cooperation. Accep-tance of programs to reduce coca productioncould be enhanced through efforts to incorporatelocal groups in planning and implementation(27).

Support for U.S.-bilateral efforts in the Andeanregion is poor. Many Andeans perceive U.S.activities as heavy-handed attempts to solve ourdomestic narcotics problem on foreign soil. A keyconcern is that without commensurate demandreduction efforts, supply reduction merely in-creases costs to the Andean countries. Yet, U.S.


Table l-l—Federal Drug Control Budget Authority(billions of dollars)

Percent demandSupply Demand of total

1981 . . . . . . . . . $ 800 $ 350 30 %1983. . . . . . . . . 1,250 350 22.61985 . . . . . . . . . 1,700 400 191987. , ... , . . . 2,900 900 241989 . . . . . . . . . 4,000 1,600 29

SOURCE: M. Collett, “The Cocaine Connection: Drug Trafficking andInter-American Relations,” Headline Series, Foreign Policy Associa-tion, No. 290, Fall, 1989.

Federal expenditures focus on supply reduction(table l-l). Analysts suggest that under thesecircumstances, multilateral activities are morelikely to be publicly acceptable. In addition,public outreach and education efforts and greatercoordination and cooperation with host countriescould support these activities (57,58).

Issue: Lack of economic incentives at thenational level hinders active participation incoca reduction programs.

The ability to carry out programs is inextrica-bly linked to economic conditions. Some poorlypaid public officials can be bribed to ignoreillegal activities, poorly supported research andextension systems are unable to provide high-quality technical assistance to producers, andscarce alternative employment opportunities leadto participation in the coca trade. The level ofbilateral debt owed by the Andean countries to theUnited States alone is significant and far outstripstheir annual gross national products (GNPs)(table 1-2). Debt servicing hinders national gov-ernment investment in needed development activ-ities.

Generating political will to undertake cocareduction might be enhanced by providing gen-eral economic incentives to national govern-ments. The current political and economic condi-tions of the Andean countries significantly reducethe ability of national governments to undertakecoca reduction programs. Yet, without nationalcommitment to improving opportunities for ruralcommunities in general, and coca farmers specifi-

cally, potential for effective alternative develop-ment programs is greatly reduced (57,58).

Option: Congress could create “debt-for-drugs”swap opportunities for the Andean countries.

Providing bilateral debt relief in exchange forcoca reduction achievements—“debt-for-drugs’swaps—has been suggested as an opportunity forimproving supply reduction efforts, yet specificlegislative action has not been taken. Examples ofsuccessful debt swaps suggest similar actionscould be useful for coca reduction. The UnitedStates recently eliminated $371 million of Boliv-ian debt under the Enterprise for the AmericasInitiative (EAI) (25). The EAI debt reductioncomponent could serve as a model to develop“debt-for-drugs” swaps. National policy actionspromoting preconditions for successful alterna-tive development could serve as “collateral” fordebt relief.

Conversely, if lessons from related activitiesinvolving national economic incentives are re-viewed, possibilities for dramatic results from a“debt-for-drugs” program may seem less likely.For example, certification for U.S. developmentassistance funding has been used as a mechanismto motivate compliance with coca reduction goalsand although it has elicited short-term reductionefforts, it has yielded little in overall supplyreduction. Nevertheless, debt relief could providea double service by increasing political will toundertake supply reduction and improving thefiscal ability of national governments to financeneeded national projects.

Issue: Andean eligibility for U.S. developmentassistance is closely linked to coca reduc-tion.

Eligibility for development aid is in part basedon narcotics reduction achievements. Thus, at thenational government level, the development goalmay become secondary to a counternarcoticsagenda-i. e., success may be measured by hec-tares of coca reduced rather than hectares oflegitimate crops produced. Further complicating


Table 1-2—Andean Bilateral Debt With the United States(In millions of dollars, as of 9/30/90)

Debt:GNPGNP ratio AID PL-480 c c c EXIM Total

Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . $ 4 6 . 0 11:1 $ 331 $141 $ 0 $33 $ 505Colombia . . . . . . . . 354.0 3:1 499 2 0 497 998Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . 189.0 4:1 318 221 95 54 688

Totals . . . . . . . . . 1,149 95 2,191

AlD-U.S. Agency for International DevelopmentPL-480-Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 as Amended, “Food aid”CCC--Commodity Credit CorporationEXIM--Export-lmport Bank

SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Enterprise for the Americas Fact Sheet,” Washington, DC, September 30, 1990.

this situation is the reliance on narcotics data ofquestionable accuracy to support reductionclaims.

Option: Congress could refocus certificationrequirements for development funding to in-clude specific development objectives in addi-tion to satisfying “coca clauses.”

The basis of alternative development is toassist recipient nations to enter the internationallegitimate economy. Preconditions for achievingthis goal have been identified and are part of manydonor activities. However, some conditions canonly partly be fulfilled by donors and require thefirm commitment of host countries. For example,increasing local government presence, promotingrural justice, and providing social services forrural populations will depend largely on nationalgovernment efforts, yet are critical for improvingdevelopment opportunities. Refocusing assist-ance certification criteria on the achievement ofthese development goals could increase intereston the part of the host country.

However, placing additional burdens on na-tional governments to achieve development goalsto qualify for U.S. assistance might be unrealisticgiven economic and political conditions in theAndean region. Conversely, certification couldhighlight development objectives to the exclusionof coca reduction. Such an act is likely to requirea significant increase in U.S. domestic enforce-ment, interdiction, and education to preventincreased narcotics abuse in the short term.

Issue: Lack of rural governmental presencehinders adoption of coca reduction pro-grams.

Government presence generally is weak inrural Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Nationalgovernments could choose to address this condi-tion through policies that establish effective localgovernments and state control within the frame-work of the legitimate judicial system. An im-proved judicial system could facilitate develop-ment activities and offer increased human rightsprotection.

Rural government presence encompasses ac-countability to local political authorities by policeand security forces, legitimizes support of thedemocratic process, and strengthens the judicialsystem. Administration of rural justice and con-trol of national territory are critical for imple-menting development programs and developmentof popular support for substitution efforts. Com-mon development assistance goals-institutionbuilding, providing social services, and improvingstandards of living-may contribute to increasingsecurity in rural areas.

The U.S. Department of Justice and AID offerassistance to judicial institutions in the Andeancountries through several programs intended toimprove the administration, operation, and effec-tiveness of the country’s judicial system. How-ever, this assistance is a small part of the overallassistance budget.


Option: Congress could direct AID to increase itssupport to judicial institutions in the Andeannations through Justice Sector and Strengthen-ing Democracy projects.

Greater presence of rural justice in currentcoca-producing areas could yield benefits inincreasing stability by assuring those breakinglaws would be properly adjudicated in an estab-lished legal system. AID justice-sector programshave been implemented since the mid- to late1980s in Bolivia and Peru.

Achieving increased rural justice in the currentsocial and political climates of the Andean regionis likely to be difficult. A concerted effort is likelyto require additional fiscal resources, and in areaswhere violence is significant, security needswould be paramount. Increasing military andpolice presence in some areas may not beperceived as a benefit at a time when militariza-tion components of the “drug war” are unpopu-lar.

Alternative Option: Congress couId direct AID toincrease the level of coordination/cooperationwith local grassroots organizations.

Local community groups have and continue toplay an important role in Andean rural politics.Grassroots organizations typically have strongsupport from local populations and understandlocal cultures, aspirations, and priorities. Groupssuch as the Bolivian sindicatos provide a mobiliz-ing force for rural change and expression ofconcerns to the national governments.

Incorporating existing community groups andother grassroots organizations in planning andimplementing alternative development programscould yield benefits in adoption rates. Boliviancrop substitution programs might work coopera-tively with sindicatos to promote peaceful cropsubstitution and alternative development efforts.Such cooperative efforts would ensure localconcerns were identified in project planning andencourage local understanding of the projectprocess.

Coca farmers receive the lowest percentage of profitin the cocaine industry-perhaps as little as 1 percent.Here, a coca farmer in the Chapare is spreading theharvested leaves to dry them in preparation for sale.

However, diverse political parties may influ-ence grassroot organization activities, and politi-cal conflicts between the state and these organiza-tions may create difficulties for the organizationsas development vectors. These features should beconsidered in project plarming and approaches todeal with them identified to reduce any potentialadverse impact on project effectiveness.

INFORMATION NEEDED TO SUPPORTALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Setting realistic goals for coca reduction pro-grams will depend, in part, on availability andaccuracy of basic information on coca farmersand others linked to the cocaine economy. Identi-fication of key targets for alternative developmentactivities will be integral to increased effective-ness of U.S. development assistance. Severalinitial questions need to be addressed: What is thecurrent and potential areal extent of coca produc-tion? Who and where are the populations eco-nomically linked to production? What are theappropriate levels of development (e.g., subsis-tence, semi-commercial, commercial) for theseareas and populations? Additional decisions mightfurther refine target groups (e.g., identifying what


economic population should receive priority—poorest, borderline, or entrepreneurial). Informa-tion needed to support alternative development/coca reduction programs includes:

● Extent of the coca economy (including directand indirect participants),

. Comparison of coca and alternatives, and

. Centralized and easily accessed source ofinformation related to ongoing activities.

Issue: Inadequate information on the trueextent of the coca economy hinders develop-ment of programs to reduce dependence.

Studies of the extent of the coca/cocaineeconomy are lacking and likely to be difficult toconduct. While estimates of the relative size andimportance of coca to national economies exists,little information is available that identifies thesubsectors dependent on coca/cocaine produc-tion, nor their level of dependence. Yet, suchinformation could provide insights for develop-ment projects and improve opportunities forintegrated development.

Collecting information that accurately identi-fies populations involved directly in coca produc-tion (through production, labor, transport), in-cluding the extent of dependence (i.e., part-time,seasonal, full-time), and survival strategies dur-ing low coca prices, is likely to be difficult.Existing information sources might provide analternative to new information-gathering activi-ties. Information on coca farmers in the Chapareexists through the Cooperative Agreement onHuman Settlements and Natural Research SystemAnalysis (SARSA). Although somewhat dated,similar information exists for farmers in the AltoHuallaga. This resource could be reviewed andevaluated within the context of improving identi-fication of target populations for alternativedevelopment programs.

Option: Congress could direct the U.S. Depart-ment of State, Bureau of International Narcot-ics Matters, and AID, cooperatively, to developcomprehensive coca industry profiles that

identify populations and economic sectorsdirectly and indirectly linked to coca produc-tion and their relative level of dependence anduse this information to direct developmentprojects to high priority targets.

Profiles could be developed using existinginformation gathered through activities of bothagencies. AID and its contractors have accumul-ated a wide array of information on coca produc-ers and farm laborers. The U.S. Department ofState has focused more on those involved in theadditional aspects of transport, processing, pro-viding precursor chemicals, etc. This informationcould be pulled together to create a comprehen-sive profile of the breadth of the coca economyand provide an outline of key populations/sectorsthat ultimately will be affected by coca reductionprograms. Such an outline could provide anagenda for future international development plan-ning as well as a resource for a national develop-ment strategy.

Additional funding could be made available toallow profile development without adding theburden on agency staff. In addition, some activi-ties and populations may be more transient thancan be incorporated readily into such analysis.The segments of the coca trade that are likely tobe excluded or insufficiently described also couldbe identified in the overall effort. Mechanisms toassure the profile information is used in futureproject plarming also would be needed.

Issue: Lack of accurate economic studies com-paring coca with other potential alterna-tives hinder efforts to promote adoption ofrenewable resource-based alternatives tococa.

Coca is a traditional Andean crop, relativelyeasy to produce and sell, and provides a goodreturn on investment. Although coca prices fluc-tuate, traditional economic analyses suggest theyare high relative to legitimate agricultural com-modities that are more visibly affected by globalmarkets. These conditions make identifying andpromoting alternative crops difficult.


Although alternative crops, products, and ac-tivities exist, information on the market potentialof many of them is lacking. However, suchinformation could facilitate identifying prioritiesfor alternative development efforts. Additionally,economic analyses of other alternatives such asforest products, wildlife, and fisheries as com-pared with coca and alternative crops could beused to identify additional opportunities forspecific regions.

Option: Congress could direct AID, coopera-tively with the U.S. Department of Agriculture,Economic Research Service, to undertake eco-nomic studies of renewable resource-basedalternatives environmentally suitable to coca-producing areas that have not been evaluatedeconomically to date.

Alternatives to be evaluated economically(e.g., agroforestry, forestry, extractive reserves,alternative crop plants, animals, etc.) could beidentified by AID, along with regional characteri-zations describing existing production opportuni-ties and constraints. For example, if tropicalhardwood production provides an environmen-tally suitable and high-value opportunity in cer-tain regions, but is constrained by lack ofprocessing or harvest mechanisms, these featurescould then become development priorities.

Studies would be prepared and filed withAID’s Office of Evaluation, Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) andavailable to prioritize activities in the Andeanregion. The information could be made freelyavailable to international development assistancegroups and used to promote adoption and assist indeveloping appropriate incentives for adopters.

However, the fluctuation of global marketsmay complicate such analyses. Thus, opportuni-ties and analyses may only be accurate for shortperiods, making rapid turnaround a high priority.Additional pressures on staff time could result inreduced attention to ongoing priorities.

Issue: Lack of a centralized informationsource on alternative development activities

hinders improved project planning andimplementation.

A lack of institutional memory within AID, andother bureaucratic constraints, work against incor-porating lessons learned from past activities intonew project plans. The AID project approachincorporates numerous technical and contractgroups and information gathered by these groupsmay or may not reach CDIE files. Thus, potentiallessons learned from early activities may not beused to improve current projects or the design offuture projects. Stringent requirements for filingproject studies and reviews along with improvedtraining of AID personnel, emphasizing areahistory, could promote use of “lessons learned”materials. Additional requirements for contrac-tors to generate logs of activities and results fromtheir efforts could be useful in future programplanning. AID could strengthen its requirementsfor filing contractor reports and other project-related information with CDIE to assure that thisresource is easily available for future projectdevelopment.

Option: Congress could direct AID to establishand maintain an interpretive database oninstitutional experiences and developmentproject evaluations in the Andean region.

A large body of information exists on develop-ment in the Andean region, but much of thisinformation is “gray literature” and can bedifficult to access. AID currently is developing amanagement information system (MIS) databaseon AID alternative development projects in theAndean region to improve its ability to measurethe impact of these efforts. The system will beupdated semi-annually and will include a varietyof economic and project data. This effort could beexpanded to incorporate the activities of otherdonor groups operating in the Andean region,thereby supporting improved donor coordination.Once established, project planning could requirea database search to identify potential cooperativeopportunities.


However, by incorporating the broad array ofactivities, database development and mainte-nance tasks would be increased dramatically.Additional financial resources might be neededand without additional appropriations could comeat the expense of more applied activities. Inaddition, the ongoing United Nations effort todevelop a Sustainable Development Network(SDN) could complement AID’s MIS effort. TheSDN effort is intended to assist less developedcountries to develop and maintain data on domes-tic development activities with an ultimate goal ofdeveloping a global network.

DONOR COORDINATIONThe narcotics problem is immense, and the

impact of one donor is likely to be small. Manybilateral and multilateral groups are activelyworking toward a variety of development andcoca control goals. Coordination of the numerousorganizations involved in the Andean countriesposes a difficult problem, yet it could yield largebenefits in achieving comprehensive counternar-cotic and development goals. The Organization ofAmerican States identified the need for a coordi-nating body for early development efforts in theChapare to coordinate the activities of nearly 54donor organizations. The need for such coordina-tion throughout the Andean region remains.

Issue: Lack of donor coordination has reducedthe effectiveness of rural development andcrop substitution efforts in Andean drug-producing nations.

Uncoordinated donor activities can result induplicative or counterproductive efforts. Devel-opment funds may be spent on similar projectswithout incorporation of ‘lessons learned. ’ Simi-larly, lack of coordination can reduce opportuni-ties for efforts aimed at solving mutually identi-fied problems and preclude potential for ex-panded efforts or building on current activities.‘‘Reinventing the wheel’ may have high costs inoverall terms of donor funding.

Option: Congress could direct the U.S. Depart-ment of State to establish a coordinatingcommittee comprised of U.S. developmentagencies, those receiving U. S. funds for devel-opment activities, and national governmentcounterparts to improve coordination of develop-ment programs.

A variety of U.S. agencies and internationalinstitutions, and multilateral banks receive U.S.funding for development activities in the Andeanregion (e.g., AID, InterAmerican Foundation,World Bank, InterAmerican Development Bank,United Nations). A committee composed ofrepresentatives of these organizations could becreated to develop a unified alternative develop-ment approach for the United States and ensurethat activities complement one another or at leastdo not work against each other. Such a committeecould be responsible for setting a developmentagenda, prioritizing needs, and linking similaractivities among cooperating groups.

However, coordination by committee can betime-consumin g. Scheduling meetings and pre-paring committee reports would add to staffduties. Further, authority would be needed toensure committee findings and recommendationswere adequately considered by individual imple-menting agencies. Such additional bureaucraticprocesses are unlikely to be popular amongimplementing agencies.

Issue: Coordination between enforcement anddevelopment activities is inadequate.

Diverse or conflicting goals and operations ofthe numerous agencies (e.g., U.S. Department ofState, Drug Enforcement Administration) activein the Andean nations have adversely affectedlocal response to development activities. Forexample, nondevelopment operations have led tosome distrust of development personnel in certainlocales. Thus, coordination of all agency activi-ties may be required to improve acceptance ofU.S. development groups. Enforcement typicallyis dependent on maintaining a certain level ofsecrecy and, possibly, coordination with develop-


ment activities would be seen as potential ‘leaks. ’ fulfill a broad number of needs concomitantly.Nevertheless, these two activities necessarily For example, whereas the crop substitution effortscomplement one another and, without coordina- in the Chapare region concentrated on identifyingtion, have the potential to detract from each high-value crops, little effort was invested inother’s effectiveness. Coordination of enforce- developing processing, transport, and marketingment and development activities should occur at mechanisms. This has changed under the currenthigh levels, with clear separation at the field project (i.e., CORDEP), however, and a regionalapplication level. development approach has been embraced.

Option: Congress could create an interagencycoordinating body composed of representa-tives of the agencies involved in developmentand enforcement in the Andean countries (e.g.,AID, InterAmerican Foundation, U.S. Depart-ment of State, Drug Enforcement Administra-tion).

A coordinating group with representativesfrom the agencies involved in development andsupply control activities in the Andean regioncould promote unified direction for U.S. efforts.Congress could choose to create a separate taskforce or place the responsibility under an existingagency. The Office of National Drug ControlPolicy currently coordinates agency activitiesrelated to international and domestic demandcontrol, interdiction, and financial systems, andthus may be an appropriate entity to coordinatethe broader picture of narcotics-related activities.However, as an executive branch office, congres-sional investigation and oversight of committeeactivities could be curtailed.

INTEGRATED NATIONALDEVELOPMENT

Alternative development programs could beenhanced further through integrated developmentstrategies that expand options for those involvedin the coca economy. Development, agriculturalor otherwise, in the Andean countries might bestbe approached in terms of economic diversifica-tion. Diversification of local and regional econo-mies could include agricultural options, lightindustry, and service operations.

Should efforts continue to focus on narrowlycircumscribed regions and solely agriculturalopportunities, the chances for coca reductionsuccess will be similarly narrow and circum-scribed. Rural development alone may be insuffi-cient to extricate these countries from theireconomic dependence on coca production. In-creasingly, urban poor have become involved inthe coca economy as farmworkers, processors,and transporters.

Issue: Short-term project cycles reduce thepotential for effective, integrated alternativedevelopment efforts.

Alternative development is not a short-termproblem nor likely to be solved with short-termsolutions. The transition time from coca to

The extent and importance of the coca econ- alternative production systems is likely to beomy in the Andean nations strongly influences lengthy and programs or projects must considerthe ability of narrowly focused, short-term effortsto achieve promising results in coca substitution.Development groups have identified a variety ofgoals ranging from the highly specific (e.g.,building agroprocessing plants) to more general(e.g., increasing rural incomes), but all are basedon general rural development. Achieving thisgoal, however, requires development activities to

this investment time. Moreover, incremental sub-stitution programs are likely to be more attractiveto potential participants. Efforts likely will needto be long-term irrespective of the approach takento promote alternative crops or livelihoods. Nev-ertheless, short-term project cycles are standard inU.S. development activities, in part, driven byfinancial management requirements.


Option: Congress could expressly identify “noyear’ funding status for AID crop substitutionprojects to remove the current constraintsassociated with fiscal year spending andshort-term project deadlines.

Long-term project cycles could contribute to asense of continuity for program participants andrecipient countries. Such stability could contrib-ute to reducing the perceived risks associated withadoption of alternative systems. Long-term pro-ject cycles could also assure efforts are notredirected based on political changes.

However, cross-year funding could complicatebureaucratic requirements and increase budgetingdifficulties. Such a change would also requireconcomitant changes in project reporting, evalua-tion, and review to ensure that despite longertimeframes, project difficulties are noted andresolved expeditiously.

Issue: Development activities designed to re-duce coca production have been createdwith insufficient understanding of the exist-ing sociopolitical, economic, and environ-mental conditions of recipient countries.

Alternative development programs largely havebeen developed by U.S. agency personnel. Yet,the existing sociopolitical, economic, and envi-ronmental conditions of the Andean countriessignificantly influence whether or not these pro-grams will succeed. Program components may bebased on counternarcotics goals, rather than theunderlying development needs to shift black-market economies to legitimate markets. In largepart, this might be addressed by increasing thelevel of host nation participation in programdevelopment.

Option: Congress could create an InternationalAndean Commission responsible for develop-ing an integrated strategy to reduce economicdependence on coca.

This commission would be interdisciplinary,composed of technical experts from the UnitedStates, Andean, and other concerned foreign

nations. The group would serve as a long-terminclusive coordinating organization unencum-bered by U.S. programs, but including NGOS,private-sector, and grassroots and stakeholderorganimations to oversee long-term developmentprograms. The commission could address practi-cal technical needs for successful developmentand be responsible for oversight of impacts ofdevelopment activities.

Congress could create a similar commissioncomposed of domestic agencies and U.S. repre-sentatives of the Multilateral Development Banks(i.e., InterAmerican Development Bank, WorldBank, etc.). However, such a commission mayappear strictly bilateral, which is already unpopu-lar in host countries. Further, it may be no moreable to solve development problems without asignificant Andean presence.

IMPROVING CROP SUBSTITUTIONEFFORTS

The importance of coca in the national econo-mies of the Andean countries suggests develop-ment efforts narrowly focused on improvingagricultural opportunities alone are unlikely toachieve broad coca reduction goals. The Cocha-bamba Regional Development Project (COR-DEP) has expanded crop substitution efforts inthe Chapare region to diversified agriculturaldevelopment throughout the Cochabamba De-partment. However, the current effort does notadequately address alternative development forparticipants in the coca trade in nearby depart-ments also involved through cocaine elaborationand as migrant workers.

Existing information on the extent of theeconomy, populations, and sectors dependent oncoca indicate it is broadly distributed. Over thelong term, single-sector development is unlikelyto create stable national development of the kindneeded to shift economies to legitimate enter-prises nor fulfill the economic diversification goalof alternative development. Thus, alternative

1--Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options 119

Developing value-added industries, such as this textilefactory in Meellín, is one mechanism to diversifyeconomies and increase the value of locally producedraw materials.

development efforts for Andean countries need toincorporate options for nonagriculturists as well.

This thinkm“ g has already been articulated inAID documents (55), although not yet demon-strated through implementation. Opportunitiesmay exist in developing mineral resources, lightindustry, etc. to diversify economies, particularlyfor the urban populations currently involved inthe coca chain. This issue is beyond the scope ofthe present study, yet is likely to be critical forachieving coca reduction goals. This might beaddressed in part by expanding the range ofresource-based alternatives and undertaking ac-tions to ease the transition from coca-based tolegal livelihoods.

M Expanding the Range of AlternativesThe Andean countries have a wide range of

renewable resources that could be developed toincrease economic opportunities for producers.Indeed, many coca-growing areas are more suita-ble to some of these options than traditional

agriculture. For example, in the Alto Huallaga,most coca is produced on steep slopes whereagriculture is environmentally, if not econom-ically, unsuitable. In the Chapare region ofBolivia, logging was the primary economic activ-ity until the mid-1970s when coca expansioneclipsed the industry (39). However, the existingdevelopment thrust is largely agricultural. Pro-jects that focus on forest, wildlife, and aquaticresources, integrated resource use, and relatedindustries are likely to require an expertise-building period prior to implementation.

Issue: Agricultural alternatives have focusedon export markets to the exclusion of domes-tic market opportunities.

The value of smallholder agricultural produc-tion in the Andean countries is low relative toother sectors. To some degree this is the result ofnational food policies that maintain low-cost foodfor urban areas (6). In addition, some analystssuggest competition with P.L. 480 (The Agricul-tural Trade and Assistance Act of 1954, asamended) food imports may also contribute tothis condition (26,58). Increasing the value ofdomestic agriculture through domestic policyadjustment could have larger beneficial effects onnational agriculture generally and rural econo-mies and crop substitution specifically.

Import substitution may offer an opportunity todiversify markets for some producers involved insubstitution programs and contribute to increas-ing national food supply. This approach hasgenerated some success in a cooperative projectamong the Food and Agriculture Organization,the United Nations International Drug ControlProgramme, and the Pakistani Government indeveloping alternative employment for opiumcultivators. Similar activities could be undertakenin the Andean region with long-term goals ofincreasing the value of agriculture domesticallyas well as internationally.

Option: Congress could direct AID to increaseattention to import substitution opportunities


in crop substitution to meet local and nationalmarket needs.

Although cropping systems incorporating sta-ple crops exist, most effort seems to be placed ondeveloping export agriculture. International agri-cultural research centers (IARCS) in the Andeanregion (Centro International de la Papa, Centrode Investigación y Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo,Centro de Investigación de Agricultural Tropical)have developed improved cultivars and produc-tion practices for several staple crops (e.g., potato,corn, rice) and could provide a valuable technicalresource for development activities.

However, increased attention to local andnational markets could come at the expense ofattention to possibly higher-priced export mar-kets, if an appropriate balance is not defined.Further, without concomitant agricultural policyreforms that increase the value of domesticagriculture, available national markets may beinadequate incentive for producers to shift tolegitimate crops.

Issue: Greater investment in Andean agricul-tural research and extension is needed.

Enhancing agricultural profitability in the An-dean nations will require a continuing and signifi-cant investment in research and extension todevelop alternatives and demonstrate techniquesand technologies to potential adopters (12). Re-search and extension activities were large compo-nents of early crop substitution efforts in Boliviaand led to numerous alternatives for coca farmers.However, this effort has declined and continueddevotion of funding to long-term research andextension activities is hampered by pressure toproduce immediate results. Small-scale farms arelargely the rule in coca-producing zones andopportunities to intensify their production areneeded.

Although several IARCS conduct research oncrop improvements directly applicable to theAndean region, there are no similar institutionsfocusing on integrated farming systems such aspolyculture and tree crop research (agroforestry)

Access to external markets is highly dependenton adequate transport infrastructure. Largely,agricultural commodities produced in coca-growingregions are sold at the farm gate or in local marketssuch as this one in Peru.

(33). One Consultative Group on InternationalAgricultural Research institute focuses primarilyon agroforestry--the International Council forResearch on Agroforestry (ICRAF), however, it islocated in Kenya, hundreds of kilometers distantfrom tropical wet forests ecologically similar tothose of the eastern Andean foothills. Agro-forestry research previously carried out in Peru byNorth Carolina State University largely was anoffshoot of traditional agricultural research, yethighlighted the importance of perennial tree cropsin tropical agriculture. These efforts have ceased,however; largely due to violence in the area.

Option: Congress could authorize fundingthrough AID for development of an integratedfarming system research center (IFSRC) in theAndean region.

An IFSRC could support efforts to developimproved traditional agriculture systems. SeveralIARCS in Latin America could provide a valuableresource in development of an IFSRC in theAndean region. IFSRC research could focus onhighly productive crop combinations, improvedwater and nutrient management, cultivar im-provements, and agronomic research to identify

1--Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options I 21

appropriate production practices to assure qualityproducts to meet market requirements.

Research and extension activities could em-phasize the local and national research centers topromote institution building and skill develop-ment, thereby improving the potential for activi-ties to continue after direct assistance is with-drawn. Agronomic management research couldbe oriented to on-farm, farmer-participation pro-duction trials, involving the local farm populationin direct participatory research. Extension activi-ties could emphasize on-farm demonstration andfarming systems to maximize the diffusion of newtechnologies and practices to rural adoptingpopulations.

Development of a full-scale research center islikely to be costly. Yet opportunities to poolresources of many donors could alleviate thefinancial burden and contribute to a larger effortand wider use and acceptance of the institution.Alternatively, financia1 investment in the Insti-tuto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropecuario-Chapare (IBTA-Chapare) could be increased.This institution has undertaken alternative cropresearch for nearly a decade and already containssubstantial expertise. However, since IBTA-Chapare is a Bolivian institution, it may bedifficult for practioners in other areas to access.

Issue: Insufficient attention has been placed ondeveloping forest resource exploitation op-tions.

The importance of sustaining tropical forestresources has been highlighted in the last twodecades and recently was underscored by theUnited Nations Conference on Environment andDevelopment. Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru havesubstantial areas of remaining natural forests withpotential for biodiversity conservation and forestmanagement (33). For example, the value offorest products (e.g., nuts, fruits, latex) harvestedfrom an extractive reserve can be longer-term andsignificantly higher than that offered by one-timelogging operations or conversion to agriculturalproduction (48). Opportunities also exist for

“chemical prospecting’ in tropical forests toidentify compounds with commercial potential.Sustainable timber exploitation technologies alsoexist and have been demonstrated in the PalcazuValley in Peru. Such innovative operations couldbe tested and adapted to other forest areas.Despite these potential opportunities, efforts willbe needed to increase the understanding oftropical forest management, specifically in theAndean region (33).

Forestry opportunities have now taken a moreprominent position in U.S. alternative develop-ment efforts in Bolivia (21) and would beappropriate for other coca-producing areas aswell. Full-scale research centers in relevant An-dean forests are needed, however, to promoteforestry activities. Initial activities could focus onexisting forest management technologies thatseem successful, such as those at the experimentallevel in the Palcazu Valley, Peru (52). Such aneffort, however, would require significant finan-cial investment over a 10-to 20-year period.

Option: Congress could authorize findingthrough AID to establish a full-scale, state-of-the-art, tropical forest research experimentstation in the Andean countries.

While a number of tropical forest researchstations exist worldwide, none are in the humidtropical Andean region. Given increasing concernover conservation of the Amazonian rainforest,this would seem to be an appropriate site. A majortropical forest research center could be located ina humid tropical Andean region and severalsub-centers could be located in other places toconduct site specific activities and adaptation ofidentified technologies. These experiment sta-tions could concentrate on conservation andforest management technologies that use forestsand species native to the coca-producing regions.The U.S. Forest Service, Institute for TropicalForestry in Puerto Rico could provide a valuableresource for research station development.

Concomitant with on-site research efforts,education and training opportunities could be


made available for conservation, forest, andprotected area scientists from tropical countries.Professionals trained at those stations could fulfillnecessary roles in development and extension offorest management systems to local populations.

Issue: Insufficient attention has been placed onexamining potential wildlife and wildlandresource use options.

Wildlife-centered economic development hasbecome more acceptable and research efforts arebeing undertaken to determine sustainable yieldsand appropriate husbandry practices. Techniquesfor raising/producing certain wildlife specieshave been developed and are easily incorporatedin rural communities with little capital invest-ment. For example, experimental programs forranching of green iguanas have now spread fromPanama to other neotropical countries (7,62).Licensing and protection mechanisms that makefarming and ranching of wildlife more profitablethan taking from the wild are being implementedin the region (46). The International Union for theConservation of Nature and Natural Resourcesand other international resource organizations areworking to create viable legal markets for wildlifeand wildlife products in conjunction with protect-ing habitats and wild populations.

Wildlife-based tourism has grown at least 20percent annually since 1980 (58,99), and has beendescribed as a reasonable approach for sustain-able wildland development. Tourism offers anopportunity to earn foreign exchange and provideemployment for local communities. Where tour-ism is developed properly, it may have a greaterpotential for generating local income than mosttraditional farming or ranching activities.

Option: Congress could direct AID to provideassistance for wildlife industry development inthe Andean countries.

Efforts could include extension of productiontechniques, development of educational materia-ls, and programs on potential benefits fromfarming or ranching and the needs for resource

conservation to support such development. Mar-ket identification and logistical needs to meetmarkets will be critical for industry development.Existing programs have tended to be production-oriented, as were the initial crop substitutionefforts.

Coordination with other donors in the Andeanregion could contribute to developing an adequatesupport structure to handle transport and market-ing opportunities for producers. Further, areassuitable for wildlife production may lie outsidethe current region of AID focus, yet are of interestto other donors.

Option: Congress could direct the US. GeneralAccounting Office to review current U.S. traderegulations affecting wildlife and wildlife prod-uct imports in light of changing productionmethods.

Current regulations on wildlife imports havebeen based primarily on wild-gathering as op-posed to established ranching and farming sys-tems. Size and quantity restrictions suitable underthese conditions may not be appropriate whentrade is not affecting wild populations. A reviewof existing trade regulations on wildlife andwildlife products could evaluate potential adverseeffects of existing regulations on developingwildlife industries.

Option: Congress could direct the U.S. ParkService, U.S. Forest Service, and U.S. Fish andWildlife Service to give priority to Andeanparticipants in their respective internationalnature tourism training programs.

Training programs offered by the U.S. ParkService and the U.S. Forest Service to foreigngovernment officials currently focus on culturaland nature-based tourism and buffer zone man-agement. Programs might be expanded to includetraining opportunities for professional guides,operators, and protected area staff to promotesustainable development of wildlands. Trainingshould include land-use planning, environmentalimpact analysis, and tourism monitoring system


development to improve the abilities of nationalgovernments to determine optimum tourismgrowth and sustainable tourism industries. With-out these capabilities, the tourism industry islikely to be short-lived or encounter significantproblems (7).

Issue: Aquatic resource development has re-ceived little attention in development ef-forts.

Potential exists to expand fishery production inthe Andean region to offer an alternative to cocaproduction and provide additional protein sourcesfor national populations. The numerous lake andriver systems contain a variety of harvestableorganisms and, with application of appropriatetechnology, their productivity could be enhanced(47). Past fishery development projects havefocused on high-value species and have for themost part been unsuccessful (37). Efforts topromote subsistence aquiculture in Bolivia weresimilarly unsuccessful. Nevertheless, internationalefforts could focus on artisanal fishermen tomaximize occupational opportunities. Althoughfisheries may not be significant in some cocaproduction regions, they could increase in impor-tance within the context of national development.

Constraints to developing Andean fisheries arelargely due to a lack of information on the extentand quality of the various resource systems, levelof resource extraction, and fishermen themselves.Significant postharvest losses characterize exist-ing artisanal fisheries due to shortfalls in han-dling, processing, and storage technologies andtransport infrastructure (47).

Option: Congress could direct AID to conduct anaquatic resource inventory for the Andeancountries to complement ongoing alternativedevelopment programs.

An aquatic resource inventory was contractedby AID in 1983. Although the survey focused onthe Chapare region, it could be updated within thecontext of alternative development opportunitiesin general and similar efforts could be undertaken

for other coca-producing zones. A cooperativeeffort involving AID, the U.S. National Oceanicand Atmospheric Administration, InternationalSea-Grant Program, and the Andean countriescould inventory existing aquatic resources andidentify potential for improving production andharvest opportunities.

Alternatively, the Andean countries could takeadvantage of existing international expertise inaquatic resource management and development.International research organizations, such as theInternational Center for Living Aquatic ResourceManagement (ICLARM) that conducts researchon tropical fishery management and production,could be tapped to assist in fishery development.Congress could promote such support throughfunding to ICLARM and increased collaborationwith U.S. and Andean universities to conductapplied research on aquiculture developmentappropriate to the Andean countries.

I Easing Transition toAlternative Livelihoods

Strategies to enhance coca-substitution effortsmust address a wide variety of constraints fromproduction to marketing. Producers are unlikelyto cease coca production in favor of alternativecrops or activities if they cannot be assured that amarket exists and that the mechanisms for pro-duction, harvest, processing, and transport are inplace. Nevertheless, the current support structureto sustain alternative livelihoods is lacking orinadequate in several areas: insufficient technol-ogy and technology transfer, lack of markets andmarketing assistance, unavailable or unaffordablecredit, and inadequate agroprocessing facilitiesand transportation systems (20,49).

A guaranteed sufficient quantity and quality ofproduct must be available to interest internationalmarkets. This has been a difficulty to date,although efforts to expand production areas andincrease use of modern production technology areunderway. Promoting producer organizations of-fers an opportunity for smallholders to combine


products to reach the necessary threshold level repayment schedules seem unrealistic for resource-and, thereby, enter a market. Contract farming poor farmers. Credit availability and affordabilitymay provide a long-range prospect for assuring could be further attenuated under alternativesufficient product quantity. While this approach development programs that expand the range ofcan be very successful, it requires firm commit- resources exploited, processed, and marketed.ment on the part of agroprocessors and advancedagronomic understanding of crop requirements toachieve standard product quality.

Revision of credit programs could improve theopportunities for smallholders to obtain financingfor entering legitimate production systems. Creditrevisions could mimic current U.S. subsidy pro-grams, providing loans to farmers at lower ratesthan those currently available in the Andeancountries. Such an effort, with planned obsoles-cence as a goal, could be relatively short term,provide appropriate grace periods prior to repay-ment (i.e., allow for real production to occur), andperhaps augment or replace current coca eradica-tion payments as a method of inducing change.

Issue: Existing terms for agricultural creditreduce its availability and discourage farmerinvestment in improved legitimate systems.

There are a number of disincentives to invest-ment in agricultural production improvements inthe Andean region; these stem largely fromnational economic and political conditions (e.g.,rural poverty, risks to personal security). Yet, onemechanism open to U.S. and multilateral organi-zations to improve investment opportunities is toincrease the availability and affordability ofagricultural credit. Coca farmers tend to besmallholders, often without land title, few per-sonal capital resources and, thus, little access tonormal routes of credit. Recent actions by na-tional governments have improved the outlookfor gaining land title, but, bureaucratic constraintsmake the process slow.

Within the context of coca-substitution pro-grams, opportunities for credit exist; however,evidence suggests insufficient attention has beenpaid to developing appropriate credit packagesfor coca farmers. Loan rates are high, in somecases collateral terms are difficult to meet, and

Option: Congress could direct AID to amend thecurrent credit Grant Agreement process torequire the private voluntary organization(PVO) selected to include host country partici-pation in developing credit terms.

Credit components of development projects areintended to improve opportunities for the targetpopulation to participate in the planned interven-tion. However, in some cases, credit terms restrictthe ability of individuals to participate. Forexample, existing credit under CORDEP is madeavailable through a grant agreement between AIDand a private voluntary organization. However,the terms of credit are so high that credit isessentially unavailable for most smallholders(49). The existing Grant Agreement process usedby AID could be amended to ensure host coun-tries are adequately involved in development ofcredit eligibility requirements, loan rates, andrepayment schedules.

Credit could be made available on a “suspen-sory loan’ basis. This would allow a proportionof the capital sum normally repayable to bewritten off over 5 years, or some other termdepending on the activity. The scheme couldreplace the current ‘‘payment” for coca eradica-tion in the production phase and might alsopromote full private-sector involvement in theregion’s development. The cost to AID or na-tional governments would be unchanged, butfunds would be guaranteed to go into productivedevelopment, which is not assured under thepresent system (49).

Issue: Additional effort is needed to promoteprivate investment in value-added process-ing.

Increased agricultural productivity is likely todo little for producers’ economic well-being if


they cannot effectively and efficiently applypostharvest technologies. Such applications willbe necessary for alternative crops to becomesignificant in terms of total agricultural exports.Success, in part, depends on establishing cost-effective postharvest processing, enhancing pro-ducer efficiency through reduced production costsand increased yields, and improving access tomarkets. The United States has provided supportfor processing facilities with respect to cropsubstitution efforts (table 1-3). Creating incen-tives for marketing these products could comple-ment this investment. Loans to the private sectorat realistic interest rates could promote entrepre-neurial activity, and ultimately replace the needfor AID and other contributing institutions tomaintain the present high level of investment ininfrastructure and agroindustry.

Option: Congress could direct the OverseasPrivate Investment Corporation (OPIC) tomake the Andean region a priority.

OPIC promotes U.S. investment in developingcountries by providing insurance against numer-ous risks, financing investment projects, andproviding investment counseling. OPIC coulddevelop a portfolio of opportunities in the Andeanregion to make available during counseling toencourage investment in the Andean region.

Increased investment could expand the array ofemployment opportunities in the Andean coun-tries. However, if approached without sufficientplanning, it could lead to haphazard growth andpotentially complicate national economic devel-opment. Mechanisms for coordinating investmentand development efforts could address this poten-tial problem. For example, investments for agro-processing of alternative crops could be coordi-nated with AID and national governments toensure the production, processing, and trans-portation components are synchronized.

Option: Congress could reduce tariffs on value--added products from the Andean countries for10 years to promote development of the proc-essing industry.

Raw materials tend to be less valuable thanprocessed materials, and processing activities canincrease national employment opportunities. Typ-ically, tariffs increase as products move throughthe processing chain (i.e., raw materials generallyare subject to lower tariffs whereas processeditems have higher tariffs). This aspect of U.S.trade policy has been suggested to reduce incen-tive for development of value-added industry inexporting nations. An examination of tariff poli-cies on value-added products that might beexported by the Andean Nations is needed todetermine if this policy adversely affects develop-ment of processing industries.

Value-added processing provides a multiplieropportunity for economic improvement. TheUnited States could foster development of suchindustries by providing preferential treatment forvalue-added products associated with alternativedevelopment programs under the authority of theAndean Trade Preference Act. Such an actioncould be given a specified lifetime, long enoughto allow industrial development and stabilization.As capability increases with experience, opportu-nities for Andean extension into other nationaland international markets could improve. Othercountries that currently participate in alternativedevelopment might be induced to provide similarpreferential opportunities.

Issue: Lack of infrastructure hinders successof alternative development efforts.

Inadequate infrastructure exists to supportalternative development (e.g., paved roads, post-harvest handling, storage facilities, agroprocessingplants). Yet, infrastructure development tends tobe approached slowly because of the potentialbenefits that might accrue to coca transporters(i.e., roads are seen as potential landing strips fornarcotics traffickers). Despite the fact that infra-structure development might initially contributeto the coca economy, alternative developmentand production cannot occur without the availa-bility of adequate transportation and marketingroutes.


Table 1-3--Value-Added Processing Investment in the Chapare Region

Industry Source of finance Dollar value capital Comment

Coffee pre-processing. . . . . . . . .

Latex pre-processing . . . . . . . . .

Tea processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Glucose plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vinegar plant . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . .

Yuca and banana drying . . . . . . .Banana and kudzu drying . . . . . .

Mint oil extraction . . . . . . . . . . . .Lemon balm plant . . . . . . . . . . . .

Milk plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

AID Project 412

INC - AID

China -1984AID Project 412Universidad Mayor de

San Simon/UNDCPUniversidad Mayor de

San Simon/UNDCPAID Project 412Universidad Mayor de

San SimonAID Project 412AID Project 412

Public Law 480UNDCP

$ 73,835

32,900

108,000166,728307,174

175,298

73,897105,572

103,200

3,200,000

Started in 1980;Project 412 in 1990.


In production.

installation now underway.

Installation now underway.

Not yet in operation.Starting production.

Starting production.Working; low oil return per

hectare.Project incorporates health

aspects.

SOURCE: B. McD. Stevenson, “Post-Harvest Technologies to Improve Agricultural Profitability,” contractor report prepared for the Office ofTechnology Assessment, May 1992.

However, significant fault has been linked tothe methods and approaches used by U.S. andmultinational development groups to developland transportation routes in the tropics. Adverseenvironmental impacts associated with road-building in South America are highly visible (e.g.,increased erosion, forest loss, poaching). In-creased attention to developing mechanisms tomitigate such impacts should be included inproject design and planning.

Option: Congress could direct AID to increasesupport for improving rural-urban trade net-works, including roads, trucking, communications,and postharvest handling facilities.

Primary constraints to marketing alternativecrops and products largely are linked to inade-quacy or lack of infrastructure. Increasing capa-bility to handle, process, and transport products todomestic and international markets could imp-rove the ability of alternative resource exploita-tion activities to compete with coca. Increasedattention would be needed to address the potentialenvironmental impacts of infrastructure develop-ment, particularly road systems.

This is likely to be a long-term and costlyendeavor, requiring a substantial increase infinancial resources for assistance projects. Addi-tional burdens on staff time could reduce effortson production-related activities. Nevertheless,without ability to move products effectively andeconomically, alternative products are likely toremain at a disadvantage relative to coca.

Issue: Meeting food quality and safety require-ments for agricultural exports can posedifficulties for some alternative crop pro-ducers.

Increased share in the international market cancontribute to improving the economies of theAndean countries. Although crop substitutioncomponents of alternative development programshave focused on export markets, additional effortis needed to assist producers and processes tomeet the quality and safety criteria required in theinternational marketplace (53).

The United States maintains a broad range oftrade policies, ranging from import quotas andtariffs to complex food safety, sanitary, andphytosanitary requirements. Meeting these re-


quirements is often difficult for developing na-tions. Assistance in developing capacity formeeting these standards could contribute toincreased competiveness of Andean products.Assisting the Andean countries in improving theircompetitiveness in international markets couldyield additional benefits by increasing their rangeof trading partners, encouraging foreign invest-ment, and improving national food systems.

Option: Congress could direct the U.S. Depart-ment of Agriculture, Animal and Plant HealthInspection Service (APHIS) and Food SafetyInspection Service (FSIS) and the U.S. Depart-ment of Health and Human Services, Food andDrug Administration (FDA) to assist the An-dean countries to improve the quality andsafety of agricultural export products.

Authority for entering into international coop-erative work exists primarily for APHIS, althoughFDA and FSIS possess limited authority forproviding assistance. Current APHIS cooperativeefforts are designed to assist developing countriesmeet U.S. inspection standards and quality re-quirements and thereby facilitate imports to theUnited States. Similar activities among FDA,FSIS, and the Andean countries could addressother processing and marketing areas.

However, increasing agency responsibility with-out a commensurate increase in fiscal resourcescould come at the expense of the primary mission.Funding and responsibilities could be increasedfor a specified period to provide training anddevelopment of expertise in the Andean countrieswith periodic reports to Congress that evaluate theprogram’s progress.

Issue: Lack of product quantity hinders small-holders from entering large, high-valueagricultural markets.

Despite the existence of alternative crops,production remains at low levels that inhibitsentrance into lucrative markets. Opportunities areneeded to expand the production base to increaseproduct availability or aggregate the production

!2

Steep topography and difficult road conditions inmany rural areas may hinder expanded production ofrenewable resource products by limiting easy accessto inputs and markets.

of numerous smallholders. Strong producer or-ganizations could overcome the problem smallindividual producers have in negotiating justprices for their product.

Option: Congress could direct AID to increaseefforts to encourage producer organizations inthe Andean region in order to reach productquantity thresholds for international market-ing.Lack of sufficient product quantity has con-

strained international marketing of some productsof ongoing substitution programs. Producer or-ganizations can provide an opportunity for groupsof smallholders to consolidate production quan-tity to meet the needs of larger markets. Forexample, cocoa cooperatively produced and proc-essed in the Alto Beni, Bolivia has been success-ful in competing in the international cocoamarket. Ongoing alternative development effortscould be required to increase the focus onsupporting producer groups for other alternativecrops as well. However, increasing product quan-

331-054 - 93 - 2


tity must be accompanied by ability to move theseproducts quickly and efficiently to markets torealize benefits from such an effort.

Alternative Option: Congress could increasefunding for the InterAmerican Foundation toexpand efforts in grassroots development inthe Andean region.

The InterAmerican Foundation (IAF) has exten-sive experience in grassroots development inSouth America and many of its projects havedemonstrated success (e.g., El Ceibo, see chapter4). IAF has provided assistance for a broad rangeof cooperative activities including agricultural,textile, and handicrafts and such economic diversifi-cation could generate benefits beyond increasingproduct quantity for outside markets.

BIOLOGICAL CONTROL OF COCACoca eradication is seen by some as a necessary

precursor to successful alternative development(57), whereas others view it as a futile attempt tocurtail cultivation of illegal narcotic crops. Re-gardless, quantitative goals of a coca eradicationstrategy in the Andean region do not exist. It hasnot been determined what level of coca removalis required to achieve domestic supply-reductiongoals.

Interest in the potential benefits of a biologicalcontrol (biocontrol) approach to coca reduction isevident. Biocontrol may offer the least environ-mentally damaging and lengest-term means ofreduction, although the current state of thetechnology suggests likely levels of reductionwill be difficult to determine. Predation levelsevident in laboratory experiments do not neces-sarily translate into similar effects in the field.Thus, biocontrol cannot guarantee specific results(47, 57). Further, as long as coca remains anattractive crop, it is likely farmers would takemeasures to protect their investment.

U.S. activities abroad that involve a regulatedsubstance, such as herbicides or biocontrol agents,require an environmental analysis under Execu-tive Order 12114--either an Environmental Im-

pact Statement (EIS) or a less rigorous ConciseEnvironmental Review (CER). However, thechoice of document is at the agency’s discretion.Experience with herbicide testing in Peru sug-gests significant sociopolitical constraints will bedifficult to overcome without increased attentionto rigorous testing and safety features for candi-date coca control agents (13).

Several key technology factors hinder develop-ment of biocontrol agents: lack of inventories ofpotential agents, incomplete understanding of theefficacy of biocontrol (i.e., what level of reduc-tion might be achieved through deployment of anagent), lack of understanding of what level ofcontrol is required to achieve ‘success,’ and lackof containment mechanisms. These needs couldbe addressed through a highly focused researchand development effort, but, such an effort wouldbe conditional on host country cooperation.

I Coordination and CooperationCoordination and cooperation among donor

and host countries will be critical elements foreffective research and development of a cocabiocontrol program. Traditional biocontrol devel-opment methodology includes search and identi-fication of existing predators, screening for host-specificity, and testing. The search activitiescould be undertaken in the target range and otherlocations; however, efficacy testing needs to beconducted in the implementation site or sites withsimilar environmental characteristics.

Issue: Insufficient coordination and coopera-tion with potential host countries in plan-ning and design of eradication programsreduces support for implementation.

Experience with herbicide testing in Perusuggests significant government and public par-ticipation will be necessary for a successful cocaeradication effort (56). Incorporating public re-view and comment periods, broad disseminationof environmental impact reviews and methodolo-gies, and coordination and cooperative effortswith national groups will be key.


The United Nations International Drug ControlProgramm e (UNDCP) investigations into poten-tial narcotic crop control opportunities highlighthost country involvement and agreement. Cur-rently, UNDCP is evaluating biocontrol potentialthrough expert group meetings. Any activitiesthat might result from these investigations will beconditional on host country agreement and coop-eration in all phases (50). The U.S. Department ofState notes similar agreements would be soughtfor U.S. bilateral eradication activities in theAndean region but currently little likelihoodexists for obtaining them (57).

Option: Congress could create a multinationalcommission, with representatives from donorand host countries, that would manage theresearch and development of a biocontrolagent for coca and the implementation of anycoca reduction program.

Creation of a multinational commission couldprovide for substantial host country involvementin developing a biocontrol program and perhapsovercome public resistance that was evident in theearlier chemical control research. Such a commis-sion could be composed of U. S., Andean, andother interested country scientists and narcoticscontrol policymakers. The commission could beresponsible for overseeing the development andimplementation of a coca biocontrol program,including determining acceptable levels of risk,desirable levels of control, and necessary testingand screening precautions. Such an internationalcommission would serve to improve the coordi-nation and cooperation of the various donor andhost countries.

However, developing a commission could be alengthy process. Competing agendas among par-ticipants could make agreement and directiondifficult. Setting a lead country or chairman couldalleviate some difficulties, yet, it could also givethe commission an appearance of being domin-ated by single-member concerns or motivations.Nonetheless, without such cooperation and coor-dination, research and testing of potential agents

is also likely to be slow. Further, without hostcountry agreement for implementation, any re-search runs the risk of being moot even before itis completed.

1 Information Needs for DecisionmakingInformation to support wise decisionmaking is

fundamental to undertake a biocontrol program.Basic informational needs include identificationof:

. The level of reduction necessary to fulfillsupply reduction goals,

. The role of coca in the Andean ecosystem,and

. Potential environmental impacts of a bio-control program.

Issue: Lack of understanding of the level ofreduction necessary to achieve supply re-duction goals hinders establishment of cleartarget levels for eradication efforts.The extent of coca reduction necessary to

achieve supply reduction goals in the UnitedStates has not been identified and, given thequestionable accuracy of historical data on cocaproduction, it is likely to be difficult to derive.Nonetheless, setting goals and identifying mecha-nisms for reduction programs may require thistype of information. For example, biologicalcontrol of coca, while suggested as an environ-mentally benign alternative to chemicals, mayonly achieve low coca reduction in the short term.Information on how this level of reduction wouldaffect overall cocaine availability could be used todetermine feasibility of such an approach.

Option: Congress could direct the U.S. Depart-ment of Energy, through its National Lab-oratory System, to conduct a supply/demandanalysis to identify the relative level of cocareduction required to achieve domestic supplyreduction goals.

The National Laboratory System has substant-ial resources for computer modeling and could bedirected to create an integrated computer model to


simulate the effects of several reduction scenarioson U.S. cocaine supply. Although numerousvariables confound precision of such a model,resulting information could identify high-lowscenarios to provide bounds for coca reductionobjectives.

However, such a model would likely be basedon existing narcotics data, the accuracy of whichis questionable. Data on coca and cocaine arenotoriously suspect, leading to widely varyingestimates of the area under production, areaeradicated and newly planted, potential leafyields, and conversion rates from leaf to paste andcocaine hydrochloride. Thus, existing data usedin such an analysis could lead to a “garbagein-garbage out” product yielding little new in-sight. Improved data collection could address thisproblem, although it would likely be a lengthyprocess. Alternatively, in the near term resultscould be given a “percent confidence” ratingwhile new data-gathering activities were under-taken.

Issue: Little is known of the role of coca in theAndean ecology. Thus, determining poten-tial adverse impacts of coca eradication isdifficult.

Generating support for biocontrol efforts willrequire placing adequate attention on addressingthe concerns of the potential host countries.Environmental concerns have been highlighted inprevious activities and are likely to continue toplay an important role. Information on the role ofcoca in the complex Andean environment wouldbe important in determining the feasibility andappropriateness of a biocontrol program. Thisinformation could provide needed backgroundinformation to help national government deci-sionmakim g on the biocontrol of coca.

Option: Congress could direct the U.S. Depart-ment of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service toconduct ecological studies of coca’s role in theAndean environment cooperatively with hostcountry counterparts.

Some fungi and lichens are natural coca pests thatmay significantly reduce the plants’ productive life.Here, lichen covers the stem of a coca shrub.

Financial and technical support could be pro-vided for a comprehensive study of coca in theAndean environment. Cooperative efforts amongU.S. and Andean scientists could identify therange of coca species of interest and the role wildcounterpart plays in local ecology. This informa-tion would be a logical counterpart to potentialhost screening studies on candidate agents andcould further be used to determine potential areasof concern with biocontrol activities. However,such a study would require site visits in hazardousareas (e.g., Alto Huallaga) for observing andcharacterizing g coca ecology. Substantial effortswould be required, in some cases, to assureparticipant safety in such a study.

Issue: The current environmental assessmentprocess applied to U.S. activities in foreigncountries is inadequate to identify the broadrange of potential environmental impactsthat might be associated with biocontrolefforts.

Despite government agreements during the1987 herbicide testing in Peru, local populationsand environmental groups felt inadequate oppor-


tunity existed for their input and discussion (56).The resulting public outcry over the potentialadverse environmental effects of the tested herbi-cides was significant. Similar situations are likelyto occur with a biocontrol program if inadequateattention is given to local participation in theenvironmental impact review process.

Determining g potential environmental impactsof a biocontrol program will require a rigorousassessment effort. The instrument under whichthese environmental reviews currently are re-quired (Executive Order 12114) allows agencydiscretion to undertake a Concise EnvironmentalReview rather than a more comprehensive Envi-ronmental Impact Statement is as required underNational Environment Policy Act (NEPA) fordomestic actions (13).

The legal status of NEPA with respect to theextraterritorial environmental impacts of Federalprograms remains in doubt. However, it is clearFederal agencies involved in the proposed cocaeradication program will be required to preparesome kind of environmental evaluation, eitherunder NEPA or Executive Order 12114. Experi-ence demonstrates the value of this environmentalanalysis can be enhanced if the relatively rigorousprocedural requirements of NEPA are followed.In particular, the agency should ensure full publicparticipation throughout the assessment process,environmental assessment early in the decision-making process, full discussion of alternativesand mitigation techniques, consultation with ex-perts within and outside of government, and thatthe results of the assessment are meaningfullyconsidered by involved decisionmakers.

Option: Congress could choose to expand theauthority of the National Environment PolicyAct to include U.S. coca control activities inforeign countries.

A rigorous environmental review process couldalleviate some of the public resistance to cocacontrol efforts. The Environmental Impact State-ment (EIS) process required domestically couldbe an appropriate process for examining the full

array of potential impacts of a coca eradicationmethod. However, expanding the U.S. Environ-mental Protection Agency’s responsibility toinclude international EISS, would increase agencyworkloads substantially and would likely requirea concomitant increase in staff and financialresources. Further, technical expertise for outlin-ing requirements and reviewing EIS’S would beneeded and could create a lengthier process.Changes in the process may be necessary toaccount for environmental differences betweenU.S. and Andean environments.

1 Technological FeasibilityBiocontrol methodologies exist, but there are

considerable technological constraints to rapidimplementation. Investigations into possible her-bicides continue to be the primary focus at theFederal research and development level (45).Thus, if a biocontrol program is to be pursued, anextensive research and development period couldbe needed. Ongoing research is classified andconducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture,Agricultural Research Service and cooperatingagencies.

Option: Congress could direct the U.S. Depart-ment of Agriculture to balance finding re-sources for crop control research betweenherbicides and biocontrol.

Currently, biocontrol research is treated as partof an overall eradication method research pro-gram. Division of funds and activities are agency-discretionary and largely focused on chemicalresearch. Nevertheless, balanced attention to bothopportunities could be undertaken to assureneither development is disadvantaged if hostcountry agreement is forthcoming.

Alternative Option: Congress could place re-sponsibility for coordinating a broad-basednational research and development programfor biocontrol with the Office of National DrugControl Policy, Counterdrug Technology As-sessment Center (ONDCP/CTAC).


There are numerous public and private researchresources that could be appropriate to undertakeor participate in biocontrol research. Currently,responsibility for development, oversight, andcoordination lies with the U.S. Department ofAgriculture. Responsibility for a broad-basedresearch and development effort could be placedwith ONDCP/CTAC, which holds responsibilityfor counternarcotic enforcement research of whicheradication is one aspect. Coordination with thenumerous Federal agencies appropriate to thepreconditions for development (e.g., USDA, DOE,DOS) could be undertaken by ONDCP/CTAC toexpedite efforts. However, recent Administrationactions have downsized ONDCP significantlyand without concomitant efforts to rebuild theOffice, such a task might not be feasible.

Alternatively, Congress could choose to haltnew programs for coca biocontrol research andcontinue existing programs under maintenancebudgets conditional on the outcome of the UNDCPefforts in biocontrol. U.S. intellectual and fina-ncial resources could be directed to assist theUnited Nations effort if host country agreementwere obtained. Such an approach would ensurethe program was multilateral and assure theAndean countries of an international forum withinwhich their concerns or grievances over biocon-trol or coca eradication in general could be heard.

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22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28,

l-Summary, Issues, and Congressional Policy Options 33

Cuellar, F. H., private consultant, personal com-munication, Santafe de Bogot& Colombia, Sep-tember 1992.Cuellar, F. H., “Incidencia del cultivo de coca enla economia Colombian y comparaci6n con 10Scases de Peru y Bolivia, ’ Instituto Interamericanode Cooperaci6n para la Agricultural, Santafe deBogota, Colombia, 1991.DeFranco, M. and R. Godoy, “Economic Conse-quences of Cocaine Production in Bolivia: Histor-ical, Imcal, and Macroeconomic Perspectives.(Boston, MA: Harvard University, 1990).DeVincenti, J., ‘‘Infhstructural Needs to SupportAgricultural Alternatives to Coca in Bolivia,”contractor paper prepared for the Office of Technol-ogy Assessment, December 1991.Development Alternatives, Inc., “CochabambaRegional Development Project (CORDEP) Bo-livia: Technical Proposal,” Submitted to AIDunder RFP No. Bolivia 92-001, Bethesda, MD,January 21, 1992.Dourojeanni, M. J., “The Environmental Impactof Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production in thePeruvian Amazon Basin,’ paper presented at theCongressional Research Service Panel on CocaineProduction, Eradication, and The Environment:Policy, Impact, and Options,” U.S. Congress,Library of Congress, Congressional ResearchService, Washington, DC, Feb. 14, 1990.TheEconomist, “GettingAwaywithI t,” 323(755):44,April 18, 1992.The Economist, “The Cocaine Economies: LatinAmerica’s Killing Fields,” October 8, 1988, pp.21-24.Hatlleld, L.Z., “Bolivia’s New Legislation At-tracts Foreign Investment,” Business AmericaMarch 23, 1992, pp. 19-20.Healy, K., I.nterAmencan Foundation, Rosslyn,VA, personal communication, September 1992.Healy, K., “Opportunities and Constraints toSource Reduction of Coca in Bolivia: The Politi-cal Context, ” contractor paper prepared for theOffice of Technology Assessment, March 1992.Healy, K., “The Boom Within the Crisis: SomeEffects of Foreign Cocaine Markets on BolivianRural Society and Economy,” D. Pacini and C.Franquemont (eds.), Coca and Cocaine: E@ectson People and Policy in Latin Amen”ca, Cultural

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40.

Survival Report 23 (Peterborough, NH: TranscriptPrinting Company, 1986) pp. 101-143.Jacoby, T., Miller, M., and San&a, R., “A Choiceof Poisons,” Newsweek, December 1988, p. 62.Kraljevic, I., ‘‘Migration, Social Change, and theCoca/Cocaine Economy in Bolivia,” contractorpaper prepared for the Office of TechnologyAssessment, February 1992.Larrain, F,, and Sachs, J. D., ‘International Finan-cial Relations, ’ Paredes, C. and J. Sachs (eds.),Peru’ sPath to Recovery (Washington, DC: Brook-ings Institution, 1991) In: Alvarez, 1992.Mardon, M., “The Big Push,” Sierra, November/December 1988, pp. 66-75.McCaffiey, D., “Biodiversity Conservation andForest Management as Alternatives to Coca Pro-duction in Andean Countries,” contractor paperprepared for the Office of Technology Assess-ment, August 1991.McClintock, C., “Opportunities and Constraintsto Source Reduction of Coca in Peru: The PoliticalContext,” contract paper prepared for the Officeof Technology Assessment, September 1991.Morales, E., “Coca and Cocaine Economy andSocial Change in the Andes of Peru,” EconomicDevelopment and Cultural Change 35(1):143-161, October 1986.O’Carroll, P., “Crop Substitution,’ InternationalDrug Report, United Nations, Geneva, February,1978, p. 4.Orlove, B., and hVieil, D., ‘Some Doubts AboutTrout: Fisheries Development Projects in LakeTiticaca,” In: B. Orlove, M. Foley, and T. Love(wk.), State, Capital, and Rural Society: Anthro-pological Perspectives on Political Economy inh4em”co and the Andes (Boulder CO: WestviewPress, 1989) In: Schroeder, 1991.Painter, M., Institute for Development Anthropol-ogy, personal communication, August 1992.Painter, M., and Bedoya-Garland, E., “Institu-tional Analysis of the Chapare Regional Develop-ment Project (CRDP) and the Upper HuallagaSpecial Project (PEAH),” contractor papr pre-

pared for the ~lce of Technology Assessment,July 1991.Plowman, T., “Coca Chewing and the BotanicalOrigins of Coca (ErythroxyZum spp.) in SouthAmerica,’ In: D. Pacini and C. Franquemont

34

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I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in the Andean Region

(eds.), Coca and Cocaine :E#ects on People andPolicy in Lutin America, Cultural Survival Report23, (Peterborough, NH: Transcript Printing Co.,1986).Rae, C. B.J., “Sericulture and Silk Production inBolivi~ Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia,” papersubmitted to Corporation Andina de Fomento,Caracas, Venezuela, January 31, 1990.Raymond, J. S., “A View from the TropicalForest,” R. Keatinge (cd.), Peruvian Prehistory:An Overview of Pre-Inca and Inca Society,(Cambridge, England: CambridgeUniversityP ress,1988); in Reeve, 1991.Reeve, M.E., ‘Traditional Roles and Uses of Cocabaf in Andean Society,” contractor paper pre-pared for the Office of Technology Assessment,July 1991.Rosen, D., “Potential for Biological Control ofCoca,’ contractor paper prepared for the Office ofTechnology Assessment, November 1991.Rosenquist, E., U.S. Department of Agriculture,Agricultural Research Service, personal commun-ication, August 1992.Ross, P. R., Executive Officer, Crocodile Special-ist Group, personal communication, 1991, In:Ashton, 1991.Schroeder, R., “Fishery/Aquatic Resources inBolivi~ Colombia, and Peru: Production Systemsand Potential as Alternative Livelihoods, ” con-tractor paper prepared for the Office of Technol-ogy Assessment, October 1991.Smith, E., “Growth VS. Environment,” BusinessWeek, May 11, 1992, pp. 66-75.Stevenson, B.McD., “Post-Harvest Technologiesto Improve Agricultural Profitability,’ contractorpaper prepared for the Office of TechnologyAssessment, May 1992.Szendri, K., United Nations Drug Control Pro-grarnrne, Vienna, Austria, personal communica-tion, August 1992.Thourni, F., “Opportunities and Constraints toSource Rduction of Coca: The Colombian Macro-Economic Context,” contractor paper preparedfor the Office of Technology Assessment, April1992.Tosi, J.A., Jr., “Integrated Sustained Yield Man-agement of Primary Tropical Wet Forest: A Pilot

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Project in the Peruvian Amazon,” Tropical Sci-ence Center, Costa llic~ 1991, In: McCaffrey,1991.‘Ibrner, E., “Primer on U.S. Agricultural andTrade Policies: Opportunities and Constraints toCrop Substitution in the Andean Nations,” con-tractor paper prepared for the Office of Technol-ogy Assessment, Febmary 1992.United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs,Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Environ-mentally Safe Methods for the Eradication ofIllicit Narcotic Plants, meeting held in ViemaDecember4 -8,1989, IYCN.7/1990/CRP.7, Dec.14, 1989.U.S. Agency for International Development, “Last-ing Solutions to the Translational Drug Problem:The Role of Development in the Counter-DrugWar,” July 1991, p. 21U.S. Congress, Library of Congress, Congres-sional Research Service, Cocaine Production,Eradication, and The Environment: Policy, Im-pact, and Options, seminar held on February 14,1990, Washington, DC.U.S. Congress, Hlce of Technology Assessment,Biological Control of Coc~ Workshop held Janu-ary 23, 1992, Washington, DC.U.S. Congress, Ofilce of Technology Assessment,Agricultural Alternatives to Coca, Workshop heldSeptember 30- October 1,1991, Washington, DC.U.S. Department of State, Bureau of InternationalNarcotics Matters (INM), International NarcoticsControl Strategy Report (Washington, D. C.: U.S.Department of State, 1992).U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Enterprise forthe Americas Fact Sheet,” Washington, DC,September 30, 1990.Villachica, H., “Crop Diversification in Bolivia,Colombia, and Peru: Potential to Enhance Agri-cultural Production, ’ contractor paper preparedfor the Office of Technology Assessment, April1992.Werner, D. I., “The Rational Use of Green Igua-nas,” Neotropical Wildlife UseandConservation(Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1991) In:Ashton, 1991.

FactorsInfluencing

CocaReductionInitiatives 2

T he Andean region is complex in its geology, ecology, andcultural history. This complexity precludes simple orbroadly applicable coca substitution strategies. Success-ful, cooperative, counternarcotics efforts among the

United States and Andean countries require careful considerationof all of these factors. This chapter examines the biophysical,cultural, socio-political, and economic conditions that may affectthe success of efforts to reduce coca cultivation in Bolivia, Peru,and Colombia.

GEOECOLOGY OF THE NORTHERNAND CENTRAL ANDES

Clear understanding of the biological and physical environ-ments in the Andean region is critical for appropriate design ofprojects to eradicate or offer alternatives to coca. The naturalenvironmental diversity of Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia resultslargely from the abrupt altitude changes in the Andes mountainsystem (2). There is a vertical succession of ecozones, rangingfrom rainforest and desert at the lowest levels to mountain tundra,snow, and ice at the highest (104). The enormous latitudinal span(approximately from 10 degrees north to 40 degrees south alongthe western edge of South America) and longitudinal breadth(approximately between 80 degrees west and 60 degrees west)also make for considerable variations in climate, soil, vegetation,and land-use (104). Thus, the local and regional diversity ofbiophysical environments requires that any project be site-specific (2).

35


I Andean Geography and GeologyThe Andean cordillera (mountain range) di-

vides the South American continent into Atlanticand Pacific drainage systems and is part of a greatband of active crustal uplift that circles the PacificOcean. The Andes are among the youngestmountains on Earth, and consequently, soils aregenerally shallow, stony, and undifferentiated(104). Extensive volcanic and earthquake activityhas characterized the region’s geologic history,and this activity continues today (84). Anytechnologies dependent on the land’s surficialcharacteristics---g. g., road-building or soil identi-fication and use-must deal with the geologicvariability, as well as the instability of the areadue to ongoing mountain-building (2).

The Andean cordillera is made up of manyinterwoven ranges, which include high intermon-tane plateaus, basins, and valleys. Colombia,Peru, and Bolivia are located within the Northernand Central Andean ranges (figure 2-l).

The Northern Andes extend from coastal Vene-zuela and Colombia to northern Peru and containseveral broad ecosystems falling into four altitu-dinal belts, the highest and coldest of which risesto 4,500 meters above sea level (masl). TheNorthern Andes subregion is distinguished fromthe rest of the region by higher relative humidityand greater climatic symmetry between the east-ern and western flanks of the range (2).

The three main warm ecosystems of the North-ern subregion are the upper montaña (mountain)slopes, the intermediate-level coffee belt, and thefoothills. The upper montaña slopes, with theirvast, dense forests, have experienced little ad-verse human impact. However, in some areas,deforestation may have contributed to increasedstream flow and erosion. Precipitation is heavy,averaging 4,000 mm per year, and physical andchemical weathering and erosion can be intense.The coffee belt, immediately below the upper

montaña, has been profoundly modified by coffeeplantation agriculture. The best coffee soils aredeveloped on volcanic ash, which is sensitive toerosion. The low Andean foothills are relativelyhumid with annual rainfall of at least 2,000 mmand a mean annual temperature of at least 24degrees C. Low-productivity, lateritic soil coversmuch of the area, particularly in cleared fieldswhere maize, manioc (yuca), plantain, and cocoaare cultivated.

The Central Andes extend from northern Peruto the Antofagasta Province in Chile and Cat-amarca Province in Argentina. They are charac-terized by a succession of agricultural zones withvaried climatic conditions along the mountains’flanks and by large, high-altitude plateaus above3,500 masl, which do not occur in the NorthernAndes. Variously called puna or altiplano, theseplateaus, separated and surrounded by highermountains, were the heartland of the pre-Columbian Andean empire (2).

The soil fertility of the northern altiplanogenerally is good (147). The western CentralAndean ranges are relatively arid with desert-likesoils, whereas the eastern ranges are more humidand have more diverse soils (26). The easternslopes of the Central Andes in many ways aresimilar to the wet forests of the Northern Andes.Unlike the Northern Andes, however, theseslopes have a dry season (2).

The altiplano and páramo (heathland) arebroken by river valleys. Cutting deep into thelofty plateaus, these valleys descend 2,000 to3,000 meters, often in a few tens of kilometers,and create areas of highly distinctive relief,climate, habitat, and agricultural uses. The upperends of the valleys merge with the high plateaus.Their middle slopes and alluvial plains aretemperate, referred to as kichwa by indigenousAndean peoples. Lower parts of the valleys, the

2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives

@w Inz< I

Figure 2-l-Generalized Geographic Map of Andean Coca-Producing Countries

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Chapare Region

“’i N-’i=7Yungas

137

Region



yungas, can be wet or hot and dry as a result ofrain-shadow. l

Unlike regions of gentle topography (e.g., thecentral United States or Amazon basin), whereregional climatic variation can be determinedfrom a few widely spaced measurements, regionswith extreme topographic and climatic features(e.g., the Andean cordillera) make regional pro-jections difficult (2). For example, while airtemperature generally decreases with increasingaltitude, variability of mountain topography canproduce much lower-than-expected air tempera-tures at any altitude.

Some general climatic patterns, however, arediscernible in the Andes. For example, withincreasing distance south of the equator theseasonality of precipitation increases, whereasthe total annual amount generally decreases.Humidity commonly increases with increasingaltitude, but only to some intermediate altitude(e.g., approximately 1,000 masl on the easternslope of the Ecuadoran Andes at the equator)above which it declines (92). The variability ofmountain terrain also affects precipitation, suchthat conditions of extreme wetness and ariditymay exist in close proximity. Annual tempera-tures in upper reaches of many Andean valleysmay average 8 degrees C with frequent nocturnalfrosts, whereas lower levels may average as highas 24 degrees C, with no frost. Related to thistemperature gradient is a pattern of greaterrainfall at the valley heads, and less rain at loweraltitudes, resulting in part from mountain rain-shadow effect (2).

The weather patterns of the Andean cordilleraand Amazon basin in general reflect movementsof high and low-pressure “cells’ associated withthe Intertropical Convergence Zone, a low-pressure trough that moves further north andsouth on a seasonal basis. Precipitation is high

throughout the year in the highlands and on thecoast in the Northern Andes. South of centralEcuador, at about the latitude of Guayaquil,coastal aridity increases, culminating in the Ata-cama desert of northern Chile. In the CentralAndes, highland precipitation is seasonal, andamounts are approximately one-half those meas-ured in the northern Andes. The aridity of theCentral Andean coastal zone is the result of thedrying effect of the cold Pacific Humboldtcurrent, and the southern Pacific high-pressurecell (59). Much of the southern portion of theCentral Andes in Bolivia is also arid. The dryseason causes soil moisture deficits and dimin-ished stream flow for a part of each year.

9 Andean Agroecosystems2

At the regional or macroscale level, vegetationpatterns in the Northern and Central Andes tendto reflect climatic zones determined by latitudeand altitude. At the local or mesoscale level,however, this correspondence becomes less pre-cise, as local variations in soil type, slope,drainage, climate, and human intervention comeinto play.

Most of the Northern Andes can support lushvegetation because of the high humidity andrelatively high temperatures. Tropical rainforestsand other types of evergreen and deciduousforests dominate this subregion, with consider-able symmetry of vegetation types on the easternand western flanks of the mountains. The lowestslopes support agriculture year-round, producing,for example, bananas, yuca, and cocoa.

Aridity reduces vegetation growth and agricul-tural options in some areas of the Central Andes.The Atacama desert region of the coastal plain,for example, is one of the driest places on Earth.However, the lower valley floors of the CentralAndean western ranges, and the lands at the foot

1 Rain-shadow occurs when moist easterly winds lose their moisture as they pass over the him cool peaks and plateaus. & the air descendsfrom the punu orpdranw, the temperature rises and its moisture-bearing capacity increases, resulting in a desert condition below 1,500 maslin most interior valleys of the Andes (2).

z Agmecosystem is a term used to describe mtural ecosystems modifkd by human agricultural activities (2).

2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives I 39

of the mountain slopes, along the coast, aredensely populated and support intensive, high-yield cultivation of cash crops including maize,rice, cotton, tobacco, garden vegetables, peppers,sugar cane, and fruit trees. Irrigation water isprovided by the numerous streams that drain thewestern slopes. The eastern slopes of the centralAndes have vegetation types similar to that of thenorthern Andes (2).

A significant portion of the Andean populationlives within the Central Andes’ eastern valleysystems and altiplano. Settlements and farmingare concentrated toward the upper end of theinter-Andean valleys for several reasons: the

primary subsistence crops are acclimatized tothese altitudes; drought and frost are less commonthan in the lower and upper aptitudinal extremes;and access to the grazing lands of the puna andpáramo is relatively easy (31).

ANDEAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Humans first altered the Andean landscapesome 12,000 to 15,000 years ago as hunters andgatherers (146). By 3,000 to 4,000 years ago, theoriginal nomadic, hunting and gathering way oflife had been supplanted by a village-basedagro-pastoral economy (95). Pre-Columbian agri-cultural productivity was achieved largelythrough specialized adaptation of food crops tothe myriad of local microenvironment. Indige-nous farmers planted numerous varieties of eachcrop in a single field, or in neighboring fields, sothat if one variety performed poorly, severalothers might provide an adequate yield (42).Virtually all productive land was used for cropproduction. These two strategies led to a suffi-ciency of food supplies throughout the Andeanhighlands.

From the onset of human occupation, thevaried Andean environments led to vertical ar-rangements of settlements, production regimes,migrations, and political organizations. Patternsof verticality derive from the classiffication ofdifferent agricultural zones, based on their cli-matic conditions (31,32,107,145). For example,

the inhabitants of the Uchucmarca valley inNorthern Peru recognize seven agro-climaticunits that are distinguished according to altitude,moisture, temperature, vegetation, land tenure,crop assemblages, and agricultural technologies(31,32).

The Spanish conquest of the Andean regionproduced severe dislocations in the indigenouspattern of resource exploitation. The arrivingSpanish found a highland Andean agriculturalcomplex that focused on the intensive hoe culti-vation of maize, squash, beans, and hot peppers(chiles). Fiber was secured from the cabuya,cultivated on the drier leeward sides of themountain valleys, and from American cotton,cultivated in the lowlands, along with coca andsweet manioc (21). The principal root crop wasthe small Andean potato.

The Spanish developed urban centers andintroduced exotic plants and animals in theNorthern and Central Andes. Forced clustering ofthe semi-dispersed indigenous settlement pat-terns, exploitation of the large resident laborforce, and establishment of the Iberian grazingethic also followed. Large landed estates (hacien-das) were developed in the altiplano belt foranimal husbandry. In the hot, humid yungas, landclearing was facilitated by the introduction of irontools, and maize, sugar-cane, and pigs were raisedfor urban markets (2).

Displacement of indigenous people to mar-ginal lands that began in the colonial periodcontinued under subsequent regimes. Invariably,the best lands of the region (e.g., flat, fertile valleybottomlands) were claimed by the existent rulers,and often were designated pasture for livestock.Many indigenous people who had lived on theselands were forced to move to remote, inhospitab-le, forested slopes. Others were reduced tolandless laborers, or colonas, on the haciendas.Thus, throughout the Northern Andes, the logicalspatial relationships of agricultural productionwere reversed. The broad, level bottom lands sosuitable to the cultivation of staple foodstuffswere given over to pasture and meat production,


or commercial crops such as sugar cane destined

for foreign markets. Highland plots, more suitableas pasture or forest, were cultivated, with conse-quential damage to the natural vegetation. Har-vests were meager and had to be transported, onthe back of either man or beast, to distant urbanmarkets (43).

Competition for land between haciendas andpeasant communities became a common andsometimes violent feature of rural society in theCentral Andes. The concentration of land owner-ship, uneven population distribution and land-use, feudal subjugation of many peasants, and riseof a large pool of displaced, landless peasantscreated a legacy of inequality that still prevails inthe region (19,61,141). The dichotomy betweenthe urban dweller, or civil servant of Spanishdescent, and the rural Indian peasant-betweenthe lowland centers of power and the powerlessinhabitants of the eastern Andean slopes—persists, with significant implications for anyattempts to alter agricultural practices in coca-producing regions (2).

In more recent times, the so-called “greenrevolution” has had mixed blessings. For in-stance, production of some crops (e.g., banana,rice, and maize) and of poultry has increaseddramatically in the Andean region (16,78,82).However, this increased agricultural productionoccurred among the large landowners of theregion, with few benefits accruing to the impover-ished subsistence sector (43).

A significant modern-era land-use change hasbeen the opening of eastern lowland regions in theNorthern Andes for agricultural use. For centu-ries, fear of disease and reluctance to leave thesecure highland social structure deterred high-lander settlement of lowlands. With their worsen-ing economic plight in modern times, however, anever-increasing number of highland Indians aremoving eastward along every major river valley(46). In spite of endemic shortages of good roads,legally recognized land titles, credit, education,electricity, and modern health and sanitationservices, highlander colonization of the Orinoco

and Amazon basins serves the interests of theindividuals and nations involved and can beexpected to continue (43).

Today, the basic pattern of Pre-Columbian landuse and agricultural practices, as modified by theSpanish, remains more or less intact in the CentralAndes. Commercial agriculture tends to be con-centrated in flat, lowland areas, at least in part dueto high transportation costs and difficulties apply-ing mechanization to farmin g on valley andmountain slopes. This mitigates in favor ofmountain crops that are hand-cultivated, easilyharvested, and easily transported with low spoil-age, one example being coca.

COCA-PRODUCING ECOSYSTEMSPotentially, 10 to 20 percent of the Andes

mountain range (7,250 kilometers in length) issuitable for coca production, and these areas areconcentrated in an aptitudinal belt from sea levelto about 2,000 mad, extending from Colombia toBolivia. Coca grows best at temperatures averag-ing above 15 degrees C, with high precipitation,but does not require evenly distributed rainfall.Coca can be grown in a wide variety of soils, butis sensitive to poor drainage and intolerant of frostor drought. In addition, a wide range of soil pHlevels can be tolerated by coca (i.e., E.coca var.coca, the most important source of cocaine, willtolerate pH levels as low as 4.3 and as high as 8.0(54)).

Coca cultivation is concentrated in and alongdeep valleys that cut into the eastern slopes of theNorthern and Central Andes, and coca is the mostimportant agricultural product of the hot, oftendry lower reaches of the yungas (31). Other warmecosystems with a potential for coca growth arefound between sea level and 2,200 masl in thenorthern Andes, which are characterized by asub-Andean or tropical montaña at higher limitsand wet forest at lower levels. These regions areheavily populated, particularly in the “coffeebelt” (2).

Coca bushes are stripped of their leaves up tosix times a year, and the leaves are then dried and

——

transported to the highlands by porters, packanimals, or trucks. Some highland communitiescontrol territory in the coca-producing valleys,and may establish satellite communities there.Several times each year, they journey to thesefields to tend their coca, or to work as laborers inthe fields of relatives and fellow villagers (107).

Much of the land involved in coca productionis sloping, and its suitability for other agriculturaluses will depend on factors such as slope steep-ness, soil type, and water availability. Waterquality problems now exist in some Andeanwatersheds, largely as a result of dischargesassociated with mining and agricultural activities,and high rates of natural erosion from the region’sgeologic Instability and climatic variability (102,114).The extent to which new agricultural practicesmay contribute to these water quality problemscan only be determined by basin-specific moni-toring programs in the affected watersheds (2).

9 Environmental Impacts ofCoca Cultivation and Processing

The adverse environmental consequences ofcoca cultivation and processing often are cited asa problem in the Andean nations (14,53). Becausemost data are anecdotal, and on-site research isproblematic, the degree of environmental damagethat directly or indirectly can be attributed to cocacultivation and cocaine processing remains unde-

termined. However, the few available informa-tion sources point to significant differences be-tween damage from coca cultivation and cocaineprocessing.

COCA CULTIVATIONLittle is known about the role of coca in the

ecology of the Andean rainforest, or about theenvironmental impacts of coca cultivation. Im-pacts are likely to differ from one growing area toanother, given variations in ecology, culture, andcultivation practices. Today, no formal compara-tive study exists of even the most notablecoca-growing regions (i.e., the Alto Huallaga of


x

Terracing is a traditional, more environmentallybenign means of growing coca still practiced mostnotably in the Bolivian Yungas.

Peru and the Chapare of Bolivia). Despite thislack of information, three factors seem key todetermining g coca cultivation’s environmental im-pact: geographic area, types of external inputs andfrequency and intensity of their use, and cultiva-

tion practices.

Experts argue that deforestation is the mostvisible damage caused by coca cultivation. Someolder coca production regions (e.g., the Yungas,Bolivia) continue to produce coca along well-constructed terraces that reduce soil erosionpotential. However, these practices are not em-ployed in the newer coca-growing regions. In

many areas coca is grown on unterraced plotswith no barrier to soil loss from heavy rains.Migrants to these regions may use slash-and-burnpractices to clear forested areas. Between theearly 1970s and the late 1980s, an estimated700,000 hectares (about 2,700 square miles) ofAmazon rainforest were deforested as a directorindirect result of coca cultivation (53).

The potential consequences of deforestationassociated with coca cultivation are numerous.Habitat loss and decreased species diversity areoften a direct result of destruction of tropical


forest. In addition, the rise in soil temperaturesand decrease in organic matter and soil nutrients,resulting from slash-and-burn practices, can makethe area hostile to revegetation. In the AltoHuallaga in Peru, tropical forest burning causesextensive air pollution, and smoke layers havebeen observed covering the valley in August andSeptember (14).

The most devastating effect of deforestation inthe Andean region maybe extensive soil erosion.Clearing tropical forest areas for agriculturalexpansion without investing in soil conservationcan severely disrupt biological productivity andstart a self-reinforcing cycle of degradation. Forexample, soil erosion reduces soil fertility, whichin turn can reduce growth of cover plants, leadingto more soil erosion and to rapid depletion ofdiversity as the site becomes suitable for fewerspecies.

The cultivation practices, tillage and weedcontrol, can increase the potential for soil erosion.Tillage loosens the soil and leads easily toerosion. Whether coca seeds or seedlings areplanted, the soil remains largely unprotected fromheavy rains. Furthermore, the soil around the cocaplants is weeded regularly to reduce competitionfor the minimal nutrients available. These prac-tices leave the soil in coca plots almost continu-ally bare during the production years, and theresults are increased soil temperatures, reduceddevelopment of soil microbial populations, andlong-term exposure of the soil to wind and rainerosion. Finally, the leaves of the coca plant arestripped periodically (e.g., three to six times peryear), thereby removing whatever protection thecanopy might offer.

As a result of soil erosion, sediment-ladenrunoff may flood lowlands, overcome the nutrienttrapping capability of wetlands, and damageassociated aquatic systems by smothering bottomcommunities and decreasing oxygen availabilityto other organisms. Floods, avalanches, andlandslides have been attributed to the increasedsoil erosion found in the coca-growing areas ofthe Andean foothills. Exceptionally heavy rain-

Table 2-1—Pesticides Commonly Used inCoca Production

Common name Trade name Percent used

Carbaryl . . . . . . . . . . . Sevin 70%Metamidophos . . . . . . Monitor 15Decamitrina. . . . . . . . . Decls 10Monocrotophos . . . . . . Azodrin 5

SOURCE: J. Antognini, Research Leader, Tropical science and Re-search Lab, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Remarks,” U.S. Library ofCongress, Congressional Research Service, Cocaine Pruduction,Eradication and the Environment: Policy, Impact and Options Hearing,February 14,1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,1990), p. 3.

Table 2-2—Dimensions of Pollution from CocaProcessing in the Alto Huallaga Valleya

QuantityMaterial (in millions)

Acetone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 ICarbide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 kgKerosene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 IQuicklime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 kgSulphuric Add . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 1Toilet paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 kgToluene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 I

a Based on estimated quantities of these substances in Alto HuallagaValley rivers and streams in 1986.

SOURCE: M. Buenaventura, “Victims of the Drug Trade,” U.S. Libraryof Congress, Congressional Research Service (CRS), Cocaine Pro-duction, Eradication, and the Environment: Policy, Impact, and Options,February 14, 1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,1990), pp. 143-146.

fall in November 1987 caused devastating land-slides killing animals and people as well asruining roads, villages, and productive land through-out coca-growing regions (14).

Pesticides and fertilizers used in coca cultiva-tion may cause environmental and health prob-lems as well. Synthetic pyrethroids, carbaryl, andparaquat area few of the pesticides used to controlinsects and weeds in coca fields (135) (table 2-l).Some of these chemicals are known to be mobilein soils, thus increasing the potential for contamina-tion of groundwater resources. Pesticides ad-sorbed on soil particles may be carried to nearbyaquatic systems during heavy rains common inmany production regions. Similarly, nitrate fromfertilizers is highly mobile in the soil and that not


Table 2-3--Cocaine Processing Chemicals and Potential Environmental Effects

Chemicals Characteristics

Carbide compounds b

Kerosene ●

●

Sulphuric acid (H2SO4) ●

●

●

●

Toluene (C7H8) ●

●

Highly toxic to organic tissue, can raise water’s pH to toxic levels.

Oily liquid, pungent odor.Only moderately toxic to living organisms, but if present in surface water for along time can produce chronic adverse effects in amphibians and fish.Problems may arise from inhalation or ingestion.Reduces dissolved oxygen levels in the water.

Highly corrosive, toxic, oily liquid.Extremely harmful to organic tissue.Dissolves easily in water.Fish and plants may suffer from acute sulfuric acid poisoning.

Highly soluble in water and very toxic.Harmful to fish and amphibians.

SOURCE: M. Buenaventura, “Victims of the Drug Trade,” U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Cocaine Production,Eradication, and the Environment: Policy, Impact, and Options Hearing, Feb. 14, 1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990),pp. 143-148.

taken up by vegetation may leach to groundwateror be transported to nearby surface waters muchthe same as pesticides. Agrichemical contaminat-ion of water resources can lead to adverse effectson human, plant, and animal health (136).

Evidence suggests that coca production canlead to serious erosion problems and reduce landproductivity. However, data comparing the envi-ronmental impacts of coca production with thoseof other crops are lacking. The environments inwhich coca is produced may be just as easilydamaged, or perhaps more so, from legitimateagricultural activities that are as likely to involvedeforestation, heavy tillage, and extensive agrichem-ical inputs (135). Coca is a perennial shrub andonce planted can provide some soil stabilizationduring its productive life (10 to 18 years), annualgrains on the other hand would result in tillageand harvest once a year. In this comparison, cocamay be more conserving of resources.

COCA PROCESSINGAlthough little concrete data exist illustrating

the damage caused by coca processing, it is clearthat the chemicals used to process coca leavesinto coca paste and, later, cocaine can haveconsiderable adverse impacts on the Andeanenvironment. Data gathering alone poses some

problem because some of the items used inprocessing also have legitimate uses (e.g., kero-sene, toilet paper, lime) (table 2-2). Estimatesmay be based on overall consumption under theassumption that the items are purchased for illegalpurposes although clearly for some items this maynot be the case. In any case, coca and cocaineprocessing methods employ a variety of toxicchemicals (e.g., toluene, sulfuric acid) that, ifreleased in sufficient quantities, could harm theimmediate surroundings and ecosystems far re-moved from the processing site (table 2-3).

In the first phase of coca processing, the driedleaves are soaked in a solution of sulfuric acid andwater. The resulting acid fluid, which nowcontains the alkaloids (one of which is cocaine)from the leaves, is decanted and mixed with a

chemical base (e.g., lime or sodium carbonate) toneutralize the acid, and finally with an organicsolvent (kerosene). The mixing is repeated, asneeded, until the solutions have yielded anexpected amount of coca paste. In the process,thousands of gallons of polluted water may bedumped onto the land or into nearby rivers andstreams (105). Thus, primary processing chemi-cals may contaminate soil and ground- andsurface water supplies (53). Such contaminationalso has taken place in the course of enforcement


Table 2-4--lnputs Required to Preparea Kilogram of Coca Paste

Material Quantity Price ($U.S.)

Coca leaves . . . . . . . . . . . 150-170 kg $100.00Kerosene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26.5 I 7.00Lime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 kg 1.50Sodium carbonate . . . . . . 1 kg 4.00Sulfuric acid . . . . . . . . . . . 5 kg 10.00Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,300 I —

Total cost . . . . . . . . . . . 122.50

SOURCE: R. Henkel, “The Cocaine problem,” Bolivia After HyperInflation: The Restructuring of the Bolivian Economy (Tempe, AZ:Arizona State University, Center for Latin American Studies, 1990).Author's note: Data provided by informants familiar with the cocaineindustry in the Chapare region, August 1989.

efforts, when coca processing chemicals some-times have been dumped on the ground and intonearby waterways.

Although there is no accurate account of the

amount of dumping, estimates have been madebased on the amount of chemicals needed toprocess a kilogram of coca paste (table 2-4).Further estimates have been made for the amount

of chemicals used throughout the processingchain to transform coca leaf into cocaine hydro-chloride (table 2-5). While these figures are notlikely to illustrate the degree of the problemadequately, they help to identify areas of concern.

CONCLUSIONAlthough little documentation of environmental

degradation caused by coca cultivation and proc-essing exists, it is clear that these activities havesignificant potential to damage the Andean envi-ronment. Deforestation and soil erosion are two ofthe most notable effects of coca cultivation,whereas chemical contamination of soils and

surface and groundwater seem likely results ofcoca-processing. Human and wildlife populationsin coca growing and processing areas may sufferthe consequences of these environmental imp-a c t s .

Concrete data on the degree of contaminationfrom processing activities is needed to determinethe level of risk to human and wildlife popula-tions. A comprehensive assessment of the envi-ronmental damage caused by coca cultivation andprocessing in the Andean countries could identifythe relative environmental risks from both activi-ties. Although recent efforts in Bolivia havesought to identify the impacts of processingactivities on terrestrial resources (largely soils),additional effort is needed to quantify overallecological impacts. National support for cocareduction might increase if coca cultivation andprocessing-related activities are shown to beadversely affecting the Andean resources andthus reducing alternative development options.

When compared with the destructive practicesof some other agricultural and nonagriculturalindustries in the Andes, however, the potentialquantity of land degradation and pollution attrib-utable cocaine industry becomes somewhat lessstriking. The destructive land-use practices ob-served among coca growers could occur in thecase of any other “booming” export crop, andlikely stem more so from the social and economicmarginalization of coca growers than the illegalstatus of their livelihood (108).

TRADITIONAL ROLES ANDUSES OF COCA LEAF

Ritual importance of coca leaf in traditional

religious and social activities, and traditional andmainstream medical and therapeutic applicationsare concerns of some sectors of the Andeanpopulation. Chewing unprocessed coca leaveshas long been a pervasive Andean cultural tradi-tion. Generally, a dry leaf of cultivated cocacontains less than one percent of the alkaloidcocaine. 3 Thus, although related, cocaine hydro-chloride and raw coca leaf are unique substanceswhose pharmacological and cultural uses differsignificantly.

3 Amazonian coca contains less than 0.5 percent of the alkaloid cocaine; chemical analysis showed the cocaine conkmt in “HuAnaco’ or“Bolivian” COCA the principle source of the world’s cocaine, to vary from 0.23 to 0.93 percent (1 12).


Table 2-5-Estimated Quantity of Chemicals Used to Process Coca Leaf IntoCocaine Hydrochloride in 1990

Low/High

Processing stage Inputs (in millions) Regionwide Bolivia Colombia Peru

Coca leaf to coca paste Kerosene (/) 567/776 108/31 7 --/45.8 —/41 3Sodium bicarbonate (kg) 1.2/1 .64 0.23/0.67 -/0.1 o —/0.87Ammonia (/) 5.56/7.62 1 ,06/3.12 - /0 .45 —/4.05

Coca paste to coca base Sulfuric acid (/) 9.94/13.6 1 .90/5 .57 - /0 .80 —/7.24Potassium permanganate (kg) 0.24/0.32 0.05/0/13 -/0.02 —/0.1 7

Coca base to cocaine HCI Ethyl ether (/) 15.8/21 .7 1.06/3.1 2 13.6/1 7.4 —/1 .16Acetone (l) 7.89/10,8 0.53/1 .56 6.78/8.69 —/0.01

SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Narcotics: The Environmental Consequences (Washington, DC:Department of State, 1991).

Many indigenous Andeans chew coca on adaily basis as a mild stimulant to allay fatigue andhunger, and coca leaves are used by indigenousand non-indigenous people for medicinal pur-poses. Coca leaves are also an important part ofofferings made in cultural and religious ritualsand are a critical element of traditional Andeanpatterns of production and exchange betweenhighlands and lowlands. Community and politicalsolidarity were long maintained through theseexchanges.

The desire for products of the montaña,particularly coca, is a longstanding, basic part ofAndean culture, and so the commercial tiessurvived the fall of empires (1 15).

I History of Coca Leaf in Andean SocietyThe earliest archaeological evidence of coca

use, found in southwestern Ecuador, dates fromabout 2100 BC (uncorrected radiocarbon dating)(112). Different coca leaf varieties and associatechewing paraphernalia from succeeding centurieshave been excavated in such widely spread areasas Northern Chile and Costa Rica (112). Prior toEuropean settlement, major areas in Peru, fromthe north coastal subtropical desert zone to thesouthern coca-producing areas of Sonqo, werecoca production zones for the Inca state (30, 107).In Inca times, coca was a sacred plant. The Incasymbolically associated coca with the color

green, itself evocative of the rainy season, spiritsof the dead, love amulets, and in general, withsupernatural forces (151). This symbolic contextof fertility, outside forces, and the divine realmcontinues to have significance in contemporaryritual coca use (116).

Although initially opposed by colonial clergy,coca chewing in the indigenous population spreadeven further during the first years of Spanishoccupation (125,126). Wherever coca productionbrought significant revenue, as in Bolivia andPeru, attempts at suppression gradually wereabandoned (22). Evidence suggests coca con-sumption was encouraged by mining interests tohelp miners withstand harsh working conditionsin high-altitude silver and tin mines (101, 116).The transformation of coca into a commodity

during the colonial period represented a clear

break with the indigenous pattern, and has paral-lels with the current crisis (116).

9 Ritual and Medicinal UsesTraditional coca chewing is not an isolated or

relic phenomenon (table 2-6). Coca is the focalelement in all traditional religious rituals sur-rounding interaction between human s and super-

natural forces, such as supplication and divina-tion. It is employed for religious purposes by theQuechua-speaking peoples of the Peruvian Andesand the Aymara of Bolivia, as well as the


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Traditional coca use by Andean miners has persistedsince colonial times. Here, a Bolivian miner chewscoca, indicated by the bulge in her cheek, whileworking,

Tukanoans of the Colombian Amazon, whoinhabit the Vaupés, Caquetá, and Paraná riverregions (1 16). Even those who do not chew cocaon a daily basis use it periodically in rituals. Forinstance, most native Andeans believe that certainactivities, such as sowing and harvesting, requireritual offerings of coca be made to those lendingtheir labor (122).

Apart from its religious significance, coca isalmost universally regarded by indigenous peo-ples as a food, and native explanations of thecoca’s value are grounded in physiological ratherthan cultural factors (97). The persistence of thecoca habit can be understood if it has been criticalfor the adaptation and survival of native Andeansunder high altitude conditions (29). When West-ern scientists began studying coca at the turn ofthe century, they focused on cocaine hydrochlo-ride. The applicability of unprocessed coca leaf asa modern pharmaceutical product was not pur-sued and, following the abolition of cocaine, cocaleaf was not available for scientific investigation

in the United States and Europe (112). Neverthe-less, the utility of traditional coca consumptionfor Andean populations cannot be ignored. Threephysiological benefits of coca use (for relief fromaltitude sickness, as a remedy to vitamin deficien-cies, and in conserving body heat), are specifi-cally appropriate to Andeans who must endure thestresses of high-altitude labor and a low-proteindiet (29,64,101). Evidence does not supportclaims that long-term traditional use is harmful(86). Rather, the multiple advantages of coca useindicate that it has a strong positive role inAndean health (box 6-A) (1 12,116).

A much higher percentage of the Bolivianpopulation regularly consumes the unprocessedcoca leaf for daily sustenance than is involved inthe illegal production, transport, marketing, proc-essing, and trafficking of the coca leaf and itsderivatives. Coca leaf is used by eighty-sevenpercent of the inhabitants in the small towns andrural communities of Bolivia for some 40 differ-ent health remedies (76). Between 11/2 and 2rnillion people chew coca in Bolivia alone (34,76).Similar, or greater figures also apply to Peru.4

1 Traditional Patterns of Coca LeafProduction and Distribution

In traditional Andean society, coca is critical tothe smooth functioning of daily interaction andritual affirmation of kin group exchanges. Mostcoca chewing takes place within the daily routineand is carried out according to a specific ritualpattern (3,125). A coca exchange will seal a socialcontract, whether it be an agreement to share labor(anyi), a marriage contract, or acceptance of apolitical office (3,22). Coca also is used as wagesor payment for services outside of anyi in place ofless stable Andean currencies (23,35).

Production of coca is intricately linked to thewider pattern of Andean agricultural subsistencethat depends on interregional trade networks that

4 There is comparatively less available information on the extent of contemporary use of coca leaf among Andean peoples of Colombiaand the Amazonian regions (1 16).


Ritual●

●

●

Box 2-A–Traditional Use of Coca Leaf

Religious and Medicinal ImportanceDivirwtjom As part of the oomplex of beliefs surrounding its power to see and communicate with thesupernatural, and its association with the realms of ancestral and spiritual forces, oocais used by divinersto M“ng divine knowledge to the oornnwnities they serve. Throughout the Andes today, coca cmtinues tobe a major rrwdium for divination, sought by indigens and non-indigens.Su@&WorE Cooais used asanofferingtopropitiate supernatural foroes, andtoensure agricultural andanimal fertility and personal well-being; it is also ritually offered during marriage negotiations, and to thedead at burial.Tradltiomdmedkina Coca use is integral to practices of traditional healers and herbalists throughout theArtdean and Amazonian regions. Though they praotioe nonconventional (non-Vktern) medicine,traditional heaJers and herbalists do not operate within the indigenous sphere alone.

Widespread Therapeutic Importance●

●

●

●

A)esfhetidanfkepfkz Indigens and non%digens apply oooatopicalfy asalocal anesthetic; oooaalso hasantiseptic quatities. The cocaine alkaloid has been shown to exert a powerful bactericidal aotion ongram-negative and coccus organisms.CumWe/’pmverXatlve reme@ Coca tea consurrwd by indigenous and non-indigenous Andean people,alleviates the symptoms of altitude sickness; combats the effects of hypoglycemia; and helps preventvarious lung aknents (an attribute of particular significance to the mining population). For example,chewing coca leaves is believed to limit inhalation of silioates that cause silicosis.MXary s@ement Coca leaves contain vitamin A and significant amounts of B1, B2, and C; they alsocontain calaum, iron, and phosphows, in either the leaves or the calcium oarbonate customdytaken withthe leaves. Leaf chewing helps alleviate nutritional deficiencies ofadiet consisting principdlyofpotatoes.Stimulant Coca gives energy for W* reduces physical discomfort and fatigue, alleviates hunger,sharpens mental prooesses, and, at high altitudes, helps the chewer keep warm.

SOURCE: Adapted from M.E. Reeve, ‘Wditionai Rolea and Uses of Coca L@ in Andearr Sooidy,” contractor report prepared for theOffice of Tochnoiogy /k%saasrno@ Jdy 1991.

move food and coca between distinct ecological involved inmost of the Peruvian market economyzones. Exploitation of distinct zones, called‘‘verticality, “ is a critical concept symbolicallyand in terms of subsistence strategies (107). Fromprehistoric times, coca has been the major cropgrown by Andean peoples in the lowest of theprinciple ecological zones, and trade of coca forhighland goods has bound communities and kingroups across the zones. Studies of modemAndean subsistence strategies demonstrate thatthis pattern has been preserved.

The exchange of coca and food is an ancientstrategy and coca traders were a nexus of theregional integration promoted by this lowland/highland exchange (35,38). Even prior to thecocaine boom, coca was the largest trade item

(125). Peoples participated in this market if for noother reason than for the coca needed to obtainagricultural labor. Additionally, outside of themarkets, an active trade in coca has traditionallybeen part of the household activity of temporarymigrants to the lowlands. Highland Quechua andAymara households each year traveled to thelowlands with their products (meat, livestock,cereals, and produce) and traded them for cocaand other tropical products. The informal marketsector traditionally has been of significance interms of promoting regional integration and instimulating small-scale production of an agricul-tural SU@US (72,99).


However, operation within this traditionalpattern is now a risky business largely because ofthe emergence of a black market for coca leaves,with which traditional users must compete (3). InPeru, for instance, coca transported in greaterquantity than is necessary for immediate personaluse is subject to confiscation. As the number oftraditional commercial traders has Dimininished,subsistence agriculturalists have increased theirtrips, perhaps to move smaller quantities of cocaleaves at a time or to take advantage of theopportunities for wage labor (105). Other tradi-tional users find they must make do with fewersupplies of coca leaf, and use substitutes, makingproper performance of ritual obligations moredifficult (1 16).

1 Cultural Ramifications ofIllegal Coca Trade

The persistence of coca chewing in AndeanBolivia and Peru is linked most closely to culturalcontinuity, and follows the linguistic patterns ofQuechua and Aymara (30). However, as eco-nomic pressures have provoked increased frag-mentation of land holdings, temporary or perma-nent migration to coastal and tropical forest areas,and delocalization of food production and distri-bution, individuals are cut off from the traditionalwork and life patterns of their natal community(ayllu) and face a “crisis of the traditionalideology” (116). While poverty and migrationlikely will continue to disrupt rural, indigenousAndean communities, the international cocaineindustry has been instrumental in corrupting thetraditional role of coca.

In the cocaine trade, wage laborers are paidmore often in pasta básica (coca paste) thanmoney or unprocessed leaf. Pasta básica is anintermediate, unrefined coca derivative that ishighly addictive. It contains numerous chemicalimpurities accumulated during cultivation andprocessing (e.g., pesticides, kerosene, sulphuricacid), and is presumed to have serious healtheffects (75). The practice of smoking pitillos,

More than just impure cocaine, pasta básica de cocaínais cheap, widely available, and highly addictive,attributes which underscore its potential to be asignificant public health problem in coca-producingcountries,

coca paste mixed into tobacco cigarettes, hasspread among urban and rural youth, and acrosseconomic boundaries (85,86,94). Another healthrisk of the cocaine trade, which has affected poor,teenage male peasants in particular, is caused bythe process of making pasta básica. Thousands ofunemployed youth seek work as pisadores, thosewho stomp the coca leaves in a chemical soup.Exposure to pasta básica processing chemicalsover the numerous hours required for paste-making causes damage to pisadores’ feet and maypose other, as yet unknown, health risks (75).

1 Cultural and Economic Implicationsfor Coca Reduction

A recent study in Bolivia found that amongtraditional agriculturalists and miners, 13 percentsaid their productivity would decrease withoutcoca, and 16 percent said they would fall ill (39).Laboratory testing of the effect of coca chewingon individuals indicate that there is no significantdifference in actual work efficiency, but that itmay slightly increase endurance in work perform-ance, acting much like caffeine and ampheta-mines to produce central body stimulation (72).Still, further restrictions on the availability ofcoca leaf for traditional use could, at the veryleast, increase the difficulty of traditional Andean


cultures to fulfill ritual religious and socialactivities. Furthermore, 40 percent of the Bolivi-ans studied believed that “people would rebel insome way or another” (39).

Indeed, coca leaf has become an importantfocal symbol in the indigenous struggle forself-determination, a significant political move-ment already active in Bolivia. The ongoing effortfor cultural equity by indigenous Bolivians oftenincludes support for or approval of traditional useof coca leaf; concurrently, the Bolivian peasantryhave used what political power and organizationthey have as a means of fighting coca eradicationefforts and bans on coca cultivation (76).

In addition to cultural factors, economic andpolitical factors need to be carefully considered inevaluation of any action which would alter thecurrent situation. Unless illegal demand is re-moved, regulation of legal coca cultivation andtrade likely will be too great a challenge for theAndean countries. Restrictions on all coca-relatedactivity then will likely continue, to the detrimentof traditional users (116).

SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICALASPECTS OF COCA CULTIVATION

Bolivia and Peru share the distinction of beingthe world’s leading producers of coca leaf, acondition spurred in both countries by long-termsocial inequality, and political and economicunrest. Over time, the appeal of coca leaf cultiva-tion was heightened by national agriculturalpolicies that promoted agricultural production foroften unstable international markets while dis-couraging production for domestic markets. Smallfarmers in Bolivia and Peru, who grow the bulk ofnationally consumed food products, were particu-larly hurt by agricultural and rural developmentpolicies.

In contrast, Colombia’s involvement in thecocaine industry mostly has been confined tococaine processing and international trafficking.Numerous aspects of Colombia’s history contrib-

uted to creating an enormous advantage forenterprising Colombian criminals in these activi-ties, and Colombia’s narcotics traffickers remainthe industry’s chief beneficiaries.

How all these problems are linked might bestbe understood by briefly examining some of thesocial, political, and economic developments inBolivia, Peru, and Colombia that have motivatedinvolvement in the cocaine industry most di-rectly. For Bolivia and Peru these developmentswill be discussed mainly in the context ofsettlement in the Chapare and the Alto Huallagaregions.

E BoliviaThe development of coca activity is very much

within the framework of the political and eco-nomic history of Bolivia (5). Stagnation ofCochabamba’s upland valley agricultural econ-omy is a development problem and periodicsource of crisis that dates from Bolivia’s colonialperiod.

Within the colonial economy, agricultural areassupplied mining and administrative centers withfood and fiber (109). Then, as now, smallholdingfarmers frequently undercut large estates, becausethey did not attach a value to their own labor, andcould sell their produce at prices the large estatescould not match profitably. In fact, large estatescould only count on making money in droughtyears, when smallholders were obliged to con-sume most of what they grew. Because theirlandholdings were small and located in the leastfavorable areas for agriculture, many smallhold-ers could not support themselves from farming,despite the fact that they dominated the marketsfor agricultural products in most years. As aresult, smallholding farmers became heavily de-pendent on off-farm sources of income early inBolivian history (91).

This social context effectively discouragedinvestment in agriculture and contributed toworsening imbalance between the agricultural


and mining sectors of the economy. 5 For largelandowners, their estates were essentially collat-eral for investment in other economic activities.For smallholders, revenues not immediately con-sumed were also invested in off-farm activities.Economic opportunities were not plentiful, how-ever, and worried government officials constantlysought ways to bring new life to the agriculturaleconomy through development schemes.

The imbalance between the agricultural andmining sectors was exacerbated by several eventsduring the 20th century. With completion of therailroad linking Cochabamba with ports on thePacific coast in 1917, centers of craft productioncould no longer compete with manufacturedimports, and many had to seek employment in themines. Large estates contracted labor on behalf ofmines, frequently obliging part of their residentpeasant population to work there. The relation-ship with the mines was strongly influenced byinternational ore prices. During periods of highore prices, the agricultural areas of central Boliviaexported large numbers of people to the miningcenters, and then reabsorbed many of them whenore prices declined (48,73).

NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL POLICY AFTER 1952

The problems faced by agricultural areas deep-ened in 1953 when the Movimiento NacionalistaRevolucionario government enacted agrarian re-forms that substantially redistributed land in theupland areas and released peasants from thepolitical domination of large estates. The reformsdid not address productivity of peasant labor; infact, although more rural people had land, theconditions for earning a living on that land wereas unfavorable as before, owing to the absence ofgovernment policies to assist smallholders.

Conversely, land concentration reoccurred as aconsequence of economic growth in the new

export agricultural sector (140). Larger landholders in the eastern lowland areas of Bolivia,such as the Santa Cruz department, were encour-aged and financed to expand and modernize acommercial and largely export agriculture indus-try. Bolivia was the world’s largest recipient ofU.S. foreign assistance under the Point Fourprogram during the 1950s (77). Economic devel-opment policy focused on expanding the exportenclave and landowners in lowland areas wereprovided with large amounts of foreign assistancefor transforming their estates into modern comm-ercial agricultural enterprises. Much of theeconomic growth experienced in the lowlandsfollowing the agrarian reform was based on theavailability of migrant labor from upland areas(109).

The impact of the growing commercial agricul-tural export sector on rural smallholders in areassuch as the Cochabamba department was torecreate the economic imbalance that had charac-terized their relationship with the mining indus-try. Agrarian reform and the growth of thecommercial agricultural export sector did little toimprove livelihoods for small farmers and re-sulted in large numbers of people migrating toseek employment in cities. This movement con-tinues to swell Bolivia’s urban population (87,1 11).

CAUSES OF EXPANDING COCAPRODUCTION IN BOLIVIA

By the mid-1970s, but before the rapid expan-sion of coca production, at least 90 percent ofrural families in areas of central and southernBolivia earned at least half of their income fromoff-farm sources (120). Peasant families, fromtheir bases in rural upland areas, maintainedcontacts in multiple migratory destinations, andrapidly changed their migration patterns in re-sponse to changing opportunities and risks (87,109).

s This discussion refers generically to the mining economy or the nu”ning sector. From the beginning of the colonial period through most

of the 19th century the mining industry revolved around silver, but beginning in the last quarter of the 19th century, tin grew in importanceand became Bolivia’s major mineral expofl. Tin dominated the mining industry until 1985, with the crash in international tin prices and the

bankruptcy of the London Metal Exchange (1 10).


In 1974, international cotton prices collapsed,and cotton producers, who had received substan-tial national and international assistance in pre-ceding years, found themselves overcommitted toa failing venture. Some continued to be recipientsof national support for alternate crops, and someapparently became involved in coca leaf produc-tion (20). International financial connections,physical infrastructure, and access to national andinternational agricultural development assistancefacilitated involvement in narcotics by somemembers of the agricultural elite at this time (76).Following investment by members of the nationalentrepreneurial classes, coca leaf production in-creased exponentially, with most of the growthtaking place in the Chapare area of the Coch-abamba department (109).

When a series of natural and economic disas-ters dramatically worsened the conditions of rurallife during the 1980s, and coca-leaf productionrose in response to increasing international de-mand for cocaine, the nearby Chapare area wasincorporated into the migratory strategies ofmany rural families (table 2-7). Three factorsbrought about a dramatic deterioration in theliving conditions of rural families during the1980s:

●

●

A severe drought began in 1983 and contin-ued through the 1980s in much of central andsouthern Bolivia, pushing thousands of small-holders “over the edge” in terms of theirability to earn a living through agriculture.Thousands of families left their homespermanently, and thousands more have ei-ther begun to migrate seasonally or have hadto increase the amount of time they mustspend away from home to provide for familyneeds. Impoverished rural people in thesemiarid upland valleys of the Cochabambadepartment migrated to the nearby Chapareregion and became involved in coca grow-ing.International tin prices collapsed in 1985when the London Metal Exchange stopped

Table 2-7—Reasons for MigrationCited by Chapare Farmers

Reason cited Number of Percentrespondents of total

Lack of land . . . . . . . . . . . 74 42%Seeking employment . . . . 39 22Increase income . . . . . . . . 33 19Traveled with family. . . . . 17 10Other reasons . . . . . . . . . 13 7

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 100

SOURCE: M. Painter and E. Badoya, Socioeconomic Issues in Agricul-tural Settlement andf Production in Bolivia’s Chapare Region, WorkingPaper No. 70 (Binghamton, NY: Institute for Development Anthropol-ogy, 1991 b).

●

trading. Some 27,000 mine workers losttheir jobs between August 1985 and August1986. The Banco Central de Bolivia esti-mated the unemployment rate to be 20percent by the end of 1985, largely becauseof the layoff of mine workers. According tothe Central Obrera Boliviana, the nationaltrade union movement, the figure approached30 percent by the end of 1986 (45). Theimpact of the mining collapse on familiesnot directly employed by the mining indus-try but dependent on it has not been meas-ured. Many families migrated to urban areas,particularly Cochabamba and La Paz. FromCochabamba, many, unable to find work inthe city, went to the Chapare.Finally, this was a time of general financialcollapse. Since the 1970s, different gover-nment administrations had relied on externalloans and expanding export production, tofinance domestic budget deficits and unpro-ductive government spending (134,149). Ul-timately, Bolivia was unable to make pay-ments on its substantial foreign debt. Inaddition, in 1983, the government unlinkedthe exchange rate of the Bolivian peso fromthe U.S. dollar. The effects of this dezdolar-ización on the already weakened Bolivianeconomy were disastrous; the annual infla-tion rate exceeded 14,000 percent at its peakin 1984. Since only those with access to U.S.


dollars enjoyed any financial protection,many people turned to producing or process-ing coca leaf as a way to earn hard currency(109).

Official estimates of coca leaf production showa gradual increase from 1963, when productionwas approximately 4,800 metric tons, and 1975,when it reached 11,800 metric tons. By 1988,coca leaf production was officially estimated at147,608.3 metric tons (51).

CURRENT MACROECONOMIC TRENDSBolivia has a primary export-oriented economy

that currently is following a fairly coherent set ofeconomic rules (5). The severe political andeconomic instability experienced by Bolivia from1978 to 1985 led to rethikn ing of the overalleconomic strategy (44). A drastic stabilizationprogram, implemented by the newly inauguratedPaz Estensoro administration in August of 1985,reduced inflation to 60 percent, limited publicspending, increased tax revenues, and brought thefiscal deficit under control (134,149).

Gross domestic product (GDP) growth re-mained slow throughout the 1980s vis-a-vispopulation growth, with negative GDP ratesoccurring between 1980 and 1986, and very slowgrowth to date. Inflation averaged about 18percent from 1987 to 1990 (144,149). Further-more, increasing absolute poverty and sluggishprivate investment growth continue to plague theeconomy, although the Bolivian Government hastaken some recent policy steps to promote foreigninvestment (5).

Bolivia has been negotiating its debt since1986, and had managed to reduce its level ofoutstanding debt to about 79 percent of GDP (or$3,504 million) by the end of 1990 (149). It hasmanaged to retire most of its commercial debt,and newly contracted debt is being held bybilateral and multilateral official creditors underconcessionary terms. Thus, the maturity profile ofBolivia’s external debt has improved signifi-cantly (149). Despite these considerable improvem-

ents, Bolivia’s debt burden remains high rela-tive to GDP and exports, and the country hasalmost no prospects of becoming credit worthyfor commercial bank lending for some time tocome (5).

CURRENT SOCIOPOLITICAL CLIMATEDespite severe economic problems, Bolivians

have enjoyed uninterrupted, democratic, civiliangovernment rule for the last 10 years. Amongststronger political candidates, a trend towardcoalition building and negotiations has emergedin response to the repeated need for run-offs inpast elections. Thus, Bolivia is governed mostrecently, by a coalition government comprisingthe centrist and conservative parties (Movimientode la Izquierda Revolucionaria and Acción De-mocratica Nacional, respectively) through anarrangement called the ‘‘Acuerdo Patriotic”(74).

Nevertheless, Bolivia holds the world recordfor most government turnovers via coup d’etat(76). The recent transition to democraticallyelected civilian rule was slow, and remainstenuous in spite of the smooth succession ofelections in the 1980s. Prolonged economicinstability has weakened government institutionslike the judiciary and law enforcement agencies,opening the way for corruption by narcoticsinterests. Moreover, there have been disturbingsigns of decay. At least half of the eligibleelectorate is turning away from participation atthe ballot box, perhaps due to disillusionmentwith the regressive impact of public policies.Some 80 percent of the population is below thepoverty line (74). And, although Bolivia has hada relatively strong human rights record since1982, there have been moments when the systemseems to revert back to military repression (143).

Even under democratic rule, the military con-tinues to wield influence and protect its relativeprivileges. One legacy of the most recent era ofmilitary rule, lasting from 1964 to 1977, is theoften drug-related corruption and fraud foundthroughout the armed forces. Repressive state


behavior, coupled with the military’s record ofpolitical intervention, suggests the potential forsubverting democracy via the ‘militarization’ ofU.S. counternarcotics policy in the Andes (74).

Some argue that the Bolivian political systemlacks the institutional ability to develop effectivelinks between public and private sectors, and thatparty activists and government officials divertscarce resources and benefits to themselves,friends, and associates (96). In addition, socialclass and ethnic discrimination place seriousconstraints on possibilities for broad-based socio-economic development (74,87).

Close to 50 percent of Bolivia’s populationcontinues to reside in rural areas, and to derivesignificant income and food from agriculture(87,1 13). The peasant sector is responsible for 70percent of Bolivia’s national agricultural produc-tion, despite adverse and discriminatory publicpolicies for marketing, credit, investment, trans-port, export, and rural education (87,103). Inexchange for providing cheap food, tax revenues,and a significant part of the labor for lowlandcommercial agriculture, construction, trade, andcommerce, peasant families receive poor hous-ing, negligible health services, meager educa-tional opportunities, rustic transport infrastruc-ture, and almost no effective state assistance forimproving their farm operations. Indigenous leaderVictor Hugo Cardenas called this structural ine-quality “internal colonialism” (74).

The social and political inequities in Boliviacreate inherent difficulties for state-led ruraldevelopment. For example, elite groups whoseinfluence often extends to banks, public officials,political parties, foreign aid support, and themedia, may monopolize public and private re-sources earmarked for agricultural production(60). Thus, in the inter-class competition betweenrural large- and smallholders for resources, therural elite tend to have the advantage irrespectiveof the apparent orientation of the national politi-cal regime (74).

An elite minority has also benefited disproportion-ately from public investments in rural infrastruc-

ture, agroindustry, technological improvements,and farm price subsidies (150). Figures for the1970s show that only 5 percent of the subsistencepeasant population had access to formal agricul-tural credit (63). A 1990 Ministry of Agricultureand Peasant Affairs report implied the peasantryhad access to only 4 percent of the formalinstitutional credit available for agricultural pro-duction (103).

BOLIVIA’S RURAL SINDICATOSThe rural peasant labor unions, or sindicatos

have waged the only serious challenge against theprevailing policy environment and entrenchednational and regional power structure. The sindi-catos were organized after the takeover andtransfer of lands following the 1952 agrarianreforms (1,49). Subsequently, they have func-tioned as community development organizationswith local, sub-regional (centrales), regional(federaciones), and national levels with officesand elected leaders (74).

The peasant sindicato movement has obligedthe government and international interests to takecoca-leaf growers concerns into account. Becausethey have been represented through the unionmovement, coca growers in Bolivia have repeat-edly rejected efforts to organize insurgences inthe Chapare. This situation contrasts sharply withthat of Peru’s Alto Huallaga coca-growing region,where violence is much more prevalent (74,109).

The implication of the contrast between Peruand Bolivia in this regard is, whether motivatedby neo-liberal economic ideology or concernsabout the political orientation of the sindicatomovement, efforts to repress the unions or findways around their participation in developmentplanning and implementation are badly mis-placed. They have been shown to be attuned to theneeds of coca producers and, indeed, they haveproposed alternative development programs (74).

It is misleading, however, to assume thatsindicatos are a completely sufficient substitutefor true political empowerment. Without locallyelected, controlled, and accountable central gov-


Bolivian sindicatos help organize rural communitiesand voice peasants’ political and economic concernsat local, regional, and national levels. This bannerfrom a Cochabarnba peasant federation depicts afarmer chained to a coca bush.

ernment institutions, the Bolivian peasant popula-tion will continue to be dependent on grassrootand nongoverment organizations for their politi-cal voice, and will remain locked out of thecentral government power structure (87). Oppor-tunities exist for including grassroots social andpolitical organizations in development projects(109). Such involvement likely would strengthenthe political and institutional influence of ruraldwellers and would further their efforts to securethe political and social justice, equality, andstability they need to overcome the historic,economic roots of involvement in the narcoticsindustry.

I PeruRecent migration to the Alto Huallaga is only

a chapter in a long history of economicallyinduced migrations by Peru’s rural peasants.Colonization of the Peruvian Amazon basinbegan in the 19th century, spumed by increasingrubber exploitation (105). Air transportation tojungle cities, and inland road construction weremajor contributing factors in the 20th century.Meanwhile, expansion of the hacienda systemconcentrated land ownership, consigning peas-ants to more marginal lands (9). The upper jungleareas of the Peruvian Andes, such as the AltoHuallaga, were almost exclusively the property ofdescendants of Spanish settlers, and not until latein the 20th century would social and demographictransformations push the peasant population intothese areas (105).

MIGRATION AND ALTO HUALLAGA SETTLEMENTThe economic need to migrate was caused

primarily by rapid population growth beginningin the 1940s. When a road through Huánuco,Tingo María, and Pucallpa was opened the samedecade, migration increased from the centralhighlands to the Huallaga area (109). Somecommercial estates, including large tea and coffeeplantations, were established in the Alto Hual-laga, and the central highland departments ofHuánuco and Junín became regular suppliers ofcheap, seasonal wage labor. Labor-force sizedepended on foreign exchange earnings: wheninternational prices rose, plantation managerscontracted a large number of wage earners; whenprices fell, they did not (24). In spite of these earlydevelopments, however, most rainforest areas onthe Andes’ eastern slopes would remain onlysparsely populated until the 1970s (105).

The combined effects of high populationgrowth rates throughout Peru, and long-standingpolitical and economic marginalization of thehighlands, also led to surges in urban migration.In the 1960s and 1970s, the highland populationincreased by 20 percent (from 5 to 6 million) and


the coastal population increased by 120 percent(from 3,859,000 to 8,513,000). Peruvian peasantfarmers, often dependent on outside income forsubsistence needs, migrated to the coast tosupplement income between growing and harvestseasons. It was in response to the unprecedentedburden on coastal city resources that the PeruvianGovernment introduced policies to redirect mi-gration to the less populous Eastern Andean range(105).

The military regime that took power in 1968(1968-75) restructured property ownership inmost economic and social sectors (100). It alsolaunched radical agrarian reforms, includingplanned settlement campaigns (25,37,98) andagricultural production cooperatives, some in-volving the country’s most productive land.Nevertheless, reform did not increase most of therural population’s standard of living substantiallyand, in not incorporating producers outside theboundaries of project areas, it excluded manymigrants (25). In the end, even more landless ruralresidents migrated to urban areas, and by 1972,45percent of Lima’s population consisted of mi-grants (105).

A 1973 study of agriculturalists settled in AltoHuallaga from upland areas in the Tingo Maria,Tocache, and Campanilla regions found that 42percent had migrated because of acute shortagesof land at home, whereas another 26 percent hadmoved because of the lack of work. Thus, 68percent of migrants to the region relocatedbecause they could not earn a living at home (40).However, expectations that frontier colonizationcould solve urban economic and social problemswere dashed by the lack of long-term funding,management and guidance, and rampant resourcedestruction (105). Funds were spent primarily onnonagricultural development, such as urbaniza-tion and service sector activity. Most migrantswere unfamiliar with the local ecology, appropri-ate crops, and farming methods, and were left to

The shortage of transport infrastructure in most ruralAndean and tropical forest regions mitigates in favorof low-tech, low-weight, high-value crops like coca,Local transport of goods still is largely by porters orbeasts of burden.

market expansion, or irrigation and farmingtechniques improvement.

Settlers were economically debilitated by un-derdevelopment and underproduction. The AltoHuallaga continued to be characterized by lowproductivity of food crops and minimal use ofmodern inputs such as fertilizers (109). Thisplaced farmers at a disadvantage relative to thosefrom other tropical valleys. New roads wereneeded, not to export a bounty of new agriculturalproducts to the rest of the country, but to importfood (105).

The profitability of legal crops declined through-out Peru in the 1970s. Agricultural trade wasincreasingly unfavorable, in part due to interna-

depend on advice of equally inexperienced au- tional lending policies (e.g., removal of subsidiesthorities (105). Finally, little money went into allowing markets to reflect real demand andaddressing key agricultural problems such as supply)(7). Most significantly, production input


costs for agricultural crops severely outweighedtheir market value. Government-instituted coop-eratives in the Alto Huallaga, such as the tea andcoffee plantations, began disbanding as partici-pants took up coca cultivation. The resulting laborshortage for legitimate agriculture further debili-tated the cooperatives and their regions, assuringtheir demise (109).

The democratic era succeeding the militaryregimes was based on a new constitution draftedby a constituent assembly popularly elected in1978. Illiterates (about 40 percent of the popula-tion in 1960) were granted voting rights for thefirst time in 1980. Unfortunately, the 1980s werealso marked by the inability of Peru’s leaders tocope with the international debt crisis, resulting inthe nation’s economy spiraling downward.

Under the democratic administration, frontiersettlement and tropical forest agricultural produc-tion continued to receive the most attention, to theneglect of resource distribution and agrariandevelopment in other regions of the country.6 Aconservative alliance in the Peruvian Congressblocked all reformist measures for the ruralhighlands proposed in the legislative chamber(109). Longstanding economic policies that didnot favor small farmers (e.g., subsidized foodimports, maintaining low urban food prices)continued, while the economic crises of 1981 and1983 increased disparities between agriculturalprices and input costs (127). Agricultural policiesin the last decade were oriented toward supplyingurban areas and have led to deteriorating terms oftrade (6). For example, overall production costsincreased 2.7 times more than agricultural pricesin the Alto Huallaga (10). It was also a period ofincreasing indebtedness.

Loans from the World Bank, InterAmericanDevelopment Bank, and the U.S. Agency forInternational Development (AID) financed roads

and provided credit for tenant farmers. However,while the government sought a road system thatwould open the maximum amount of land tosettlement (27,109), road construction was notaccompanied by economic measures or agricul-tural policies favoring small producers (142).Economic constraints continue to pose funda-mental obstacles to Peru’s agricultural develop-ment. Long-term economic investments in Peruremain extremely rare, and most come in the formof high interest loans. Without adequate andaccessible markets, legal agricultural productionis poorly rewarded, particularly in a coca-industryinflated economy. Local banks impose highinterest rates that can easily place farmers in debt,forcing them to sell their land and join the migrantlabor and squatter populations. Inability to investin production improvement (e.g., agrichemicals,irrigation) feeds the cycle of economic decline formost farmers of legal crops, further aggravatingtheir debtor status (105).

Economic Developments of the Late-1980s

Peru’s GDP per capita declined throughout the1980s, with an increasing number of Peruviansliving in absolute poverty. An unconventionaleconomic strategy was undertaken by the Peru-vian Government, between 1985 and 1990, toredistribute income to poorer segments of thepopulation. The Garcia Administration attemptedto implement recovery by expanding aggregatedemand, instituting price controls, increasing thebudget deficit, and deferring external debt serv-ice. Domestic supply was expected to expand,while consumption would be fueled by increasingreal wages, direct subsidy programs, temporaryemployment-generating public works in marginalareas, and transfer of disposable income from thepublic to the private sector. The latter wasexpected to be accomplished through tax reduc-

6 Resettlement of poor peasants in remote tropical areas of Third World countries often seems to be politically preferable to redistributionof existing agricultural lands. This is because such colonization programs do not threaten politically powerful landowners or other rural elites.It gives the false impression of a “positive sum game. ” To the exteng nevertheless, that the cleared tropical land ultimately cannot sustain thecolonist population this positive “sum” is a politicaI illusion (93).


tion and freezing public sector prices and tariffs,and deferring external debt payments. Use ofslack capacity would be guaranteed by closing thedomestic market to imported competing goods(88).

The experiment resulted in the most severeeconomic crisis ever experienced in Peruvianhistory (5). Peru began to accumulate debt arrearswith multilateral financial institutions, and in1989 its total external debt was about 104 percentof GDP (or $19,156 million) (88,90). The accruedinterest obligations on public foreign debt repre-sented about 8 percent of GDP, which was morethan tax revenues in 1989 (5.2 percent) (90).

Coca production expanded considerably amidworsening economic conditions in the 1980s. Infact, the coca economy softened the most pro-found economic and employment crisis in thenation’s republican history (109). Coca dollarsprovide hard currency to finance desperatelyneeded imports and as foreign exchange reserveshave been depleted major banks have adopted atolerant attitude toward coca dollars. The cocaeconomy continues to increase in direct propor-tion to the decline of the legal economy (90).

Current Macroeconomic TrendsThe Fujimori Administration (1990-) has

used various strategies to stabilize the Peruvianeconomy following the years of hyperinflation,real income declines, and budget deficit in-creases. New legislation has fostered privateinvestment in different economic sectors and thebasic economic agenda of the Fujimori Adminis-tration has been a return to orthodox economicmanagement and full participation in the worldfinancial community. A‘ ‘shock treatment’ stabi-lization program and several other policy meas-ures were launched to fulfill these goals, theimmediate objective being to stop inflation (5).Although hyperinflation indeed was halted, asecond result has been further, severe deteriora-tion of Peruvian standard of living (83). Theeconomic crisis has also taken a heavy social tollon Peru, sharpening perceptions of ethnic and

regional discrimination in an already dividednation, and weakening institutional performance.

When President Fujimori took office, at leasttwo-thirds of the foreign debt was in arrears (5).The stabilization programs and the various re-forms implemented to reorder the country’sfinancia1 situation allowed Peru to start servicingits debt to the multilateral organizations (83).During most of 1990-91, these payments were inthe range of U.S. $40 to $60 million a month(loo).

The Fujimori Administration slashed govern-ment expenditures to gain resources for debtpayments. For example, large government out-lays for subsidies were halted, freeing prices onfoods, medicine, and other staples. In early 1991,Fujimori’s finance minister launched a widerarray of free-market measures. These includedprivatization plans for about 30 state companies;the application of free-market rules to the re-formed sector of Peruvian agriculture; the adop-tion of a unified, floating exchange rate; thereduction of import tariffs to an average of 17percent; and the removal of most nontariff tradebarriers (100).

Fujimori’s stabilization program exacted aheavy toll on the majority of Peru’s alreadystruggling citizens, and no major social emer-gency programs to ameliorate the harmful eco-nomic and social consequences were applied.Social costs of “Fujishock,” as the program wascalled, included increases in the already signifi-cant numbers of citizens suffering from criticalpoverty (specified as a per capita income below$15.50/men@ and chronic malnourishment (36).

In light of Peru’s historically violent andunstable political situation, private investment inPeru has grown slowly (71,128). A Special SenateCommittee report estimated that losses of freedcapital and physical infrastructure related toviolence during the period 1980-88 totaled aboutU.S. $45 billion (67). Although investment hasnot stopped altogether, its focus has changed inways that are not conducive to strong economicdevelopment. Current investment projects con-

centrate on: 1) risk-averse activities, such as realestate investments, which have partly replacedinvestments in transportation equipment and in-dustrial machinery, and 2) new investments inmicro-level enterprises, or in small-scale informalsector operations, where overhead costs are low(68).

In practice, Fujimori’s economic policies arestill undermined by continuing poverty, politicalconcerns, and an uncertain business environment.Even the most adventurous entrepreneurs havehad good reason not to undertake productiveinvestment in Peru. Economic balance andgrowth simply may not be achievable in themedium term if the country’s political situationdoes not stabilize.

2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives

CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATEMuch of the Peruvian populace has been

skeptical as to the importance of counternarcoticsefforts relative to other domestic crises. In givingprecedence to domestic concerns other than thecoca industry, the Peruvian Government long hasabided with the public sentiment. In opinionpolls, the economy consistently is cited as thenumber one problem, and subversion historicallyhas been the second; drugs were cited as aprincipal problem by no more than 5 percent of a1990 Lima sample. Most Peruvians do notconsider the drug industry politically advanta-geous for Peru; however, while the majoritysupport the principle of fighting drugs, fewbelieve that Peru should assume major costs in theeffort. Those groups that would be affected mostby counternarcotics initiatives hold similar be-liefs (100).

Peru’s peasant coca producers naturally areleery of counternarcotics efforts. Many peasantleaders have criticized the Fujimori governmentfor failing to consult them on past bilateralcounternarcotics agreements, and for bypassingPeru’s regional governments, institutions in whichproducer organizations would have official par-ticipation (100). The coca producers contend thatthey have resorted to coca cultivation only

Peru’s security forces, like its civilians, are moreconcerned with chronic political and economic woesthan with the drug war. Often poorly paid, securitypersonnel in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia also areparticularly vulnerable to corruption by narcoticsdollars.

because no market exists for other crops, andrepeatedly stress that their existence is due todemand for cocaine by consuming countries.

Guerrilla movements have had an especiallystrong presence in Peru’s coca-producing areas,primarily the Alto Huallaga Valley. SenderoLuminoso historically has been active in thesouthern sector of the Valley, while the Movim-iento Revolucionario Túpac Arnuru (Tupac AmaruRevolutionary Movement, MRTA) has been vig-orous to the north. Sendero is said to havereceived an estimated $20 to $100 million annu-ally in fees (cupos) levied on peasant cocaproducers and drug traffickers (69). Both guerrillaorganizations remained powerful in these areasduring 1991, thus making on-the-ground counter-narcotics initiatives extremely hazardous (e.g., inrecent years, 10 workers on the AID/Alto Hual-laga Development Project have been killed)(100). No coca was eradicated in Peru in 1990 or1991, and U.S. and Peruvian efforts at alternativedevelopment were not initiated in 1991. Despitethe recent capture of numerous Sendero a n dMRTA leaders, the extensive war chest and

331-054 - 93 - 3


Box 2-B–The Fujimori Presidency and the April 1992 Coup

Peru’s political history is characterized by successions of constitutional and de facforegimes (alternating ruleabout every 5 to 12 years). Historians tell us, however, that the differences among past regimes are nominal; bothhave been dominated by oligarchical families whose primary concern was exclusion of competitors anddisadvantaged sectors from political and economic power. By his actions in April of 1992, Alberto Fujimori seemsto have futfilled a pattern prescribed by history. After more than a decade of democracy, which included hiselectionas president in 1990, Fujimori has instated a government of his own design.

The openness and competitiveness displayed sometimes in Peru’s political system were evident in the 1990election to the presidency of Fujimori, a political unknown until a mere 2 months before balloting. Despite winningthe presidency in good part through denouncement of the opposition’s proposed economic “shock treatme~”Fujimori immediately implemented what many analysts consider an equally draconian economic stabilizationprogram. Fujimori shifted toward a more radical program upon recognizing the need to restore good relations withthe international finandal community, whom his predecessor had alienated. To open negotiations with theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Wxld Bank Peru had to begin to repay its outstanding debt.

Fujimori’s economic reforms ended hyperinflation and renewed prospects for Peru’s economic recovery, butalso resulted in a severe recession. Given this trade-off, a key concern was the length of time Peruvians wouldgrant Fujimori to achieve economic revival. Critics believe he sought to ensure his government’s survival throughcourting the military, in particular the army, the service that traditionally launches coups in Peru. Upon hisinauguration, for example, Fujim” had named an active-duty army general as minister of the interior, and restoredarmy power over the national police. This military alliance was cemented when Fujimori took control of Peru, onApril 6,1992, by dissolving the Peruvian Congress and suspending the Constitution. His pledge to reinstate fulldemocracy after the constitutional reforms-to be arrived at some future date-was approved by popular vote.

Democratic leaders in this hemisphere, and elsewhere, decried the act as an aufoga’pe(self coup). Ensuingevents received extensive and negative coverage from the international media: arrests of opposition leaders andjournalists, resignations of key Cabinet members, censorship of radio and press reports, and placement of troopsthroughout Lima. The United States, Germany, Spain and, eventually Canada and Japan, suspended most aidto the Peruvian Government, and the Organization of American States (OAS) issued a stern statement ofdisapproval.

armaments believed to held by the Sendero widespread. Salaries in the Peruvian militaryLuminoso in particular, could continue to hamperdevelopment efforts in the Huallaga for years tocome.

For various reasons, Peru’s security forceshistorically have been unenthusiastic about coun-ternarcotics initiatives. Military officers arguethat such initiatives impede their more pressingcounterinsurgency demands. Many claim thatresentful coca-growers likely would side withinsurgents, as would the drug tmfllckers, thuscreating three enemies (100). Finally, in thecontext of dire fiscal conditions, tolerance of andparticipation in drug-related corruption have been

often are extremely low and, thus, drug money istempting. According to some estimates, the ma-jority of drug-trafficking flights depart hornofficial aiports. Not only have security forcesfailed to obstruct traffickers-in some cases theyactively have obstructed counternarcotics efforts.Military personnel have shot at helicopters onanti-drug missions, and some believe that govern-ment authorities were behind the assassination ofWalter Tocas, one of the few coca-growers’leaders to support the May 1991 Anti-NarcoticsAgreement (100).

———.

2—Factors Influencing Coca Reduction Initiatives 161

However, from the outset of his takeover, Fujimori argued the necessity. In misaddress to the Peruvian publicApril 5,1992, he claimed that thus far in his term as President, his efforts to revive the economy and to fight SenderuLurninoso and the drug trade had been repeatedly undermined by the courts and Peruvian Congress, and thatcorruption throughout the judiaal and political system was to blame. The poor performance of Fujimori’s Carnbio7990 party in the congressional elections had left him with Iittte party support in the Peruvian legislature. Thepresident was put at odds with the congressional representation from his primary opponents, the APRA and

FREDEMO parties, whom he blamed thereafter for policy deadlocks.

Although the future of democracy in Peru remains uncertain, the status of Fujimori’sgovernment has evolvedconsiderably. Initially, Fujimori would not set dates for presentation of political reforms to Peruvian voters, butincreasing international pressure prompted him to accelerate his schedule for the reinstitution of democracy.Instead of first holding a vote on public opinion of his rule by decree, he announced that a plebisate on creationof a constituent assembly would be held. The elected “Democratic Constituent Congress,” of which Fujimori’ssupporters now hold 43 of 80 seats, is tasked with reforming Peru’s now-defunct 1979 constitution.

Fujimori’s rapid restoration of some democratic processes has been attributed to concerns about theeconomic consequences of losing international approval. With much of the government’s economic assistanceinitially cut off, Peru’s ability to secure future ioans from the Wrld Bank, the IMF, or the Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank was questionable. Not only would this loss of support jeopardize Peru’s present and futureprograms for debt payme~ but would delay indefinitely Peru’s economic revival.

At any rate, the capture of Sendero leader Abimael Guzman in September 1992, the election of theconstituent assembly in November 1992, and continued support from Peru’s populace seem to have earnedFujimori tolerance from the international community. Despite concern amongst human rights officials that theleadership of Fujimori’s security forces will become abusive in their zeal to root wt Sendero corroborators (e.g.,since April 1992, disappearances and paramilitary actitity have increased), the OAS has reestablished relationswith the Fujimori government, as have the United States and other foreign countries.SOURCES: Adapted from C.J. Doherty, “Lawmakers Support Decision to Halt Funding for Peru,” Congress/ona/ C)uarter/y, 50(15)961,1992; “Peru and its Neighbors,” The I%mon@ 323~60):44, 1992; “Getting &vay with It” The Economk?? 323(7755):44, 1992;Federation of American Scientists (FAS), 77M Serrdem File (Washington, D.C.: FAS Fund’s Project for Peru, 1992); G. Gorritl, “MouseTrap,” The New Republic, 206(18):14-15, 1992; L. Hockstader, “Peruvian President Takes Case to OAS,” The Washh?gtorr Poet May 18,1992, p. A12; C. McClintock “Opportunities and Constrainta to Source Reduction of Coca: the Peruvian Sodopofitical Conte~” contractorreport prepared for the Office of Ttinology Assessme~ Aprfl 1992; Reuters News Service, ‘Troop Surround Congress and Lima,” ZheNew York firms, April 7,1992, p. Al; Reuters Newa Servke, “Peruvian President Schedules New Vote,” The Washington Posfj July 29,1992, p. A24; L. Robinson, “No Holds Barred,” US. News and 146ddl?eporfj 113(12):49-50, 1992.

CONCLUSION with similar urgency to the cocaine industry’sIn 1992, Peru experienced tremendous changes

in its social and political situation (see box 2-B).In April 1992, President Alberto Fujimori, withsupport of the army and police, suspended thePeruvian Constitution and disbanded the Con-gress in a “psuedo-coup.” Additionally, onSeptember 12, 1992, Peruvian Police captured theSendero Luminoso’s founder and leader AbimaelGuzman. With Guzman’s imprisonment, Fujimorimay succeed in ending what was believed to be anunstoppable campaign for control of Peru. Whetheror not the new Fujimori government will respond

equally threatening advance, remains to be seen.

9 ColombiaCoca leaf production and consumption in

Colombia has not been widespread. Historically,coca use was confined to traditional leaf chewing,mostly by Inca-descended peasants of the south-ern region, where it was produced 1egaUy until1947 (12). Coca production was banned follow-ing lengthy public debate about coca’s allegedlong-term negative health effects and the role itplayed in promoting exploitation of Indians by


landlords. Coca production was not a public issueagain until the late 1970s, when it reappeared insignificant quantities, only after development ofa cocaine manufacturing industry based on cocaleaf imported from Peru and Bolivia (129).

Now, however, Colombian criminal organiza-tions are involved in virtually every aspect of thenarcotics trade, from drug plantations and labora-tories in Colombia and other South Americancountries, to smuggling operations and distribu-tion networks at wholesale and street levels in theUnited States, Canada, and Europe. The entirespectrum of drug exports (marijuana, cocaine,quaaludes, opium) brings nearly U.S. $2.5 to $3billion a year in profits to Colombia; drugs nowrank along with coffee ($2 to $2.5 billion) as thecountry’s principle foreign exchange earner (18).The Medellin and Cali drug trafficking organiza-tions (“cartels”) control the bulk of the Andeanregion’s cocaine traffic. They have used theirwealth since the mid-1970s to organize privatemilitias, purchase sophisticated weapons, andbribe, intimidate, and terrorize the Colombianjustice and political systems. Their money, fire-power, and influence have enabled them toseriously impede the evolution of the Colombiangovernment’s counternarcotics program in thelast decade.

GROWTH OF THE ILLEGAL DRUG INDUSTRYDeveloping appropriate counternarcotics pol-

icy in Colombia requires an understanding of whycocaine manufacturing, and the illegal drugindustry in general, has developed there. Whilenot a completely sufficient explanation, an impor-tant factor behind Colombia’s “internationaladvantage” in the illegal narcotics industry is thatstate presence traditionally has been weak. TheColombian Government at times has been unableto control significant areas of the country orenforce its laws, and has been vulnerable tomanipulation by interest groups (129).

Like those of its Andean neighbors, Colom-bia’s history is fraught with social and politicalinequality and instability. Agrarian reform failed

in the early 1970s, largely due to the undermininginfluence of powerful landed and agro-exportinterests. Urban reform failed because of theintense opposition of real estate, urban construc-tion, and financial interests. The upper ranks ofthe educational system remained essentiallyclosed and elitist despite repeated “reforms”during the 1960s and 1970s. As land, capital, andcredit became more concentrated, and the gapbetween the rich and poor grew larger, so did thegap between written laws and socially acceptablebehavior (17).

Outward signs of Colombia’s weakening statewere numerous, evidenced by the growing infor-mal economy, and widespread predatory eco-nomic behavior and violence. As its economygrew more complex and segmented, the Colom-bian state took up an increasing number offunctions that it performed less and less effec-tively. Many laws were disregarded, governmentbureaucracies became inefficient and increas-ingly unaccountable and unresponsive to thecitizenry, and private and public sector corruptiongrew. As the underground economy expanded,the legitimacy of the regime declined. Drug-related violence and corruption have further

ed the integrity of already weak institu-undermintions such as the court system, the police, thecustoms service, and the military (129).

CURRENT ECONOMIC CLIMATEThe Colombian Government has maintained a

resilient and stable economy despite numerousdifficulties. Urbanization and income diversifica-tion have increased. Colombia did not borrowheavily during the 1970s and, thus, avoided thedebt crises that plagued the rest of Latin America(129). With annual GDP growth averaging 3.3percent from 1981 to 1991, Colombia was alsothe only country in the region that did not have ayear of declining GDP during the 1980s (148).Inflation climbed to 28 percent in 1988 (up from20 percent in 1984), but dropped to 26 percent in1990 (47).


Despite positive growth overall, social indica-tors point to a continuing problem of poverty andlack of opportunity for a large part of thepopulation (47). Colombia’s economy is charac-terized by a high concentration of income andwealth, associated primarily with political privi-lege and power, and foreign sector booms.Neither innovative entrepreneurship nor accumu-lation of savings are associated with most privatewealth, and property rights are weak (131).

THE COLOMBIAN COCAINE ECONOMYDrug money’s presence and corrupting influ-

ence reverberates through the Colombian econ-omy. To estimate the economic impact of thecocaine industry on Colombia and the possibili-ties for substitution, it is necessary first todetermine the order of magnitude of the industry.This requires estimation of domestic consump-tion and prices, prices of the imported coca pasteand chemical products needed to refine cocaine,wholesale export prices, the amounts of theproduct which are lost to interdiction, and otherrelated factors. The estimation of the ColombianGDP generated by the industry is even morecomplex because it requires information aboutvalue added, and about the income generatedoutside the country by the Colombian illegalenterprises. While the data to make these esti-mates can be found, a consensus exists amongstAndean and U.S. experts that they are oftenextremely weak and inaccurate (129).

Cocaine Economy Data

Although estimates of the size of the cocaineeconomy vary widely, some trends are apparent.The U.S. wholesale price of cocaine is declining,and the amount produced is increasing. This trendpersisted in spite of interdiction and eradicationefforts undertaken during the 1980s. In the early

1980s the price of cocaine was high relative torisks involved in the business, so that the incen-tives to increase output were strong even as pricesdeclined. In this sense, the cocaine output expan-sion of the 1980s was demand driven (129).

The estimated value of cocaine exports, rangebetween approximately U.S. $1.2 billion to $5billion depending on the year or source of theestimate. Since Colombian official non-factorservice exports fluctuated between the U.S. $4 to$5 billion range, cocaine exports were obviously“large” relative to legitimate exports. However,this does not necessarily mean that the cocainerevenues are brought back to the Colombianeconomy, and it does not measure the impact ofthe cocaine industry on the economy (129).Rather, cocaine revenue commonly is investedoutside of Colombia, enters the black market, oris invested in domestic ventures that provide littlebenefit to the Colombian people (66).

Consequences of Drug Industry GrowthWhile the cocaine industry’s impact on Colom-

bia’s formal economy cannot be measured accu-rately, the cocaine industry has had a negativeimpact on the country's welfare, as well as on itseconomic growth (129).7

First, the cocaine boom of the 1980s has madeit increasingly difficult to maintain macroeco-nomic stability. The drug industry acted as acatalyst to growth of the underground economy,which has become relatively large and impossibleto track (132). As the government loses informa-tion about real exports and imports, capital flows,and investment, the planning and implementationof economic policies becomes formidable (129).

Second, Colombia’s growth record was sign&cantly better in the pre-cocaine era than it is in thepost-cocaine era. Investment has been distorted asnarcotics businessmen choose investments that

7 Colombia may have escaped the debt crisis because of the revenues from cocaine exports. However, the history of the rest of Latin Americashows that no relationship exists between a primary resource export boom and the ability to avoid a foreign sector crisis. For instance, all thecountries of the region that experienced the oil boom during the 1970s also experienced a debt crisis in the 1980s, in spite of the fact that theoil boom was larger relative to the size of their economies tban the illegal drug boom experienced by Colombia during the same period (129).


can be used to launder capital and that have a fastturnover, over those that can produce high,long-term yields (132). The increased violencethat accompanies the drug industry also imposesa burden on the rest of the economy as securityexpenses increase in other business activities,lowering their overall productivity.

Third, the large size of the drug industry hasproduced a struggle for the control of the country,between old monied elite and the newly emergingdrug capitalists. Many elite, though attracted bythe capital and foreign exchange that drugsgenerate, nevertheless do not accept drug busi-nessmen as peers (11,124). This conflict also hasbeen at the core of drug-related violence, and isreflected in government policies that have beenpredominantly reactive-responding to either ex-ternal forces (U.S. pressure) or to the assassina-tion of national political figures by the druggroups (129).

Fourth, direct employment in coca growingand cocaine production has been unimportantrelative to the size of the labor force of the countryand, thus, employment is not among the mainimpacts studied. Instead, most employment gen-erated is believed to be in the “security” branch(e.g., bodyguards, paid assassins, paramilitary),which if anything, has a negative contribution toGDP (129).

Real Estate Construction andRural Land Investment

Two areas of the domestic economy heavilyinfiltrated by narcotics investors are real estateand construction. Few sources of nonhousingmortgage funds exist in Colombia; therefore, asubstantial proportion of commercial and indus-trial construction is financed by the informalcapital market, short-term bank loans, or personalresources. In recent years, particularly from 1985on, the amount of new construction financed bymortgage institutions, and the amount of newconstruction measured by the amount of area forwhich building permits were issued have deviatedmarkedly. In the absence of formal funding, much

The climate for foreign and domestic investment inColombia is severely undermined by drug- and guerilla-related violence. The personnel and property ofimportant state and private industries increasinglyhave been targets of political terrorism.

of the new construction in Colombia is attributedto narcotics businessmen, whose investments areestimated at approximately $1 billion a year (65).

Narcotics businessmen have invested heavilyin urban real estate and construction and realestate and cattle holdings in certain rural areas ofColombia, particularly in the middle Magdalenavalley, the Urabá area in Antioquia and theneighboring Córdoba department, and in theeastern piedmont and prairies. These regions havebeen settled recently, and frequently have landproperty rights that are still in question (119).Furthermore, they were regions of significantguerrilla activity before narcotics investors movedin (123). Narcotics investors have appropriatedtheir own dairy and cattle plantations, as well asprivate paramilitary security forces which com-pete with local guerrilla forces for the rights to“protect” area estates (131).

———


The involvement of narcotics businessmen inthese regions has had a technologically moderniz-ing but socially backward effect (129). Theirresources have allowed them to increase thecapital intensity of production processes, andintroduce new technologies for increasing pro-ductivity in beef and dairy. Simultaneously, theparamilitary groups have discouraged politicalparticipation among local peasants. Violent landcounter-reform has led to increased land concen-tration, even in areas chosen for official landreform programs. Ironically, rural wages haveincreased in those areas, perhaps as a result of thehigher productivity, and the emigration of ruralworkers pressed by the increased violence (123).

INCREASING NARCOTICS-RELATEDVIOLENCE IN THE 1980s

The narcotics trafficking organizations broughturban and rural violence in Colombia to newheights in the late 1970s and throughout the1980s, in the form of brutal assaults on the state,guerrilla action, and conflicts between rival drugorg anizations. Authorities responded with stepped-up military and police repression, which oftenserved only to intensify the country’s spirallingviolence, multiply human rights abuses, andthreaten further the stability of Colombia’s demo-cratic regime. In the ensuing cycles of govern-ment crack-downs, narcotics-related terrorist re-taliations, and uneasy truces, Colombian leader-ship repeatedly nurtured and then abdicated theircountry’s role as the frontline in Washington’s‘‘war’ on drugs.

Included in the U.S.-supported counternar-cotics effort, along with militarization and eradi-cation (see Chapter 3), was a bilateral treaty forextradition of nationals directly between Colom-bia and the United States. The rationale was thatsuch a treaty would deter drug lords, reducenarcotics trafficking, improve bilateraI relations,and alleviate the Colombian legal process fromthe burden of mounting drug-related offenses.Implicit in the agreement, however, was the U.S.Government’s lack of confidence in the Colom-

bian justice system. Nevertheless, the Treaty ofExtradition was sanctioned in Colombia in No-vember 1980, and ratified by the United States inlate 1981 (17).

When the Betancur Administration took officein 1982, it refused to honor the extradition treaty,preferring to try Colombian traffickers in Colom-bian courts (41). Nevertheless, when successfulpolice interdiction efforts against the Medellin“cartel’ prompted the assassination of Betan-cur’s Justice Minister in April 1984, the Presidentsigned an extradition order for Medellin leader,Carlos Lehder (17).

Betancur further invoked state-of-siege powersin 1984, announcing a ‘‘war without quarter,’which led to an unprecedented number of arrests,raids, and seizures. The success of these prelimi-nary efforts, however, seemed to confirm U.S.Government officials’ suspicions that Colombianauthorities had more information about drugsmugglers’ operations than they routinely actedupon (17). Major “cartel’ figures avoided thecrackdown by fleeing Colombia. Several subse-quently offered to negotiate a truce with theColombian Government, conditional upon theirexemption from extradition. Rather than bargain,President Betancur escalated the war. With U.S.Government backing, the Colombian Govern-ment extradited 10 Colombians, stepped uperadication programs, and seized more illegaldrugs than all previous administrations combined(41).

The campaign was costly, however, for contin-uing violence between 1981 and 1986, resulted inthe murder of more than 50 Colombian judges. Itis widely believed in Colombia that the Medellin“cartel” paid guerrillas to seize the Palace ofJustice in November 1985. The struggle ended inthe deaths of 17 Colombian Supreme Courtjustices, all the guerrillas involved, and numerousmilitary and police personnel (41).

Not long after President Barco took office, in1986, a massive wave of army and police raidsyielded almost 800 arrests, including three traf-fickers targeted for extradition. In February 1987,


the government captured and extradited Medellinkingpin Carlos Lehder. Despite the fanfare sur-rounding Ledher’s capture and extradition, theflow of cocaine from Colombia and the wave ofdrug-related violence in the country were notstemmed. Furthermore, during the same period,eight of nine Colombian guerrilla groups brokethe truces they had negotiated with the precedingadministration, and, thus, began a new cycle ofviolent retaliation from the guerrilla and drugorganizations (17,41).

The “cartels” mounted an all-out war againstextradition, in which they aimed at governmentofficials and judges, in particular. After Medellinassassins killed the Colombian Attorney General,in 1988, the Colombian President institutedstate-of-siege measures, built up police forces,and appointed 5,000 new judges and assistants.More violence followed, including the assassina-tion, in 1989, of Liberal politician and 1990presidential candidate Senator Carlos Galán. Be-tween August 1989 and January 1990,263 bombswere set off throughout Colombia, killing 209people, and in late 1989 and early 1990, theMedellin ‘‘cartel” began a kidnapping campaignaimed at the Colombian elite. Most of the 420police deaths in 1991 were related to counternar-cotics efforts or narcotics-related terrorism (17).

These nationwide terrorist attacks made appar-ent the narcotics traffickers’ ability to disruptnormal life throughout the country. In mid-December, members of the Colombian Congressattached a proposal for a national referendum onextradition to the Barco Administration’s consti-tutional reform bill. President Barco ultimatelywithdrew the constitutional reform package alto-gether, but continued to face pressure to end theviolence through talks with drug ‘‘cartel’ mem-bers. Barco denied involvement in any suchnegotiations and, in January 1990, ordered theextradition of another Colombian trafficker. How-ever, after January 1990, extradition efforts werereduced, and narcotics-related terrorism subsidednoticeably (17).

Colombia’s public infrastructure serves a greaterportion of its population than does Peru’s or Bolivia ’s.Recently, however, these services have beenthreatened by mismanagement and neglect: drought-induced electricity shortages in 1992 wreaked havocthroughout Colombia and heightened politicaltensions.

The extradition policy dilemma faced in the1980s is illustrative of two distinct facets com-prising Colombia’s narcotics problem: domesticviolence and terrorism on the one hand, andinternational trafficking on the other. The securityof the Colombian state most directly is threatenedby narcotics-related terrorism, not drug trafficki-ng (17). Barco’s forceful reaction to the wave ofviolence that led to the murder of Senator Galánwas motivated by the need to defend state securityfrom a clear and present danger. Narcotics-relatedterrorism was viewed as an urgent Colombianproblem that required an immediate response bythe government. The international narcotics busi-ness, in contrast, was seen as a broader and morecomplicated problem that could not be solvedquickly nor unilaterally by Colombian authoritiesand policy actions (17). Under the current admin-


istration a new constitution, ratified in 1991,again halted extraditions.

CURRENT POLITICAL CLIMATEStrengthening and redefining the role of the

state in Colombian society is a prerequisite forsuccess of any narcotics-control policy. Onesignificant step begun by the previous administrat-ion (Barco 1986-1990) and continued by thecurrent one, was the institution of constitutionalreform, which included strengthening the judici-ary system and reforming the legal system. TheGaviria Administration also focused its efforts onaccelerating the opening of the economy toforeign trade and investment, and broadening thepolitical legitimacy and popular support of thestate. In August 1991, the maximum tariff formost imports was reduced to 23 percent. On manyother items, tariffs were reduced to zero, severelyundermining g Colombia’s once thriving contra-band trade (17).

However, the economic aperatura (opening)has not been problem-free: interest rates havestayed high and the process has encouraged there-entry of drug money. Another tax reform,granting amnesty to those who had illegallyacquired assets and who had income abroad, wasimplemented in late 1991, to complement theelimination of the exchange control system (129).Foreign exchange reserves in 1991 alone grew byalmost U.S. $2 billion, of which 60 percent isbelieved to be drug money (17).

Since the Gaviria Administration took office inAugust 1990, the dynamics of the drug problemin Colombia once more have come full circle. Fora time, the narcotics-related terrorism of the late1980s subsided, and many major figures of theMedellin “cartel” were in jail. Of the country’sprinciple guerrilla groups, all but two had negoti-ated peace treaties with the government and wereactively engaged in legal political activities.However, in mid-1992, widespread guerrilla andnarcotics-related violence resumed. To the cha-grin of the Colombian government, their mostprominent state prisoner, Medellin drug leader

Pablo Escobar, escaped. Terrorist attacks in ruraland urban areas by Colombian guerrilla groupshad been on the rise, and Escobar’s escapecoincided with a resurgence of narcotics-relatedterrorism. In November, 1992, the ColombianGovernment instituted a W-day state of emer-gency (55).

CONCLUSIONThe Colombian President proposed steps at the

Cartagena II Drug Summit, held in San Antonioin early 1992, to improve international coopera-tion to halt the flow of precursor chemicals forcocaine processing, control arms trafficking, curbinternational money laundering of drug profits,and improve judicial and law enforcement coop-eration in the area of counternarcotics intelligencegathering and evidence sharing. Additionally, theColombian Government has made efforts to de-mocratize, and in general, to promote an economyin which profits are not associated with privilegeand predatory capitalism. Unfortunately, reformsof this nature bear fruits in the medium and longterm, and face many obstacles in the short run. Asin Bolivia, entrenched economic and politicalgroups that benefit from the current conditionswill oppose any significant changes. Cooperationin foreign trade, economic assistance, and severaltypes of technical assistance are needed (17).

Many Colombians believe that the influence ofColombia’s drug “cartels” has continued tospread through the economic and political sys-tems; and recent events like Escobar’s escapesuggest that drug trafficking activities continuelargely unchecked in Colombia. When theseproblems are set in the context of Colombia’sreduced economic growth, trend toward decliningeconomic productivity, continuing widespreadrural poverty, and infrastructural bottlenecks tothe expansion of legal export agriculture, it isclear the Colombian Government and citizensface serious threats to social and political stabilityin the 1990s. Colombia remains one of the mostviolent countries in the hemisphere (e.g., murderis the leading cause of death in males aged 15 to


44, and overall second leading cause for allColombians) and there has been no overallreduction in the number of Colombians killed inpolitical and criminal violence (17,18).

Finally, the illegal drug industry in Colombiahas continued to diversify. Although illegal drugcultivation in Colombia is not an especiallyprofitable business, social and political factors,not economic imperatives, constitute the mainimpediments to the implementation of government-sponsored alternative development strategies. Theconditions in some areas, such as the impover-ished and badly neglected Southern Cauca re-gions, where marijuana is grown, add increasingurgency to the search for alternative developmentoptions for Colombia’s rural poor.

Until viable economic alternatives are createdfor the poorer peasantry in rural areas, cocacultivation and, now, the opium poppy trade arelikely to spread, bringing with them increasinglevels of violence and corruption. Furthermore,most of the opium fields are believed to be inareas under the influence of the guerrillas groupswith which the government has yet to negotiatepeace. Partly because of the growing heroinindustry, many observers doubt that peace talkswill be successful soon. Even if a peace treaty isnegotiated, a high risk exists that many factions ofthe two rebel groups could continue fighting asbandits or terrorists, using funds derived fromtheir links in the heroin trade (17).

THE COCA ECONOMYNowhere, perhaps, is the social and economic

importance of the coca industry more significantthan at the local supply, or micro-level. Small-scale coca growers and coca-leaf processors andtraffickers are the trade’s principal dependents.Predictably, they remain at the bottom of theillegal industry’s pay scale, and they are the leastwell represented actors in supply reduction ef-

forts. Many international narcotics policymakerssuggest that if the monetary value of coca couldbe sufficiently diminished, coca growers wouldvoluntarily leave the coca trade for alternativecrops (135). This overlooks many, less-directcircumstances that are promoting and perpetuat-ing coca cultivation. The size and impor-tance of the coca economy among small-scale in-dustry-related producers, processors, and trans-porters clearly determine opportunities and con-straints to source reduction at the microeconomiclevel.

# Difficulties Establishing theSize of the Coca Economy

Gathering agricultural data for any crop in theAndean region is difficult for a variety of reasons,including: 1) diversified geography and topogra-phy, 2) variation in types of agricultural units,agricultural farming systems, and productivitylevels, 3) wide dispersion of agricultural units,and 4) inadequate funding and personnel todevelop official agricultural data. The remotenature of production regions, their inaccessibility,and dangerous trafficker or guerrilla presencefurther compound data gathering problems (5).

Establishing annual coca industry price esti-mates is hampered by frequent market priceadjustments at the macro-economic level, andbecause the coca industry is so segmented, pricevariation often can be traced to a regional level aswell. Variation may depend on a industry partici-pants’ “business connections.” For example,growers, processors, or transporters from uncon-nected or unestablished regions likely will re-ceive lower prices.8 Thus, to arrive at a reasonablyaccurate price estimate, researchers would berequired first to pool the prices posted frominnumerable markets, and then to adjust theseprices relative to the size of each particular marketsegment (131).

s An example of region- ar4 even, individual-spezific price variation found in Perw results from Sendero Lti”noso’s use of quotas. meSendero charges quotas from transporters and peasant growem according to various criteria. The quotas in Sendero<ontrolled regions, havea direct adverse impact on the incomes of local producers, as well as an adverse, albeit indirect impact on load market prices (15).


Estimates of the size of the coca economy alsovary with different assumptions regarding yield,geographical scope, number of hectares involved,different prices at different stages and, in particu-lar, overall inaccurate knowledge about the un-derground “industry.” This latter factor forcesanalysts to make arbitrary assumptions whichmay or may not reflect the changing reality of thecocaine industry (5). Researchers have laboredsince the early 1980s to calculate and report thesize of the population employed and/or estimatethe value of coca earnings by participants in thevarious stages of its cultivation and transforma-tion. These numbers vary over years and acrosssurveys. It is enormously difficult to collectaccurate information for such figures.

1 Importance of Coca Production atthe Macroeconomic Level

A former Finance Minister of Bolivia statedthat if the narcotics industry were to disappearovernight, the result would be rampant violenceand unemployment. Indeed, as a relatively stablesource of income and employment, the cocaineindustry has cushioned the blow of poverty formany in the Andes. The cocaine industry pro-vided work for between 750,000 and 1.1 millionpeople in Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia accordingto some 1988 employment estimates (58).

The cocaine industry comprises a large assort-ment of workers, who have assumed a variety ofoccupational and socio-economic niches. Thethree principal categories of the locally employedare:

●

●

Those involved in coca cultivation, whetheras plantation and land owners, farmers andtheir families, migrant laborers, or fertilizerand pesticide merchants;Those involved in coca paste and cocaineprocessing, such as laboratory owners, theirhired “chemists,” pit laborers, and armedguards, and those who trade in leaf-processing and paste-processing materialsand chemical ingredients;

Table 2-8-Percentage of the Mid-1990 WholesaleValue of a Kilogram of Cocaine Received

at Successive Stages of Activity

Stage Bolivia Colombia Peru

Coca leaf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43%0NAa

1.80%Coca paste . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.12 NA 2.01Cocaine base . . . . . . . . . . 3.29 3.29 2.53Cocaine hydrochloride .. .10.70 5.80 19.50

Miami wholesale levelcocaine hydrochloride{U.S. $20,500/kg) . . . . . . . 100% 1 00% 100%

a Colombian organizations or cooperative ventures process cocaleaves directly into cocaine base. Leaves are not usually soldseparately.

SOURCE: Adapted from U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforce-ment Administration, “From the Source to the Street: Mid-1990 Pricesfor Cannabis, Cocaine, and Heroin--Special Report,” IntelligenceTrends (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1990).

● Participants in the transport of coca, process-ing ingredients, and paste and cocaine,including local manufacturers, suppliers,traders, and haulers, international dealersand associated transport vehicle and smallaircraft owners and operators, airfield secu-rity guards, bribed government abettors, anddirectly and indirectly employed legal andfinancial advisers (75).

No more than 1 or 2 percent of the fina1 cocarevenue is enjoyed by coca growers. Instead,coca-product prices increase substantially at eachmarketing stage, with value added more so for therisk involved than for actual processing or trans-portation costs (131). In producing the smallestproportion of raw coca, but refining and transport-ing the highest proportion of cocaine bound forthe United States and elsewhere, Colombianshistorically have obtained the lion’s share of theillegal drug profits (table 2-8) (129).

Some trafficker networks establish close tieswith coca growers in specific regions, and providethem with seeds, tools, suppliers’ credits, andother forms of assistance that obligate the farmersto sell their crops exclusively to the traffickerssponsoring them. The traffickers use these patron-client relations to wield considerable social and


political control in some coca-growing regions.Like the insurgent groups with whom they maycompete in Colombia and Peru, traffickers areable to limit the state’s ability to execute alterna-tive development projects in coca growing areas.The traffickers have brought jobs and higherincome to otherwise impoverished zones of someColombian and Peruvian rural communities long-neglected by the government. As a result, traffick-ers in some of these areas commonly are shelteredand protected from police and other authorities(17).

SIZE OF THE COCA-COCAINE INDUSTRYConservative employment estimates in early

1990 for Peru’s illegal coca industry (based on asurvey of 60,000 families) suggested that 200,000people, or 3 percent of the total population ofPeru, may be directly employed by coca activities(50). The figure would be higher if indirectemployment were considered (6). In Bolivia, anestimated 120,000 people labored in the drugindustry in 1990, or about 1.7 percent of the totalpopulation (50). However, a wide range ofestimates are available concerning most aspectsof the coca economy’s size and value (table 2-9).Given Peru’s and Bolivia’s cocaine industryemployment estimates, the number of Colom-bian’s employed is negligible, an arbitrary esti-mate being about 50,000, or no more than 0.2percent of Colombia’s total population (130).Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of State esti-mates suggest that there were 40,100 hectares ofcoca in Colombia in 1990; this represents 18.8percent of the total area cultivated in the Andeancountries. Colombia produces about 13.7 percentof the coca leaf volume, a share that has beenincreasing continuously during the last decade(129).

EARNINGS AT THE MICRO-ECONOMIC LEVELAlthough information on coca farmers’ earn-

ings are scattered and commonly anecdotal, thecontrasts between annual income from illegalcoca production and any other source of income

Table 2-9--Range of Estimates of the Importance ofCoca in Bolivia (1989) and Peru (1988)

Bolivia Peru

Coca production value(millions $U.S.) . . . . . . . . . 313-2,300 869-3,000Coca exports(millions $U.S.) . . . . . . . . . 132-850 688-2,100Total income(millions $U.S.) . . . . . . . . . 246-442 743-1,200Total employment(thousands) . . . . . . . . . . . . 207-463 145-700Area of coca production(hectares) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35,000-55,400 115,530-166,500

Share of coca economy relative to legitimate’ (percent)

GDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-19% 2-11%Exports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-98 14-78External debt ., . . . . . . . . 7-25 3-18

a For Bolivia: totals for 1989 were GDP, U. S.$4,494 million; exports,U. S.$868 million (includes goods and services); and total externaldebt, U. S.$3,420.2 million. For Peru: totals for 1988 were GDP, U.S.$28,200 million; exports, U.S.$16,494 million; and external debt,U. S.$2,691 million.

SOURCES: Adapted from E. Alvarez, “Opportunities and Constraintsto Reduce Coca Production: The Macroeconomic Context in Boliviaand Peru,” contractor report prepared for the Office of TechnologyAssessment, March 1992; R. Henkel, “The Cocaine Problem,” BoliviaAfter Hyper Inflation: The Restructuring of the Bolivian Economy(Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University, Canter for Latin AmericanStudies, 1990); R. Henkel, “Coca Cultivation, Cocaine Production, andPeasants in Bolivia,” presented at the annual meeting of the Associa-tion of American Anthropologist, Washington, DC, November 1989;U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters,International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Washington, DC: U.S.Department of State, 1991).

are marked. AID estimated in 1989 that $375million in coca profits went to small-scale culti-vators, paste producers, and wage laborers, whereaslegal crops brought in no more than $50 million(89). U.S. Government sources report that coca-leaf prices remained fairly stable, at an average of

$3 to $4/kilogram, throughout the 1980s (89).While an average Bolivian worker’s income wasapproximately U.S. $600 a year, a Chapare cocafarmer’s earnings were up to U.S. $5,500 a year(28).

The earning opportunities for migrant and daylaborers are also impressive. For example, in Perumigrant farmers were earning U.S. $16 a daypicking coca, whereas rice field laborers collectedonly $3 a day (133). Similar disparities also occur

—


in urban wages. For instance, in 1986, a seasonalcoca plantation worker in Monson or Uchiza,Peru, might earn a daily minimum wage of U.S.$2 or $3, respectively, in addition to room andboard. These wages were significantly higherthan the U.S.$1.60 daily minimum wage paid tothe unskilled industrial laborers in Lima (106).Figures in 1989 were reported as follows: daylaborers could expect about U.S. $12 a day

($3,600/year); and cultivators/owners a gross ofU.S. $3900/hectare a year. On average, cocalaborers could earn from 2.5 to 8 times more thanother laborers; and coca farmers and coca fieldowners, from 3 to 11 times more than their lawabiding counterparts (89). Although coca produc-tion employs a predominantly unskilled class oflaborers, they may receive 20 times more thanpublic employees, and 3 to 5 times what theywould earn in their home departments (50).

Information on wages is sketchier for small-time participants in other sectors of the coca andcoca-product industry. Nevertheless, the follow-ing breakdown of the highly lucrative kerosenetrade in Bolivia illustrates the increase of value asit enters the black market. In 1985, a 5-liter dailyration of kerosene was routinely resold on theblack market for about 20 times its original value.In the Chapare, its black market price could againdouble or triple (75). Meanwhile, the salary forpaste transport was usually U.S. $2.00 per arroba(approximately 11 1/2 kilograms), resulting in anaverage day’s earnings of about U.S. $8, anamount 500 percent greater than the average$1.60 minimum wage for a Lima laborer (106).

CONCLUSIONAs sociocultural, political, and economic cir-

cumstances in the Andean region suggest, differ-ing U.S. and Andean interests that have longhindered cooperation on the drug front are notlikely to be resolved soon. Bilateral cooperationon anti-drug policies is hinged less on straight-forward agreement than on rhetoric, tension, andprotracted negotiation (100).

Coca generates high incomes because it isillegal, (i.e., the market has to pay a premium tothe producers involved for the risk associatedwith it). Coca-leaf products, in addition, are highvalue/low volume commodities that cover hightransportation costs particularly where transpor-tation is primitive. Legal crops cannot commanda comparable premium under these conditions.Thus, coca has been incorporated as part of aportfolio of crops, in which it is the chief cashcrop (5).

Because of the coca economy’s size, it may notbe realistic to believe that alternative crops will beenough to substitute for coca in the short or eventhe medium run. Coca remains the best alternativefor many farmers and, if its price declines,growers always have the option of simply leavingthe leaves on the bush until the price improves.Interdiction activities have helped lower the priceof coca in the past, but without adequate demandcontrol, industry participants are assured thathigher prices eventually will return (4).

Other important considerations for long-termcoca substitution include:

●

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Creating secure economic opportunities—Growers already obtain the smallest piece ofthe cocaine industry pie. While artificiallycreated coca-price declines such as thosecreated by interdiction activities cause somegrowers to find other sources of income tooffset their losses (coca paste and baseprocessing, in some cases), they do notprovide long term solutions. The need todiversify agricultural activity is recognizedby growers (5). Crop substitution and alter-native development may not have to replacecoca income on a dollar-for-dollar basis, ifthey create a safer and more stable social andeconomic environment.Diminishing comparative advantage—TheBolivian, or Huánuco, variety of coca has ahigh cocaine alkaloid content and growssuccessfully in the Chapare and Alto Hual-laga. However, features that further contrib-


In a seemingly timeless tradition, young, unemployedmen migrate to the Bolivian Chapare to find work inthe coca trade.

●

ute to the ‘‘comparative advantage’ ofproducing coca in these areas are twofold: 1)their ecological conditions, and 2) theirremoteness. The latter, creates difficultiesfirst for policing illegal activity and secondfor profitability of other livelihoods. Al-though it would be undeniably useful to drugtraffickers, developing and improving trans-portation infrastructure in the Chapare andAlto Huallaga areas would, in particular,improve the profit potential of alternativecrops and resources vis-á-vis coca by facili-tating their internal and external movementand marketability.Reinforcing the role of the state—In general,strengthening the state’s presence and role inproducing public goods and services wouldcontribute to alternative development. Thereare a number of things the Andean countriescan do to increase the standard of living ofagricultural producers that the coca industrydoes not. The national government, throughhelp from the international community, could

●

provide potable water, access to basic healthcare, electricity, and better schools. Theseare basic preconditions for almost any typeof successful economic development.Fostering equity and political stability--Alternative development strategies that tar-get populations at the bottom of the scale ofincome distribution need to be applied to theagricultural sectors of Bolivia, Peru, andColombia. The neglected rural peasant pop-ulations long have been a major target groupfor the guerrilla organizations’ membershipexpansion, as well as being primary illegaldrug cultivators. Increased stability in theAndean states likely will require improvem-ents in the standard of living of ruralpopulations.

The U.S. and Andean Governments havediffered with respect to the correct ratio of“sticks” (repression of drug production andtrafficking) to “carrots’ (economic support anddevelopment assistance). Drug policymakers acrossthe board have thus far been unable to fashion arealistic, consensus-based, multilateral, long-term approach to address demand and supplysides of the drug equation effectively. Althoughdifficult, no other approach is likely to offeranything but temporary and partial victories onspecific battle fronts in an overall failing effort.Profound changes are probably needed in theeconomic and social structure and public policyof the United States and Latin America, yet thesechanges are unlikely to be achieved quickly andcheaply, and certainly not by law enforcementand military tactics alone (17).


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harnton, NY: Institute for Development Anthro-pology, 1991).

112. Plowman, T., “CocaChewing and the BotanicalOrigins of Coca (Erylhroxykn ssp.) in SouthAmerica,” D. Pacini and C. Franquemont (eds.),Coca and Cocaine: Effects on People and Policyin Lutin America, cultural Survival Report #23(Peterborough, NH: Transcript Printing Com-pany, 1986), pp. 5-33.

113. Population Reference Bureau, 1992 World Pop-ulation Data Sheet (Washington, DC: Popula-tion Reference Bureau, 1992).

114. Posner, J., Antonini, G., Montanez, G., Cecil, R.,and Grigsby, M., “A Classification of theSteeplands in the Northern Andes,” Journal ofMountain Research and Development, 2(3);273-280, 1982, In: Alford. 1991.

115. Raymond, J. S., “A View from the TropicalForest,’ R. Keatinge (cd.), Peruvian Prehistory:An Overview of Pre-Inca and Inca Society(Cambridge, England: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1988), In: Reeve, 1991.

116. Reeve, M. E., “Traditional Roles and Uses ofCoca kifin Andean Society.” contractor reportprepared for the Office of Technology Assess-ment, July 1991.

117. Reuters News Sexvice, “PemvianPresidentS ched-ules New Vote,” The Washington Post, July 29,1992, P. A24.

118. Reuters News Service, “Troops Surround Con-gress and Patrol Lima,” The New York TimesApti 7, 1992, p. Al.

119. Reyes, A., ‘‘Geograffa de 10S Conflicts Socialesy de la Violencia en Colombia,” presented at“Political Crisis in Colombia: Violence, Mobili-zation, and Restoration of hgitimacy” Sympo-sium, Center for Iberian and Latin AmericanStudies, University of California, San Diego (LaJolla, CA: December, 1989), In: Thourni, 1992.

120. Riordan, J., An Assessment of the SouthernValley Region of Bolivia, Farm Policy StudyAnalytical Document No. 1A (La P- Bolivia:U.S. Agency for International Development,1979), In: Painter and Bedoya, 1991a.

121. Robinson, L., “No Holds Barre&” U.S. Newsand World Report 113(12):49-50, 1992.

122. Sandagar@ A., “Sociocultural Aspects of CocaUse,” F. Jerf (cd.), Cocaine 1980: Proceedings

of the Interamerican Seminar on Coca andCocaine, (Lima, Peru: Pacific Press, 1980), In:Reeve, 1991.

123. Sarmiento, L., and Moreno, C., “Narcotr411co yel Sector Agropecuario en Colombia,” Econ-omb Colombian N. 226-227: 29-37, 1990, In:ThOuITli, 1992.

1 2 4 Sarmiento Palacio, E., “Econornfa del Nar-Cotrif.fico,’ ‘ C.G. Arrieta, et. al., (eds.), Nar-cotrdjico en Colombia: Dimensioned Pollticas,Econ&micas, Juridicas, e Internacionales(llogoti, Colombia: Tercer Mundo Editores,1990), pp. 47-96.

125. Steward, J. (cd.), Handbook of South AmericanIndians, Volume 2: The Andean Civilizations,Smithsonian Institute, Bureau of American Eth-nology Bulletin 143 (New York NY: CooperSquare Publishers, 1963), In: Reeve, 1991.

126. Steward, J., and Faron, L., Native Peoples ofSouth America (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill,1959), In: Reeve, 1991.

127. Stocks, A., Fragile Lanak Development and thePalcazu Project in Eastern Peru, IDA WorkingPaper No. 34 (Binghamton, NY: Institute forDevelopment Anthropology, 1988), In: Painterand Bedoya, 1991a.

128. Thorp, R., and Bertram, G., Peru 1890-1977(New York NY: Columbia University Press,1978), In: AIVareZ, 1992.

129. Thoumi, F., “Colombia: Opportunities and Con-straints to Source Reduction of Coca and Co-caine,” contractor report prepared for the Officeof Technology Assessment, April 1992.

130. Thoumi, F., economist, Arlington, VA, personalcommunication, August 1991.

131. Thourni, F., “Institutional Crisis and EconomicPolicy Reform Challenges in Colombi&” Cali-fornia State University, Chico, Department ofEconomics (Chico, CA: 1990).

132. ThOUmi, F., “Some Implications of the Growthof the Underground Economy in Colombi%’Journal of Interamerican Studies and WorldAffairs, Special Issue, 29(2):35-53, 1987.

133. ‘lMlis, F.L., “Cocaine and Food: Likely Effectsof a Burgeoning Translational Industry on FoodProduction in Bolivia and Peru,” Pursuing FoodSecurity: Strategies and Obstacles in Afi”ca,Asia, Lutin America, and the Middle East


134.

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140,

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142.

(Boulder, CO: Lynne Riermer Publishers, Inc.,1987) pp. 247-283.Ugarteche, O., E l Estado Deudor. EconomlaPolitica de la Deuda: Perti y Bolivia 1968-1984(Lima, Peru: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos,1986), In: Alvarez, 1992.U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess-ment, “Biological Control of Coca,” workshopheld Jan. 23, 1992, Washington, DC.U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess-ment, Beneath the Bottom Line: AgriculturalApproaches to Reduce Agrichemical Contami-nation of Groundwater, OTA-F-418 (Washing-ton, DC: Government Printing Office, Novem-ber 1990).U.S. Department of Justice, Drug EnforcementAgency, “From the Source to the Street: Mid-1990 Prices for Cannabis, Cocaine, and Heroin-Special Report,” Intelligence Trends (Washing-ton, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1990).U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intern-ational Narcotics Matters (INM), Narcotics: TheEnvironmental Consequences (Washington, DC:U.S. Department of State, 1991).U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intern-ational Narcotics Matters (INM), InternationalNarcotics Control Strategy Report (Washington,DC: U.S. Department of State, 1991).Urioste, M., Segunda Reforrna Agraria: Com-pesinos, Tierra, y Educaci&n Popular (La Paz,Bolivia: Talleres CEDLA, 1987), In: Painter andBedoya, 1991.van den Berghe, P., and Primov, G., Inequality inthe Andes: Class and Ethnicity in Cuzco (Colum-bia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1977), In:Alford, 1991.Verdera, F., “Estructura Productive y Ocu-pacional en la Selva Alta. ” Poblaci6n y Coloni-zaci6n en la Alta Amazonia Peruana (L ima ,

143,

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Peru: CNP-CE?A, 1984), In: Painter and Bedoya,1991a.Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA),“Resurgence of Human Rights Violations inBolivia,” Latin America Updde, 16(1):2, 1991,In: Healy, 1992.Webb, R., and Fernandez Baca, G., Perti enNumeros 1991 (Lima, Peru: Instituto Cuanto,1991), LXX Alvarez, 1992.Webster, S., “An Indigenous Quechua Commu-nity in Exploitation of Multiple EcologicalZones,’ Actas y Memorias &1 X?CUX Con-gresso International de Americanistas, vol. 3(Lima, Peru: 1971), pp. 174-183, In: Alford,1991.Willey, G.R., An Introduction to Amen”ca Arche-ology, Vol. 2 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1971), In: Alford, 1991.Winterhalder, B. P., and Thomas, B. P., GeoecoZ-ogy of Southern Highland Peru: a HumanAaizptation Perspective, Occasional Paper No.27 (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado, Insti-tute of Arctic and Alpine Research, 1978), In:Alford, 1991.World Bank, World Tables 1992 (Baltimore,MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).World Bank, “Bolivia from Stabilization toSustained Growth,” Draft (Washington, DC:World Bank, 1991), In: Alvarez, 1992.World Bank, Country Study: Bolivia, Agricul-tural Pricing and Investment Policies, 1984(Washington, DC: World Bank+ 1984), In: Healy,1992.Zuidema, T., “The Lion in the City: RoyalSymbols of Transition in Cuzco, ” G. Urton(cd.), Animal Myths and Metaphors in SouthAmerica (Salt Lake City, UT: University of UtahPress, 1985), In: Reeve, 1991.

Historyof Selected iI

I

NarcoticsSupply-Reduction

Efforts 3

T he majority of coca leaf used to produce cocaine and othercoca derivatives is grown in Peru and Bolivia (i.e., nearly90 percent), whereas Colombian involvement largelycenters on cocaine trafficking. Difficulty with controlling

U.S. demand has fueled interest in reducing foreign productionof narcotic crops such as coca. An examination of past opiumpoppy reduction efforts may provide some insights into ongoingcoca supply reduction activities in the Andean nations.

INTRODUCTIONInstitutions involved in the narcotics supply-reduction effort

include: the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of InternationalNarcotics Matters (INM) and Agency for International Develop-ment (AID); the U.S. Department of Justice, Drug EnforcementAdministration (DEA); the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD),and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme(UNDCP), which includes what was once the United NationsFund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). These organizationsand agencies use a variety of strategies to reduce or stopcultivation of illegal crops, including identifying viable substi-tute crops, providing training and assistance for national militaryenforcement and interdiction, and offering economic incentivesfor eradication.

International treaties and agreements developed over the past80 years concentrated on identifying the narcotics abuse problemand encouraging controls by consuming countries. Later treatiesintegrated supply and demand control efforts (box 3-A). How-ever, effectiveness of recent treaties is not clear, and one reasonis the inadequacy of narcotics data for assessing narcotics controlmeasures. Irrespective of data shortcomings, narcotics traffick-

81


Box 3-A-Selected Narcotics Control Treaties and IsgislationThe Hague Opium Convention of 1912

The Hague Convention of 1912 was the first attempt at international oversight of narcotics production andtrade (3). Treaty members outiined a system of production and trade regulations designed to curtaii abuse ofopium, its derivatives, and cocaine. Key points included farm-ievei production controls, processing controls, andinternationai-trade controls (6). However, disputes over target narcotics and producing countries, andimplementation mechanisms plagued the Convention resuiting in a fairiy ineffectual and narrow final text.Uitimateiy, the treaty required aii parties to enact legislation aiiowing oniy medical use of opium, its derivatives,and cocaine.

l%e Harrison Act of 1914The Harrison Act of 1914 marked the first attempt to regulate the distribution of narcotics in the United States

and establish nationai narcotics record keeping. The Act included taxes and accounting of narcoticexhining“medicines.” it had a profound effect on pharmaceutical and medical professions in the United States and spurreda reduction in the psychotropic drug content of “over-the-cwnter” medicines. The ac~s impact was furtherunderscored by the emergence of black markets and higher prices for narcotics.

The Geneva Opium Convention of 1925

The bague of Nations organized the Geneva @’urn Convention of 1925 to discuss the regulation ofinternational drug trade. This Convention addressed an earlier proposal that crop substitution programs bedeveioped for opium-producing countries in order to heip them iimit production to iegitirnate needs (14). Theresuiting treaty required aii raw materials and finished products in international trade to be iicensed, but did notaddress production ieveis (6).

The Geneva Convention to Limit the Manufacture and Reguiatethe Distribution of Narcotic Drugs of 1931

This Convention iimited any country’s abiiity to manufacture narcotic drugs beyond the ieveis adequate tosuppiy international medicai needs as established by an international board. Consequently, many factoriesinvolved in opiate manufacture were ciosed. Analysts of the Convention suggest that this act ied traffickers toestablish their own laboratories.

Conference for the Suppression of the Iiiegai Traff ic in Dangerous Drugs of 1936in an effort to increase the effectiveness of interdiction activities, thetreatycailed forinternationai cooperation

of member countries in curtailing trafficking, and providing evidence and information ieading to narcotics seizures.

The Opium Protocoi of 1953

The 1953 Opium Protocol iimited the number of countries that couid iegaiiy produce opium poppies, createdgovernment iicensing of poppy cultivation, and established government monopolies over aii opium purchases. itmade no reference to cocaine.

The Singie Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961

in 1961, aii of the international drug treatieshxmventions since the Geneva Convention of 1925 werecombined into the Singie Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Whereas previous treaties deait almost exclusively withthe production and distribution of opium, the Singie Convention extended the cultivation and iicensing provisionsof the 1953 Opium Protocol to coca and marijuana. it also included a specific provision requiring participatingcountries to phase out the practice of coca-ieaf chewing by 1969,25 years from the treaty’s effective date. TheUnited Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Controi (UNFDAC) was established to repiace the bague of Nations as thebody responsible for oversight and enforcement of international narcotics regulation. t

1 The UNFDAC isnowintegrated with the formedyseparate International Narcotics Control Board and DivislonofNarcotic Drugs into a single organization-the United Nations International Drug Control Programme,

.

3-- History of Selected Narcotics Supply-Reduction Efforts 183

ing and abuse laws continue to be the primarycounternarcotics approaches based on the as-sumption that they are a clear deterrent to presentand potential drug traffickers and users. The focusof international narcotics control remains on howto improve enforcement of international anddomestic regulations.

The United States has worked with securityforces in the Andean region to reduce cocaproduction. However, the public and the mediahave often viewed the efforts as heavy-handedand intrusive. The Bolivian response to U.S.military intervention, for example, has been nomore favorable than their view of development-related eradication. One expert in Bolivia goes sofar as to assert the “DEA has replaced the CIA[Central Intelligence Agency] in unpopularity”(10). Despite coordination efforts, conflictinggoals of development and narcotics control havecreated difficulties for development personnel.

OPIUM-REDUCTION ACTIVITIESAggressive international drug control policies

began in the early 1970s with the establishment ofInter-Agency Task Force One charged with iden-tifying targets for supply-reduction efforts. Mex-ico was a key target because of opium poppy (thesource of heroin) and marijuana production.Search-and-seizure border operations were under-taken, yet quickly abandoned for political reasons(i.e., contradicting the “good neighbor policy”)(9). Heroin abuse subsequently was elevated to anational security problem, and the U.S. Govern-ment began investigating potential heroin supply-reduction tactics.

Turkey was identified as the most politicallyadvantageous country for heroin supply-reduction efforts, The proximity of the country toEuropean smuggling routes and laboratories con-vinced U.S. officials that Turkey was a key playerin the heroin problem, despite the fact that only 4percent of U.S. supply came from Turkey (31).U.S. supply-reduction goals were embraced bythe Turkish military regime that gained power in

,

** ‘

A disproportionate number of those arrested andimprisoned for illegal, coca-related activities arepeasants. Eradication and crop substitution policiesfurther heighten distress and conflict in coca-growingcommunities by forcing those least able to control thecircumstances of their coca-trade dependency to riskimpoverishment or imprisonment or both.

1971 (26). A ban on opium poppy cultivation wasannounced in 1971, declaring that all poppyproduction would be forbidden by 1972 (31). Thismove was followed by U.S. technical and mone-tary assistance to promote alternative productionsystems.

The Turkish program was deemed a success bythe U.S. Government and the American public,and the heroin problem was briefly reduced.However, supplies from Mexicoj Southeast Asia’s

Golden Triangle, Afghanistan, and Pakistan quicklyfilled the gap (15).

Within 2 years, the Turkish Opium Ban wasrevoked for several reasons. The Turkish popula-tion felt that undue control was being exerted andinsufficient compensation offered for the adverseeffects of opium reduction on the Turkish econ-omy and populace. Contributing to this sentimentwas U.S. purchase of opium derivatives fromother countries. Dwindling political support ledTurkish politicians to pledge their allegiance topoppy growers and this quickly became a majortheme in the 1973 election (30). The U.S.Government responded by cutting off monetaryassistance (23,28).


Pakistan became a primary opium supplier inthe 1970s, complete with clandestine laboratoriesand trafficking organizations (29). The govern-ment of Pakistan complied with internationaldrug treaties because of internal concerns overincreasing addiction problems. Having met withlittle success in their own programs, the Paki-stanis were willing to accept and support U.S.supply-reduction efforts.

Four major U.S.-supported projects were at-tempted in Pakistan, including:

●

●

●

●

The Buner Agricultural Development Pro-ject, 1976-Crop substitution in key poppyproduction areas combined with eradication(26), sponsored by the U.N. Fund for DrugAbuse Control;Malakand Area Development Project, 1981—Incorporated economic assistance for nar-cotics control organizations and enforcederadication (26), sponsored by the U.S.Department of State, Bureau of InternationalNarcotic Matters;Tribal Areas Development Project, 1982—Focused on infrastructure development, edu-cation, and voluntary eradication (27), spon-sored by the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment; andNorthwest Frontier Area Development Pro-ject, 1983 (ongoing)-Combined eradica-tion and development; components includedintroducing various high-yield crops, pro-viding short-term relief, improving irriga-tion, and teaching farmers about long-termagricultural options (26). Vocational train-ing is provided for those wishing to leaveagricultural livelihoods, sponsored by theU.S. Agency for International Development.

Although enforcement of opium poppy erad-ication is considered a critical aspect of the opiumsupply-reduction policy, AID acknowledged thatits most successful projects were those thatcombined development with enforcement, andpermitted eradication to occur gradually and in

conjunction with the emergence of new incomeopportunities. This method offered the localleadership and citizenry a greater role in assuringtheir financial security (26).

COCA REDUCTION EFFORTS:THE ANDEAN STRATEGY

Coca has been cultivated in the Andes forcenturies, and the plant has traditional culturalsignificance. Although the governments of Bo-livia and Peru allow some legal production ofcoca for traditional use, they have attempted tosupport U.S. efforts to eliminate all productionabove traditional and medical needs.

The governments of Bolivia, Colombia, andPeru have worked to reduce their supply of cocaand cocaine using differing methods, according tospecific regional problems and anticipated out-comes. Projects undertaken in Colombia, forinstance, largely focus on interdiction because ofColombia’s cocaine trafficking role. Conversely,approaches in Bolivia and Peru (the major leafproducers) incorporate development as well asenforcement approaches. Past mandatory eradica-tion efforts in Bolivia and Peru have beensuspended, in favor of encouraging voluntaryeradication and identifying alternative crops forcoca cultivators. Bolivia, and the Chapare regionin particular, has been the primary focus in recentyears as security declined in Peruvian coca-producing regions.

9 Bolivia and Coca Substitution ProjectsInitial AID development efforts took the form

of the Agricultural Development in the CocaZones Project (ADCZP) (1975). ADCZP soughtto identify alternative crops and evaluate them forproduction and marketing feasibility. However,viable alternatives were slow coming, and theproject reached its deadline with its goal unful-filled. Bolivia’s economic concerns and coca’sheritage presented some barriers to acceptance ofthe AID project (26).

3-History of Selected Narcotics Supply-Reduction Efforts 1 8 5

The Department of Regional Development ofthe Organization of American States (OAS)worked with the Bolivian government between1978 and 1980, to formulate an ambitious devel-opment strategy for the Chapare that includedidentifyng investment opportunities for immedi-ate implementation. First and foremost, the strat-egy provided a framework for coordinating theactivities of some 54 international, national,regional, and private institutions promoting de-velopment in the Chapare at the time (17). TheOAS plan remains the standard from which allsubsequent Chapare development activities havebeen drawn, and included seven areas: 1) technol-ogy transfer; 2) provision of agricultural credit; 3)promotion of agroindustry; 4) zonal market de-velopment; 5) secondary road construction; 6)electrification; and 7) installation of potablewater systems (19).

OAS foresaw a controversy that would charac-terize much of the discussion surrounding theChapare and other coca-growing regions in thedecade to come: that development would promotethe production of coca leaf along with othereconomic activities. Recognizing farmer interestin coca leaf was in large measure the due to lackof other economic options, OAS acknowledgedthat coca leaf production might expand in re-sponse to development investment over the short-to-medium term. However, it felt that only aseconomic development opened opportunities toearn a reliable income through other activities,would the importance of coca leaf and cocainediminish (19).

The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau ofInternational Narcotic Matters (INM) funded thefirst effort specifically intended to reduce cocacultivation in Bolivia. The project, Proyecto deDesarrollo y Sustitución? (Development and Sub-stitution Project, PRODES), was to investigatethe feasibility of crop substitution and produce aproject proposal for implementing crop substitu-tion through AID. The 1980 Bolivian coup haltedPRODES activities and U.S. assistance wassuspended (26). Drug related activities escalated

?2—

.

Many coca-growing regions lack sufficientinfrastructure (e.g., roads, electricity, irrigation)for alternative development. How to improveinfrastructure without unduly benefiting localnarcotics traffickers presents a policy dilemma.

under the military regime. When democraticcontrol was restored in 1982, the new governmentwas unable to assert authority in the Chapare.

ORIGIN OF THE CHAPARE REGIONALDEVELOPMENT PROJECT

The Chapare Regional Development Project(CRDP) was initiated in August 1983 as anagreement between the Bolivian Government andAID. New development efforts began in 1984 ascontrol was regained in the region. It quicklybecame apparent that the CRDP effort could notproceed under its original design (21). Twopractical problems confronted the CRDP andcatalyzed the redesign effort:

●

●

State control over the Chapare was andremains tenuous. Bolivian government pres-ence in the Chapare is limited to a smallgroup of development specialists and to arepressive police force, both funded largelyby the United States. Effective efforts wouldrequire a continuous development presencein the Chapare.The overall production systems of Chaparefarmers, and the relationships of those sys-


terns to the physical capacity of differentparts of the Chapare to support sustainedagricultural production were largely ne-glected. This problem had two dimensions.The one most fully appreciated before theredesign was that the cropping systemsbeing promoted probably would not besustainable in most parts of the Chapare.This raised the specter that, should cropsubstitution be successful, it could be thecause of an environmental disaster. Thesecond dimension, was that potential alter-nate crops to coca leaf were assessed primari-ly in terms of the technical feasibility ofcultivating them in the Chapare. Little atten-tion was paid to where and if farmers wouldbe able to sell their new crops (19).

A strategy to improve economic conditions inupland areas-the origin of most Chapare settlersand coca laborers-was developed by AID. Theredesign was formalized in 1987 and incorporatedthe framework that continues expanding today—a combination of crop substitution in the Chapareand improving resource management activities inthe Associated High Valleys (AHV) (cf: 17,19).The amendment recognized that the solution tothe problem of widespread involvement in theproduction of coca leaf in the Chapare was not tobe found exclusively in the tropical lowlandvalley itself (figure 3-l).

Migration created chronic labor scarcity inhighland areas, and affected family capacity tomanage on-farm resources effectively. Conse-quently, long-term agricultural production andlivestock management strategies were neglectedin favor of short-term gains. The resulting declinein agricultural productivity progressively intensi-fied migratory pressures (19).

The Campero and Mizque provinces of south-ern Cochabamba Department were selected as theareas in which the AHV component would beimplemented initially, based on a study by theCorporación de Desarrollo de Cochabamba (Re-gional Development Corporation of Cochabamba,

CORDECO). The study suggested the areas hadpotential to become a center of economic growthand a secondary area of population attraction (1 3).Through this effort, AID/Bolivia and Bolivianimplementing agencies expected to gain experi-ence relevant to an expanded AHV component.

THE REDESIGNED CHAPARE REGIONALDEVELOPMENT PROJECT

The redesigned CRDP suffered from politicaland institutional difficulties that diffused develop-ment efforts. Fighting political and institutionalbrushfires consumed a great amount of develop-ment personnel time. The link with narcoticscontrol created a dual goal for developmentpersonnel, drawing resources toward nondevel-opment activities. Similar difficulties were facedby the Bolivian institutions involved in theCRDP--the Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Alter-native y Sustitución de Cultivos de Coca (Subse-cretariat for Alternative Development and CocaSubstitution, SUBDESAL), the Programa deDesarrollo Alternative Regional (Regional Pro-gram for Alternative Development, PDAR), andthe Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropec-uaria (Bolivian Institute of Agriculture and Live-stock Technology, IBTA). Lack of staff continu-ity impeded CRDP progress in the late 1980s.These problems and others resulted in ineffectualimplementation of CRDP activities (12,18,20).The CRDP likewise suffered criticism in Cam-pero and Mizque because it had created expecta-tions that were not being fulfilled, and results inthe Chapare were equally modest. Activitieslargely concentrated on continuing agriculturalresearch programs, although this research wasfrequently criticized in government circles andamong unions representing coca growers ashaving little impact on Chapare farmers (18,22).

AlD/BoliviaThe AID/Bolivia has been criticized as an

overly passive manager, potentially unable t o

obtain the respect due the entity that financesexistence of the two Bolivian institutions respon-

3-History of Selected Narcotics Supply-Reduction Efforts I 87

sible for the CRDP. Problems that have limited ●

the effectiveness of the CRDP, include unneces-sary bureaucratic awkwardness among participat-ing institutions, a lack of connection between theobjectives of individual CRDP activities andoverall project goals, and use of CRDP resources ●

to respond to parochial political party interestsinconsistent with project goals (19).

AID officials suggest that several factors havehindered their ability to solve management prob- ●

lems confronting the CRDP:

Staffing and other resources are inadequateto participate in day-to-day project manage-ment. This is exacerbated by the complexityof CRDP and associated bureaucratic proce-dures.The project is highly visible because of itslink to narcotics, resulting in AID/Boliviaofficials spending large amounts of time onnondevelopment related activities.

Avenues exist to “bypass” the AID/Boliviamanagement structure with little avenue for

vPandoL

)

Bent ,●1-.

) ‘ d - \ -77 —Santa

Chapare APunata

SOURCE: Adapted from Development Alternatives, Inc., (DAI),Proposal (Bethesda, MD: DAI, 1992).


Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Alternative ySustitución de Cultivos de Coca

The SUBDESAL was responsible for directionof the CRDP, and it had authority to changefundamental directions in the project withoutapproval or coordination with implementing in-stitutions. Directional changes made by SUBDE-SAL have been criticized for complicating imple-mentation. In addition, the SUBDESAL heads upthe council charged with coordinating the partici-pation of international assistance organizations.1

The SUBDESAL is the principal source ofinformation for the ministers comprising thecouncil, and primary interpreter of their wishesregarding implementation of drug policy. How-ever, specific lines of authority and responsibilitywere not defined, sometimes leading to arbitraryand internally contradictory uses of power thatprejudiced implementation of the redesignedCRDP (19).

Programa de Desarrollo Alternative Regional

The PDAR has major responsibility for imple-menting development projects in the Chapare,like the CRDP, and coordinating the activities ofstate agencies and nongovernrnental organiza-tions (NGOS) that would be responsible for thebulk of implementation activities in the AHV.2

The PDAR would provide resources and ad-ministrative support to the state agencies andNGOS already involved in development activitiesto provide alternatives to migrating to theChapare. The coordinating role was assigned forseveral reasons, including: 1) the substantialburden that its implementing role in the Chaparewas expected to entail; 2) the large number ofstate agencies and NGOS involved in rural

development activities in upland Cochabamba(4); 3) the desire to maximize the immediateimpacts of the AHV by tapping into existingefforts; and 4) the desire to promote participationin activities that supported the CRDP by as widea range of Bolivian institutions as possible (19).

However, despite its strong technical abilities,PDAR has not been effective at planning, implem-enting, and evaluating individual projects inlight of overall CRDP goals. This reflects thescarcity of skilled planners in Bolivia, and areluctance to engage in this type of planning andimplementation because of its potential to removesome flexibility for executive auspices. Conse-quently, while PDAR carries out a number ofactivities, the contribution of these activities tothe goals of CRDP is insufficient. It has beensuggested that the lack of AID/Bolivia authoritymay foster such poor administrative practices(19).

Instituto Boliviano deTecnología Agropecuaria

Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropec-uaria (Bolivian Institute of Agriculture and Live-stock Technology, IBTA) is the inheritor ofagricultural research begun under PRODES, and,thus, has acquired long-term tropical agricultureresearch experience. It has assembled what iswidely regarded as an excellent team of agricul-tural scientists and technicians, and has con-ducted important research on a wide range ofcrops in the Chapare that might provide farmerswith alternatives to coca-leaf production. How-ever, research has focused primarily on technicalfeasibility and yield maximization, rather thanproduct marketability. The IBTA-Chapare long

1 Additi~~ co~slon Ww ~~oduced when SuBDES~ ~W tie Utited Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) ifltO the

midst of the AID-funded institutions with no clarification of what their respective roles were to be (19).2 pDAR ~s ~dergone sever~ me c~nges. At me time of tie r~esign of the CRDP, in 1987, the entity was called the hbsecrefarfa

paru elDesarroZlo def Tr6pico Boliviano (Secretariat for Development of the Bolivian Tropics, SDTB) under the Ministry of Planning andCoordination. In July 1987, SDTB was placed under SUBDESAL authority and renamed the Programu de Desarrollo A/ternufivo deCochaburnbu (Cochabamba Program for Altermtive Development PDAC). In January 1990, this was changed to the Program de DesarrolloAlternutivo Regional, reflecting concern with regional development problems that extended beyond the boundaries of Cochabamba department(19).


The poor, unemployed, and landless from neighboringcommunities often migrate to centers of coca-relatedactivity. Thus, counter narcotics projects must alsotarget areas of out-migration to reduce the lure ofcoca-related income. Here, vehicles pass a checkpointbefore entering the Bolivian Chapare.

maintained that marketing issues were outside oftheir purview and that PDAR should be responsi-ble for addressing these.3 However, past PDARefforts on market issues had been inadequate ( 19).

THE CHAPARE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTPROJECT SINCE 1989

Significant improvements were made in thisbleak picture in mid-1989. PDAR staff andtechnical abilities increased during this period. Anew government assumed power in August 1989,and with it came increased commitment to CRDPactivities (18). PDAR initiated 29 ‘‘immediateimpact projects’ in the Campero and Mizqueprovinces, which engendered considerable enthu-siasm and participation by rural communities.During 1990, the number of projects carried outin the AHV increased to at least 40, and additionalincreases were projected for 1991. Institutionalarrangements and responsibilities were defined(19).

Since 1989, SUBDESAL also has undergoneseveral changes that improved the ability of the

CRDP to implement projects (18). SUBDESALwas placed in a chain of command with theMinister of Peasant Affairs and Agricultureclearly at the top, and a clear relationship betweennational policy objectives and the planning andimplementation of local activities was established(25). Furthermore, some redefinition of the divi-sion of labor between SUBDESAL and PDARoccurred.

Increased attention also has been placed onmarketing aspects in the CRDP (24), Technicalassistance to PDAR and producer groups is nowbeing strengthened, particularly in marketing.Irrespective of where market issues are addressed,an integrated production-to-market approach isneeded for crop substitution efforts in the Chapareto be successful. Research might be prioritized bymarket availability for potential alternative crops.Thus, market identification and research would beclosely integrated with agricultural research andextension.

Still, the CRDP was criticized for being unableto: address the development issues underlyingparticipation of rural populations in coca produc-tion, conduct the necessary planning and coordi-nation to repeat past successes and reduce oreliminate failures, or develop individual activitiesto reinforce one another to produce the multipliereffect needed for results to be long-term andsignificant beyond the local level. Problemscontinued to confront the major institutionsinvolved in the CRDP (cf: 12,17,19). The CRDPwas recently replaced by CORDEP (CochabambaRegional Development Project), and CORDEP’Srelationships with Bolivian Government agencieshave been modified or redefined (figures 3-1 and3-2), in part to address the kinds of problemsreferred to above.

9 Peru and Coca Substitution ProjectsIn the early eighties, the Peruvian Government,

in cooperation with the United States, created

3 Nevertheless, IBTA<hapare has, on the other hand, on several occasions invited input from internatiord advisors on marketing issues,and is taking a larger role in this matter under CORDEP (19).


Figure 3-2—Cochabamba Regional Development Project Organizational Structure

AID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .La Paz

MACA

I

AIDCochabamba ‘ - - - - -” - - - - -” - - - - - - - SUBDESAL

T =:

PDAR

ICREDIT

AGRICAPITAL ‘ -

“ ‘ L : ~ ~ a ’ 1

‘?

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

, [ : = 9 ” 3 ‘ E a\-- /

I

IBTA/Chapare.[+G:I

— Report ing 1-- Coordination Iinks

> Targeted Impact

AID = Agency for International Development.CORDEP. Cochabamba Regional Development Project.IBTA = Instituto Boliviano de Tecnología Agropecuria (Bolivian Institute of Agriculture and Livestock Technology).MACA - Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos y Agricultural (Ministry of Agriculture and Campesino Affairs).NGO - Nongovernmental organization.PDAR = Programa de Desarrollo Alternative Regional (Regional Program for Alternative Development).SNC = Servicio Nacional de Camines (National Road Service).SUBDESAL - Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Alternative y Sustitución de Cultivos de Coca (Subsecretariat for Alternative Development and CropSubstitution for Coca).

SOURCE: Development Alternatives, Inc., (DAI), Cochabamba Regional Development Project (CORDEP)-80/ivia, Technical Proposal (Bethesda,MD: DAI, 1992).


several special projects to develop the upperjungle, among them, the Proyecto Especial AltoHuallaga (Alto Huallaga Special Project, PEAH)(figure 3-3). The general objectives of this set ofprojects were to:

●

●

●

●

Increase regional agricultural productivity;Occupy upper and lower jungle areas;Economically matriculate the region by meansof the Marginal Highway; andMaintain regional ecological equilibrium,rational exploitation of natural resources,and improvement in the living standards ofthe population (8).

PROYECTO ESPECIAL ALTO HUALLAGA

PEAH had peculiar characteristics that distin-guished it from the other projects because of theneed to address the problem of coca expansion.The Peruvian Government and AID/Peru de-signed a Project Paper for the execution of PEAH.The project design included research, extension,and training components; highway maintenance;and credit development components (19).

The Project Paper incorporated control anddevelopment strategies. It proposed massive cocaeradication under direction of the Proyecto deControl y Reducción de los Cultivos de Coca enel Alto Huallaga (Project for the Control andReduction of Coca Cultivation in the Alto Hual-laga, CORAH) and a development plan to in-crease legal agricultural production in the regionunder the responsibility of PEAH. The secondobjective, however, was subordinate to the former(8). While the development objective is consid-ered in some sections of the Project Paper asan independent one, in reality, both objectiveswere interrelated and even explicitly articulated.4

PEAH management assumed that eradicationwould oblige farmers to turn to legal production,

irrespective of the economic and historical proc-esses that gave coca production in the AltoHuallaga its importance (19).

Several features of a national social, political,and economic nature were neglected and contrib-uted to the failure of CORAH and PEAH. Somemore notable of these include:

●

●

●

●

●

The narrowly defined project area that ex-cluded producers outside identified bounda-ries;

The assumption that producers inside bound-aries would remain after eradication irre-spective of economic dysfunctions associ-ated with legitimate agricultural productionin the region;Failure to anticipate a violent reaction toeradication by the population, and subse-quent expansion of subversive violence;Lack of development components appropri-ate to the producing areas (e.g., despite thesuitability of the region for tropical forestproduction, a forestry component was lack-ing); andFailure to recognize the historical laborscarcity problem (8).

Labor shortages are one of the worst conse-quences of coca expansion in Alto Huallaga, andconstitute an authentic bottleneck for the promo-tion of technical assistance and the extension ofareas under legal crops (19). Those farmers whooriginally were unwilling to enter into cocaproduction finally did so in the face of thepressure from increased production costs.

The Project Paper was amended in 1986 toemphasize agricultural extension above researchand training, and also include a communitydevelopment component. The principal objectiveof the extension component was to increase the

4 For example, the Project Paper said that regional development should minimize the negative social effects of coca eradication and thateradication and economic development formed two sides of the same co~ with eeonomic development efforts depending on progress ineradication. The paper did not treat regional development as an end in itself and did not formulate significant proposals for an integrated programof economic development to include dl farmers in the region, not just coca producers (8). AIso, it did not consider how coca eradication mightnegatively affect possibilities for development.

331-054 - 93 - 4


Figure 3-3-Location of Proyecto Especial Alto Huallaga

.----

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Ancash’- c

[ [<’ M a r g i n a l \ Huancavellca ‘\lca ~ IL/

\ \*& H’ghwa’

\Alto (

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t

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1

I

t

I

I

I

I

I

I

1

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f

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(Lima,

——..


rate of adoption of new production technologiesdeveloped through agricultural research. The lackof a relatively stable market for most legal cropshindered extension efforts and made it difficultfor legal crops to be as attractive to farmers ascoca. In light of the importance of family labor, astable market has always been important inmaking a legal crop an attractive alternative tococa. Family labor reduces price sensitivity andincreases incentives to distribute labor inputsover longer periods (19).

The introduction of the community develop-ment subcomponent was a positive decision,resulting in a qualitative change in attitude amongthe farmers affected by the actions implementedby social promoters. Agricultural clubs and women’sclubs, established and supported by the compo-nent, were capable of managing new cultivatedplots and proved efficient in installing nurseriesfor cocoa and citrus plants and in rearing smalllivestock. Similarly, the community developmentsubcomponent successfully carried out a range ofactivities including road construction, park beau-tification, and latrine construction. The commu-nity development operations were placed in thecontext of regional agricultural development that

took into account the most important problems ofcoca expansion. Even though it was a positivestep, community development was not placedwithin the principal objective of stimulating legalagriculture in the Alto Huallaga (19).

1 Colombian Narcotics Control andEradication Projects

Only a small amount of coca is produced inColombia (i.e., roughly 13 percent); its clandes-tine laboratories and an efficient traffickingnetwork pose greater concerns. Therefore, narcot-ics control policies have focused on disruptionand deterrence of drug processing and trafficking,often by military and police countermeasures.Furthermore, because relatively few Colombiansgrow coca, U.S.-assisted eradication programshave a narrower social and economic impact and,

thus, have been more politically feasible than isthe case in Bolivia or Peru.

1978-1982Early Colombian counternarcotics efforts be-

gan in the 1970s, aimed at marijuana trade on theAtlantic Coast. The marijuana industry perme-ated the economic and political fabric of theGuajira region, and with corruption and violencereaching anarchic proportions, the governmentfeared loss of control in the area ( 1). Then, as now,the Colombian Government was under pressureto adopt U.S. counternarcotics policies in returnfor assistance. Two policies of fundamentalimportance in Colombian supply-reduction ef-forts were interdiction and eradication (1), (Seealso Extradition, in chapter 2.)

In November 1978, Colombia’s President re-sponded by instituting a National Security Stat-ute, authorizing military participation in nationalgovernance and law enforcement. The ColombianGovernment then initiated Operación Fulmi-nante, a U.S.-assisted, militarization- and manualeradication-based effort to curb the marijuanatrade and regain control of the Guajira. Approxi-mately 10,000 troops were deployed. Results ofthat campaign were mixed, and did not suggestsuccess (1,2). For example:

●

●

●

●

●

Although marijuana trade was reduced, itwas not halted.To the extent that enforcement efforts weresuccessful, they tended merely to displaceproduction and trade activities to other partsof the country (the ‘‘balloon effect’ ‘), ratherthan eliminate them.The Colombian military was susceptible tocorruption.Traffickers proved able to reestablish activi-ties quickly as military presence withdrew.Supply-sided eradication and interdictioncampaigns were not coupled with paralleldemand-reduction programs, thus reducingprospects of disrupting narcotics trafficking.


● The costs to the local population were highand deeply resented, and lacking rapid head-way, the general public quickly concludedthat repressive counternarcotics measureswere not in Colombia’s best interest, despiteU.S. Government praise for the operation.

From the Colombian military’s perspective,the guerrilla challenge was more important, andfrom the civilian perspective, increasing politicalviolence and social unrest were of greater concern(2). In March 1980, the Colombian army an-nounced that it was abandoning its anti-marijuanaefforts in the Guajira region.

During this period, the Colombian Governmentcommissioned a study on using herbicides toeradicate marijuana. However, Colombia’s Na-tional Council of Dangerous Drugs (ConsejoNacional de Estupificantes) determined by con-sensus not to apply herbicides (l).

1982-1986

A new narcotics directive was establishedunder President Betancur: no extradition onnationalist grounds, no militarization because ofdomestic considerations, and no herbicidal eradi-cation for environmental reasons. Yet, despite itsseemingly unaggressive agenda, the new admini-stration quickly initiated an ambitious, DEA-backed interdiction effort. Furthermore, whennarcotics traffickers retaliated by assassinatingthe Justice Minister, the new government promptlyreversed its no-extradition and no-herbicide poli-cies (1,5).

As had occurred with anti-marijuana opera-tions, the narcotics trafficker’s quickly adoptednew tactics for evading interdiction. Processingwas reverted to mobile, small-scale operations,and the powerful cartel bosses negotiated newtrade routes and alliances through other countries.They also increased their use of bribery, murder,kidnapping, and other terrorist activities to pro-tect themselves, and assure the loyalty of theiremployees (2).

Betancur initiated programs for herbicidaleradication of marijuana in 1984, and coca in1985. Both programs were protested by thepublic, and neither achieved long-term success.Marijuana production declined only temporarily,and, again, many growers responded to the threatof eradication by reducing their plots, movingoperations to less air-accessible canyons, andgrowing marijuana alongside legal crops (l).

1986-1990In the mid-1980s, the Colombian Government

faced conflicting images: though praised forcracking down on narcotics trafficking, it did notseem to have restricted the flow of cocaine.Moreover, the Colombian justice system hadbeen decimated by drug-related violence, and thenew administration faced the same dauntingpanorama of threats (e.g., guerrilla insurgences,drug-related corruption and killing, and rampanthuman rights abuses).

Marijuana and coca eradication programs con-tinued, but the returns on these efforts, particu-larly for marijuana, began to decline relative toincreases in the number of hectares under cultiva-tion. Explanations for the declining rates in-cluded: 1) shifting of marijuana cultivation toother regions; 2) increasing profitability of otherillegal drug markets, such as hashish and poppies;3) declines in U.S. Government assistance; and 4)diverted government effort to militarization andextradition aspects of narcotics policy, as well asongoing counter-insurgency concerns (l).

1990-PRESENTAlthough production of narcotic plants has

never weighed heavily in Colombia’s involve-ment in narcotics industry, evidence indicatesexpansion of these activities. A January 1992Departamento Administrative de Seguridad re-port stated that Colombia had some 25,000hectares of opium poppies under cultivation,while the U.S. Government estimated 10,000hectares (16). The Colombian Government beganeradicating opium poppy fields with glyphosate


in 1992, despite protests from the peasant popula-tion (16).

Coca eradication as a Colombian narcoticscontrol policy has had short-term effects, al-though little chance to have a large impact.Growth of coca cultivation came after Co-lombians were deeply involved in the cocainetrade and, thus, the supply of coca leaves in thecountry grew in response to the growth of thecocaine industry. Most of the income obtained byColombians from the coca and cocaine tradecomes from the manufacturing and internationaldistribution of cocaine and the drug “cartels”have already large investments in and out of thecountry. Thus, policies to disrupt illegal drugmanufacturing and marketing, and to make itmore difficult to use the capital accumulated, arelikely to have a greater overall impact on theColombian cocaine industry than eradicationprograms (l).

1 National Narcotics Enforcement andEffects on Development

In addition to the inherent difficulties faced bydevelopment projects in Bolivia and Peru, en-forcement practices in both countries sometimeshave compounded the task of generating localsupport for activities. Rather than fostering alter-native means of livelihood, even limited eradica-tion has notably impeded execution of someagricultural extension and community develop-ment efforts (8). Some experts suggest thatcompeting goals of narcotics control and develop-ment generally contribute to this situation. Re-pressive actions on the part of some U. S.-sponsored institutions may be the single largestconstraint on the success of U.S.-sponsoreddevelopments efforts (19).

Unidad Móvil de Patrulla Rural (Mobile RuralPatrol Unit, UMOPAR) has primary responsibil-ity for narcotics control activities in Bolivia. Theorganization has been accused of brutality againstpeasants involved in coca production as well asproviding protection for narcotics traffickers on

occasion (1 1). Analysts suggest that increasingmilitarization of the “drug war” generally andU.S. sponsorship of UMOPAR particularly mayconstitute the largest constraints on success ofU.S.-sponsored development efforts in Bolivia.Partly as a response to the problems withUMOPAR, the Bolivian Government, with U.S.sponsorship, has created a new counternarcoticsforce, the Fuerza Especial en la Lucha Contra elNarcotráfico (Special Force in the StruggleAgainst Drug Trafficking, FELCN), which beganoperations in late June 1991. Because of thecorruption problems associated with UMOPAR,plans call for the FELCNtobe‘‘insulated’ fromthe rest of the Bolivian police force. How thisinsulation is to be accomplished remains unclear.It is also unclear how the addition of a secondcounternarcotics unit will address the problems ofabusive and violent behavior on the part of policethat have unclermined development efforts (19).

The effectiveness of Peru’s PEAH in workingwith coca farmers also was hampered by itsassociation with repressive police action. Thissituation was provoked by the fact that CORAHreceived logistic support from the Unidad Móvilde Patrullaje Rural de la Guardia Civil del Perú(Mobile Rural Patrol Unit, Peruvian Civil Guard,UMOPAR of Peru). The coercive method used bythe CORAH with the support of UMOPARproduced resistance by the affected coca farmers(8). The process of eradication also caused animportant sector of rural and urban populations tofail to discriminate or distinguish between thesethree different institutions. Drug dealers and theSendero Luminoso have taken advantage of thisfact to distort the program of PEAH. This problemshould also be analyzed in terms of the PEAHconcept and its relation to the eradication processimplemented by CORAH. While it is true thatPEAH was designed to promote regional legalagricultural development, the emphasis on theneed to assist former coca farmers constituted arisk inherent in the institutional life of the project.The violent image of CORAH and UMOPAR ofPeru evidently affected PEAH’s image not only


The conflicting militarization and development assistance objectives of past counternarcotics programs haveundermined their effectiveness and often generated lasting resentment among target populations. Here,demonstrators in Cochabamba, Bolivia, carry a poster that reads, ‘ ‘No to militarization! Yes to development!’

among coca producers, but also among othereconomic sectors, increasing the resentment ofthe farmers against CORAH as well as PEAH(19).

CONCLUSIONCrop substitution and eradication efforts are

inherently slow. Coordination among develop-ment and enforcement organizations is critical;coordination can help ensure that they will notadversely affect one another in pursuit of theirindividual goals. In the past, they have worked indifferent areas with varied degrees of success.Development groups generally work to improvethe region’s standard of living, whereas enforce-ment agencies work to impede production ofillegal crops and their derivatives.

Colombia poses an interesting political prob-lem because it is not a major coca producer anddoes not depend on U.S. development assistance.It is possible that Colombia’s involvement willchange if supply is reduced, but concomitantdemand reduction will be necessary to avoid the“balloon effect.’

Development organizations can maintain theiroriginal philosophies while working with en-forcement agencies. ‘‘Phased eradication” hasbeen most successful for crop substitution anderadication projects in the past, and existing U.S.organizations are well-equipped to adopt such astrategy.

AID and INM [Bureau of International Narcot-ics Matters] have fundamental differences in their


bureaucratic ethos and staff orientation. Theformer is essentially a development agency andits staff has expertise in overseas development.AID personnel tend to view the problem ofnarcotics control from a long-term developmentperspective and give priority to economic andsocial factors that affect coca production. INMhas a narcotics control orientation and its staff isexperienced in enforcement work. They tend tohave a short-term perspective and believe en-forcement must begin early in the project. Thesedifferent attitudes can sometimes create barriersto cooperation and coordination efforts (26).

A proper blend of development assistance andenforcement and domestic and international agen-cies is needed. However, separation of enforce-ment and assistance activities should be clear atall levels. Determining the relative importance ofeach of these components, however, is problema-tic. Trust and education will probably prove to bethe most important factors for success.

Ideally, public pressure for elimination of thedrug problem should not be met with feweroptions. Rather the effective translation of knowl-edge, scientific and historical, should enable thepublic to avoid over-simplification, and to exertinfluence based on more rational understanding(26).

CHAPTER 3 REFERENCES

1.

2.

3.

4,

Bagley, B., ‘‘Coca Eradication and Crop Substitu-tion in Colombia, ” contractor report prepared forthe Office of Technology Assessment, April 1992.Bagley, B., “Colombia and the War on Drugs,”Foreign Affairs, fall 1988, pp. 70-92.Brunn, K., Pan, L,, and Rexed, I., The Gent[ernen’sClub---lnternational Control of Drugs and Alco-hol (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,1975).Carafa, Y., Arellano, S., and Uribe, M., Tratam-iento de la Temdtica & la Mujer en 10S Vanes delSur de Cochabamba (La Paz, Bolivia: U.S.Agency for International Development, 1987), In:Painter and Bedoya, 1991.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

Claudio, A., “United States-Colombia Extradi-tion Treaty: Failure of a Security Strategy, ”Military Review, 71:69-77, 1991.Cusack, J.T, “The International Narcotics Con-trol System: Coca and Cocaine,” D. Pacini and C.Franquemont (eds.), Coca and Cocaine: Effectson People and Policy in Latin America, CulturalSurvival Report #23 (Peterborough, NH: Tran-script Printing Company, 1986), pp. 65-71.Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), Cocha-barnba Regional Development Project (CORDEP)-Bolivia, Technical Proposal (Bethesda, MD:DAI, 1992).ECONSULT, Final Report on the Evaluation ofAID Project No. 527-0240evelopment of theAlto Huallaga Area (Lima, Peru: ECONSWTS.A., 1987).Epstein, E.J., Agency of Fear (New York, NY:G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1977).Healy, K., “Coca, the State, and the Peasantxy inBolivia, 1982 -1988,” Journal of InteramericanStudies and World Ajj4airs, 30:105-127, 1988.Jones, J. C., Farmer Perspectives on the Econom-ics and Sociology of Coca Production, IDAWorking Paper No. 77 (Binghamton, NY: Insti-tute for Development Anthropology, 1990).Jones, J. C., Institutional Analysis of the Programade DesarolloAlternativo Regionul (PDAR), Work-ing Paper (Binghamton, NY: Institute for Devel-opment Anthropology, 1991), In: Painter andBedoya, 1991.Kent, R., Regional Planning and the Subsecre-tariat for the Development of the Bolivian Tropics(La Paz, Bolivia: U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment, 1987).McNicoll, A., Drug Trafich”ng: A North-SouthPerspective (Washington, DC: North-South In-stitute, 1983).Musto, D.F., The American Disease: Origins ofNarcotics Control (New Haven, CR Yale Uni-versity Press, 1987).“Many in Colombia Resisting Use of a StrongHerbicide on Poppies,’ New York Times, Feb. 17,1992, A5,Organization of American States (OAS), Secretar-iat for Economic and Social Affairs, integratedRegional Development Planning: Guidelines andCase Studies from the OAS Experience, Depart-

98

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in

ment of Regional Development (Washington,DC: OAS, 1984), In: Painter and Bedoya, 1991.Painter, M., Institutional Analysis of the ChapareRegional Development Project (CRDP), WorkingPaper No. 59 (Binghamton, NY: Institute forDevelopment Anthropology, 1990), In: Painterand Bedoya, 1991.Painter, M., and Bedoya, E., ‘Institutional Analy-sis of the Chapare Regional Development Project(CRDP) and the Upper Huallaga Special Project(PEAH),” contractor report prepared for theOffice of Technology Assessment, July 1991.Painter, M., and Rasnake, R. N., “Human Dimen-sions of the War on Drugs,” IDA: DevelopmentAnthropology Network 7(2):8-16, 1989, In: Painterand Bedoya, 1991.Pool, D. J., Adams, C., Boonstra, C., and Morris,G. L., Evaluation of the Chapare Regional Devel-opment Project (Gainesville, FL: Tropical Re-search and Development, Inc., 1986), In: Painterand Bedoya, 1991.Rasnake, R. N., and Painter, M., Rural Develop-ment and Crop Substitution in Bolivia: USAIDand the Chupare Regional Development Project,Working Paper No. 45 (Binghamton, NY: Insti-tute for Development Anthropology, 1989), In:Painter and Bedoya, 1991.Spain, J. W., “The United States, Tbrkey, and thePoppy,” Middle East Journal, summer 1975, pp.295-301.Stevenson, B., “Post-Harvest Technologies toImprove Agricultural Profitability in Bolivia andthe Andean Region,’ contractor report preparedfor the Office of Technology Assessment, May1992.Subsecretm’a de Desarrollo Alternative y Susti-tuci6n de Cultivos de Coca (SUBDESAL), Marco

the Andean Region

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

Institutional Para Desarrollo Alternative y Susti -tuci6n de Cultivos de Coca (La Paz, Bolivia:SUBDESAL, Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinosy Agricukura, 1990), In: Painter and Bedoya,1991.U.S. Agency for International Development, AReview of AID’s Narcotics Control DevelopmentAssistance Program, AID Evaluation SpecialStudy No. 29 (Washington, DC: Agency forInternational Development, 1986).U.S. Agency for International Development, TribalAreas Development Project, Special Second Evalu-ation, PD-AAZ-101 (Washington, DC: USAID,1988).U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, Re-scission of the Opium Growing Ban by Turkey,Report to the Congress B-173123 (Washington,DC: U.S. Government Printing OffIce, Sept. 9,1974).U.S. Department of State, Bureau of InternationalNarcotics Matters (INM), In~ernational NarcoticsControl Strategy Report 1985 (Washington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985).U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Com-mittee on Foreign Affairs, Special Ad Hoc Sub-committee on International Narcotics Problems,Politics of the Poppy, Report of a Special StudyMission to Tbrkey: March 14-16, 1974, House ofRepresentatives Print 93-n.a. (Washington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974),Zentner, J. L., “The 1972 lhrkish Opium Ban:Needle in the Haystack Diplomacy?” WorldAfiairs 136(1):36-40, 1973.

—.

RenewableResource-BasedAlternatives to

Coca Production 4

T he geography and topography of the Andean regionprovide diverse ecological settings with a broad range ofnatural renewable resources. Developing and implementi-ng sustainable management of these renewable re-

sources could help improve food and fiber production fornational consumption and for export markets. Today, agricul-tural, forest, wildland and wildlife, and aquatic resources are allexploited to some extent. However, use of improved productionand management technologies could expand these activities andgenerate increased economic benefits. In terms of coca substitu-tion programs, greatest attention has been given to agricultureand some promising crops and cropping systems.

INTRODUCTIONAgroecosystems in the Andean coca-producing regions differ

markedly from the highly mechanized lowland agriculture prac-ticed, for example, on the great plains of North America. Rather,agriculture tends to be small-scale and distant from markets orpolitical or financial support, and extremes of topographypreclude extensive mechanization in most cases. The smallreturns for most farmers impede acceptance of new and poten-tially risky technology. High-input approaches to farming, char-acterized by the green revolution, are less applicable in thesesettings.

Moreover, the diversity of Andean environments does notfavor regional agricultural and agronomic planning. For exam-ple, almost 50 percent of Bolivian and Peruvian land area is steepslopes and highlands. Only about 10 percent of the total surfacearea of each country is suitable for row crop agriculture. Frequentfloods, droughts, and severe soil erosion make agriculturalproduction difficult in many areas.

99


The most fertile agricultural soils are alluvialdeposits in the valleys. Physical environmentalfeatures (e.g., soils, slope, erosion potential) canchange character markedly over short distances.Climatic features (e.g., precipitation patterns,winds, temperature) may vary with distances(especially altitudes) and time (season). Thisvariability means that a site-specific approachmust be applied to defining realistic technicalsolutions for coca substitution. Unfortunately,little site-specific information exists on climate,soils, or topography for some parts of the Andesand the prospects are minimal for gaining thisinformation in certain coca producing areas (e.g.,Alto Huallaga).

Intricate patterns of land uses and land tenurehave evolved over the years as a result ofdisparate cultural forces. Current agriculture inthe region is a mixture of pre-Columbian, Span-ish, and contemporary practices, many of whichare incompatible with one another. This situationfurther complicates development of alternativecrops and cropping systems. Nevertheless, signif-icant efforts have been invested in identifyingcrops and crop combinations that might improvethe value of agricultural activities in the Andeanregion. Largely, these efforts have focused onexport agriculture rather than enhancement of thedomestic food supply system. Difficulties inmoving these commodities to the internationalmarket, as well as in providing sufficient quantityand quality of product, have constrained alterna-tive crop efforts to date.

In addition to agricultural resources, forest,aquatic, and wildlife resource exploitation couldoffer alternative livelihoods. Tropical forest re-sources have received increased global attentionover the last several decades. Tropical timberexports were key in national economies in themid- 1900s and continue to command high pricesin the international market. Constraints to contin-ued or increased exploitation largely arise fromconcerns over conservation of biological diver-sity and potential adverse global environmentaleffects. Indeed, consumer boycotts of tropical

Simple processing and storage requirements makecocoa (Theobroma cacao) an attractive alternative inremote areas. Shown here is cocoa production in theAlto Beni, Bolivia.

hardwoods for these reasons are becoming morecommon. Nevertheless, there are opportunitiesfor sustainable timber production and forest con-servation and protection in the Andean region (71).

Tropical wildlife has been an important domes-tic and export resource in South America for atleast 400 years (70,72) and has been economicallyimportant. Unsustainable exploitation, however,increased concerns over species loss and led tointernational treaties and trade agreements toprotect rare, threatened, and endangered species(i.e., Convention on International Trade in Endan-gered Species). More recently, international con-servation organizations have focused on sustain-able development of wildlife resources. Potentialmarkets include hides and fibers, pet, meat, andother animal products (e.g., bone), and technolo-gies exist for managing a variety of amphibians,reptiles, fishes, birds, and mammals to providethese commodities. Nature-based tourism associ-ated with protection and conservation of wildlifeand wildland resources offers another opportunityfor increasing economic returns from conserva-tion activities (6).

Freshwater aquatic resources, largely fisheriesin lakes, rivers, and streams, currently occupy asmall share of national food production systems.

4—Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 101

Estimates suggest that current harvest is far belowoptimum sustainable yield for many species. Apaucity of data on the extent of Andean freshwa-ter resources hinders analysis of the potentialcontribution they could make to national foodproduction and economies. Yet, use of improvedpostharvest handling, storage, and transportationof fishery products alone could increase theircontribution. Additional opportunities lie in im-plementation of improved capture, resource resto-ration, and aquiculture technologies (101).

Opportunities exist for improving crop substi-tution programs and increasing their acceptabilityto local populations. Some crops, production andprocessing technologies, and markets are availa-ble. New crops that might improve the econom-ics of agricultural production have been identi-fied. However, further research will be needed toidentify appropriate cultivars, production tech-niques, and market potential. If substitutionprograms expand the range of resources ex-ploited, sustainable development technologies forforest, wildland and wildlife, and aquatic re-sources will be needed.

AGRICULTURAL RESOURCESCoca is grown mostly in the humid tropic

regions of the Andean countries of Bolivia, Peru,and Colombia. While little variation in tempera-ture is evident among the coca growing zones,precipitation variation is obvious (table 4- 1). Thedifficulties faced by agriculture in such areas arewell known (49,55,98). Many problems are re-lated directly to high rainfall and temperatureregimes that promote nutrient leaching, poor soil

Table 4-l-Temperature and Rainfall ofMajor Coca Production Zones

Mean annual Rainfalltemperature (C) (mm)

BoliviaChapare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-25

ColombiaAmazon a . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22-26coffee belt . . . . . . . . . . . . 20-24

PeruAlto Huallaga . . . . . . . . . 22-26Central Hullaga . . . . . . . 21-25Central Urubamba..... 21-25Ene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-25Gran Pajonal . . . . . . . . . 21-25La Convention . . . . . . . . 22-24Mayo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-25Pachitea a . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-25Palcazu a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-25Pichisa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-25Tambo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23-25Yurimaguasa . . . . . . . . . . 23-25

2,500-5,000

2,500-5,0001,000-1,900

2,500-3,5001,400-1,9002,000-2,5001,700-1,9001,700-1,900

n.d.n.d.

2,000-3,5004,000-8,0002,500-3,5001,700-1,9002,000-2,500

a Little diurnal temperature variation.n.d. = no data.

SOURCE: H. Villachica, C. Lescano, J. Lazarte, and V. Chumbe,“Estudio de oportunidades de inversion en desarrollo e industriali-zacion de cultivos tropicales en Pucallpa,” Perfil de proyectopara Ia planta de coloantes naturales yu para la planta de conservas depalmito, Convenio FUNDEAGRO, Region Ucayali, Lima Peru, 1992.

composition, low fertility, and rapid growth ofpest problems. All of these features can lead toincreasing dependence on external inputs (e.g.,pesticides, fertilizers, fuels) and affect the typesof agricultural opportunities available to farmers.

Distinct changes in the agricultural sectorresulting from the expansion of the cocaineeconomy complicate efforts to improve agricul-tural profitability. As production of coca leafbecame agronomically and economically attrac-

1 This section was drawn largely from the following contracted background papers:H. Villachic& “Crop Diversification in Bolivia Colombi% and Peru: Potential to Enhance Agricultural Production, ” contractor report

prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, April 1992.S. Gliessmam “Diversification and Multiple Cropping as a Basis for Agricultural Alternatives in Coca Producing Regions, ” contractor

report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, February 1992.B. McD. Stevenson, “Post-Hamest Technologies to Improve Agricultural Profitability,” contractor report prepared for the OffIce of

Technology Assessment, March 1992.A. Chavez, “Andean Agricultural Research and Extension Systcms and Technology Transfer Activities: Potential Mechanisms To Enhance

Crop Substitution Efforts in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, ” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, December1991.


tive, many farmers abandoned livestock raisingand other crop production systems. Some localtraditional agriculture systems were abandoned aswell. Larger areas were deforested, more cocaplanted, and less time and energy were invested intraditional agriculture. This increasingly affluentagricultural sector developed a dependence onimported purchased food and experienced a shiftin aspirations.

While the agricultural sectors in Bolivia, Peru,and Colombia are diverse, some similaritiesamong producers and farm size are evident inprimary coca producing regions. Producers tendto be semi-commercial (i.e., producing subsis-tence crops along with some cash crops includingcoca), production units are small (e.g., 20 hectareunits or less are common); and production sys-tems tend to be labor intensive. The remote natureof the producing zones means that inputs maybecostly and difficult to obtain and markets (otherthan at the “farm-gate”) are difficult to reach.Coca plays a key role in farm income.

Crop substitution strategies must work on twofronts. Development of new production optionsfor the coca producing regions must be comple-mented by development in areas from whichmigrant coca growers and laborers come. Na-tional and international assistance and researchorganizations support efforts to identify andexpand opportunities for new crops that canreplace coca in the agricultural economy (105).Primary categories through which agriculturalprofitability might be increased in the cocagrowing regions of the Andean nations include:

Diversifying production,

Intensifying production,

Improving production efficiency, andIncreasing the value of products throughprocessing (chapter 5).

Current crop substitution efforts focus on diversi-fying production by incorporating high valuecrops. However, attention is being given increas-ingly to the latter categories.

Despite the potential for improving productionthrough innovative cropping systems, the accept-ability to producers comprises an importantconcern. Social and economic advantages mustaccompany improved systems. Crop diversification,increased market options, reductions in directcosts and risks, and increased opportunities forinvolvement for all members of the family orcommunity become critical components of ac-ceptable alternative systems.

1 Diversifying Agricultural ProductionDiversifying agricultural production by incor-

porating high-value crops into production sys-tems offers one approach to expand alternativesfor agricultural populations and allows an incre-mental evolution from a coca-based productionsystem to one based on legitimate markets.Indeed, this approach is the basis of traditionalcrop substitution efforts, and ongoing researchfocuses on identifyng high-value traditional andnontraditional crops suitable to local agriculturalproduction systems.

Inherent in the diversification strategy is theability of farmers to continue to provide for theirbasic needs during the development stage of thenew production system. For example, manycropping systems require 3 to 5 years of effortprior to realization of profit (105,122). Cocacould be maintained as a cash source during thisperiod although it seems counter to substitutionprogram goals. However, such an approach couldoffer an alternative to costly agricultural subsi-dies.

Research has focused on a variety of crops thatcould be suitable for local, regional, national, andinternational markets. Largely this research ismarket driven and focuses on grains, industrialcrops, fruits and nuts, and spices. Blending ofthese crops into traditional food production sys-tems is another important feature of these efforts.In this way, producers continue to provide forbasic food and fiber needs while developingopportunities to generate cash through marketing.


Table 4-2—Cropping Patterns of theChapare, Bolivia

Hectares PercentCrop (thousands) Percent of total

AnnualsCorn . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 9.00/0 2.7%Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.0 54.3 16.8Yuca . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3 36.1 11.2

PerennialsBanana . . . . . . . . . . . 19.8 24.0 16.6Citrus . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 7.9 5.46Coca . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55.9 67.8 46.9Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.3 2.5

SOURCE: Development Alternatives, Inc., “Environmental Assess-ment of the Chapare Regional Development Project, Bolivia, ” DAI,Bethesda, MD, 1990, In: Stevenson, 1992.

The range of potential commodities that couldoffer agricultural alternatives is restricted to acertain extent by the environmental features ofcoca growing areas. Box 4-A describes somecrops identified as potential alternatives. Al-though the list is not exhaustive, it illustrates therange of crop types that might be considered andblended into existing production systems,

Most crop subst i tut ion s trategies in theChapare region of Bolivia involve some combina-tion of soil-conserving perennial crops and annualcash crops for immediate returns (table 4-2).Research in annual crops concentrates on maize,rice, beans, and yuca; the perennials program isfocused on citrus, coffee, cocoa, and pepper.Other research deals with production and man-agement of cattle, pigs, and poultry.

Efforts are also underway to examine essentialoils (e.g., eucalyptus, pyrethrum oils); naturalplant chemicals (e.g., xanthophyll); spices (e.g.,piper nigrum); tropical fruits (e.g., pineapple,passionfruit, bananas, carambola); and nuts (e.g.,macadamia). Pineapples and bananas seem to bepromising in terms of fresh export and there hasbeen some success with shipments to Argentinaand northern Chile. Nontraditional crops of tur-meric (Curcuma domestica) and ginger (Zingiberofficinale) demonstrate export potential and pro-duction is underway at a trial level. Several other

Pineapple is being produced as an alternative crop inthe Chapare, Bolivia. Private sector investment in alocal processing facility for Chapare and Santa Cruzpineapples may promote the value of production.

crops from the areas may have potential forincreased profitability, including garlic, onions,peanuts, anise, cumin, and perennial fruit crops.Although export potential for many of these cropsis low, improved postharvest practices couldcontribute to higher quality and greater economicreturns.

A number of agricultural products are beingindustrialized, including: tea, banana, kudzu, yuca,mint, and lemon grass. In addition, a coffeeproduction and processing industry is beingdeveloped in the Chapare. The scale of existingproduction and the 5-year potential for productionincreases for these crops are shown in table 4-3.Achieving this potential will require investmentin producing plant material, promoting the crops


Box 4-A–Alternative Crops

Alternative crop research poses an immense problem because of the numerous, and sometimes competing,requirements associated with identifying legitimate crops that can compete with a “black madcet’ activity. Not onlymust crops be suitable to agroecoiogical conditions, they must possess quaiities that make them socioculturaliyacceptable and economically attractive. This is a tail order for any research activity. Research in the Andeancountries has focused on annual grain crops, industrial crops, commercial fruits, nuts, and specialty crops (e.g.,spices, fibers, dyes). The foilowing briefly describes some of these crops.

Annatto (f3hcawe//ana): Annatto (also Achiote) isa native plant from the Amazon region. The plant chemicalbixin is extracted from the seeds and has commercial value as a naturai dye. Peru currently suppiies 40 percentof the international bixin market. Substitution efforts in Bolivia have begun to work on increasing Annattoproduction. Primary production concerns include the highly variabie yields and bixin content of seeds (2.5 to 3percent), appropriate pianting densities, difficulties in biending annatto with other crops because of its fast-growingnature (although some success has been noted in annattokowpea combinations), and high hand iaborrequirements. Piant breeding efforts are focusing on increasing yields and the bixin content of seeds (up to 4percent) and developing cultivars suitabie to iow-fertility, acid soiis. High hand labor requirements might be

addressed through harvest and threshing mechanization. Improved processing technques could provide productswith higher bixin content (increasing from 30 to 35 percent to 90 to95 percent). The trend toward natural dyes mayincrease market opportunities for annatto production. Annatto seems to be relatively free of pests and diseaseproblems.

Araza (Hqw?ia stlplfafa): Arazaisatropical fruit tree native to the Amazon region, aithough it is not yet widelycultivated. Whiie the tree is tolerant of acid, iow-fertility soiis, best production is observed in well-managed andproperty fertilized fields. Primary production concerns include the relative lack of agronomic technology forcultivation, ptanting densities and field management to obtain optimum production, and fertilizer requirements.Improved production techniques, inciuding promising ecotypes and associated nursery and fieid managementneeds, are current research areas. Fruit production begins 1 year after transplanting with finai height reached by6to 7 years, aithoughthis is affected bysoilfertility. Araza’s slow growth rate allows intercropping with crops suchas cassava or turmeric, thereby generating benefits during the field development stage. However, there is nointernational market for araza currently. The high acid content precludes fresh consumption but it can be used forjuice, dried fruit, and ice cream flavoring.

Bananas (lWsa sp.): Bananas currentiy are produced in coca-growing zones and some success with exporthas been noted in Boiivia Banana is a traditional wop in the Andean region and thus adoption is nota key concern.Further, since farmers already are familiar with banana production they could be more responsive to extension

efforts to improve production. Primary production concerns include need for eveniy distributed rainfall, highsunlight requirements, fertilizer requirements, need for iow wind conditions, and soil condition (deep with highorganic matter content). Research is needed on improved varieties to enter export markets, appropriate plantingdensities, improved propagule selection, carefui field management (e.g., weeding and thinning) to sustainproduction, and postharvest technologies. A number of pests and diseases affect bananas; however, chemicaiand management techniques exist to controi the most devastating of these.

Black Pepper (F@ern@m): Black pepper is being cultivated to some extent in or near coca-growing regionsin the Andean countries. Pepper is a climbing shrub and requires a support to grow on. Either posts or trees maybe used as supports and production techniques exist for both systems. National research institutes are workingto improve production technology, and potential exists for technology transfer from current producing countries.Key needs include improved cultivars (for increased yield and pest resistance), propagation, and seedlingmanagement. Production concerns include field preparation, soii condition (e.g., well-drained, aerated, high

4-Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 105

organic matter content), fertilizer needs, and high labor requirements during establishment and harvest phases.Systems have been developed that intercrop pepper with ginger or cassava during the early growth stages, andadditional work in China indicates potential for pepper, rubber, and tea systems. Primary pests include fungi andnematodes and while chemical controts are available, they are costly. Despite high Iabr requirements forproduction, primary processing is relatively simple and generally involves sundrying and threshing.

Brazii nut (Bertho#elia excekw): Brazii nut trees are not found in most coca-growing zones and a somewhatiengthydeveiopment period may hinder plantation development. Under cuitivatedconditions, nut production maybegin in 8 to 10 years after planting or if trees are grafted this may be shortened to6 years. Production concernsIargeiy center on the need for weii-drained soiis and the iengthy period from initialization to production. Braziiianresearchers have developed techniques for brazii nut production and cro~”ng systems. Further work conductedin Peru indicates some potentiai for mixed systems of brazii nut, cassava, rice, and tahiti lime. in fact, intercroppingwith other fruit trees may increase nut production by maintaining pollinator populations during the time the nut tree

is not fiowering. Testing is still in initiai stages and there are no accurate estimations of potential income. Areaswhere the tree currently exkts and coca is expanding, or areas where it is iikeiy to expand, may provide the bestpossibilities for introducing this type of production system.

Cardamom (Hettaria cadamonwrrt): Cardamom, a high-vaiue spice, is not native to the Andean region,although it has been identified as a potential alternative crop. Shade is important for cardamom growth but the piantwili produce in poorly drained soii. This combination may offer an opportunity for farmers to crop some of their iowerquality production areas. Propagation by rhizome aiiowscardamom production within 3 years, butthe susceptibilityof rhizomes to mosdc virus detracts from this approach. Seed is being used increasingly, however, developmenttime increases to 5 years and seeds iose their viability quickly. Cardamom has been incorporated in someCoiombian cropping systems in an effort to diversify coffee and it is being introduced in Bolivia and Peru.Constraints to expansion inciude the lack of a Iocai market and that the international market currentiy is satisfiedby Asian and Central American production.

Citrus (Orange, Mandarin, Tangelos): Citrus production requires rather specific soil andciimaticconditions.However, it is suitabie for the Chapare, Aito Hualiaga, Upper Mayo, and Coiombianpiedmont. Orange productioniargely wouid be directed to the juice market whiie mandarin and tangeio production have potential for freshmarkets. intercropping systems incorporating citrus are used wideiy in current production areas. Primaryproduction concerns include soii conditions (e.g., well-aerated, deep soiis), market size, and processing optionsfor smali communities. Pests and diseases are weli known+Ms, aphids, fruit fries, root rq triste~ and exocortis.Tolerant varieties are available and other management methods exist to prevent virai infections.

Cocoa (Theobr’oma cacao): Cocoa k cultivated in coca-growing areas of Peru and, to a iesser extent, inCoiombia and Bolivia. Research undertaken in Coiombia, Brazii, Ecuador, and Costa Rica has focused onimproved cultivars, nursery management, planting densities, cropping systems, agrichemicai needs, andpostharvest processing. Additional research needs include: matching varieties to ecological zones, seedproduction and availability, shade management for new fieids, and intercropping systems for cocoa and othersubsistence or economic crops. Eveniy distributed rainfaii and soii pti factors are primary production concerns forcocoa. Coma is affected by severai disease~”tches broom, biack pod, and moniiia. Cultivation and harvestpractices can combat witches broom and black pod infestation (i.e., tree pruning, frequent harvest), while moniliacurrentiy is oniy controlled through pesticide applications.

Coffee (Coffea arabica): Coffee seems toofferthe ciosest economic aiternativetococain some regions andproduction methods and cuitivars exist for shade and sun coffee. However, cocagrowing regions that do notexperience sufficient cfiurnai temperature variation may not tM suitable since coffee requires such shifts forripening. Primary production concerns inciude soii drainage, nursery management, and pest- and temperature-resistant cultivars. Coffee is affected by a number of pests and diseases (e.g., insects, nematodes, fungi), although

(conthwd on next page)


Box 4-A-Continuedthe cherry borer and yellow rust pose the prhnary problems. Pestiddes and tolerant varieties are available toreduce the adverse impact of pest infestations on productkm. Research supported by the Colombian NationalCoffee Growers Association (NCGA) has contributed significantly to salving a number of productkM problems.

Macadamia (hfac@m hintegrfibilaand MacadarrI& tetraphyk): Macadam iaproduction ty@cal& requireswell-drained fertile SW with high organic matter content. Low temperatures can reduce nut production and thetree is very susceptible to freezing. This aspect may pose some difficulty for expansion in the Chapare, whereseasonal winds can bring temperatures as low as 6 degrees C. Production concerns focus on the need forappropriate fertilizer regimes to sustain pnxluction. Current iow grafting success (i.e., only 15 to 20 percent) hashhxteredexpansionin Bdiviaand Peru, although efforts areongdngtoprornote macadamlaproductbn. The treeis suitable forinterplanting with annual crops or coffee orottwrtrees during eariy years and thus could be integratedinexistingproduction systems. Pests anddiseasesthat attack macadamiahwktethebladc bee, ants, nut borers,rats, root diseases, and fungi; yet controt measures are available, atthough in some cases expensive. Interest inproduction is increasing because ofongdng substitution programs. However, market is largely internatkmal andthus will require concomitant infrastructure development

Passion fruit (I%ssha eduh): Passion fruit is a fast growing tropical vine andfmit production may beginas early as 8 to 10 months after transplanting from the nursery. While two varieties exist the fladcwpavarietyseems to be more suitable to the temperature conditions of the Andean region. Seed production is prdificand thusdoes not pose aconstraint to increased production. The fast grwth rate, however, affects passion fruit’s suitabilityfor h?tercropping systems, although it may be assodated with short-season ~ turmek Phwappie, or asa nurse species for estabhhing another crop. Primary production concerns include high cost of posts to allow thevine to climb, pruning and fertilizing to sustain production, and need for hand labor. Insects and worms are theprimary pests although control measures have been identified. Fungal pathogens can becontrolledbyappropdatefield management that ensures good soil drainage. Although internal and external market conditions are good,improved fiefd management techniques and harvest andprocesdng opportunities coukf increase the profitabilityof passion fruit production.

Peach palm (6actrk@ws@aes): Peach palm is native in many of the coca-growing regions of the Andeancountries. The tree iscultivatedfor fruit and palm heart with the latter being more economically attractive. Prfrnaryproduction concerns include need for wail-distributed rainfall and dry periods, fertilizers, and near access toprocessing fa”lities. Harvests can be made within 18 to 20 months after planting. The patm has a high rate ofsucker production allowing for3t04 harvests per year. Instituto Nacional de lnvestigack5nAgrariay Agrolndustrial(INIM) in Peru has been working on production technology since 1985, inctuding seedling types, transplantingtechniques, and appropriate p!antingdensities. Peach Palmcanbeintegrated with other cropsat tower densities,but shading by the palm may preclude certain spedes;cassavacan be planted prior to the palm to provide shadeand income until the palm outshades it. Few problems with pests or diseases are noted and currently most canbecontrolledthrough good field management efforts (e.g., cultivation). Peach palm has been identified asoneofthe most promising alternative crops. However, efforts would be needed toexpandthe cwre~ small wcrld marketfor palm hearts.

Pineapple (Ananas comosus): Traditional pineapple production is largely dependent on hand iabor andalthough traditional varieties tend to have low yietds, fields may produce for6to 10 years. Improved yield cultivarshave been developed, however the production per-d length is shortened significantly (Le., 11/2 to 3 years).

Production concerns include improved cultivars (smooth cayenne), planting densities, fertilizer programs, soilpreparation, and flower induction to increase yield and speed time to first harvest The shattow rooting systemmakes pineapple extremely susceptible to competition and higher planting densities make it difficultto intercropsuccessfully. Numerous pests and diseases affect pineapple production, although chemical and cultural controlsexist. Some of these problems maybe reduced by using traditional varieties resistant to fungi although there isa trade-off with yields.


Rice (Oryza sativa): Increased rice production opportunities Iargelylie in import substitution. Research hasidentified high-yielding cultivars for certain production systems (e.g., alluvial and flooded systems), althoughvarieties appropriate to upland coca zones are scarce. Primary production oonoerns indude agrichemicalrequirements, field preparation (e.g., land bevelling which is costly and if done improperly can pose problems forwater management), improved water management, and equipment. Fungal diseases pose the largest pestproblems for rice production, and fungicides to treat these diseases are costly. Development ofdisease-resistantvarieties could improve opportunities for expanded rioe production.

Silk: Mulberry/silk production systems are being promotedin Colombia asanalternative toeoca. Productiontechnologies are well-known and easily available and technical assistance and credit opportunities exist for silkproduction in Colombia. Primary production concerns indude the susceptibility of silkworms to agrichemicalsrequiring an organic production approach, establishment of “casetas” to house the silkworms, and availability oftransportation to processing sites. Silk markets are well-established and, with quality cocoons, should be open toAndean production.SOURCE: H. Villachiea, “Crop Diversification in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru: Potential to Enhance Agrfodtural ProductIon,” contractorreport prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, April 1992. P. Oonway, “Silk For Liffiroject Proposal,” Silk for Lifa, Madison,Wwxmsin, January 1991.

through extension programs, establishing post- Considerable agricultural research has beenharvest and marketing infrastructure, increasing conducted in Peru’s Arnazonia, covering agro-availability of credit and private investment, and ecological conditions horn the tropical highlandsexpanding market opportunities through product to the lowlands. Research programs and projectspromotion in local and foreign markets (105). have addressed production problems in a variety

InstitutoBoliviano de Tecrwlog{aAgropecuaria- of crops (e.g., rice, maize, grain-legumes, oil-Chapare (IBTA-Chapare) research focuses on seeds, tobacco, coffee, cocoa, tropical fruits, andidentifying profitable agricultural options suita- palrns) as well as tropical soils management,ble to the producers and markets in the Chapare. tropical pastures, livestock production systems,These efforts indicate that a variety of agroecol- and forestry. Research programs conducted in theogically suitable production options are available. 1980s increased yields and reduced production

Yet, factors such as credit and market availability costs for rice, maize, potatoes, and beans, thus

seem to detetie the acceptability of identifkd opening new technology options for the average

options. Thus, setting speciilc research priorities producer in Peru. These programs yielded a

will continue to be difficult until marketing substantial number of new varieties and cultivars

studies are completed for some of the identifkd adapted to diverse agroecological conditions and

alternatives (e.g., perennial tree crops). Lack of cropping techniques (79).

farmer representation in the project and lack of Several research centers located in the Ama-transition production systems2 further constrain zonian and Orinoquian regions of Colombia have

setting realistic research and extension priorities been active in developing high-yielding cultivars,

(22). Nevertheless, on-farm research and the and applying improved technology and manage-production systems approach are valuable meth- ment practices to support agricultural expansion.

orological tools arising from the Chapare project For example, high-yielding soybean varieties led

(box 4-B). to a 5-fold production area increase since 1985

2 Transition systems are based on gradual reduction of coca cultivation and involve development of production schemes that integrate coca

with legitimate crops. This approach offers security to risk-averse farmers during the lag time between planting alternative crops and receivingeconomic benefits.

Table 4-3-Current Production and Potential Increase of Some Alternative Crops in the Chapare, Bolivia

Value ofMature crop Total production Value of product Potential Potential (5 yr) increased production

Current planted production average in the region (FOB Chapare) developed areas increase in total area (U.S.$)Crop area (ha) (m f/ha) (ret) (U.S.$)

Achiote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(ha) (ha) (1991 prices)

135 1.00 20.0 20,000 23,200 1,000 1,000,000Bananas-Total . . . . . . . . . . 14,000 13.00 2,000.0 160,000 28,000 1,000

Export . . . . . . . . . . . 2,000 500 727,000National. . . . . . . . . . 12,000 174,000.0 3,300,000 500 142,000Industry . . . . . . . . . 40,000.0

Citrus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20,000 40.00 800,000.0 12,000,000 27,000 1,000 600,000Coffee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 0.80 59.2 17,500 6,750 200 47,000Ginger ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 13.00 106.0 42,000 2,000 50 264,000Passion Fruit . . . . . . . . . . . 5,620

Export . . . . . . . . . . . 21 10.00 15.0 4,000 300 810,000National. . . . . . . . . . 75.0 2,100 100 270,000Industry . . . . . . . . . 120.0 32,500

Pepper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 0.80 4.0 4,000 5,070 100 80,000Pineapple-Total . . . . . . . . . 274 13.50 582.0 3,100 500 891,000

Export . . . . . . . . . . . 150 128,000National. . . . . . . . . . 978.0 110,000 500 2,700,000Industry/losses . . . . 1,082.0 146,000

Tea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 5.50 302.5 49,000 7,500 200 178,000Turmeric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 10.00 120.0 12,229 1,500 500 510,000Yuca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,000 19.00 95,000.0 4,400,000 1,000 873,000

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53,779 20,446,229 109,740 7,450 9,092,000

KEY: FOB = Freight on board/shipping point; mt = metric ton.

SOURCE: B. McD. Stevenson, “Post-Harvest Technologies to Improve Agricultural Profitability,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, March 1992.

--


Box 4-B—Examples of Successful Bolivian Research and Extension Efforts

The most dynamic agricultural region in Bolivia is the eastern plains, with 50 percent of national agriculturalland. Only 20 percent of the population, concentrated mostly around Santa Cruz, occupy this region. This areais likely to provide the most immediate agricultural expansion in Bolivia, and some successes can already be cited.Soybean production, for example, has jumped from 67,000 hectares in 1965 to almost 150,000 hectares in 1966,accompanied by an average productivity increase of 20 percent. A new high-yielding cultivar (Totai) developedby Centro de Investigack$n Agrkxla Tropical (CIAT) has been instrumental to this development. ClAT’s work onother aspects of soybean production is outlined in a manual w“dely distributed among extension workers. CIATsoybean recommendations are based on field trials and open discussion of results.

Bolivia’spositive experience with soybean improvements can be attributed to several factors: Bolivia took fulladvantage of foreign technical development (in this case, genetic material and agronomic practices from Brazil)and the active involvement of private interests and collective action. CIAT used practical and effective methodsof technical diffusion; and extensionists from private entities were trained and backed by CIAT to solve specifictechnical problems and to reach farmers with sound technical recommendations.

Another example of effective research and extension work in the Santa Cruz area is seen in CIAT and theAsociaci6n de Productores de Oleaginosas y Trigo (ANAPO) 5-year plan for expanding wheat production toreduce wheat imports. ~is plan is supported by the recent removal of wheat import subsidies and P.L. 460 wheatsales. The Bolivian Government also will allocate revenues from P.L. 480 wheat imports to support research andextension and to finance seed production and marketing. An agreement between ANAPO and Santa Cruz’s millindustry guarantees a minimum price for local wheat.

First year production under the plan (40,000 metric tons) was double the plan goal for that year, and savedthe Bolivian economy an estimated $6 million in wheat imports. Bolivia’s success with wheat, as with soybeans,can be attributed in part to technology and experience borrowed from neighboring countries. The specific wheatvariety used (Cordilleraz) came from Paraguay; ANAPO traded soybean seed for wheat seed of this variety. Forits part, CIAT has developed a comprehensive technology package for wheat production and is trainingextensionists.

Another success story is that of the Instituto Boliviano de Technologia Agropecuario (IBTA) research inquinoa. New varieties with low saponin content have led to a wider consumption of this traditional product. IBTAalso has produced barley varieties widely adopted in highland production areas. These and other of IBTA’sresearch successes are in the form of specific projects financed by external sources. As such, they have beenisolated from IBTA’s financial and institutional instability.

Finally, a long-term joint effort by the Bolivian Government, Cooperaci6n T6cnica Suiza (COTESU), andCentro lnternacional de la Papa (CIP) to increase potato production throughout Bolivia with high-quality seed hasbeen reaping results. Proyecto de lnvestigaci6n de la Papa (PROIMPA) takes a multidisaplinary approach to thisgoal. Specific project areas include plant genetics, entomology, phytopathofogy, hematology, postharvestphysiology, seed production technology, and socioeconomic. A complementary Dutch-supported project,Proyecto de SemiHa de Papa (PROSEMPA), is aimed at strengthening local and regional capacities to producecommerical high-quality potato seed. PROSEMPA is basically a technology transfer/extension effort directlyrelevant to producers’ problems and market realities.SOURCE: A. Chavez, “Andean Agricultural Research and Extension Systems and Technology Transfer Activities: Potential Mechanismsto Enhance Crop Substitution Efforts in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment,December 1991.


and yield increases. Other crops being examinedfor expansion include rice, oil palm, mace,sorghum, cassava, and tropical fruits. In addition,research on tropical pasture and soil managementis performed at the Macagual Regional ResearchCenter in the Amazonian region. Results from theOrinoquia could be transferred to other areas ofthe Colombian Amazon, although such an effortwould require greater investment in extensionactivities (22).

I Intensifying Agricultural ProductionDiverse, multiple cropping3 systems have a

history in the Andean coca growing regions andthus provide a likely starting point for intensify-ing agricultural production (46). Sustainablesystems that preserve the natural renewableresource base and provide long-term environ-mental and economic benefits to farmers areneeded (box 4-C).

MULTIPLE CROPPINGTraditional multiple cropping systems make

use of locally available resources and provide forlocal consumption needs while also contributingto regional or national markets. The key feature ofmultiple cropping systems is the intensification ofproduction to include temporal and spatial dimen-sions (box 4-D). Production focuses on long-termsustainability of the system. The continued pro-ductivity of traditional multiple cropping systemsprovides the kind of social and ecological stabil-ity that modern monoculture systems have notachieved.

Multiple cropping can have a definite advan-tage over monoculture systems (46,40,57,128)(e.g., total crop yield can be greater than thatachieved in monoculture systems). In some cases,the yield of one crop may be lower than undermonoculture, but the yield of the companion crop

is sufficiently greater to offset any loss. LandEquivalent Ratios-the amount of land needed inmonoculture to produce a yield equal to thatachieved through intercropping of two or morecrops-developed for a number of commontropical crops indicate that greater productionmay be achieved through intercropping comparedto monoculture (57,111) (figure 4-l). Of course,crop complementarily and proper crop mixturesmust be determined to achieve such results.

Multiple cropping systems mimic the energyand nutrient cycling processes of natural ecosys-tems. Characteristics common to natural andmultiple cropping systems include:

. Return of organic matter to the soils (enhanc-ing nutrient cycling, improving fertility, andreducing needs for external inputs);

3 Multiple cropping, nuked cropping, andpolyculture are terms used to describe agricultural systems that incorporate spatial and temporaIdimensions in production. For the purposes of this discussion, such systems will be referred to as multiple cropping.

4 Sustainable refers to the ability of an agroecosystem to improve or maintain production over many generations despite long-termecologicxd constraints and disturbances or social and economic pressures (3).

— .-


Box 4-D-Classification of Types of Multiple-Cropping Systems

Multiple cropping is the intensification of cropping intimeand space dimensions generally defined by growingof two crops in the same field within the same year. This type of cropping maybe further defined as intercroppingor sequential cropping.

Intercropping: Growing of two or more crops simultaneously in the same field. Crop intensification is in timeand space dimensions. However, under this system, potential for competition and growth interference exists duringall or part of the growth period. Thus, crop complementarily is a key concern in developing production systems.Varieties of intercropping include:

. Mixed intercrqoping-growing two or more crops simultaneously with no distinct row arrangement,

. Row intercropph?~rowing two or more crops simultaneously with one or more crops planted in rows,

. Strip inter’croppi~lanting crops in strips wide enough to permit independent cultivation but closeenough for them to interact agronomically, and

● F/e/ayintercfoppin~rowing crops simultaneously for some part of each others life cycle. Typically, thesecond crop is planted after the first has reached a certain growth stage but before the first crop is readyfor harvest.

Sequential cropping: growing two or more crops in sequence on the same field each year. The succeedingcrop is planted after the first crop has been harvested. There is only temporal intensification and no intercropinterference or interaction. Sequential cropping maybe further defined based on the number of crops incorporatedin the crop year (e.g., double, triple, quadruple, and ratoon cropping).SOURCE: S. Gliessman, “Diversification and Multiple Cropping as a Basis for Agricultural Altemativee in Coca Producing Regions,”contractor reporl prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, February 1992.

. Soil conditioning (e.g., improving soil mois- focused on the potential for beneficial associa-ture storage, increasing soil biota popula-tions, soil stabilization);

. Plant diversity;

● Suitability to varied soil, topographic, andaltitude conditions; and

● Efficient resource capture due to the variedrooting geometies, canopy patterns, andbeneficial associations with other ecosystemcomponents (e.g., nitrogen fining soil bacte-ria).

Under the moist tropical conditions of most

tions among early planted crops and later crops.These early crops improve microcli.matic condi-tions so that growth of later, often more econom-ically important, crop species is enhanced (122).Such advantage reaches its greatest point whenmutualistic or symbiotic relationships occur thatpermit plants in mixtures to do better than whenplanted alone (45). The ideal mixture providesincome and food for the family.

Largely, coca farmers are smallholders andproduce a composite of subsistence crops and

coca. Risk aversion is a kev feature of thesecoca production zones, farmers produce a variety production systems. There are-numerous socioec-of crops per year under a sequential cropping onomic advantages of multiple cropping systemssystem. This requires timely harvests, appropriate commired with monocukure svstems for thecultiva.rs, and proper sequencing to minimize

.h~d tropic regions, including:

potential negative interactions. It can be ex-panded to forma continuum from strict sequential o Reduced risk from market changes, pest

cropping to relay intercropping for additional infestation, and climatic variability;

beneficial effects. Indeed, much of the agronomic . Greater energy cycling (reducing the need

research conducted in the Andean nations has for costly external inputs);


1.0

0.712lu

8 0.5

Figure 4-l—Land Equivalent Ratios

●

●

●

Harvest periods throughout the year (provid-ing better annual distribution of income andfarm labor needs/opportunities);

Faster returns (earnings) from combiningshort-, medium- and long-term crops; and

A diversity of products (reducing the needfor purchased supplies such as fuelwood andconstruction materials).

Multiple cropping systems are more complexthan monoculture systems, having greater agro-

nomic and biological diversity and a greater needfor hand labor. In coca zones where labor isexpensive, therefore, these systems might beeconomically handicapped. Improved yields arehighly dependent on appropriate system struc-ture. A large body of traditional knowledge ofmultiple cropping systems remains in the Andeancountries and could provide a research andextension resource for improving multiple crop-ping systems.

AGROFORESTRYIncorporating trees in multiple cropping sys-

tems—agroforestry--is a traditional tropical andsubtropical agricultural practice. The objective ofmost agroforestry systems is to generate diverseproducts, reduce external input requirements, andsustain resource productivity (44).

Agroforestry systems may be designed toproduce trees with crops, trees with livestock, ortrees with crops and livestock. The level ofcomplexity increases along the continuum. Gen-erally, little soil disturbance is involved once theagroforestry system is developed. The environ-mental benefits of agroforestry are well-identifiedand the principal limitations to widespread useare largely economic, social, and technological.

Home gardens have the greatest complexitybut also offer the greatest product diversity. Awidely used agroforestry system in tropical areas,home gardens are broadly defined as a piece ofland with definite boundaries usually near ahouse, occupying an area generally between 0.5and 2.0 hectares (2,21 ,78). They are an integratedsystem of humans, plants, animals, soils andwater, with trees playing key roles in ecology andmanagement. Home gardens tend to be rich inplant species, usually dominated by woody peren-nials, and generally have multistoried canopies(1,23). A mixture of annuals and perennials ofdifferent heights form layers of vegetation resem-bling a natural forest structure. The high diversityof species permits year-round harvesting of food,fuelwood, medicinal plants, spices, and ornarnen-tal plants (24,47,48).


Home gardens are a common feature of tropicalagriculture. This diversified home garden agroforestrysystem in Costa Rica generates multiple productsincluding banana, papaya, and pineapple.

Much of the coca production region is charac-terized by brush fallow and poor second-growthforest that could be used for agroforestry. TheU.S. Agency for International Development (AID)sponsored research in the Chapare region sug-gests that many of the promising agriculturalalternatives to coca are nontraditional tree crops,such as macadamia and peach palm and long-cycle perennials such as passion fruit and blackpepper (4). Incorporating these economic cropsinto an agroforestry system could provide in-creased economic and environmental benefits forproducers.

Agroforestry systems are being developed byInstituto Nacional de Investigación Agraria yAgroindustrial (INIAA) in Peru incorporatingcassava or beans, fruit trees, and timber species(Schizolobiurn amazonicum or Guazuma crinita).This combination allows producers to use theirlow fertility soils unsuitable to production ofother crops. Although the income generationcapability of this system is low in the initial years,when the timber species becomes harvestable (6to 8 years) it could generate as much as U.S.$1,500/ha with harvests being made every 3 years(122). Hand labor and investment requirementsfor this system are low. However, potential forpest infestations is likely to be higher in the

mature timber monoculture and could createadditional maintenance costs.

Potential also exists for interplanting timberspecies in coca fields to diversify production.While coca cultivation would benefit timbergrowth, it also would provide a source of incomefor the farmer until the trees are harvestable.Ultimately, the trees will shade out the coca andreduce production. Such a ‘‘natural’ eradicationscheme initially may need to be coupled withother incentives (e.g., subsidies to maintain theforest until maturity) to encourage adoption.

Despite the apparent benefits of multiple crop-ping systems, little research has focused onoptimizing plant densities. Incomplete under-standing of the ecological processes of thesesystems complicates identifying ideal combina-tions and patterns. Applied research on cropcombinations, patterns, and planting densitiescould be promoted under existing alternativecropping research, for example, through IBTA-Chapare. Demonstration activities could be un-dertaken to provide examples for local farmersand perhaps increase system adoption. In addi-tion, research at each demonstration site couldidentify specific environmental differences amongproduction zones and promote adaptive work tooptimize production systems.

1 Improving Production EfficiencyImproving production efficiency, by reducing

costs of required inputs or increasing output, canincrease economic returns to producers. Produc-tion efficiency can be improved through use ofproper fertilizer regimes, pest control systems,improved soil and water management practices,and improved cultivars. However, inadequateinfrastructure, extension and technology transfer,and agricultural credit constrain use of improvedpractices.

Lack of infrastructure causes production inputsto be costly and difficult to obtain. Many croppingsystems previously described focus on reducingneeds for external inputs; nonetheless, some


inputs are needed to sustain agricultural land use.The infrastructure problem is being addressed bya number of multilateral and bilateral agencies inthe forms of road development, irrigation pro-jects, and energy production systems. However,lag time between project initiation and realizationof benefits is likely to be lengthy.

Extension of improved production practices(e.g., Integrated Pest Management, cropping sys-tem management) is hindered further by inade-quately developed national agricultural systemsand concerns over personal security. While exten-sion occurs, it is small scale relative to the overallneed (see chapter 5).

NUTRIENT MANAGEMENTAddition of nutrients to a cropping system is an

accepted axiom of agricultural production. Agri-cultural products, whether plant or animal, re-move nutrients from the land on which they areproduced. Even well-maintained organic farmsthat carefully collect and return crop residues andlivestock wastes to the soil only replace part of thesoil nutrients extracted. The other available nutri-ent sources internal to the agroecosystem (e.g.,rock weathering, soil minerals, soil animals) areunlikely to make up this deficit. Fertilizer costs inmost coca producing regions are high (U.S. $300to 400/mt vs. U.S. $ 220/mt on the internationalmarket (122)), indicating a need for efficientfertilizer programs and use of alternative nutrientsources (e.g., green manure, nitrogen-fixingplants).

PEST CONTROLAgricultural losses to pests significantly re-

duce production each year and costs for pestcontrol place added burdens on producers. It ispossible to optimize pest control and reducepesticide needs using a variety of methods,including crop rotation, crop monitoring, pest-resistant cultivars, timing of planting and harvest,and biological controls.

Pest control may be initiated based on pestscouting-monitoring to determine a pest prob-

lem. Depending on the type of pest identified, theorganization of the production system, and theextent of infestation, various control approachesmay be used. Crop rotation and manipulation ofplanting and harvesting dates can break the lifecycles of many pest species. Cultural controlssuch as tillage and water management can renderthe crop environment less favorable for pestpopulations.

Integrated Pest Management (IPM) blends thesuite of pest control technologies into a singlesystem designed to benefit (economically andenvironmentally) the user and society. IPM pro-grams attempt to restructure an ecosystem tominimize the likelihood of pest damage. Pro-grams are meant to be adaptive with an objectiveof improving program efficacy over time. Theultimate goal is to maintain pest populations atnear-harmless levels.

SOIL AND WATER MANAGEMENTManagement of the soil and water environment

for crop production requires understanding theinteraction of these cropping-system compo-nents, and the suitability of the chosen crop(s) forthe agroecosystem. Production of crops ill-suitedto a given region may require more intensiveexternal inputs, such as pesticides and fertilizers,to overcome the associated plant stress responsesand to achieve acceptable yield levels (16).

Use of soil- and water-management techniquescan adjust or modify the agroecosystem toenhance crop production and thus affect therequirements for external inputs. For example,soil-management practices designed to improvethe friability and moisture-holding capacity ofsoils can facilitate crop root development. This inturn may improve the plants’ nutrient extractioncapability, thereby reducing the need for externalnutrient inputs.

CROP MANAGEMENTCrop management refers to the numerous

decisions that most directly relate to the crop,including cropping pattern (e.g., rotation, inter-

—


cropping) and crop or cultivar choice. Certaincrop-management alternatives and techniquesmay complement or enhance nutrient and agrichem-ical management activities. Crop-managementdecisions may have direct impacts on agrichemi-cal use and on how such compounds will behaveand move through the agroecosystem. Cropchoice alone has instant implications for thepesticide and fertilization regime a producer willuse. Similarly, certain cropping patterns, such aslegume-based crop rotations, may supply plantnutrients and break pest cycles for a subsequentcrop and thus reduce agrichemical requirements.

1 ConclusionAlternative crops must compete with the low-

risk economic scenario associated with cocaproduction. Although scattered economic data on

potential alternative crops suggest that there areno legitimate economic equivalents to coca 5

(table 4-4), this could change if benefits oflegitimate agricultural activities increased. With-out improved production techniques, technicalassistance, and other associated services, how-ever, the chances are slim that substantial num-bers of farmers will voluntarily adopt alternativesystems. Despite some encouraging signs thatcoca profitability is decreasing, alternatives willstill need to be economically attractive. Develop-ment of systems that allow incremental diversifi-cation of coca cropping with a goal of replace-ment may hold promise.

Constraints to crop diversification fall largelyin the areas of support systems. While improvedcultivars, cropping combinations, and productiontechnology are available, extension of these toproducers is hindered by inadequate extensionand technology transfer systems (chapter 5).Primary constraints include:

●

●

●

●

●

●

Input availability and costs (agriculturalchemicals, machinery),Labor availability and costs,Credit availability and terms,Land tenure systems,Market availability (domestic and interna-tional), andSecurity risks.

Irrespective of the identified difficulties, legiti-mate agricultural production in the Andean na-tions could be enhanced. Some crops, productionand processing technologies, and markets areavailable. Although new crops that might im-prove the economics of agricultural productionhave been identified, further research is needed toidentify appropriate cultivars, production tech-niques, and market potential. Understanding thatcrop diversification is as important as interdictionhas reached high political levels in the Andeannations and leaders have identified the need forconcomitant efforts on these fronts.

FOREST RESOURCES6

Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia have substantialareas of remaining natural forests with potentialfor biodiversity conservation and forest manage-ment. These tropical wet forests and tropicalpre-montane rainforests contain large numbers oftree species, epiphytic plants, lianas, and verte-brate and invertebrate animals (50). For example,the Palcazu Valley in east-central Peru contains atleast 30 species of fish, primarily food fish (10);at least 50 mammalian species, at least 400 birdspecies, and numerous reptiles and amphibians(17); and between 5,000 and 10,000 vascularplant species. Almost one-half of the nearly 30mammal species that could be of economicimportance are rare or very rare and requireprotection to ensure their survival (33). Early

5 While coca appears to be more profitable than suggested alternatives, this has not been proven. Classical benefit/cost analyses may notbe an appropriate method for such economic analysis because of the illegal nature of the coca economy.

s This section was drawn largely from: D. McCaffrey, “Biodiversity Conservation and Forest Management as Altermtives to CocaProduction in Andean Countries, ’ contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment August 1991.


Table 4-4-internal Rate of Return (net cash flow/costs) for Some Alternative Crops

Internal rate Year at positiveCrop of return Data area Data year cash flow

Coca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Annatto (Achiote) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Araza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Banana (export) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Black pepper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Macadamia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Orange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Passion fruit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Peach Palm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Pineapple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

165.420.020.253.822.954.029.041.982.240.322.3

Pucallpa, PeruPucallpa, Peru

ColombiaPucallpa, Peru

ColombiaPucallpa, Peru

PeruUcalyi, Peru

Pucallpa, PeruTarapoto, Peru

January 1992November 1991

January 1991

February 1992March 1992

January 1992January 1992March1992

24625554221

SOURCES: H. Villachica, Lescano, C., Lazarte, J., Chumbe, V., “Estudio de oportunidades de inversión en desarrollo e industrialización decultivos tropicales en Pucallpa,” Perfil de proyecto para la planta de coloantes naturales y para la planta de conservas de palmito, ConvenioFUNDEAGRO, Región Ucayali, Lima Peru, 1992.Coca-H. Villachica, “Crop Diversification in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru: Potential to Enhance Agricultural Production,” contractor report prepared

for the Office of Technology Assessment, April 1992.Banana--J. Arbeiaez, “El Cultivo de Plátano en Zona Cafetera, Federación Nacional de Cafeteros,” Bogota, Colombia, p. 40, 1991.Macadamia-O. Rincon, “El cultivo de Macadamia, Federación Nacional da Cafeteros,” Bogota, Colombia, p. 29, 1990.

estimates suggested that between 100 to 1,000species could become extinct if this forest areawas removed (39). Based on ecological similari-ties, it may be assumed that equivalent levels ofbiodiversity exist throughout the coca-producingregions in South America.

Deforestation occurs in all parts of each coun-try (table 4-5) and in large part is correlated withcoca production. Currently, deforestation affectslarge areas in the eastern Andean foothills and theUpper Amazonian lowlands of each country.Despite this, promoting protected areas and forestmanagement in these zones could provide conser-vation benefits and alternative livelihoods forexisting populations.

It has been suggested that many areas nowsupporting subsistence farming, including theproduction of coca for cocaine manufacture,might best be returned to long-term forestrydevelopment as the most ecologically sound landuse. Considerable effort and state support wouldbe needed to promote such a program althoughsignificant employment and economic benefitscould arise from sustainable forest managementapproaches. However, the intensive subdivision

of the land makes this a very difficult proposal toimplement (105).

~ Protected AreasProtected areas include conventional protected

areas (e.g., national parks, forest reserves) andmore recently biosphere and extractive reserves.However, some disagree as to how well extractivereserves function as mechanisms of forest/diversity conservation (19). Lands set aside forindigenous peoples also may serve as protectedareas. Ownership and management commonly ispublic although some areas are privately owned.Use restrictions control the level of access andnature of extractive activities in protected areas.

Protected area management typically requiresidentification of suitable sites based on conserva-tion criteria and formal establishment within thenational system of protected areas. Although thesize and extent vary among the protected areasystems in the Andean countries (table 4-6), thenecessary institutional framework exists.

Protected areas also provide indigenous peo-ples a method to gain or maintain access toculturally important wild resources. For example,


Table 4-5—Forest Areas and Deforestation Rates in Andean Countries, 1980s

Forest area Deforestation rate Deforestation rateCountry (sq km) (sq km/yr) annual percentage

Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 668,000 870 0.2Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 517,000 8,900 1.7Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 706,000 2,700 0.4

SOURCE: World Resources Institute, World Resources 1990-1991: A Guide to the Global Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990),table 19.1 In: McCaffrey, 1991.

Table 4-6—Protected Areas in Andean Countries, 1985

Number of Total area protected Percent nationalCountry protected areas (sq km) territory protected

Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 47,076 4.3Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 39,588 3.5Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 24,076 1.9

SOURCE: World Resources Institute, International Institute for Environment and Development, World Resources 1986: An Assessment of the

Resource Base that Supports the Globa/ Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), table 19.1 In: McCaffrey, 1991,

16 Yanesha Native Communities occupy 580square kilometers of forest and agricultural landin the lower Palcazu Valley (1 14), The nationalpark and protected forest provide for conserva-tion, research, and tourism, and the communalreserve provides for traditional uses by theYanesha people. Ultimately, greater economicbenefits (in terms of tourism dollars) could arisefrom the maintenance of these wild areas, as isevidenced through expanding ecotourism mar-kets worldwide (15).

However, national governments do not provideadequate legal backing, sufficient staffing, andfinancial support for protected areas (18). Thus,protected areas frequently cannot meet desiredconservation goals and often exist as ‘‘paperparks’ ‘ that do not fulfill their mandate. TheIsiboro-Secure National Park in Bolivia possessesmany of the qualities that identify a highlyappropriate protected area and also provides forthe needs of the Yuracare and Mojenio nativepeoples. However, the park is located in an activearea of coca cultivation. Its boundaries arebreached increasingly by coca cultivators, log-

gers, and hunters (88,89), and enforcement isinadequate to control poaching.

9 Forest ManagementForest management describes the use of techni-

cal practices designed to increase the flow ofbenefits from forest resources. Management maybe strictly for sustainable yield of forest productslike timber and wildlife and may provide indirectbenefits like erosion control over the long term.Benefits may be harvested or generated continu-ously or cyclically. Multiple-use managementprograms seek to provide numerous, often di-verse, benefits from forests. Some spatial andtemporal separation of benefits maybe associatedwith multiple-use systems since uses may not becompatible (e.g., forest preservation and lumberoperations).

Forest management can be applied to primary,secondary, and heavily disturbed natural forestsystems. Practices vary depending on the level ofdisturbance and the desired benefits from man-agement. All of these forest types as well as some


Slash-and-burn forest clearing commonly is used to access agricultural lands, but land productivity tends to beshort-lived. Evidence suggests that maintaining forests for sustainable timber operations and extractive reservesmay offer longer term economic benefits.

small areas of planted forest are found in thecoca-producing regions.

Forest management in the coca-producingregions could offer significant environmental andeconomic benefits to local populations. Forestsystems offer a mechanism to reduce soil erosion,increase soil fertility, sustain biological diversity,

and manage water resources. An economic di-mension can be added to the environmentalbenefits by careful and systematic selection offorest trees for economic benefits. Selectiveremoval of undesired species and regeneration ofdesired species can maintain the basic characterof the forest while increasing the flow of eco-nomic benefits. Similar principles could be ap-plied to other economically important forestplants and wildlife.

Potential also exists for managing traditionalsubsistence swidden-fallow agriculture to in-crease the abundance of economically importantplants. Typically, the fallow period of agriculturallands involves allowing regrowth of naturallyoccurring plants for later removal once soilproductivity has been enhanced. Selective re-moval of plants as opposed to slash-and-burnpractices can contribute to maintaining a seedsource for desired species. Ultimately the compo-sition of plants can be shifted toward moreeconomic forest species (117).

1 Technical Considerations inForest Management

Forest characteristics (e.g., species composi-tion, age), site environmental features (e.g., slope,

. .


climate), and external factors (e.g., roads, proc-essing facilities) are important considerations indeveloping forest management and extractionplans (53). There is protocol to manage tropicaltimber forests based on natural regeneration ofharvested tracts (108,1 10) (box 4-E). Selectivecutting, enrichment planting, or plantation estab-lishment regimes may be used to manage andexploit secondary growth and disturbed forests(75).

Incorporating the participation of the localpopulation and providing them with tangibleeconomic benefits can improve the success offorest management efforts (90). Reconciliation oflocal interests with national policies and identifi-cation and quantification of environmental bene-fits and potential beneficiaries are also necessaryfor forest management to be effective (80).Ideally, forest management pays for itself bygenerating high-value products in the short term.Alternatively, external economic incentives maybe required to support such management (73).

Pilot forest management activities in undis-turbed and secondary growth forests are ongoingin the American tropics. Largely these activitieshave concentrated on timber production, althoughsome effort has been placed on extractive reserves(90). Funding for these activities has come fromprivate and public sources. The key lesson fromthese pilot activities is the lack of a single formulafor successful forest management in wet tropicalenvironments. Plan development requires carefulexamination and incorporation of environmental,sociocultural, infrastructural, and political fea-tures of a site.

1 Constraints to Forest ManagementOpportunities to manage forests sustainably

are constrained by a variety of factors, including:

. High demands placed on forest areas for landand forest products (e.g., conversion offorestland for agricultural purposes and ex-ploitation of existing forest resources),

Potential for long lag-time between planimplementation and realization of benefitsfor production systems in disturbed forests,Low value placed on forests and the view offorests as an obstacle to development (92),andConventional economic analyses that ignorethe value of future forest (76)

Forestry institutions have not grown to meetthe additional challenges arising from increasingglobal concern over tropical deforestation (129).Several features of tropical forests complicatemanagement efforts, including forest complexity,distance from urban centers, and widely variedvalues placed on forests by various sectors ofsociety (90). The inherent difficulties with forestmanagement are heightened in coca-producingregions that also must cope with economicdistortions and environmental difficulties associ-ated with coca production and processing prac-tices (32).

I ConclusionA number of forest management approaches

are applicable to the Andean countries. Localcommitment and participation are key elementsof all of these approaches. Efforts range fromlargely communal to commercial efforts, yet arebased on a fundamental goal of enhancing forestproduction (table 4-7).

Some private organizations are promotingsustainable logging through negotiations directlywith forest communities. This approach allowsfor gradual exploitation and gives local inhabi-tants incentive to protect forest to maximizeeconomic benefits over the long term. Selectivecutting techniques are used to remove highquality wood for high value markets. Resourcesustainability and social equity are criteria foracceptability of potential agreements. Develop-ment of such sustainable harvest methods mayprovide an opportunity to maintain the tropicalhardwood market in the face of increasing con-


Box 4-EAustainable Forest Exploitation:Case Example in the Palcazu Valley of Peru

Sustainable exploitation of forest resources in tropical areas commonly is viewed as having little potentialbecause of the complexity of managing diverse, old-growth stands. In fact, estimates suggest that less than 1percent of tropical forests currently are being managed sustainably. However, an innovative forest productionsystem in operation in the Pabazu Valley of Peru is demonstrating that sustainable forest exploitation in tropicalhumid forests may be possible. The project emerged from an AlD-sponsored subproject (the Pabazu ValleyDevelopment Project-PVDP) of Peru’s Pichis-Pabazu Special Project (Proyecto Especiat Pichis-Palcazu-PEPP). PEPP was promulgated by road development (Carretera Marginal de la Selva) along the base of thePeruvian Andes in the early 1980s and was intended to promote agricultural colonization in the region. The AIDsubproject was to maintain a part of the highway leading to the Pabazu Valley and provide rural devebpmentassistance.

Theenvironmentai assessment conducted by AID for the PVDP, however, indbatedthe agricultural potentialfor the valley was low and the region was environmentally unsuitable for a large-scale colonization scheme.Recommendations for low-impact development were made in the piansforAID’s ~tiral~lva~atuml~soumsManagement Prqiect, including a widespread production system for pnlnary forest areas. The Tropical ScienceCenter of Costa Rica deveioped an integrated forest production system based on interspersed, narrow stripclear-cuts in high, primary forest; a 40-year rotation; family or exchanged labor; complete use of all wood in thecut area; and animal traction for removal of products to roadside landings. Trees w@Jld not be planted in theclear-cut strips; natural regeneration from bordering high forest trees and stump sprouting would serve to maintainthe forest and its species diversity. Production tracts would border primary or secondary roads to faalitate thetransport of forest products to nearby processing plants and only processed products would be marketed.

However, PEPP focus remained on agricultural development in the region and land was titled to residentcattlemen for livestock production. The only remaining forested land had been titled to 12 communities of native,forest-dwelling Amuesha (Yanesha) Indians, several of which showed interest in the forestry proposal. Thus, theoriginal forest management scheme was redesigned to fit the Amuesha Although scaled-down in she and funding,the development of the Yanesha Forestry Cooperative emerged from these efforts in 1985. The techniquesenvisioned for the larger project (e.g., labor intensive, animal traction, small-sized harvest equipment) wereadapted for the Amuesha, including vertical integration, with the forest operators collectively owning theproduction, processing, and marketing operations.

Despite difficulties encountered by the Cooperative (e.g., an uncompleted processing pla~ inadequatetransport and road maintenance machinery, Iackof working cap/tal, andthethreat ofviolencefrom insurgentsartdnarcotics traffickers), it has managed to move ahead slowly. Tday, the Cooperative product mix includes finishedlumber, treated poles and posts, charcoal, and manufactured products. Although some difficulties have arisen insecuring national markets for certain products, this may be a result of the existing economic situation in Peru.Nevertheless, shipments have been made to U.S. and European buyers at premium prices and sawn timber haseffectively entered local markets. Evidence to date suggests that the Yanesha Forestry Cooperative is asustainable forest production system.SOURCES: J.A. Tosi, Jr., “Integrated Sustained Meld Management of Primary Tropical Wet Forest A Hot Project In the PeruvianAmazon,” Tropical Soience @nter, Costa Riw 1991, In: McOaffrey, 1991. M.A. Perl, MJ. Kiernan, D. McCaffrey, RJ. f3uschbaoher, andGJ. Satmanian, “Views for the Forest: Natural Forest Management Initiatives in Latin Amerfoa,” Wrfd Wildlife Fund, VWshingtorr, DC,1991, In: McCaffrey, 1991.


sumer boycotts of tropical wood products forenvironmental concerns (133).

In addition to sustainable logging opportuni-ties, economic benefits are becoming apparentfrom extractive reserves. For example, someestimates suggest that while converting forests topastureland can produce about 220 pounds ofmeat per acre each year, leaving them standingcould produce 2,750 pounds of food. Further, thevalue of the forest products (nuts, fruits, other)can reach twice the one-time logging revenue.Similarly, review of non-timber forest productvalue on two sites in Belize suggest that rainforestuse as extractive reserves seems economicallyjustifiable based on current market data andcurrency values (54). Recently, Colombia andBrazil ceded control of certain forests to nativeIndian populations for extractive reserves. Ex-panding on this trend will require developinglocal economies with an interest in conservingand maintaining the forests and demonstrationthat these activities can be economically attrac-tive. Some current activities that might assist in

highlighting the value of forests include efforts inCosta Rica, where forest samples are beingcollected and investigated for potential commer-cial value (104). If such ‘‘prospecting’ assureseconomic benefits for native communities, itcould be incentive for conservation and mainte-nance of existing forests.

Interest is increasing in forest-related activities(e.g., extractive reserves, logging, nature tourism)in the Andean region. Research in the Chapareregion suggests that many of the promisingagricultural alternatives to coca are nontraditionaltree crops, such as macadamia and peach palmand long-cycle perennials such as passion fruitand black pepper (4). In fact, the Chapare isideally suited for a land use system based largelyon forestry and to a much smaller extent onagriculture (109).

The importance of incorporating forest re-source opportunities in substitution programs isclear. For example, according to several esti-mates, between 66 and 80 percent of cocaproducers in the Alto Huallaga were settled on

Table 4-7—Forest Management Approaches To Promote Sustainable Resource Exploitation

Project Type Location Activity Goal

YaneshaCooperative

Portico

Boscosa

Plan Piloto

ExtractiveReserves

ANAI

Cooperative

Commercial

Public/private

Public/private

Community

Publicprivate

Palcazu Valley, Peru

Costa Rica

Costa Rica

Quintana Roo,Mexico

Brazil

Costa Rica

Harvest of undisturbed naturalforest using strip clearcutting.

Harvest of single tree species fromswamp forests.

Reclamation of cut-over andsecondary growth forests,management plans forsustainable use.

Rehabilitation of degraded forest,increase numbers of economicspecies through regulatedharvest, natural regeneration,and enrichment plantings.

Formalizing lands as extractivereserves through petition tonational government.

Works with small farmers toprotect and manage localforest.

Produce lumber, chemicallytreated poles and posts,charcoal, and firewood.

Produce high-quality doors forinternational market.

Harvest of economic treespecies.

Harvest of forest reserves (e.g.,rubber, brazil nuts).

Integrated land use.

SOURCE: D. McCaffrey, “Biodiversity Conservation and Forest Management as Alternatives to Coca Production in Andean Countries,” con-tractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, August 1991.


steep slopes when the Proyecto Especial AltoHuallaga (PEAH) was developed (11,34). De-spite this knowledge, the project excluded land insteeply sloping areas-areas classified as suitableonly for forestry or protected forest—and focusedon areas suitable for agriculture or livestockproduction. Since the project addressed only theflat areas, the impact on coca producers waslimited from the outset. Likewise, a developmentfactor that should have been of major importance,a forestry component, was not even considered.This is a serious shortcoming given circum-stances where lands classified as suitable forforestry use constitute a considerable part of theregion (12). However, forestry and agroforestry,although promising, should be viewed as compo-nents of an overall package of land use practicesthat could provide stable incomes and improvedenvironmental conditions for populations in thecoca-producing regions.

WILDLIFE ANDWILDLAND RESOURCES

Wildlife and wildland resources could providean opportunity to expand renewable resourcebased development. Andean ecosystems supporta broad variety of wildlife species that are, ormight be, managed to offer alternative livelihoodsfor local populations. Potential wildlife marketsinclude hides and fibers, pet, meat, and otheranimal products (e.g., bone). Techniques exist formanaging a variety of amphibians, reptiles, fishes,birds, and mammals to provide these commodi-ties.

Nature-based tourism depends on maintainingcertain valued ecosystems to attract foreign ex-change. Considerable efforts are being made toincorporate local communities in nature tourismdevelopment (e.g., Monte Verde) (7). Wildlifedevelopment, and particularly tourism, is likely tobe curtailed by social, political, and economicpressures in target areas.

Development of wildlife resources for thenational and international markets in wildlife andwildlife products may provide more immediatereturns than tourism and may also provide abasefor developing tourism industries. Ranching,farming, and collection of wildlife are dependenton maintenance of wild populations and criticalhabitats. Although farming and ranching mayrequire greater capital investment than hunting,they also offer greater security in terms of supplyconsistency. Market demand for neotropical wild-life and wildlife products has been increasingsteadily and exhibits sufficient profit margins toentice international investors (13,27).

South American wildlife products remain im-portant traditional protein and fiber sources andhave been exported for nearly 400 years (70,72).International conservation organizations have fo-cused on sustainable development of wildliferesources, and international wildlife conservationtreaties (e.g., CITES, Migratory Bird Treaty) haveled to some control over the exploitation andinternational marketing of wildlife products. De-spite these actions, considerable amounts ofillegal hides flow from the region.

Wildlife-centered economic development hasbecome more acceptable and research efforts arebeing undertaken to determine sustainable yieldsand appropriate husbandry practices. Techniquesfor raising certain wildlife species with littlecapital investment have been developed and areeasily incorporated in rural communities. Forexample, experimental programs for ranching ofgreen iguanas have spread from Panama to otherneotropical countries (6,127). Licensing and pro-tection policies are being implemented in theregion that are making farming and ranching ofwildlife more profitable than taking from the wild(97).

7 This section was drawn largely from: R.E, Ashton, Jr., ‘‘Potential Use of Neotropical Wildlife in Sustaimdde Developmen~” contractorreport prepared for the OffIce of Technology Assessmen~ December 1991.

—


1 Wildlife Farming and RanchingFarming and ranching of reptiles and amphibia-

ns have been successful in several countries,including Bolivia. These operations provide hides,meat, and live animals for the internationalmarket. Animals tend to be superior to thosecollected from the wild since they are healthier,accustomed to captivity, and generally parasiteand disease-free, A select review of live animalimporters showed that 100 percent prefer farmedor ranched animals for these reasons (6),

Wildlife ranching and farming appear to be onthe threshold of becoming a major industry insome areas. Only within the last year have SouthAmerican iguanas and caiman reached the petmarkets in the United States. Table 4-8 showssome species that retailers and researchers sug-gest as having the possibility for sales volumessufficient to sustain an industry. Underlyingresearch needs include information on sustainableyield levels, life history, and husbandry tech-niques.

Wildlife farming involves collecting enoughstock from the wild to have a viable breeding baseto sustain a captive population and produce amarketable commodity. Once the stock is col-lected, the captive population is sustained throughbreeding and recruitment from the wild is notrequired. Although farming may offer an opportu-nity to propagate rare species without harmingwild populations (102), it may also result in littleconcern for sustaining the wild populations ortheir habitat since the economic value lies withthe farmed populations. Farming may also beused to conceal wildlife harvests, as has beensuggested to have occurred in Colombia undersome of the recent captive propagation programs(35). Nevertheless, well-organized and managedwildlife farming programs can promote monitor-ing of exports and provide revenue for enforce-ment activities and local communities. Con-straints to this approach include potentially highstartup and operation costs to sustain the captivepopulation.

Wildlife ranching is based on capturing wildstock and raising it to marketable size and qualityand requires continuous replenishment from wildpopulations. While this form of wildlife produc-tion is preferred for species with large wildpopulations, it can affect the viability of thosepopulations if management is inadequate. Indis-criminate collection of wildlife can lead toextinction (102). By necessity, wildlife ranchingdepends on the maintenance of wild populationsand their habitats and thus may yield conservationbenefits. Revenues generated through taxes onranching systems could support enforcement andprotection of the resource.

Local communities that may not be able tofinance a full-scale ranching system may stillparticipate and receive economic benefits throughcollection of stock for ranching activities. Cul-tures that retain strong hunting and gatheringsystems may then supplement their incomesthrough supplying ranching needs.

Sustainable harvest from wild populationsrequires understanding population dynamics. Al-though such information generally is lacking formany exploitable neotropical wildlife, there areoptions for developing sustainable harvest pro-grams in situ. Harvest levels can be based onempirical evidence during the period that popula-tion dynamics data are collected (13) (box 4-F).

EXOTIC SPECIESThe introduction of exotic species for farming

or ranching activities is controversial. Concernscenter largely on the potential for escape andensuing displacement of native species and eco-system disruption, disease transmission to wildpopulations, and economic consequences result-ing from predation of exotic species on nativebiological resources.

If introduced species are excellent competitorsor predators, native species maybe displaced andecosystems disrupted. Displacement may take theform of population decline or range limitations. Ineither case, if the native species is desirable, oreconomically important, the adverse impact is

331-054 - 93 - 5


Table 4-8—A Partial List of South American Wildlife SpeciesWith Potential for Sustainable Development

Current Potential Current PotentialSpecies status status Market Species status status Market

InvertebratesButterflies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Beetles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Spiders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tropical fish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

AmphibiansTreefrogs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Dendrobatids . . . . . . . . . . . . .Bufonids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Salamanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CrocodiliansCrocodylus intermedius . . . .Crocodylus acutus . . . . . . . . .Crocodylus moreleti . . . . . . .Caiman crocodilus . . . . . . . . .Caiman latirostris . . . . . . . . . .Melanosuchus niger . . . . . . .Paleochuchus

palpebrosus . . . . . . . . . . . . .Paleochuchus trigonatus . . .

TurtlesGeochelone denticulata . . . .Geochelone carbonaria . . . .Aquatic turtles . . . . . . . . . . . . .

G,FGG

F,G

GGGG

GG

G,RG,RG,RG,R

GG

GGG

F,RG,RG,F

G,F,R

G,RR

G,RG

RRR

G,RG,R

R

G,RG,R

F,RF,R

R

HHP

P

PP

P

HHHHHH

PP

PPP

LizardsEnyalioides laticeps . . . . . . .iguana. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ctenosaura pectinata . . . . . .Basiliscus sp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tubinambis sp. . . . . . . . . . . . .

SnakesBoa constrictor . . . . . . . . . . . .Corallus sp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Epicrates sp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Eunectes sp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Drymarchon corias . . . . . . . .Lampropeltis sp... . . . . . . . . .Spilotes pullatus . . . . . . . . . . .Lachesis muta . . . . . . . . . . . . .Bothrops sp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Crotalus durissus . . . . . . . . . .

BirdsAmazona sp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ara sp. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Other Psittacines . . . . . . . . . .

MammasTayassu pecari . . . . . . . . . . . .Felis pardalis. . . . . . . . . . . . . .Panthera onca. . . . . . . . . . . . .Lutra iongicaudis . . . . . . . . . .Hydrocherus hydrocherus . .Agouti paca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Vicugna vicugna . . . . . . . . . . .

GG,F,R

GG

G,R

GGGGGGGGGG

G,RG,RG,R

GGGG

G,RG,RG,R

F,RF,RF,RF,RF,R

F,RF,RF,RF,RF,RF,RF,RG

F,RFIR

R,FR,F

G,R,F

RFFFRFR

PH,PH,P

PH,P

H,PPP

H,PPPPP

H,PH,P

PH,P

P

HH,PH,PH,PH,PHIP

H

KEY: G = Hunted or collected.R = Ranched or potential for ranching.F = Farmed or potential for farming.H = Animal products industry (e.g., hide, meat, feathers, bone).P = Live animal trade.

SOURCE: R. E. Ashton, Handbook on Central American Tourism and Wildlands Protection, Paseo Pantera Ecotourism Project, Wildlife ConservationInternational, 1991, In: Ashton, 1991.

quickly apparent. In cases where the species isless obvious or desirable, the impact also maybeserious since the ecological balance will havebeen disrupted. Similarly, when introduced spe-cies prey on economic biological resources (e.g.,crops, trees, fish), economic disruptions occur inthe form of reduced yields, and increasing costs ofcontrol measures and management effort.

Nevertheless, species introductions are under-way for potential economic gain. Nile crocodiles

have been introduced on an Amazonian crocodilefarm because of their higher quality hide com-pared with the native species. Accidental releaseof this prolific and potentially dangerous speciesinto the Amazon basin could have serious conse-quences (97).

Asian and African big game have been intro-duced into some private game hunting ranches insavanna areas in Central and South America.Cattle associations in affected areas have re-


●

●

●

●

●

●

Box 4-F–lnformation Needsfor Developing Sustainable

Harvest Practices

Population size and range.Habitat requirements.Resilience to human disturbance.Mortality and productivity rates.Key factors regulating populations and their ten-dency to increase or decrease.Effects of environmental variation (e.g., effects ofclimatic cycles) on productivity.

SOURCE: S.T. Beissinger and E.H. Bucher, “Can Parrots BeConserved Through Sustainable l-harvesting? Bioscience 42(3):164-172, March 1992.

sponded with demands for strict control of theseimports due to the potential for transmission ofungulate diseases to their stock.

INFORMATION NEEDS TO SUPPORTWILDLIFE PRODUCTION

Despite available technologies for wildlifeproduction, species specific information is neededto support a viable wildlife production industry,Some of this type of research currently is under-way for caiman and birds in South America.Biological studies are needed that characterize theextent of the resource and identify likely impactsof increased wildlife production and marketing.

Member countries of the Convention on Interna-tional Trade in Endangered Species of WildFauna and Flora (CITES) are required to providea management plan based on recent surveys and

studies on listed8 species population dynamicsand other key aspects affecting their viability. Ifit is determined that the species can be harvested,limits on the take are set to provide for thepopulation to sustain or increase its numbers.

Allowable take limits must be based on solidscientific information regarding population size,dynamics, reproductive behavior, and current

status. Species’ feasibility for captive propaga-tion is determined by behavioral, reproductive,and husbandry needs as well as economic value.Most species are not suitable for captive propaga-tion (106) and comprehensive planning is neces-sary to avoid failure. For example, the UnitedNations, Man and the Biosphere and the UnitedNations Education, Science, and Cultural Organi-zation 1970s project with tortoises failed to

account for the time required to raise tortoises tomarket size for food. A component directed to thedemand for hatchling tortoises in themight have been more appropriate.

H Protection and EnforcementEnforcement of wildlife protection

pet trade

and man-

agement regulations is a primary requirement fordeveloping a sustainable wildlife exploitationprogram. Game laws typically have been difficultto enforce, and regulations have not been wellsupported since wildlife is considered part of thepublic domain (102). Most efforts at protectionhave been directed by international laws andtreaties such as CITES. However, funding formuch needed enforcement and education pro-grams typically has been low.

Political will and increased revenues will benecessary to support sustainable development ofwildlife resources. Economic pressures fromconservation groups and the international marketcould provide incentive for producing nations toadopt or enforce protection programs. Revenuefrom legitimate business could help in providingthe capital necessary for implementing theseprograms. The American alligator harvestingprogram and the International Union for theConservation of Nature and Natural Resources(IUCN) Crocodile Specialist Group are examplesof programs to promote protection, enforcement,and licensing and to facilitate marketing wildlifeproducts.

8 Li~fe~ ~cfers t. ~e identification of a sp~ies as rae or protected under CITES.

126 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies

S Economics of Wildlife Opportunities

Economic concerns include startup costs, tech-nology costs, logistics, cost/benefit ratio, andmarketing (127). Although there are no datashowing that sustainable development of wildliferesources could protect natural ecosystems orbecome the dominant method for economicdevelopment for small rural communities, indica-tions are that well-managed sustainable wildlifeindustry development can be economically attrac-tive. For example the demand for natural leathershas remained stable and has prompted some toinvestigate producing leathers from nontradi-tional sources such as frogs and toads (97). Pricesfor hides or animal fibers (e.g., vicuna wool) varyand high-quality products may bring significantearnings. For example, high-quality crocodilianhides may bring as much as U.S. $100 for anaverage caiman or crocodile.

The exotic animal pet trade has grown, mainlyover the last decade. Tropical fish exports fromseveral neotropic locations comprise a flourishingmultimillion dollar business. Conditions thathave led to the popularity increase of exotic petsinclude:

●

●

●

●

Expanding awareness of rainforest biodiver-sity and intrigue with associated wildlife,Affluent populations in urban areas that viewexotic pets as status symbols and as beingeasier to care for (27,51,97),Increasing accessibility and availability ofexotic pets, andIncreasing availability of captive care andmaintenance techniques and trained exoticpet care experts.

Nearly all species of birds common to the pettrade are being raised in captivity, perhaps asmuch as 75 to 90 percent of the demand. Farmedor ranched birds could pose an alternative tocaptive raised animals if accompanied by attrac-tive prices. Costs of transporting live birds and thequarantine requirements may pose major con-straints to entrance into this market (6). In

in the Andean Region

addition, competition from illegal imports mayhurt the exotic bird market. For example, it hasbeen estimated that nearly 150,000 birds fromvarious countries were imported illegally eachyear through Mexico, totaling roughly U.S. $1million in receipts for bird trade (107). As Mexicohas become a member of CITES, this situation isexpected to change. Considerable research wouldbe required to develop systems appropriate to theraising of mammals for the exotic pet trade. Highinvestment costs and the extensive care require-ments are key considerations.

Few areas within Bolivia, Peru, or Colombiahave adequate infrastructure to enter the liveanimal export market. In addition, the currentmarket structure is weighted toward enriching themiddleman rather than the supplier. Prices paid tovillagers are about 10 percent of the wholesaleprice. For example, a boa constrictor that mightfetch U.S. $250 results in an earning of U.S. $0.50to $5.00 for the individual capturing the boa.Clearly, market access must be improved toincrease economic benefits to the supplier.

Significant concern exists over the importationof disease with live animal trade. Despite manda-tory health certificates, quarantine, and otherimportation restrictions under the Animal Quar-antine Regulations administered by the U.S.Department of Agriculture (USDA), illegal im-ports have spread some diseases.

Quarantine and certification of health require-ments will need review if the spectrum ofimported wildlife increases. As the agency re-sponsible for quarantine and health certificationof imported birds and mammals, USDA must beadequately equipped to handle these tasks at portsof entry. Even today, some importers indicate thatthe current status of bird and mammal quarantineand staff training for these duties is inadequateand responsible for some wildlife losses.

Regulations regarding importation of wildlifeto the United States may need to be reviewed aswildlife production becomes more controlled.Regulations established to curtail overexploita-tion or illegal takings of wildlife will be inappro-


priate for farmed or ranched species. For example,under the Public Health Service Act only 4hatchling to 4-inch carapace turtles or tortoisesmay enter the United States in a single shipmentand they cannot be sold except for scientific oreducational use. Clearly, this regulation wouldpose a considerable obstacle for imports ofcaptive raised turtles or tortoises.

1 Wildlife- and Wildland-Based TourismWildlife-based tourism has grown at least 20

percent annually since 1980 (58,99), and has beendescribed as a reasonable approach for sustain-able wildland development. Tourism offers anopportunity to earn foreign exchange and provideemployment for local communities, Where tour-ism is developed properly, it has a greaterpotential for generating local income than mosttraditional farming or ranching activities (68).

Nature-based tourism could provide economicopportunities for the Andean countries. However,it should be noted that poorly developed tourismindustries all too commonly degrade naturalresources and ultimately may reduce develop-ment options. There are examples of well-planned, appropriately designed nature tourismattractions that could serve as models for similardevelopment in the Andean countries. Ecotour-ism is gaining interest globally and expertise indeveloping these resources is expanding.

Game tourism has not reached the levels of biggame hunting in Africa and Southeast Asia,although jaguar, tapir, peccary, white-tailed deer,and birds have been hunted in South America.Fishing in the Amazon has been popular for atleast 20 years and has focused on such exoticspecies as peacock bass and giant catfish. Somegame tourism is seasonaI in nature due to themigratory behavior of target species (e.g., ducks)and provides only short-term employment forlocal populations. Sustainable management ofgame resources will require development andenforcement of optimum harvest limits.

While studies have been conducted on thecontributions of nature-based tourism to localcultures, they lack data on the level of economiccontribution and volume. In fact, data on nature-based tourism’s actual importance to local andnational economies are lacking. There are nostandard data collection methods by tourismofficials or international organizations and re-searchers’ poor knowledge of nature tourism(58,99) has led to ineffective study methods anderroneous conclusions.

Appropriate planning and management ofwildland tourism areas must incorporate theneeds of the local communities, fair user fees, andequitable distribution and use of revenue tomaintain the attractions that sustain the industry.Where nature tourism has been developed, pri-mary criticisms relate to failing to fulfill theseneeds. Tourism developed around indigenouscultures and wild areas may also offer an opportu-nity to preserve traditional cultures, skills, andknowledge. Also important is the investment oftourism revenue into the local society in terms ofimproving quality of life by providing employ-ment, training, and education. Such revenue hasbeen shown to contribute significantly to eco-nomic growth (8) and increase support for parksby local communities (62).

Developing successful tourism programs thatsupport local communities should include:

●

●

●

●

Written working agreement with communi-ties or local people outlining the use of lands,jobs, interactions with tourists, wildlife pro-tection and associated compensation forundertaking such activities, tr aining, andadvancement potential;Agreement describing operators efforts tosupport the local community;Agreement to the privacy rights of touristsand local populations; andAgreement on marketing goods produced bythe local community that assures fair com-pensation and precludes overharvest of localresources upon which the industry depends.


If nature tourism increases in importance inthe Andean countries, mechanisms will be neededto protect wild resources supporting the industry.However, competing demands for resources canpose a constraint to development and implemen-tation of such regulations. For example, theIsiboro-Secure National Park in Bolivia providesa highly diverse forest system that could be ofinterest to nature tourism, but encroachment onpark lands by squatters producing coca hasadversely affected its tourism potential.

S ConclusionInternational and domestic markets for wild-

life, wildlife products, and nature tourism exist.Developing these resources could contribute tooverall economic improvements in the Andeanregion. Farming and ranching of wildlife speciesand protecting and preserving of habitats aretechniques that could promote development ofthese sectors,

Revenues from sustainable development andexploitation of wildlife resources can supportconservation efforts critical to sustaining theindustry. Governments must set appropriate userfees and allocate revenue for habitat protection,monitoring programs, research and educationprograms, and maintenance of necessary infra-structure. Models of successful efforts (e.g.,crocodilian programs) could provide the basis fordeveloping rational revenue allocation schemes.

AQUATIC RESOURCES9

Abundant freshwater aquatic systems (e.g.,lakes, reservoirs, rivers, and streams) in theAndean nations provide opportunity for sustain-able exploitation of endemic and introducedfishes, other vertebrates and invertebrates, andplants. However, little development effort hasbeen placed on improving existing commercialand artisanal fisheries.

Comparisons of estimated productivity andactual harvest suggest that a higher level ofsustainable exploitation of Andean aquatic re-sources is possible. Use of better management,production, and postharvest technologies couldincrease fishery production. Well-designed man-agement systems that include size, season, andgear restrictions can influence aquatic communitycomposition and sustain high-value fisheries andprotect the resource base. Such systems, however,need to be suitable to the local community andlocal input in developing management plansshould be an integral part of such activities.

Use of improved capture technologies canallow more precise exploitation of aquatic com-munities and greater benefit per fishing trip.Aquiculture technologies offer an opportunity toincrease food production through intensive fishfarming through stocking to maintain commercialfisheries. Perhaps, the key need for improving thepotential contribution of aquatic resources to theAndean countries will be efforts to reduce post-harvest losses of aquatic products by improvingprocessing, handling, and storage methods. Infra-structure development could assist in marketing,reduce product cost, and potentially increaseeconomic benefits.

In some regions, coca production and process-ing have adversely affected aquatic systems andreduced their potential productivity. Aquaticremediation technologies could be applied, al-though clear definition of the problem will benecessary before undertaking reclamation activi-ties.

W Existing FisheriesCommercial and artisanal freshwater fisheries

in the Andean countries have not been a focus ofdevelopment activities. Some commercial fisher-ies have been developed around introduced high-value species. For example, rainbow trout andpejerry introduced into Bolivian and Peruvian

9 This section was drawn largely from: R. Schroeder, “Fishery/Aquatic Resourees in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru: Production Systemsand Potential as Alternative Livelihoods, ” contractor report prepared for the Offke of Technology Assessmen6 October 1991.


lakes supported a commercial trout fishery untilsevere overfishing caused a significant stockdecline (36,1 19). Pejerry is now the most abun-dant fish in these lakes and supports a majo rfishery in Bolivia. Pejerry is also cultured inlagoons and lakes at Cuzco and Apurimac in Peru(31). In addition to lake fisheries, river basinssupport active fisheries, including the Magdalena,Pilcomayo, Amazon, and Orinoco Basins.

Other aquatic animals and plants may havesome potential as food and fiber resources.Amphibians, birds, mollusks, and crustaceans arefound in the Titicaca Basin (42,120,121). Eco-nomically valuable plants (e.g., bullrush, algae,Elodea, Myriophyllum, and Potamogeton) arefound in lakes and streams and rivers. These plantmaterials can be used for human and livestockfood, construction materials, crop fertilizers, paperproduction, and medicines (69). Estimates sug-gest that sustainable totora—Scirpus tatora o rbullrush--production in Lake Titicaca could feed265,000 head of livestock. Development of theseresources will require strategies to protect againstoverharvest and to enhance their growth (e.g.,cultivation through careful cutting can enhancebed productivity and density).

Aquatic vegetation also provides nursery habi-tat for economically important fish and inverte-brates, feeding areas for birds, and shorelineprotection (65). Littoral swamps may extractcontaminants from terrestrial runoff. Thus, main-taining or enhancing these resources could pro-vide conservation and economic benefits for localcommunities.

Fishing communities of the Andean regiontypically are small and dispersed, with fisheriesbeing largely artisanal and labor intensive. Arti-sanal f isheries are characterized by low-technology, high effort with seasonal fluctuation,limited fishing range, and landing of smallquantities at scattered sites. Fishermen typicallyare low income, have few opportunities foralternative employment, and wield little politicalinfluence (74). Fishing tends to be a part-timeoccupation due to the seasonal nature of fisheries

and migratory behavior of many economic spe-cies; full-time fishermen must migrate alongriverine systems to follow stock (124). Fishingtrips typically are short (e.g., several hours), andmost fishermen are also involved in crop orlivestock agriculture. Rapid development of large-scale fisheries could result in resource overex-ploitation to the detriment of these artisanalfishermen (82). Lack of formal training opportu-nities in fishing skills also poses a constraint toexpansion of fishery development (63).

Fishing craft, gear, and methods vary widelydepending on target species, whether the fisherytype is artisanal or commercial, and whether theexploited aquatic system is a river, stream, lake,or reservoir. Boats range from paddled dugoutcanoes to small powerboats. Some traditionalfishing gear (e.g., reed rafts, nets of llama wool,traps, and spears) is being replaced by moremodern technology.

Marketing typically is dependent on fish trad-ers and some traders may even provide smallloans to fishermen (74). Although some productsnow reach distant markets, difficulties remain forlong-distance marketing (81,82). Existing pro-duction and market system features reduce thepotential for increasing fisher-y value in domesticmarkets. In the Lake Titicaca Basin, for example,export of high-value fish is controlled by middle-men and import of frozen marine products hasundercut the price of native fish, which make upthe greatest part of poor fishermen’s catch (9).Thus, annual earnings for fishermen providing forlocal markets averaged one-half that of export-oriented fishermen (i.e., U.S. $1,200 vs. $2,400)(82).

~ Management of Aquatic ResourcesFishery legislation typically has been difficult

to enforce largely due to lack of public acceptabil-ity and the remote nature of many of the region’sfisheries. A variety of regulatory measures maybe needed to promote and sustain fishery develop-ment. These can include restrictions on total


fishing effort, resource restoration, habitat en-hancement, pollution controls, and selective re-moval of competitive species. Restriction oneffort can include catch limits, licensing quotas,gear limitations, closed seasons and areas, andzoning guidelines for waterside development(124).

Ad hoc resource management is accomplishedin some areas through community-controlledfishing territories-Territorial Use Rights Fish-ing (TURFS), whereby aquatic resources aredefended from exploitation by outsiders. TURFSmay extend from a few hundred meters to severalkilometers from shore (64). Although the TURFsystem is not recognized legally, this informalmanagement system may also function to sustainfisheries by preventing overexploitation. Con-flicts between commercial and artisanal fisher-men may be promulgated by fishery developmentsince the latter primarily depend on higheryield/lower catch per unit effort fishes while theformer depend on larger, high-value species.TURFS may function to defend harvest zonesfrom commercial efforts.

Generally, fishery development focuses onhigh-value species and seeks to manage the entiresystem with respect to sustainable yield for theseproducts. Without careful management, overfish-ing for high-value fish may result in communitydominance by short-lived species that supportgreater sustainable populations. It may be possi-ble to develop a balanced system for producinghigh- and low-value species, but managementrequirements are likely to be even greater. Elimi-nation of competitors through a variety of meth-ods (e.g., selective application of electrofishing orichthyocides) can reduce pressure on desiredfishery species. Understanding life history andbasic biology of fishes can be used to developharvest measures specific to certain life stages orspecies.

Effective management and compliance withfishery regulations also require an understandingof the importance of such measures at thecommunity level. Active fisheries extension serv-

Fishing gear vessels typically range from dugoutcanoes to small motor-powered boats, A dugout canoeallows these two Colombian fishermen to extend thearea they can exploit with a castnet.

ices can facilitate understanding of requirements,and community level organizations (e.g., TURFS)might offer opportunities to distribute informa-tion. Active local participation in the develop-ment of fishery management plans can alsopromote acceptability and compliance with theseefforts. Management planning for the TiticacaBasin, for example, could incorporate the tradi-tional TURF system with more formal manage-ment strategies and stress cooperation betweenthe various stakeholders (63)

9 Increasing FisheryProduction Potential

Methods to increase or improve fishery pro-duction at the commercial and artisanal levels,include use of improved harvest technologies,habitat improvement, and aquiculture. Aquaticsystems are subject to numerous and competingdemands from other activities (e.g., agriculture,urbanization, recreation). A primary considera-tion prior to fishery development or enhancementwill be the additional surrounding activities thatmay have an impact on the aquatic system andstrategies to integrate such competing needs withfishery development.

—


HARVEST TECHNOLOGIESImproved fishing gear and methods could

increase production in artisanal and commercialfisheries. Gear/method combinations vary de-pending on the target species, location, and watersystem; artisanal fishermen tend to employ avariety of nets, seining, and fishpots. Thesetechnologies are simple to implement and providerelatively inexpensive harvest methods. Whilepreviously constructed from local materials, netsand lines of more modern materials are now beingused. However, boats are used infrequently,restricting the range of exploitation to nearshoreenvironments. Dugout canoes that are handpad-dled maybe used by some fishermen, but size andstorage abilities also create harvest restrictions.Wider use of improved materials in traditionalfishing gear and boats with greater capacity forproper catch storage could contribute to improvedcatch per unit effort in artisanal fisheries. Com-mercial fishermen also use a variety of nets forcapture. Although some commercial efforts onLake Titicaca focus on nearshore activities (i.e.,beach seining for catfish), higher value speciesare captured from boats by pelagic gillnetting ortrawling. Vessels commonly are equipped to storecatch on ice to decrease postharvest losses.

HABITAT ENHANCEMENT

Actions that reduce habitat complexity threaten

the diversity of fish populations. Variations instream flow, siltation, and chemical inputs allmay result in physical or chemical changes inaquatic ecology. Such effects are common incoca-producing and cocaine-processing areas whereerosion from cultivation can contribute largeamounts of sediment to nearby riverine systemsand periodic dumping of processing chemicalsinto rivers and streams may change the water’spH balance temporarily.

Resource enhancement can be accomplishedthrough physical (e.g., artificial reefs, fish lad-ders, current generation) and biological (e.g.,stocking, selective exploitation) means. Artificialreefs have been used successfully in temperate

lakes to increase abundance of economic fishesand might hold promise for high altitude lakes inthe Andean region. Increasing exploitation pres-sure on competitive species can also improveproductivity of desired species. Sufficient naturalreproduction and recruitment to maintain a fish-ery require optimum conditions (e.g., water tem-perature, flow, clarity, substrate type, complex-ity) and, most often, regular stocking.

AQUACULTURESeveral organisms have culture potential for

high-altitude tropical aquatic systems. Tilapia isthe most popular freshwater fish cultured intropical and subtropical regions. However, earlyefforts to promote small-pond culture of tilapia incertain regions of the Andes were unsuccessful.The program failed largely because plans lackeda strategy for the local population to produce fishfood cheaply and easily (84). An integrated,farming systems approach could have addressedthis need.

In Rwanda, small fishponds (0.8 ha) at altitudesof 1,300 to 2,500 meters have been found to beeconomically viable with production levels aver-aging 400 kg/ha/yr. Tilapia (Oreochromis nilot-icus) was found to be the most suitable species forthis type of culture. Andean river shrimp havecommercial aquiculture potential (120,121) andnative freshwater prawns in mountain streamsand lakes may have similar potential (67). Tech-niques for shrimp and prawn culture have beenused successfully in tropical areas (115).

Aquiculture also can be used to complementcapture fisheries by providing fingerlings forstocking. Characterization of the aquatic ecosys-tem is necessary, since artificial enhancementscan alter interspecific competition (41,77). In-creasing nutrient and organic content of naturalsystems and temperature elevations may causeundesirable shifts in natural aquatic communities(28). Algae also may be “stocked” to provide asupplemental food source for fish and be har-vested as livestock feed, fertilizer, or for humanconsumption (135).


Floodplains may provide an area for expandedaquiculture activities by blocking small channelsor depressions and constructing drain-in pondsand refuge traps. Annual production can averageseveral hundred to a thousand kilograms of fishper hectare (124). Successful examples of trans-forming waterlogged soils in tropical floodplainsinto productive aquiculture/agriculture systemsare evident in the Peoples Republic of China.Traditional dike-pond agriculture and aquicul-ture systems on the Pearl River Delta have beenoperating for at least 400 yearn. Fish, livestock,and agricultural crops are produced and materialcycling contributes to reduced production costs(box 4-G).

HANDLING, STORAGE, AND TRANSPORT

Infrastructure development has lagged in pro-viding the facilities necessary to promote fisher-ies in many areas. Indeed, key constraints togreater economic benefits from fishery produc-tion in Bolivia seem to center on inadequateinfrastructure for processing, handling and stor-age, and lack of equipment to exploit the resourceadequately. These difficulties translate into lowprices for the fishermen and high prices forconsumers. For example, in 1987 fresh fish priceswere nearly three times greater in La Paz (market)than in Trinidad (production center) and only 25percent of the price was retained by the fisherman(87). Development of roads, ice plants, marketingchannels, and credit systems could support in-creased fishery development (126).

I ConclusionAquatic resource systems of the Andean region

harbor significant potential for enhanced produc-tion. The numerous lakes and river systemsinclude a variety of harvestable species that couldsupport artisanal and commercial fisheries undergood management conditions and application ofappropriate technology. Some systems clearly areunderexploited and could provide significantincreases in domestic food production.

om

Productivity estimates for Luke Titicaca, shared byBolivia and Peru and covering 8,135 squarekilometers range from 50,000 to 250,000 metrictons--far above actual yield estimates.

Despite the availability of resource assessmenttechnologies, little information on aquatic re-sources has been gathered. Fishery researchactivities that demand the highest priority arestock assessment, aquiculture, fishery expansion,resource administration and management, han-dling and processing, and technical training tosupport enhanced fishery production. Assistanceof an applied nature designed to address immedi-ate problems could provide rapid results and thebasis for demonstration and diffusion of n e wtechnologies and approaches to fishery produc-tion (14).

Quantitative and qualitative field assessmentson the extent of aquatic resources are necessary todevelop rational resource management plans.Information on species composition, recruitment,and life history help to establish sustainableharvest parameters. A variety of methods areavailable for gathering such information, somehighly technical and others based on surveys atlanding sites and local fish markets (125).


Box 4-G–Dike-Pond Aquiculture Systems

Blending of aquiculture and agriculture systems may hold promise for increasing productivity of floodplainsor waterlogged soils. A notable example is the dike-pond system that has been used in the Pearl River Delta forat least 400 years. The system is composed of land and water subsystems Iinked through agriculture and livestockcomponents. Byproducts from one subsystem become inputs for the other (29).

A diversity of fish are cultured in ponds (bottom, mid-level, and surface dwellers) and sugarcane, fruit trees,mulberry, forage crops, vegetables, and flowers are produced on the dikes. Poultry and livestock are raised nearthe ponds and silkworms are raised on the mulberry trees. The forage crops produced on the dikes are fed toIivestockand fish. The Iivestockexcrement is used to fertilize ponds and pond mud piledon dikes to fertilize crops.

Despite the antiquity of the Chinese system, scientific procedures for quantifying analyzing andexperimenting with these farming systems are sparse. The International Center for Living Aquatic ResourceManagement (lClARM) is actively researching combined agriculture and aquiculture systems in India andMalawi. These efforts closely resemble those of the Chinese systems. As in agricultural crop substitutionapproaches, a key need identified through the ICLARM effort is mass farmer participation in the adaptive researchand development process (66),SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

Models to predict the potential catch produc- status of a wide variety of parameters, including:tivity of river fisheries can be based on character-.

●

istics such as channel length or drainage basin●

area; correlations with environmental parameters;●

or habitat variables (124,125). For example,●

standing stock may show a high correlation withstream width, width-to-depth ratio, extent of

●

ripa.rian vegetation, and dry-season stream flow(59). Primary productivity estimates-requiringexamination of morphological, physical, chemi-cal, and biological features of the resource-arealso necessary in developing management plans(20).

Some work has been done on quanti&ngproduction potential of the riverine systems of theAltiplano (the large, high-altitude inland drainageplateau of Bolivia and Peru) (86) and the MagdalenaRiver Basin of Colombia (52,1 18). The aquaticsystems of the eastern and western cordillera ofthe Andes have yet unquantified productionpotential, although these resources could contib-ute to national protein production (132).

Development of sustainable resource manage-ment plans requires information on the current

Resource production and potential,Fishing activity,Environmental health,Historical trends to identify critical vari-ables, andSpatial and temporal variations in condi-tions.

Once this information is available, opportunitiesfor developing sustainable exploitation strategiesmay improve. Such management strategiesshould contain at least the following components:resource enhancement/regeneration plans, finan-cial support, regulation and enforcement meas-ures, development of local organizational capac-ity and coordination, and training and extension.

STRATEGIES TO ENHANCE COCASUBSTITUTION EFFORTS1°

Development of the alternative economy beingpromoted in Andean countries to reduce depend-ence on cocaine is at a critical stage. Some

promising alternative crops have been identifkd

10 me ba~i~ for ~s section was developed l~gely from: U.S. Congress, Office of TechnoIou Assessment, Crop substitution wor~hoPI

September 3@October 1, 1991, Washingto~ DC.


and efforts continue to improve adoption andproductivity of these systems. Largely the focushas been on agricultural crops as opposed to thebroad range of renewable resource uses that mightoffer alternatives to coca production. Indeed,some coca production areas are identified asinappropriate for agriculture, yet suitable forforest management and production. Improvingcoca substitution programs in the Andean coun-tries might be approached through:

. Diversifying agriculture systems,

. Intensifying agricultural production, and

. Expanding the range of resources exploited.

Some key principles unique to the Andean cropsubstitution effort create the framework withinwhich improved substitution programs might bedeveloped. First, the degree of economic andtraditional dependence of Andean peoples oncoca hinder acceptance of coca substitution pro-grams linked to complete eradication of the crop.Coca is a traditional crop in Andean agriculturewith a high degree of symbolism; further, itprovides the largest share of export earnings forthe Andean countries. Programs that approachcrop substitution incrementally, therefore, mayfind greater acceptance than replacement strate-gies. Transition time from producing coca toproducing alternative crops may be lengthy.Programs or projects must consider investmenttime for producers to make the transition toalternative livelihoods. Programs might focus oncreating preconditions necessary to implementcrop substitution programs, identifying how theseprograms fit with existing policies, and assistingin marketing and developing other support struc-tures necessary for success of a substitutionprogram.

Secondly, coca farmers tend to be smallhold-ers, yet national agricultural policies (e.g., land-tenure, agricultural pricing and structure) seem towork against development of smallholder agricul-ture. Investment in improved agricultural produc-tion systems require access to affordable credit—

a feature largely lacking for smallholders, particu-larly in coca production regions. Nevertheless,increasing profitability of national agriculturalproduction is likely to depend on intensifyingsmallholder production systems. Progress towardthe transition to alternative cropping systems inthe coca-growing regions will depend on availa-bility of improved technology and techniques,practices and cropping combinations, and a sup-portive policy environment at the local, regional,national, and international levels.

Finally, the extent of the cocaine economy inBolivia, Peru, and Colombia highlights the size ofthe crop substitution task. If substitution pro-grams focus on current coca-producing regions,environmental features will constrain the breadthof alternative crop choices. Coca grows on poorsoils with low pH, high aluminum content, andlow cation exchange--conditions few other cropswill tolerate. Because of coca’s value, carryingcapacity of coca-producing regions exceeds thatallowed through production of legal crops. Sub-stitution efforts that seek to expand the range ofresources exploited may be more successful thanthose that focus solely on a single resourcealternative (i.e., regional economic developmentvs. alternative crops). Sustainable exploitation iskey in such goals in order to maintain benefits inthe long term. However, sustainable-use systemsrequire development to support such resource use,and economic and sociocultural constraints mustbe addressed (e.g., market availability, practi-tioner skill). These features are important considera-tions and underscore the need for a flexibleapproach to developing alternative livelihoods forAndeans involved in coca/cocaine production.

H Strategy: DiversifyAgriculture Systems

Diversification of agricultural systems by in-corporating high-value crops is the driving forcebehind current crop substitution efforts in theAndean countries. High-value agricultural ex-ports offer potential to generate foreign exchange


Box 4-H–Estimated Economics of Intercropping Coffee with Annual,Semi-perennial Crops, and Shade Trees

The following table illustrates potential earnings from establishing a coffee, shade tree, semi-perennial,annual cropping system under good soil conditions. During the first 2 to 3 years of the system, annuals andsemi-perennials are interplanted with the coffee to provide income (e.g., corn, cassava, bananas). Corn maybeplanted in October/November followed by bananas in November/December. The coffee seedlings are planted inJanuary/February, and the established corn crop provides shade to promote coffee seedling development. Afterthe corn crop is harvested, legume tree seedlings are transplanted. At this point the banana development issufficient to provide shade for coffee, and annual crops such as cassava may be interplanted for harvest in 8 to10 months. Bananas produce 14 months after transplanting and can be harvested for 3 to 4 years. Banana treedensity is reduced 30 to 40 percent annually until it reaches 10 percent of its initial planting density. By years 4to 5 coffee is in full production and legume tree cover is sufficient to provide shade.

Year after Yield Incomeplanting Crop (kg/ha) (U.S.$/tta)

1 Corn 1,500 1802 Banana 5,000 5003 Banana 2,000 2003 Coffee 275 2104 Banana 1,500 1504 Coffee 440 3355 Banana 500 505 Coffee 660 5036 Coffee 990 7547 Coffee 1,175 8808 Coffee 1,375 1,048

SOURCE: H. Villachica, “Crop Diversification in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru: Potential to Enhance Agricultural Production,” contractorreport prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, April 1992.

earnings and thereby increase the attractiveness provide a basis for agricultural diversification andof legitimate agriculture. For example, tropicalhits and nuts, coffee, and spices are impressivein terms of potential income per hectare producedbecause of their value in European, Asian, andU.S. markets. Although still lower returns thanthat generated by coca production, these commodi-ties are viewed as having the greatest potential

for competing with coca. Yet, at the same time,existing infiastructural constraints to movingthese products to market can reduce their value atthe producer level and create a disincentive toparticipate in substitution programs. Integratedsystems of high-value and staple crops could

increase agricultural profitability (box 4-H).

The Andean countries remain net food import-ers currently because cheap food imports are morecost effective than internal movement of food-stuff from production site to urban markets. Pricesfor traditional agricultural products are adverselyaffected by present agricultural structure andpricing policies. Nonetheless, crop diversificationstrategies could be approached in an incrementalfashion with an initial focus on increasing produc-

tion of traditional food products for local andregional markets and phasing in of high-valueexport commodities. Developing systems thatintegrate legitimate crops with coca offers an


Irrigation networks can increase agriculturalproduction, particularly in areas subject toseasonal rainfall. Here, farmers harvest greenpeppers on an irrigated cooperative farm.

option to reduce the perceived risk of transition toalternative systems for some coca producers.Coordinated effort could be placed on developingnecessary infrastructure to support an agriculturalexport industry along with value-added process-ing to increase the economic benefits for localcommunities.

OPPORTUNITY: INCREASEIMPORT SUBSTITUTION

Diversion of land from legitimate agriculturalproduction to coca production is suggested tohave increased the Andean nations’ dependenceon foreign food imports. Production of typicalAndean crops has declined; however, to whatdegree this may be attributed to expanding cocacultivation or to changes in food consumptionpatterns is unclear. Although increasing agricul-

tural productivity of the Andean peasant economythrough application of selective technologicalpackages is now viewed more optimistically,such approaches may require redesign of certainrural strategies (e.g., Peru’s Agrarian Reform) andsignificant infrastructure development and tech-nical assistance (115).

While the economic conditions of the Andeancountries imply that internal markets will not behigh-priced, ability to market maybe increased ifproducts and markets are in close proximity (e.g.,a producer in the Chapare may stand a betterchance of getting grain to La Paz than bananas toChile). Price differentials, however, will con-strain this approach and may result in a need foradditional economic incentives associated withsubstitution programs.

Lessons from activities to convert opium cultiva-tors to legal crops in Pakistan could be applicableto the situation in the Andean countries. The Foodand Agriculture Organization (FAO) has beenassisting the Pakistani Government for the past 10years to develop alternative employment foropium cultivators with a focus on increasing pro-duction of food crops for national markets. Proj-ect funds have been provided by the UnitedNations International Drug Control Programmeand the Government of Pakistan. Production oflegal crops in the region (wheat, maize, andpulses) has been increased through the applica-tion of improved cultural practices and increasedinputs. Cash crops (sugar cane, tobacco, horticul-tural products, and fodder) were introduced aswell, largely through development of irrigationtechnologies, and the livestock sector was strength-ened. A major factor in the success of these effortswas the strengthening of supporting infrastruc-ture, including potable water-supply systems,irrigation networks, and gravel and tarmac roads(38) (chapter 3).

OPPORTUNITY: INCREASE THE VALUE OFAGRICULTURE IN DOMESTIC MARKETS

The value of smallholder agricultural produc-tion in the Andean countries is low relative to

4--Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to Coca Production I 137

other sectors. To some degree, this is the result ofnational food policies that maintain low-cost foodfor urban areas. In addition, international pro-grams may have adversely affected the pricesproducers can command in local, regional, andnational markets. Food assistance under the P.L.480 program (the Agricultural Trade Develop-ment and Assistance Act of 1954 as amended)provides low-cost food imports to the Andeancountries, largely staple crops produced in excessin the United States. Competition with thesecheap commodities may have contributed toreduced value of Andean agriculture in thedomestic market.

OPPORTUNITY: DEVELOPTRANSITIONAL SYSTEMS

Transitional systems that allow coca producers

to shift their production systems gradually tolegitimate crops may offer an opportunity to easerisk-averse farmers into legitimate agriculturalproductions systems. While participants in cur-rent substitution programs continue to producesome amount of coca, focus remains on cocareplacement systems rather than integrated sys-tems. This may have several effects. First, farmersmay maintain separate fields for coca and substi-

tution crops, dividing time and effort and poten-

tially reducing yields of the legitimate crops.Secondly, with coca being the “cash crop,”farmers are more likely to weight their attentiontoward the “sure thing’ as opposed to the

alternative, particularly in times of adversitywhen yields of both maybe threatened. Lastly, thereplacement approach may discourage participa-tion by risk-averse farmers who are unwilling toeliminate coca or by those who do not havesufficient land or labor to tend separate plots.Alternatively, integrated systems that incorporatealternative crops in coca production could pro-vide source reduction benefits as well as im-proved agronomic attention to legitimate produc-tion by the farmer.

Increasing markets for legal coca products (e.g., cocatea or rnaté de coca) may reduce the hardship forproducers adopting alternative crop systems.

OPPORTUNITY: EXPAND MARKETS FORLEGITIMATE COCA PRODUCTS

Mechanisms to absorb program participants’coca during the transition phase and channel itinto legitimate markets offer an opportunity toreduce the coca supply for cocaine production.Options might include expanding the interna-tional market for legitimate coca products (e.g.,coca tea, pharmaceuticals). However, the largeamounts of coca produced are likely to overflow

existing legitimate markets.Alternatively, developing new products from

coca may have some merit (61). Potential medici-nal and therapeutic applications of coca include:1) treatment for spasmodic conditions of thegastrointestinal tract, motion sickness, toothacheand other mouth sores; 2) caffeine substitute; 3)antidepressant; and 4) adjunct to weight reductionand physical fitness (91). Examination of theother alkaloids found in coca might yield addi-tional industrial possibilities. Although the re-search and development time required to bringnew products to market may reduce the short-term utility of this approach, it could be a useful


component in an overall package of efforts toreduce illicit coca production.

I Strategy: Intensify AgriculturalProduct ion

Intensifying agricultural production for domes-tic and international markets will be necessary forthe Andean countries to reduce food imports andproduce sufficient quantities of products to inter-est international markets. This might be donethrough improving traditional agricultural pro-duction systems, facilitating input availability,and reducing disincentives to investment inimproved production practices. At least fourInternational Agricultural Research Centers (IARCS)conduct research on crop improvements directlyapplicable to the Andean region. In fact, many ofthe advances in staple crop production in theAndean nations have arisen from IARC researchefforts (e.g., recent increases in rice and maizeyields and production expansion in Peru).

Highly productive forms of agriculture intropical regions generally focus on some form ofpolyculture. Improvements in productivity can begenerated through carefully planned crop combi-nations, agroecological suitability, and effectivenutrient and energy cycling systems. Integratedsystems can be developed that efficiently recyclesubsystem by-products through other subsys-tems, such that the waste from one activitybecomes the input to another.

OPPORTUNITY: IMPROVE TRADITIONALAGRICULTURE SYSTEMS

Traditional production practices developed inthe Andean countries could be improved to offerexpanded economic benefits for producers. Ex-amination of how these practices promote pro-ductivity and sustainability could be used toidentify where research and development effortcould best be placed. Agroforestry, polyculture,and integrating livestock with agricultural pro-duction systems may offer particularly promisingopportunities.

Multiple cropping systems have a long historyin the Andean region and are ideally suited to thehumid tropical zones where crop substitutionactivities are underway. Agroforestry is of partic-ular interest in substitution programs as many ofthe alternatives identified are long-cycle treecrops (e.g., tropical fruit trees, nut trees). Cur-rently, only one Consultative Group on Interna-tional Agricultural Research (CGIAR) institutefocuses primarily on agroforestry-the Interna-tional Council for Research on Agroforestry(ICRAF). ICRAF is located in Kenya, hundredsof kilometers distant from tropical wet forestsecologically similar to those of the easternAndean foothills and thus these efforts are un-likely to be easily transferred to the Andeancountries. Additional agroforestry research wascarried out by North Carolina State University atYurimaguas, Peru. This effort was largely anoffshoot of traditional agricultural research, yet ithighlighted the importance of perennial tree cropsin tropical agriculture. These efforts have ceased,however, largely due to violence in the area.

OPPORTUNITY: DEVELOP SMALLHOLDERAGRICULTURE

Small-scale farms are essentially the rule incoca-producing zones and opportunities to inten-sify their production are needed. Farming systemscould be intensified through the application ofmodern technology adapted to suit local agroecol-ogical conditions. Increasing the availability ofagricultural inputs and improving delivery meth-ods may offer an opportunity to intensify agricul-tural production. Increased productivity at thesubsistence level would likely lead to surplusesthat could be marketed. Technical assistanceexists for many crops and additional work onimproved cultivars could increase yields. Assist-ing smallholders to intensify production mayallow them to move gradually to semi-commerc-ial and commercial production. Concomitantwith this effort would be strengthening localmarkets, perhaps to redirect from imports tolocally produced commodities.

——


OPPORTUNITY: ASSIST WOMENAGRICULTURALISTS

In many regions, women contribute the largestamount of farm work. Yet most efforts to assistfarmers have been aimed at men. Traditionally,Latin American women in rural areas have beenneglected by development projects (112). Womenparticipate in agriculture in a number of ways,including crop and livestock selection, cultiva-tion, harvest, postharvest handling, and market-ing. Significantly, in areas where migration forseasonal labor is common (e.g., High Valleys),women stay at home to care for the crops andlivestock. Recently, greater effort has been placedon the role of women in agricultural development,yet, increased efforts could improve the contribu-tion of women farmers in crop substitutionprograms.

OPPORTUNITY: REMOVE DISINCENTIVESTO INVESTMENT IN IMPROVED SYSTEMS

There are a number of disincentives to invest-ment in agricultural production improvements inthe Andean region. These largely stem fromnational economic and political conditions (e.g.,rural poverty, risks to personal security), and mostwill need to be addressed by national govern-ments. One mechanism open to U.S. and multilat-eral organizations to improve investment oppor-tunities is to increase the availability and afforda-bility of agricultural credit. Agricultural credit isa key need to improve opportunities for producersto invest in production and land improvementsnecessary for alternative systems. Coca farmerstend to be small-holders, often without land title,personal capital resources, or access to normalroutes of credit. Recent actions on the parts ofnational governments have improved the outlookfor gaining land title, although bureaucraticconstraints slow the process.

Within the context of coca substitution pro-grams, opportunities for credit exist. Evidencesuggests, however, that insufficient attention hasbeen paid to developing appropriate credit pack-ages for coca farmers. For example, agricultural

credit is available to farmers in the Chapare,Bolivia, through an AID grant and is administeredthrough a local private voluntary organization.However, the terms of credit are so high as tomake it essentially unavailable for most farmers.Further, in Bolivia credit is conditional on re-moval of the coca crop, often the sole income-generating activity of the family. Although assist-ance is provided to develop an alternative produc-tion system, income is generally not establisheduntil the third year after planting. Yet, repaymentsfor interest are due in year 1 of the loan. Under thisscenario it is simple to understand the reluctanceto give up coca in exchange for legitimate crops.

Much the same situation exists in Peru wherecollateral terms are significant (e.g., urban homes)and interest rates vary depending on the creditcurrency (i.e., 18 percent per year in U.S. dollarsand 8 percent per month in Peruvian soles) (122).Although Colombia also lacks agricultural creditfor crop diversification for coca, it does providecredit for diversfying coffee. Coffee farmers mayreceive up to 80 percent of the cost of developingnew production sites at 20 percent interest peryear. Loan repayment begins with the first harvestand must be completed in 10 years. Delayedpayment schedules such as this could likely beappropriate for crop diversification credit.

Issues of credit availability and affordabilitymay increase in importance if substitution be-comes more broad-based in order to expand therange of resources exploited. In this case, creditopportunities will be needed for forest, wildlifeand wildland, and aquatic resource exploitation—additional activities where producers are likely tobe handicapped in meeting existing credit eligi-bility requirements.

1 Strategy: Increase the Range of ExploitedRenewable Resources

The Andean countries have a wide range ofrenewable resources that could be developed toincrease economic opportunities for producers.While much attention has been placed on nar-


rowly defined agricultural opportunities, lessemphasis has been directed toward the potentialfor expanding sustainable exploitation of otherresources such as forests, fisheries, wildlife, orwildlands. Indeed, many coca-growing areas aremore suitable to some of these options thantraditional agriculture. For example, in the AltoHuallaga, where most coca is produced on steepslopes, agriculture is an environmentally, if noteconomically, unsuitable alternative. In theChapare, Bolivia, timber operations were theprimary economic activity until the mid-1970swhen coca expansion eclipsed the industry (85).

OPPORTUNITY: DEVELOP SUSTAINABLEFORESTRY SYSTEMS

Considerable potential exists to manage An-dean forests to increase the flow of benefits tosmallholders, and even though deforestation af-fects an increasing area of these forests, sub-stantial areas of natural forest remain. Efforts topromote protected areas and forest managementoffer alternative livelihoods and environmentalbenefits. Opportunities include:

● Conserving biological resources,● Developing extractive reserves, and. Developing sustainable timber operations.

The importance of sustaining tropical bio-logical resources has been highlighted in the lasttwo decades and recently was underscored by theUnited Nations Conference on Environment andDevelopment. One mechanism of conservationhas been to cede certain forest areas to indigenouspopulations to sustain their traditional lifestyleswhile offering conservation benefits. Similarly,extractive reserves offer economic and conser-vation opportunities. The value of forest products(nuts, fruits, etc.) harvested from an extractivereserve can be longer-term and significantlyhigher than that offered by one-time loggingoperations or conversion to agricultural produc-tion (104). Opportunities also exist for ‘chemicalprospecting” in tropical forests to identify com-pounds with commercial potential. Sustainable

timber exploitation technologies have been demon-strated in the Palcazu Valley in Peru. Suchinnovative operations could be tested and adaptedto other forest areas in the Andean countries.Despite these potential opportunities, efforts willbe needed to increase the understanding oftropical forest management, specifically in theAndean region.

Recently, a cooperative effort between theNature Conservancy and AID has provided fund-ing (Parks in Peril Project) to ensure protectionfor threatened national parks in areas of concern.As part of this effort, on-site management will beestablished in Amboro National Park and NoelKempff Mercado National Park in Bolivia, LaPaya National Park in Colombia, and Pampas delHeath National Sanctuary in Peru. Efforts willinclude surveying protected area boundaries,recruiting, training, and educating rangers andlocal communities about park protection, devel-oping park infrastructure, and promoting localcommunity participation (1 13). The AID Envi-ronmental Support Project that supports coopera-tive efforts between foreign organizations andLatin American countries is active in Bolivianforests in conducting botanical inventories (Am-boro and Noel Kempff) and developing sustain-able harvest for economic tree species. These andsimilar efforts can contribute to developing na-tional expertise and highlighting opportunities inforest management in the Andean nations.

OPPORTUNITY: DEVELOP SUSTAINABLEWILDLIFE AND WILDLAND MANAGEMENTSYSTEMS

The Andean region has a diverse range ofecosystems supporting a broad variety of wildlifespecies that are, or might be, managed to offeralternative livelihoods for local populations. Fur-ther, wildland management to sustain wildlifepopulations may offer an additional opportunityto enhance nature-based tourism industries. De-velopment of wildlife resources for national andinternational markets in wildlife and wildlifeproducts may provide more immediate returns

. —.


than tourism but could also provide a base fortourism markets.

Wildlife-centered economic development hasbecome more acceptable, and research efforts arebeing undertaken to determine sustainable yieldsand appropriate husbandry practices. Some tech-niques for raising/producing certain wildlife spe-cies have been developed and are easily incorpo-rated in rural communities with little capitalinvestment. For example, experimental programsfor ranching of green iguanas have now spreadfrom Panama to other neotropical countries (6,127).Licensing and protection mechanisms imple-mented in the region are making farming andranching of wildlife more profitable than takingfrom the wild (97).

The International Union for the Conservationof Nature and Natural Resources and otherinternational resource organizations are workingto create viable legal markets for wildlife andwildlife products in conjunction with protectinghabitats and wild populations. Congress couldsupport these efforts by providing funding tothese organizations to assist the Andean countriesto develop wildlife industries. Coordination withAID, UNDCP, and other donors would be neces-sary to ensure that an adequate support structurewas available to handle transport and marketingopportunities for producers.

OPPORTUNITY: DEVELOP SUSTAINABLEFISHERY PRODUCTION SYSTEMS

The numerous Andean lakes and rivers containa variety of harvestable organisms and, withapplication of appropriate technology, their pro-ductivity could be enhanced. For example, recentfish production in Colombia’s Guajira reservoirwas 82/kg/ha/yr, whereas sustainable productionhas been estimated at 103 to 256 kg/ha/yr (134).Similarly, estimates on the productivity potentialfor the total fishery of Lake Titicaca range from50,000 to 250,000 metric tons (maximum sustain-able yield)--far above current actual yield esti-mates. Based on a conservative estimate of U.S.$0.50/kg, the fishery resources of Lake Titicaca

could realize an annual earning potential of U.S.$25 million (56,60,82,94).

Constraints to developing Andean fisheriesinclude a lack of information on the extent andquality of the various resource systems, level ofresource extraction, and fishermen themselves;and shortfalls in handling, processing, and storagetechnologies and transport infrastructure. Currentfishery production is characterized by significantpostharvest losses that could be reduced throughattention to these needs. For example, post-harvest losses from the Pilcomayo fishery arerelatively low (9.4 percent) compared with thosein the Bolivian highlands (30 percent). Theprimary difference between these examples is theuse of ice in transport from the Pilcomayo fishery(87). Poor handling can reduce the value offishery products and increase losses to spoilage.

Technical assistance to promote enhancedproductivity of existing fisheries will be needed.Introduction of efficient gear and harvest technol-ogies and aquiculture practices to support stock-ing efforts, training in processing techniques forpostharvest handlers, and strengthening of ad-ministrative and management protocol for fisheryoffices are a few of the key needs. Trainingprograms similar to those developed for trouthatcheries in rural communities of Maucana,Peru, could improve local economies throughfishery enhancement of lakes and streams (96).Currently, AID does not identify fishery produc-tion as a priority for resource development in theAndean region and there is only one fisheriesspecialist (on loan from National Marine Fisher-ies Service) in AID (103). AID could increase itseffort toward fishery development and establishtechnical assistance as a priority. A developmentproject costing one to several million dollarscould produce a 10-fold increase in total localearning for inhabitants of Lake Titicaca (93).

Alternatively, the Andean countries could takeadvantage of existing international expertise inaquatic resource management and development.International research organizations, such as theInternational Center for Living Aquatic Resource


Management (ICLARM), Peace Corps, and otherinstitutions (e.g., International Center for Aquac-ulture at Auburn University) could be tapped toassist in fishery development or enhancement.


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Tree Species in Managed Swidden-Fallows ofthe Amazon,” Agroforestry Systems 11(2):175-197, 1990.Valderrama, M., and Zarate, M., “Some Eco-logical Aspects and Present State of the Fisheryof the Magdalena River Basin, Colombia, SouthAmerica, ’ Proceedings of the InternationalLarge River Symposium 106:409-421, 1989, In:Schroeder, 1992.Vaux, P., Wurtsbaugh, W., Trevino, H., Marine,L., Bustamente, E., Torres, J., Richerson, R., andAlfaro, R., “Ecology of the Pelagic Fishes ofLake Titicaca, Peru-Bolivia,” Biotropica 20:220-229, 1988, In: Schroeder, 1992.Vegas-Valez, M., Ruiz, L., Vega, A., and San-chez, S., ‘‘The Shrimp Chryphiops caernentarius(Palaemonidae): Embryonic Development, Stom-ach Content, and Controlled Reproduction: Pre-liminary Results,” Review of LutinoAmericanAquacul~ure 9:1 1-28, 1981, In: Schroeder, 1992.Vegas-Valez M., Ruiz, L., Vega, A., and San-chez, S., ‘‘The River Prawn Chryphiops caemen-tarius (Palaemonidae): Embryonic Development,Stomach Content and Reproduction Under Lab-oratory Conditions, Preliminary Note, Summa-ries Workshop of Natural Sciences, 1980, In:Schroeder, 1992.Villachica, H., ‘‘Crop Diversification in Bolivia,Colombia, and Peru: Potential to Enhance Agri-cultural Production, ’ contractor report preparedfor the Office of Technology Assessment, April1992.Villachica, J., Lescano, C., Lazarte, J., Chumbe,V., Estudio de oportunidades de inversion endesarrollo e industrialization de cultivos tropi-

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TechnologiesTo SupportAlternative

CropProduction 5

whatever the product, supporting technologies are neededto enable producers to compete in global markets. Key

M needs in the Andean region, include:

●

●

●

Research, extension, and access to technologies that can

improve production of commodities;Processing, transport, handling, storage, and communicationinfrastructure; andImprovements in product quantity and quality and tradeprograms to increase competitiveness of Andean products.

Meeting these needs is the ultimate challenge facing national andinternational development organizations.

INTRODUCTIONResearch and extension plays an enormous role in providing

alternative livelihoods for coca producers and promoting theiradoption. Development of suitable technology packages for cocafarmers will depend in large part on the ability of research andextension specialists to conduct interdisciplinary and adaptivework. Existing research and extension systems are not well-equipped to fulfill this role and economic disparities and politicalconditions restrict the level of national funding for these efforts.Technology transfer can provide assistance in this arena, butimprovements are needed.

Adequate infrastructure (including processing and storagefacilities, tyransportation pathways and vehicles, and communica-tion pathways) is critical in supporting production and marketingof Andean products. Ability to move necessary inputs intoproducing regions and raw or processed materials out to wider

149


markets depends on effective, affordable trans-portation. Information on markets and prices isnecessary for practitioners to make productiondecisions. Currently, agricultural marketing ishindered by the lack of: specialized packingfacilities; cooling facilities; airport-based coolstorage; ability to load refrigerated shippingcontainers at product source; and specializedprocessing installations nearby production areas.

Private-sector investment in supporting produc-tion and marketing is hindered by the lack ofaffordable credit, and government inability to

service international loans hinders national in-vestment in comprehensive roads and other serv-ices or in sizable construction projects.

Infrastructure development—particularlytransportation systems—is controversial. Someargue such development will assist narcoticstraffickers and others cite the disastrous environ-mental consequences of some early road-buildingprojects in the Amazon region. Nevertheless,while it is possible that improved infrastructure

would benefit narcotics traffickers, it is certainthat producers of legitimate products are handi-capped by its absence.

Production of alternative crops is not yet at alevel where Andean producers can enter interna-tional markets effectively—small production unitsmake product quantity a key constraint to effec-tive competition. There is a need for importerswilling to accept small shipments with a visiontowards expansion as producer capability andproduction area increase. Marketing agriculturalproducts also can be complicated by the strictproduct quality and safety requirements of im-porting nations. Such restrictions can be difficultfor developing countries to meet without propertraining and assistance programs. Trade programsthat stimulate Andean exports to the United Statesand other countries can complement alternativedevelopment efforts. For example, the Andean

Reliable roads are essential for profitable agriculturein the Andean region. Here, heavy rains have washedout a road in the Chapare, Bolivia, disrupting farmeraccess to agricultural inputs, markets, andagricultural extension.

Trade Initiative (ATI) offers specialized tradearrangements for the Andean nations with theUnited States. This action addresses the need inpart, but greater effort is likely to be necessary.

ANDEAN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCHAND EXTENSION SYSTEMS

Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia possess the essen-tial institutional foundations to develop effectivenational research and extension systems. How-ever, each country has a unique situation and mustovercome certain problems evident in existingsystems. Proper action to improve the functioningof research and extension is a basic condition forfuture agricultural success. All three countriesrequire foreign financial aid and/or specializedtechnical assistance. Peru requires financial aidurgently to rebuild its system. In Bolivia, the needfor technical assistance probably is more acute.

Whatever the amount and quality of technicaland financial assistance granted to the affected

1 The infomnation contained in this section was drawn largely from A. Chavez, “AndeanAgricultural Research and Extension Systems andTechnology Transfer Activities: Potential Mechanisms To Enhance Crop Substitution Efforts in Bolivia Colombia, and Peru,” contractorreport prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, December 1991.

5-Technologies to

countries, its usefulness will depend on actualmeasures taken by governments to secure perma-nency and progress for research and extensionagencies and their programs. A real and effectivepolitical commitment to technical innovation andmodernization of agriculture must be made,particularly in Bolivia and Peru, including ade-quate funding for research and extension activi-ties, respectable salaries for personnel, and appro-priate regard for the entities in charge of theseactivities.

Agricultural research and extension systemsvary significantly among Bolivia, Peru, andColombia. Funding levels, staff size and capabil-ity, and institutional arrangements comprise keydifferences. Government instability has constrainedagricultural modernization in Bolivia and Peruwhere the research and extension systems areunder central government control. Colombia’ssystem has been participatory and stable, with anobvious direction toward modern agriculture.

Agricultural research and extension systemstypically are based on national research organiza-tions, agricultural colleges, and private non-governmental organizations. Regional politicalpressures in Bolivia and a strong private sector inColombia influenced diversification of their re-spective research systems, while the Peruviansystem has remained unchanged. A review ofinstitutional frameworks and resources highlightsthe importance of foreign assistance and interna-tional cooperation in promoting Andean researchand extension systems.

9 Bolivia

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKBolivia’s agricultural research system has four

main components established in the 1970s thatconduct basic and applied research and provideextension services to most agricultural producers:

. Bolivian Institute of Agriculture and Live-stock Technology (Instituto Boliviano deTecnologla Agropecuaria (IBTA))--IBTA

Support Alternative Crop Production I 151

●

●

●

is the leading national research institute, andits subcomponent the IBTA-Chapare, is themain research and extension agency forBolivia’s coca substitution program.Tropical Agriculture Research Center (Cen-tro de Investigación Agrícola Tropical (CIAT))--CIAT is a regional research agency forSanta Cruz, the country’s most dynamicagricultural sector.

Pairumani Plant Genetics Research Center(Centro de Investigaciones Fitogenéticas dePairumani (Santa Cruz) (CIFP))-CIFP is atechnical branch of the Patino foundations,Bolivian Institute of Science and NuclearTechnology (Instituto Boliviano de Cienciay Tecnología Nuclear (IBTN))--IBTN fo-cuses on chemical analysis and tissue cul-ture.

In addition to these organizations, several Depart-ment development corporations (CorporacionesDepartmentales de Desarrollo), universities, andnongovernmental organizations (NGOS) performagricultural research on short-term, specific prob-lems for local clientele. However, little coordina-tion exists among the formal research and exten-sion system and these groups,

IBTA direction is determined by the Ministryof Agriculture (MACA--an organizational struc-ture that has created substantial difficulties forIBTA. Politically-oriented changes in Directorsand research priorities have fragmented IBTA’smeager financial resources. The Government ofBolivia’s investment in agricultural researchthrough IBTA has declined, resulting in man-power reduction policies and complete relianceon foreign assistance.

IBTA research is commodity-oriented andgeographically restricted to the Altiplano andValley areas. IBTA operates three experimentstations, three substations, and two germplasmcenters, all poorly equipped and staffed. Researchconducted by IBTA will continue to focus ongenetic improvement and field management ofcommodities in the Altiplano and Valley regions.


IBTA was responsible for Bolivia’s extensionservice, operating seven regional offices with atotal of 80 extension posts. The national extensionsystem failed, however, due to poor coordinationwith other research agencies, poorly paid andinadequately trained staff, and lack of well-established extension methodologies and moni-toring and evaluation methods.

IBTA-Chapare operates under the RegionalAlternative Development Project (Proyecto deDesarrollo Alternative Regional (PDAR)), andcarries out research and extension activities forBolivia’s coca substitution program. IBTA-Chapare operates two experiment stations: LaJota—for research on crops, soils, and pestcontrol; and Chipiriri--for research on livestockand poultry. In addition, IBTA-Chapare under-takes many studies, and extension2 and promo-tional activities through NGOS and other regionalentities. It also maintains close technical relation-ships with several national and internationalresearch entities.

Centro de Investigació Agrícola Tropical hasa regional research focus on production systemsin Santa Cruz emphasizing grains, tree crops, andlivestock. CIAT also performs research in rhizobi-ology, fertilizer management, and postharvestproblems. Research programs of the UniversidadAutónoma “Gabriel Rene Moreno,” which con-centrate on beans, corn, and cassava, complementCIAT activities. Additional activities includehorticulture research at the Okinawa ExperimentStation and sugarcane research at the SugarcaneProducers Association Experiment Station.

CIAT receives national and international fund-ing to carry out its research and extensionactivities. Domestic funding ($1.6 million annu-ally) primarily comes from regional public enti-ties and local producer associations. Externalfinancial assistance comes from seven interna-tional donors. CIAT is managed by a Board 01Directors under an Executive Director appointedby the Minister of Agriculture for a 5-year term.

Irrigation networks can be important supportinginfrastructure for regions experiencing a dry season.IBTA-Chapare research on improving agriculturalproduction in the High Valleys includes an irrigationcomponent.

A Regional Research Council meets twice a yearto coordinate research activities in Santa Cruz.

The Centro de Investigaciones Fitogenéticasde Pairumani focuses its research efforts ondeveloping new varieties of grain legumes, maize,and wheat. Most of its research is done inCochabamba. Although CIFP has a significantlysmaller annual budget than some of the otherinstitutions, it has been successful in geneticimprovement of maize for silage, and develop-ment of some new maize varieties for humanconsumption.

The Instituto Boliviano de Ciencia y Tecnolo -gía Nuclear recently began to address agriculturalmatters in its chemical analysis and tissue culturework. These areas of expertise allow IBTN tocomplement IBTA research in soil-water rela-tionships, soil fertility, and high-altitude croppingsystems.

RESEARCH AND EXTENSION PRIORITIESBolivian near-term agricultural policy goals

include: 1) improving rural economies, 2) in-creasing food production, 3) integrating the

z Extension activities include 87 demonstration production units reaching more than 7,000 producers.

5-Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production ! 153

agricultural economy with international markets,4) promoting agricultural exports with competi-tive advantages, 5) developing and implementingsustainable agricultural systems, and 6) improv-ing crop substitution activities (18). A nationalcouncil (Consejo Nacional de Investigación yExtensión Agropecuaria---CNIEA) directs Boliv-ian research and extension activities to achievenational agricultural goals. CNIEA is headed bythe Deputy Secretary of Agricultural Productionand includes representatives from major publicand private entities that conduct research andextension. Although all agencies involved inresearch and extension continue to pursue indi-vidual agendas, CNIEA can play a critical coordi-nation role in Bolivian agriculture.

A major priority is to rebuild a nationalextension service. This has been accomplishedpartially through regional and local systems andinternational donors through their agriculturaldevelopment projects (e.g., Cochabamba Re-gional Development Project). An estimated 130NGOS are active in extension and reach between100,000 and 150,000 small farmers-roughlyone-third of the national farm population (37).Some Department development corporations alsoprovide extension services through regional orlocal agricultural projects. Finally, a growingnumber of farmer cooperatives and commercialfirms provide extension assistance and informa-tion to farmers.

Ideally, research priorities are set according tolocal or regional conditions and actual productionproblems and patterns. Involving farmers andproducer organizations can be key in settingrealistic research and extension priorities. Thesegroups can assist in identifying primary produc-tion problems. For example, CIAT researchpriorities closely reflect local agricultural prob-lems in Santa Cruz. The close relationship be-tween CIAT and local farmer associations andextension specialists fosters such applied prioritysetting. Conversely, lack of farmer representationin IBTA-Chapare and lack of transitional pro-duction systems may have constrained priority

setting in connection with coca substitutionactivities.

IMPROVING EXISTING RESEARCHAND EXTENSION SYSTEMS

Agriculture is beginning to be revitalized tosupply domestic markets at reasonable prices andexpand and diversify exports. Accordingly, muchattention is focused on Bolivia’s agriculturalresearch and extension system. International fi-nancial and technical support, and specific com-modity projects by different research and exten-sion agencies represent important contributionsto Bolivian agricultural development.

A need exists for enhanced coordination amonginstitutions within the system such that nationaland regional research priorities can be establishedand institutional research plans harmonized. Animproved relationship between research and ex-tension is also needed to enhance technicalassistance to farmers and to keep research rele-vant to their needs. Also necessary are attention toagricultural regions that lack research and exten-sion services and comprehensive training in theskills and expertise needed to modernize Bolivianagriculture.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Agricultural research and extension activitiesin Peru have been provided almost exclusively bycentral government institutions. Accordingly, theseinstitutions have been characterized by instabil-ity. Over the last two decades, institutionalstructures and responsibilities for research andextension have changed frequently due largely topolitical changes. The current political flux ofPeru may result in further alterations of theexisting research and extension systems.

National crop, forestry, livestock, and agro-industry research are the responsibility of theNational Institute for Agrarian and AgroindustryResearch (Instituto Nacional de InvestigaciónAgraria y Agroindustria! (INIAA)) established in


1987, while extension activities have been placedunder regional governments. Most of these unitsare ill-equipped for extension activities and cur-rently the system barely operates. Another reorganiza-tion is planned to give extension responsibilitiesto the INIAA.

Peruvian universities rarely are involved inproviding research for government or privateinstitutions; most university research activity isconfined to student thesis work. Exceptions tothis situation are the National University of SanMarcos Graduate School (Universidad NacionalMayor de San Marcos (UNMSM)) and theNational Agrarian University (Universidad Na-cional Agraria (UNA)) at Lima. UNMSM has

made major contributions related to animal healthand livestock production systems. UNA, the mostimportant academic center for agricultural andbiological sciences in Peru, has managed todevelop and maintain a highly qualified cadre ofagricultural professionals since the 1960s. For-eign investment and institution-building effortshave fostered UNA’S position as a key contributorto agricultural development.

General financial and political crises that haveravaged the university system since the 1970shave adversely affected UNA, however, and itsacademic quality and research potential havedeclined. Tropical forestry research on speciesinventory and on tropical woods characterizationfor industrial uses is one of the few research fieldsthat UNA has pursued continuously. Four univer-sities at Tingo Maria, Tarapoto, Iquitos, andPucallpa, cover Amazonian ecosystems, but theirresearch capabilities are very limited.

The Peruvian Amazon Research Institute (ln-stituto de Investigaciones de la Amazonía Peru-ana (IIAP)) was created to promote and coordi-nate research in the Amazon region. IIAP has fewtechnical and financial resources, however, andthus its activity and power fall far short of itschartered mandate. Currently, the only vehicle forresearch coordination in Peru is the PeruvianAmazon Research Network (Red de Investigaciónde la Amazonía Peruana (REPAP)), an Interna-

tional Research Center for Development (CentroInternational de Investigaciones para el Desar-rollo (CIID))-funded research network estab-lished in 1989 to develop sustainable productionsystems for the Amazon region.

Research and extension funding has dimin-ished significantly over the last 5 years and recentbudgets have provided only for payroll and notoperating expenses. Thus, most technical person-nel sit idle; the few ongoing research activities aretotally dependent on foreign interests and fund-ing. The public extension system has declined inimportance as nonpublic organizations (e.g., na-tional and local commodity organizations, uni-versities and technical institutes, and the commerc-ial sector) began to provide extension services.However, these services tend to address specificneeds in the most favored agricultural areas ratherthan possessing a broader national agriculturalagenda. The government has not made anysystematic effort to organize or extend thesealternative extension services nationally. Thus,most Peruvian farmers lack systematic and per-manent technical support.

Institutional instability, unrealistic salary poli-cies, and political maneuvering have constrainedattempts to establish permanent professional re-search and extension teams in Peru. In fact,government actions have reduced the number ofpublic research and extension personnel. INIAA’sprofessional staff has been reduced already by 40percent (around 200 positions).

PRIORITIES FOR AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION

Research and extension were neglected duringthe late 1960s and throughout the 1970’s (16) asresources were directed to irrigation projects andland reform. During the 1980s, governmentinterest and investment in research and extensionimproved substantially with financing from theWorld Bank, U.S. Agency for International De-velopment (AID), and the InterAmerican Devel-opment Bank (IDB). Even then, total publicinvestment in agricultural technical change re-

5-Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production I 155

mained small. Today, Peru’s agricultural struc-ture is based on minifundia-small landholdings—with 72 percent of units smaller than 5 hectares(approximately 12.5 acres). Undoubtedly, thiswill present great challenges to research andextension.

Economic policies promoting low-priced basicfood imports since the 1960s have adverselyaffected domestic food production. A wideninggap between domestic supply of and demand forbasic foods led to prioritization of researchprograms on rice, maize, potatoes, grain legumes,and wheat. During the second half of the 1980’s,the number of research programs expanded asdemand for work on other products grew. Re-search in oilseeds, horticulture, fruits, soil andwater management, forestry, and agroindustrywere added to the agenda. However, increases infunding did not accompany the expanded agendaof research and extension institutions. In recentyears, agricultural priorities have shifted fromdomestic to export markets.

Extension priority was given to the northerncoast and the most important Andean valleys. Inthe Amazon region, only the big valleys of thenortheast received some support. The Andeanhighlands, with the largest and poorest peasantpopulation, and new agricultural areas in theAmazonian region, remained almost unattended,

IMPROVING RESEARCH ANDEXTENSION SYSTEMS

The key constraints to improving the agricul-tural research system in Peru revolve around thelack of a functional national extension service,poor coordination of activities, and low fundinglevels. The impulse given to agricultural researchand extension during the first half of the 1980slost steam as economic and political difficultiesincreased. The number of international donorsdecreased, which in turn has resulted in redistri-bution of existing outside funding. The sectoralproject supported by IDB came to an end in 1986and the World Bank stopped disbursing in 1987.AID’s financial support continued, but had to be

redistributed among a growing number of re-search programs and to all experiment stations.The situation continues to decline with mostexperiment stations being transferred to regionalgovernments or the private sector, The majority ofthese organizations do not have the financialmeans or the technical expertise to manageresearch.

~ Colombia

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

International assistance has been very impor-tant to the Colombian research and extensionsystems. During the 1960s, most foreign assist-ance was from the United States, and focused oninstitution building. In 1963, the Ford, Rock-efeller, and Kellogg Foundations played criticalroles in the organization and implementation ofresearch and extension programs. By the end ofthe 1960s, 18 international agencies were cooper-ating with the Colombian Agricultural Institute(Instituto Colombian Agropecuario (ICA))----the most important agricultural research institu-tion in Colombia. ICA was created in 1962 as partof the government restructuring of the publicagricultural sector and has been the most impor-tant source of technical and financial assistance toagricultural producers. The Institute maintains alarge, highly trained staff to provide a broad anddiverse human-resource base for agriculturalresearch and extension. This may be the mostimportant single factor contributing to moderni-zation of Colombian agriculture. Key factors inICA’S success were government financial andpolitical commitment to research and extension,and the involvement of the private sector and keypublic agencies (13).

ICA has been instrumental in promoting theuse of modern agricultural techniques in Colom-bia. Improved cultivars and practices are nowused on nearly 40 percent of Colombian cropland.The Institute supplies most of the basic seed usedfor agricultural production and is active in devel-

331-054 - 93 - 6


oping improved varieties. For example, ICAreleased 236 new varieties and cultivars of thecountry’s most important crops, 34 of thembetween 1986 and 1990.

ICA’S institutional framework for research andextension includes 4 national research centers, 12regional research centers, 7 experiment stations,29 diagnostic centers for animal health, and a net-work of 66 regional centers for extension, train-ing, and technology dissemination. Training is ahigh priority for ICA. Between 1986 and 1990,ICA spent $7.7 million, or 6 percent of its totalbudget, for training. About 35 percent of ICA’Sbudget supports direct research and extensionactivities (15 and 20 percent, respectively) (14).

Government support for research and exten-sion has accounted for 55 to 75 percent of ICA’Sbudget. Government contributions grew steadilybetween 1964 and 1990, but currently are de-creasing. With fewer financial resources andnumerous loan repayment obligations, ICA islooking for avenues to increase income. Possibili-ties include increasing competition with theprivate sector.

Colombia also has a complex network ofprivate institutions in the agricultural sector. Theprivate sector has expanded its role in genetic andagronomic research as well as in certified seedproduction. In the 1980s, significant privateresearch effort was placed on sugar cane andcoffee. Oil-palm producers recently have organ-ized a research center (CENIPALMA), and flow-er and banana producers are planning their ownresearch centers. Benefits for producers could beachieved through a vigorous coordination effortamong the numerous private and public researchand extension institutions.

Private-sector support of university researchhas improved capabilities of the Agronomy De-partment and the Graduate School of Colombia’sNational University. However, the majority ofColombia’s universities do not play importantroles in agricultural research or extension. De-spite Colombia’s strong institutional frameworkfor agricultural research and extension, productiv-

ity improvements are hampered by financialinstability for exports (due to an overvaluedColombian peso), lack of security in manyagricultural regions, institutional confusion, andlack of coordination.

Colombia is now in the process of decentraliz-ing public functions and responsibilities. Agri-cultural extension will become the responsibilityof Municipal Units of Technical Assistance(Unidades Municipales de Asistencia TécnicaAgropecuaria (UMATAS)). Tax revenues will betransferred to the UMATAS for rural develop-ment. The Integrated Rural Development Fund(Fondo de Desarrollo Rural Integrado (DRI)) isimplementing a strategy for local agriculturaldevelopment working through the UMATAS. Atthe same time, a compromise between centralizedand decentralized approaches to extension isemerging in the National System of TechnicalAssistance for Small Producers (Sistema Nacionalde Transferencia de Technología Agropecuaria(SINTAP)). SINTAP will focus on small produc-ers and development of local production options.Local extension priorities will be set by theUMATAS. Finally, ICA is preparing a set of local,regional and national agricultural projects.

PRIORITIES FOR AGRICULTURALRESEARCH AND EXTENSION

The Alta and the Media Guajira (1.7 millionhectares), and parts of the Orinoquia region (2.1million hectares farmland and 13 million hectaresgrassland) have been identfied as high productiv-ity zones, which should be prioritized for re-search. Research priorities by topic include:

. Agricultural production in acid soils,

. Low-cost production systems for Andeanvalleys, and

. Biotechnology.

Production option priorities are not clear and, ingeneral, insufficient attention is given to prioritiz-ing the research use of public resources. ICA,perhaps due to its large size, is finding it difficultto focus on research subjects consistent with the

&Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production ! 157

Box 5-A–Necessary Conditions for Successful Technology Transfer

1. Technology should fitthe Iod biophysical and socioeconomic environment of the adopters and should haveproven successful elsewhere under similar conditions, at least on a pilot scale.

2. Technology is transferred most effectively by direct people-to-peopie actions involving individuals withexperience in applying the technology. Media presentations (e.g., pamphlets, books, radio) may assist, butpersonal interactions are necessary.

3. Technology transfer agents must be well-qualified and experienced in applying the technology and able tocommunicate effectively to potential adopters. Development of expertise in local organizations is necessaryto continue technology transfer beyond the bounds of development assistance projects and time frames.

4. Facilitators or middlemen are needed in addition to transfer agents and capable adopters to help newtechnologies compete with established resource use methods.

5. Adopters andtransferagents should beinvolvedinchoosing, planning, andimplementing technology transferso that it will meet actual needs and is appropriate to the setting in which it will be implemented.

6. Interests of all parties involved intechnology transfer should be identified and addressed inthetechnologytransfer effort; all must see how the technology will benefit them.

7. Early definition of participant roles is needed so that all are aware of the subsequent steps in the transferprocess and the relationship between their actions and those steps.

8. Demonstrations of the technology should take place under environmental, economic, and socioculturalconditions similar to those where it will ultimately be implemented.

9. Commitment of financial resources should be sufficient to carry out the technology transfer until it isself-supporting.

10. The transfer process must indude mechanisms through which all participants can contribute effectively tointerim evaluations and adaptations.

SOURCE: Derived from a Technology Transfer Workshop held for the Office of Technology Assessment study of 7&#vm/o@es to SustainTropical Forest Resounxis, OTA-F-214 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1984).

regionalization process. Demands fi-om the local funds dwindle and local, regional, and private-extension systems and the growing involvementof the private sector in research further compli-cate this task. Several observers and publicofficials propose focusing ICA research on basiccrops, small-farming production systems, andnatural resource management.

IMPROVING RESEARCH ANDEXTENSION SYSTEMS

Colombia’s political and economic system is influx. The new constitutional rules and the macro-economic policies of the Colombian aperaturamay create opportunities for social and economicdevelopment. However, institutional adjustmentto these new conditions could be difficult. Thesize and role of national research and extensioninstitutions are likely to change as fiscal support

sector entities begin to replace them. ICA inparticular has had difficulties prioritizing effec-tively in light of expanding responsibilities.Reduced government financial contributions anddebt repayment obligations may exacerbate thesedifficulties. Conversely, extension funding doesnot seem to be a probIem, The SINTAP projectalone is likely to provide a significant amount toextension (nearly $130 million). The centralgovernment is providing value-added tax reve-nues for extension activities through the UMA-TAs. Private-sector institutions can and are will-ing to play an important role in promotingtechnical innovation in agriculture, in some casesthrough research contracts with universities. Thegovernment then could concentrate its efforts onsmall producers and improving rural economies.


Box 5-B-Horizontal Cooperation for Agricultural Research and Extension

Technology transfer among Latin American countries can link regions with similar environmental conditionsand promote research and development of suitable technologies. For example, PROCITROPICOS, a cooperativeagreement recentty signed by a number of national agencies for agricultural research (NAARs) of Latin Americancountries, is focusing on cooperative or joint research programs, scientific and technical information exchange,and technology transfer. Efforts will be devoted to three main tropical ecosystems (i.e., humid-tropic, tropicalsavanna, and Amazon highlands) common to Bolivia Brazil, Colombia, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and VenezuelaThe PROCITROPICOS will be supported by the Inter-American Institution for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA)of the Organization of American States. Programs and activities of PROCITROPICOS should contribute to policyformulation and determination of production options conducive to sustainable development in the tropics.Sustainability criteria for the Latin American tropics and practical measures and actions for achieving sustainableproduction systems will be a main research focus (PROCITROPKXX Agreerrwnt, 1990).

Another cooperative program for research and technology transfer among Andean countries, PRO-CIANDINO, was initiated in 1985 by IICA and the InterAmerican Development Bank. The participant NAARs arefrom Bolivia, Colombi% Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela and the program is governed by a council of NAARdirectors. The program includes two major activities: joint research bytwoor more participantson specific probtemsthat affect production of selected commodities; and horizontal technology transfer through atraining program andexperts consultation. PROCIANDINO initially focused on potatoes, maize, grain-legumes, and extension methods,and recently has expanded to include crop and livestock production problems in the Andean region.PROCIANDINO generally is praised as an effective mechanism for horizontal cooperation although delays infinancing operating expenses and equipment purchases have hampered the research component. Through thisproject, scores of techniaans and professionals from the NAARs have been able to experience and observedifferent ways of soiving common problems.SOURCE: A. Chavez, “Andean Agricultural Research and Extension Systems and Twhnology Transfer Activities: Potential Mechanismsto Enhance Crop Substitution Efforts in 6olivia, Colombia, and Peru,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment,December 1991.

1 Agricultural Technology Transfer ties in this way increases the potential for

Technology transfer is a temporary activity andprovides a mechanism to build local expertise

throughout the technology development and dif-fusion process (box 5-A). Activities that areconceptualized and implemented such that along-term professional partnership is establishedbetween native and foreign experts may be mostsuccessful. Project cycles of at least 10 yearsprobably are necessary to produce relevant resultsspanning technology generation to technologyadoption by the average producer. Examplesinclude the joint programs established by Interna-tional Agricultural Research Centers (IARCS)and specitlc financing sources (e.g., the Trop-Soils and the Small-Ruminants programs in Peru)or bilateral assistance groups (e.g., AID Seedprogram in Bolivia). Development of local abili-

continuation of efforts after foreign assistance hasended. Regional technology transfer activitiesalso have proven to be very useful. Collaborativeresearch programs among Latin American coun-

tries (box 5-B) could be enhanced organization-ally and financially and used more intensively.

In the early 1970s, key Bolivian nationalresearch groups (e.g., IBTA and CIAT) werecreated under U.S. technology transfer programs.Today, a number of bilateral and multilateralassistance organizations provide a wide array oftechnical expertise. CIAT in Santa Cruz is work-ing with British, Japanese, and Dutch donors, andforeign consultants comprise a large part ofCIAT’S technicians (box 5-C). While some diffi-culties exist with donor coordination, this may beaddressed with the establishment of CNIEA to


facilitate and coordinate national planning fordevelopment. World Bank projects to integratepublic and private-sector development effortscould increase professional and economic secu-rity in the research system. These stabilizationmeasures are likely to improve the effectivenessof technology transfer activities and increase theirlong-term contribution to Bolivian agriculture.

In Peru, technology transfer activities contrib-uted heavily to establishing the research andextension programs and helping to train Peruvianresearchers that became the technical core ofINIAA’s resewch programs. Responsibility fortechnology transfer currently is being shiftedfrom central government institutions to regionalgovernments. Privatization of public functionsand activities is gaining momentum, but wherethis trend will take Peru’s technology transfersystem is unclear. Peru has developed a relativelyextended and well-qualified human-resource basethrough cooperation with international donors(box 5-D). However, institutional instability anderratic salary policies have eroded this baseconsiderably and security problems reduce Peru’sability to receive and handle technology transferprojects effectively. These difficulties must beaddressed to improve training efforts, consolidatekey institutions, and maximize technology trans-fer benefits.

Technology transfer and financial assistancehave been integral parts of the Colombian re-search system. Technology transfer contributedsignificantly to improved product quality controlwhen the Colombian private sector initiated astrong drive to increase agricultural exports in the1970s (primarily coffee, cut flowers, and ba-nanas). Financial assistance in connection withtechnology transfer activities similarly has beenimportant for national institutions. From 1979 to1984, technology transfer projects brought ap-proximately $5 million in grant money to the ICAand in 1986, ICA held nearly 200 technologytransfer agreements with 30 different foreignentities (14) (box 5-E). Technology transfer hasgreatly diversified ICA’S research agenda, al-

Box 5-C–Bolivian Seeds Project

One of the most fruitful technology transfer experi-ences in Bolivia, and one that carried importantlessons for other developing countries, was the SeedsProject (Project T-059), initiated at the end of the1970s with AID funding. The underlying concept wasthat properly organized and trained producers couldsucceed. Thus, the m“n project strategies of technicalassistance and financial support for seed productioninfrastructure were revised to focus more on producerorganizations and training. Technical support wasgiven to a public office (MACA—Departmento deSemillas) and financial support was given to upgradepublic-sector seed plants that were operating at verylow capacities. The project advisor was based in SantaCruz instead of La Paz where the project benefitedfrom liberal ideas of local agricultural leaders andrestricted national government ability to dominate theproject. From Santa Cruz, the project expanded to ElChaco, Chuquisaca, to part of Tarija.

Producer participation was significant, particularly inthe training activities and several small- to medium-sized seed enterprises were organized. Increasingnumbers of institutions and producers became in-volved in t he new production and marketing activities.Forinstance, the experiment stations became special-ized producers of foundation seed. The projecttriggered a qualitative change in the local farmers’technical environment and promoted the institutionalstructure needed by a modern seed industry. Com-mercial demand for certified seed experienced tremen-dous growth, from 200 metric tons in 1970 to more than10,000 metric tons in 1988 with a continuing growthtrend.SOURCE: A. Chavez, “Andean Agricultural Research and Exten-sion Systems and Technology Transfer Activities: PotentialMechanisms to Enhance Crop Substitution Efforts in Bolivia,Colombia, and Peru,” contractor report prepared for the Office ofTechnology Assessment, December 1991.

though there is some indication that this may haveoperated to the detriment of the institution (e.g.,by increasing responsibility beyond institutionalcapacity).

Increasing agricultural productivity and profit-ability will be critical to support crop substitutionapproaches as part of a long-term strategy to


Box 5-D-Collaborative Technology Transfer Efforts in Peru

The Trop-Soils and Small-Ruminants collaborative programs are examples of Iong-termtechnology transferactivities. The Trop-Soils program, focusing on problems of tropical soils of the Amazon region, involved a teamof Peruvian professionals and technicians working full-time with foreign scientists. The effort has resulted in anumber of important contributions in productive, economically efficient, and ecologically sustainable soilmanagement technologies. The program also has a successful training component; helping young Peruviansaentists in graduate studies and providing hands-on training in specialized tasks for laboratory and fieldtechniaans. The Trop-Soils program has been in operation for nearly 12 years, although security concerns havehad an adverse impact on the level of activities at the Yurimaguas experiment station.

The Small-Ruminants program, focusing on native cameloid stock, is now in its 1 lth year. This effort alsohas been an important and useful experience for Peruvian research. In addition to National Institute for Agrarianand Agroindustry Research (INIAA) and Institute for Tropical and High Altitude Veterinary Research (IVITA), theleading Peruvian partners, the program involved several regional universities, cameloid production units, and anarray of Peruvian professionals and scientists. The program trained 90 Peruvian professionals seeking advanceddegrees, and generated about 700 publications. These two results are probabty the program’s most usefulcontributions to research in this field and to the diffusion of technical knowtedge to producers.SOURCE: A. Chavez, “An&an Agricultural Reeearch and Extension Systems and Tschnoiogy Transfer Activities: Potential Mechanismsto Enhance Crop Substitution Efforts in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru,” contractor report prepared for the Office of T=hnology Assessment,December 1991.

reduce coca cultivation. Most coca production nities to improve technology transfer activities. Inoccurs in areas characterized by low land- genera.1, greater attention toward natural resourceproductivity and poverty. Research, extension, management is needed as well as refocusing cropand technology transfer efforts can work to research to include cultivation practices, inte-develop packages of practices suitable to these grated management of pests and diseases, andregions. A comprehensive crop-substitution strat- postharvest problems. A multidisciplinary ap-egy

●

●

is likely to require: preach and close cooperation with specialized

Enhanced research and extension activities,international programs and research centers will

Financial assistance for research and exten-be needed to achieve these goals.

sion,Foreign expertise to share professional re- INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORTsearch and extension responsibilities on a AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIONlong-term basis, and AND MARKETINGEnhanced cooperation among Latin Ameri-

Processing, handling, and storage facilities andcan countries.

transportation and communication networks are

Several issues that should be addressed jointlyby research and extension specialists to improvetechnology transfer include: improved communi-cation among researchers, extension agents, andproducers; prioritization of technology dissemin-ation efforts; and adaptation of extension meth-ods to local conditions. External reviews andevaluations have identified research areas deserv-ing of future attention, and point to new opportu-

critical needs for successful alternative develop-ment. Alternative crops must compete with aneasily produced, processed, and transported com-modity-coca-with a known and largely stablemarket. Producers need information on legitimatecrop markets for production decisions, easilyavailable and affordable inputs, and scheduledand reliable transport services. Lack of attentionto transport and communication development

—— — —


Box 5-E–The Panela Project

The Dutch-supported Panela project, initiated in 1983 in Colombia, is an excellent example of successfultechnology transfer. Panda-cane, a small farmer’s crop, is a popular sugar substitute in many villages and ruralareas, as well as an important ingredient in traditional Latin American dishes, The panda industry providesemployment and a year-round income to many peasant famiiiesthroughout the Coiombian vaiieys and Piedmontearea

Project goais were to improve paneia-cane varieties and cultivation methods and to improve traditionalpaneia processing piants and methods. The instituto Coiombiano Agropecuarii (iCA) established a piiot centerin Santander (Barbosa) to promote adoption of the newtechnoiogies and resuits have been very promising. A newpaneia-cane variety has generated yieid increases by as much as 30 percent.

The prqect aiso has produced technicai recommendations for improving harvest efficiency and transport tomiiis. At the miiis, new mechanical and chemicai methods forcieaning juices were introduced, bringing extractioneffiaency to 70 percen% significant rise for a smaii-scaie industry. Purity of juices aiso has improved. Fhaliy,the project increased the efficiency of cookers and established the use of miiied cane residuai as fuei.

There are severai important aspects of the Paneia-project that made it a successful technology transferexperience. it addressed an important sociai and economic sector; changes and innovations in techniques andequipment were progressive and iocaiiy deveioped; and finaiiy, the project had a iong-term pianningperspective-basic diagnosis and prioritization of probiems ied to application and extension of soiutions. Atpresent, iCAisextending the achievements of the Paneiaproject with the involvement of nine Centros Regionaiesde Capacitaci6n, Extensi6n, y Difusi6n de Tecnoiogfa (CRECEDS) and severai nongovernmental organizations.SOURCE: A. Chavez, “Andean Agricultural Reeearch and Etieneion Syetems and T6ctmoiogy Transfer ActhMea: Potential Meebanismsto Enhance Crop Substitution Efforta jn Bolivi% Colombia, and Peru,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Aeseaement,Decamber 1991.

compounds the comparative disadvantage for less, adequate infrastructure will be necessary toproducers of legitimate crops in remote areas by improve opportunities for coca farmers to under-increasing costs above competitive levels (box take alternative crop production.5-F).

Despite the clear need for infrastructural sup-9 Value-Added Processing Opportunities3

port for alternative crops, constraints to develop-ment include: Preservation and processing techniques can

●

●

●

●

increase storage life and quality, minimize wast-Insufficient financing and credit mecha- age and spoilage, and facilitate shipping andnisms, marketing of agricultural products. ProcessingDifficult environments for building physical also may increase value for producers and marketinfrastructure, demand. Efforts to develop value-added process-Small and dispersed production units coming in the Andean region are ongoing, althoughplicating facility siting, and they have met with some difficulties. In mostTenuous security in some production areas. cases appropriate technologies exist, but the

In addition, the potential for efforts to benefit facilities are lacking. In addition, inadequate or

coca production and cocaine trafficking reduces lack of electrical distribution networks in produc-

interest in infrastructure development. Neverthe- ing areas is another significant problem.

J The information contained in this section was drawn largely from B. McD. Stevenso% “Post-Harvest Technologies to ImproveAgricultural Profitability,’ contractw report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessmen~ May 1992.


&.,. .-.

Simple techniques can be usedforprirnary processingof some tropical food products. Here, cocoa is beingsundried; the intermediate product will be packed andshipped to another cooperative facility.

An essential part of the analysis of anyvalue-added proposal is quanti.&ing raw materialavailability, processing costs, and current marketprices for the transformed product. The latterinformation is more readily available than theformer. International commodity markets aretransparent in the sense that there are manyinformation systems, including the commoditiesexchange reports from major trading countries. Itis important that the Andean count ies haveaccess to this information. Subscription to infor-mation services on a regular basis could be a part

of alternative development projects to addressthis need.

A variety of Andean tropical food products aresuitable for processing for domestic and interna-tional markets. Tropical fruits can be juiced,aseptically packed, frozen, canned or dried. Whilenone of these options currently are available in theChapare in Bolivia, caming facilities are avail-able in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, and conven-tional juice extraction plants are also available inCochabarnba. Investment in processing opportu-nities in the production zone could reduce trans-port costs and improve product competitiveness.

Box !%F-From Production to Market:Development Dilemma

Although difficult, identifying potential alternativecrops is simpler than developing the industrial base tomake the crop economically sustainable. The problemcan be illustrated using a real example from theChapare region. Maracuya (passion fruit) has demon-strated good production characteristics under smallfarm conditions. The fruit has been processed 100allyand international buyers have expressed enthusiasmfor the single strength juice extract, such that an orderwas placed for approximately 18 tons of product, to beshipped in 55 gallon drums, frozen. At present totalproduction in the Chapare is unlikely to exceed thisquantity per year. However, freezing facilities are notin place, and due in part to high transport processing,and handling costs, the product is costing approxi-mately 50 percent more than that from competitivesources.

Each of these factors can be addressed within thecontext of Cochabamba Regional Development Pro-ject (CORDEP), butrnakhgthetransition from suppiy-ing 100al market to that of exporting will requireinvestment in plant material, extension effort to expandthe production base, increased effiaency in process-ing, establishment of frozen goods transport systems,and reduction of transport costs that currently reflectthe distance of the production area from the nearestseaport in Arica, northern Chile. Thus, the problembecomes less one of marketing and more one ofproduction and infrastructure. This is typical of anumber of products with which ahernative develop-ment programs are working. There is insufficient rawmaterial to begin an agroindustrial operation, exceptwit h multilevel investment starting with the expansionof the production base.SOURCE: B. McD. Stevenson, “Post-Harvest Technologies toImprove Agricultural Profitabilityr” contractor report prepared forthe Offica of T~hnology Assessment May 1992.

Similarly, nut crops can be harvested, shelled,and packed for transport with a minimum ofinfrastructure and can provide good returns de-spite a somewhat lengthy waiting time beforetrees are productive. In addition, many othervalue-added products can be derived from the raw

—


material. Macadamia production is still develop-ing in the Chapare and private-sector interest innut processing is increasing.

Tea and coffee are being produced and achiev-ing quality acceptable to international buyers.Primary processing is done in the production areaand the resulting product is readily transportedand offers good possibilities for export income.The small quantity of local production remains inall cases the biggest deterrent to internationaltraders who generally require quantities much inexcess of the local production capability. Table5-1 identifies some specific possibilities forvalue-added processing in Bolivia and many ofthese crops are also produced in Peru andColombia.

INVESTMENT IN AGROINDUSTRYInvestment in processing and storage facilities

is a key need to promote alternative developmentin the Andean region. Although internationaldonors have provided assistance in plant develop-ment (table 5-2), the private sector is reluctant toinvest similarly. Nevertheless, there are examplesof successful private sector investment, includingthe fruit-juice extraction plant in Cochabambaand rehabilitation of the Montero canning plant,which has expanded to process pineapples andpalm hearts from the Chapare and Santa Cruzregions. In these cases, investors identified suffi-cient production of raw material to provide abasefrom which processing could expand. The citrus-juice processing plant may have a beneficialimpact in import substitution and the pineapplecanning operation may have export potential ifcosts can be contained to competitive levels.

The United Nations program has several agro-industrial plants now entering production and isproviding infrastructure complementary to pro-duction increases. However, several of theseplants are encountering problems in terms of theirproduction economics, largely a reflection of thescale of plants built as pilot operations. Forexample, essential oils plants now entering opera-tion in the Chapare highlight the problems. The

Table 5-1—Andean Tropical Fruits and Nuts WithMarket Potential

Fruit Processed form

Banana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Papaya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Passion fruit (Maracuya) . . .

Pineapple . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pulped for industry; dried forsnack food; processed for stockfood.

Processed for pectin extract;dried.

Juice concentrate (frozen oraseptically packed); pulp (full-strength or concentrate; with orwithout seeds.

Canned as slices, dices, pulpor puree; juice concentrate(frozen or aseptically packed).

Nut Processed form

Castana (Brazils) . . . . . . . . . . Shelled, whole and pieces;confectionery (chocolate-coated); ground as marzipan.

Macadamia Nuts . . . . . . . . . . In shell; shelled, whole andpieces; confectionery (chocolate-coated).

SOURCE: B. McD. Stevenson, “Post-Harvest Technologies to im-prove Agricultural Profitability,” contractor report prepared for the Officeof Technology Assessment, May 1992.

lemon-grass oil and mint oil projects are small-scale, and have a design capacity to process rawmaterial from 120 and 75 hectares, respectively.Processing costs are high and production isunlikely to service capital and operating costs.Additional effort is needed to assist the smallindustries and organize growers to support theactivity.

Credit for investment in agriculture typicallyhas been deficient in the Andean countries.Largely a result of unfavorable credit terms andeligibility requirements, this situation has con-tributed to sluggish adoption of alternative agri-cultural livelihoods. For example, in Bolivialoans are being made to small producers atcommercial terms. One concern is that loans arepegged to the value of the U.S. dollar, and also areat a commercial interest rate-currently 13 per-cent per annum. The combined inflation rate ofperhaps 15 percent and the interest rate produce areal interest rate approaching 30 percent per


Table 5-2-Value-Added Processing Investment in the Chapare Region

Industry Source of finance Dollar value capital Comment

Coffee pre-processing. . . . . . . . .

Latex pre-processing . . . . . . . . .

Tea processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Glucose plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vinegar plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Yuca and banana drying. . . . . . .

Banana and kudzu drying . . . . . .

Mint oil extraction . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lemon balm plant . . . . . . . . . . . .

Milk plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

AID Project 412

INC - AID

China -1984AID Project 412

Universidad Mayorde San Simon/UNDCP

Universidad Mayorde San Simon/UNDCP

AID Project 412

Universidad Mayorde San Simon

AID Project 412

AID Project 412

P.L. 480United Nations

$ 73,835

$ 32,900

$ 108,000$ 166,728

$ 307,174

$ 175,298

$ 73,897

$ 105,572

$ 103,200

$3,200,000



In production.



Not yet in operation.

Starting production.

Starting production.

Working; low oil return per hectare.

Project incorporates healthaspects.

KEY: UNDCP-United Nations International Drug Control Programme.P.L. 480-Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended.

SOURCE: B. McD. Stevenson, “Post-Harvest Technologies to Improve Agricultural Profitability,” contractor report prepared for the Office ofTechnology Assessment, May 1992.

annum. This is not sustainable on many agricul-tural programs. The loan situation is furthercomplicated by significant failure rates, in partdue to some borrowers withholding payments inthe expectation that they may be forgiven theloans, the seasonal nature of cash flow, and thedifficulty in achieving product sales at profitablelevels. The lack of profitability, in turn, is afunction of product quality and lack of infrastruc-ture to reach major markets (28).

Any product-processing will require traininglocal people to assume responsibility for thetechnical standards of the processing phase. Thiscan be done either through training gained in asecond country already experienced in the partic-ular process, or through technology transfer andtraining in the host country. Both systems havemerit, but the failure most commonly seen insending people for second country training andexperience is that the training is of a generalnature and is too brief for technical competence tobe achieved. Often the trainee returns and is

diverted to an unrelated activity, or denied theresources necessary to implement new technol-ogy.

Building national capacity to take full andongoing responsibility for implementation of newproduction systems is a primary goal of develop-ment efforts. The economics of bringing a singleexpert from overseas to teach groups of localpeople are obvious in terms of the multipliereffect achieved. Training programs could empha-size the use of overseas expertise within thedeveloping country, rather than the general tourapproach which frequently is seen as an excursionrather than a learning exercise. It is also importantthat invited expertise is of a technical levelsufficient to achieve the desired level of compe-tence in trainees. Frequently, the needed expertiseis at a field practitioner level and not at the levelof the professional consultant. Preparation ofinstruction manuals in the language of the recipi-ent country is fundamental, and should form apartof the brief of any overseas expert engaged.

-Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production I 165

PRODUCT QUANTITY TO SUPPORTPROCESSING OPPORTUNITIESAND MARKET PENETRATION

There is a lack of product quantity to maintainsome processing equipment at even pilot levels.Defining local production costs requires closeliaison with the extension arm of the localdevelopment organization. This can be achievedthrough careful analysis of “real costs” incurredin the field which frequently differ greatly fromthe cost structure implied by an experimental ormodel evaluation. The theoretical cost of inputsmay be much greater than the costs actually beingincurred by low technology producers. Cropyields will usually reflect the reduced inputs andso the real production function must be known tomake realistic crop recommendations. A respon-sible and adequately equipped field evaluationgroup should be an integral part of an extensioneffort, and should have input into the marketingprocess.

In some cases, the costs of production andprocessing can create a disincentive for producersto expand activities (e.g., Chapare lemon balmand mint oil plants). An example is the milkproduction plant nearing completion in theChapare. Efforts are now commencing to increasethe milk production capacity but may be compli-cated by high dairying costs in the region. Further,the zone is not a traditional milk-consuming areaand lacks the infrastructure for refrigerated col-lection facilities and sales points. If the plant is tosucceed, development in all these phases will bevital.

In areas where production units are small,contract farming could be developed whereby aprocessor contracts with producers to supply acertain quantity and quality product for process-ing. Thus, processors are assured of sufficientproduct quantity and quality and producers areassured of a market. However, a highly sophisti-cated level of agronomic research is required tosupport contract farmin g. Technology packagesare needed that can assure a certain productquality from set production practices—infor-

mation not currently available for most of thealternative crops being promoted in the Andeanregion.

Emphasis on product quantity and expandingproduction areas will be needed to reach volumesthat will allow greater market penetration. Mean-while, the short-term need is for buyers to acceptsmall product lines with a view to developing arelationship with Andean exporters. Tariff incen-tives within major consumer nations and theformation of commercial links with developingcountries would complement the donor gov-ernment investment in regional development.

Producer OrganizationsProducer organizations offer an opportunity to

organize and mobilize capital and people indeveloping communities where conventional cor-porations are unable or unwilling to investbecause of inadequate return, high risk, or lack ofcapital. These organizations provide an avenuefor bulk purchase of supplies (e.g., seeds, agrichem-icals, equipment); processing and marketing ofproducts; financing; and even in someresearch and development of new crops oring practices.

casesfarm-

Adequate storage facilities are critical in supportingproduction and marketing of alternative crops. Here,cocoa is being stored in the El Ceibo cooperativestorage facility in the Alto Beni, Bolivia.

166 I Alternative Coca Reduction Strategies in

Producers organized into cohesive commoninterest groups could pool individual productionto meet market product quantity requirements.The present marketing system relies heavily onintermediaries who buy products directly fromindividual farmers at the farm gate. Developmentof producer organizations could offer opportuni-ties for smallholders to increase their bargainingpower and disseminate market information (box5-G).

In some instances, producer organizations maycollectively purchase and work land, either bysubdividing the land or sharing in the productionof the entire tract. The more highly organizedfood producer organizations provide fully inte-grated programs for their members. Verticalintegration also can offer expanded benefits bylinking production, processing, and marketing.Although some efforts have been made to accom-plish this in Bolivia, local politics have inter-vened to limit the efficiency and overburdenorganizations with administrative costs. Retain-ing an independent manager could help to avoidthese problems. Involvement by the financinginstitution to assure internal factions do notadversely affect overall operations could becontinued until the unit has attained economicindependence and has demonstrated viability.

A major advantage of producer organizations isthe built-in incentive for members to use servicesoffered, increasing organization revenue. How-ever, members generally lack incentive to pur-chase more than one share, limiting organizationcapital. There also is a danger of shortsighteddecisions by members with diverse interests orlimited knowledge of market economies. Someargue that not enough profit motivation exists ina producer organization to assure sufficient earn-ings for future growth. Nonetheless, the organiza-tion structure and similar constructs seem, insome cases, to be encouraging successful agricul-

the Andean Region

tural production and marketing in some areas ofthe Andean region.

Alternative Trade OrganizationsAlternative trade organizations (ATOS) seek to

establish an equitable system of trade betweendeveloped and less developed countries (LDCS).Their mission is to trade with small-scale, demo-cratically organized LDC producers and helpthem obtain higher prices and increased controlover the market (9).

The ATOS of the 1990s emerged out of threedifferent trends in marketing strategies: 1) churchrelated, 2) development focused, and 3) politi-cally motivated. The groups with a religious basewere formed primarily in the United States, whilethe development and politically focused organi-zations are rooted in Europe. Today, ATOS aremost developed in Europe where they havesignificant government and union support. Salesof the international ATO movement totaled approxi-mately $75 million in 1987, $8 million of whichcame from sales in the United States (4).

ATOS focus on returning control and profit tothe peasant producers. However, they have tendedto remain in marginal markets where, althoughthey may influence conventional business, theyare unlikely to pose a great threat (9). Yet, ATOSand their products are finding greater acceptancein the national and international marketplace. As“green consumerism” has flourished and theawareness of global interdependence has in-creased, ATOS have created a niche for them-selves in the world economy (box 5-H). Thus,ATOS may have a unique and potentially impor-tant role to play in marketing Andean alternativecrops or products.

9 TransportationProfitable agricultural production in part de-

pends on access to affordable necessary inputsand markets. A general lack of transportation

4 The information for this section was drawn largely from J. DeVincenti, “Infrastructural Needs to Support Agricultural Alternatives toCoca in Bolivia, ” contractor report for the Office of Technology Assessment December 1991.

5--Technologies to Support Alternative Crop Production I 167

Box 5-G-Some Successful Andean Cooperatives

El Ceibo is a federation of 37 producer cooperatives of cocoa beans in the Alto Beni region of Bolivia.Representing some 900 peasant families, the organization offers its members multifaceted services that includeagroprocessing, transport, marketing, agricultural extension, and diverse training programs in bookkeeping,accounting, agriculture, and rural development. The federation owns and manages its own industry, producingcocoa powder, baker’s chocolate, cocoa butter, and chocolate candy. It sells these products nationally andinternationally in wstern Europe and Chile. In 1991, El Ceibo exported W,000 Worth of its products to

alternative trade organizations and networks of health food stores for organic products.The key to El Ceibo’s success is a dynamic system of self-management that allows members to run their

own business and services and acquire important rural development skills through intensive job training andexperience. The participatory structure fosters abroad distribution of developmental benefits to peasant membersand even non-members in the Alto Beni and high levels of motivation throughout the organization. By processingand marketing their products themselves, they are able to add value to their cocoa beans and attain the highestprices available to peasant producers. The positive economic incentives have permitted a continuous growth inmember cooperatives and cocoa bean production over the past 14 years.

Asociaci6n Central de Comunidades Productoras de Caf4 (ACCOPCA) is an “association” of coffeefarmers located in the La Paz department of Bolivia within the Yungas area. The group was originally created bythe Centro de lnvestigaci6n y Promcci6n de! Campesinado, as an alternative to cooperatives, the traditionalmethod of organizing small farmers in Bolivia. It was hoped that ACCOPCA would be more agile, representative,dynamic, and functional than a cooperative. Originally, the group reached out to carnpesinos through a radioprogram that provided farmers with information about local organizations and marketing power and a bulletin inthe publication KUNATSA. ACCOPCA achieved legal status in 1980 and today there are 732 campesinosmembers who live in 23 small communities around the town of Coripata. The association offers a wide variety ofservices for its members in an attempt to develop a system based on self-management. They have establishedprograms that address issues such as crop disease, pest control, crop diversification, and coffee marketing andexport.

ACCOPCA is highly organized and its leadership structure is intact and essential to the successfulmanagement oft he group. The traditional cultural framework for conducting group activities is a fundamental partof ACCOPCA philosophy. ACCOPCA markets coffee through t he European Alternative Marketing OrganizationOS-3, which also works with El Ciebo. In 1987, ACCOPCA was recognized for the quality of its coffee at theinternational trade fair in V&t Germany and received the “Premio International de Afimentaci6n” in 1988 inBarcelona, Spain.SOURCE: K. Healy, “From Field to Factory: Vertical Integration in Bolivia,” &assroots &WdO~fT7t9flt, VOI. 11, No. 2,1987, pp. 2-11.

infrastructure is apparent in the Andean region Some extensive riverine systems in the Andean

and may be the most limiting factor to improvingagricultural production potential. Scheduled airservice is available to numerous locations, but thetransport hubs where bulk cargo shipments arepossible are far fewer. Airport capacity rangesfrom modern international airports with adequatestorage and handling capabilities to those lessable or entirely lacking cargo services. Transportby water to distant markets can be an importantexport/import mechanism for the Andean region.

region are important cargo navigation systems.For example, Bolivian riverine systems providefor cargo transport from the Chapare to northernpoints and also to the Atlantic Ocean throughParaguay and Brazil. Rail transport providesanother link for certain areas, but rail networks arenot extensive. For example, systems in Boliviaserve the east and west of the country and arelinked to other national systems but are not linkedto one another. Further, they can be expensive and

331-054 - 93 - 7


Box 5+i-Profiles of Two Alternative Trade Organizations

The Max M?velaar /%un@Wor?, founded by two Dutch alternative trade organizations (ATOS) along withchurches and several consumer organizations, is the largest alternative trade effort Inthewodd. The Foundation’sgoal wastomove alternative trade coffee into the mainstream by creating atrademarkopento all roasters meetingcertain purchasing criteria: direct purchase from democratic farmers’ organizations, a minimum purchase price,a long-term contract with the farmers, and generous credit terms for the farmers. Over a dozen small andmedium-sized Dutch coffee roasters joined the initiative.

The Haveiaar Foundation began its effort in 1966. Within the first year the goal was to capture 2 percent ofthe Dutch market. As of December 1990, Havelaar reached 2.25 percent of overall coffee consumption in theNetherlands. Havelaar now is available inmost Dutch supermarkets and hasten times the market penetration thaneither of the founding ATOS alone.

Every year the Foundation purchases approximately 6 million pounds of coffee from peasant farmers. Itsmandated purchase price is nearly 50 percent higher than the world market price. Because the Havelaar programdemands direct payment to the growers’ associations as well as favorable financing, the economic benefits tofarmers may be two or three times those of the conventional coffee system.

Pueb/o to FkP/e, a Texas based ATO is one of the largest in the United States. The non-profit organizationwas founded in 1979 to promote marketing outlets and economic support to democratically based grassrootsorganizations in Central America. The ATO returns $0.40 to $0.45 of each sales dollar to the producer, while thedifference pays for the organization’soperational expenses. Since the organization was founded in 1979, Puebloto People has paid over$4 million topeasantproducers in Latin America Itreportedthat in 1990, $1.3 million wasreturned to its Latin American producers and projected that $1.5 million would be returned in 1991 (29).

Tbday, Pueblo to People works with eighty groups from seven different LatinAmericancwntries (29). Puebloonly works with grwps that meet its social criteria, which are often the least profitable and economically riskyproducers. Furthermore, Pueblo looks to work with gr.wps organized for social as well as economic reasons. Itsinfluence allows peasants to learn organizational skills and democratic methods as well as earn income. Puebloto People sells its products in a retail store located in Hwston, Texas, and thrwgh a mail-order catalogue.

A major focus of ATOS is educating consumers about the culture and lifestyle of producers and returninga fair price to producers. For example, Pueblo to People achieves its education goal through its catalogue thatcontains a blend of information about products, producers, and the mission of the organization.SOURCE: Dicldnson, R., “Alternative Trade Organizations, Peasant Farmers and Coca,” contractor report prepared for the Office ofTdnology Assessment January 1992.

do not provide a modern or efficient mode of fertilizer costs in remote areas are nearly twicetransport (23). Currently, Bolivia is investing inrailway expansion in some areas (e.g., northeastof the Chapare to Trinidad).

ROAD SYSTEMSRoad access in many coca-producing areas is a

function of weather conditions, thus restrictingaccess for extension workers and producers. Thelack of a comprehensive network of feeder roadsand adequate road maintenance make transportcosts a significant barrier to increased agriculturalproduction and contribute to high production andmarket costs for Andean products. For example,

that of the cost on the international market (34).Adverse road conditions take a heavy toll onvehicles adding further costs that are ultimatelyreflected in market prices (27).

The existing Peruvian and Bolivian road sys-tems are largely the result of national governmentefforts in the 1950s and 1960s. These roads wereconstructed to promote colonization of remoteareas of the country and increase production andavailability of agricultural products (e.g., Be-launde Highway, Peru; and LaPaz-Santa Cruz,Bolivia). Although efforts to improve Bolivianroads have been made, the situation has not

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improved appreciably. For example, while thenetwork of Bolivian roads has increased by atleast 100 percent in the last 20 years, only 3.7percent of the network is paved, 22.6 percent isgravel, and nearly 74 percent is dirt (22). Poordrainage conditions of the dirt roads continue tocause transport interruptions in rainy seasons.The current condition of Bolivian and Peruvianroad systems is poor and, for a variety ofenvironmental and security reasons, little abilityexists to maintain or improve conditions.

Colombia placed considerable effort on devel-oping its transportation network; however, trans-port costs remain high reflecting the difficultnature of the country, lack of modern transfer andtransport facilities, and the generally low effi-ciency of operators. Infrastructure for farm-to-market access and intraregional connections re-ceived lower priority than interregional connec-tions and today remain the weak link in thedomestic transport system. Rural road construc-tion and improvement and maintenance of theexisting national highway network have beenstarted recently to address this situation (38).

The virtual absence of refrigerated transportvehicles in the Chapare region is a primaryconstraint to improving marketing of agriculturalproducts. Of the handful of refrigerated trucks inthe Chapare, perhaps three are dedicated to thefresh produce business. Little incentive exists forprivate investment in such transport due to theunreliability of specialized vehicles, high mainte-nance costs, and low returns in the fresh productmarket. The Bolivian bananas arriving by road toArica in Chile must compete with the sophisti-cated Ecuadorean production and transport sys-tems, which achieve a quality product at a lowerprice.

Loading and transportation time in addition todifficult road conditions further affect marketingpotential. At a minimum, the trip from Chimorein the Chapare, to Arica in northern Chile is a totalof 700 kilometers, taking 3-1/2 days of constantdriving. Although much further, the trip to themajor Argentinean market of Buenos Aires bene-

fits from excellent roads across the frontier.However, it is still 4 days minimum and involvestransfer of the cargo at the border.

Despite these difficulties, small shipmentshave been made to both destinations and productssold in both markets. In order to assure buyers ofa specific quantity and quality of desired produceit will be necessary to address infrastructureproblems. For example, although Bolivian ex-ports to northern Chile and Argentina have beendescribed as success stories, recurring problemswith product quality have created consumerresistance to the Bolivian product. These prob-lems arose from lack of a well-established coldchain and transport infrastructure in advance ofopening new markets and further highlight thedanger of entering a new market before the basicexport infrastructure is in place. To date, buyershave shown perseverance in helping Bolivianproducts become established in their markets,although it is questionable how much longerbuyers will assume abnormal losses as a normalbusiness hazard (28).

STORAGE, PACKING, HANDLING FACILITIESStorage infrastructure from production point to

market is insufficient. This situation contributesto seasonal price fluctuations resulting in lowproducer prices during harvest season and highconsumer prices in off seasons with the greatestbenefits accruing to the intermediaries, There aretwo cold storage units now approved for construc-tion by AID in the Chapare and the first may beoperational in 1992. Similarly, grain storagecapacity is limited and silo capacity is needed.

In the Chapare, nearly all local market produceis transported by open truck, without any attemptat primary processing or packing. Size anddispersal of production units in the coca-producing regions complicate efforts to designpackinghouses for fresh products. At presentpacking technology in the Chapare region is afield operation using small, rain-protected pack-ing sheds where fruit is washed and treated withfungicide dips to extend storage life. The availa-


El Ceibo, a federation of 37 cocoa producer organizations in the Alto Beni, Bolivia produces cocoa powder,baker’s chocolate, cocoa butter, and chocolate candy for national and international markets. Exports totaledU.S. $600,000 in 1991.

bility of a clean water source at the packing siteis paramount to a successful operation. Despitethe region’s high rainfall, this need can belimiting, often requiring shallow wells adjacent topacking facilities. In addition, lack of ruralelectricity sources requires manual pumping tofill washing tanks. It is anticipated that electricitywill be available in the next 2 years to much of theChapare, facilitating mechanization of crop proc-essing and handling and is a high priority forimproving postharvest handling in the region.

9 CommunicationsEffective communications systems are critical

to’ producer decisionmaking on crop, market,processing, and transport opportunities. Cur-rent ly, communicat ion networks in coca-producing areas are inadequate. For example, inthe Chapare communications are provided by

Institutional radio and two or three public tele-phones. The system is inefficient and is a furtherdeterrent to private-sector involvement. Estab-lishment of communications systems in remoteareas, however, is likely to be subject to the sameconstraints as road development. While wirelesscommunication technologies can reduce the needfor physical structures (e.g., telephone poles,underground cables), they are costly.

Information availability does not pose a keyconstraint in itself since many information sys-tems exist. Moving the information to producers,however, is a primary need. Development effortscould include mechanisms to develop local infor-mation collection and dissemination for produc-ers of legitimate crops through cooperatives orother joint activities. Subscriptions to interna-tional information services would be needed tosupport this activity (27). Producer organizations

—— . .


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Poorly developed and maintained road systems take aheavy toll on vehicles, particularly in areas with heavyrains. Little incentive exists for private investment intransport due to the unreliability of specializedvehicles and high maintenance costs.

may provide a mechanism to pool producerresources to invest in communications and dis-seminate information to members,

Improved communications are nececessary toassist in promoting export opportunities andcoordinating complex transport interlinking. Theremote nature of producing regions and producerinability to purchase or maintain communicationssystems are areas to be addressed to supportalternative crop production. In large part theseconstraints could be addressed through develop-ment efforts in coordination with national govern-ments.

Engineering activities in tropical regions fre-quently are difficult and some past activities havebeen linked to significant environmental prob-lems making such development unpopular withthe public at large as well as potential donors.Financial resources are the limiting factor in

every phase of infrastructure development, fol-lowed closely by construction capability. Fund-ing resources alone likely are insufficient to solvethe problem.

Thus, the broad-based infrastructure needs forimproving production and marketing of legiti-mate crops include: 1) road development andmaintenance; 2) additional and improved vehi-cles; 3) processing, handling, and storage facili-ties; 4) reliable energy sources; and 5) informa-tion systems via communications networks. Ad-dressing all of these needs is likely to requiresignificant investment on the parts of nationalgovernments and donor organizations. Withoutsuch investment, however, efforts to developalternative crops and livelihoods will continue tobe disadvantaged.

AGRICULTURAL TRADE POLICIES5

The United States is a key trading partner withmany South American countries; U.S. exportscomprise nearly 43 percent of the market share inColombia and 20 percent in Bolivia (19,11). U.S.investment in Latin American and Caribbeanagribusiness has grown significantly since 1987.Primary targets have been Mexico, Brazil, and, toa lesser extent, Argentina, Venezuela, and Co-lombia (36). This trend is expected to continueunder new trade initiatives designed to promoteopportunities for U.S. producers and exporters inconjunction with increasing trade flexibility forthe Andean countries.

The United States enforces a broad range oftrade policies, ranging from import quotas andtariffs to complex food safety, sanitary, andphytosanitary requirements to protect domesticindustries and human, plant, and animal health.While some protectionist policies have beenwaived temporarily, 6 meeting food safety and

5 ne infomtion for this section was drawn largely from L. nrner, “Primer on U.S. Agricultural and Trade Policies: Opportunities andConstraints to Crop Substitution in the Andean Nations, ’ contractor report for the Office of Technology Assessment, February 1992.

G The debate over this came to a head in the late 1980s in a dispute between the U.S. Department of Agriculture and AID/Bolivia over U.S.technical support for Andean soybean producers. Domestic concerns focused on the potential for Bolivian production to adversely affect theU.S. industry. Dcvclopmcnt groups argued that Ihe Bolivian production was unlikely to even reach 1 percent of the global soybean market.


quality requirements remains a significant chal-lenge for potential importers. Training and tech-nical assistance can help improve compliancewith regulations and also help build local exper-tise to address similar problems in domestic foodsystems.

1 Trade Policy InitiativesA number of agreements and initiatives are

intended to promote extra- and intra-Andeantrade. U.S. administrative initiatives include theUruguay Round (under the General Agreement onTrade and Tariffs (GATT)), the Andean TradePreference Act (ATPA), and the recently pro-posed Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI)(box 5-I). The result of these actions on Andeaneconomies is not yet clear.

Agriculture emerged as the most contentiousissue in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotia-tions. Developing nations abandoned negotiationscontending that an agricultural commitment wasessential to their continued participation in GATT.Efforts to increase trade of Andean products willneed to examine potential trade strategies withrespect to GATT rules to avoid challenge andpossible retaliatory action from other GATTnations.

Emphasis on trade assistance for the Andeancountries has included several commitments: toexpedite Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)review under GATT, to provide technical assist-ance for the agricultural sector, to explore oppor-tunities for expanded textile trade, and to rees-tablish an International Coffee Agreement (ICA).Although some of these areas have been pursued,restoration of ICA remains elusive although it isconsidered critical in the Andean region. Interna-tional trade in coffee largely has been controlledby export quotas established under the ICA. Thelatest ICA collapsed after contentious debateleading to a sharp reduction in world coffeeprices. Coffee exports, nevertheless, are substan-

tial for Colombia, and comprise part of Bolivian,Peruvian, and Ecuadorian income. Colombiancoffee exports accounted for 51 percent of thecountry’s 1985 legal export earnings, 7 percentfor Ecuador, 5 percent for Peru, and 1 percent forBolivia (34). Current interest in negotiating anICA likely will focus on modifying quotas toreflect demand for different varieties of coffeesand prohibitions on sales to nonmember nations.

1 Trade Preference ProgramsProviding preferential trade arrangements with

developing countries is one approach to stimulatetheir economic growth and has been included inGATT in a variety of forms. This approach isreflected in U.S. trade policy in the GSP, theCaribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), and most re-cently the Andean Trade Initiative (ATI). Thelatter two are specialized forms of the GSP andreflect U.S. efforts to provide greater tradeadvantages to specific beneficiary countries (table5-3).

The GSP program promotes economic devel-opment by opening trade opportunities for lesserdeveloped countries by offering zero-or reduced-duty on certain imports. The Andean nations arebeneficiary nations individually, and as part of theAndean Group-an association allowed to betreated as a single country for purposes of GSPeligibility. Products that exceed a certain level ofcompetitiveness may be removed from the U.S.GSP program, although the President may waivethese limitations. Similarly, countries may beremoved from the GSP program as level ofdevelopment increases, market penetration in-creases, or as a sanction protesting other practicesof the participating country (e.g., trade practices,worker rights violations).

The GSP program covers raw and processedproducts; however, value-added products mustcomply with the rules of origin. 7 If the rawmaterial originates from a non-GSP country, the

7 At least 35 percent of the cost or value of the article must be attributable to direct costs of processing in the beneficiary country.

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Box 544elected Trade Policies Affecting Andean Trade

A number of trade agreements, economic policy reforms, and legislation affect Andean trade. Many haveoccurred in t he past several years and how they will affect national economies is not yet dear. The following brieflysummarizes some initiatives likely to play a role in the international trade activities of the Andean region.

Andean Pact

The Pact wasa result of a trade framework established in the 1969 Cartagena Agreement. Members includeVenezuela, Colombia, Bolivia Peru, and Ecuador. The goal was to harmonize member trade and investmentregimes through preferential tariff structure for member countries, develop a common external tariff, and developagreements on investment and intellectual property rights. Recent activities under the Pact include:

. Subsidy program elimination for intra-Andean trade and agreement to create a common Andean marketby 1996,

. Establishment of free trade between Venezuela, Colombi~ and Bolivia in January 1992 with expectedadditions of Peru and Ecuador in July 1992,

. Tentative agreement on common external tariffs for most goods, although the treatment of the agriculturalsector remains unclear,

. Initiation of national treatment of foreign investors, and● Establishment of minimum standards on patent and trademark protection, allowing individual members to

implement stricter laws (19,20).

Andean Trade Initiative

Authorized through the Andean Trade Preference Act of 1991, the Andean Trade Initiative (ATI) establishespreferential trade arrangements for Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador with the United States. ATI providesduty-free access for certain Andean exports for a 10-year period pending country-specific determination by thePresident. Products excluded from duty-fee status include textiles, footwear, canned tuna, petroleum, rum, andleather goods. As a result of the ATI a number of Andean exports are expected to increase as well as Andeandemand for U.S. goods and services to support economic expansion (6). Trade has yet to be visibly affected bythe ATI, making projections difficult.

Enterprise for the Americas

This initiative offers market access, financial and technical resources, and debt reduction to countries thatliberalize trade and investment regimes, maintain sound economic @ides that promote investment andcompetition, and responsibly manage international debt obligations. The intent is to stimulate economic growthin the entire M&tern Hemisphere through increased trade and investment and reduction of official debt. Keycomponents include:

. Trade-hemispheric free trade, an incremental approach beginning with smaller free-trade associationssuch as the North American Free Trade Agreement (among the U. S., Canada, and Mexico) and theAndean Pact;

. /rwestrnent-stimulate investment reform and privatizationthrough the Inter-American Development Bankprograms, Investment Sector ban Program (ISLP), and Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF); and

. Debt+educing debt obligation to the United States through a variety of mechanisms includingcongressional reduction of food aid debt and debt-for-nature swaps (26).

Some benefits associated with this initiative have twen visible in Bolivia:. Development of a bilateral framework agreement establishing the U.S.-Bolivia Trade and Investment

Council,● Elimination of $371 million in debt to the United States, and. Grant of an Investment Sector Loan in 1991 (11).

SOURCE: Office of T=hnology Assessment, 1993.


Table 5-3—Exports Expected to Increase Under t heAndean Trade Initiative

Country Product

Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Colombia. . . . . . . . . . .

Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cereals (including rice), cutflowers, wood products, andspices.

Cut flowers (particularly roses andchrysanthemums), fresh tunaand skipjack, glazed ceramicproducts, raspberries, grapes,tropical fruits, and melons.

Rope, zinc, copper wire, lead,precious metals, asparagus, sea-food (including yellowtail,mackerel, and sardines),tomatoes, and dried potatoes.

Cut flowers, fresh tuna andskipjack, pineapple and grapejuice, iron and steel wire, limes,tropical fruits, and melons.

SOURCE: E. Turner, “Primer on U.S. Agricultural Trade Policies:Opportunities and Constraints to Crop Substitution in the AndeanNations,” contractor report prepared for the Office of TechnologyAssessment, February 1992.

final product must be ‘substantially transformed’in the beneficiary country. Changes in productand country coverage are made through generaland annual reviews, and any interested party maypetition for such a change.

~ Tariff and Quota PoliciesA variety of restrictions control imports to

levels that will not adversely affect U.S. produc-ers. Largely, these controls take the form of tariffsand quotas on specific commodities, Tariffs arethe preferred means for restricting imports underGATT. Although member countries have beenencouraged to maintain tariffs at existing levels,or not to increase them beyond a specified level,such a proposal has not been agreed upon.

Tariffs imposed by the United States and othermajor importing nations tend to escalate asproducts move through the processing chain. Thisapproach is suggested to have inhibited growth ofprocessing industries in some developing coun-tries (5). Review and possible revision of tariffschedules for processed Andean products couldcomplement crop substitution efforts and contrib-ute to growth of the value-added industries.

Import restrictions may be placed on certainproducts that may undermine any USDA domes-tic commodity program (1). 8 These section 22fees and quotas are designed to keep productprices above the government price support leveland to protect U.S. producers by stabilizingdomestic prices, particularly during times whenworld prices are low. Such import restrictionsapply to all nations, irrespective of other tradingarrangements with the United States (e.g., CBI,ATI).

The Sugar Tariff Rate Quota system is de-signed to protect the domestic price-supportprogram for sugarcane and sugar beets. Sugarimports are restricted by a country-by-countrytariff rate quota system in effect since late 1990.9

Imports up to the quota amount are subject to asmall duty and levels above that are dutiable at asignificantly higher rate. This system helps sup-port a U.S. market stabilization price much higherthan the world price (21.5 cents vs. 9.2 cents)(17). Bolivia recently requested an expansion ofits sugar quota from 16,000 to 100,000 metrictons to help provide alternatives for some farmlaborers involved in coca production (10). Therequest was denied, however, and critics sug-gested the benefits would accrue to plantationowners and processors rather than the targetpopulation (24).

Tariffs are also imposed on sugar-derivedproducts such as alcohol fuels. A schedule of

8 An investigation on the effect of imports on U.S. commodity programs is conducted by the U.S. International Trade Commissionhowever, ITC’S report is merely advisory and the President may set fees or quotas irrespective of its content.

9 Revised based on a GA’IT ruling that the 1981 absolute quota system was not in conformity with GA’IT IUk. yet, the effect Of the newprogram, in terms of restricting sugar imports, was identical to the old quota program.


tariffs was developed to curb imports of alcoholfuels in 1980 and protect U.S. corn and ethanolproducers, although ethanol auto fuels remain asmall part of the overall gasoline pool (i.e., lessthan 1 percent). Tariffs for ethanol importscurrently run $0.54 cents per gallon (21), Propo-nents of ethanol fuel suggest the market willexpand in response to environmental concernover fossil fuel use and carbon dioxide reductionpolicies. While ethanol largely is produced fromsugarcane and corn, many plants may be used asfeedstocks. Technology exists to use a variety ofgrasses in an ammonium freeze explosion processto produce ethanol. Tariff reductions for ethanolcould provide incentive for industry developmentin the Andean nations. In addition to U.S. imports,several South American countries are large usersof ethanol auto fuels (e.g., Argentina, Brazil).

Countervailing duty and anti-dumping lawsseek to preclude unfair competitive advantageimporting countries might have over U.S. produc-ers as a result of foreign subsidies or by marketingproducts at less than their fair market value.Imports suspected of violating these conditionsare investigated by the U.S. Department ofCommerce and International Trade Comrnission.10

Additional duties may be imposed on productsdetermined to violate these laws. Subsidies andother assistance promoting agricultural develop-ment in the Andean nations potentially could bechallenged under U.S. countervailing and anti-dumping laws (15).

H Food Safety and Quality RequirementsImports to the United States are subject to

quality and grade standards and requirementsdeemed necessary to protect human, animal, andplant health. The USDA’s Animal and PlantHealth Inspection Service (APHIS) and Agricul-tural Marketing Service (AMS) are responsiblefor phytosanitary and produce quality programs,

respectively. The U.S. Department of Health andHuman Services’ Food and Drug Administration(FDA), the USDA Food Safety Inspection Serv-ice (FSIS), and the U.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) are responsible for regulatinghealth and safety programs. Phytosanitary regula-tions can pose unique challenges for developingcountries. They can restrict trade if applied in anarbitrary manner or if compliance assistance isdifficult to obtain. Provision of technical assist-ance and training could offer benefits for industrydevelopment domestically and internationally.

PHYTOSANITARY REQUIREMENTS

Plant, live animal, and meat product importsare subject to APHIS inspection and quarantinerequirements, Inspections may be conducted atport-of-entry or in producing countries. APHISpersonnel are authorized to enter cooperativeprograms with counterparts in foreign countriesto control or eradicate pest problems. Suchprograms may minimize potential infestations inthe United States as well as provide valuabletraining for importing countries that can contrib-ute to improvements in national food systems (2,3). Currently, APHIS personnel are stationed inPeru and Colombia to assist in complying withU.S. phytosanitary requirements; this may expandas a result of Andean Trade Preference Act.

SANITARY AND FOOD SAFETY REGULATIONSImported goods (except meat and poultry

products) are subject to FDA inspection forcompliance with health, safety, packaging, andlabeling requirements. Food products that areunsafe, produced under unsanitary conditions, orthat contain illegal additives or pesticide residuesare prohibited from entry. Imports are subject toinspection and testing at time of entry, althoughit is estimated that no more than 1 percent ofFDA-regulated food imports are actually tested.

10 us, D~~m~~~t ~fcommerce ~vcstiga[ions ex~e whe~crornot subsidi~ we be~g supplied directly or indirectly, or if the product

is being sold in the United States at less than fair value. The International Trade Cornrnission investigations focus on the potential injury toU.S. producers,


Inspection programs have been criticized forfailing to provide adequate protection.

All domestic and importing commercial proc-essors of heat-processed, low-acid canned foodsand acidified foods and shellfish are required toregister and file processing information withFDA. Requirements for sanitary food productionfacilities are explained in the FDA’s CurrentGood Manufacturing Practice Regulations (avail-able only in English). While the FDA does nothave authority to conduct foreign plant inspec-tions, personnel may travel to help solve publichealth threats at the request of foreign govern-ments.

Food importers must have access to currentU.S. food and safety labeling regulations toexport effectively. Further, facilities to monitorcompliance with import regulations could assistin improving the domestic food system andinternational marketing of food products. If foodprocessing is to take a greater role in providingalternative livelihoods in the Andean countries,assistance in the form of compliance training is akey need.

MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTIONFSIS is responsible for assuring the safety,

quality, and accurate labeling of meat and poultryproducts. Importing countries inspection systemsmust be equivalent to the U.S. system and beevaluated and approved by FSIS. Currently, noSouth American countries are authorized to shipmeat and poultry products to the United States(33). Development of meat or poultry productindustries for export to the United States willrequire development of Andean inspection facili-ties, technical assistance, and training.

MARKETING ORDER REGULATIONSAMS is responsible for regulating produce

quality standards. Inspections are conducted onlyat point-of-entry and costs for this service arecharged to importers. There are 15 marketingorders that regulate minimum grade, size, and

quality requirements for imports. Although mar-keting orders apply only to quality of imports,meeting these requirements may also pose chal-lenges for poorly developed export systems.

Available infrastructure, handling, and shippingtechnologies in the Andean nations currently areinadequate to handle increased export opportuni-ties.

Trade incentives form a principal thrust of theU.S. strategy for promoting agricultural produc-tion in the Andean countries. Recent trade initia-

tives indicate a U.S. commitment to improvingthe ability of these countries to compete in theinternational marketplace, Yet, the value of thesetrade concessions may be overshadowed byfuture agreements with other countries (e.g.,North American Free Trade Agreement). Never-theless, complementary efforts are needed toassist the Andean countries to comply with thenumerous phytosanitary, sanitary, safety, and

quality requirements for imports.

It may be useful to evaluate trade incentiveswith respect to their contributions to the overallAndean economy. This could include promotingdevelopment of related economic sectors ratherthan the narrow agricultural focus of currentsubstitution efforts. It may also be useful toevaluate the impact of trade incentives in terms ofthe global trade environment, recognizing thatdevelopment of trade agreements with othernations could adversely affect U.S. demand forcertain Andean products.

The need for restrictions on agricultural assist-ance activities should be re-evaluated in relationto the actual ‘threat’ to U.S. agricultural produc-tion. Previous reports suggest the potential effectof certain increased Andean agricultural importson U.S. producers was negligible. Further, in lightof the emphasis on trade liberalization andreducing subsidies and barriers to trade, thesemay become key issues in future GATT negotia-tions.

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STRATEGIES TO SUPPORTRENEWABLE RESOURCE-BASEDALTERNATIVES TO COCA

One way of summing up is to insist thatadvising “shock treatment” for countries withweak or missing market institutions or limitedtechnical capacity—that they go “cold turkey onpolicy reform-must be rejected as little morethan self-indulgent intellectual sloth, It reflects alack of willingness to invest the intellectualenergy necessary to understanding the economiesand the societies for which reform prescriptionsare being written (25).

Strategies to enhance coca substitution effortsmust address a wide variety of constraints fromproduction to marketing. Producers are unlikelyto cease coca production in favor of alternativecrops or activities if they cannot be assured that a

market exists and that the mechanisms are inplace for production, harvest, processing, andtransport. A shift from a production- to market-driven approach is evident currently in Cocha-bamba Regional Development Project. Neverthe-less, the support structure necessary to sustainalternative livelihoods is lacking or inadequate.

Recent U.S. policies have been designed t o

increase comparative advantage for certain An-dean products (e.g., ATI) in U.S. markets. Revi-sion of credit programs could improve the oppor-tunities for smallholders to obtain financing forentering legitimate production systems. Creditrevisions could mimic current U.S. subsidy pro-grams, providing loans to farmers at lower ratesthan presently exist in the Andean countries. Suchan effort with planned obsolescence as a goal,

could be relatively short-term, provide appropri-ate grace periods prior to repayment (i.e., allowfor real production to occur), and perhaps aug-ment or replace eradication payments as a methodof inducing change. Further, supporting nationalgovernments in encouraging greater domesticfood production could increase the viability ofAndean agriculture. Such an effort could incorpo-

rate financial incentives and loan programs, andimproved export and import policies.

Strategies to improve support for alternativesto coca in the Andean region will likely requireattention to:

●

●

●

●

National research and extension systems,Opportunities for value-added processingand increased product competiveness,Infrastructure to exploit and export theproduct, andIncreased trade opportunities (31)

I Strategy: Support National Research andExtension Systems

Enhancing agricultural profitability in the An-dean nations will require continuing and signifi-cant investment in research and extension todevelop alternatives and demonstrate techniquesand technologies to potential adopters. However,national funding for research and extension activ-ities may be difficult to secure and U.S. interna-tional academic research and extension activitiesare declining.

While research and extension activities werelarge components of early AID crop substitutionefforts in Bolivia, the level of effort has dropped.Continued devotion of funding and effort tolong-term research and extension activities ishampered by pressure to produce immediateresults. Research on developing alternatives anddemonstration and extension of this informationto potential adopters are long-term propositions—conservatively running 10 to 15 years whilestandard project lengths are only 5 years (31).

To overcome this situation, emphasis could beplaced on local and national research centers topromote institution building and skill develop-ment, thereby improving the potential for activi-ties to continue after direct assistance is with-drawn. Agronomic management research couldbe oriented to on-farm, farmer participationproduction trials, involving the local farm popula-tion in direct participatory research. Extensionactivities could emphasize on-farm demonstra-


tion and farming systems to maximize the diffu-sion of new technologies and practices to ruraladopting populations. On-farm trials should bemaintained for sufficient time to demonstrateeffectiveness and promote technology/practicediffusion (7,27,31).

1 Strategy: Improve Opportunities forValue-Added Processing

Increased agricultural productivity is likely todo little for producers’ economic well-being ifproducers cannot effectively and efficiently applyimproved postharvest technologies. Such appli-cations will be necessary for alternative crops tobecome significant in terms of total agriculturalexports. Current formal exports of some alterna-tive crops (e.g., turmeric, ginger) are at no morethan trial levels. Success will be dependent on theestablishment of cost-effective, postharvest proc-essing, as well as the enhancement of producerefficiency through reduced production costs andincreased yields (27,31).

For the Andean countries to increase theiragricultural export earnings and reduce agricul-tural imports, major public and private-sectorinvestment will be necessary. AID is a majorcontributor to Andean country development oflegitimate economies. The channeling of thatcontribution is a joint effort between the offices ofthe recipient government and the AID coordinat-ing office in the benefiting country. The effective-ness of the AID investment can be enhanced in anumber of ways:

Implement Training Programs-Emphasis couldbe placed on specific technical training at theproduction technique and processing level, in-volving the import of short-term expert assistancewith a group training responsibility. Programswith specific tr aining objectives, directed topractical-level personnel who can be integratedinto production or processing units such as theyare expected to manage in their home country,could recieve priority. The need for languagetraining as part of a training proposal should be

reviewed and adjusted to promote participation ineducational exchanges. Professional training can-not be neglected, but this too must be monitoredcarefully to ensure trained people remain inpositions justifyng their preparation and benefit-ing the AID program (27).

Prioritize AID Investment—Where investiga-tion results have demonstrated agronomic poten-tial of a crop, the processing and marketinginfrastructure should be developed along with theexpansion of production, so that market outletsfor production will be in place when productiongoals are realized (27).

Promote Producer Organizations—The devel-opment of strong producer organizations that canaggregate products for sale to processors, interme-diaries, or consumers could overcome the prob-lem small individual producers have in negotiat-ing just prices for their product (27). A grassrootsdevelopment strategy may be the most appropri-ate mechanism for assisting rural communities inprocessing, storage, marketing, and transport of adiversity of agricultural commodities. Grassrootsorganizations typically have strong support fromlocal populations and understand local cultures,aspirations, and priorities. Abundant organiza-tional skills exist within Bolivian grassrootsorganizations, sindicatos. These groups have along tradition of solving development problemsand promoting rural reform in the Chapare andelsewhere in Bolivia. Bolivian crop substitutionprograms might work cooperatively with sindica-tos to promote peaceful crop substitution andalternative development efforts (31 ). (See chapter

2.)Promote Private Investment in Processing—

Loans to the private sector at realistic interestrates could promote entrepreneurial activity, andultimately replace the need for AID and othercontributing institutions to maintain the presenthigh level of investment in infrastructure andagroindustry. Careful investment evaluationsshould be conducted, and full market historiesand the long-term strategy should be a part of theProject Evaluation (27).


S Strategy: PromoteInfrastructure Development

Infrastructure is inadequate to support alterna-tive development (e.g., paved roads, bulking andstorage facilities, agroprocessing plants). Thehigh cost associated with infrastructure develop-ment in remote areas is prohibitive in terms ofnormal financial assistance. Economic studiesmust explore fully the infrastructure and inte-grated development of alternatives, and envi-ronmental impacts should be identified and mech-anisms to mitigate them included in projectdesign and planning (27).

Infrastructure development is approached slowly,however, because of the potential benefits thatmight accrue to coca transporters (e.g., roaddevelopments are seen as potential landing stripsfor narcotics traffickers). Although infrastructuredevelopment might initially contribute to the cocaeconomy, alternative development and produc-tion cannot occur without adequate transportationand marketing routes. Interdiction, monitoring,and enforcement of illegal activities also could besimplified with improved transportation networks(8).

Investment in transportation infrastructure, ac-companied by expanded credit programs in produc-tion systems can help coca-dominated economiesmove to more profitable, exportable alternatives(8,27,31). Long-term involvement with this de-velopment, and greater emphasis on expandinglegal production rather than eliminating coca,could ultimately achieve coca reduction goals.Resources must be channeled in an ordered,well-planned basis with the knowledge that thepolitical requirements for short-term, demonstra-ble achievements will precede the overall successof the program (27).

~ Strategy: Increase Trade Opportunitiesfor Andean Products

An increased share in the international marketcan contribute to improving the economies of theAndean countries. Current crop substitution ap-

Locally produced bananas are being prepared fortransport. However, these producers are at adisadvantage compared with other highlysophisticated production and marketing systems.

preaches have focused on this approach, largelythrough promoting production of high-value crops,to generate foreign exchange for national govern-ments. However, meeting complex food safety,

sanitary, and phytosanitary requirements is oftendifficult for developing nations. There are someavenues for assistance in developing capacity formeeting these standards. Additionally, develop-ing national abilities to ensure quality and safetystandards for produce could help in meeting U.S.import requirements as well as those of othercountries. Compliance with these standards couldcontribute to increased competitiveness of An-dean products in international markets and couldyield additional benefits by increasing the rangeof trading partners, encouraging foreign invest-ment, and improving national food systems (27,30,31).

Improve Ability to Meet Quality and Safety

Standards for International Markets—Increasedexchange among U.S. agencies and potentialAndean exporters could assist in identifying keyneeds to facilitate trade. Such exchange wouldallow greater insight into the difficulties faced byforeign producers/exporters and familiarize themwith U.S. requirements for importing products.


Again, technical assistance will be a criticalcomponent (27,30).

Reduce Import Tariffs for Andean Products toComplement Crop Substitution Programs—Although the ATI and certain waivers havereduced import barriers for some Andean prod-ucts, this effort could be expanded to providereduced tariffs for all products linked to alterna-tive development projects. While this may runcounter to some U.S. commodity support regula-tions, import levels would likely be low, creatinglittle competition with U.S. producers. Further,the program could contain a clearly identifiedtime frame after which review and possiblerevision could be undertaken (30,31).

Provide Incentives for Value-Added Processing—Typically, tariffs increase as products movethrough the processing chain, i.e., raw materialsgenerally are subject to lower tariffs while proc-essed items have higher tariffs. This aspect ofU.S. trade policy has been suggested to reduceincentive for development of value-added indus-try in exporting nations. U.S. tariff policies onvalue-added products could be reviewed andmodified if they are determined to affect develop-ment of processing industries in the Andeanregion adversely (27,30).

CHAPTER 5 REFERENCES

1.2.3.4.

5.

6.

7.

7 U.S.C. 624, In: lhrner, 1992.7 U.S.C. 147(b), In: Tinner, 1992.21 U.S.C. l14(b), In: Timer, 1992.Benjamin, M., and Freedman, A., Bridging IheGlobal Gap: A Handbook to Linking Citizens ofthe First and Third Worlds (Washington, DC:Seven Imcks Press, 1989) pp.1 17-139.Buckley, K., “The World Market in Fresh Fruitand Vegetables, Wine, and Tropical Beverages—Government Intervention and Multilateral PolicyReform,” September 1990, In: ‘Ibmer, 1992.Business America, Caribbean Basin and AndeanTrade Initiatives, March 23, 1992, pp. 6-7.Chavez, A., “Andean Agricultural Research andExtension Systems and Technology Transfer Ac-tivities: Potential Mechanisms to Enhance Crop

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18.

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Substitution Efforts in Bolivia, Colombia, andPeru,” contractor report prepared for the Office ofTechnology Assessment, December 1991.DeVincenti, J., ‘‘Infrastructural Needs to SupportAgricultural Alternatives to Coca in Bolivia,”contractor report prepared for the Office ofTechnology Assessment, December 1991.Dickinson, R., ‘‘Alternative Trade Organizations,Peasant Farmers and Coca. ” contractor reportprepared for the Office of Technology Assess-ment, January 1992,Embassy of Bolivia, ‘‘Proposal for Bolivian SugarQuota Increase,’ paper submitted by the Embassyof Bolivia to U. S, Trade Representative, March 16,1990, In: lbrner, 1992.Hatfield, L. Z., “Bolivia’s New Legislation At-tracts Foreign Investment, ” Business America,March 23, 1992, pp. 19-20.Healy, K., “From Field to Factory: VerticalIntegration in Bolivia,’ Grassroots Development11(2):2-11, 1987.ICA, Instituto Colombian Agropecuario, “25Aiios de Tecnologia Agropecuaria al Servicio deColombia,” Bogota, Colombia, 1987, In: Chavez,1991.ICA, Instituto Colombian Agropecuario, “LaTecnologia al Servicio del Cambio, Memorias deGerencia 1986-1990, ” Gabriel Montes Llamas,Gerente General, Bogota, Colombia, 1990, In:Chavez, 1991.IngersoLl, D., Chief, Agriculture Division, U.S.International Trade Commission, personal com-munication, October 1991, In: ‘Ihmer, 1992.ISNAR, ‘‘El Modelo de Investigaci6n, Extensi6n,y Educaci6n en el Peni, Estudio de un Case,”ISNAR R30s, The Hague, 1987, In: Chavez, 1991.Lord, R., and Barry, R., “The World SugarMarket-Government Intervention and Multilat-eral Policy Reform,” Economic Research Serv-ice, September 1990, In: lbrner, 1992.MACA, Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos yAgropecurarios, “Republica de Bolivia, PolfticaAgropecuaria 1991 -1993,” Mayo, La Paz, Bo-livia, 1991, In: Chavez, 1991.MacNamara, L. “AndeanRegions Makes Integra-tion Effort,” Business America, March 23, 1992,p. 5


20.

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MacNamara, L., “Colombia, Vanguard of Eco-nomic Reform, ’ Business America, March 23,1992, p. 17-18.Migdon, R. S., “Alcohol Fuels, ” CongressionalResearch Service, Library of Congress, IssueBrief, January 8, 1991, In: Tuner, 1992.Ministerio de Industria y Thrismo and UN Indus-trial Development Organization PNUD/UNIDO,Investment Promotion Programme, La Paz, Bo-livia, 1990, In: De Vincenti, 1991.Morowetz, D., “Bolivia’s Exports and Medium-Term Economic Strategy: Prospects, Problems,and Policy Options-Beyond Tin and NaturalGas, What?’ working paper, U.S. AID, Bureau onLatin America and the Caribbean, Regional Of-fice, November 6, 1986.Paarlberg, R., Professor, Wellesley College, per-sonal communication, August 20, 1991, In: Turner,1992.Ruttan, V. W., “Solving the Foreign Aid VisionThing,” Challenge, May-June 1991, pp. 43-46.Schaeffer, W., “Enterprise for the AmericasInitiative Offers New Trade, Invest ment Opportu-nities, ’ Business America, March 23, 1992, pp.24 .Stevenson, B. McD., ‘‘Post-Harvest Technologiesto Improve Agricultural Profitability, ’ contractorreport prepared for the Office of TechnologyAssessment, 1992,Stevenson, B. McD., “Final Report Consultancyto the PDAR; Marketing and Post-Harvest Require-ments,” December 1990, In: Stevenson, 1992.Stewart, J., Product Development and ProducerRelations, Pueblo to People, Houston, TX, May1992, In: Dickinson, 1992,

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

Turner, E. H., “Primer on U.S. Agricultural TradePolicies: Opportunities and Constraints to CropSubstitution in the Andean Nations, ” contractorreport prepared for the Office of TechnologyAssessment, February 1992.U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,Crop Substitution Workshop, Sept. 30-Oct. 1,1991, Washington, DC.U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,Technologies to Sustain Tropical Forest Re-sources, OTA-F-214 (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov-ernment Printing Office, March 1984).U.S. Department of Agriculture, FSIS, “Meat andPoultry Inspection: Report to the U.S. Congress, ’March 1, 1991, In: Tinner, 1992.Villachica, H., “Crop Diversification in Bolivia,Colombia, and Peru: Potential to Enhance Agri-cultural Production, ’ contractor report preparedfor the Office of Technology Assessment, April1992.Vogt, D., “International Coffee Agreement: AStatus Report, ” U.S. Congress, Library of Con-gress, Congressional Research Service, March 22,1990, In: Turner, 1991.Wilde, Jr. T. E., “U.S. Agribusiness Trade andInvestment Rise in Latin America and the Carib-bean, ” Business America, March 23, 1992, p. 4.World Bank, Bolivia, “Agricultural TechnologyDevelopment, Research Program Development,’Working Paper, Washington, DC, 1990, In:Chavez, 1991.World Bank, Colombia: Second Rural RoadsProject, Washington, DC, 1990, In: DeVincenti,1991.

CocaBiological

ControlIssues 6

Biocontrol is something akin to gambling-it works, sometimes (13).

E r ad i ca t ion l has been a component of U.S. supplyreduction efforts for illegal narcotic crops (e.g., opiumpoppies, marijuana, and coca) for nearly two decades.Some experts believe that eradication must precede

alternative development in the Andean nations. Others view cocaeradication as futile and a threat to the culture and traditions ofnative Andean populations. Although key requirements, hostcountry consent and cooperation are unlikely to be easilyobtained (27,28).

INTRODUCTIONThe level of coca reduction necessary to have a clear and

measurable impact on cocaine availability is an unknown.Further, new processing technologies have changed the relation-ship between coca leaf production levels and cocaine availabil-ity. For example, an intermediate product of cocaine processing,“agua rica, ’ appears to have excellent storage propertiesallowing processors to stockpile supplies. Thus, even with areduction in cultivated area, a reduction in cocaine availabilitymay not occur for years, if at all. Further, current cocaineextraction techniques are only about 50-percent efficient; im-proved extraction could yield the same amount of cocaine froma much reduced leaf production base (28).

1 For tic ~Wo~e~ of ~js djsc~ssion, e~~icafion wi]l refer tO comp]e[c erasure Of d]

traces of coca within a defined area. The area could be defined as small as a single plotor as kuge as a country.

c@l

(/)

183

331-054 - 93 - 8


Eradication efforts have included voluntaryand involuntary removal of the target crop.Although coca eradication programs have reliedsolely on manual techniques, possible applicationof chemical methods have attracted attention.Renewed interest in application of biologicalcontrol methodology to coca reduction also isevident. The U.S. Department of Agriculture hasresponsibility for research and development ofcoca control methods, including research onchemical control methods and classified researchon biological control.

MANUAL COCA CONTROLManual eradication of coca can be dangerous

and inefficient. The Special Project for Controland Eradication of Coca in the Alto Huallaga,Projecto de Control y Reducción de los Cultivosde Coca en el Alto Huallaga (CORAH), in themid- 1980s attempted manual coca eradication inPeru. CORAH workers destroyed 5,000 hectaresof coca in 1985 with ‘‘weed whackers’ andmachetes (15). Although the manual eradicationprogram had some success, the problems wereextensive. Between 1986 and 1988, 34 CORAHworkers were killed by insurgent groups (31).CORAH’S association with the Mobil Patrol Unitof Peru’s Civil Guard, Unidad Móvil de Patrul-laje de la Guardia Civil del Peru (UMOPAR), anorganization accused of using repressive andabusive tactics on local growers, led to greatpublic resistance to eradication. Manual methodsalso can be ineffective. For example, some fieldseradicated manually by coppicing coca shrubsshowed invigorated growth later (10).

CHEMICAL COCA CONTROLChemical coca eradication thus became of

greater interest as it was expected to reduce risk,achieve more uniform results, and increase thepotential treatment area. Nonetheless, proposalsmet with some resistance. Largely driven bypolitical, social, and economic realities in coca-producing countries (see chapter 2), resistance

Uprooting coca shrubs is one method of manualeradication, but it can be a difficult and slow process,Here, workers are uprooting coca in an eradicationprogram in Bolivia.

has been bolstered by public concern over therelease of chemicals in the environment. Herbi-cide formulation, chemical properties, and appli-cation methods most affect their environmentalfate and thus the potential for creating environ-mental or human health hazards.

I FormulationHerbicides are formulated as liquids (aqueous,

oil, emulsifiable concentrates), solids (dust, wet-table powders, granules, encapsulated products),and gases (fumigants). The type of formulationdepends on the chemical nature of the pesticide,target pest, and other pesticidal properties (29).Granular and pelletized herbicide formulationsare preferred because the drift and volatilizationconcerns are reduced relative to sprays. However,the density of granular products can affect per-formance and deposition. Because moisture isneeded to release the active ingredient, releaserates can be highly variable depending on precip-itation patterns. Controlled-release formulations(e.g., starch-encapsulated herbicides, ethylenevinyl acetate copolymers incorporated with activeingredients) could contribute to regulated release(29), particularly under high moisture conditions

6—Coca Biological Control Issues I 185

common in many coca-producing areas. Severalherbicides have been identified as prospectiveeradication agents for coca. Public informationabout the toxicity and environmental fate of theseherbicides has been derived mainly from testsconducted in the United States, although the U.S.Department of State conducted field tests in Peruin the late 1980s (l).

B ApplicationTechnologically, herbicide application is chal-

lenging. Irrespective of formulation, ground-based and aerial methods are the basic mecha-nisms for delivering an herbicide to its intendedtarget. Ground-based application offers precision;however, the inaccessibility of most coca plots,steep terrain, and bulky, heavy equipment canmake this type of application inefficient. Securityfor applicators further constrains potential forground-based application.

Aerial application of herbicides may use rotary-or fixed-wing aircraft. Helicopters can treat smallareas surrounded by obstructions, like many cocaplots, and also lower special equipment to avoidmajor off-site dispersal problems for liquid for-mulations (l). Several herbicides screened forcoca eradication (e.g., Imazapyr and Triclopyr)

have restrictive labeling limiting aerial applica-tion to helicopters (table 6-l).

Disadvantages of using helicopters include thecomplexity and expense of maintenance, lowfuel/distance efficiency, and susceptibility tohostile ground fire. Thus, helicopter application isunlikely to fulfill the needs of a broad-rangechemical eradication effort (l). Fixed-wing air-craft are cheaper to maintain than helicopters, cancover large application areas, and have goodfuel-to-distance efficiency. The faster applicationspeed of a fixed-wing aircraft also may reduce thesecurity risks associated with involuntary eradi-cation programs. However, for accurate applica-tion, the optimum altitude is 5 to 20 feet above thetarget. Higher altitudes result in a wider dispersalswath and increased likelihood of herbicide lossdue to wind drift, propeller and wing-tip vortices,and volatilization. Low-altitude application, how-ever, requires clear, unobstructed approacheswith ample space to allow a safe climb at the endof the run (l), conditions largely lacking in manycoca production zones.

Liquid herbicide application also depends onmixing and loading sites within a reasonabledistance of the treatment area. Sites require awater source, containment equipment, equipment


for cleaning and decontaminating aircraft, mixingand pumping gear, and protective clothing forpilots and ground support personnel. While secu-rity concerns would be significant for suchoperations near coca production zones, longferrying times between loading sites and targetzones reduce application efficiency.

M Herbicide TestingTesting is a critical step in herbicide evalua-

tion. Thorough testing investigates herbicideefficacy, environmental fate (e.g., mobility andpersistence), effects on non-target species, andpotential for adverse human health effects. Al-though a number of candidate herbicides havebeen tested, the most extensive testing has beenperformed on tebuthiuron (table 6-2). In additionto tests in the United States, field tests oftebuthiuron were conducted in Peru in 1987.

Executive Order 12114 requires an analysis ofpotential environmental impacts for certain extra-territorial activities that:

●

●

●

May significantly affect the environment ofthe global commons outside the jurisdictionof any nation,May significantly affect the environment ofan innocent bystander nation, orProvide a foreign nation with a productwhich is prohibited or strictly regulated byFederal law in the United States (e.g.,herbicides).

Only actions falling in the first category requirethe preparation of an Environmental ImpactStatement (EIS) under the National EnvironmentPolicy Act (NEPA). Second category actionsrequire preparation of bilateral or multilateralstudies or a Concise Environmental Review(CER). Final category actions, which wouldinclude coca eradication, require preparation of aCER. However, Executive Order 12114 alsocontains exemptions that might be applicable toa coca eradication effort. Exempted, for example,are actions determined not to have a significant

the Andean Region

environmental effect, actions taken by the Presi-dent of the United States, and actions taken at thedirection of the President or Cabinet in matters ofnational interest. Procedures may also be modi-fied to account for unique foreign policy needs,confidentiality, and national security.

Although similar to an EIS, a CER is lessrigorous and provides little guidance as to thecontent of the documents or the procedures bywhich those documents should be drafted. Forexample, Order 12114 states without elaborationthat a CER may be composed of environmentalassessments, summary environmental analyses,or other appropriate documents (9). The De-partment of State guidelines for implementingOrder 12114 require the responsible officer of aproposed program to determine whether theaction is likely to have a significant extraterrito-rial environmental impact. If so, the officer mayprepare either an EIS, CER, or cooperative studyto evaluate the effects subject to the requirementsof Order 12114. Of these choices, only the EIShas specific requirements for document contentsand public and Federal agency involvement (33).

Prior to testing tebuthiuron in Peru, the Depart-ment of State conducted a CER. However, thedocument was criticized for several reasons:

●

●

●

●

The

Lack of Andean public and expert involve-ment in the review process,

Reliance on existing data on the effects oftebuthiuron in temperate rather than tropicalenvironments,Lack of discussion of the need for oralternatives to the proposed action, andLack of review of measures for mitigatingthe effects of the herbicide.

latter omission is especially important be-cause of the assumption that applicators woulduse proper safety equipment and protective cloth-ing, an assumption frequently not borne out in thedeveloping world (6).

The Peruvian Government’s agreement to thetesting of tebuthiuron in April 1988 provoked

6-Coca Biological Control Issues I 187

Table 6-2—Coca Herbicide Screening Summary

Application rateSuccess against targeta

Chemical (lb active ingredient/acre) E. Coca E. Novogranatense

Tebuthiuron b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tebuthiuron c , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Hexazinoneb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Hexazinonec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Triclopyr b . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Triclopyr c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Cacodylic Acidc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Cacodylic Acidc+ Krenite . . . . . . . . . . . .2,4-D C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Glyphosatec . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Thidiazuronc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Picloram c ......, a m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ethyl metribuzinc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Imazapyr c . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2,4,61,2,4,8,162,4,61,3,63,6,94.5,9,13.51261,2,4,84,8,1622,4,82,4,84

ssssM

S(13.5)—

uMMssss

ssssM

S(13.5)uuMsMsus

aControl Experiments were conducted inthe field and greenhouse. Control codes are: U-Unsuccessful; S-Successful; M=Marginal, in need offurtherstudy.

bTesting in Kauai, HawaiicTesting in Frederick, Maryland

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Beltsville Agricultural Research Center, 1992.

public outcry from those concerned over such alarge-scale use of an herbicide and the lack of dataon its use in tropical areas. In response, the CERwas redrafted and the State Department consultedwith the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and outsideexperts. However, environmental advocates andresidents of the Alto Huallaga still were notincorporated into the process (6,31). Testingresumed in January 1989, but was quickly haltedwhen the Peruvian Government withdrew its

support for the project.

Although the new CER described plant recoloni-zation and herbicide residue in the soil it did notinclude specific data on colonizing plant speciesand their value (e.g., economic, environmental).Also neglected was examination of the potentialimpacts on associated water resources eventhough tebuthiuron is known to leach through thesoil profile (table 6-1) (34). The adequacy of thenew CER became academic when the producer oftebuthiuron refused to sell any more of theproduct to the Department of State.

Analysts suggest a process more open to publicparticipation might have resulted in better execu-tion of the proposed program. Early involvementof interested parties would have made public thedeep opposition of many Peruvians to herbicideuse and the environmental concerns associatedwith large-scale herbicide use in tropical areas,and, thus, allowed the State Department todevelop strategies to address these concerns anddefuse opposition (6).

Rigorous analysis of the potential environ-mental and health impacts of the application oftebuthiuron and other herbicides has yet to becompleted. Some proponents of herbicide-basedcoca eradication suggest the candidate herbicidespose no greater environmental risk than cocacultivation and processing in the long term.Critics maintain use of an herbicide designed tocontrol brush and woody plants in the Andeanregion could generate numerous unanticipatedadverse effects. However, such arguments remainanecdotal at this juncture, with little hard data tosupport either side.


The potential impact of coca control activities on nontarget species is a key concern, particularly since cocacommonly is planted with or near other economic plants. Here is a coca plot with banana, papaya, and pepperon the back border.

BIOLOGICAL CONTROLBiological control (biocontrol) uses living

organisms or their byproducts to reduce a targetpest population to a tolerable level. Biocontrolapproaches are categorized by agent source (i.e.,indigenous vs. exotic) and application criteria.— primary categories of biocontrol include:l h e

●

●

Classical—importation of exotic speciesand their establishment in a new habitat;Augmentative--augmentation of establishedspecies through direct manipulation of theirpopulations or their natural products; and

. Conservative-conservation of establishedspecies through manipulation of the environ-ment (20).

Some experts suggest an augmentative approachwould be more likely to yield rapid short-termcoca reduction, whereas classical or conservativeapproaches would be more likely to offer longer-lasting results. Further, the latter approacheswould create a gradual target decline and allow atransition period for producers to adjust to alter-native livelihoods (26).


Box 6-A—Erythroxylum Species That Are the Primary Sources of Cocaine

Cocaine is derived from certain plants of the genus Eryfhroxylurn(family Erythroxylaceae). The genus nameErythroxy/wn, derived from the Greek erythros (red) and xylon (wood), denotes the reddish wood of some of theshrubs and small trees included in the genus. In all, some 250 species of Erythrcu@urn exist in tropical andsubtropical habitats worldwide. Whereas most species grow in the New World, the genus is well known also inAfrica and Asia. Two loosely related South American species of coca (E. coca and E. novogranatense) andvarieties of these species are the primary sources of cocaine. The species differ largely in trunk, branch, and barkcharacteristics, whereas the varieties within species differ largely in leaf characteristics.

Although coca was scientifically described some 200 years ago, detailed studies of coca specimens wereconducted only in the last century. They revealed subtte differences in leaf and stem anatomies, growth andbranching habits; and characteristics of bark, stipules, flowers and fruits, breeding relationships, and geographicdistributions. Coca is a perennial shrub ranging between 0.5 and 2.5 meters tall and has a short flowering andfruiting period.

Erythroxylum cm+The two varieties of this species are E. cocavar. ipaduand E. coca var. coca. The formerhas large, elliptical leaves, whereas the latter has smaller, more pointed and broadly lanceolate to elliptic leaveswith two parallel longitudinal lines on their undersides.

E. coca var. coca ● Source of most of the world’s cocaine.(Bolivian or Huanuco coca) ● Believed to be the ancestral taxon of all cultivated coca.

. Cultivated and found in the wild.

. Restricted arealy to narrow zone of moist tropical forest known asmontafia.

● Little known outside South America.

● Restricted to the western Amazon, and geographically isolatedfrom other coca varieties.

. Cultivated for its leaves by a few isolated Indian tribes of Brazil,Peru, and Colombia.

. True cultivar, unknown in the wild.

. Probably a recent derivative of E. cmavar. coca; the two varietiesshare many morphological characteristics.

(continued on next page)

E. coca var. ipadu(Amazonian coca)

By definition, biocontrol is based on a density- biocontrol approach. Information about the life-dependent balance—the control agent abundance cycle, reproduction, and metabolic pathways canis directly dependent on the availability of thetarget (coca). As the target numbers decrease sodoes the control agent population. Thus, thebiocontrol methodology is an unlikely eradica-tion technique. It could, however, provide meansto reduce the amount grown in target areas, andmake coca cultivation difficult (20).

Understanding the traits of the various cocaspecies and varieties is key to selection of a

be used to focus a biocontrol strategy (box 6-A).For example, the coca (Erythroxylurn) species ofinterest have short flowering and iiuiting periods,propagation depends on seed production, andseed viability is brief (27). These botanicalfeatures might suggest that a biocontrol agent thathinders reproduction or seed viability couldreduce opportunities for expanding coca produc-

tion.


Box 6-A-Continued

E~hro~/umno~ra~tens~The twovarietiesofthis species are E. nov~rantensevar. novogranatenseand E. novogranafense var. trutillense and both have complex distribution patterns. E. novograr)atense var.trwdlerwehas narrowly elliptic leaves that tend to be smaller than those of the other varieties whereas the leavesof E. novogranafense var. novogtandeme are larger and more oblong in shape and have a distinct brightyellow-green color. Both varieties occur only as cultivated plants and are tolerant of arid conditions, growing wherethe E. coca varieties would not survive. Neither variety of E. novogranatense is a major world source of cocaine.

E. novogranatense ●

var. novogranatense(Colombian coca)

●

●

E. novogranatensevar. truxillense(Trujillo coca)

c

●

●

Found today as a plantation crop only in Colombia, where it iscultivated in drier mountain areas by a few isolated Indian tribesthat harvest the leaves for chewing.Tolerant of diverse ecological conditions.Figured prominently in world horticultural trade in the eariy 20thcentury, and continues to be grown in many tropical countries asan ornamental piant.

Grows today only in the river valleys of the north coastal Peru andin the arid upper Rio Mar#ion valley.baves are highly prized by chewers for their excellent flavor.Duetodifficultiesof extracting andcrystallizing pure cocaine, it isa minor contributor to the illicit drug marketTrujillococa is used primarily in the manufacture ofde-cocainizedextracts for soft drink fiavoring.

The ecological conditions under which coca plants are cultivated in part determine their morphologicalcharacteristics, such that a continuum of leaf sizes and shapes exists among the four primary coca varieties. Ptantsgrown in full sun develop thicker and smaller leaves, while plants grown in partial shade develop larger, thinnerand more delicate leaves. Humidity and moisture availability also can affect the size, form, and venation of cocaleaves. Because of these variations it is often impossible to identify a coca variety positively from isoiated leavesor ieaf fragments alone. Integrated data on a number of micromorphological features of leaves and other plantparts are required, along with information on the geography and ecoiogy of the specimen source.

Coca varieties differ in their physical properties and growth habits, as well as in the biochemical propertiesof their leaves. The alkaloid content of coca leaves is of particular concern. Coca leaves contain 13 differentalkaloids, the most concentrated of which is cocaine, first isolated from coca leaves in the mid 19th century. Like~ many plants contain economically important and naturally occurring alkaloids (e.g. caffeine in coffee, nicotinein tobacco, morphine in opium poppies, and piperine in black pepper).

Coca Ieaveson average contain about 1 percent cocaine, but typical values range between 1.02 percxmtforE. novogranatense var. tnod//ense, and 0.11 to 0.41 percent for Amazonian coca (E. cocavar. @adu). Averagevalues for E. cocavar. coca and E. novogranatensevar. novogranatense are intermediary (0.23 to 0.93 percent).The potency of coca leaves with respect to cocaine content also depends on the plant’s growing site. The E. cocavar. coca leaves with the greatest cocaine content were found in Chinchao, in Hu&wo, Peru, among the highestelevations where coca is grown. Plants grown in the montallas generally are thought to produce more potentleaves than plants at lower altitudes.SOURCE: T. Plowman, “Coca Chewing and the Botanical Origins of Coca (HyWmy/urn sep.) in South America,’” D. Padni and C.Franquemont (eds.), Owe and Cocahe: Efiecte on People and Po/&y in Latin Amedca, Cultural Survivat Report S23 (Peterborough, NH:Transcript Printing Company, 19S6), pp. 5-S3.


1 Agricultural Application of BiocontrolEx amining biocontrol of weeds may offer

some insight into the potential of this method forcoca reduction. The first practical attempt atbiocontrol of weeds dates from 1863, whenefforts were made to control the prickly pearcactus with an insect observed to attack the cactusin northern India. Based on these observations,the insect was introduced to southern India andlater to Sri Lanka, where it was successful incontrolling wild populations of prickly pear.Initially, most of the weed targets for biocontrolefforts were exotic, terrestrial species, but, in-creasingly, aquatic and semi-aquatic native andexotic weeds have been subjects of biocontrolresearch.

Biocontrol has experienced a rapid expansionin the last three decades. By 1985, 214 exoticnatural enemies had been introduced into 53countries for the control of 89 weeds. Biologicalagents, primarily insects and plant pathogens,have achieved substantial control for many targetweeds (e.g., klamath weed, prickly pear, lantana)(17), Additional examples of successful develop-ment and marketing of weed biocontrol agentsinclude the use of pathogens to control northernjoint vetch (biocontrol agent Collectotrichumgloeosporioides) and stranglervine of citrus (bio-control agent Phytophthora) (29). Insects havebeen the most common successful biocontrolagents to date, yet nematodes, fungi, and miteshave also been used.

To date, 267 biocontrol projects have beenundertaken worldwide and 48 percent have achieveda measurable degree of success. The majority ofbiocontrol projects have relied on importation ofexotic organisms-classical biocontrol--and ofthese projects, 45 percent have been rated assuccessful. Whereas an introduced organism maybecome established, success is measured by theagents identifiable control effects on the targetpest. Results of introductions tend to be mixedwith only some of the introduced agents becom-ing established and effective (i.e., 64 percent of

. ~

~-~

sIJ

?

;

*&

Insects are the most widely used biocontrol agents foragricultural pests, although interest in using otherorganisms is increasing. Shown here is a fungalparasite penetrating the hyphae of its target.

the natural enemies introduced in the biocontrolprojects have become established and 26 percentof these have been rated effective). Nevertheless,nearly two-thirds of the target weed species havebeen brought under control using biologicalmethods in at least one project (7).

I Application of Biocontrol toNarcotic Crop Control

Agricultural biocontrol achievements have oc-curred under conditions where security risks andlikelihood of countermeasures were not factors.The potential for achieving similar success withinthe framework of a narcotics control program maybe less likely. Clearly, the need for internationalcoordination and cooperation would be para-mount.

Experts indicate development time for a bio-control program for coca would be stronglyinfluenced by the outcome of initial search for andidentification of potential agents. Effective, in-digenous candidates would be likely to have ashorter development period than candidates need-ing enhancement to meet safety and efficacyrequirements. Common protocol for biocontrolresearch and development programs includes:


Box 6-B-Categories of Potential Biocontrol Agents

Numerous arthropod species feed on coca or related plants. Deliberate establishment of an arthropod pestin coca-growing regions would add to the complex of pests attacking cultivated coca. However, if heavy damageensued, countermeasures would likely be undertaken by growers. Insects and mites generally can be controlledeffectively with pesticides, particularly where there are no restrictions on the choice of materials or applicationrates. Stem borers and soil-dwelling root borers are more difficult to control, although there are chemical andcultural means for their control. Pesticide resistance is likely a critical requirement for these types of biocontrolagents.

Pathogenic fungi are becoming increasingly usefui in ciassicai biocontrol of weeds. However, they aiso canbe controlled with pestiades. Alternatively, they couid be used as mycoherbicides, aithough in this form applicationmay become problematic.

Nematodes have been iittie used in weed biocontroi to date, aithough some gali- forming varieties haveshown some promise (16). in generai, nematodes are more difficuit to diagnose and controi than arthropods orfungi. However, iittie is known about nematodes attacking coca so that their use in biocontroi couid requireextensive research.

Viruses may offer the greatest potential because they cannot be controlled chemicaiiy, either before or afterinfection. Those transmitted by effective insect vectors can spread rapidiy and are among the most viruient anddevastating disease problems for legitimate agricultural crops. However, there is a generai iack of biocontroiworkers trained in viroiogy and iittie has been done in this area of biocontroi. Further, currently very Iittie is knownabout virai diseases of coca, or potentiai vectors.SOURCE: D. Rosen, “Potential for Biological Control of Coca,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment,November 1991.

● Search and identification of natural enemies, ErylhroxyZum occur in South America and else-. Enhancement of candidate agents (if needed), where, 24 of them just in Peru, (14,36), and many

. Screening of candidate agents, of the organisms attacking them may prove

. Production of candidate agents, and capable of infesting or infecting coca. Other

. Application. potential agents might be identified through fieldsurveys reviewing pests and diseases associated

SEARCH AND IDENTIFICATIONwith wild and cultivated coca.

Desired characteristics for candidate biocon-The frost step in a biocontrol program for coca

trol agents include:entails international, interdisciplinary research toident~ natural coca enemies (box 6-B). Existing ●

literature reveals 44 arthropods, 24 fungi, onenematode, and one virus recorded from Erythrox-ylum coca alone (tables 6-3 and 6-4). Numerousothers have been recorded from other Erythrox- ●

ylum species, including some polyphagous (nonhost-specific) and notorious agricultural pests. How-ever, most known natural enemies have been ●

recorded from cultivated coca. No intensive studyof the natural enemies of wild E. coca, E.novogranatensey and related species has been ●

conducted (20). Approximately 250 species of

Density-dependence-The population den-sity of the natural enemy increases or de-creases with the population density of thetarget species.Host spec~icity---Agents should be highlyadapted to the target species and unable toaffect nontarget species adversely.Searching abiZi~—Mobile agents shouldhave great capability of finding the targetspecies.Reproductive capacity-Agents should becapable of high levels of reproduction to

——. .

6—Coca Biological Control Issues 1193

Table 6-3—insects and Mites Associated With Erythroxylum coca

Order Family Species Activity Known range

Acarina Tetranychidae

Coleoptera Curculionidae

Scolytidae

Diptera TrypetidaeHeteroptera PentatomidaeHomoptera Asterolecaniidae

Coccidae

Diaspididae

KermesidaePseudococcidae

Hymenopteran Formicidae

Megachilidae

Tefranychus sp.

Conotrachelus sp.Mecostylus vittaticollis

Pantomorus bondariStephanoderes hampei

Xyleborus coffeae

Xyleborus morstattiTrirhithrum nigerrimumRhynchocoris piagiatusAsterolecanium pustulans

Coccus elongatusCoccus hesperidum

Lecanium sp.Saissetia coffeae

Tachardia gemmiferaTachardia IaccaTachardia silvestriiAspidiotus sp.Howardia biclavisLepidosaphes sp.Quadraspidiotus sp.Selenaspidus articulates

Kermes sp.Pseudococcus sp.

Acromyrmex hispidus

Atta sexdens

Atta sp.Megachile opposita

Spider mites attack leavesand twigs.In seeds of fruits.Beetles feed on leaves and

larvae develop asborers.

Beetles feed on leaves.Beetles bore fruits for

shelter.Beetles and larvae tunnel in

bark.Twig borer.Larvae infest fruits.Bugs suck plant sap.Scale insects suck from

leaves and twigs. This isthe pit scale-apolyphagous pest ofdeciduous fruit treesand ornamental.

Polyphagous scale insect.Scale insects suck sap from

leaves and tender tips.This is the soft brownscale-a polyphagouspest of fruit trees andornamental.

Scale insect feeds on twigs.This is thehemispherical scale-a pest of citrus andcoffee.

Scale insect feeds on twigs.Polyphagous.

This is the rufous scale-a major pest of citrus.

Mealy bugs feed ongrowing tips, twigs, androots.

Leaf-cutting ants damageyoung plants.

Leaf-cuttingpolyphagous ants.

Leaf-cutting ants.Leaf-cutting bees.

Peru, Bolivia

Cuba, TrinidadEast Africa

BrazilIndonesia

Indonesia

Indonesia, MalaysiaGhanaIndia, Sri LankaBrazil, Cuba

TaiwanBrazil, Peru, Bolivia

PeruPeru, Bolivia

PeruGuianaIndiaPeru, BoliviaSri LankaPeruPeruCuba

PeruPeru, Bolivia

Peru

Peru, Venezuela

PeruIndonesia, Malaysia

(continued on next page)


Table 6-3-Continued

Order Family Species Activity Known range

Lepidoptera Arctiidae

Cossidae

Geometridae

LimacodidaeLymantriidae

Noctuidae

NymphalidaeSphingidaeTineidae

Thysanoptera Thripidae

Rhodogastria atrivenaRhodogastria buboZuezera coffeae

Boarmia spp.Hyposidra talacaPhobetron hipparchiaEloria noyesi

Eloria sp.

Spodoptera litura

Morpho catenariusProtambulyx strigilisEucleodora cocae

Linoclostis gonatiusSetomorpha rutella

Neosmerinthrothrips xylebori

Selenothrips rubrocinctus

Caterpillars tunnel in twigsand stems and feed onleaves,

Caterpillars attack twigs.Caterpillars feed on leaves.

Caterpillars feed on leaves,stalks, and tender tips.

Caterpillars feed on leavesand twigs,

Caterpillars feed on leaves.Also a pest of Cannabisand Papaver.

Caterpillars feed on leaves.Caterpillars feed on leaves.Caterpillars feed on leaves

and tender tips.Caterpillars bore in bark.Caterpillars feed on leaves

and tunnel in dry leaves.Thrips found in tunnels of

Xyleborus coffeae.Thrips attack leaves.

UgandaUgandaIndia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia,

Indonesia

IndonesiaIndonesiaVenezuelaPeru

Bolivia

Malaysia, Indonesia

BrazilVenezuelaPeru

TaiwanMalaysia, Indonesia

Indonesia

Venezuela, Brazil

SOURCE: D. Rosen, “Potential for Biological Control of Coca,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

●

A

assure sufficient populations to achieve thedesired goal.Adaptability--Agents should be highly adapt-able to the broad range of environmentalconditions in which the target species maygrow (20).

comprehensive field survey team would

require at a minimum, biocontrol experts, bota-nists, entomologists, and plant pathologists. Asmaller search team might be required to collectsamples from the field and bring them back to asecure site for comprehensive examination. Fieldsurveys for potential control agents should in-clude observations on their role in controlling theabundance and reproduction of coca, and on theirlife history (e.g., reproduction, fecundity, disper-sal, overwintering, epidemiology, mode of attack,target plant parts, direct and indirect damageinflicted, and existence of distinct biotypes) (4,7).Search efforts should cover at least one season’s

activity of the plant and as much of its distribu-tional range as possible to note variations inpredator/prey relationships and plant vulnera-bility at different life stages.

Throughout the search and collection of natural

enemies, sound biosystematics—the identifica-

tion and classification of species and the recon-struction of their evolutionary history-provesessential. When live natural enemies of a plant arebeing sought, or are transferred from one regionto another, correct identification of the plant hostand the natural enemies and recognition ofinfraspecific entities may be of utmost impor-tance. Biosystematic study may show a potentialbiocontrol agent rejected for its seemingly broadhost range, is a combination of sibling species,each with a narrow host range and one of whichmay be an appropriate biocontrol candidate.Many serious failures of biocontrol agents haveresulted from inadequate biosystematics (7).


Table 6-4—Pathogens Recorded From Erythroxylum coca

Order Species Activity Known range

Fungi Armillanella mellea

Aschersonia turbinataAspergillus cinereusBubakia erthroxylonis

Cercosporella cocaeClavulina IeveilleiColletotrichum cocaeCorticium invisumCorticium pervagumCorticium samonicolor

Fomes noxius

Fusarium SpaGloesporium sp.Hypochnus erythroxyloniHypochnus rubrocinctusHypocrella palmaeMycena citricolor

Mycosphaerella erythroxyloniPellicularia sasakii

Phyllosticta erythroxylonisProtomyces cocaeRavenelula boliviensisVerticillium sp.Xylaria apiculata

Nematoda Pratylenchus branchyurusViruses Witches’ broom

Broad spectrum; causes damage to peanutsand sweet potatoes.

Entomopathogenic.Occurs on poorly dried leaves.Rust, causing yellowing of leaves premature

defoliation, not a serious threat; also onother Erythroxylum spp.

Occurs on roots, probably not pathogenic.

Causes black rot, also affects tea.Thread-blight, kills leaves and twigs.Causes pink disease on branches, twigs and

leaves; attacks many tropical plantsincluding rubber.

Ubiquitous in tropics on many hosts; causesbrown root rot.

Soil borne disease.Attacks seedlings, losses of nearly 50 percent.Attacks basal parts of young seedlings.Now considered a lichen.Entomopathogenic.Broad spectrum; particularly damages coffee

in South America and West Africa.

Causes banded sclerotial disease on leaves.

Occurs on dead wood.

Black root disease, infecting roots, stem bases;may cause plant death; also found onpotatoes and other hosts.

Occurs in roots.Apparently a virus transmitted by an aphid.

South America

BoliviaArgentinaArgentina, Bolivia, Colombia,

Peru, Ecuador, Panama,Costa Rica; possibly Brazil,Venezuela, Cuba, PuertoRico

ArgentinaIndonesiaArgentinaSri LankaSri LankaSri Lanka, South America,

Indonesia

Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Taiwan

PeruSouth America, IndonesiaTaiwanVenezuelaPeruPeru, USSR

ArgentinaJapan, India, Indonesia,

Phil ippinesr TaiwanPeru, Bolivia, ColombiaArgentinaBoliviaPeruBrazil, Dominican Republic,

Puerto Rico, China, Sri Lanka,Indonesia, Zimbabwe

Ivory CoastBolivia

a Fusarium oxysporum has been spreading in the Huallaga Valley, Although reports vary, between 10,000 and 15,000 hectares are reported tO

have been affected by the fungus (22).

SOURCE: D. Rosen, “Potential for Biological Control of Coca,” contractor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

ENHANCEMENT OF CANDIDATE AGENTSEnhancement of a natural enemy can improve

its ability to provide the desired control safely andeffectively. Conventional selection techniquescan be used to develop a large, uniform popula-tion displaying a desired trait. Alternatively,genetic manipulation could be used to enhance adesired trait of a natural enemy. Currently,

conventional selection and mass rearing offer thegreatest possibilities for enhancing the capabili-ties of a natural enemy.

Arthropods are amenable to enhancementthrough conventional selection. Many adaptiveraces exist and there usually is considerablegenetic variation in natural populations. Selectivebreeding has been used to increase tolerance for


climatic extremes, alter host preferences, andincrease pesticide resistance (11,12). Release andestablishment of such a strain, however, could beconsidered equivalent to importing an exoticspecies (20). Pesticide resistance may be a desiredtrait since producers are likely to use chemicals tocontrol pest infestations. For example, many cocaproducers already use insecticides to control suchpests as Eloria noyesi.

Genetic variability is a primary concern toensure agent vitality. Stock cultures would needto be established from abundant material col-lected at numerous and varied localities to maxi-mize genetic variation. If natural variability isinsufficient, it could be enhanced by irradiation ormutagenic chemicals, although mutagenesis cancause random, often deleterious, mutations andmay require large numbers of organisms to bescreened. Following the selection program, theimproved strain should be tested to determine itsability to survive, as well as the genetic mecha-nism governing the selected trait (20).

An alternative to this more conventional,non-invasive method of enhancement of naturalenemies would be to use genetic engineeringtechnologies used to isolate genes from anorganism, manipulate them in the laboratory, andinsert them stably into another organism. In thisway it may be possible to introduce a desired trait(e.g., pesticide resistance) into a natural enemy ofcoca. Although the technology in this area ofbiocontrol is not yet well-developed, significantadvances have been made in recent years andpossibilities for improvement exist (27).

Eventually, genetic engineering through re-combinant DNA (rDNA) techniques maybe moreefficient than conventional selection. Someday,desirable genes may be obtained from a givenspecies, cloned, and inserted into another species.Some work has been done in this area, particularlywith fruit flies. However, developments in fruitfly research have not been duplicated with otherinsects. With micro-injection techniques for in-serting hybrid genes into insect eggs for germ-linetransformation, it is believed methodology for

the Andean Region

genetic engineering of arthropods will be avail-able within 5 or 10 years (35). However, conven-tional selection and genetic engineering are cur-rently more feasible with plant pathogens thanwith arthropod biocontrol agents.

The debate over whether or not genetic engi-neering should be considered for a biocontrolprogram focuses largely on development time.Detractors suggest the complexity of geneticengineering would add to research and develop-ment time and reduce the potential for near-termproduction of a biocontrol agent (27).

SCREENINGScreening of candidate agents is a critical

development step in a biocontrol program todetermine whether a candidate can be releasedwithout the danger that it may also damagenontarget organisms. The procedure follows sev-eral steps, beginning with collection of informa-tion about the target plant and associated phyto-phagous and pathogenic organisms and theirrespective host spectra (i.e., if any of them arealready known as pests of desirable plants).Information also is collected on host records oforganisms closely related to the potential candi-date. Only organisms likely to be host specific areselected for screening tests, beginning with thosecausing the greatest damage and possessingspecial adaptations likely to restrict host prefer-ence (20).

It is likely to be impossible to screen candidatespecies on all plants in coca production areas. Ata minimum, potential targets chosen for thescreening process would include:

●

●

●

●

●

Recorded hosts of the candidate agent,Host plants of species closely related to thecandidate agent,Desirable plants related to the target plant,Nonrelated plants having morphological orbiochemical characteristics in common withthe target plant, andCrop and ornamental plants in the target areawhose pests and diseases have not been


identified and have not been exposed to thecandidate biocontrol agent.

The common sequence is first to test the agenton other forms of the target species, other speciesof the same genus, and other members of the samesubfamily, family, and order. However, labora-tory tests alone are insufficient, for a broaderrange of plants may be accepted by the agent inthe laboratory than in nature. Field tests areneeded to corroborate laboratory data, preferablyin the countries of origin (20).

Once an organism is screened and determinedto be sufficiently host specific to be used as abiocontrol agent, it may be imported and checkedfor contaminants under strict quarantine. Prior torelease, an agent normally is tested in the targetarea since climatic and ecological variationsamong areas make extrapolation of test resultsacross target sites inappropriate.

Genetically engineered organisms also must gothrough an extensive screening process. Re-searchers and regulators have established fivecriteria for evaluating the potential environmentalimpact of a genetically engineered organism:

1.

2.

3.

Potential for negative effects-if it is knownthat a recombinant organism will have nonegative effects, there is no cause forconcern. But predicting ecological effects,their probability, and assessing whetherthey are negative or positive is not straight-forward.Survival--If a genetically engineered orga-nism does not survive, it is unlikely to haveany ecological impact. It is also unlikely tofulfill the purpose for which it was engi-neered (unless brief survival is all that isrequired).Reproduction-Some applications requirenot only the recombinant organism’s sur-vival but also its reproduction and mainte-nance. Increasing numbers could, in somesettings, increase the possibility of unfore-seen consequences.

4.

5.

Transfer of genetic information-Even ifthe engineered organism itself dies out, itsenvironmental effects could continue if thecrucial genetic material was favored byselection, and transferred to and functionedin a native species.Transportation or dissemination of the en-gineered organism—A recombinant orga-nism that moves into nontarget environ-ments in sufficient numbers could interactin unforeseen ways with other populationsor members of other communities (30).

PRODUCTION AND STORAGEStability, shelf life, and potential for mass

production are key issues in developing a biocon-trol agent. Agents often must be reared in alaboratory or controlled environment. Qualitycontrol is extremely important since inbreedingcan have negative effects, causing future genera-tions to lose vigor and efficacy. Cultures must besupplemented periodically with material col-lected from the field (19). Rearing methodologiesfor genetically enhanced agents would varyaccording to the nature of the agents. Artificialmedia are available for many pathogens andvarious arthropods, however, it may be better torear them on the target plant to reduce thepotential for undesirable adaptations.

Full exploitation of pathogenic agents is likelyto require careful attention to formulation. Tem-perature, moisture, and growth media require-ments are critical for producing and storing liveagents. Formulation techniques can overcomesome of the stresses associated with storage andapplication. For example, a well-proportionedadjuvant or surfactant may overcome certainenvironmental stresses, such as reduced moistureavailability, to assist the activity of the agent (3).

APPLICATIONThe approach (classical, augmentative, conser-

vative) and the agent selected determine the rangeof suitable application technologies. Both factors


will affect the timing and frequency of applica-tion. For example, under an augmentative ap-proach application would be more frequent thanunder a classical or conservative approach. Thebiological activity of the selected agent mayrequire that application occur during specificseasons. For example, some fungi depend onmoisture availability to disperse effectively; thus,application during wet seasons could be a require-ment (3). Other potential application concernsinclude photoperiod and dew period length,temperature, and inoculum concentration.

In general, the same application methods usedfor herbicides can be used to apply biocontrolagents (e.g., spray, broadcast) as well as release ofmobile agents at the target. Thus, the constraintsthat apply to herbicide application also apply tobiocontrol application (e.g., difficulty in preci-sion using aerial application techniques). Theformulation of the biocontrol agent (e.g., liquid,pellets, live insects) will determine the type ofequipment suitable for application. Pathogensmay lend themselves to liquid formulations andbe easily applied using existing spray technology.For example, a mycoherbicide inoculum can beapplied so every plant is deliberately inoculated(25). However, for a mycoherbicide to be effec-tive, problems involving production of spores,efficacy, specificity, genetic variability, and timi-ng of applications would have to be solved(5,24,25). Pelletized forms may be broadcastfrom aerial or ground-based systems.

Potential exists for developing biocontrol com-plexes using a number of discrete bioforms toaccomplish search and attack of a target pest. Forexample, mobile vectors could be inoculated witha virus that would be introduced into the target asthe mobile vector feeds. The mobile part of thecomplex would be selected for its searchingability, whereas the additional agent would beselected for its virulence. This technology is notyet well-developed but it could provide an optionto simplify application. Another possibility maybe combining chemical herbicides and biocontrolagents.

CONTAINMENTAbility to contain or restrict movement of

biocontrol agents once released poses a signifi-cant problem, yet would be key in addressingconcerns about release of biocontrol agents. If therelease of a biocontrol agent had unanticipatednegative environmental, health, or economicimpacts, containment could reduce the level ofimpact. However, only a few methods for elimin-ating a released agent have been identified,including applying pesticides, releasing a naturalpredator of the agent, and employing geneticcontrols (e.g., “suicide genes, ” sterile malerelease). A lethal pathogen of at least 40 weeds,Sclerotinia sclerotiorum, has been manipulatedby deletion mutagenesis to have an absoluterequirement for cytosine to activate its pathogenictraits. Thus, containment can be achieved bywitholding the activating compound. In anotherinstance, a pathogen was mutated to create alifeform incapable of overwintering or producingdispersal structures. Thus, the initial populationwould die off with cold weather or old age (26).

There are concerns that some containmentmechanisms could compound environmental orhuman health problems. Applying pesticides todestroy a biocontrol agent could have adverseenvironmental impacts such as affecting non-target species and contaminating groundwaterand surface waters. Releasing another enemy tocontrol the coca agent also could have variousunforeseen environmental consequences. Em-ploying genetic controls would also raise con-cerns about the release of a genetically manipu-lated organism in the Andean region.

A containment mechanism, however, could bea valuable facet of a biocontrol program and couldbe an important research component for cocacontrol. Identifying a natural enemy of coca couldinclude research on ‘‘suicide genes, ’ susceptibil-ity to pesticides, and identification of naturalpredators. Demonstrated ability to contain acontrol agent of coca could help achieve hostcountry consent.


DEVELOPMENT NEEDS FORBIOCONTROL OF COCA

A biocontrol program will face many obstacles,the most obvious being sociopolitical and eco-nomic constraints. The bulk of experience withbiocontrol efforts has been in the realm ofcontrolling unwanted pests. Coca is not a weed—it is a valuable crop and a source of income. Thus,coca biocontrol programs are likely to meetresistance from participants in the cocaine econ-omy. Furthermore, biocontrol of coca hinges oncooperation and coordination with host govern-ments. Implementing a biocontrol program fordomestic marijuana production in the UnitedStates could demonstrate U.S. confidence in thistechnology as an eradication method (27). Suchan effort might increase acceptance in potentialhost countries as well as highlight unforeseen

pitfalls that might be associated with this technol-ogy.

Technologically, biocontrol of coca faces sev-eral constraints as well. Several key research anddevelopment priorities are identified in box 6-C.Whereas there are several possibilities for en-hancing an existing enemy (box 6-D), the mostsophisticated type of enhancement—genetic en-gineering-is not likely to be feasible for nearly5 years. Moreover, there is no way to determinethe efficacy of any given control agent until it isactually released into the target area. Levels ofcontrol can only be estimated and there are noguarantees (20).

The environmental concerns over biocontrolfocus on the potential for effects on nontarget

species and the likelihood of increased use ofpesticides by coca producers. Additional con-cerns relate to the lack of knowledge of the role ofcoca in the Andean ecology and the potential foradverse effects resulting from its removal. Incom-plete knowledge of Andean ecology furthermeans that comprehensive screening and host-specificity testing of potential agents are likely tobe difficult.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONSEradicating coca across its current range in the

Andean region is most likely an unrealistic goalgiven the enormity of the task and the variety ofbarriers. The difficult environments of the coca-growing regions compound the technologicalconstraints to eradication. Further, the overarch-ing sociopolitical and economic features of theproducing countries suggest that even if somesuccess is achieved through eradication efforts,production would likely shift to other areas.Nevertheless, control efforts could play a role inoverall narcotics reduction by increasing incen-tives to adopt alternative livelihoods (27,28).Without clear risks connected to coca production,little incentive exists for farmers to adopt alternat-ive crops or enter into other livelihoods (27).Effective production control programs, particu-larly biocontrol, could increase the hardshipsassociated with coca cultivation. However, forsuch activities to achieve the desired effect (i.e.,decrease supply) viable, acceptable alternativesshould be available.

Criteria for evaluating the suitability of differ-ent coca reduction opportunities include efficacy,minimal potential environmental and humanhealth impacts, and current and easily demon-strated technological feasibility. At the moment,no single eradication method satisfies all of thesecriteria. Whereas a biocontrol approach may offerthe least environmentally damaging and longest-term means of coca reduction, reduction levels aredifficult to determine. Experiments measuringpredation levels on targets in the laboratory areinsufficient to extrapolate agent behavior oncereleased (i.e., a 40-percent efficiency in thelaboratory does not necessarily translate into40-percent efficiency in the wild). Thus, biocon-trol cannot guarantee specific reduction results(27). As long as coca remains a profitable cropand conditions promoting entrance into legiti-mate livelihoods are lacking, it is likely thatproducers will increase pesticide use to protecttheir investment.


Box 6-C-Priorities for Biocontrol Development

Developing a biocxmtrol agent or complex against coca species in the Andean region would require attentionto a variety of unknowns. The following list summarizes priority areas identified by a panel of experts contributingto this Office of Technology Assessment study.

1. International, interdisciplinary search to identify natural enemies ofcoca-Wide-scale search forcoca predators on cultivated and wild coca that may have potential as biocontrol agents.

2. National and international recognition of cocaine asa probletiampaignt oincrease awarenessof the adverse effects of cocaine on sodety to increase support for efforts to control cocaine production.

3. Host specificity screening-Rigorous screening tests of candidate species on coca and associatedplants prior to field tests to determine the specificity of the agent and reduce risk.

4. Human and ecological health riskassessment-Environmental assessment of the potential adverseimpacts of a biocontrol program in the Andean region.

5. Genetics, ecology, and biology oftargetpiantand relative%Detailed information oncocaspecies,reiated species, and plants associated w’th coca to augment screening and search efforts.

6. Efficacy screening ofcandidate specie-creenirtg programs todeterminethelevel ofpredationofcandidate agents on coca and associated plants.

7. Production technologies and quality control—Techniques to produce candidate agent and ensurequality/conformity suitable to fulfill the goal of a biocontrol program.

8. Education on biocontroi--Educationonthemethodology, development regimes, andsafetymeasuresto contribute to building pubtic support for biocontrol.

9. Field triais-Carefully controlled field experiments to determine the activity of potential agents in thenatural environment and identify potential areas of concern.

10. Environmental damage of coca productionlprocessing-information on the Ievelof environmentaldamage from coca production and processing activities to be used as a comparative for assessing thevalue of a biocontrol effort.

11. Socioeconomic model--Model to assist in determining potential socioeconomic outcome of potentialpolicy actions and identify needs to mitigate adverse impacts.

12. Application technology—Technologies to apply a selected biocontrol agent in a safe and efficientmanner.

13. Identification of potential countermeasures-identification of actions that may be undertaken bygrouptindividuals against biocontrol efforts and development of mechanisms to thwart such efforts.

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology &seesment, “Biological Control Wrkshop,” Washington, DC, January 23,1992.

The United Nations International Drug Control in all phases (22). The U.S. Department of State

Prograrnm e (UNDCP) investigations into poten-tial narcotic crop control opportunities highlighthost country involvement and agreement. Bio-control was identiiled as an opportunity fornarcotic crop control in the late 1970s by theUNDCP, but little research was conducted be-yond the initial scoping phase. The UNDCP isnow conducting meetings with experts to deter-mine biocontrol’s potential. Any actions thatmight result from these activities will be condi-tional on host-country agreement and cooperation

notes similar agreements would be sought for

U.S. bilateral eradication activities in the Andeanregion, but little likelihood exists for obtainingthem now (27).

The potential for successful biocontrol applica-tion in the Andean countries are affected by threefactors:

1. Cooperation and coordination-Coopera-tion among potential host and donor coun-tries to develop and implement a biocontrol

6—Coca Biological Control Issues 1201

Box 6-D-Examples of Natural Enemies of Coca

One species particularly specific to coca and indigenous to Peru, Eloria noyesi Schaus (kpidop-tera:Lymantriidae), could be a possibility y for biocontrol research. The larva of the moth feeds on coca leaves andis a principal natural pest of coca. With a short Iifecycle (30 days) and repeated breeding throughout the year, larvalpopulations can be sustained relatively easily. Eloria noyesi was reported to’’swarm” anddestroyalmost 20,000hectares of coca in Peru, causing losses to drug traffickers estimated to be at least $37 million. Another speciesfrom Peru, Eucleodora cocae Busck (Lepidoptera: Tineidae), could be a possible candidate for biocontrolresearch as well (20). Both species meet many of the listed criteria although further screening would be necessary.

More recentiy, outbreaks of Fusarium oxysporum in Peru have increased awareness of the potential impactfungi can have on coca production. Under normal conditions fungi and lichen infestations of healthy coca shrubsare key factors in limiting the plant’s productive life (8). The Fusarium fungus has contributed to widespreaddestruction of coca plantations near Santa Rosa in the Alto Huallaga (2). Peruvian farmers in the region havecomplained that the fungus and the blight it produces have affected legal crops as well as coca (21).SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1993.

program effectively is a key need forsuccess. primary needs include multilateralagreements to undertake eradication pro-grams and broad-based public participationin the program assessment process. Experi-ence with herbicide testing in Peru suggestsgreater government and public participationwill be necessary (31). Incorporating publicrev iew and comment periods, broad dissem-ination of environmental impact reviewsand methodologies, and coordinated andcooperative efforts with national groupswill be critical.

2. Information —Information on the potentialbenefits and costs of a biocontrol programfor the Andean countries is needed. Areasneeding investigation include the effects ofcoca production and processing on theAndean environment and the subsequenteffects on future development options, mech-anisms to improve environmental assess-ments of potential impacts of biocontrolefforts, and the role of coca in Andeanecology.

3. Technological feasibility—Although bio-control methodologies exist, technologicalconstraints to rapid implementation areoverwhelming (21). If a biocontrol programis determined to be feasible, an extensive

research and development period could berequired. Further, ability to conduct neededfield experiments is hindered by lack ofpolitical agreements, and the technologydoes not afford the certainty of a spectilcreduction level (i.e., in many ways biocon-trol may be considered “applied experi-mentation’ ‘).

Absent the political realities hindering anycoca eradication effort, the current state of bio-control development does not seem to offer atimely mechanism for reducing coca productionin the Andean nations. Although opportunitiesexist to develop biocontrol, existing information,cooperation, and coordination needs will con-tinue to have a profound effect on the possibilitiesfor success.

CHAPTER 6 REFERENCES1,

2.

3.

Adamczyk, T, “Chemical Eradication of Coca, ’Contractor report prepared for the Office ofTechnology Assessment, December 1991.Arroyo, A., a n d Medrano, O., “Hua.llaga inFlames,” CARETAS, Aug. 13, 1992, pp. 30-37,in: Joint Publication Research Service, “PeasantArmy Expels Shining Path in Huallaga,” JPRS-TOT-92-029-L, Aug. 28, 1992, p.lo.Bannon, J. S., “CASST Herbicide (Altemariacassiae): A Case History of a Mycoherbicide, ’


American Journal of Alternative Agriculture3(2&3):73-75.

4. CAB International, Screening Organisms for Bio-logicai Control of Weeds, CAB InternationalInstitute of Biological Control, Silwood Park,Ascot, UK, 1986, In: Rosen, 1991.

5. Charudattan, R., “The Mycoherbicide ApproachWith Plant Pathogens, “ in Microbial Control ofWeeds, D.O. TeBeest (cd.) 1991, In: Rosen, 1991.

6. Christensen, E., “TheEnvimnmentallmpactA naly-sis Process and Coca Eradication programs,’Contractor report prepared for the Office ofTechnology Assessment, August 1991.

7. DeBach, P., and Rosen, D,, Biological Control byNatural Enemies, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge: Cambri-dge University Press, 1991) In: Rosen, 1991.

8. Duke, J. A., Botanist, U.S. Department of Agricul-ture, Agricultural Research Service, BeltsvilleAgricultural Research Center, Beltsville, MD,personal communication, August 1989.

9. Executive Order 12114, “Environmental EffectsAbroad of Major Federal Actions,” vol. 44Federal Register 1957, Jan. 4, 1979, In: Christen-son, 1991.

10. Genter, W., U.S. Department of Agriculture,Agricultural Research Service, retired, personalcommunication, August 1992.

11. Hey, M.A., “Use of Genetic Improvement inBiological Control,” Agricultural Ecosystemsand Environment 15: 109-119, 1986, In: Rosen,1991.

12. Hey, M. A., ‘‘Genetic Improvement of ArthropodNatural Enemies: Becoming a Conventional Tac-tic?” in New Directions in Biological Control:Alternatives for Suppressing Agricultural Pestsand Diseases, R.R. Baker and P.E. Dunn (eds.)(New York: Alan R. Liss, 1990), pp. 405-417, In:Rosen, 1991.

13. Krebs, C.J., Ecology: The Experimental Analysisof Distribution and Abundance, (New York, NY:Harper & Row, 1972).

14. Machado Gazorla, E., “El Genero Erythroxylonen el Peru. Las Cocas Silvestres y Cultivadas delPais,’ ‘ Raymondiana 5:5-101, 1972, In: Rosen,1991.

15. Mardon, M., “The Big Push,” Sierra, November/December 1988, p. 75.

16. Parker, P, E., “Nematodes as Biological ControlAgents of Weeds,” In: Microbial Control ofWeeds, D.O. TeBeest (cd.) (New York, NY:Chapman and Hall, 1991) pp. 58-68, In: Rosen,1991.

17. Perkins, J. H., Insects, Experts, and the InsecticideCrisis (New York, NY: Plenum Press, 1982).

18. Plowman, T, “Coca Chewing and the BotanicalOrigins of Coca (Erythroxyhm ssp,) in SouthAmerica,” D. Pacini and C. Franquemont (eds.),Coca and Cocaine: Effects on People and Policyin Latin America, Cultural Survival Report #23(Peterborough, NH: Transcript Printing Com-pany, 1986), pp. 5-33.

19. Rosen, D,, Vivigani Professor of Agricuhure, TheHebrew University of Jerusalem, Rehovot, Israel,personal communication, February 1992.

20. Rosen, D., “Potential for Biological Control ofCoca,” Contractor report prepared for the OffIceof Technology Assessment, November 1991.

21. Rosenquist, E., U.S. Department of Agriculture,Agricultural Research Service, Beltsville, MD,personal communication, 1991.

22. Stevenson, S., “Peru Farmers Blame U.S. forCoca-Killing Fungus,” Miami Herald, June 2,1992, p.A-19.

23. Szendri, K., Director, United Nations Drug Con-trol Programrn e, Vienna, Austria, personal com-munication, September 1992.

24. TeBeest, D, O., “Conflicts and Strategies forFuture Development of Mycoherbicides,’ in NewDirections in Biological Control: Alternatives forSuppressing Agricultural Pests and Diseases,R.R. Baker and P.E. Dunn (eds.) (New York: AlanR. Liss, 1990), pp. 323-332, In: Rosen, 1991.

25, Templeton, G.E., and Heiny, D,K,, “Mycoherbi-cides, “ in New Directions in Biological Control:Alternatives for Suppressing Agricultural Pestsand Diseases, R.R. Baker and P.E. Dunn (eds.)(New York: Alan R. Liss, 1990), pp. 279-286, In:Rosen, 1991.

26. United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs,Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Environ-mentally Safe Methods for the Eradication ofIllicit Narcotic Plants, meeting held in ViennaDecember 4-8, 1989, E/CN.7/1990/CRP.7, Dec.14, 1989.


27. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,“Biological Control Workshop,” held in Wash-ington, DC, Jan. 23, 1992.

28. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,“Crop Substitution Workshop,” held in Wash-ington, DC, Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 1991.

29. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,Beneath the Bottom Line: Agricultural ApproachesTo Reduce Agrichemical Contamination of Ground-water, OTA-F-418 (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov-ernment Printing Office, November 1990).

30. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,New Developments in Biotechnology: Field-Testing Engineered Organism&enetic and Eco-logical Issues, OTA-BA-350 (Washington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), pp.16-17.

31. U.S. Congress, Senate, Permanent Subcommitteeon Investigations, Cocaine Production, Eradica-tion, and the Environment: Policy, Impact, AndOptions, prepared by Congressional ResearchService, IOlst Congress, 2d session, 1990, S. Print101-110.

32. U.S. Department of Agriculture, AgriculturalResearch Service, Weed Science Laboratory,“Coca Herbicide Screening Summary, ’Beltsville Agricultural Research Center, 1992.

33. U.S. Department of State, Department of StateForeign Affairs Manual Circular No, 807A, sub-part B(2)(c), Sept. 4, 1979, reprinted FederalRegister vol. 44, p. 67004 (Nov. 21, 1979) In:Christenson, 1991.

34. Weeks, J., “Control of Coca With Herbicides inPeru” in U.S. Congress, Senate Permanent Sub-committee on Investigations, Cocaine Produc-tion, Eradication, and the Environment: Policy,Impact, And Options, prepared by CongressionalResearch Service, IOlst Congress, 2d session,1990, s. Print 101-110.

35. Whitten, M. J., Commonwealth Science and Infor-mation Research Organization, Canberra, Austra-lia, personal communication, 1991 In: Rosen,1991.

36. Willis, J. C., A Dictionary of Flowering Plants andFerns, 7th Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 1966) In: Rosen, 1991.

Appendix A:Workshop

Participants

9 Crop Substitution WorkshopSeptember 30 and October 1,1991Elena AlvarezUniversity Center for Policy

ResearchState University of New YorkAlbany, NY

James AndersonWeed ScienceU.S. Department of AgricultureAgricultural Research ServiceBeltsville, MD

Ray AshtonWater & Air Research, Inc.Gainesville, FL

Bruce BagleyUniversity of MiamiGraduate School of International

StudiesCoral Gables, FL

Antonio ChavezIndependent ConsultantLima, Peru

Howard ClarkU.S. Agency for International

DevelopmentQuito, Ecuador

Lee DarlingtonWeed ScienceU.S. Department of AgricultureAgricultural Research ServiceBeltsville, MD

James A. DukeU.S. Department of AgricultureAgricultural Research ServiceBeltsville, MD

Victoria GreenfieldNatural Resources and Commerce

DivisionCongressional Budget OfficeWashington, DC

Kevin HealyInterAmerican FoundationRosslyn, VA

Ray HenkelDepartment of GeographyArizona State UniversityTempe, AZ

Michael PainterInstitute for Development

AnthropologyBinghamton, NY

Raphael PerlCongressional Research ServiceLibrary of CongressWashington, DC

Douglas J. PoolDevelopment Alternatives, Inc.Bethesda, MD

Eric RosenquistU.S. Department of AgricultureAgricultural Research ServiceBeltsville, MD

Robert SchroederRDA InternationalPlacerville, CA

Sean SwezeyAgroecology ProgramUniversity of California--Santa CruzSanta Cruz, CA

Joseph TosiCentro Científico TropicalSan Jose, Costa Rica

Hugo VillachicaIndependent ConsultantLima, Peru

Ken WeissChemonics, Inc.Washington, DC

205


B Biological Control of Coca WorkshopJanuary 23, 1992Tom AdamczykU.S. Environmental Protection

AgencyOffice of Pesticide ProgramsHerbicide-Fungicide BranchWashington, DC

Joseph AntogniniWeed ScienceU.S. Department of AgricultureAgricultural Research ServiceBeltsville, MD

Dominic CataldoBattellePacific Northwest LaboratoriesRichland, WA

Larry ChristyBioherbicide ResearchCrop Genetics, Inc.Columbia, MD

Lee DarlingtonWeed ScienceU.S. Department of AgricultureAgricultural Research ServiceBeltsville, MD

Walt Gentner (retired)U.S. Department of AgricultureAgricultural Research ServiceAdelphi, MD

Clifford GerwickBiological and BiochemicalResearchDowElancoGreenfield, IN

George HeimGeodot AssociatesVirginia Beach, VA

Dennis LinskeyU.S. Department of StateBureau of International Narcotics

MattersWashington, DC

Luis MorenoU.S. Department of StateBureau of International Narcotics

MattersWashington, DC

Peggy OlwellCenter for Plant ConservationSt. Louis, MO

Paul ParkerU.S. Department of AgricultureMission Biological ControlLaboratoryMission, TX

Robert RoseU.S. Environmental Protection

AgencyOffice of Pesticide ProgramsWashington, DC

David RosenFaculty of AgricultureThe Hebrew University of

JerusalemRehovot, Israel

Peter Van VorisBattellePacific Northwest LaboratoriesRichland, WA

James L. WalkerU.S. Department of AgricultureWashington, DC

Appendix B:List of

ADCZP

AID

AMS

ANAPO

APHIS

ARS

ATIATPACIACIAT

CIFP

CIID

CIP

—Agricultural Development in the CocaZones Project

—Associated High Valleys, Asociaciónde Vanes Altos

—U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment

—Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S.Department of Agriculture

—Associate of Wheat and Oil Producers(Asociación de Productores deOleaginosas y Trigo)

—Animal and Plant Health InspectionService, U.S. Department ofAgriculture

—Agricultural Research Service, U.S.Department of Agriculture

—Andean Trade Initiative—Andean Trade Preference Act—Central Intelligence Agency—Tropical Agriculture Research Center

(Centro de Investigación AgrícolaTropical)

—Pairumani Plant Genetics ResearchCenter (Centro de lnvestigacionesFitogeneticas de Pairumani)

—International Research Center forDevelopment (Centro lnternacionalde lnvestigaciones para elDesarrollo)

—International Potato Center (CentroInternational de la Papa)

CNE

CNIEA

CORAH

CORDECO

CORDEP

COTESU

CRDP

DAS

DEA

DIRECO

DOD

Acronyms

—Colombia National Council ofDangerous Drugs (Consejo Nacionalde Estupificantes)

—National Counsel on AgriculturalResearch and Extension (ConsejoNacional de Investigación yExtensión Agropecuaria)

—Project for the Control and Reductionof Coca Cultivation in the AltoHuallaga (Proyecto de Control yReducción de los Cultivos de Coca enel Alto Huallaga)

—Development Corporation ofCochabamba (Corporación deDesarrollo de Cochabamba)

—Cochabamba Regional DevelopmentProject

—Swiss Technical Cooperation(Cooperación Técnica Suiza)

—Chapare Regional DevelopmentProject

—Colombia Administrative SecurityDepartment (DepartamentoAdministrative de Seguridad)

—Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S.Department of Justice

—Bolivian National AgriculturalReconversion Board (DirecciónNacional de Reconversión Agrícola)

—U.S. Department of Defense

207


EAIEPA

FDA

FELCN

FSIS

GATT

GSPIARC

IBTA

IBTN

ICA

IIAP

INIAA

INM

IVITA

MACA

NGOOASONDCP

—Enterprise for the Americas Initiative—U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency—Food and Drug Administration, U.S.

Department of Health and HumanServices

—Bolivia Special Force in the StruggleAgainst Drug Trafficking (FuerzaEspecial en la Lucha Contra elNarcotráfico)

—Food Safety Inspection Service, U.S.Department of Agriculture

—General Agreement on Trade andTariffs

—Generalized System of Preferences—International Agricultural Research

Center—Bolivian Institute of Agriculture and

Livestock Technology (lnstitutoBoliviano de TecnologíaAgropecuaria)

—Bolivian Institute of Science andNuclear Technology (InstitutoBoliviano de Ciencia y TecnologíaNuclear)

—Colombian Agricultural Institute(Instituto Colombian Agropecuaria)

—Peruvian Amazon Research Institute(Instituto de Investigaciones de laAmazonía Peruana)

—National Institute for Agrarian andAgroindustry Research (lnstitutoNacional de Investigación Agraria yAgroindustrial)

—Bureau of International NarcoticsMatters, U.S. Department of State

—Veterinary Institute for Tropical andHighland Research (InstitutoVeterinario de InvestigacionesTropicales y de Altura)

—Bolivia Ministry of CampesinoAffairs and Agriculture (Ministeriode Asuntos Campesinos yAgricultural)

—Nongovernmental organization—Organization of American States—U.S. Office of National Drug Control

Policy

OPIC —Overseas Private InvestmentCorporation

PDAR —Bolivia Regional Program forAlternative Development (Programade Desarrollo Alternative Regional)

PEAH —Alto Huallaga Special Project(Proyecto Especial Alto Huallaga)

PRODES —Bolivia Development andSubstitution Project (Proyecto deDesarrollo y Sustitución)

PROSEMPA —Potato Seed Project (Proyecto deSemilla de Papa)

PVO —Private voluntary organizationREPAP —Peruvian Amazon Research Network

(Red de Investigación de la AmazoníaPeruana)

SINTAP —National System of TechnicalAssistance for Small Producers(Sistema Nacional de Transferenciade Tecnología Agropecuaria)

SNC —Bolivia National Road Service(Servicio Nacional de Caminos)

SUBDESAL —Bolivia Subsecretariat for AlternativeDevelopment and Coca Substitution(Subsecretaria de DesarrolloAlternative y Sustitución de Cultivosde Coca)

UMATAS —Municipal Units of TechnicalAssistance (Unidad Municipal deAsistencia Técnica Agropecuaria)

UMOPAR —Bolivia Mobile Rural Patrol Unit(Unidad Móvil de Patrulla Rural) orMobile Rural Patrol Unit, PeruvianCivil Guard of Peru (Unidad Móvil dePatrullaje Rural de la Guardia Civildel Perú)

UNA —National Agrarian University(Universidad Nacional Agraria)

UNDCP —United Nations International DrugControl Programme

UNFDAC —United Nations Fund for Drug AbuseControl

UNMSM —National University of San MarcosGraduate School (UniversidadNacional Mayor de San Marcos)

USDA —U.S. Department of Agriculture

Overviews

The Geoecology and Agroecosystems of the Northernand Central Andes

Donald AlfordGeoResearch, Inc.Billings, MT

Institutional Analysis of the Chapare RegionalDevelopment Project (CRDP) and the UpperHuallaga Special Project (PEAH)

Michael PainterEduardo Bedoya GarlandInstitute for Development AnthropologyBinghamton, NY

Sociopolitical Setting

Opportunities and Constraints to Source Reduction ofCoca in Colombia: The Sociopolitical Context

Bruce M. BagleyUniversity of MiamiGraduate School of International StudiesCoral Gables, FL

The Bolivian Sociopolitical Context forRural Developrnent

Kevin HealyInterAmerican FoundationBallston, VA

Appendix C:List of

ContractorReports

Migration, Social Change, and the Coca/CocaineEconomy in Bolivia

Ivo KraljevicChemonics, Inc.Washington, DC

Opportunities and Constraints to Source Reduction ofCoca: The Peruvian Sociopolitical Context

Cynthia McClintockGeorge Washington UniversityWashington, DC

Traditional Roles and Uses of Coca Leaf in AndeanSociety

Mary-Elizabeth ReeveUniversity of Illinois-UrbanaHuntington, MD

Economic Setting

Opportunities and Constraints to Reduce CocaProduction: The Macro-Economic Context inBolivia and Peru

Elena AlvarezState University of New YorkAlbany, NY

Colombia: Opportunities and Constraints to Source

Reduction of Coca and Cocaine

Francisco ThoumiIndependent ConsultantArlington, VA

209


Renewable Resource-Based Alternatives to CocaPotential Use of Neotropical Wildlife in Sustainable

DevelopmentRay E. Ashton, Jr.Water and Air Research, Inc.Gainesville, FL

Diversification and Multiple Cropping as a Basis forAgricultural Alternatives to Coca Production

Stephen GliessmanUniversity of CaliforniaSanta Cruz, CA

Biodiversity Conservation and Forest Management asan Alternative to Coca Production in the AndeanCountries

Dennis McCaffreyIndependent ConsultantGaithersburg, MD

Fishery/Aquatic Resources in Bolivia, Colombia, andPeru: Production Systems and Potential asAlternative Livelihoods

Robert SchroederRDA, InternationalPlacerville, CA

Crop Diversification in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru:Potential to Enhance Agricultural Production

Hugo VillachicaIndependent ConsultantLima, Peru

Supporting Alternative Livelihoods

Agricultural Research, Extension, and TechnologyTransfer Activities: Potential Mechanisms toEnhance Crop Substitution Efforts in Bolivia,Colombia, and Peru

Antonio ChavezIndependent ConsultantLima, Peru

Infrastructural Needs to Support AgriculturalAlternatives to Coca Production

Juan DeVincentiArchitect/PlannerBethesda, MD

Alternative Trade Organizations, Peasant Farmers,and Coca

Rink DickinsonEqual ExchangeStoughton, MA

Postharvest Technologies to Improve AgriculturalProfitability in Bolivia and Andean Nations

Bill StevensonDevelopment Alternatives, Inc.Cochabamba, Bolivia

Primer on U.S. Agricultural and Trade Policies:Opportunities and Constraints to Crop Substitutionin the Andean Nations

Elizabeth Turner

Coca Eradication and Control

Chemical Eradication of CocaThomas AdamczykU.S. Environmental Protection AgencyWashington, DC

The Environmental Impact Analysis Process and CocaEradication Programs

Eric ChristensenConsulting AttorneyArlington, VA

Potential for Biological Control of CocaDavid RosenThe Hebrew University of JerusalemRehovot, Israel

Index

Agrarian reformBolivia, 51

Colombia, 62Peru, 6,56

AgricultureAlternatives to coca. See Alternative cropsAndean agroecosystems. See Andean Cordillera,

agroecosystemsCoca. See Coca productionCropping systems

Agroforestry. See Forest resources, agroforestryHome gardens, 112-113

Multiple cropping, 110-112, 138. See also Forestresources, agroforestry

Development. See Agricultural development

Research and extension. See Agricultural development,

research and extensionTechnology transfer. See Agricultural development,

technology transferAgricultural development. See also Alternative crops; PEAH

Agricultural credit, 24,54, 139, 150, 163-164, 177, 179Food quality and safety, 26-28, 149, 150, 171-172,

175-176, 179Infrastructure and. See Infrastructure

Postharvest storage and handling, 24-25, 149, 160, 165,169-170

Producer organizations, 165-166, 167, 170, 178Research and extension, 150-160, 177Strategies to enhance production, 102-115, 134-139,

159-160, 177-180Technology transfer, 23, 149, 157-161, 178

Value added processing, 19,24-25,26, 102, 136, 149,161-166, 167, 178, 180

AID. See U.S. Agency for International DevelopmentAlternative crops. See also Forest resources, agroforestry;

Aquatic resources (freshwater); Wildlife and wildlandresources; Agricultural development, research andextension

As a coca substitution strategy, 7, 8,9, 13, 17,71,96, 99,100, 102-110, 115, 134-135, 199

Constraints to developing and marketing, 7,100,101-102,103, 107,115,134,135, 137,161, 162, 163,167,169,171, 179. See also Alternative development,constraints to

Domestic market opportunities, 19-20, 100, 135-137, 163Economics of, 71, 103, 113, 115, 116, 121, 135Examples of, 9,20,100,103-110,113, 116,121,161, 162,

163, 170, 174Export markets, 19-20, 100, 103, 107, 135-136, 150, 163,

174, 179Prerequisites for developing and marketing, 8,20-28,100,

106-107, 113, 115, 134, 160-161, 163, 165, 169-171,178

Strategies to promote and support. See Agriculturaldevelopment, strategies to enhance production

Transition to, 17-18,23-28, 102, 107, 115, 134, 135-136,137-138, 179

Alternative development. See also Alternative crops;Agricultural development; PEAH

As a cocaine control strategy, 2, 8, 71Assistance for, 1, 2,6-7, 13,67,72,96-97150-151, 155,

163, 171, 172, 176,179-180. See also U.S. Agency forInternational Development; Agriculturaldevelopment, technology transfer

Cocabamba Regional Development Project, 7, 8, 17, 18,24,89, 162

Constraints to, 5,6,7,14-16,23-28,57-60, 69-70,95, 151,165

CRDP, 7,85-87,88,89,90&otourism, 22-23, 100, 122, 127-128, 140-141Infrastructure for. See Infrastructure (in support of

alternative agricultural development)Requirement for long-term commitment to, 17-18, 19,97,

177-178, 179Andean Cordillera

Agroecosystems, 38-41,68,99-100, 110Cultural history, 3, 39-40. See afso Bolivia, history;

211


Colombia, history; Peru, historyGeoecology, 3, 35-38,68,99-100, 122

Aquatic resources (freshwater)Aquiculture, 23, 100, 131-132, 133As an alternative development base, 99, 100, 141-142Fisheries, 23, 100-101, 128-133, 141-142

Biological coca control. See Coca supply reduction/eradication, biological control

BoliviaAgrarian reform in, 51

Coca substitution and, 84-90History, 5,50-53Migration in, 5,51, 52,72, 86, 89

Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (U.S. Departmentof State). See INM

Chapare Regional Development Project. See CRDPChemical coca control. See Coca supply reduction/

eradication, chemical controlCoca

Control of. See Narcotics control; Coca substitution; Cocasupply reduction/eradication; CORAH, interdiction

Legitimate market for, 137-138Natural enemies, 30, 192-199, 201Processing. See Coca processingProduction. See Coca productionSpecies, 189-190Traditional uses, 2, 10,44-47,48,49, 50,84Value as a cash crop, 2, 7-8. See also Coca production,

economics of

Coca processing, 3, 6,41,43,44,45,67,69, 93, 128Coca production

Cultivation practices, 41-43, 188Economics of, 2,7, 8, 10, 13, 14-15, 18,68-72, 102Environmental impacts of, 3, 19, 30-31,41-43,44, 102,

128

Inputs, 101, 102Production zones, 3,4, 7, 37,4041,4748,71-72,

100-101, 111, 112, 113, 116, 117-118, 189-190

Sociopolitical and economic context, 5,6, 18,50-68Coca substitution. See also Alternative crops; Alternative

development; Coca supply reduction/eradication;CORDEP; CRDP; IBTA; PRODES; SUBSEDAL

As a supply-reduction strategy, 1,7, 35,83, 133-134,159-160

Bolivia, 84-90Colombia. See Coca supply reduction/eradication,

ColombiaConstraints to, 10, 17,23-28, 134Early efforts, 7, 177Goals, 7, 17, 102Peru, 91-93

Strategies to enhance. See Agricultural development,strategies to enhance

Coca supply reduction/eradication. See also Alternativecrops; Alternative development; Coca substitution;Interdiction, narcotics control

Agroforestry and, 113Alternative development and, 11-12,28,95, 183Biological control, 5, 28-32, 184, 188-201Bolivia. See Coca substitution, BoliviaChemical control, 3,5,94, 184-187Cocaine availability and, 183

Colombia, 93-95Constraints and incentives, 10-13, 183,201Incentives for, 10, 11, 12, 13Mandatory, 84, 184Manual, 184Peru, See Coca substitution, PeruPhased, 17,96, 177Voluntary, 84, 184

Cocaine

Abuse, 1Adverse impacts on society, 3,49,59,63-67. See also

Colombia, drug-related violence and terrorism; Peru,drug-related violence and terrorism

Economy, 5,6,7,8,62, 63-65,68-72,95, 101-102, 134Pasta bi%ica, 3,49

Cochabarnba Regional Development Project. See CORDEPColombia

Agrarian reform, 62Agricultural research and extension in, 155-157Coca production in, 1,6,61-62,68,70,81,94, 95Coca supply reduction, 93-95Drug-related violence and terrorism, 6,62,65-66,67,68,

72,93,94CORAH, 91-93,95-96, 184CORDEP, 7,8, 17, 18,24,89, 162CRDP, 7,85-87,88,89,90

DEA, 16, 17, 81,83Drug Enforcement Administration (U.S. Department of

Justice). See DEA

Extradition, 1,65-66,81,94

Forest resourcesAgroforestry, 15,20, 112-113, 122, 135, 138As an alternative development base, 15,20,21,99, 100,

155-122, 140Biodiversity, 100, 115-116, 126Conservation and protected areas, 116-117, 140Deforestation, 4142, 102, 117, 118Extractive reserves, 21, 116, 118, 119, 121, 140Management, 21, 22, 115-122

Index I 213

Timber production, sustainable, 21, 100, 117, 118, 119-121, 140

IBTA, 88-89, 107, 151-153, 158IDB, 16, 18,57, 154-155Infrastructure (in support of alternative agricultural

development), 17,20,25-26,54, 55,56,57,66,72,85,113-114,119,126,132,135, 136,149-150,152,160-171

INM,81,85,97Institute Bolivtinode Tecno[ogla Agropecuaria. SeeIBTAInterAmerican Development Bank. See IDBInterAmerican Foundation, 27-28, 167Interdiction, 1, 2, 81, 84, 93,94, 115, 179

Marijuana, 62,93-94Migration. See Bolivia, migration in; Colombia, migration

in; Peru, migration in

Narcotics control, 11, 82, 89, 93-97. See also Interdiction

@ium (POPPY , heroin), 19,62,68,81-84,94-95, 136

PDAR, 86,88, 89, 152

PEAH, 91-92,95-96, 121-122Peru

Agrarian reform in, 6, 56Agricultural research and extension in, 153-155Coca production in, 1,6, 57, 58, 59, 81Coca-related violence and terrorism in, 6,59-60,72

Coca substitution and, 91-93Migration in, 6,55-56

Programa de Desarrollo Alternative Regional. See PDARProyecto de Control y Reducci6n de [OS Cu[tivos de Coca en

el Alto Iluullaga. See CORAHProyecto Especial Alto Huallaga. See PEAH

PRODES, 85

Sindicatos, 10, 13,54-55, 178Subsecretarfa de Desarrollo Alternative y Sustitucidn de

Cu[tivos de Coca. See SUBDESALSUBSEDAL, 86,88, 89

Trade, 8, 22,25, 150, 165, 166, 168, 171-177, 179-180

United Nations International Drug Control Programme. SeeUNDCP

UNDCP, 7,29,32, 81, 141,200U.S. Agency for International Development, 12-27, 57, 70,

81, 84, 85, 86-87,91, 113, 139, 140, 141, 154-155,158, 169, 177, 178

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 26-27, 31-32,174-176.187

Wildlife and wildland resources, 22-23,99, 100, 117, 118,121, 122-128, 140-141. See also Forest resources;Alternative development, ecotourism

World Bank, 16, 18, 57, 159

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alternative coca reduction strategies in the andean region

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