albion vol. 8, no. 4, winter, 1976

Index to Volume 8 (1976) Entries marked (A) are abstracts.

Aikins, Patricia T., The Complex Pastoral of "As You Like It": Coming and Going in the Magical Forest of Arden, (A) 190

Anderson, Michael S., Phenomenology and the Thought of Colin Wilson, (A) 377 American Historical Association, Conference on British Studies, Joint Session,

December 29, 1976, Washington D.C., 387 Arnstein, Walter I , Mid-Victorian Anti-Catholicism: A Reappraisal, (A) 383 Atkins, G. Douglas, Slave to No Sect: The Meaning of Pope's Anti-Sectarianism (A)

189 Baroody, Wilson G., The Culmination of 16th Century Repentance in Shakespeare's

Plays, (A) 191 Bates, Paul A., Perspective Reversal in "The Merchant of Venice", (A) 191 Beattie, J.M., Crime and the Courts in Surrey, 1736-1753, (A) 99 Bell, Susan Groag, The Victorian Woman's Return to the Garden: Horticulture as a

Classless, Creative and Emotional Refuge, (A) 103 Benick, Gail, From Ethics to Economics: The Social Thought of Alfred Marshall, (A)

385 Blecki, Catherine L., "To Catch the Conscience of a King": Two Adaptions of

Shakespeare's Richard II and Henry VI, Parts II, III, (A) 187 Block, Edwin F., Neo-Gothic Tales: Diagnosis for Late-Nineteenth Century Malaise,

(A) 192 Books Received, 300 Braddock, Robert C., The Tudor Revolution in Government and Reform of the

Royal Household, (A) 378 Brink, Jeanie R., Play Elements in Renaissance Aesthetics: A Redefinition of

"Delight", (A) 190 Bryson, Mary E., Metaphors for Freedom: Theosophy and the Irish Literary Revival,

(A) 192 Busch, Allan J., Chancery Procedure and Politics During the Interregnum: The Case

of "Rodney V. Cole", (A) 178 Carlton, Charles, The Widow's Tale: or Male Myths and Female Reality in Tudor

and Stuart England, (A) 192 Carson, John, A Matter of Policy: The Lessons of Recent British Race Relations

Legislation, 154 Casada, James A., Henry Morton Stanley: The Explorer as Journalist, (A) 382 Clift, Jean Dalby, Dickens' Little Nell and the Lost Feminine: An Archetypal

Analysis of Projections in Victorian Culture, (A) 180 Cogan, Nathan F., The Libertine Code in James Shirley's London Comedies: A Study

of Comic Form, (A) 193 Conroy, Graham P., Deism, the Devil and David Hume, (A) 193 Cunnar, Eugene R., "The Golden Eagle": Restoration Fiction and the Aesthetics of

Alchemical Transformation, (A) 187 Davis, Richard W., The Mid-Nineteenth Century Electoral Structure, 142 Dobler, Bettie Ann, Macbre Courtship: An Allegegorical Opposition in "Richard

III", (A) 184 Dozier, Robert, The Trial of John Reeves, (A) 194 Duignan, Peter, The British Colonial Governor, (A) 104 Engstrom, Hugh R., Jr., Sir Arthur Hesilrige: The Forgotten Knight of the Long

Parliament, 320 Erickson, Robert, Mother Jewkes and the Midwife Tradition, (A) 102 Espey, David B., The Image of Women in British Empire Fiction: Kipling to Orwell,

(A) 185

Index 391

Fair, John D., The Political Aspects of Women's Suffrage During the First World War, 274; Politicians, Historians, and the War: A Reassessment of the Political Crisis of December 1916, (A) 383

Fairlie, Lyndelle D., Conservative and Labour Party Secretary/Agent's Perceptions of Political Socialization and Recruitment, (A) 184

Farr, Barbara L., The Development and Impact of Right-Wing Politics in Great Britain, 1903-32, (A) 384

Filner, Robert, Biology and Marxism: The Career of J.B.S. Haldane, (A) 101 Flemion, Jess Stoddart, The Nature of Opposition in the House of Lords in the Early

Seventeenth Century, 17 Garratt, Robert F., The Road Not Taken: Patrick Kavanagh and Austin Clarke, (A)

194 Gilbert, Arthur N., Anality and Death: The Execution of Sodomites in the Eighteenth

Century British Navy, (A) 183; The Regimental Courts Martial in the Eighteenth Century British Army, 50

Glassie, Henry, Architectural Evidence of Social Revolution in Modern Ireland, (A) 379

Glen, Robert, The Working Classes of Stockport during the Industrial Revolution, (A) 386

Goldstein, Morton Ellis, George Cruikshank and Napoleon: The British Popular View of Napoleon before 1830, (A) 182

Gollin, Alfred, Historians and the Great Crisis of 1903, 83 Gormly, James L., British Perceptions of Soviet Intentions at the End of World War

II, (A) 186 Gravlee, G. Jack and Irvine, James R., Franklin's "Examination" Before the House

of Commons: A Case Study of Dialectical Exchange, (A) 375 Grossman, Richard H., Indirections of Social History in Jane Austen, (A) 105 Hackman, W. Kent, The British Raid on Rochefort, France, 1757, (A) 195 Hampsten, Elizabeth, Petticoat Authors in Stuart Times, (A) 187 Harpham, Geoffrey, Time Running Out: The Edwardian Sense of Cultural

Degeneration, (A) 100 Harrington, Henry R., Muscular Christianity and the Worship of Physical Force in

Victorian England, (A) 195 Helmstadter, R.J., The Nonconformist Conscience, (A) 388 Hicks, Sandy Burton, The Anglo-Papal Bargain of 1125: The Legatine Mission of

John of Crema, 301 Hutch, Ronald Kind, Joseph Hume (1777-1855): Boring Fool, Radicals' Martyr, and

Ceaseless Laborer for the Public Good, (A) 188 Jay, Bill, Queen Victoria's "Second" Passion, (A) 185 Joiner, G. Hewett, The Pea-Jacket of Charity: John Fielding, the London Police and

the Origins of the British Marine Society, (A) 178 Joint Meeting of the American Historical Association and The Conference on British

Studies, Atlanta, Ga., December 29, 1975, 98 Kelly, H.A., Royal Witchcraft Scares in Fifteenth-Century England, (A) 102 Knafla, Louis A., Jurisprudence and History: The Case of Sir Thomas Egerton, (A)

376 Kriegel, Abraham D., Whiggery and the Conditions of Liberty in Early Nineteenth-

Century England, (A) 384 Kuziran, Eugene E., The London Root and Branch Petition and the Failure of the

English Revolution, (A) 178 Lammers, Donald, Nevil Shute and the "Imperial Tradition in Literature", (A) 179 Lander, J.R., The Crown and the Aristocracy in England, 1450-1509, 203

392 Albion

Lee, Cecil, Robert Morris and 18th Century Aesthetic Utilitarianism, (A) 185 Lee, L.L., Leonard Woolfs "The Hotel," or, All the World's a Stage, (A) 196 Leichman, Howard and Weisser, Henry, Teaching Victorianism in the American

West, (A) 377 Lenowski, Daniel S., W.B. Yeats: Metaphysics and Aesthetic Theory, (A) 196 Lloyd, Trevor, The Politics Behind News from Nowhere, (A) 104 McBride, Gordon K., A Minor Tudor Revolution: Marian and Elizabethan Politics

Toward Portugal's Overseas Possessions, (A) 182 McFarland, Ronald E., John Donne on Business, (A) 197 McReynolds, Douglas J., Tragedy and the Common Shepherd, (A) 377 Malament, Barbara C., The Origins of the British Labour Party: Some Interpretive

Problems, (A) 381 Marsh, Peter, The Conservative Conscience, (A) 388 Matthews, Roy T., "Vanity Fair": The First Society Magazine, (A) 100 Meinig, D.W., Creating a North Atlantic System: A Geographic Perspective, (A) 379 Meldrum, Ronald M., The Letters of King James I to King Christian IV: 1603-1625,

(A) 387 Miklovich, James I., Royal Influence in the Development of Legislative Procedure in

the Reign of Henry VIII, (A) 190 Mitchell, Dolores, Industry's Patronage for British Sculpture: 1950-1970, (A) 188 Moody, Michael E., Charles Middleton, First Baron Barham, and the English

Evangelical Movement: The Permeation of a Personality, (A) 183 Munsell, F. Darrell, Patron v. Publisher: The History of a Biography, (A) 181 National Conference on British Studies, November 6, 1976, New York University,

379 Newbould, I.D.C., Lord Durham, the Whigs and Canada, 1838: The Background to

Durham's Return, (A) 197, 351 O'Malley, Leslie Chree, The Whig Prince: Prince Rupert and the Court vs. Country

Factions During the Reign of Charles II, 333 Pacific Northwest Conference on British Studies, April 15-16, 1976, 191 Pacific Coast Conference on British Studies, Stanford University, April 9-10, 1976,

100 Palmer, Stanley H., The Making of the Irish Constabulary, 1822-1836, (A) 178;

Calling Out the Troops: The Military, the Law, and Public Order in England, 1650-1850, (A) 375.

Parkin, Andrew, Yeat's Orphic Voice, (A) 198 Peterfreund, Stuart, Keats's Debt to Maturin, (A) 376 Petter, Martin, Public Records, the Historian and Central Administration: The

Example of the Colonial Office During World War II, (A) 198 Phifer, James R., The Year of the Convention Parliament: The Use of Treason and

the Emergence of Moderation, (A) 378 Platt, Jeffrey, A Sixteenth Century Ambassador at Large: Sir Thomas Wilkes and

Elizabethan Diplomacy, (A) 182 Presentations of Recent Doctoral Research, Conference on British Studies, American

Historical Association, December 28, 1976, Washington, D.C., (A) 384 Price, Richard, "Learning the Rules of the Game": The Crisis of the Mid-Victorian

Working Class, (A) 380 Reddy, T. Ramakrishna, Governmental Responsibility in Great Britain, (A) 183 Robertson, Craig A., The Tithe-Heresy of Friar William Russell, I Rocky Mountain Conference on British Studies, October 31 -November 1, 1975, 178 Rocky Mountain Conference on British Studies, October 8-9, 1976, Salt Lake City,

Utah, 375

Index 393

Rollin, Bernard E., The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense, (A) 188 Rothblatt, Sheldon, Commentary on Conscience of the Victorian State panel, (A) 389 Rousseau, George, John Hill: Eighteenth-Century Renaissance Man, (A) 198 Rozkuszka, W. David, British Cabinet Office Records on the Second World War,

296 Ruggiero, John, The Foreign Policy of Neville Chamberlain: A Reappraisal, (A) 186 Ryan, Marjorie, Charlotte Bronte's "Villette": Reappraisals, (A) 199 Salevouris, Michael J., The Rifle Volunteers and Mid-Victorian Society, (A) 179 Schwarz, Marc L., "Twenty-Four Arguments": Sir Robert Cotton Confronts the

Catholics and the Church of England, 35 Shrimp, Robert, Negotiations for the Anglo-French Marriage Treaty, 1624-25, (A)

189 Slonim, Ruth, Of Dissonance and Resonance: Some Irish Writers, (A) 199 Smith, Robert W., Edmund Burke and Slavery, (A) 199 Smith, Steven R., Growing Old in Seventeenth Century England, 125 Southern Conference on British Studies, November 11-13, 1976, Atlanta, Georgia,

382 Stow, George B., The Authorship of the "Vita Ricardi Secundi", (A) 200 Sundstrom, Roy A., The French Hugenots and the Civil List, 1696-1727: A Study of

Alein Assimilation in England, 219 Tamke, Susan Smith, Separating the Sheep from the Goats: Victorian Didactic

Hymns, 255 Theilmann, John M., Stubbs, Shakespeare, and Recent Historians of Richard II, 107 Timmis, John H. III, The Basis of the Lords' Decision in the Trial of Strafford: Con-

travention of the Two-Witness Rule, 311 Trout, Paul A., Prophecy and Politics in Revolutionary England: The Revival of

Beheminism in Context, (A) 200 Wechsler, Robert S., The Economic and Social Impact of the Clothing Industry on

the Immigrant Community in the East End of London, 1875-1914, (A) 385 Weiner, Carol Z. Criminal Courts and the Poor in Late Elizabethan Hertfordshire,

(A) 98 Weir, Lorraine, Portrait of the Poet as Joyce Scholar-An Approach to A.M. Klein,

(A) 201 Westin, Jean K., Horace Walpole as an Art Patron, (A) 185 Westin, Robert H., The Baroque Decorations of Brompton Oratory, London, (A) 181 Wiener, Joel H., The Search for the New Jerusalem: Richard Carlile and Working-

Class Politics, (A) 381 Wiener, Martin J., The Myth of William Morris, 67 Willen, Diane, A Comment on Women's Education in Elizabethan England, (A) 382 Willis, Richard E., "An Handful of Violent People": The Nature of the Foxite Op-

position, 1794-1801, 236 Work, James C., Heavy Barges, Slow Horses: "The Lady of Shalott" as an 1832

Allegory, (A) 180

A LBION Including the Procccdings of the

CONFERENCE ON BRITISH STUDIES

at its Regional and National Mcctings

Volume 8, Number 4 Winter, 1976

Abstract Policy

All papers, addresses, and commentary delivered at recognized Conference on British Studies meetings are eligible for publication. Abstracts may not exceed 1 25 words. Program chairpersons should arrange for the official program and abstracts to be sent to Albion within four weeks of the conclusion of their meeting; abstracts received later than this will not be printed. Publication of the abstract does not preclude full publication in Albion or another place. Albion reserves the right to judge whether abstracts submitted meet the requirements for publication.

ALBION Including the Proceedings of the CONFERENCE ON BRITISH STUDIES at its Regional and National Meetings

Published at Appalachian State University 4I with Widener College and the Assistance of Grants from Wilfrid Laurier University, Ontario

and The Conference on British Studies

ALBION Including the Proceedings of the CONFERENCE ON BRITISH STUDIES at its Regional and National Meetings

Volume 8, Number 4 Winter 1976

Contents

300 Contributors

301 The Anglo-Papal Bargain of 1125: The Legatine Mission of John of Crema Sandy Burton Hicks

311 The Basis of the Lords' Decision in the Trial of Strafford: Contravention of the Two Witness Rule John H. Timmis III

320 Sir Arthur Hesilrige: The Forgotten Knight of the Long Parliament Hugh R. Engstrom, Jr.

333 The Whig Prince: Prince Rupert and the Court vs. Coun- try Factions During the Reign of Charles II Leslie Chree O'Malley

351 Lord Durham, the Whigs and Canada, 1838: The Background to Durham's Return I.D. C.Newbould

375 Reports of Proceedings

390 Index to Volume 8

Contributors

Hugh R. Engstrom, Jr. is Assistant Professor of History at Bethany College, West Virginia. He has previously authored an article in Albion.

Sandy Burton Hicks, Assistant Professor of History at Texas A & I University in Kingsville, has previously published in the Journal of Church and State.

I.D.C. Newbould, whose article on William IV and the Whigs will appear in the Canadian Journal of History, is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Lethbridge in Alberta, Canada.

Leslie Chree O'Malley received his Ph.D. from Temple Univer- sity, and is presently Director of Educational Programs for Historic Bethlehem, Inc., Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.

John H. Timmis III, University Professor of Rhetoric and Legal History at Ohio University, Athens, has published Thine Is The Kingdom (University of Alabama, 1975), which examines the trial of Stafford and which received the 1976 James A. Winans-Herbert Wichelns Award from the Speech Communication Association.

300

The Anglo-Papal Bargain of 1125: The Legatine Mission of John of Crema

Sandy Burton Hicks

King Henry I, for most of his reign, exercised unrivaled authority over the English church. Following the Concordat of London in 1107 which formally ended his bitter dispute with Archbishop An- selm of Canterbury, Henry reestablished effective control over the ecclesiastical affairs of England. During the remaining twenty-eight years of his rule, he assiduously cultivated and generally sustained friendly relations with the papacy while maintaining royal control over the internal matters of the English church.'

There is, however, a dramatic exception to this picture of royal primacy. In 11 25, the papal legate, Cardinal John of Crema, made a spectacular tour of England. During his six-months stay, John exercised greater authority than any other papal legate sent to England during the reign of Henry I. As Austin Lane Poole observes, of the nine legates dispatched between 1 100 and 1135, "one only-John of Crema in 1125-was permitted to preside over a church synod or to exercise any legatine authority."2 To underscore the unprecedented nature of this visit, neither of Henry's predecessors, William the Conqueror and William Rufus, had allowed a foreign legate to exert such power within England.

This paper will examine the events leading up to the legatine mission of 1125 and attempt to explain why Henry sanctioned this rare exhibition of papal authority within his kingdom.

The roots date back to late November, 1120 when the king suf- fered a stunning personal loss: the accidental drowning of his sole legitimate son and heir-designate, William Atheling. The Atheling's death shattered Henry's dynastic vision of passing on a unified Anglo-Norman state to his son. The king's response to the tragedy was predictable. A widower since 11 18, the fifty-two-year-old

'On the literature dealing with the English church under Henry I, see the extensive bibliography found in M. Brett's The English Church under Henry I (Oxford, 1975).

2Austin Lane Poole, From Domesday Book to Magna Carta, 1087-1216, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1955), p. 184.

302 Albion

monarch married a young German princess in January 1121, only two months after his son's death. Henry no doubt hoped that his new wife would produce a son, a legitimate heir to the Anglo- Norman throne. Because of the king's advanced age, it was clearly a gamble. Yet Henry's past performance of fathering a score of bastard sons and daughters bode well for his chances.

As the king awaited the birth of a son, he faced the disquieting repercussions of the Atheling's death. Foremost among them was the deterioration of relations between his realm and its continental neighbors. The initial dispute involved Anjou. In 11 19, Henry had arranged for the marriage of his son to the daughter of Count Fulk of Anjou in order to bring about peace between the two rulling houses. The Atheling's death nullified the agreement and, in late I 121 and early 122, Henry and Fulk quarreled over the Angevin dowry which consisted of castles and towns in Maine. The count insisted upon the return of the dowry but Henry balked at the demand. After many months of fruitless negotiations, Fulk ordered his envoys in England to return home. By early 1123. the Angevin count once more entertained plans for waging war against his powerful neighbor.3

Besides the weakening of Henry's position on the Continent, the Atheling's death also contributed to the strengthening of Henry's dynastic rival, William Clito. As the son of the king's brother, Robert Curthose, Clito emerged as a serious candidate not only for the throne of Normandy but also for the crown of England. Until Henry's second marriage produced an heir, segments of the Anglo- Norman aristocracy judged William Clito as the likely successor to the realm.4

For Henry I, these unsettling effects converged in an alarming fashion. In February or March, 1123, the king learned that Count Fulk had decided to marry his daughter, Sybil, to William Clito. According to the marital agreement, the Angevin ruler gave his new son-in-law temporary possession of the county of Maine and assurances of military assistance for conquering Normandy. The negotiations included others besides Fulk and Clito. A major figure

3The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, ed. Dorothy Whitelock, David C. Douglas and Susie I. Tucker, rev. trans. (London, 1961), pp. 188-89 [hereafter cited as A.S.C]; Orderic Vitalis, Hitoria Ecdesiastica, ed. Auguste Le Pr6vost, 5 vols. (Paris, 1838-55), IV: 439-40; and Simeon of Durham, Opera Omnia, ed. Thomas Arnold, 2 vols. (Rolls Series, 1882-85), II: 267.

4C. Warren Hollister, "The Anglo-Norman Succession Debate of 1126: Prelude to Stephen's Anarchy," Journal of Medieal History, 1 (April, 1975): 25-32.

Anglo-Papal Bargain of 1125 303

was Fulk's powerful uncle, Count Amaury of Evreux, who later in the year created a formidable pro-Clito league in southeastern Nor- mandy.5

Henry responded swiftly to these events. In March, 1123, he discussed Fulk's actions with his vassals at Woodstock. As a result of these talks, the king commissioned two trusted earls to take a large army and cross over to Normandy. Three months later, on June 11, Henry himself sailed from Portsmouth to Normandy in order to supervise personally the defense of his duchy. Upon his arrival, he commenced a massive project to strengthen Norman for- tifications especially along the southern frontier where an attack from Fulk and Clito could be expected. Henry also hired large con- tingents of Breton mercenaries, levied heavy taxes upon his English subjects and collected information on the extent of rebel activity.6 With preparations complete, Henry launched a major offensive in October, 1123, against Count Amaury's allies in the Risle Vallevy west of Evreux. By the end of April, 1124, royal forces had over- whelmed the rebels, capturing most of them and seizing their castles. Meanwhile, Henry's defenses along the Norman-Manceaux border repulsed the attacks of Clito and Fulk from the south.'

Thus, Henry had survived the immediate crisis posed by the marriage of his nephew to Sybil of Anjou. But the long-term threat persisted. So long as the king ruled without an heir, his Angevin- backed nephew remained a serious dynastic rival and a continuing source of inspiration for Henry's continental opponents. The king, therefore, sought to break up the marriage itself. If successful,

5Orderic Vitalis, IV: 294 and 439-40; Simeon of Durham, II: 267; and William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum Anglorum, ed. William Stubbs, 2 vols. (Rolls Series, 1887- 89), II: 498.

6Simeon of Durham, II: 267-68 and 273-75; Hugh the Chantor, The History of the Church of York, 1066-1127, ed. and trans. Charles Johnson (London, 1961), pp. 110- 11; Henry of Huntingdon, Historia Anglorwn, ed. Thomas Arnold (Rolls Series, 1879), p. 245; Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorwn, 1066-1154: vol. II, Regesta Henrici Primi, 1100-1135, eds. Charles Johnson and H. A. Cronne (Oxford, 1956), no. 1395 [hereafter cited as Regesta Regwn] and Robert of Torigni, Chronica in Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry 11 and Richard 1, ed. Richard Howlett (Rolls Series, 1890), IV: 106-7.

70n the 1123-24 Rebellion, see Orderic Vitalis, IV: 44044 and 448-63; A.SC., pp. 190-91; Simeon of Durham, II: 273-75; Robert of Torigni, Chronica, IV: 105-7; Robert of Torigni, Interpolations de Robert de Torigni in William of Jumieges, Gesta Normannorum Ducum, ed. Jean Marx (Paris, 1914), pp. 294-96; Florence of Wor- cester et al, Chronicon ex Chronics, ed. Benjamin Thorpe, 2 vols. (London, 184849), II: 78; Henry of Huntingdon, Historia, p. 245; and "Ex Chronico Rotomagensi" in Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. Martin Bouquet et al, 24 vols. (Paris, 1738-1904), XII: 784 [hereafter cited as Recueil des Hitoriens des GaulesJ.

304 A lbion

Henry could expect far greater rewards than those derived from his military victories of 1123-24. The destruction of the marriage would sever Clito from the ruling house of Anjou and prevent him from establishing a potentially powerful Anglo-Norman-Angevin dynasty of his own.

Although the exact chronology and sequence of Henry's actions to undermine the marriage are unclear, the basic thrust of his com- paign was discernible to contemporaries. The king made no particular effort to conceal his actions and it was commonly known that he alone was responsible for the attempt to destroy the marriage8 and that he employed "menaces and petitions, gold and silver, and many other weighty arguments."9 His weightiest argument dealt with the blood relationship of the marriage partners: Henry called upon the Church to annul the union on the basis of consanguinity. What the Anglo-Norman monarch wanted from Pope Calixtus II was simply an annulment of the marriage between William Clito and Sibyl of Anjou. Technically, the bride and bridegroom were within the prohibited degree of relationship but it was a technicality often overlooked. The marriage of Henry's son to Matilda of Anjou in II 19 seemingly produced no criticism from churchmen or laymen on the basis of consanguinity although the couple's blood ties were identical to those of Clito and Sibyl. For Henry, however, it was a technicality to be exploited.

Henry commenced his campaign early in 1123 following the collapse of Anglo-Angevin talks and the news of Fulk's intention to marry his daughter to William Clito. In February, the month in which Fulk's emissaries abruptly left England, the king welcomed the papal legate, Abbott Henry of St. Jean d'Angely. A kinsman of the king, Abbott Henry typified an especially influential group of churchmen employed by the pope. He was ambitious, worldly and fond of money: in short, the type of cleric with whom the king could bargain.'0 The abbot seems to have been the first papal agent with whom Henry discussed the Clito marriage. As the pope's representative, the abbot had come to England for the customary papal tax. Later developments indicate that the king broadened the discussions to include his nephew's marriage for the abbot would be a "principal man in swearing the oath and bearing witness" to the

$A.S.C., p. 193; and Simeon of Durham, 11: 282. 'Orderic Vitalis, IV: 294: "...minis, precibusque, et auri, argentique alirumque

specierum ponderosa enormitate." 'DOn Abbott Henry's career, see Cecily Clark, "'This Ecclesiastical Adventurer':

Henry of Saint-Jean d'Angdly," English Historical Review, 84 (July, 1969): 548-60.


uncanonical nature of the marriage." Presumably, the abbot returned to Rome with both Peter's Pence and the English monarch's recommendations for dissolving the conjugal union. If the abbot profited immediately by acquiring money for himself as well as for the papacy, contemporary writers failed to learn of it. That he profited eventually from his efforts on behalf of the king is in- disputable. In 1127, the Anglo-Norman monarch rewarded his valuable kinsman and ally by installing him as the new abbot of Peterborough. 12

With Abbot Henry, money and promises had produced favorable results. And these were the two instruments used by the king to secure papal condemnation of his nephew's marriage. These tools were not new. When the king met with Calixtus at Gisors in 1119, he showered the pontiff with gifts and with promises to do his share in ending the war between Henry and the French monarch. Louis VI.13 The efficacy of this approach was reaffirmed in 1123 when Henry sent large sums of money and promises of a threatening nature to Rome in order to insure papal acceptance of his candidate for the archbishopric of Canterbury. Despite several irregularities in the election of William of Corbeil, the pope submitted to the king's demands.'4

In the matter of William Clito's marriage, the papacy showed some reluctance to comply with Henry's wishes. When the papal legate, Gerard, bishop of Angouleme and a Norman, condemned the marriage, Calixtus countermanded the legatine decision in deference to Clito's ally, the king of France.'5 The issue, however, could not be squelched; Henry made certain of that. In early II 24, a council was held at Chartres under the auspices of two of the most powerful cardinals, Peter and Gregory, to examine the validity of the marriage. The results were disappointing for Henry. The council adjourned without rendering a decision.'6

During this apparent impasse, a single figure arose out of the papal hierarchy who seized control of the controversy and

"A.S.C., p. 193. See also Orderic Vitalis, IV: 294. 2A.S.C., pp. 193-94; and Orderic Vitalis, IV: 428-30.

l3Robert of Torigni, Interpolations, p. 309; William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum, 11: 482; and Hugh the Chantor, p.77.

'4Hugh the Chantor, pp. 111-17; and A.S.C., p. 189. '5JosEphe Chartrou, L'An]ou de 1109 a I 1 51, Foulque de Jerusalem et Geoffroi Plan-

tegenet (Paris, 1928), p. 17. See also Orderic Vitalis. IV: 471. 16Chartrou, L'Anjou, pp. 17-18. In 1130, Peter and Gregory would be the can-

didates for the papal throne in a hotly disputed election. Both cardinals may have disliked Henry. See Orderic Vitalis, IV: 446-48; and Hugh the Chantor, p. 81.

306 Albion

agressively pushed forward a rapid solution. This man was John of Crema. Although he had risen no higher than the rank of a priest, John had oeen made a cardinal by Calixtus' predecessor and had become one of the closest and most influential of Calixtus' counselors. In many ways, this cardinal-priest resembled the ambitious and worldly abbot of St. Jean d'Ang6ly. John, however, was far more powerful within papal circles and probably shrewder. One author has paid him a high compliment by remarking that John of Crema was "every bit as sharp as" Henry I.17

John's motives for pursuing the Clito marriage affair with such intensity remain obscure. He probably viewed it as an opportunity to enhance both his own career and papal authority. For many years, this cardinal-priest had shown a proclivity for being at the center of major controversies involving the papacy. He attended the Council of Rheims in 1119 where he heard Louis VI inveigh against Henry I and where he played a prominent role in the proceedings.'8 According to Orderic Vitalis, John was among a select group of five cardinals who sat closest to the pope and who dominated the discussions. During a recess in council activity, he journeyed with Calixtus to Mouzon in an unsuccessful attempt at reconciliation with the German emperor. Upon their return, it was John who reported to the full assembly the details of the trip and the lack of good faith displayed by the imperial side. Toward the end of the council, John emerged as a key figure in yet another controversy. Bitter exchanges occurred between the supporters of the great Burgundian monastery at Cluny and those neighboring church prelates who complained of jurisdictional encroachment by the Cluniacs. Following a day of deliberation over the dispute, John delivered the papal judgment. In the speech attributed to him by Orderic Vitalis, John gave a ringing defense of papal authority in the best Gregorian style and also displayed a marked concern for the papal revenues received from Cluny. If Orderic's report is substantially accurate, the speech indicates that the cardinal-priest was a zealous advocate of papal sovereignty as well as a man keenly concerned with the money necessary to support that claim. At the close of the council, John performed the vital function of phrasing

X7Donald Nicholl, Thurstan, Archbishop of York (1114-1140), (York, 1964), p. 92. '50n the Council of Rheims. see Orderic Vitalis, IV: 372-93; Hugh the Chantor,

pp. 71-74; Simeon of Durham, ll: 254-57; Florence of Worcestor, 11: 73; Recueil des Historiens des Gaules, XV: 339; and Suger, Vie de Louis VI le Gros, ed. Henri Waquet (Paris, 1964), p. 204.


the conciliar decrees which were then publicly read and approved by the full assembly. '9

After Rheims, John went with Calixtus to Gisors where the pope and the Anglo-Norman ruler conferred. He was probably among the majority of papal subordinates who were disappointed with Calix- tus' performance and with the pope's failure to adopt a firmer stance in his discussions with Henry.20 Four years later, at Rome, John was involved in the deliberations on whether the English king's candidate for the archbishopric of Canterbury ought to be recognized by the pope.2'

And so it was-at Rheims, Gisors and Rome- that John of Crema emerged not only as a leading ecclesiastical politician but also as a man familiar with Anglo-Norman affairs. In short, the cardinal-priest was aware of the political implications of Clito's marriage as well as Henry's supremely powerful hold upon the English church. He seems to have been the first to see the full potential of the Clito affair for advancing pontifical authority in England.

Following the indecisive church council at Chartres in 1124, Calixtus appointed John to handle the investigation of the marriage. Under John's direction, the issue was quickly resolved.22 The marriage was formally annulled and those districts which persisted in recognizing the marriage were threatened with interdict. This latter condition was directed specifically toward Clito's father-in-law, Count Fulk of Anjou. On August 26, 1124, Pope Calixtus ordered the bishops of Chartres, Orldans and Paris to place non-complying districts under interdict.23 When Fulk received the news, he was enraged "to the point of burning the papal annulment letter, clap- ping the pope's envoys in prison, and singeing their beards and hair."24 For his treatment of the papal messengers and for his in-

'9Orderic Vitalis, IV: 375, 383-84, 387-89 and 391. 200n Henry's meeting with Pope Calixtus, see Orderic Vitalis, IV: 398-405; Hugh

the Chantor, pp. 76-77; William of Malmesbury, Gesta Regum, 11:482; and Louis VI le Gros: Annales de sa Vie et de son Re'gne (1081-1137), ed. Achille Luchaire (Paris, 1890), no. 267.

21Hugh the Chantor, p. 114. 22See Pope Calixtus' letter in Recueil des Historiens des Gaules, XV: 251; and

Helene Tillmann, Die pdpstlichen Legaten in England bis zur Beendigung der Legation Gualas (Bonn, 1926), p. 28 n. 89. Tillmann (p. 28) briefly suggests the possibility that the annulment of the Clito marriage led directly to John of Crema's mission to England.

23Chartrou, L'Anjou, pp. 17-18. 24C. Warren Hollister and Thomas K. Keefe, "The Making of the Angevin Em-

pire," The Journal of British Studies, 12 (May, 1973): 11.

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transigence, the count was excommunicated and his lands placed under interdict.25

In John's perception of things, the condemnation of Clito's marriage to Sibyl of Anjou was a valuable service to the Anglo- Norman monarch which required recompense. It represented the first stage of a quid pro quo. After months of hesitation, the pope himself had come around to this view and, as a result, endorsed the hardline position of his cardinal during the summer of 1124. If John or any other papal official approached Henry in Normandy concerning a bargain before the pope's annulment decree, such information is unknown. But within a few months of the August announcement, Calixtus sent John of Crema to Normandy as the new papal legate to England. His selection was neither surprising nor coincidental. As the architect of the scheme to exploit the Clito issue for the benefit of the papacy, John was the obvious choice and the most qualified to steer the matter through to a successful conclusion. The king welcomed the legate with honor but without en- thusiasm. Unfortunately, the nature of the discussions between these two wily and politically-wise champions of secular and ecclesiastical power is unreported. Nevertheless, Henry reacted to John's proposals with characteristic caution. For several months the legate remained in Normandy, where "the king kept him.. .for matters of business."26 The king's hesitant stance and refusal to allow John to enter England mirrored his uncertainty that the Clito marriage affair had actually been resolved. Fulk of Anjou had spur- ned the papal decision and, in the last months of 1124, still upheld the marriage of his daughter and William Clito.27 Any agreement between king and legate was further delayed when in mid- December, Calixtus II died. For Henry it was now necessary to wait and see if the new pontiff, Honorius II, would renew the prohibitions against the marriage and reconfirm the legatine commission of John of Crema. By April, 1125, Henry received sufficient assurances on both counts. On April 12, Honorius sent a letter to the clerics of Saint-Martin de Tours reaffirming the ban of interdict upon the lands of the Angevin ruler and excommunicating the recalcitrant count.28 On the following day, the pope wrote John

25Chartrou, LAnjou, p. 18. 26Hugh the Chantor, p. 120. See also Simeon of Durham, Il: 276. 27The count opposed the papal pronouncement until at least mid-April, 1125. See

Chartrou, L'Anjou, p. 18. 28Chartrou, L'Anjou, p. 18.


confirming his legatine authority.29 With these matters settled, king and legate concluded their negotiations and John crossed over to England.

The chronicles conflict regarding the date when the legate reached England. Hugh the Chantor places his arrival in Lent; Henry of Huntingdon states that he arrived at Easter; and the Wor- cester writer claims that he came after Easter and before April 12.30 Since John's appearance in England pre-dated the papal letters of April 12-13, Henry had evidently already received preliminary notice that Honorius would follow his predecessor's policies regarding the marriage and the legatine commission. And from what John would accomplish during his stay in England, it is clear that Henry had also accepted the legate's contention: the dissolution of Clito's marriage by the papacy demanded a reciprocal act by the king. Reciprocity as advanced by John of Crema meant a high price, and Henry paid it.

The legate fully exploited his unusual opportunity.31 He apparently celebrated High Mass on Easter at Canterbury, England's ecclesiastical capital. To Gervase, it was a reprehensible sight: a simple priest acting as the ruler of the English church and exhibiting the pomp and accoutrements of an archbishop.32 Fronm Canterbury, John journeyed throughout England and was received with great honor at numerous monasteries and episcopal sees. More than honor, he accepted many gifts from the abbots and bishops. His travels took him as far north as southern Scotland where he met with King David of Scotland at Roxburgh. The culmination of his grand tour of Britain occurred during the second week of Sep- tember when he presided over a three-day synod of English churchmen at London.33 It was a rare and impressive sight: both English

29Simeon of Durham, II: 276. 30Hugh the Chantor, pp. 120-21; Henry of Huntingdon, Historia, p. 245; and

Florence of Worcester, Il:79. 310n John's tour of England, see A.S.C., p. 192; Hugh the Chantor, pp. 123-24.

Henry of Huntingdon, Historia, pp. 245-46; Florence of Worcester, II: 81-83; Simeon of Durham, II:278-81; and Brett, English Church under Henry 1, pp. 42-45.

32Gervase of Canterbury, Opera, ed. William Stubbs, 2 vols. (Rolls Series, 1879- 80), II: 381-82.

33For a recent discussion of the council, see Brett, English Church under Henry 1, pp. 43-45. Brett deemphasizes the importance of the council and, for that matter, John's tour of England. To do so, he offers a novel though unpersuasive explanation for Henry's approval of the legatine mission. Brett argues (pp. 4547) that John was allowed to enter England in order to resolve the bitter Canterbury-York primacy dispute in a manner favorable to the king and the archbishop of Canterbury. This argument, however, ignores the traditionally pro-York posture of the papacy and especially the strong friendship between Pope Calixtus 11 and Archbishop Thurstan of York. See Nicholl, Thurstan, pp. 41-74 et passim.

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archbishops attended as well as a score of bishops, about forty abbots and a multitude of other church officials and laymen. Under John's guidance, the synod passed seventeen canons proscribing abuses that ranged from simony to consanguinity. Soon after, the legate returned to Normandy bringing with him boxes, bags, and purses filled with money and leaving behind him some resentful churchmen who circulated rumors of John's moral misconduct.

While in Normandy, John concluded additional business with the king and returned to Rome accompanied by the archbishop of York. Henry, no doubt disturbed by the reports of the legate's activities in England, immediately took measures to return legatine authority to the archbishop of Canterbury, a maneuver which would end any possible repetition of the events of 1125.34 Thus, Henry had fulfilled the terms of his bargain with the papacy. To allow so grand a display of papal power within his realm had been an embarrassing though necessary concession. But, once his rival's marriage was ended, the king could again concentrate on the critical task of determining his own successor.

34Hugh the Chantor, pp. 122-23; Simeon of Durham, 1I: 281; and Regesta Regum, 11, nos. 1426-27.

The Basis of the Lord's Decision in the Trial of Strafford: Contravention of the Two-Witness Rule

John H. Timmis III

"Resolved by the majority that the Bill of Attainder against the Earl of Strafford should pass as a law."' Thus, on May 7, 1641, the House of Lords enacted that Thomas, Earl of Strafford, should "undergo the pains and forfeitures of high treason by law."2

The passage of the Bill of Attainder against Strafford has subsequently engendered one of the perennial controversies of English political and legal history. On one side of the issue, it is claimed that the answer of the judges and the decision of the Lords were warranted by generally-accepted doctrines of law and constitutional theory.3 The other side claims that the charges against Strafford had no basis in statute or common law, that the abandonment of the impeachment proves the weakness of the case against the accused, and that in going by way of the Bill, the Commons "slaughtered a man they could not convict."4

Resolution of the controversy over Strafford's case has been hampered by a lack of historical data because at the restoration Charles II ordered all proceedings of the trial to be stricken from the Journals of the House of Lords. The Journal Manuscripts were rendered almost totally unreadable and, as a result, the official record of the trial has been missing for over three hundred years. Until recently, Rushworth has been the main source for histories of the Strafford trial. However, the usefulness of Rushworth has been marred by many lapses and errors, the most significant being that he

'House of Lords, Braye MSS, fo. 142b, May 7, 1641. 2Ibid. 3For the text of the questions to the judges, see Lords MSS, May, 1641. For their

answer, see Braye MSS, fo. 142b, May 7, 1641. The best argument that I have seen in favor of a sound basis in law for the Lords' decision is Conrad Russell, "The Theory of Treason in the Trial of Strafford," English Historical Review, LXXX, (Jan., 1965): 30-50. In the end, however, Russell's excellent position is not statutable ad litterwn.

4For an excellent statement of this position, see C.V. Wedgwood, 7Tomas Went- worth, First Earl of Strqfford, 1593-1641: A Revaluation (New York, 1962), pp. 357- 378. See also John H. Timmis III, Thine Is The Kingdom: The Trial Jbe' Treson of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford (University, Alabama, 1974), pp. 165-169.

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was absent for several days at the climax of the trial. Consequently, the conclusion of the trial, the proceedings of which would help to resolve the legal controversy, has been reconstructed from fragmen- tary sources.

The availability of hitherto unused documents, the Braye MSS, now allows the historical record to be corrected.5 On many significant points, the Braye MSS not only bring to light new evidence, but also allow the scope of influence to be significantly extended.6

This paper details the impact of the new evidence in the Braye MSS upon the heretofore unresolved questions of evidence and law in the Strafford case. It will demonstrate what the Lords found in the case to be: (1) the points to adjudicate; (2) the questions for decision; and (3) the points of law or else of evidence which warranted each of their judgments. It will prove that the long- continuing controversies over Strafford's execution have been misdirected into the status of the charges under treason law; and that the crucial decision by the Lords in the case was not upon whether the charges were warranted by law, but rather upon a simple, but far-reaching point concerned with the admissibility of evidence.

The indictment of Strafford comprised nine general and twenty- eight specific articles of impeachment, and upon these thirty-seven charges, the trial was convened on March 22, 1641, and proceeded for nineteen days. On the nineteenth day, April 10, the impeachment proceedings broke down and were adjourned sine die. That same afternoon, the House of Commons brought in for a first reading a Bill of Attainder against the Earl of Strafford.

5The Braye MSS are a nearly complete set of notes taken down at the trial by the official recorders and stenographers of the House of Lords. From these minutes, the Lords Journals were written. John Browne was the Clerk of the Parliaments, 1638- 1691, and many of his papers, including official and semi-official records of the House of Lords, passed on his death to his daughter and from her ultimately to Lord Braye. The most important of these have been bought or photographed for the House. They include Draft Journals (1621-1690), original Manuscript Minutes of the trial of Archbishop Laud (1644). Papers laid on the Table of the House, and Parliament Of- fice Memoranda (1625-1691). Cf. the general description given in H.M.C. 10th Report, Appendix, PART VI, pp. 104-106, the Record Office List of Braye MSS., the Record Office Memoranda, Nos. 7, 1 1, and 24, and the Addenda 1514-1714 volume of the calendar. See also House of Lords Record Office Memorandum No. 24, The Braye Manuscripts bought by the Record Office on 26th January 1961.

6Before the Braye MSS, the cardinal sources were Rushworth, A Brief and Perfect Rehato, and Harleima MSS 6424.

The Trial of Strafford 31 3

The Bill had been constructed from the legally strongest of the original charges, and it cited as treason two of the nine general articles and four of the twenty-eight specific articles. Of the six charges in the Bill, the House of Lords finally selected four, two general and two specific, for deliberation.7 What is most noteworthy about the four charges is that two of them clearly were statutory offenses under the law of treason as it stood in 1641.

The basis of all treason law was the statute of Edward III. By the time of Henry VIII, this law had been so often amended that it had become both extensive and ambiguous. For example, the taking of goods by Welshmen was treason. So also had poisoning been made treason, the penalty for which was boiling of the offenders. Likewise, to marry the king's children was treasonous, as was un- chastity in the queen.

The 1st Edw. 6, cap. 12 swept away this plethora by repealing all treasons between the third and sixth Edwards and declared "only such acts as were made by ... 25 Edw. 3" to be the law. As functional as this statute might have been, I Edw. 6 was later discovered to contain a few props to support a Protestant crown. Consequently. I Mary I repealed it and defined treason to be "only as such declared...in 25 Edw. 3." Thus, two successive reigns abolished all intervening statutes and passed laws which fixed treason to be as stated by 25 Edw. 3.

At this point, it is pertinent to bring up the question of the power of parliament to declare an act as treasonous. The statute 21 Rich. 2, cap. 20 declared that "to pursueth to repeal or reverse statutes of the king or parliament is treason." By way of interpretation, Lord Chief Justice William Thirning, at the request of Richard II, "layed that the declaration of treason not declared by 25 Edw. 3 or 21 Rich 2 belongeth to the parliament." From this, the 1641 House of Com- mons inferred that parliament had the power to declare treason upon its own authority. Yet, we note that 21 Rich. 2, cap. 20 was specifically repealed by I Hen. 4. Indeed, the first parliament of Henry IV repealed all laws passed in the twenty-first year of Richard II, and pardoned all treasons made by that parliament. To this specific repeal must be connected I Edw. 6 and I Mary I which fixed treason in 25 Edw. 3. Now to apply the law to Strafford.

The 25th Edw. 3 made it treason to "compass, imagine, desire, or intend the death of the sovereign,...to wound the royal per-

7See below, where I give in toto the preceedings in Lords during their votes on the Bill.

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son,...and to make war upon the subjects." The 6th Edw. 3 stated that "whomsoever should carry about with them enemies of England, Irish rebels, or hooded men, and should force them upon the subject, shall be punished as a traitor." I Mary 1 made a traitor he who should "bring parties beyond the sea into this realm." 1 Eliz. 1, cap. 6 declared it treason "to make war upon the subject" and "to move or stir foreigners or strangers."

Thus, in the original indictment, articles 15 and 23 constituted treason under statute law ad litteram. And, in the Bill of Attainder, the third and fifth charges, having been drawn from articles 15 and 23 of the impeachment, were likewise treason by statute law. The House of Commons, therefore, had a statutable case: there clearly was no need for the Managers of the prosecution either to manufacture, as Wedgwood puts it, a new theory of treason, or to amplify an attack by Strafford upon the constitution, as Russell has it, into an attack upon the person of the sovereign.8

Why, then, if the 1 5th and 23rd articles made treason under law, did the House of Commons bother with a Bill of Attainder in the first place? Why not simply convict the accused straightaway with the juridicial means at hand? Why the shift to a legislative means when the original charges were statutable?

To answer these questions, we must examine the trial of the two articles on May 1st and 5th, respectively, to see how well each stood up under the pressure of adversary proceedings and the rules of evidence. The fifteenth article charged Strafford with billeting soldiers under arms, and, hence, with levying war upon the subjects of Ireland. The Managers of the prosecution for Commons called nine witnesses to testify, but only one, Sergeant Saville, connected Strafford with the warrant for billeting.9

The twenty-third article charged that Strafford had gathered an army in Ireland to invade and subdue a near-rebellious England for King Charles. Of all the members of the Council of Eight, only Sir Harry Vane testified to the point, and his testimony was ambiguous as to whether England or Scotland was meant to be invaded.I0

8I mean no strong criticism here. Given the earlier gaps in the record, Miss Wedgwood came very close to what actually happened, and Mr. Russell has done an excellent job of showing how the making of a division between king and people might be interpreted as treason, if the law is extended and interpreted.

9For the proceedings on the entire article, see John Rushworth, The Tryal of Thomas, Earl of Strafford (London, 1721), pp. 427-459.

'(Scotland was in open rebellion at the time. Vane testified that Strafford had said in Council to the King, "You have an army in Ireland. You may employ it to reduce

The Trial of Strafford 315

It is clear from the proceedings that the two articles of the indictment, which were statutable as treason, were each testified to by a single witness. However, the admission of evidence to a treason trial was highly conditional and came under a special law: the statute I Eliz. I, cap. 6 enacted that no person should be indicted, convicted, or condemned of any offense of treason unless there were two witnesses. It was this rule of evidence pressed ad litteram by Richard Lane, and not any particular loophole in treason law, which made ineffectual the statutory charges of the articles of impeachment.

The legal problem was discussed by a joint committee of the two Houses which met several times between April 29 and May 3. The leadership of the Lords emphasized the dangers inherent in the creation of any new precedent for treason and the initiation of a method by which the lawful could be made illegal and laws stret- ched or set aside by Act of Parliament. Consequently, the committee's compromise completely bypassed the Commons' original, keystone position that treason could be against the state as well as the person of the sovereign," and focused their attention on two specific articles: the 15th and the 23rd, both reducible to treason statutes. Thus, the supporters of the Bill intended to stake out a firm position in statute law.12

The two articles held further advantages. They did not involve the question of whether the 21st Rich. 2, cap. 20 (which allowed parliament to declare treason) was still in force,'3 or the difficult

this kingdom" Whether "this kingdom" referred to Scotland or England was not clear. Vane testified to the words not the interpretation. Rushworth, Tryal, p. 546. For the proceedings on the entire article, see pp. 520-581.

"Russell, "Theory of Treason," p. 50. 12I intend here legality under the strict letter of treason law by statute. A Bill of

Attainder was unquestionably legal but it was a specific legislative act. It still is legal, or course, as a bill of pains and penalties.

13The best descussion of the question by a legal historian that I know is by J.F. Stephen, History of the Common Law, II: 250-253. After a great deal of hesitation, he decides that the Commons' abandonment of the impeachment should be taken as a tacit admission that the salvo was no longer in force. Vaughan (Verney's Notes, p. 53) argues that I Mary I, cap. I allows parliament to declare treasons but not to punish for them unless they are committed after the declaration. I don't understand this hesitation. 21 Rich. 2, cap. 20 was specifically repealed by I Hen. 4 and I find no ambiguity in the law. Further, the Ist Edw. 6, cap. 20 fixed treason to be 25 Edw. 3, as did 1 Mary 1. On this question, see also Elton, The Tudor Constitution and Rezneck, "The Parliamentary Declaration of Treason," Law Quarterly Review, XLVI (1930): 80.

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question of whether there were treasons at common law.'4 Finally, the two articles avoided the vague doctrine of constructive treason upon which so much labor had been spent by the Managers, especially their counsel Oliver St. John.

The Lord's judgment of the Strafford case will now be shown through an examination of their voting on the Bill of Attainder.

On May 5, 1641, their lordships Resolved upon the question: that going by way of Bill in the discussing of the matter of fact in this whole cause, the rule shall be the persuasion of every man's conscience.15

Thus emerges the basis for the Lord's decision: a vote to break the rules of evidence by which they were bound under law. Sir Harry Vane on the 23rd article, and Sergeant Savile on the 15th, were to be corroborated, not by the required second witness, but by Act of Parliament and the persuasion of every lordship's conscience.16

The manuscript notes are quite clear on this point, and in three different places during the voting of May 5, 6, and 7, it states that the peers were debating matters of fact, not points of law, and were deciding by vote what had been proven, not what was illegal.

Next, the Lords adjourned to a committee conference with the House of Commons. A delegation of peers asked representatives of the lower House whether the general charge of subverting the fundamental law was to be taken as standing alone or as relative to article fifteen. The Commons replied that the charge was made relative to the article. 17 In a stroke, the question of treason at common law had been disposed of, and the Commons' general charges of subverting the fundamental laws of the kingdom had been connected, and thereby reduced, to a statutable offense.

I4The authority of Coke is against common law treasons. The House of Lords did consider treason at common law on May 7, 1641, but voted only that the matter of fact had been proved and not whether the general charges made treason. The question was then submitted to the judges, whose opinion simply held that Strafford was guilty of treason on the basis of what had been voted as proven. The judges did not divide the question and state which charges were to be taken under statute law and which under common law. Given the centrality of articles 15 and 23, it seems clear that the main effort was to bring Strafford under the sway of statute law.

53Braye MSS, fo. 142b, May 5, 1641. [Emphasis mine.] t6The official recorders twice attribute the tactic to Arundel, once on May 3rd,

when it was declared as policy, and again on the 10th, when it was "Ordered that the House did approve of the ...Lo. Steward in his forming & managing of his plan at the trial of the E. of Strafford & gave him thanks for the same." The ultimate compromise between the two Houses was apparently worked out by a joint committee which met several times between April 29 and May 3 in Westiminister Hall. The members from Lords were Lord Privy Seal, Lord Steward, Bath, Essex, Bristol, Sayc, Warwick, Southampton, Robarts, and Seymour. Ibid., May 3 and 10, 1641.

'71bid., May 5, 1641.


The text of the Braye MSS for May 5, 6, and 7-cited below in its entirety-should lay at rest some of the longer-standing historical problems which have surrounded the last days of Straf- ford's trial:'8

May 5, 1641 1. Resolved upon the question: that going by way of Bill in the

discussing of the matter of fact in this whole cause the rule shall only be the persuasion of every man's conscience.

2. Resolved etc. that the Earl of Strafford gave warrant for the sessing of soldiers upon men's lands in Ireland, and the same was executed accordingly.

3. Resolved etc. that the sessing of soldiers was done for the disobeying of the Earl of Strafford's orders made upon paper petitions between party and party against their consents.

4. Resolved etc. that the sessing of soldiers was with armies and an officer conducting them.

After this the house was resumed to debate the matter of fact of the 23 article.

E. Northumberland's deposition.

Sir Robert King's dep., who hear of S. Geo. Radcliffs speak.

Lord Ranelaugh's testimony.

May 6, 1641 6. Resolved etc. that the Earl of Strafford did counsel and advise

his Majesty that he was absolved from rules of government. 7. Resolved etc. that the Earl of Strafford said unto his Majesty

that in cases of necessity, and for the defence and safety of the kingdom if the people did refuse to supply the king, the king is absolved from rules of government. And that everything is to be done for the preservation of the king and his people. And that his Majesty was acquitted before God and man.

8. Resolved etc, that the Earl of Strafford used these words to his Majesty, that his Majesty having tried all ways, and refused in cases of this extreme necessity, and for the safety of the kingdom, you are absolved from all rules of government, and are acquitted before God and man, or words to that effect.

"8Mr. Russell has already printed in the E.H.R. a partial text of the Braye MSS as an authentic record of the Lords' proceedings for May 5, 6, and 7, 1641. However, he left out approximately one-hundred words which are important to both my argument and the historical record. I have "italicized" these sentences and offer my reading of the Braye MSS as a slightly more authentic version of the proceedings.

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9. Resolved etc. that the Earl of Strafford said to the king these words: you have an army in Ireland, which your Majesty may employ to reduce this kingdom, or words to that effect.

I0. Resolved etc. that these words (to reduce this kingdom) were spoken of the kingdom of England.

May 7, 1641 House was resumed and took into consideration the matter offact of

those charges in the Bill which are charged as treason by the common law.

11. Resolved etc. that the Earl of Strafford hath by his words counsels and actions endeavored to subvert the fundamental laws of the kingdoms of England and Ireland, and to introduce an arbitrary power.

1 2. Resolved etc. that the Earl of Strafford hath exercised a tyrannous and exorbitant government above and against the laws, over the lives of his M's subjects of both kingdoms of England and Ireland.

13. Resolved by vote that this question be put to the judges; that upon all the Lords have voted to be proved, that the Earl of Straf- ford doth deserve to undergo the pains and forfeitures of high treason by law.

"We are of opinion upon all that your lordships have voted to be proved: that the Earl of Strafford doth deserve to undergo the pains and forfeitures of high treason by law."19

Resolved by the majority that the B of A against the E of S should pass as a law.

The deliberations and the votes of the House of Lords show that C.V. Wedgwood, although her emphasis was slightly misplaced, has been substantially correct in her judgment that the Commons were unable to make a faultless case against Strafford and for this reason had recourse to legislative means to bring him down. Where the Managers had strong evidence, they found no law. And where they had the law, they lacked evidence. The most important law in the trial of Strafford was 1 Eliz. I, cap.6 which mandated a minimum of two witnesses to make faith in a treason trial. Strafford and Lane's effective use of this law forced Commons to bring in a Bill of At- tinder. The vote in the Lords was not upon the application of

"Observe the careful wording of the question and the reply: "upon all your lordships have voted to be proved." To have done otherwise would have been illegal.


treason law to Strafford's case but rather upon the validity of trial evidence. The House of Commons did not piece out with the Bill a want of legality but a want of evidence. If this is granted, surely the Parliamentarians did slaughter a man they could not convict.

Sir Arthur Hesilrige: The Forgotten Knight of the Long Parliament

Hugh R. Engstrom, Jr.

On January 4, 1642, Charles I's ill-starred attempt to reassert his authority over Parliament led to the unsuccessful attempt to arrest five of the leading members of the parliamentary opposition on charges of high treason. Three of the men, John Pym, John Hamp- den, and Denzil Holles, were prominent members of the opposition party, well known to their contemporaries and posterity. The remaining two members, Sir Arthur Hesilrige and William Strode, were less well known to their contemporaries and by and large forgotten by later generations. The Earl of Clarendon quite easily dismissed them as minor figures when he came to write his great history.

Hesilrige along with Mr. Strode were persons of too low an account and esteem; and though their virulence and malice was as conspicuous, and transcendant as any man's yet their reputation, and interest to do any mischief, otherwise than concurring in it was so small, that they gained credit and authority by being joined with the rest, who had indeed a great influence.'

Thus were Hesilrige and Strode consigned to the dustbin of history. In Hesilrige's case such treatment did not accord with all the facts as recorded by Clarendon, nor apparently did it coincide with the opinion Charles I held of Hesilrige. The Earl, by his own account of events, leaves little doubt that Hesilrige was capable of doing great mischief although he always preferred to see the knight as the instrument of other men's designs. As for the King, who was fighting to save his ancestral throne, Hesilrige must have appeared as the bitterest of enemies, and it was with good reason that Charles included Hesilrige among the five members.

Who then was this radical knight about whom so little is known? This essay proposes to examine the role of Sir Arthur Hesilrige in the Long Parliament up to Charles' attempt to arrest the five members in January of 1642. We shall see that it was Charles' estimation

'Edward, Earl of Clarendon, The History of the Rebellion (Oxford, 1807), 1:351.

Sir Arthur Hesilrige 321

of Hesilrige, and not Clarendon's, which is more nearly supported by the facts.

In spite of a violent and at times uncontrollable temper which handicapped his natural abilities as a parliamentarian, Hesilrige was indeed a powerful and dangerous adversary. Though certainly not the force in the Commons that his mentor John Pym represented, Hesilrige, because of his radical views, was potentially a much greater threat to the monarchy. While such radicalism might be expected in a Cromwell or a Henry Marten, it is more surprising to find it in someone of Hesilrige's background.

Sir Arthur descended from an ancient and prosperous Leicester- shire family. His father, Sir Thomas Hesilrige, was a prominent member of the Leicestershire gentry, who had been knighted by James I in 1608 and created a baronet in 1622. He served as high sheriff of Leicestershire in 1613 and sat as one of the knights of the shire in the parliaments of 1614 and 1624. He opposed the forced loans of 1621 and 1626. By Sir Thomas' time Leicester was well established as the family's home county, although they still had extensive holdings in Northumberland, the county of their origin. With good reason Laurence Echard could describe Sir Arthur, who succeeded to the baronetcy upon his father's death in 1630, as a gentleman of "very great Estate."2

By the time the writs were issued for the Short Parliament of 1640, Sir Arthur Hesilrige was one of the more prominent members of the growing opposition to the rule of Charles I. His second marriage in 1634 to Dorothy Greville led to a close association with many of the most notable Puritan leaders of the day. In addition to the influence provided by his brother-in-law, Lord Brook, Hesilrige now came under the political tutelage of such men as Lord Say and Sele, John Pym, and John Hampden.

Sir Arthur was actively involved in the early English colonizing movement. For a time in the 1630's he seems to have seriously considered emigrating to Saybrook colony in Connecticut. Prevented from doing so by an action of the Privy Council, he soon became one of the Crown's most violent opponents.3

When the third writ for ship money was issued in 1636, Sir Ar- thur openly opposed its collection in Leicestershire. As a result of this popular act of defiance and his earlier imprisonment by the

2Laurence Echard, The History of England (London, 1720), p. 520. 3Hugh R. Engstrom, Jr., "Sir Arthur Hesilrige and the Saybrook Colony," Albion,

V (Fall, 1973): 157-168.

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government for some unknown offense, Hesilrige must have been something of a local hero among the men of Leicestershire who shared his opinion of the King's government. It is not surprising that they returned him to represent them in the Short Parliament.

Sir Arthur was little more than a silent observer in this, his first parliament. There are indications in the Commons Journal, however, that as the session drew rapidly to a close so did Hesilrige's apprenticeship. Two days before the dissolution he obtained his first committee assignment on the Committee for Second Elections.4 When the summons was issued for a new parliament to meet on November 3, 1640, Hesilrige once again was chosen as one of the knights of the shire for Leicestershire. He was not only prepared, but more willing than most to press forward the program of opposition to the King's government.

Sir Arthur's friendship for Pym, developed during the years of their cooperation on various colonial schemes, had by now matured into a fruitful political alliance. Evidence of Hesilrige's close political association with both Pym and Hampden during the early years of the Long Parliament is provided by Clarendon, who, as young Edward Hyde, had at one point been invited to their council, held

at Mr. Pym's Lodging, which was at Sir Richard Manly's House, in a little court behind Westminster Hall; where He and Mr. Hampden, Sir Arthur Haslerig, and two or three more, upon a stock kept a table, where they transacted much business; and invited thither those, of whose Conversion they had any hope.5

Although Hesilrige supported Pym's programs for the most part until the latter's death in 1643, the foundation of the War Party, which would assume control of the Commons after Pym's death, was already being laid as Hesilrige came to associate with other members who shared his more extreme views-notably Sir Harry Vane, Jr., Oliver Cromwell and Oliver St. John.

Pym and his confederates recognized that the key to controlling Parliament lay in controlling the various parliamentary committees, enabling a small but determined minority to impress its will upon the majority.6 As the only group with a clearly developed program

4Journals of the House of Commons, (London, 1803), 11:18 (hereafter cited as Corn- mons Journal].

5Edward, Earl of Clarendon, The Life of Edward Earl of Clarendon (Oxford, 1759), 1:80.

6A more complete discussion of these parliamentary tactics is to be found in Lotte Glow, "The Manipulation of Committees in the Long Parliament, 1641-1642," The Journal of British Studies, V (November, 1965): 31-52.


whose goals were supported by the great majority of the Commons, Pym and his followers found their task somewhat easier during the early months of the Long Parliament than it was to become later.

As one of Pym's lieutenants, Hesilrige's most effective work was done in committee and not on the floor of the House. An example of his effectiveness, and that of his party in manipulating committees, is illustrated by an incident occurring shortly after the beginning of the session. On November 6, Hesilrige was named to the important Committee on Privileges and Elections.7 As a member of this committee he figured prominently in a case involving Sir John Bramston and Anthony Nicolls. A dispute had arisen over the election of one of the burgesses chosen to represent Bodmin in Cornwall. Although Sir John Bramston had, by his own account, secured a majority of the votes, his opponent Anthony Nicolls was returned and took the seat. Bramston petitioned Parliament to have Nicolls' election overturned and his own ruled valid, a ruling which the committee made, with Sir Arthur Hesilrige and Sir Henry Mild- may dissenting.8

This matter never proceeded farther than the committee, however. Nicolls was a nephew and then staunch supporter of John Pym. By some unknown stratagem, Hesilrige prevented the committee vote from being reported to the House. Perhaps at this point he was joined by Pym, St. John, Hampden and others who were also members of the committee. Whatever the methods used, they were successful in spite of the fact that Bramston described John Maynard, who chaired the committee, as "my freind and good acquaintance." At this point Bramston abandoned his efforts. Later. encouraged by the Earl of Stamford who had quarrelled with Nicolls, he made another attempt. An unknown member was induced by the Earl to call for the report from the committee. Hesilrige effectively stifled any further action, however, by asser- ting, perhaps a little too plainly, "they were possessed of a good member, and why should they change for one they could not con- fide in."9 With this, the incident came to an end. Nicolls continued to sit until he was expelled during Pride's Purge.

In addition to the Comnmittee on Privileges and Elections, Hesilrige joined a number of other very important committees during the first months of the Long Parliament.'0 On November 13,

7Commons Journal, 11:21. 8 The Autobiography of Sir John Branston, K.B. (Camden Society, 1845), p. 160-161. 9Ibid., p. 161. '0See Commons Journal, 11:28, 44, 46, 50.

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his name was added to a committee examining the petition of Alexander Leighton, a long-suffering victim of the Laudian church. Before December was scarcely a week old, he had received two more important committee assignments. On the third of the month he was named to a committee to examine the petitions of William Prynne, Thomas Burton, and other victims of Laudian persecution. This committee was given the additional task of considering the jurisdiction of the Courts of High Commission and Star Chamber. On the seventh he was named to a small committee charged with questioning the judges who had sat on the ship money case, as well as acquainting these judges with a number of votes in the House concerning them. One week later Hesilrige's name was added to a large committee of fifty-two who were to examine the misdemeanors of the lord lieutenants and deputy lieutenants of the counties.

The formation of the latter committee stemmed directly from Sir Arthur's initiative on the floor of the House. He still retained vivid memories of his encounter ten years earlier with Sir John Skef- fington, one of the deputy lieutenants of Leicestershire, and the humiliation he felt in having to crave the pardon of the Privy Coun- cil for his offense. Thus, on the fourteenth of December he rose in the Commons to move that the excesses of the deputy lieutenants in Leicestershire might be examined." A committee was set up to do this and more. In addition to the matter of the deputy lieutenants, much of Hesilrige's concern at this time focused on religious matters.

On December 19, Sir Arthur received an appointment to a sub- committee of the Grand Committee on Religion.'2 From that date his name was closely associated with grievances concerning religion, as evidenced in his participation on several committees, including one appointed December 22, to consider a petition from Ipswich against the Bishop of Ely, and another on February 23, to examine the affairs of Bishops Mountague, Landaff and Man- waring.'3 in March, he was one of a committee named to prepare for a conference with the Lords concerning the removal of the clergy from the Commission for the Peace. He also served on com- inittees to consider the act to disable the clergy to exercise any tem- poral or lay office or commission and the act against pluralities of

"The Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes, ed. Wallace Notestein (New Haven, 1923), p. 145.

I2Commons Journal, 11:54. 13Ibid., p. 91.


spiritual promotions and finally he was a member of the Committee for the Popish Hierarchy.'4

Hesilrige's speech to the House of Commons on February 21, 1641 favoring a bill against plurality of benefices, expressed his views on religion.'5 Sir Arthur felt the bill would "bee a meanes to purge the clergy from much vice and impuritie..." by the elimination of those "time-servers" clergy who in his view were considered able "if they could learne to dance after the Bishops Musicke." In addition, Hesilrige hoped that the House would go beyond the present bill and adopt measures to insure

That no Popish Lords, or disaffected Prelates may have no longer the presentation to Benefices but all presentations may be committed to the disposall of such as Parliament in their wisedome shall thinke fit to be intrusted with the same.

When this was accomplished, Hesilrige envisioned a church in which all men of the Ministery may be preferred to place, according to their worth in their Learning and piety, that men of most virtue may bee planted in the best Benefices, that by this meanes, they may strive (as before by vice) so now by virtue, to raise their fortunes by the M inistery.

Such a scheme left no place for the bishops, whose positions were to be abolished. The episcopacy still had its supporters, however, and the elimination of the bishops would have to wait for a more op- portune time.

While Hesilrige seems to have been absorbed in the religious issue during the early spring of 1641, he had also been following with keen interest the trial of the Earl of Strafford. On April 10, Hesilrige introduced into the House a bill of attainder against Straf- ford, catching it would seem, even Pym by surprise.

How Hesilrige came to be associated with the bill will probably always remain something of a mystery. The charge of impeachment against Strafford had been moved in the Commons by Pym on November 11 and carried up to the Lords the same day. It was not until the 23rd of March, however, that the trial actually began. At no point in the more than three months of investigation does Hesilrige seem to have played a role, nor was he anything more than a spectator once the trial commenced. Even more surprisingly, he had not been one of the committee of ten who, on November 19,

"I4bid., pp. 99, 100, 105. '3Burney I IA.(8.) Sir Arthur Hesilrige, Sir A. Haseirige, His Speech in Parlimaent

concerning the Bill Passed against Plurality of Livings (London, 1641).

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had been instructed to search the records of attainder in King's Bench as part of the preparation of the charge against Strafford.'6

As the trial progressed it became increasingly evident that the Lords were unlikely to find the Earl guilty. Strafford's enemies no doubt felt the Earl slipping from their grasp. On April 10, the pent- up frustration of many burst forth. John Glyn, one of the parliamentary managers, asked that they might be allowed to introduce fresh evidence concerning several of the charges already presented. Straf- ford immediately requested the same privilege. When the Lords ruled that both sides might be allowed to do so, pandemonium broke loose in the hall. Cries of "Withdraw! withdraw!" broke out on the benches where the Commons sat and were immediately met by shouts of "Adjourn! adjourn!" from the Lords. The members of the Commons spilled out of the hall in great confusion. Among those members who now streamed back to their own house to hear the new evidence Pym had intended to present was Sir Arthur Hesilrige. In his pocket he carried a bill of attainder against the Earl of Strafford.' 7

The evidence Glyn had spoken of was not really new, simply the notes of a Privy Council meeting recorded by the elder Vane, the King's secretary of state, and already presented in his testimony before the court. These notes had been copied by his son, who had discovered them by chance and shown them to Pym. Nonetheless, since the notes effectively corroborated Vane's statements, which to this point had been unsupported, they produced quite a stir. When the excitement died down Hesilrige rose and introduced the bill of attainder. 18

This move seems to have taken the Commons, members and even the leadership, under Pym, by surprise. It is unlikely, however, that Pym did not know of the bill of attainder. Probably he not only knew of its existence but planned to use it at a later date. Hesilrige, to whom the bill had been entrusted and who was prone to be impatient, foiled this plan by his premature introduction of the bill, an action most likely triggered by the earlier events of the tenth. If Pym had intended to introduce the bill that day it is unlikely he would have disclosed Vane's notes as he did, which was embarrassing to both the secretary and to his son. If in fact Pym did

'6Commons Journal, II:31. '7Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series of the Reign of Charles 1, 1640-1641

(London, 1882), pp. 539-540. I8Ibid.


lose control of the House, he quickly regained it and insisted that the impeachment proceedings continue.19

Certainly Hesilrige's act had not been that of a renegade, but was in accordance with the ambitions and goals of the members of his party. They would all have agreed with Thomas May, who wrote in his official account:

the King's affections toward his People and Parliament, the future suc- cesse of this Parliament, and the hopes of three Kingdoms depending on it were all tryed, when Strafford was arraigned.20

The Puritan leaders were determined not to let this one man, whom they all detested, stand in the way of their aspirations.

At Pym's insistence the impeachment continued but so, too, did work on the bill of attainder. On April 21, the bill passed the House and was carried up to the Lords by Mr. Pym. By May 8, the bill had carried the Lords and was sent to the King for his signature. Charles, reluctant to break the promise he had given to Strafford that his life would not be endangered, but mindful of the pressure upon him and fearful of the danger to his family, at length consented to sign.

Pym's program was still incomplete though much had been accomplished. The evil counselors had been removed. Strafford was about to forfeit his life upon the block. Laud was confined to the Tower awaiting a similar fate, while secretary Windebank, who had shown favor to the Catholics and the notorious Judge Finch of Hampden's ship money trial, had fled across the sea. Other grievances, however, were still to be considered. The acts to abolish ship money, the Forest Laws, the Courts of High Commission and Star Chamber, and other acts of a similar nature were progressing through the House but they had not yet reached the point where they could be sent to the Lords for approval. In addition, the debates in February over the question of episcopacy had revealed serious differences among the members and led to a split between the 'Root and Branch' men, those who sought to abolish episcopacy, and the defenders of episcopacy. This schism widened as Hesilrige and his fellow 'Root and Branch' men undertook to press home their attack against the bishops.

On May 21, Sir Edward Dering, who sat for Kent, stood in the Commons and introduced a bill for the utter abolition of episcopacy. He was the unwitting tool of a small faction comprised

19Samuel R. Gardiner, History of England (London, 1883), X:330. 2OThomas May, The History of the Parliment of England, (London, 1647), pp. 87-88.

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of Sir Arthur Hesilrige, Oliver St. John, Oliver Cromwell, and Sir Henry Vane the younger. Dering had no wish to abolish the episcopacy but he apparently hoped that the introduction of the bill might frighten the Peers into passing an exclusion bill designed to restrain the bishops and others in holy orders from meddling in secular affairs.2' That bill, which would exclude the bishops from their seats in the upper house, had passed the Commons on May 1, and was now held up in the Lords.

Sir Edward came to regret his action and later sought to explain it away by publishing his own account of what happened.

Upon Thursday, May 21, 1 subjected my selfe to the obloquy I suffer, the Bill for Abolition of our present Episcopacy was pressed into my hand by S.A.H. [Hesilrige] (being then brought unto him by S.H.V. [the younger Vane] and O.C. [Cromwell]). He told mee he was resolved that it should goe in, but was earnestly urgent that I would present it. The Bill did hardly stay in my hand so long as to make a hasty perusal. Whilst I was over viewing it, Sir Edward Ascough delivered in a Petition out of Lincolnshire, which was seconded by M. Strode, in such a sort, as that I had a fair invitement to issue forth the Bill then in my Hand.22

Hesilrige's action in giving the bill to Dering for presentation lent it some measure of respectability. Sir Edward was a moderate, above the suspicions of most of the supporters of episcopacy, in addition to being chairman of the Committee for Religion and an effective speaker. The bill met with sharp objection and came close to being rejected. Dering was forced to make many excuses for his "ignorance in the customs of Parliament" and the bill was finally saved by a strenuous effort on the part of St. John.23 If Hesilrige, Vane or any other of the 'Root and Branch' men had attempted to bring in the bill they probably would have met with immediate failure.

On May 27, the bill was read for the second time and it was now clear to all that its passage through the House would be a difficult one. Edward Hyde, who had strongly opposed the introduction of the bill on the twenty-first, was chosen to chair the committee of the whole House appointed to consider the bill. The objective of this maneuver on the part of those in favor of the bill was to prevent Hyde from speaking and thus obstructing passage of the bill. After a

2'Sir Edward Dering, A Collectioun of Speeches made by Sir Edward Dering Knight and Baronet in Matter of Rdigion (London, 1642), p. 3.

221bid., p. 62. 23Clarendon, History, 1:369-370.


month had passed, and the bill was still hopelessly stuck in committee, Hesilrige was overheard to say that he, "would never hereafter put an enemy into the chair."24 Hyde's stalling tactics were entirely successful. On August 10, the same day the King set out for Scotland, the bill died in committee. No doubt, as S.R. Gardiner suggests, circumstances now made the bill far too divisive a measure, but in any case there was little chance it could have passed a third reading.

Despite this setback, Sir Arthur was not to be deterred from his personal quest to bring down the bishops. On July 30, he had been named to a committee to draft articles of impeachment against the thirteen bishops whom the House held responsible for the im- position of new canons.25 By August 11, the committee had com- pleted its work and Sir Arthur carried up to the Lords the message that the Commons was "ready to make good their accusation." At the same time he was appointed manager of the conference to receive the Lords' message in reply.26

On October 25, Hesilrige moved that a committee of twenty-four should proceed to examine the Archbishop of Canterbury.27 The vote on Laud's impeachment had passed the previous December and his immediate imprisonment brought an end to his influence over Charles and the church. For the time being this had been enough to satisfy most of the members, but not Sir Arthur who had borne a personal grudge against the Archbishop since their encounter in 1636. He now hoped to bring Laud to trial, but this was not to be.

Questions of religion were among the most divisive issues the House had to face. The Commons, which up to this point had accepted Pym's leadership and provided the margins necessary to legislate his programs into law, was now dangerously divided between the 'Root and Branch' party and the supporters of episcopacy. In addition, a royalist party was in the process of forming. Some members, for constitutional and political as well as religious reasons, were no longer able to support Pym. At this moment, the arrival of news of a rising in Ireland heightened the tension. Faced with this crisis, Pym now moved to rally the House and to broaden

24Ibid., p. 42. 23Cmamons Journal, 11:230. 26Ibid., p. 251. 27Diurnall Occurrences, p. 384.

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his base of support by appealing beyond the Commons to the people. His tool in this attempt was the Grand Remonstrance.

There is no need to recount the Remonstrance's stormy passage through the Commons. Hesilrige was one of its supporters as it passed by a slim majority of eleven. He was also one of the committee of twelve who presented the Remonstrance to the King on December 1. Charles gave them no encouragement other than to reply that his response would be given after he had taken time to consider the petition. The following day he appeared before Parliament to give his consent to a tonnage and poundage bill. On this occasion he spoke briefly of misplaced fears, of designs and plots, and assured the Commons of his affection for the people. In particular he recommended that swift action be taken where Ireland wvas concerned.28

Hesilrige for once was resolved to follow the King's advice, although what he was about to propose was not at all what the King had hoped for. It was becoming clear that the troubles in Ireland could only be put down by military force. Command of the army and navy had always been an essential part of the King's prerogative, while it was the Parliament's task to grant supplies. Now, however, Hesilrige and others felt the King could no longer be trusted to use this power constitutionally. Sir Arthur sought to resolve the problem on December 7, when he brought in a bill "for the settling the militia of the kingdom, both by sea and land, in such persons as they [the Parliament] should nominate." The names of the lord general and lord admiral who were to be appointed were left blank. Great power was granted to raise forces, levy money to pay them, and execute martial law.29

The effect on the House was electric. Members called to have the bill cast out. Sir John Culpepper wondered how a gentleman who so often complained of the exorbitant power of the deputy lieutenants in his own county could bring in such a bill-a bill, he said, which "tooke away that power from the King which the law had left in him, and placed an unlimited arbitrarie power in an- nother."30 The bill was in grave danger of being rejected when Oliver St. John, to whom Clarendon gave credit for actually

25The Parliamentary or Constitutional History of England (London, 1763), X:92-93. (hereafter cited as Old Parliamentary History].

29Clarendon, History, 1:430; Notestein, D'Ewes, p. 244; Sir Ralph Verney, kt., Notes of Proceedings in the Long Parliament, ed. John Bruce (Camden Society, 1844), p. 132.

3'The Journal of Sir Simonds D'Ewes, ed. Willson Havelock Coates, (New Haven, 1942), p. 248.

Sir A rthur Hesilrige 33 1

drawing the bill, made a strong speech in its defense. When the vote to accept the bill finally came after much debate, it passed by 158 to 125.31

No doubt Hesilrige, St. John, Strode, and others who spoke strongly in favor of this bill sincerely desired its passage, but for the moderates such as D'Ewes who supported them, it was enough that the existence of the militia bill could serve as a threat to force the Lords into passing the far milder impressment bill.

The Lords were not to remain intransigent for long. On Decem- ber 21, the same day the militia bill received its first reading, Charles appointed Colonel Lunsford, whom the Commons regarded as little more than an ordinary cutthroat, as Lieutenant of the Tower. Strong protest resulted in his being replaced by Sir John Byron on the twenty-sixth, but the excitement of the last few days had attracted the apprentices from London.

For two days, mobs prevented the bishops from entering the Lords. In an ill-advised move, the bishops protested to the King "that all laws, orders, votes, resolutions and determination made by the Lords during their absence were null and void" and asked him to command that their protest be entered among the records of the Lords.32 For Charles to entertain such a request was to unite the Lords once more with the Commons. The lower house at once moved to impeach the bishops and this action was immediately accepted by the Lords. The roadblock had been cleared.

Flushed with this success, some of the leaders of the opposition to the Crown may have considered impeaching the Queen. The King, fearful of just such a threat, struck first. On January 3, 1642, Sir Edward Herbert, the King's Attorney General, appeared in the House of Lords to accuse Lord Kimbolton, Denzil Holles, John Pym, John Hampden, Sir Arthur Hesilrige, and William Strode of high treason. While the articles were being read, the King's Sergeant at Arms appeared at the door of the Commons to arrest these five members, but the House refused to surrender them.

The next day, January 4, the King, at the Queen's urging, came in person to the Commons to arrest the five members. Years later Hesilrige recounted in Richard Cromwell's Parliament what had happened.

The King demanded five members, by his Attorney-General. He then came personally to the House, with five hundred men at his heels.

3'Clarendon, History, 1:431; Coates, D'Ewes, p. 248. 320ld Parliamentary History, X:139.

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and sat in your [the Speaker's] chair. It pleased God to hide those members. I shall never forget the kindness of that great Lady, the Lady Carlisle, that gave timely notice. Yet some of them were in the House after the notice came. It was questioned if, for the safety of the House, they should be gone but the debate was shortened, and it was thought fit for them in discretion, to withdraw, Mr. Hampden and myself being then in the House, withdrew. Away we went. The King immediately came in, and was in the House before we got to the water.33

The members had fled to the haven of the city. On January 10, the King, admitting defeat, left Whitehall, never

to return until the days of his trial. The next day the five members, escorted by the rest of the Commons, returned to Westminister in triumph. Civil war, unthinkable just a few months earlier, was now inevitable. While Charles had committed a fatal error in attempting to arrest the five members, he had made no mistake in placing Hesilrige's name among them. There can be little doubt that the King thought Hesilrige dangerous. Whether he thought him guilty of high treason we cannot know.

Sir Arthur's real crime in Charles' eyes may well have been that he sought to promote three bills which struck at the very heart of all the King held dear. The bill of attainder, introduced by Hesilrige, had resulted in Strafford's downfall. The bill for the abolition of the bishops, which the wily knight had pressed upon the unwitting Sir Edward Dering for introduction, threatened to destroy the church Charles had taken an oath to protect. The militia bill, also introduced by Sir Arthur, was aimed at the very core of the royal prerogative, seeking as it did to remove control of the armed forces from the King. Charles recognized that Hesilrige was more than simply an "absurd bold man" as Clarendon would label him, "used by Pym's party like the dove out of the ark, to try what footing there was."34 Quite the contrary, it was Hesilrige, in concert with a few other members, who was responsible for developing much of the program of radical legislation. The King's methods had failed but his assessment that Hesilrige posed him a grave threat was correct.

33Diary of Thomas Burton, Esq., ed. John Towill Rutt (London, 1828), 111:97. 34Clarendon, History, 1:351, 430.

The Whig Prince: Prince Rupert and the Court vs. Country Factions During the Reign of Charles II

Leslie Chree O'Malley

Considerable scholarly attention has been paid to the origins of political parties in England during the reign of King Charles II. Yet the fact that a prominent courtier and member of the king's own family, Prince Rupert, was also a leader of the opposition or "country" party has frequently been overlooked by historians. J. R. Jones, for example, in The First Whigs, fails to mention the prince, and even Rupert's biographer, Eliot Warburton, has dismissed the last decade in his subject's life by saying that, after 1673, the ailing prince was too ill to play a role in English government.'

But Prince Rupert was, in fact, very active politically in the two decades following the Restoration. He sat in the House of Lords as duke of Cumberland and served on parliamentary committees. He had a seat on the Privy Council and was a member of all four of its standing committees. Rupert was often selected to serve the crown: as special emissary to his friend, Emperor Leopold I, in 1661 with the task of preventing an Anglo-imperial rupture over the marriage of King Charles to a Portuguese princess; as England's representative in negotiations with Denmark in 1669 and Brandenburg in 1670; as joint admiral of the fleet during the second Anglo-Dutch War, and de facto commander of the fleet during the third conflict with the United Provinces. Although the prince became openly

'Part of the reason for this omission is that the usual sources for England's history during this period, the Calendar of State Papers Domestic, as well as the British Museum's list of councillors for the reconstructed Privy Council of April. 1679. fail to mention Rupert's political activities. In addition, there was the prince's caution in avoiding involvement in any action which might be considered treason. He was, after all, a German, born in Bohemia, and, like his cousin Charles 11, Rupert did not wish to resume the wanderings which had occupied the first forty years of his life. For these reasons, it is necessary to work from other sources to reconstruct Rupert's political role: the diplomatic reports of foreign representatives at the London court (Colbert de Croissy, Ruvigny, Nauvitz, Waldstein) now in the Public Record Office and the Viennese archives; Rupert's letters to his sister Sophie now in the Hanoverian state archives; contemporary letters and diaries (for example, Burnet, Essex, Pepys, Halifax); and the records of the Privy Council Committee for Intelligence and the Journals of the House Lords.

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critical of the royal government as early as 1667 and, by 1673, had allied with Anthony Ashley Cooper, first earl of Shaftesbury, to form an opposition group, the future country or Whig party, he also retained many ties with the court. He was King Charles' first cousin and shared the king's interests in scientific experiment, tennis, hunt- ing, amateur theatricals, and the Restoration theater and its act- resses. As constable of Windsor, Prince Rupert oversaw the castle's renovations and was host for court visits. He also attended family gatherings for weddings, funerals, and state visits. Thus, King Charles who, as a child, had greatly admired his dashing Cavalier cousin, tended to listen to Rupert's arguments and persuasions when no other Whig was welcome in his presence. In this essay, I will examine the relation between the court and opposition forces during the years 1667 to 1682 by analyzing the role which Prince Rupert, a member of both groups, played in English political life.

By the time of the Restoration, Prince Rupert had a long history of service to the English monarchy. His mother, Elizabeth of Bohemia, was the daughter of King James I, and in 1636 she had sent her third son, Rupert, to visit his English relatives and seek a post in England. From 1642 to 1646, the prince served his uncle, Charles I, as cavalry general in the royalist army. After his ex- pulsion from England by the victorious parliamentary forces, Rupert headed a mini-fleet of pirate ships in the service of his cousin, Charles II. When Charles returned to England in May, 1660, he sent for Rupert who was then fighting with the imperial troops in Mecklenburg. The prince arrived in England in mid- October, and took his seat as duke of Cumberland in the House of Lords on November 6, 1660.2 Except for the diplomatic mission to Vienna in 1661, Rupert played a minor role in English affairs from 1660 to 1664. There are many reasons for this non-involvement: the prince was a foreigner, born in Bohemia, and he was remembered with fear and hatred by many of his former foes in the Civil War; as a landless prince, he had to make his fortune, and his court contacts furnished him with his only chance for royal patronage of such ven- tures as the Africa trade, the patenting and manufacturing of the guns which the scientifically-oriented prince designed, and for sinecures and pensions.

The outbreak of the second Anglo-Dutch War permanently changed Rupert's status in England. Because of his naval service in

2AII dates are old style except where otherwise noted. The year, however, has been adjusted to begin on January I rather than March 25.

The Whig Prince Rupert 335

1649-53, he was placed in charge of an abortive mission to in- tercept Admiral Michael de Ruyter's fleet in Guinea.3 When Rupert's squadron was recalled before it left home waters, the prince was appointed admiral of the White Squadron, one of the three major divisions of the English fleet.4 After the three men standing next to James, duke of York, were killed by a single bullet at Lowestoft, it was decided that York, as heir to the throne, must remain safely ashore, and Rupert and George Monck, duke of Albemarle, were given joint command in his place.5 It was this experience of working with the royal government which first brought the prince into conflict with the "establishment."

Angered by an insufficiency of provisions and ammunition, Rupert and Albemarle fired off indignant protests to the commissioners of the ordnance.6 The lack of ships, money, and men was compounded by incorrect intelligence reports, a fact which resulted in the disastrous division of the English fleet in May, 1666. After the Dutch were able to burn the unprotected fleet in the Medway in June, 1667, Parliament demanded to know why three years of fighting and a vast expenditure of men and money had gained them nothing. On October 23, Parliament sent a deputation of six men to convey its thanks to Rupert and Albemarle for their two years' service, and to ask them to report to the House of Commons, in writing, concerning the entire conduct of the war.7

Rupert's reply was a full accounting of the problems which had plagued the fleet throughout the war. It was also his first public attack on the king's government. The prince complained that the navy office's failure to adequately supply the fleet had forced the premature return of the ships on several occasions. He criticized the

3August 31, 1664, Samuel Pepys, The Diary of Samuel Pepys, ed. Henry B. Wheatley, 2 vols, (New York, 1942), I:265; Charles 11 to Henriette of Orleans. Sep- tember 9, 1664, ed. Sir Arthur Bryant, The Letters, Speeches and Declarations 91' King Charles II (New York, 1968), p. 164.

4List of the English fleet, March 29, 1665, Granville Penn, Memorials of ilie Professional Life and Times of Sir William Penn, 2 vols. (London, 1833). I:, between pages 316 and 317.

SNovember 6, 1665, Pepys, Diary, 11:266. 6Rupert and Albemarle to the commissioners of the ordnance. April 24. 1666. in

Prince Rupert and George Monck, Duke of Albemarle, The Rupert and Monck Letter Book, eds. J. R. Powell and E. K. Timings, (London, 1969). p. 14; same to) Denis Gauden, April 24, 1666, ibid.; same to Coventry, April 24, 1666. ibid., pp. 14-15; same to commissioners of ordnance, April 28, 1666, ibid., p. 27.

7October 23, 1667, John Milward, The Diary of John Milward, ed. Caroline Rob- bins, (Cambridge, Mass., 1938), p. 95; October 8 (incorrect date, actually October 24), Marvell to Lord Mayor of London, Andrew Marvell, The Poems and Letters of Andrew Marvell, ed. H. M. Margoliouth, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1971), 11:58.

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conduct of both officers and seamen, saying that, in his opinion, the significant difficulty had been lack of discipline. Rupert concluded by pointing out that he had warned King Charles on several occasions to fortify Sheerness, but nothing had been done. This was why the Dutch had been able to destroy a helpless fleet at anchor.8 In short, the prince found the English navy, from shipwrights to the highest echelon of command, to be grossly negligent.

The parliamentary investigation broadened into an attack on the king's "bad councillors." The most important of whom was the Lord Chancellor, Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon. Andrew Mar- vell, who has been called Rupert's parliamentary "tutor," hints in a letter of October 26, 1667 that Rupert was involved in the earl's destruction.9 The prince had quarreled with Clarendon in 1653 when the earl had refused to pay Rupert's pirate crews, and he had been a member of the anti-Clarendon faction headed by George Villiers, duke of Buckingham, at the court in exile.10 But Rupert, busy with his naval responsibilities, did not return to Parliament until November 23.11 Milward's diary has a notation that the prince, had he been present, would have supported the faction which signed a protestation against the decision that the House of Lords should not agree with Commons regarding the reason for the Lord Chancellor's impeachment,12 but there is no direct evidence of Rupert's involvement in the scheme to unseat his former foe. Although he attended the meetings on November 27 and 29 which considered the charges against Clarendon, and he was present on December 3 when Clarendon's statement in his own defense was read, the prince was not a member of the committee which drew up the bill to banish and disenable the earl.'3

Prince Rupert did, however, join the duke of Albemarle in leading a parliamentary party to secure the revival of the Com- mittee on Miscarriages in late March, 1668, and the committee then launched an enquiry into Sir William Penn's alleged role in the em- bezzlement of prize goods in 1665. Here the prince may merely have been seeking to keep Penn from commanding the fleet, for he

8October 31, 1667, Milward, p. 106. 9October 26, 1667, Marvell to Anthony Lambert, Mayor, and the Aldermen of

Kingston-upon-Hull, Marvell, Letters, 11:59; editor's notes on "Last Instructions to a Painter," ibid., 1:358-59.

"'Lady Winifred Burghclere, George Villiers, Second Duke of Buckingham (New York, 1903), p. 68.

"'Journals of the House of Lords, XII. 12November 21, 1667, Milward, p. 134. 13Journals of the House of Lords, XII.


dropped the matter as soon as it became certain the Sir William would not, in fact, be placed in command.'4

The impeachment of the Lord Chancellor created the nucleus and precedent for the later country party, a term which was first employed during this session of Parliament.15 But Prince Rupert, although an opponent of King Charles' pro-French, pro-Catholic policies, remained an active member of the government, serving as joint admiral of the fleet and privy councillor with a seat on the four standing committees of the Privy Council. From 1668 to the outbreak of the next war in 1672, the prince was actively involved in building up a system of continental alliances against France, a pattern he was also to follow after the war. In December 1667- January 1668, Rupert vigorously opposed a Franco-English alliance, warning against the dangers of England's being drawn into the expansionist schemes of Louis XIV.16 So open were his sentiments that the ambassador extraordinary, Colbert de Croissy, brother of the French finance minister, described him as "ennemi de la France," and Marquis de Ruvigny, the French ambassador in London, suggested to King Charles in 1671 that, instead of Rupert, the pro-French, Catholic duke of York be put in charge of the fleet.17 The prince represented England in negotiations with other Protestant powers: Denmark in 1669 and Brandenburg in 1670.18 He was especially suited for these negotiations as he was the distant relation of the Danish ruler, and the first cousin of the Great Elec- tor, Frederick William of Brandenburg-Prussia. Rupert, despite a busy schedule, found time to attend many of the meetings of the Privy Council Committee for Foreign Affairs.'9

X4Clayton Roberts, The Growth of Responsible Government in Stuart England (Camn- bridge, 1966), pp. 176-77.

15H. C. Foxcroft, The Life and Letters of Sir George Savile, First Marquis of Halifax. 2 vols. (New York, 1898), 1:64; Roberts, pp. 174-75; Hester Chapman, Great Villiers (London, 1949), p. 124.

16Violet Barbour, Henry Bnnett, Earl of Arlington (Washington, 1914), p. 129. 17Colbert de Croissy to Louis XIV, July 14/24, 1671, PRO 31/3/126; same to

same, October 22/November 1, 1671, ibid. '8Waldemar Westergaard, The First Triple Alliance (New Haven, 1947), pp. xxiv-

xxvi; C. Brinkmann, "The Relations between England and Germany: 1660 to 1688." English Historical Review, XXIV (1909):247-77.

'91n 1669, for example, he attended meetings on January 7, 24, 26; February 11. 21, 28; March 21; April 4, 15, 18, 25; May 16, 30; June 19, 20, 22; July 4, 18, 25; August 1, 8, 29; September 26; October 10, 24, 31; November 7, 14, 21; December 19 (PRO Foreign Entry Book, State Papers, 104/176).

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Prince Rupert knew that another war with the Dutch was coming, for he had been informed of the secret provisions of the Treaty of Dover by Henry Bennett, earl of Arlington, and Sir Thomas Clifford as early as the spring of 1671.20 In July, he was in- specting England's coastal defenses in preparation for the war.21 The prince was present at the council meeting in late February, 1672, when the third treaty with France was read and it was decided that war should be declared in April or May.22 On March 11, 1672, Rupert, in the unlikely company of York and John Maitland, earl of Lauderdale, carried a resolution in council which resulted in Sir Robert Holmes' attack on seventy-one Dutch sail, the official cause of the conflict.23

Prince Rupert had to drop his anti-French activities temporarily, and raise a regiment to support French efforts on land against the Dutch.24 Ironically, it was his efforts at cooperation with France which were to drive him into forming an opposition party. When Parliament struck down the Declaration of Indulgence and passed the Test Act to debar Catholics from public office, Rupert succeeded the Catholic duke of York as commander of the English fleet.25 Almost immediately, he came into conflict with the dictatorial Marshal von Schomberg, a French Huguenot who com- manded the English contingent for the Low Countries.26 Added to his aggravation was the refusal of the French naval contingent to cooperate at sea. At the third battle of the Texel on July 30, 1673, a time when the English needed a victory to gain a favorable peace at Cologne, the second French division under d'Estrees merely sailed

2"Cyril Hughes Hartmann, Clifford of the Cabal (London, 1937), pp. 205, 21 1; K. H. D. Haley, The First Earl of Shaftesbury (Oxford, 1968), p. 292; Keith Feiling, British Foreign Policy (1660-1672) (London, 1968), p.315.

21Pieter Geyl, Orange and Stuart, trans. Arnold Pomerans (New York, 1969), p. 323; Sir Charles Lyttelton to Christopher Hatton, October 20, 1670, The Correspon- dence of the Family of Hatton, ed. Edward Maunde Thompson (New York, 1965), p. 59; Lindenov to King Christian V, October 28, 1670 (n.s.), Westergaard, p. 323; same to same, November 1, 1670 (n.s.), ibid., p. 325.

22Hartmann, Clifford, p. 205, 211; Haley, p. 292; Feiling, p. 315. 23Feiling, p. 341; Hartmann, Clifford, p. 233; Geyl, p. 339. 24Francis Izod to Sir Charles Hatton, January 13, 1672, Hatton Correspondence, p.

75; William Griffith to Williamson, August 14, 1672, ibid., p. 488. 25Although the Duke of York did not resign as Lord High Admiral until June,

1673, instructions issued by King Louis to his admiral, d'Estr6es, mention Rupert as the Duke's successor on March 2/12, 1673, and by March 19 Rupert was already in charge. See, for example, Mr. Wachtendonk to Sir J. van Wachtendonk, June 7, 1672, CSPD 1672, p. 173.

26R. C. Anderson, ed., Journals and Narratives of the Third Dutdc War (London, 1946), p. 27.


to gain the windward position. Thereafter, it avoided battle, ignoring the prince's signal to form line. This was the last occasion when the Dutch and English fought without major damage or decisive victory. For all practical purposes, the war was over.

Rupert was furious. He blamed the French for his inability to destroy the Dutch fleet, and he journeyed up to London where it was reported that he was composing a narrative of the war. This action was in defiance of King Charles' order that he suppress the matter of French inaction to prevent the Dutch from taking advantage of any division between the allies. At court the prince found what he had feared-once again, as in the Civil War, an English king was using him as a scapegoat for a campaign's failure. Marshal von Schomberg later told Bishop Burnet that he feared the next parliament would break the Anglo-French alliance because of Rupert's actions, and Charles II had to assure the French ambassador that he would never again trust his cousin with a similar command. The French expected either James Crofts, duke of Mon- mouth and Charles' illegitimate son, or Vice Admiral John Harman to replace Rupert. But when the French co-commander Martel published a statement to confirm every detail of Prince Rupert's charges, King Charles returned the prince to his command.27

Although the king had ordered all officers of the fleet not to speak against the French, soon the entire nation was saying that Louis XIV was allowing the Dutch and English fleets to destroy each other to the advantage of France and Catholicism. Town wits in the coffee houses joked that Martel, now in the Bastille, was to be hanged for having risked King Louis' precious ships. It was rumored that the popular hero, Prince Rupert, had actually refused to go out again with the French.28

Since there seemed to be no progress toward peace, all eyes turned to Parliament, due to reconvene in November. Factionalism was rife. The hostility between Rupert and the pro-French heir to the throne was reflected in the political division between the pro- Catholic court and the so-called "country party" being formed by the earl of Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury was also Rupert's business part-

271bid., pp. 54-44; Robert Yard to Williamson, September 5, 1673, ed. W. D. Christie, Letters addressed from London to Sir Joseph Williamson while Plenipotentiary at the congress of Cologne in the Years 1673 and 1674, 2 vols. (New York, 1965), Il:9; Henry Ball to same, ibid., 13; Bishop Gilbert Burnet, History of His Own Time, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1833), II:15.

28Henry Ball to Williamson, September 1, 1673, Williamson, 11: 1-2; Robert Yard to same, September 5, 1673, ibid., 9-10.

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ner in two mining enterprises and in the manufacture of naval ordnance. Originally, the earl had supported King Charles' pro-French, anti-Dutch policy, and in February, 1672, he had even given a ringing denunciation of the Dutch in Parliament. But he quarreled with Sir Thomas Clifford, whom he accused of stealing his idea to stop all Exchequer payments in order to finance the war. When Lord Arlington informed Shaftesbury of the details of the secret Treaty of Dover, the powerful Lord Chancellor, along with his followers, switched sides in the summer of 1672.29

In the March 1673 session of Parliament, Commons had proposed to vote supply for the war if King Charles would abandon his claim to be able to suspend the penal laws against Catholics and Dissenters. Prince Rupert counseled King Charles that supply for the war effort was more important than his pledge to the Catholics, but Parliament's passage of the Test Act put an end to the matter.30

The prince, who was growing increasingly impatient with royal policies, found a kindred spirit in Lord Chancellor Shaftesbury, who was claiming that Clifford's scheme did away with the need for Parliament and so endangered the English government and the Stuart dynasty.3' Shaftesbury's biographer, Haley, says that the earl may have been trying to champion Rupert as a Protestant candidate for the post of Lord High Admiral which had been placed in com- nmission after York's resignation.32 Rupert and the Lord Chancellor vre frequently observed in earnest conversation together in the awtumn of 1673. When Shaftesbury was confined to his house with an attack of gout, Rupert's coach was often seen in front of his door. Even before the battle of the Texel, Rupert's known hostility toward France and Catholicism caused many to look to him to oppose the duke of York's marriage to Mary, sister of the duke of Modena, a marriage which had been arranged by the French. Both Rupert and the earl of Shaftesbury were viewed as "great Parliament men, and for the interest of Old England."33

291Lockyer holds that it was the discovery of the secret clauses of the treaty of Dover which drove Shaftesbury into opposition, but the Lords Debates makes it clear that the earl was attacking Clifford by going into opposition (Roger Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain 1471-1714 [New York, 1964], p. 343; Lord's Debates, 1:117-18).

30DLucy Fargo Brown, The First Earl of Shaftesbuy (New York, 1933), pp. 208-9; Foxcroft, Halifax, 1:109.

3tLord's Debates, 1:117-18. 32Haley, p. 334. 33Henry Ball to Williamson, September 19, 1673, Willianson, 11:21-22; Robert

Yard to same, August 4, 1673, ibid., 143.


Parliament reassembled on October 20, 1673, having been recalled because the king was, as ever, short of funds. Its predominant tone was anti-French and anti-Catholic, as Rupert's friends had been busy contacting members and encouraging their opposition to France and Catholicism. The French become worried about the English alliance, and Colbert de Croissy complained bitterly to both Charles II and Louis XIV about Prince Rupert's bad effects on Anglo-French relations. He claimed Rupert and his friends in Parliament were arousing the entire nation. Colbert de Croissy viewed this opposition as Rupert's creation, rather than Shaftesbury's, -and the same concept can be found in the Essex correspondence.34 The nineteenth century historian Leopold von Ranke has also described the creation of an anti-French, anti- Catholic party as Rupert's work.35 By seventeenth century stan- dards, Prince Rupert would be the natural party leader because of his aristocratic birth as the son of a king, his connection with the Stuart family, and his seat as duke of Cumberland in the House of Lords.

The prince, however, was seeking only one goal, to halt French aggression by removing English support. Rupert's foreign policy. instead, supportesd the foes of France. When Charles II did not heed this advice, Prince Rupert enlisted the support of Parliament to persuade the monarch to change his mind. Rupert was not endeavoring to change the English constitution or the structure of English politics, and he never sought to destroy the royal prerogative. It was the earl of Shaftesbury who envisaged a grander scheme. the creation of a country-wide band of supporters to keep himself and his associates in power.

King Charles had decided that as soon as Parliament met. it should be prorogued for a week. This would enable Mary of Modena to arrive in England. The plan, however, failed. Betore Black Rod could knock at the door, Commons had already passed a resolution asking that the duke of York's marriage not be con- summated. During the week's recess, Shaftesbury suggested that the king should divorce his barren queen, Catherine of Braganza, and marry instead some Protestant princess who could bear him heirs. -rhis would exclude the Roman Catholic York from the succession,

34Colbert de Croissy to Louis XIV, September 11, 1673, PRO 31/3/129; Temple to Essex, September 10, 1673, Essex Papers, ed. Osmund Airy, 2 vols. (New York, 1965), 1:121, 121n.b.

3"Leopold von Ranke, A History of England Principally in the Seventeenth Century, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1875), I11:547.

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and Shaftesbury urged that the duke be sent away from London. Prince Rupert supported Shaftesbury's demands.36 Charles, although he was angry at Rupert's interference in his private life, temporised, in the obvious hope that he could win back his once- loyal Cavalier Parliament.

On October 27, the king told both Houses that the Dutch had treated his ambassadors at Cologne with contempt, and that the peace he had hoped to present to them had not materialized. He then requested supplies to resume the war. In return, he promised to uphold the established religion and the law. When Commons protested that they did not want to be drawn into the Franco- Spanish war-they believed Spain was England's best source of trade-and voted against further supply, King Charles ordered a short recess.37 At the same time, he ordered Henry Coventry to demand the seals of office from the Lord Chancellor, as he suspected the earl was stirring up touble against him in Parliament. Colbert de Croissy reported that both Queen Catherine and the duke of York rejoiced at the news, while "Prince Rupert, the duke of Ormonde and all their cabal showed plainly by their sad faces their annoyance over the disgrace of their friend."38 The prince demonstrated his support of the fallen chancellor by visiting him on the day of his dismissal, while Shaftesbury replied that he was laying down his gown in order to gird on his sword.39

Parliament reconvened on January 7, 1674, and the Pres- byterian-Congregationalist alliance which had previously attacked the royal indulgence, the war, and the Catholics at court, now launched an attack on the king's "evil" counselors, including Lauder- dale and Buckingham. Buckingham, in a conversation with Bishop Burnet, blamed Rupert and Arlington for what was happening.40 When King Charles, seeking to make peace with Commons, took the unprecedented step of submitting to Parliament the latest Dutch peace proposals, both Houses advised him to make a speedy peace.

36Onno Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, vols. I-IV (Vienna, 1876), II:281-82; Maurice Ashley, Charles II: The Man and the Statesman (New York, 1971), p. 187.

37Sir Edward Dering, The Parliamentary Diary of Sir Edward Dering, ed. B.D. Hen- ning (New Haven, 1940), p. 51; Ashley, pp. 187-89; Bryant, ed., Charles 11, pp. 270- 71.

38Colbert de Croissey to Louis XIV, P.S. of November 11 in a letter of November 10, 1673, W.D. Christie, A Life of Anthony Ashley Cooper, First Earl of Shaftesbury, 2 vols. (London, 1871), 11:157.

39Haley, p. 343. 4"Burnet, 11:38-39.


But if war should recommence, Rupert was to be admiral, "the people demanding none but him."4'

Charles II was well aware of the strength of his opponents, for the Cavalier Parliament had rallied around the country leaders. Prorogation was the sole government weapon, and Charles, after conferring with his new Lord Treasurer, Sir Thomas Osborne, resolved to prorogue Parliament from February 24 to November 10. Osborne, whose economic achievements allowed the king to do without a subsidy, advised His Majesty to prorogue until the Treaty of Westminster would end the war and remove a major grievance.42 The wily king failed to mention his intention in council, and, indeed, the councillors were only informed after the event. When Charles finally made his announcement, he watched his cousin, Prince Rupert, very closely. Later, he told the French ambassador that the prince showed the greatest anger of any councillor and that assuredly he had hostile intentions toward the court.43 In Sep- tember, Charles decided upon a further prorogation to April, 1675, despite Rupert's protests.44 The prince's attempt to use Parliament to change royal policy had failed, and he would have to find another way. At the suggestion of the imperial ambassador, he decided to use his personal influence with his royal cousin.45

Rupert began using his position on the Privy Council to press for his aims. The opposition "cabal" was now faced with a new threat from the court supporters organized by Osborne (created earl of Danby in June, 1674) who used skillful flattery combined with the material inducements of pensions and bribes. By the winter of 1675, this court group had assumed ominous proportions. To Rupert, Shaftesbury, and other country leaders, a new election appeared the most likely means of interrupting this process.46 In council, Rupert, along with his friends, James Butler, first earl of Or- monde, the earl of Arlington, and Sir Joseph Williamson, pressed King Charles to dissolve the old Parliament and call a new one.47 In the spring, 1675, session of Parliament, Danby copied the opposition's tactics and sought to exclude the country party from

41Henry Ball to Williamson, December 18, 1673, Williamson, 11:103. 42Lockyer, pp. 344-45; Foxcroft, Halifax, 1:117. 43Christie, Shaftesbury, Il:192. 44Ibid., 199-200. 45Waldstein to Leopold I, December 17, 1677 (n.s.), Klopp, II:83-84. 46Foxcroft, Halifax, II:117; Shaftesbury party circular 1674-75, Christie, Shaf-

tesbury, II:200. 47Haley, p. 407.

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political life by means of a test oath forbidding any attack on the king, his ministers, or any attempt to alter the constitution of church or state. In the ensuing struggle, both sides seemed equal and a deadlock resulted. During this altercation, Rupert confined his actions to sitting on the Committee for Privileges in the House of Lords, a fact which again shows he had changed his ideas on how best to achieve his ambitions. In November, 1675, the king ordered a fifteen-month prorogation.

The fifteenth session of the Cavalier Parliament did not meet until February, 1677. By then, the prince's view of the English constitution was at variance with that of other opposition members. It must be remembered that Rupert was not a politician seeking office, but the king's first cousin who had been given a substantial voice in government affairs by the monarch. Rupert himself told his sister Sophie, wife of the bishop of Osnabruck, that his first concern was to serve King Charles in whatever way he could.48 Throughout his life, Rupert never forgot that he was the son of a king, and he tended, therefore, to support the royal prerogative, even when he personally disagreed with royal policies. Prince Rupert was seeking support from Parliament and his fellow councillors to change the orientation of Charles II's policies. But he never agreed that any group could usurp the king's right to formulate policy or govern England. To give one example, Rupert opposed Parliament's plan to address the throne on behalf of his appointment as Lord High Admiral. The prince maintained that the nomination of high naval officials was part of the royal prerogative; he merely informed King Charles in April, 1677, that he would be happy to serve him in that capacity in case of war.49

Prince Rupert's political beliefs became even clearer in the next few years. Shaftesbury's great victory in the 1678 election caused the king to prorogue Parliament seven times during the following year, although on at least one occasion (December 27, 1678), Rupert was able to persuade the worried monarch to postpone his planned prorogation temporarily and to promise to disband the army and prosecute those involved in the popish plot.50

King Charles was seeking to gain time in which he hoped the high tide of anti-Catholicism and whiggery would recede. There

4"Rupert to Sophie, October 26/November 5, 1679, Hanover 91, Kurftirstin Sophie, no. 15.

49James Stuart, Duke of York, "The Diary of the Duke of York," Original Papers, ed. James Macpherson (London,1776), pp. 83-84.

5"Haley, p. 494.


were petitions to have Parliament summoned, and counter petitions affirming confidence in the crown and abhorring petitions. The petitioners and abhorrers nick-named each other "Whigs" and "Tories," the first use of these names. The most distinguished of the petitioners were the ten peers who presented a petition signed by seventeen Whig leaders and Presbyterian peers in Lords. Prince Rupert, at Shaftesbury's suggestion, headed the deputation which waited for Charles II as he came out of his chapel on Sunday, December 7, 1679. Rupert, who refused to sign the petition, had been chosen leader in the hope that the king would listen to him, despite Charles' anger at the Whigs. The prince had also not signed the petition in Lords for a continuation of Parliament on November 20, 1675.51 He seems to have been drawing a distinction between using his influence to persuade the king to change his plans, and demanding the right to have Parliament recalled.

Rupert must have realized that an opposition party in seventeenth century England was helpless without friends in high places able to gather information and present its views to the king. Therefore, he was not one of the privy councillors who resigned at Shaftesbury's request as a protest when the petition failed.52 In- stead, Rupert cooperated with the Committee for Intelligence's scheme for a series of Protestant alliances to contain Louis XIV. He used his continental contacts to win allies for England.53 In doing this, Rupert was more realistic about the contemporary political structure than Shaftesbury, who appears to be anticipating a two- party system in which the king can be forced to summon the Op- position at the electorate's demand. There was no way Charles II could be forced to employ a minister he disliked and distrusted as much as the earl of Shaftesbury.

Foxcroft, in his biography of Halifax, divides the Whigs into two factions: the Shaftesbury group which put domestic issues first, and the others, like Rupert, who stressed foreign policy. According to Nauvitz, the imperial ambassador, Rupert and the other Whigs had foreseen Louis XIV's re'unions or attempts to use feudal law to an-

5 Douglas R. Lacey, Dissent and Parliamentary Politics in England, 1661-1689 (New Brunswick, 1969), p. 135; Brown, Shaftesbury, pp. 266-69. There were nine signers plus Rupert presenting the petition because the 1661 statute "Against Tumultuous Petitioning" permitted only twenty persons to sign a petition and ten to present it. Although Rupert had not been one of the seventeen signers, he was counted as being among the ten peers presenting it (Lacey, p. 324 n. 59).

52Brown, Shaftesbury, pp. 266-67. 53Minutes of the Committee for Intelligence, BM Add. MS 15643.

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nex border territories. But only Prince Rupert, he said, understood that foreign affairs were as important as domestic issues. Rupert had told him that political conditions in England could not be improved without taking the European situation into account. The two were inextricably intertwined. Rupert saw the real "Catholic plot" as the French king's machinations which were encouraged by English Catholics such as the duke of York. He asserted that France was the wrong ally for England and that the English people knew it. If England supported France, it would be due to the intrigues of the Catholic heir to the throne.54

Prince Rupert explained his view of England's role in European affairs by saying that England was balanced on the fulcrum of a see- saw, and must move either to the right or to the left to keep the see- saw from tipping too far in one direction (toward France) or the other (toward the Hapsburgs).55 He made similar statements to King Charles. When Louis XIV defeated the Dutch at Cassel and rounded out France's northern frontier, Rupert, Arlington, and Williamson warned Charles II that France posed too much of a danger to Europe for England to continue to be allied with her. They pointed out that trade with Spain was of far greater profit to England than trade with France, a telling argument for a king who needed the income from customs revenues. Charles agreed and said he would make such a statement in his next address to Parliament.56

In February, 1678, Rupert was so much in favor of England's going to war against France that he went to see the imperial, Dutch, and Spanish ambassadors to discuss the impendinig conflict and wish them all success in their struggle to restrain French aggression.57 He assured them that the meeting of Parliament on April 29 would show King Charles' resoluteness as an ally. The king would tell Parliament that the Dutch, led by his nephew, William of Orange, were impoverished, and he would ask for money for the war effort.58 But the scheme foundered on the mutual suspicions of king and Parliament. Commor; wanted Charles to declare war before it would grant a subsidy; the king feared it would abandon him without funds as it had done to his father, Charles I. A stalemate resulted, and the king ordered Danby to

54Report of Nauvitz, January 19, 1680, Klopp, 11:228; Foxcroft, Halifax, 11:131. "5Report of Nauvitz, November 10, December 25, 1679, January 19, 1680 (n.s.),

Klopp, 11:228. 56Waldstein report, June 22, 1680 (n.s.), ibid., 61. 571bid., 119; Waldstein report, February 7, 1678, ibid., 90. 58lbid.


write to the English ambassador in Paris, Ralph Montagu, Rupert's friend and fellow Whig, to negotiate for a French subsidy instead.59 It was Montagu's revelation of this negotiation which was to destroy the Lord Treasurer's political career.

In domestic politics, Prince Rupert felt affairs were reaching a crisis. In his own words:

The king here must decide either to call Parliament, and to cooperate with it, or he must raise the standard against it. In this struggle, he would be the weaker. On the other hand, if he decides to take good counsel, to drive away his bad ministers, and to cooperate with Parliament, it lies in his hands to become the mightiest king that ever reigned in this kingdom.60

The prince made this analysis in December, 1679, and it is in- teresting to see by the king's later actions that he, too, accepted this view. In a last effort to secure a cooperative parliament, King Charles summoned a new Parliament to meet at Oxford in January, 1681, away from the Whig Green Ribbon Club in London and the Whig-controlled London mobs. He also dismissed one whom he considered to be a "bad minister," Robert Spencer, second earl of Sunderland, who had gone over to the exclusionists. Although Rupert did not agree with either of these moves, the king was in- terpreting the situation according to his own views. When Parliament met, the king claimed that he was trying to protect the interests of his subjects, for if the rules governing the succession were changed, no man's property would be safe-a telling argument for the Whigs who claimed government existed to protect property. Charles said he was willing to meet Parliament half-way, for he offered to accept any limitations on his brother James which Parliament wished t' impose. But when Shaftesbury held out for exclusion, King Charles showed he was willing to raise the standard against Parliament by unexpectedly dissolving it on March 28 and making it clear he would use his Life Guards at Oxford to fight, if necessary.6' The nation sank back into a period of "Tory reaction" to the exhaustion of a series of crises, and Charles II never again summoned Parliament. The Whigs had failed in their attempt to alter the succession.

The exclusion crisis again found Prince Rupert taking his own stand. He agreed with the Whigs that York's accession would be a

59Lockyer, p. 348. 6OReport of Nauvitz, November 10, December 25, 1679, January 19, 1680 (n.s.),

Klopp, 11:228. 6lJournals of the House of Lords, XIII:745; Lockyer, pp. 351-52.

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disaster for England. But Rupert, who refused to accept Garter at the same ceremony as Monmouth, the king's bastard, could not accept him as king. First he hoped that Charles would marry again. When the king refused to divorce his queen, Rupert turned his attention to other Protestant heirs. He was a godfather to Princess Mary and was reported speechless with joy when Charles II told him Sir William Temple had opened negotiations for the marriage of the fifteen-year-old princess to William of Orange in November, 1677. Only the king, Mary's father York, Rupert, Danby, and Tem- ple were in on the secret. It was hoped that William might be able to persuade the government to support the alliance against France.62

In January, 1680, Prince Rupert wrote to his sister Sophie in Hanover that an unnamed person in Whitehall had suggested that a marriage be arranged between Mary's sister, Princess Anne, and Sophie's eldest son, George Lewis. In order to keep the matter a secret from prying eyes, the prince, who wrote to Sophie in his own hand, switched from their customary French to German script. He claimed that the entire English nation was in favor of the match, and he promised to do all he could to promote it.63 Important Englishmen also came to Hanover's representative, Spanheim, with the same idea, and William of Orange, another instigator of the match, visited Hanover for five days in October to promote the marriage. At Rupert's suggestion, the twenty-year-old George Lewis arrived in England for a visit on December 6, 1680. Although "Un- cle Rupert" was able to obtain quarters for the youth in over- crowded Whitehall and Charles II treated him with great courtesy, the secret talks in January between Charles, York, Rupert, and George Lewis came to nothing. The king feared the alliance might involve him in the continental war, York was against it, and George Lewis and Anne felt a mutual antipathy. George Lewis returned to Hanover to marry his German cousin, Sophie Dorothea, which his mother described as a much better match. Unfortunately, the marriage proved to be a disaster, and George Lewis finally imprisoned Sophie Dorothea for infidelity.

62Sir William Temple to Sir John Temple, November 1677, Sir William Temple, The Works of Sir William Temple, 4 vols. (New York, 1968), IV:337; Edward Raymond Turner, The Cabinet Council of England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 2 vols. (Baltimore, 1930), 1:338; Waldstein to Leopold I, December 17, 1677 (n.s.), Klopp, II:83-84.

63Rupert to Sophie, January 9/19, 1680, Hanover 91, Kurftrstin Sophie, no. 15; Henri and Barbara van der Zee, William and Mary (New York, 1973), p. 164.


Rupert was seeking to ensure a Protestant succession because he differed with Shaftesbury and other Whigs over the plan for a Whig revolution led by the duke of Monmouth. The prince saw his primary group as consisting of the Stuart family, not the Whig party. He allied with the Whigs to press for a Protestant policy, but, as the imperial ambassador noted, Rupert stood alone, holding a unique position in the English political scene.64 During the 1679 illness of Charles II, when the Whigs hoped for Monmouth's succession, Rupert wrote to Sophie that he must cancel his visit to Herford to see his dying sister Elizabeth, for King Charles, his master and relative, needed his assistance in this crisis. He pacified the irate king by urging Monmouth to leave England as Charles had ordered, and he allowed the angry young duke to stay at one of his houses in Arnhem.65

Although Prince Rupert could not always follow Shaftesbury's ideas, he remained a true friend and did not desert the earl when he was imprisoned and exiled. After the dismissal of the Oxford Parliament, the king took full advantage of the nation's disen- chantment with the Whigs. In July, 1681, the earl of Shaftesbury appeared before Charles' Privy Council for the last time. He attempted to defend himself against a charge of treason, but he had gone too far in his threats. Three of the councillors, Rupert, Rad- nor, and Fauconberg, withdrew rather than sign the warrent for the earl's imprisonment. Although the king permitted Rupert and the two others to leave, he ordered the seventeen remaining men: "Sign it, one and all." They did so. But the Whig sheriffs of London carefully chose a sympathetic jury, and Shaftesbury was acquitted and released from the Tower. Prince Rupert dined with his old friend on December 10 to celebrate his release, thereby showing he would not abandon him.66

In conclusion, it is necessary to analyze briefly Rupert's own view of his political objectives and contributions. There is no doubt that his contemporaries, men such as Shaftesbury and Halifax, considered him to be a Whig, and he was in fact one of the early leaders in the formation of an opposition party. But he was no party hack. Rupert himself said his first duty was to his master, the king, to whom he was related by blood and affection. Like the rebels against whom he had fought in the Civil War, Rupert was seeking to draw

64Report of Nauvitz, January 19, 1680 (n.s.), Klopp, II:228. 65Rupert to Sophie, undated letter of 1679, Hanover 61, Kurfirstin Sophie, no. 15. 66Haley, p. 655; Brown, Shaftesbury, p. 292.

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the monarch away from wrong counsels and counselors. It is likely, in terms of how the imperial ambassador described him, that the Prince saw himself as a free agent, and that he deliberately chose to serve as a link between the two hostile groups, court and country, much as he had gone between the courts of Charles II and Henrietta Maria in the 1650's.67 As a friend and confidante to both camps, he could keep the lines of communication open and functioning. Thus he refused to resign from the government in 1679, and, since he was no politician, responsible to an electorate, he could afford the luxury of independent action. Even when King Charles refused to summon Parliament and effectively crippled the Whig movement by doing so, Rupert could gain his ear as they hunted together, performed charades at court, attended the theater, or watched demon- strations by the Royal Society. The prince used these opportunities, as well as Privy Council meetings, to present the opposition viewpoint to the king and to relate to him the latest activities of Louis XIV which had been relayed to him by his friends and relatives on the continent.

Although Prince Rupert's hopes for a Protestant religious and political settlement were often frustrated, in the long run his ideas were fulfilled. As he predicted in a 1681 letter to his nephew, Elec- tor Karl of the Palatinate, England did act to stop Louis XIV by cooperating with William of Orange once the Protestant succession had been achieved.68 And Rupert's nephew, George Lewis, did ascend the English throne as King George I in 1714. But Rupert himself died in November, 1682, and did not live to see his predic- tions fulfilled.

67Karl Hauck, "Rupprecht der Kavalier," Neujahrsbldtter der Badischen Historischen Kommission, IX:I-1 17.

68lbid.

Lord Durham, the Whigs and Canada, 1838: The Background to Durham's Return*

I.D.C. Newbould

I

The most recent biography of Lord Durham begins with a com- parison between the affection felt by the people of his county for Squire Lambton, and the lack of attention paid by the nation to the co-author of the first Reform Act and the author of the Durham Report. A neo-Grecian temple, built by the Freemasons of county Durham, overlooking his seat at Chester-Le-Street is visible for miles, and provides a stark contrast to the London town house at 13 Cleveland Row, which lacks even the familiar blue plaque to serve as a reminder that Radical Jack once lived there.' The illustration is apt. Traditional deference paid by a county to a "friend of the people" who made his mark in the larger world accounts perhaps for the existence of the temple; less easily explained is his failure to earn that respect usually accorded a public figure of his sig- nificance, and it is curious, at first glance, that a man of his abilities and achievements should be regarded as an outcast by his own government. Yet the fact remains that for most of the 1830's, Durham was regarded as little more than a nuisance by his colleagues, who, following the passage of the Reform Bill, entrusted him to no position of authority in England.

Durham's biographers have laid the blame for his reputation on the Whigs. The final parting of the ways between him and his colleagues came in 1838, when his ordinances as governor-general in Canada were attacked in parliament with the apparent ac- quiescence of the cabinet. Stuart Reid and Chester New both make plain that Durham was monstrously betrayed by the home government, which gave in to its dislike for Durham in order to save its

*j wish to thank the Canada Council and the University of Lethbridge Research Fund for their support of part of the research which went into this paper.

'Leonard Cooper, Radical Jack, (London, 1959), p. 1. Durham managed to have only two public houses named after him in London.

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weak parliamentary position.2 In a recent exception to this pattern, Ged Martin attempted to redress the balance by putting the responsibility for Durham's downfall squarely on his own shoulders; the envoy discredited himself by his vain behaviour and let down the government by exceeding his authority in Canada.3 As is often the case, the truth lies somewhere between these two extremes. That the cabinet gave Durham much less support than he deserved cannot be denied, but his vainglorious and pompous conduct, overlooked or forgiven by Reid and New, was not so easily forgotten by the Whigs, who had put up with it for eight years. At the same time, the party politics of 1838 played a larger role in the government's actions than Martin allowed, although not, as New asserts, because the Whigs gave way to the Radicals. Rather, "end of session" fatique and the need to get Irish legislation through a Tory-dominated House of Lords made Durham's defence impractical. The intent of this paper, therefore, is to show that the difficulties of the parliamentary situation and a long-standing dislike for Durham, caused his downfall.

II Durham's inclusion in the reform cabinet of November 1830

was based on his attachment to Lord Grey (he had married the new Prime Minister's daughter Louisa in 1816) and to the cause of Reform. It seemed natural for Grey to ask him "to take our Reform Bill in hand"4: Durham was the only cabinet member who had been an active reformer since the war, and his aristocratic, though radical, background served Grey's plan "to show that in these days of democracy and Jacobinism it is possible to find real capacity in the high aristocracy."5 As Lord Privy Seal, Durham also sat in the

2S. J. Reid, The Life and Letters of the First Earl of Durhan, (London, 1906), II: 255; C. W. New, Lord Durham, (London, 1968), p. 94. See also G. M. Trevelyan, Lord Grey of the Reform Bill, (London, 1952), p. 367n. for a similar view.

3Ged Martin, The Durham Report and British Policy, (Cambridge, 1972), chapter 2. 4Lord Broughton, Recollections of a Long Life, ed. Lady Dorchester, (London,

1910), IV:178; see also Michael Brock, The Great Reform Act, (London, 1973), p. 136.

5Grey to Princess Lieven, November 1830, quoted in H.W.C. Davis, The Age of Grey and Peel, (Oxford, 1929), p. 228. Interestingly enough, Durham proposed the Duke of Richmond as a member of the committee, only to have Russell reject him for never having been a reformer. Russell to Durham, 19 October, 1834, B(ritish] M[useum], Add. MSS 38080, f. 73; T. G. Earl of Northbrook, ed., Journals and Correspondence of F. T. Baring, Lord Northbrook, (London, 1905), 1: 83n.

Lord Durham, the Whigs and Canada 353

cabinet, and his position of importance in the reform committee of four-with Russell, Graham, and Duncannon, together with his aristocratic connections and reputation as a reformer, suggests that he was well situated to be one of the leading politicians in this age of reform.

Durham is usually classified as a radical in his political beliefs, and he certainly did take a leading part in pressing for changes which were not always acceptable to all of his colleagues. Yet though his views on ballot, triennial parliaments, and the "democratization" of government were too advanced for many Whigs to swallow, this fact alone does not explain his unpopularity. The history of the Grey and Melbourne ministries is liberally dot- ted with internal disputes and dissensions; threats of resignation arising from policy differences were common. These disagreements reflected the dilemma of an entrenched, landed aristocracy reacting to an emerging industrial society with its attendant social and economic pressures. Indeed, there were few aristocrats who did not see the need for some bending to the winds, but finding an acceptable compromise between absolute reaction and reform posed considerable difficulties for those who took an active part in the debates at Westminster. Durham's ideas were clearly among the most progressive of the Whigs,6 but neither he nor his colleagues' views were so absolute as to render post-Reform co-operation impossible. The members of Grey's government had seen the need for reform in 1830 and were not unaware that a more progressive mind was an asset with an enlarged electorate. What made Durham's ostracism inevitable was the personal and petty nature of his attacks on his fellow ministers: in the cut and thrust of inter-governmental discussions, he was, as Cooper points out,7 a fighter, and it was this, more than his radical ideas or connections, which alienated the Whigs.

Although Durham was to tell Hobhouse in November 1832 that only personal respect for Grey kept him from resigning office,8 he

6Although a vigorous supporter of constitutional reform, Durham's attitude towards social reforms was not always as progressive. During the North East pitmen's strike of 1831, a Tory paternalist among the Durham county magistrates, Rowland Burdon, advocated the creation of a benevolent fund for the coalfield, financed by subscriptions by the miners and a levy on coal produced from the owners. Durham violently opposed this plan and after the meeting of magistrates at which Burdon suggested this Durham wrote to the Home Office about "that stupid old man Bur- don." I am indebted to Dr. Norman McCord of Newcastle University for this information.

7Cooper, Radical Jack, p. 55. 8Broughton, Recollections, IV: 256.

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began to quarrel with his father-in-law soon after the government was formed. His "childish ill humor" and "petulant criticisms" of the work of the reform committee and decisions of the cabinet against ballot and triennial parliaments, aroused suspicions, according to Holland, that he was likely to resign.9 Durham did not do so, however. Instead, he revived an earlier claim to an earldomIO in an attempt to acquire dignity and importance which he felt was both his due and too much the preserve of Russell and Brougham. When Grey explained that cabinet policy on peerages was un- decided, Durham replied curtly that he would "not degrade himself by expressing his feelings."" A few days later he told Ellice that "after what has passed I consider all public & private intercourse as at an end between Ld. G. & myself," adding that only "the responsibility I have incurred for advising the original Reform Bill" prevented his resignation.'2

When in the following autumn the government did deal with the question of appointing sufficient peers to overcome the majority in the Lords against reform (41), Durham objected to the decision to alter the bill slightly in order that a number of Tory "waverers" might change their votes.13 Absent for much of the discussion, first in Brighton where his son lay dying, then in Belgium on a diplomatic mission to King Leopold,'4 Durham was furious that those in the cabinet who, like him, supported an immediate creation of

9Durham to Russell, 21 October, 1834, Grey Papers, Durham University; Grey to Ellice, 24 October, 1839, Ellice Papers N[ational] L [ibrary], S[cotland], box 19, f. 29; Grey to Stanley, 23 October, 1834, Derby Papers, 167/2; Brock, The Great Reform Act, p. 140; Holland Diary, 20 and 21 July, 1831, BM, Add. MSS 51867, ff. 19 and 28.

'0He wanted an earldom in 1828 when he received the Baronetcy of Durham. See New, Durham, p. 94.

'Holland Diary, 5 September, 1831, BM, Add. MSS 51867, f. 127. 12Durham to Ellice, 16 September, 1831, NLS, Ellice Papers, Box 29, f. 36. 13For the problem of the creation of peers, see the following: Althorp to

Brougham, October 1831, Spencer Papers, Althorp Park, Northamptonshire, Box 6. I wish to thank the Earl Spencer for his kind permission to see these papers. J. A. Roebuck, The History of the Whig Ministry of 1830, (1852), II: 152; Grey to Sir H. Taylor, 8 October, 1831, The Correspondence of Earl Grey with His Majesty King William IV, ed. Henry Earl Grey (I867), I: 366; Brock, The Great Reform Act, chapter seven; I.D.C. Newbould, "The Politics of the Cabinets of Grey and Melbourne, and Ministerial Relations with the House of Commons, 1830-1841", Ph.D. thesis, U. of Manchester, 1971, pp. 125-45.

14Durham was a close friend of King Leopold, and had gone to Belgium at the King's request in late October. Durham encouraged Leopold to keep the Belgian throne and to accept the decision of the London conference of October 15 which attempted to arrange a peace between Holland, Belgium, and France. He succeeded in this, and returned to London at the end of November. See New, Durham, pp. 186-99.


peers, had given in to their lukewarm colleagues. Shortly after his return on 29 November, 1831, there was "a dreadful scene" at a cabinet dinner when, in Althorp's words, "Durham made the most brutal attack on Lord Grey I ever heard in my life."'5 According to Richmond, he accused Grey of being a betrayer of the cause, and reproached him with having kept him [Durham] in town in the summer on account of the Bill "and thereby having been the cause of the death of his son."16 Whatever the cause of the outburst, his colleagues attributed it to Durham's vanity and contrariness. Melbourne reportedly said that "If I had been Lord Grey, I would have knocked him down," and the ministers' first thought, to re- quire an apology from Durham for his impertinence, was rejected in order that Grey might be spared another painful scene.'7 Had Durham listened, he would have understood that the changes in the Bill were not significant. But he would not: "There is no alteration of any consequence in the main principle," Althorp wrote; "and I doubt whether he knows anything about the alterations as he will not allow anyone to tell him what they are."'8

Durham continued to advocate strong measures of reform. Still, he was little more progressive than several other ministers, and had he, at this point, carried on normally, his conduct might likely have been written off as the product of ill health and a tragic family life.'9 But continued attacks on Grey by an often sullen Durham, and an abrupt and short manner with his colleagues at the few cabinets which he attended,20 persuaded the Whigs that cooperation with him was impossible. In March, 1832 he threatened resignation over the peerage question, charged Grey at a cabinet dinner with deception, then stayed away from further cabinets altogether while encouraging Barnes to attack Grey violently in The Times.21 Nor did the passage of the Reform Bill ease tensions. He

I5Sir D. LeMarchant, Memoirs of John Charles, Viscount Althorp, (1876), p. 375; see New, Durham p. 156 and Brock, The Great Reform Act, p. 377, n. 128, for reference to this dinner.

16C.C.F. Greville, The Greville Memoirs, ed. H. Reeve (1898), III: 231-2. Durham was too ill to travel north for the funeral of his son, Charles, who died on September 24. Cooper, RJdical Jack, pp. 124-5.

17Ibid. '8Le Marchant, Althorp, p. 375. '9His eldest son, two daughters and mother all died within eighteen months.

Cooper, Radical Jack, p. 154. 20Holland Diary, 15 February and 6 March, 1832, BM, Add. MSS 51868, ff. 348

and 389. 21Durham to Grey, 12 March and 7 April, 1832, Grey Papers; Broughton,

Recollections, 13 March, 1832, IV: 198; Holland Diary, 14 March, 1832, BM, Add.

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berated Grey for again refusing him an earldom, and complained that the Privy Seal was a sinecure with no responsibilities: any information he got came "fourteen days after it was sent-round" and ten days after it was in the newspapers. Grey's having no confidence in him showed, he added, when Russell was given responsibility for carrying through the Reform Bill.22 In November, disagreements over Irish Church policy resulted in his refusal to meet with the cabinet, half of which shared his views on the Church,23 and he told Charles Wood (Grey's son-in-law), that he was "not on speaking terms" with the Prime Minister on "national affairs."24

Although Grey was reluctant to dismiss Durham just when his second daughter was on the point of death, that demand was growing in the cabinet, and he was forced to concede in November 1832 that "it will be impossible to go on with Durham."25 "Durham's conduct has been such that there is no one of your colleagues whose opinions I know who think it possible to go on with him," Althrop wrote to Grey on 5 December; "I have reason to think therefore that if Durham could be induced to resign everything might be settled..., the effect of his remaining is destroying all confidence, it is breaking us into knots and will produce our dissolution most inevitably." Two days later he suggested that "if he could be persuaded to go abroad this would be the best arrangement."26 Ellice agreed that "something must be thought of-something done," but tried to prevent a direct break which might cause the government to split. Insisting that Grey still had the same affection and kindness toward him as always, he per-

MSS 51868, ff. 406-7; Ellenborough Diary, 30 March, 1832, in A. Aspinall ed., Three Nineteenth Century Diaries, (London, 1952), pp. 217-8; Sir H. Maxwell ed., The Creevey Papers(3rd ed.; London, 1905), 17 August, 1832, p. 599.

22Durham to Grey, 23 and 25 August, 1832, Grey to Durham, 25 August, 1832, Grey Papers.

23Le Marchant, Althorp, pp. 448-9; Russell to Grey, 20 October, 1832, P(ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice] 30/22/IC, f.315; Althorp to Grey, 20 October, 1832, Spencer Papers, box 7; Holland Diary, October 1832, BM, Add. MSS 51869, f.570; Stanley to Grey, 6 November, 1832, Grey Papers; Grey to Ellice, 9 November, 1832, Ellice Papers, NLS, box 18, f.l 14; Grey to Althorp, I and 4 December, 1832, Spencer Papers, box 8; see A. Kriegel, "The Irish Policy of Lord Grey's Government," English Historical Review, lxxxvi (January 1971): 22-45 for a discussion of government deliberations over the Irish Church.

24Durham to Ellice, 28 October, 1832, NLS, Ellice Papers, box 29, f. 70. Althorp to Grey, 3 November, 1832, Spencer Papers, box 7; Grey to Ellice, 9 November, 1832, NLS, Ellice Papers, box 18, f. 115.

2"Grey to Ellice, 9 November, 1832, NLS, Ellice Papers, box 18, f.115. 26Althorp to Grey, (copies) 5 and 7 December, 1832, Spencer Papers, box 7.


suaded Durham to agree to bury all differences with the government, and to support its Irish legislation as a fi?lst step to a more progressive program me.27

Within a week, however, Durham came to the conclusion that he was not wanted. "I shall try to make arrangements for leaving England for some years," he told Ellice, "untill time has weakened the force of the melancholy recollections which attach to it & untill a change of Gov. gives me an opportunity of employing myself actively in public life." This caused further quarrel with Grey, who assumed that Durham was asking for a better job, and resulted in one last letter of reconciliation in which Durham declared that there was nothing that he knew of to prevent his co-operation in all measures of Grey's government.28 It was to little avail. Richmond, Stanley, and Graham made it clear they would resign if he did not, and there was no one else to support him.29 Pleading ill-health as the cause of his absence from cabinets for four months, he resigned on 12 March 1833.30 There was no doubt that his health was wretched,3' and this may have influenced his timing, but it appears that the resignation was caused by the complete disgust of all his colleagues at his conduct, and his own realization that he would not attain that position of respect and dignity he felt his due.

III

Durham's hope, that he would be accepted back into Whig circles, ended in disappointment. He complained, when told bluntly by Ellice that he would never get another cabinet post because of what had passed, that he should not be ostracized by others, that his quarrel was with Grey alone.32 In fact, Grey was the one person willing to support him: in May 1834, the Premier told Palmerston

27ElIice to Grey, 7 and 15 December, 1832, Grey Papers; Durham to Ellice, 1 January 1833, NLS, Ellice Papers, box 29, f.85.

28Durham to Ellice, 16 January, 1833, NLS, Ellice Papers, box 29, f.89; Durham to Grey, 30 January, 1833, Grey Papers; Broughton, Recollections, 30 January, 1833, IV: 279.

29ElIice to Durham, n.d. March, 1833, Lambton Papers, Chester-le-Street, Co. Durham, box xvi. I wish to thank Mr. A. Lambton for his kind permission to see these papers.

30Durham to Grey (copy), 12 March, 1833, NLS, Ellice Papers, box 29, v. 105. 3tLe Marchant diary, 18 March, 1833, in Aspinall, Three Nineteenth Century

Diaries, p. 315; Stuart Reid, Life and Letters of Lord Durham(London, 1906), 1: 322; New Durham, p. 231.

32Durham to Ellice, I January, 1834, NLS, Ellice Papers, box 29, f. 146.

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that he would give the government up if Durham were not offered a diplomatic post to Paris.33 Durham was bitterly resentful that the resignations at that time of Stanley, Graham, Richmond and Ripon over the government's Irish policy did not result in his own rein- troduction to the cabinet, but no one else would have him.34 Thus he went again to the pages of The Times and Morning Chronicle to vent his spleen but to no avail.35 If he would not take Paris, he could have nothing.

Nor did Grey's resignation in July 1834 pave the way for Durham's return as he had wished it might. Melbourne, the new Prime Minister, detested Durham more than most Whigs, and it was thought that the King would not have him in the government.36 Although he had "an earnest wish to be employed as a means of regaining his old friends," when Melbourne's second government was formed in May 1835 there was too much opposition to him, and he had to be content with an appointment to the court of the Tsar in St. Petersburg.37 Despite the ambassadorial trappings which he so dearly loved, Durham resigned himself to the fact that office in England was unlikely. Rheumatic fever forced a leave of absence from the Russian winter in 1836, but in asking Melbourne for something in the south of Europe, he added "Be assured I have no desire to be in England." To Palmerston, he wrote that "I cannot ex- pose myself to a repetition of the same treatment that I experienced on quitting [England]," and hesitated even asking a favour, fearing that "this circumstance may afford another occasion of wounding my feelings, in a quarter where latterly I have found no favour, or even justice."38

33Howick Journal, 30 May, 1834, Grey Papers; Palmerston to Melbourne, 30 June, 1835, R[oyal] A[rchives], M[elbourne] P[apers] 4/16. I wish to thank Her Majesty the Queen for her gracious permission to use the Royal Archives. Brougham claimed that Palmerston sent him to Paris in order to stop his attacks on the government through the press. Brougham to Russell, 1 July, 1836, PRO 30/22/2B, f.203.

34Holland Diary, May 1834, BM, Add. MSS 51870, f.723; Howick Journal, I June, 1834, Grey Papers; Althorp to Ellice, 29 May, 1834, NLS, Ellice Papers, box 50, f.99; Althorp to Earl Spencer, 29 May, 1834, Spencer Papers; Howick Journal, 29 May, 1834, Grey Papers.

3sThe Times, 31 May, 1834; Althorp to Earl Spencer, 1 June, 1834, Spencer Papers; Howick Journal, 1 June, 1834, Grey Papers.

36Howick Journal, 14 and 15 July, 1834, Grey Papers. Ellice, Howick and C. Wood thought it would be best to send him to Ireland to have the gloss taken off his reputation.

37Broughton, Recollections, 8 May, 1835, V: 35. See New, Durham, chapter 15 for a description of his labours in Russia.

38Durham to Melbourne, 2 September, 1836, RA,MP 4/20; Durham to Palmerston (copy), 2 September, 1836, (enclosed); quoted in New, Durham, p. 293.


Durham returned from Russia in the summer of 1837, shortly before the elections made necessary by the accession of Queen Vic- toria,39 and the problem of "what to do" with Durham was closely associated in Whig minds with the problem of the Radicals: the governmental majority in the new Commons was thought to be no more than twenty-five or thirty,40 a margin considered scanty should the Radicals want to embarrass the ministry. Consequently, when the deteriorating situation in Canada in 183741 made it obvious that a special envoy with extraordinary powers was necessary, Durham appeared to be an obvious choice. Mindful that a bill destined to provide a governor with almost dictatorial powers could be unpopular with some of the Radicals, the cabinet decided that the appointment of a "friend" of the Radicals might temper discon- tent and reduce opposition to the bill to a minimum.42 Residence in Canada would also render Durham less accessible to those Radicals who saw him as a possible leader of a strengthened third party.43 Although the Whigs did not with certainty view Durham as a political danger while in England, there was a feeling that absence would prevent his joining in what Ellice termed "political plays."44 At the same time, the Whigs hoped that Durham's ambition, in-

39He arrived on June 22, two days after the death of William IV. 4(Russell to Queen Victoria, 15 August, 1837, RA, A5/22; Parkes to Brougham, 2

December, 1837, Brougham Papers (University College, London) 5657. 4IFor the rebellion of 1837, see: J. Schull, Rebellion; the Rising in French Canada

1837 (Toronto, 1971); H.T. Manning, The Revolt of French Canada 1800-1835 (Toronto, 1962); D. Creighton, Dominion of the North (Toronto, 1957), chapter 5; A.R.M. Lower, Colony to Nation (Toronto, 1964), chapters 17 to 19; P. Burroughs, The Canadian Crisis and British Colonial Policy 1828-1841 (Toronto, 1972).

42Holland Diary, January 1838, BM, Add. MSS 51872, ff. 1067-8; Russell to Melbourne, 25 October 1838, PRO 30/22/3B, f.337; RA, Queen Victoria's Journal, 16 January and 6 July, 1838. The same principle was applied to the choice of Lord William Bentinck to move the Address; Melbourne told Russell that he was "very agreeable to the Radicals, whom it is well to please when you can do it so cheaply." 17 September, 1837, Broadlands Papers, MEL/RU/401, by permission of the Trustees of the Broadlands Archives.

43In its final number (July 1, 1837), the radical paper The Constitutional closed it's leader by offering "best wishes...to the People-the Franchise, with Lord Durham for a minister." In a leader entitled "We Want Lord Durham", the Weekly Chronicle (March 5, 1837) argued that "He, and he alone, can now organize the Radical party. The Radical members would support him to a man."

44E1lice to Grey, 2 February, 1837, Grey Papers. Russell wrote to Melbourne in September 1837 that it would not be wise to offend Durham and Poulett Thompson, "for they would soon find followers, if they have none now." Russell to Melbourne, 12 September, 1837, PRO 30/22/2F, f.l 13. In August, Mulgrave thought the best way to prevent Durham from gaining a strong position and forcing himself on the government would be to provide for him before he became too ambitious. Mulgrave to Melbourne, 21 August, 1837, RA, MP.

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creased, it was feared, by the accession of Victoria,45 might be satisfied with an appointment to Canada. Melbourne's oppostion, and the lack of any other support, precluded again the possibility of a cabinet post,46 and Durham was close to the truth when he told Hobhouse that he knew he was sent abroad "in order to be got rid of."47 Melbourne told Mulgrave that given Durham's "fever for any employment...it would be well to satisfy & dispose of him." "I have no personal objection to any man," he wrote to Russell, "but everybody, after the experience we have had, must doubt whether there can be either peace or harmony in a Cabinet, of which Lord Durham is a member." When the Queen mentioned in August, 1838 that it was better Durham was in Canada than England, the Prime Minister replied that "that was one of the reasons why he was sent there, but that we musn't consider that too much."48

IV

Despite an initial refusal, Durham finally consented to go to Canada,49 and an entry in Victoria's journal recording the reception of the news with "great delight" by the Radicals and "sarcastic cheers" by the Tories50 is indication that the government's plan was successful. In the end, however, the appointment proved to be more than the cabinet bargained for. Widespread disapproval of his conduct in Canada was to embarrass the government, and when it chose not to defend him against Brougham's attack on his ordinance that transported eight political prisoners to Bermuda, Durham packed

45"I suppose Durham will be soon in England," Russell wrote to Mulgrave on 9 June; "what he may do, or attempt do to, I know not, but I fancy he meditates much on a change of reign." Russell to Mulgrave, 9 June, 1837, M[ulgrave] C[astle] A(r- chives, Whitby Castle] Mt870. I wish to thank the Marquis of Normanby for his kind permission to read the papers of the first Marquis.

46"His temper is his least fault." Melbourne wrote to Russell; "he is dishonest and unprincipled. There is no opinion nor person he will not sacrifice to further his immediate end." Melbourne to Russell, Broadlands Papers, 7 September, 1837, MEL/RUI396.

47Hobhouse Diary, I February, 1838, BM, Add. MSS 56559, f.l 1. 48Melbourne to Mulgrave, 21 August, 1837, MCA MM1165; Melbourne to

Russell, 7 July, 1837, Broadlands Papers, MEL/RU/367; RA, Queen Victoria's Jour- nal, 20 August, 1838.

49Melbourne to Durham, 22 July, 1837, Lambton Papers, box XXII f.7; Durham to Ellice, January 1838, NLS, Ellice Papers, box 30 f.43; see Howick to Ellice, 22 August, 1837, NLS, Ellice Papers, box 22, f.27, where Howick claimed to have first recommended Durham for the post.

50RA, Queen Victoria's Journal, 16 January, 1838.


his bags and returned to England. The ordinance was Durham's solution to a problem that had been troubling the government for some time: how to deal with the disposal of the political prisoners still in custody following the rebellion of 1837.51 It declared that if any of the eight, or of sixteen others who had fled from justice, should return to Lower Canada without the Governor's permission, they would be guilty of high treason and suffer death.52

There is little doubt the Brougham's motive was two-fold: to weaken his arch-enemy Durham in order to ingratiate himself with the Radicals, and to point out the weakness of the Whigs' parliamentary position. The Brougham-Durham quarrel dated from the summer of 1830, and according to Melbourne, the two had "hated each other ever since."53 Brougham's resounding reform victory in the West Riding elections of that year thrust him to the forefront of reform politics, and threatened a jealous Durham, who was soon to complain that the Lord Chancellor's name was to be put on the Reform column, while "mine, who drew the bill, not."54 Brougham, on the other hand, resented the leading position which he thought Durham possessed with the Raidcals, and regarded him as a competitor to be denigrated whenever possible. Thus, for example, he used his influence with the press to deprecate Althorp and Durham following Grey's retirement in 1834, in a series of articles in The Times attacking, according to Howick, "everyone who could be put in competition with the Chancellor for the premiership."55 A rejoinder instigated by Durham and Howick56 produced a further assault in the Edinburgh Review, where Brougham accused Durham of opposing a low electoral qualification in the Reform Bill committee, and warned the Whigs against his "rashly framed" and unworkable radical proposals.57 Durham's absence from England following the Whigs' return to office in 1835 made him less a threat to the ex-chancellor, but following his return from St. Petersburg in the summer of 1837, Brougham was determined that he should not be allowed the opportunity to reassert his popularity. It was to his great delight that Durham's appointment to the

5'See New, Durham, pp. 387-9 for a description of the ordinance and of how this decision was reached.

52Ibid., p. 390. 53RA, Queen Victoria's Journal, 9 March, 1838. 54Broughton, Recollection, 2 November, 1832, IV: 256-7. 55The Times, 11 and 12 July, 1834; Howick Journal, 13 July, 1834. 56The Times, 19 July, 1834; Howick Journal, 14 and 20 July, 1834. Grey Papers;

Le Marchant to Brougham, July 1834, Brougham Papers 22795. 57"The Last Session of Parliament," Edinburgh Review, LX (1834): 231.

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Canadian post was opposed by some of the Radicals, and he lost no opportunity in heaping invective upon both Durham and the Whigs. His quarrel with the latter stemmed from his ostracism in 1835 when Melbourne's second administration had been formed. The Whigs suspected that, if not mad, he was clearly not to be trusted: they thought that he was instrumental in the secret negotiations with O'Connell which resulted in Grey's retirement,58 and his open quarrel with Durham in the autumn of the same year was regarded as one of the main elements in the King's decision to dismiss Melbourne's government.59 "My life will henceforth be devoted to vengeance," he complained to Melbourne, who would not have him back, "which I shall exact most fully ag[ains]t the creatures who have disgraced themselves and abandoned me."60

It was no suprise, then, that Durham's reinvolvement with a goverment holding a slender majority in the Commons provided grist for Brougham's mill. On the opening day of the 1838 session, he argued with Melbourne, who had berated him for calling the Duchess of Kent the Queen Mother rather than the mother of the Queen.6' On the 18th, he made a violent and intemperate speech denouncing the government, and, by implication, Durham, for its illiberal Canadian policy: "All Canada cries out for an Elective Council," he charged; "Refuse it you cannot."62 In thus portraying Durham and the Whigs as the defenders of the aristocratic factions in both Lower and Upper Canada against reformers like Papineau and Mackenzie, Brougham was in tune with the Radical faction in the Commons which opposed the government. "Brougham," thought Hobhouse, "'no doubt considered that he should give the death-blow to the Melbourne Administration by this effort. I heard

580'Connell's revelations in the Commons that the government had negotiated with him over the clauses in the 1834 Coercion Act resulted in Althorp's resignation and Grey's retirement. Most of the damage had been done by E. J. Littleton, the Irish Secretary, who had overstepped his directive simply to apprise O'Connell of the government's views, but it was thought that Brougham had given Littleton an incorrect assessment of the cabinet's position. See Hansard, 3 July, 1834, S[eries] 3, [volume] XXIV, col. 1099; Le Marchant, Althorp p. 495-505; Holland Diary, July 1834, BM, Add. MSS 51870, ff.724-8; Howick Journal, 7-9 July, 1834, Grey Papers; Melbourne to Brougham, 17 February, 1835, RA, MP 2/28.

59Melbourne to Brougham, 14 February, 1835, RA, MP 2/26. 60See also Melbourne to Grey, 23 January, 1835, Grey Papers; Melbourne to

Russell, 7 February, 1835, Broadlands Papers, MEL/RU/142; Melbourne to Mulgrave, 6 February, 1835, MCA, MM/9; Brougham to Melbourne, 4 December, 1834 and n.d. [December 1834], RA,MP 2/18 and 2/21.

6tBroughton, Recollections. 16 January, 1838, V: 115. 62Hansard, 18 January, 1838, 53, XL, col. 215.


Roebuck boasted of having Brougham in his pocket, and had said, 'As we are deserted by Durham, we must trot out the old horse."'63 When Brougham brought up the subject of Durham's ordinance on July 30 there was every reason therefore to believe that he was making a partisan attack on both Durham and the Whigs. He had vowed in March in a letter to the Delegates of the Emancipation of the Blacks to do all in his power to rid the country of the ministry, which he described as an ephemeral power, and Russell had already warned the Commons at least once against his personal and party motives.64

It seems unusual that the government, being fully aware of the partisan nature of the attack, should have given in to Brougham's taunts. Melbourne responded to Brougham's first denunciation of Durham by declaring that "it was in the highest degree imprudent, and unpatriotic-it was sacrificing the interests of the country to the interested party," and only two days earlier both he and Glenelg, the Colonial Secretary, wrote to Durham to express "the most active approval and concurrence."65 Yet within a few days of this initial approval, the Whig ministers reversed their decision and allowed the censure to be carried. It was not because Durham's acts were considered to be legally unjustifiable that they chose not to defend him. When the ordinances were first mentioned in the cabinet there was no discussion of them, nor was there on July 30, when the At- torney General reported that the instructions were faulty because Durham had no power beyond British North America. As late as August 8, two days after the law Lords handed down their decision, no action was taken; indeed Hobhouse reported that "we could not make up our minds about the Bermuda part of the ordinances--& agreed to wait for discussions in the Lords."66 Following a "very disagreeable"67 debate and division in the Lords on August 9, the decision was taken, following a hurried discussion, to disallow

63Broughton, Recollections, 18 January, 1838, V: 116. 64Broughton, Recollections, 11 and 31 March, 1838,V: 125 and 128;Hansard,S3,

XLII, col. 428. 65Hansard, 30 July, 1838, S3, XLIV, col. 758; Melbourne to Durham, 28 July,

1838, RA, MP 4/44; New, Durham, p. 439. "I am very happy to learn that you have settled the very difficult affair of the Prisoners and settled it so well," Melbourne wrote; "You are quite right in making use of your present power in order to introduce as many sound & good laws as you can." Glenelg to Durham; "my colleagues and I entirely approve-our opinion is that although there may be some legal inac- curacies of form, the substance is entirely right and the result satisfactory."

66BM, Add. MSS 56559, ff.175, 179 and 186. 67Melbourne to Queen Victoria, 9 August, 1838, RA, Al/181.

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Durham's measure.68 That the government acted on extra-legal motives does not deny

that there was nothing illegal about the ordinance. But in choosing not to show its support for Durham by proposing supplementary legislation allowing the detention of the prisoners in Bermuda, the government knew that they were sacrificing Durham to other interests, and would probably reduce his influence in the colony. It is worth noting that his resignation resulted not from the disallowance of the ordinance, but from a lack of support from his home government: if the legal officers of the crown were legally correct and disallowance was a technical necessity, he argued, the government should have corrected the errors and imperfections "which had their origins in a zeal for humanity and for the integrity of the empire."69 Opposition to Brougham's bill might have been unsuccessful, he knew, but in Canada, this would have been considered "almost as a matter of course, in the present state of parties; and would...have left my authority untouched, because it would have been attributed to the mere party motives of a powerful opposition. "70

Certainly Durham had a strong claim to support. In the first place, that part of his ordinance that was declared illegal followed the instructions issued by the Colonial Secretary. Before his departure for Canada, he was told by Glenelg to treat the guilty prisoners leniently: "Except in case of murder, capital punishments should be avoided: transportation or banishment from the province, for a certain period, imprisonment and fine, will afford the means of com- mutation of any capital sentence, and I trust also of fully vin- dicating the authority of the law."7' Durham mentioned this despatch in his defence,72 but it was, of course, too late, and

68Howick to Grey, 10 August, 1838, Grey Papers; Melbourne to Victoria, 10 August, 1838, RA, Al/183.

69Durham to Gleneig, (despatch number 68) 28 September, 1838, British Parliamentary Papers, 1839, "Colonies, British North America," (Irish University Press), [hereafter cited as B.P.P.] III: 190.

70Durham to Glenelg, (despatch number 68) 28 September, 1838, B.P.P., III: 188. Durham told Grey that it was not Brougham's bill that weakened his authority, but the government's actions. Durham to Grey, 28 September, 1838, Grey Papers. See also The Examiner, 21 October, 1838, for a report of an address by Durham in Lower Canada containing similar sentiments. Brougham's bill declared that Durham had no authority to do what he did, and indemnified the persons involved in the illegal transportation of the prisoners. Once the ordinance was disallowed, the declatory part of the Bill was dropped. Hansard, S3, XLIV, 8 August, 1838, col. 1056.

7'Glenelg to Durham, (despatch number 21) 21 April, 1838, B.P.P., III: 29. 72Durham to Gleneig, (despatch number 67) 28 September, 1838, B.P.P., III: 186.

"Your Lordship's instructions expressly suggest the substitution of transportation and banishment from the province in lieu of capital punishments," Durham pointed out.


Glenelg, in any case, never brought this up in his defence. In addition, there was much confusion over whether he was, in

fact, in error. Although criticism in both Houses of Parliament was directed against the dictatorial manner in which Durham carried out his ordinance (not sending the prisoners to trial), the law officers found only his instructions to detain the prisoners in Bermuda illegal.73 This decision was arrived at hastily. They were instructed to enquire into the legality of the ordinance on August 4, and reported on the 6th; Attorney-General Campbell, in fact, told Hobhouse as early as July 30 that it was illegal.74 The government, in its own haste, appears to have accepted bad advice. As The Examiner pointed out in Durham's defence, it was not surprising that the law should have been mistaken by his council when the highest legal authorities in both Houses could not concur. Although the law officers throught one way, Lord Chief Justice Denman argued that Durham was not authorized to punish men without trial, but that it was not clear, without searching the acts of parliament, that he could not transport the men to Bermuda. "Indeed," wrote Russell to the Queen, "the whole law of the present session was explained in a different way by every lawyer who spoke."75

Durham had made the search suggested by the Lord Chief Justice, and found sufficient authority and precedence to indicate the less than thorough nature of the law officers' report. In a lengthy despatch of September 28, he cited the Imperial Statutes of 5 George IV, c. 84 s. 3 which provided for the banishment of prisoners from the colonies, and 6 George IV, c. 69 s. 4, which provided that his Majesty, by any order-in-council, could authorize the governors of any of the colonies "to appoint the place within His Majesty's dominions, to which offenders convicted in any such colony, and being under sentence or order of transportation, shall be sent or transported." He then showed that under this act an order-in-council was issued on 11 November 1825 directing that all governors of the colonies should from time to time appoint the

73Report cof the Public Archives, 1923,(Ottawa, 1924), p.44. This is surprising, for that part of the ordinance which declared that prisoners would suffer death if returned, was clearly illegal. The act 4 & 5 William IV, c.67 specifically declared that transportation for life should replace death as the punishment for this crime. This act was passed to amend 5 Geo. 4. c.84, which had called for the death penalty for prisoners who should be at large within any part of His Majesty's dominions before the termination of sentence.

74BM, Add. MSS 56559, f.179. 75 The Examiner, 9 August, 1838; Hansard, 13 August, 1838, S3, XLIV, col. 1162;

Russell to Queen Victoria, 15 August, 1838, RA. A 6/41.

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places to which convicted offenders should be transported, and that, accordingly, Lord Gosford had issued a proclamation on 7 Oc- tober 1835, appointing such convicts to be sent to New South Wales and Van Dieman's Land via England. The Provincial Legislative Act 6 William IV c.1, continued by the ordinance of I Victoria c. 8, provided for this enactment, and he further referred to Lord Aber- deen's despatch of 2 March 1 835 which directed that transported prisoners could be sent to Bermuda, where hulks were kept for the reception of convicts.76

Durham appears to have been let down badly, for he had been instructed to transport the convicts, and had substantial legal authority. His recitation of this authority came much too late to be of any use to him, and it appears that the main consideration of the Whigs was to dispose with the whole proceeding as quickly as possible. In fact, there was some support for defending Durham. On the morning of August 9, the day the cabinet met to decide the fate of the ordinance, Howick suggested that the cabinet should oppose Brougham's bill, and defend Durham's policy by bringing in a bill authorizing the government to detain the prisoners in Bermuda. Melbourne, Rice, and Glenelg agreed that this plan was preferable, but Melbourne refused to commit himself before seeing Russell.77 He told the Queen that though Durham's conduct was "rash & in- discreet," to censure him would cause either his resignation or weaken his authority. But following a discussion with Lord John, he told her that disallowance of the ordinance was "absolutely necessary," disagreeable as it might be.78 Russell had told him that he was opposed to Howick's plan chiefly from a dread of fresh debates in the House of Commons which was so "utterly exhausted by the labours of this protracted session," and he was later to remark to Normanby that "I long for Thursday, when I hope this troublesome session will close."79 The cabinet was informed, as a result, that there was no choice but to disallow the whole of the ordinance and to agree to the indemnity clause in Brougham's bill.80

If the session proved troublesome for the government, Durham was even more so. Relations between the two were far from cordial,

76Durham to Glenelg, (despatch number 67) 28 September, 1838, B.P.P., III: 185. 77Howick to Grey, 10 August, 1838, Howick Journal, 9 August, 1838, Grey

Papers. 78Melbourne to Victoria, (two letters) 10 August, 1838, RA, CAI/182, 183. 79Howick Journal, 9 August, 1838; Hansard, 14 August, 1838, S3, XLIV, col.

1211; Russell to Normanby, 14 August, 1838, MCA, M/919. 80Broughton Diary, 10 August, 1838, BM, Add. MSS 56560, fl.


and misunderstanding and ill-feeling were generated especially over the Turton affair. Thomas Turton, a friend of Durham's from their Eton schooldays, was being considered as a legal advisor to Durham in Canda,81 but a sordid divorce case had ruined his reputation, and (not being a member of the aristocracy) he was viewed with suspicion by the cabinet which decided without hesitation that his past made him unacceptable. Melbourne persuaded Durham not to appoint him to an official position,82 and was left with the impression that Turton would go out only as a private friend (although Durham apparently thought that he could appoint him to some capacity once they arrived in Canada).83 Many Whigs were astounded that Durham should persist in taking Tur- ton,84 and Melbourne, who did not trust Durham to stick to his arrangement, reiterated the cabinet's decision following his departure.85 To the government's dismay, word arrived by way of the Quebec Gazette that Turton was appointed Secretary to the Gover- nor and a member of the executive council immediately on his arrival, and Melbourne informed Durham that the appointment would have to be revoked. The cabinet agreed that the Prime Minister, who had stated publicly that Turton would not be appointed, was put in an embarrasing position, and that Durham should reverse his decision.86 But an irate Durham had written a very caustic letter in the meantime, which arrived shortly after this discussion. He explained that he had appointed Turton before receiving Melbourne's earlier letter of May 4, and "cannot recede

81Durham claimed that E. J. Stanley and Hobhouse had suggested Turton's name, although there is no doubt that Durham wanted to do something for his old friend. See Durham to Melbourne, n.d., RA, MP 4/28, where he says: "it was at Stanley's suggestion that I offered the appointment to Turton." Hobhouse wrote in his journal of 2 April, 1838: "I have recommended Ld. D. to offer Turton the place." BM, Add. MSS 56559, f.70. See too, Durham to Ellice, 9 August, 1838, NLS, Ellice Papers, box 30, f. 57; Spring Rice to Howick, 25 September, 1838, Grey Papers.

82Ellice to Melbourne, April 1838, RA, MP 5/9; Durham to Melbourne, n.d. [April 1839], RA, MP 4/28; Melbourne to Victoria, 11 April, 1838, RA, Al 1/124.

83New, Durham, p. 372. 84"How preposterous of Durham to take such a man out," Morpeth wrote to

Mulgrave. 28 April, 1838, MCA, M/586. 85Melbourne to Durham, 4 May, 1838, RA, MP 4/32. Melbourne later told

Russell that he thought Durham intended "by schemes" to employ Turton. 9 Sep- tember, 1838, Broadlands Papers, MEL/RU/519.

86Melbourne to Durham, 29 June, 1838, Lambton Papers, xxii-7; Hansard, 30 April, 1838, S3, XLII, col.673; Hobhouse Diary, 2 and 3 July, 1838, BM, Add. MSS 56559, ff.148-9; Melbourne to Russell, 1 July, 1838, Broadlands Papers, MEL/RU/510; RA, Queen Victoria's Journal, 2 July, 1838; Russell to Melbourne, 9 July, 1838, PRO 30/22/3B, f.195.

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from it." He complained, with as much justification as impudence, Lhat Sir George Murray (former colonial secretary) and Lords Anglesey and Holland (Whig cabinet members) were all convicted of adultery; "really, if it was not very inconvenient, all this would be very ludicrous..., this petty miserable excuse." Durham's fear, as it was to be with the disallowance of the ordinance, was that his authority would be weakened. "They [the Canadians] believe...in my having support from home," he wrote; "See you to that...don't in- terfere with me whilst I am at work-after it is done impeach me if you will."87 That, in effect, was what was to happen. Durham's folly seemed dangerous to the government, and Melbourne warned him sternly that if he left Turton in office, he would have to be prepared for any motion in parliament.88

Insofar as the exigencies of party politics affected the Whigs un- willingness to support Durham it is doubtful that New's assumption can be supported-that the cabinet feared massive Radical opposition to Durham which might have brought the government down.89 It is arguable, moreover, that it was the actions of the Tories which influenced the decision rather than the Radicals.

The relationship between the ministers and Radicals had reached the stage in the summer of 1838 where the government did not consider a revolt of its Radical supporters a real possibility, and, had little cause to do so. Despite ministerial doubts about its position in the Commons, it became apparent soon after the opening of the session in January that the government was secure on the Canadian question: the extreme Radicals were split over the issue, and the Tories were not willing to overthrow the ministry on it, or on any other question which required radical support to do so.

The Radical leader Hume hoped to rally strong opposition to the "scandalous" Canada bill, but at a rally held at the Crown and Anchor Tavern on January 4, Radical disunity pointed out the futility of this course. Francis Place remarked on the "imbecility, want of arrangement, and pitiful fear pervading those who had got up the meeting"90 and only six Radicals supported Hume in

87Durham to Melbourne, 16 June, 1838, RA, MP 4/33. Melbourne told Victoria that mention of the other acts of adultery "was only making the matter worse." RA, Queen Victoria's Journal, 2 September, 1838.

88Melbourne to Durham, (copies) 17 and 18 July, 1838, RA, MP 4/39 and 4/42. 89New, Durhan, P. 433. 9OHume to Place, I January, 1838, BM, Add. MSS 35151, f.48; Place to Samuel

Harrison (copy), 14 January, 1838, BM, Add. MSS 35151, f.63; Place, memorandum, BM, Add. MSS 35151, f.50.


resisting the introduction of the bill in the Commons on January17. It was evident from their conduct that most of the Radicals supported the view of The Examiner's Fonblanque, who charged that "those who justify revolt in Canada to obtain justice, would, by let- ting in the Tories, deprive Ireland of the justice she enjoys under her existing government...[and] mar the cause of reform at home."9' Place could complain that had a Tory government proceeded as the Whigs had, the whole nation would have risen up against it,92 but it is doubtful that Canada was a popular enough issue in England to warrant this belief. Most Radicals attached more importance to the Whig government than to Canada; many assumed, like John Stuart Mill, that "the dictatorship...of which Lord Durham is the immediate depository, admits of justi- ification."93

Again, when the government feared in March, 1838 that a Radical motion censuring Glenelg would reduce the parliamentary majority to three, a meeting of all government supporters at the Foreign Office proved to be surprisingly tame.94 Melbourne was for "standing his ground" even with a majority of one, and when Russell asked Molesworth to withdraw his motion to make way for one by the Tory Lord Sandon censuring the government's handling of the Canadian affair, Molesworth had little choice but to consent.95 The Radical Warburton had publicly accused Molesworth of playing "nothing more nor less than party politics," and as the moderate Radical E. Lytton Bulwer told Mulgrave, the Tory motion was an admission by Peel that he would not accept an alliance with reformers. Not one Radical supported Sandon, and the extremists' "power of mischief," as Bulwer pointed out, was ",not as great as they supposed...& damp their ardour for a coup de main. "96

91The Examiner, 14 January, 1838. 92Place to E. Baines, Jr., 4 January, 1838, BM, Add. MSS 35151, f.57. 93"Lord Durham and the Canadians," London and Westminster Review, XXVIII,

(January 1838): 529. 94EIlice to Grey, 21 February, 1838, Grey Papers; Melbourne to Ellice, 27

February, 1838, NLS, Ellice Papers, box E28, f.62; Howick Journal, 3 March, 1838, Grey Papers; RA, Queen Victoria's Journal, 5 March, 1838; Morpeth to Mulgrave, 5 March, 1838, MCA M/583.

95Broughton, Recollections, 3 March, 1838, V: 122; RA, Queen Victoria's Journal, 8 March, 1838.

96Hansard, 7 March, 1838, s3 XLI, col. 582; Bulwer to Mulgrave, 11 March, 1838, MCA 0/77. Twice earlier in the session, the Tories saved the government from defeat at the hands of its own supporters-on December 4 and 7, 1837, on motions dealing with municipal corporations and Irish election petitions. Following Sandon's motion,

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There is little reason therefore to suppose that the Whigs needed to give in to the Radicals in August when Brougham levied his attack on Durham's ordinance, or that the Radicals in general supported him. New asserted that "The Ministers had probably known for some days that Brougham had planned his attack in conference with Roebuck, Leader, and other prominent Radicals in the Com- mons to defeat the Government,"97 but there is little evidence to support this interpretation. As late as July 8, Roebuck advised Brougham not to follow the Tory Lord Ellenborough's lead in attacking Durham's conduct, arguing that everything done by Durham was "wise, prudent & humane," and that Ellenborough and other ultra-Tories opposed Durham because of his dismissal of Sir John Colborne's executive council.98 It is true that Roebuck changed his attitude to Durham following the news of Turton's appointment and the ordinance of June 28,99 but there was little time to mount support from an unwilling Radical group in the Com- mons. The Radical press was generally hostile to Brougham, and appeared surprised at what opposition to Durham existed.100 Leader was the one Radical who spoke out against the Governor in the Commons' debates; the only other Radical who spoke was Grote, who opposed Brougham's bill, arguing that it would weaken the government's authority in Canada.'0'

The Whigs shared Roebuck's belief that the ultra-Tories were behind the sudden support for Brougham. Russell regarded the success of the bill the result of a "cabal" of Tories,102 and if there was any reason for the ultra-Tory actions, apart from Durham's reduc- tion of the executive council's powers, it was their opposition to the Whigs' Irish policies. Both the Irish tithe and municipal cor-

they did so twice more-on Villier's corn law motion on March 15, and on a motion to abolish negro apprenticeship in the colonies on March 30. Furthermore, Wellington declared in the Lords that he did not want to see a change in the government over the Canda question. See Holland Diary, January 1838, BM, Add. MSS 51872, ff.1069-70; RA, Queen Victoria's Journal, 16 January, 1838. The Tory attitude of refusing Radical support was again shown in May, 1839, when Peel refused to replace Melbourne's ministry during the Bedchamber crisis.

97New, Durham, p. 433. 98Roebuck to Brougham, 8 July, 1838, Brougham Papers 13521. See Hansard, 3

and 5 July, 1838, S3, XLII, cols, 1222 and 1260 for Ellenborough's attacks on Durham's policies.

99Roebuck to Brougham, 10 and 23 July, 1838, Brougham Papers 13522/3. 'OOSee The Sun, 9 and 12 August, 1838 and The Examiner, 12 and 19 August, 1838,

for examples of Radical support for Durham. 'O'Hansard, 14 August, 1838, S3, XLIV, col. 1242; 15 August, 1838, S3, XLIV,

col. 1307. 102Russell to Melbourne, 6 September, 1838, Broadlands Papers, MEL/RU/56.


porations bills had yet to pass the Lords, and though the Tory amendments to the corporation measure made its progress doubtful, it was thought that a compromise reached with Peel over the terms of the tithe act assured it a safe passage through the Lords.103 But during the same week that the Durham affair blew up, the Whigs worried that the ultra-Tories were bent on embarrassing the government by "wrecking-amendments" to the tithe bill. When Wellington voted for Brougham's motion censuring Durham on the 9th, Melbourne was convinced that the ultras had forced this on him, for he had learned that the Duke had stated in the morning that he would oppose it.104 This caused the government to consider their tithe bill in danger on the very day when the decision to disallow the ordinance had to be taken; Melbourne told the Queen later on the 10th that though the government had been worried about the tithe bill, it would now pass, because the government "had given way" on Brougham's Bill.105

There remains one further question to be considered. In view of the fact that Durham's recommendation of "responsible government" for Canada was rejected by the Whigs, it might be wondered if the government anticipated a "democratic" document and decided to pull the rug from under Durham's mission in order to discredit him, and by association, his eventual report. The evidence available, circumstantial as it is, renders this conclusion doubtful. None of the ministers' letters or journals makes reference to the report-making function of the mission, although, it must be owned, despatches from Canada had not yet reflected his thinking on the constitutional problems.'06 But it seems clear that the government did not want its envoy to return home. Melbourne objected to disallowing the ordinance because it might cause Durham to

I03Peel agreed to support the Irish poor law bill and the tithe bill when ap- propriation was dropped from the latter. Hansard, 27 March, 1838, S3 XLI, cols. 1313-9. See also A. Macintyre, The Liberator (New York, 1965), pp. 196-7.

'04Cooper in Radical Jack, p. 257, argues without evidence that Wellington's sudden switch was the result of Melbourne's vindictive and personal speech attacking the Tories for supporting Brougham.

105RA, Queen Victoria's Journal, 10 and 11 August, 1838. 106Durham's despatch of August 9 was the first which outlines his position on the

Canadian problem, and reflected his view that the problem was racial rather than constitutional. The Queen recorded that "M. thought it a good despatch & very able." Russell wrote to Melbourne that "what Durham says agrees with what I wrote to you yesterday." Durham to Glenelg, (despatch number 36) 9 August 1838, B.P.P., III: 152; RA, Queen Victoria's Journal, 2 September, 1838; Russell to Melbourne, 3 September, 1838, PRO 30/22/2B, f.271.

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return,107 thereby hazarding "the whole mission and with it Canada & everything else," and he did not welcome the prospect of having to fill the post.'08 It was almost a month following the disallowance that private discussion took place on a successor, should one be necessary, and Russell, in fact, expected that Durham would stay in Canada until the spring. '09 Furthermore, it had never been understood that Durham's plan would be translated directly into legislation. When news of his resignation reached London in Oc- tober, it was agreed that he should be pressed to reconsider, but, Melbourne told Russell, "our requesting him to remain would [not] pledge us to adopt his plan, unless we approved of it."1I? This was made clear in December, when the Prime Minister stated that he thought Durham would "put the Government in possession of his views, and then when they bring forward their measures state his own opinions upon them. I doubt whether he means to pledge himself to bring forward measures."'11I

In the end, it was the Whigs' dislike for Durham that made them unwilling to defend his actions when, at that late date in the session, passage of long-standing Irish legislation was considered to be more critical. In addition, a great deal of the parliamentary debate dealt with the powers conferred on the Governor by the government, and the Whigs were in no mood at this point in the session to defend their own legislation. To a certain extent, the administration was being attacked as much as its servant, for it had provided him with a next to absolute power which was difficult for a "reforming" party to justify; Holland noted than even "a less irritable man than Durham..., a less rash presumptious or conceited one" could not have issued such an ordinance "with circumstances so difficult not to say impossible to defend or approve.""12 His view accurately reflected the low esteem in which Durham was held. At a cabinet on August 16, Melbourne gave a most unfavourable opinion, saying he

'07Hansard, 9 August, 1838, S3, XLIV, col. 1092; Melbourne to Victoria, 9 August, 1838, RA Al/181; RA, Queen Victoria's Journal, 11 August, 1838.

'08Melbourne to Russell, 4 July, 1838, Broadlands Papers MEL/RU/5 12; Melbourne to Russell, 31 August, 1838, RA, MP 12/65.

'09Russell to Melbourne, 2 and 6 September, 1838, Broadlands Papers, MEL/RU/54 and 56.

"?Melbourne to Russell, 21 October, 1838, RA, MP 13/84. See too Russell to Melbourne, 22 October, 1838, PRO 30/22/2B, f.320 and Ellice to Melbourne, 25 Oc- tober, 1838, RA, MP 5/13 for references to keeping Durham in Canada.

"'Melbourne to Russell, 11 December, 1838, RA, MP 13/110. "2Holland Diary, 1838, BM, Add. MSS 51872, f. 1078. Holland crossed out the

words "presumptuous or conceited" in a second draft.


"had no truck in him," and Hobhouse, in recording that he did not think "so ill of him as M. does," nevertheless wrote the "Durham is an unscrupulous selfish man that is certain."'13 Although none of the ministers argued that the ordinances provided grounds for this belief, they looked to his past conduct. For if anything appeared to them to be consistent throughout his career, it was his vanity and recklessness.

Furthermore it was the manner in which he acted independently of the home government that offended the cabinet. Mulgrave was particularly annoyed at Durham's pretending to be a Lord Lieutenant,"14 and there was a general feeling in the ministry that his pomposity was the root of much opposition to him. Love of grandeur and importance was apparently not satisifed with the earldom granted in 1833."l5 Melbourne thought that the ex- travagance attending his Canadian departure was "the foolishest thing possible," and although the cabinet defended him when the Tories moved to restrict the expense of the mission, it was obviously alarmed when the government squeaked by with a two-vote margin." 6 "It is all his own fault," Russell told the Queen, "he has gone to such expense, and has made such an amazing fuss and show about everything; people going to see his harness in this place and his carriage in another." 17 This impression resulted in the cabinet's belief that Durham meant to act independently, whether or not that in fact was the case. Perhaps Durham did have an honest misunderstanding about his freedom to appoint Turton once he arrived in Canada (Russell thought he did), and it is clear that Glenelg authorized him to transport the convicts. But the fact was that most of his colleagues were unprepared to defend questionable actions by one who had "from the time he was appointed till he went," according to Ebrington, a Whig who knew the temper of the House

H3Broughton Diary, 16 August, 1838. BM, Add. MSS 56560, f. 6. 14RA, Queen Victoria's Journal, 10 April, 1838. 1 '5Durham was bitterly disappointed when not invested with the Order of the Bath

during his mission to St. Petersburg, being convinced that failure to have the red riband exposed him to severe ridicule. Durham to Duncannon, 13 November, 1835, RA, MP 4117.

116170-168. Hansard, 3 April, 1838, S3, CLII, col. 385. The majority was low apparently because people were suprised that a division was called. RA, Queen Vic- toria's Journal, 4 April, 1838. Papineau wrote to Roebuck on 25 October, 1838 that "Votre radical Durham a ete un insolent satrape inaccessible au public...Des in- vitations a diner etaient nombreuses pour y deployer un luxe qui l'a rendu ridicule." Brougham Papers, 21445.

"7RA, Queen Victoria's Journal, 10 April, 1838.

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better than most, "done everything to make himself unpopular."' 18

Vain, quarrelsome, and above all independent, Radical Jack had sown the seeds of his own destruction, and brought to an end a career which never attained the greatness that it promised. Le Jour Viendra, the Durham family motto, was not to come for the first Earl.

118RA, Queen Victoria's Journal, 30 April, 1838.

Reports of Proceedings

Rocky Mountain Conference on British Studies

October 8-9, 1976 Salt Lake City, Utah

Calling Out the Troops: The Military, the Law, and Public Order in England, 1650-1850 Stanley H. Palmer, University of Texas, Arlington

Longstanding fear of a powerful police combined with the unre- liability of the militia to make the regular army the most important institution for the maintenance of public order. From 1717, general policies emerged for the employment of troops; bread riots in 1766 and the Wilkes riots in 1768 produced legal formulations establishing the right of military intervention. But the building of inland permanent barracks was not significant until the challenge of working class radicalism after Waterloo. In no way was the nation a "police state," for the legal powers and liabilities of those in authority were deliberately kept vague. Using force too soon or too late, too little or too much-each was grounds for prosecution, as a London magistrate and Lord Mayor discovered. Soldiers were ac- countable to both military and civil law. These legal ambiguities, together with the orderliness and absence of personal violence characteristic of English crowds, produced curiously restrained disturbances. It is remarkable, given the frequency of disorders, how few lives were lost on both sides.

Franklin's "Examination" Before the House of Commons: A Case Study of Dialectical Exchange G. Jack Gravlee, Colorado State University James R. Irvine, Colorado State University

Benjamin Franklin's Examination (1766) is a unique journalistic- historical-rhetorical document of the pre-revolutionary era. Evidence suggests that the transcript was first sent to America with all London editions subsequently taken from one of the American editions. Franklin remained ambivalent about the authenticity and the source of the different published texts, and the elements of occasion and setting evolved over a period of time following the

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fruition of many months of personal diplomacy. Franklin's Examination was analyzed as an orgaanic species of communication produced by the orchestration of: Specificity, Consistency, Unity, and Polarity.

Jurisprudence and History: The Case of Sir Thomas Egerton Louis A. Knafla, University of Calgary

The study of English jurisprudence has been largely in the hands of Continental writers schooled in the civil law, or English writers lacking an adequate understanding of the common law, and the results have been sparse, superficial, or misleading. This paper makes an exploration into the common law mind of Sir Thomas Egerton. Based on the corpus of his writings at Lincoln's Inn in the 1 560s-80s, it conceptualizes what he conceived as the science of the common law, and how he applied it. First, there is an examination of his study of the classics, history, civil law, Continental legal humanism, and the new logic and rhetoric, and how they shaped his study of the common law. Second, there is an explanation of how the scientific historicism which he developed contributed to his writing the first essay on the understanding and interpretation of statutes, an essay whose general rules and ideas became part of the English common law.

Keats's Debt to Maturin Stuart Peterfreund, University of Arkansas, Little Rock

Knowing what we do about Keats's affinities for popular culture, especially that of the Regency stage and that which may be labelled "gothic," it should come as no surprise that Keats either read, saw, or both read and saw Maturin's first two plays, Bertram, or, the Castle of St. Aldobrand, and Manuel, both gothic melodramas of the sort quite popular in their time. Biographical evidence aside, there is evidence in Keat's poetry that he knew the plays, especially as found in the verse epistle "To J.H. Reynolds Esq." and in The Eve of St. Agnes. In the former, the mise en scMne is rather heavily depen- dent upon that of Bertram I.i; in the latter, Keats's Beadsman would seem to be drawn from both Bertram and Manuel. The names of such gothic "types" as Cuthbert de Saint Aldebrim in the "Epistle" and "dwarfish Hildebrand" in The Eve likewise seem to be drawn from a reading of Maturin. All in all, Keats's use of Maturin once

Reports of Proceedings 377

again reminds us of his ability to turn the stuff of popular culture into high art.

Phenomenology and the Thought of Colin Wilson Michael S. Anderson, California State University, Los Angeles

Wilson has developed key phenomenological concepts of Edmund Husserl and applied them to his particular interest which is the philosophical solution to existential meaninglessness. The paper ex- plains Husserl's thesis of the natural standpoint and the concept of intentionality. It is then shown how Wilson transfers the thesis of the natural standpoint to ordinary consciousness and introduces the concept of relationality to co-ordinate with intentionality. Rela- tionality is the means by which higher meanings are apprehended in the universe and establishes Wilson's thought as a metaphysical realism. The use that Wilson makes of phenomenology is then shown in an examination of two of his novels, The Philosopher's Stone and The Mind Parasites. Wilson's phenomenological approach to existential meaninglessness is evidenced in these works through the fictional adaptation of the concepts developed from the thought of Husserl.

Teaching Victorianism in the American West Howard Leichman and Henry Weisser, Colorado State University, Ft. Collins

This paper assesses the problems and results of an experimental course taught by one historian and three professors of English at Colorado State University entitled "Victorianism in the American West." The peculiar features of the history curriculum at CSU and something of the backgrounds and biases of the instructors are touched upon. The passing of the American Western heritage is lamented, albeit slightly. Some of the difficulties of conveying knowledge of British Victorians and of Victorian prose and poetry to CSU students are touched upon. The very heavy borrowing from British Victorian culture by American Westerners was a noteworthy revelation from this course. Special features of it-a journal kept by students, field trips and visits of local historians are described, with particular emphasis upon mechanics and examples from students' journals.

Tragedy and the Common Shepherd Douglas J. McReynolds, University of Denver

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Wordsworth's Michael, labeled a "Pastoral" by its author and usually read either as such or as an elegiac meditation, is in fact an early and technically expert example of what Arthur Miller would define 150 years later as "Modern Tragedy." The old shepherd's catastrophe is precipitated by his naively Manichaean view of the world: he attempts to stave off evil by accommodating it, and his dreams both for his son and for his land are consequently destroyed.

The Tudor Revolution in Government and Reform of the Royal Household Robert C. Braddock, Saginaw Valley State College

Thomas Cromwell's reform of the Royal Household culminated the "administrative revolution" described by Professor Elton. Yet despite the heated debate on Elton's thesis, his views on this final aspect of Cromwell's work have gone unchallenged. This paper points out that Cromwell's reforms were not as innovative as Elton supposed and casts doubt on reliance upon the new rules as proof of a change in the work habits of the King's servants. It describes, however, an aspect of Cromwell's plan that Elton had not detected: a scheme to streamline the staffing of the "household below stairs." Begun in 1538 and continuing through Cromwell's fall, a number of senior officials were given pensions and their positions left vacant or consolidated with other departments and the work given to subordinate officials. These reforms remained in effect until the death of the king when they were hastily scrapped. Braddock concludes that Henry VIII was an active participant in the struggle against bureaucratic inertia.

The Year of the Convention Parliament: The Use of Treason and the Emergence of Moderation James R. Phifer, Wayne State University

The use of treason as a political weapon declined markedly after 1689. Why this was so has never been adequately discussed; rather, historians have simply assumed that such dark practices necessarily ended with the Stuart kings. In fact, many Whigs after the Revo- lution fully expected to revenge themselves upon the Tories through a wave of treason trials. But, to their dismay, they found that they lacked the necessary strength in Parliament, or in the country at


large, either to label the entire Tory party as traitorous or to hang individual Tories. More importantly, revenge-minded Whigs found a new attitude developing in 1689: moderation. Its growth was encouraged by William III and by England's awareness of the emergency of the situation; but the real source of the new attitude was the realization by both parties, gained by remembering the trials of the 1680's, that treason was too dangerous to employ.

National Conference on British Studies November 6, 1976

New York University

Architectural Evidence of Social Revolution in Modern Ireland Henry Glassie, University of Pennsylvania

To be theoretically adequate, history must be founded on the direct expressions of a wide variety of people. Since few have left written records, the historian is obligated to attend to nonliterary remains, such as architecture. A study of Virginia housing revealed only one major cultural revolution between 1700 and 1920. The material evidence of this revolution, which took place in the middle of the eighteenth century, suggested that during it people became abruptly desirous of an increase in privacy and order. The theory that this desire was the simultaneously fearful and optimistic response to the chaotic conditions preceeding the Revolutionary war was tested by examining the architecture of the Irish border country, where comparable curcumstances should have produced comparable results. Formally, the results were surprising. Functionally, the hypothesis was confirmed. Between 1900 and 1920, Irish domestic architecture under went the same changes that Virginia's did in 1750 to 1770. In both instances the process of alienating, liberating modernization was escalated by actual social withdrawal accompained by an ab- stracted gesture to order: authentic order was replaced by con- ceptual order.

Creating a North Atlantic System: A Geographic Perspective D.W. Meinig, Syracuse University

The spatial perspective of geography is a natural complement to

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history and offers a useful way of viewing certain topics. From an attempt to consider the European colonization of America as a vast "'geographic process" three topics are selected to illustrate such possibilities: 1. Southwest Iberia and the English Channel region as

source regions, or "culture hearths"; how these can be identified, interrelated, and compared.

2. TransAtlantic enterprise as a system of "spatial in- teraction" and a generalized process which changed the human geography on both sides through a sequence of stages; ways of studying these alterations in the economic and social geography of Britain.

3. The translation of European social fragments into coherent American social regions, with emphasis upon the problem of identifying relevant groups.

The development of a more theoretical spatial approach has had a stimulating impact on geography and its application to appropriate topics in history, and especially the concept of "spatial system," should yield useful insights.

Learning the Rules of the Game: The Crisis of the Mid-Victorian Working Class Richard Price, Northern Illinois University

This paper examined the process by which masters and men in the building trades 'learnt' how to collectively bargain; and it argued that the critical turning point in this process can be found in the late sixties and early seventies. That period marked the culmination of a twenty year growth in the workplace power of the workers and the consequent loss of authority of masters over their workforces. By the late 1860s an employer's counter-attack was launched which resulted in the defeat of the men and in the erection of new structure of industrial relations. This new structure was economist in purpose and disciplinary in inspiration but it resulted in the legitimisation of unions and collective bargaining. It was further argued that the meaning of "learning the rules of the game" is to be understood in relation to the structures of the official labour movement and its collective behaviour, and does not necessarily describe changes of attitudes amongst the rank and file.


The Origins of the British Labour Party: Some Interpretive Problems Barbara C. Malament, Queens College, CUNY

Most accounts of the Labour Party reflect the influence of Sidney and Beatrice Webb whose interpretive structure as presented in The History of Trade Unionism cannot incorporate recent findings based on new approaches to labour history. The entire structure, involving as it does the rigid periodization of the 19th century in terms of industrial organization and tactics, politics, and ideology, has quite broken down. On close examination, it was never very strong. It was an ideological explanation of the origins of the party, an explanation resting on at least three doubtful assumptions: 1) that ideological harmony implies social and political deference or conversely, that the absence of deference, namely class-consciousness, must be expressed in a separate ideology; 2) that the formation of a separate party was ancillary or functional to the prior adoption of a separate ideology, not the reverse as suggested by Samuel Beer; 3) that the separate ideology, socialism, was in fact separate from and antithetical to liberalism. Such assumptions do not appear to be valid. They do not explain why spokesmen for labour demanded direct representation in Parliament before the socialist revival, a demand that bespoke a non-ideological form of class-consciousness to which the origins of the Labour Party ought properly to be traced.

The Search for the New Jerusalem: Richard Carlile and Working-Class Politics Joel H. Wiener, City College of New York

Richard Carlile, the early nineteenth century working-class reformer, led a movement of the disaffected poor whose occupational and geographical diversity was very considerable. Carlile's thought was contradictory-"infidelity," republicanism, political economy, birth control and phrenology were among his chief en- thusiasms-but this reflected the heterogeneity of his followers. It is misleading to characterize Carlile and his supporters as either moderate or extreme; the line separating "moral example" and a revolutionary call to arms was often indistinct. A too rigorous class analysis is also unhelpful in analysing his movement. Artisans and

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"mechanics" were drawn to him almost equally since he was per- ceived primarily as a spokesman for the oppressed and the poor. In a general sense he stimulated feelings of plebeian solidarity.

Two perceptions of reform characterized Carlile's movement: a deeprooted desire for political change; and a sustaining ethos of selfhelp. Once again, the line between the two is often blurred though Carlile indirectly stimulated the latter by emphasizing materialism at the expense of Painite deism. When he subsequently advocated an allegorical rationalism framed in Christian imagery (his own unifying "New Jerusalem") he alienated all of his supporters. Thus Carlile forfeited the opportunity to lead a unified working-class movement and to affect more directly the course of nineteenth century history.

Southern Conference on British Studies November 11-13, 1976

Atlanta, Georgia

A Comment on Women's Education in Elizabethan England Diane Willen, Georgia State University

Motivated by religious piety, encouraged by the arguments of humanists, benefiting from the example of their Queen, aristocratic women partook of the Elizabethan educational revolution. Several historians have dealt with this theme no doubt because the evidence on this score is quite visible. (Sources include library acquisitions, publications catering to women readers, and publications by women themselves.) But what was happening outside aristocratic and gentry families? Professor Anglin, by emphasing new directions in the history of education, particularly activity outside traditional gram- mar schools, already points to areas important for women's education: a flexible network of petty schools, informal education within the family, and technical or industrial training through ap- prenticeships. This paper discusses parish and borough sources relevant for the education of women in all social classes.

Henry Morton Stanley: The Explorer as Journalist James A. Casada, Winthrop College

This paper examines the career of Stanley, whose posthumous fame

Reports of Proceedings 3 83

is predicated primarily on his exploits as an explorer, from the perspective of his efforts as a reporter. It contends that journalism was both a key motivational force and in many ways Stanley's metier throughout his active African years. The difficult circumstances Stanley encountered in his youth produced a tenacity and singleness of purpose rivalled by few explorers or reporters, and his career indicates that his journalist's instincts and enterprise nicely comple- mented his efforts as a discoverer. Indeed, all of his African en- deavors combined what normally might be regarded as two distinct vocations, and in any overall evaluation of the compass of Stanley's life it must be recognized that he was, first and foremost, a journalist. Based on a variety of manuscript materials and printed sources.

Mid-Victorian Anti-Catholicism: A Reappraisal Walter L. Arnstein, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Mid-Victorian anti-Catholicism is usually regarded as a faint echo of the religious controversies of earlier centuries, and evangelical Protestantism is usually seen as the active, Roman Catholicism as the passive force. This paper suggests that it is more appropriate to view the subject in terms of Protestant-Catholic rivalry and in terms of nineteenth-century developments. The fears of mid-Victorian Protestants were aroused by the social distinction of English Ca- tholic converts and the sheer number of Irish immigrants. Those fears were enhanced by the militant rhetoric and educational policies of Cardinals Wiseman and Manning, the solidification of Catholic power in Cardinal Cullen's Ireland, and the specter of reaction evoked by a world-wide Catholic Church headed by Pope Pius IX.

Politicians, Historians, and the War: A Reassessment of the Political Crisis of December 1916 John D. Fair, Auburn University, Montgomery, Alabama

Lord Beaverbrook in his Politicians and the War and his biographer, A.J.P. Taylor, contend that the fall of Asquith and the elevation of Lloyd George to the premiership was accomplished by a conspiracy which Beaverbrook engineered in the upper echelons of the (Government and the press. The effect of these machinations was enhanced by the perfidious conduct of Lord Curzon who allegedly

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forsook his professed allegiance to the Prime Minister and his Con- servative breathren. A fresh examination of the subject reveals that Beaverbrook's evidence, particularly in those portions of his account where he was not a direct participant, was either specious or nonexistent. Asquith was dislodged from power not so much by his own errors or by the singular defection of Curzon, but by the pur- suance of a course of cautious opportunism by the entire Con- servative leadership for the purpose of gaining control of the Government.

Whiggery and the Conditions of Liberty in Early Nineteenth-Century England Abraham D. Kriegel, Memphis State University

Aristocratic Whigs conceived of themselves as the party of liberty. Their conception of liberty was associated with the inviolability of property and with a pre-industrial, corporate and hierarchical conception of society. Equated with limited government and opposition to arbitrary power, liberty required the ascendancy of an aristocracy, possessed of the quality of honor, to resist despotic temptation. Industrialization, however, produced conditions which compelled aristocratic Whigs to choose between these hitherto com- plementary principles. An examination of politics, particularly in the 1830's, reveals that the Whig devotion to liberty was invariably sacrificed when it conflicted with principles of the inviolability of property or the perpetuation of a conception of society as hierar- chically structured. Whig liberty signified the liberation of individuals within a hierarchical society, not the reconstruction of society. Moreover, it required the perpetuation of social inequality.

Presentations of Recent Doctoral Research Conference on British Studies

American Historical Association December 28, 1976 Washington, D.C.

The Development and Impact of Right-Wing Politics in Great Britain, 1903.32 Barbara L. Farr, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle

Right-wing politics was a dynamic anti-socialist political


phenomenon. Unlike conservatism, which emphasized stability and tradition, and reaction, which opposed progress and change, twen- tieth century right-wing politics was a positive force aimed at industrial harmony, social order and economic progress. New voluntary associations, representing the political right, directed their activities towards affecting governmental decisions and influencing public opinion. These organizations comprised a movement which proposed various solutions, such as Tariff Reform, non-partisan politics, Industrial Politics, fascism and corporatism, for Britain's economic ills and social conflicts. The movement's impact was visible in the sharpening of anti-socialist behavior in the 1920's, the development of class-oriented politics, the passage of pro-business, conservative legislation and the political domination of a "Na- tional" Government in the 1930's. Finally, the voluntary association established itself as a tool for the control of parliamentary affairs.

The Economic and Social Impact of the Clothing Industry on the Immigrant Community in the East End of London, 1875- 1914 Robert S. Wechsler, Brooklyn College

This study concerns the growth of the garment trade in East London and its economic and social interrelationships with the immigrant Jewish workforce in the period 1875-1914. It includes an analysis of the industry on all levels of production from the wholesale clothier and large-scale retailer down to the laborer in the work- shop and at home. The labor force is examined in terms of the im- migration of East European Jews after 1880. As work influences life, the thesis deals with both the industrial and social problems of these immigrants such as housing and health. There is also a discussion and evaluation of the ameliorative efforts of the public, private, and philanthropic sectors to deal with these problems. The thesis concludes with a major section devoted to trade union activity among Jewish garment workers.

From Ethics to Economics: The Social Thought of Alfred Marshall Gail Benick, City University of New York

There is no better introduction to the social and economic thought

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of the eighteen-nineties than Alfred Marshall's Principles of Economics which first appeared in 1890 and went through four editions by 1900. The book recast the old doctrines of orthodox political economy. It marked the entry of a different tone and vocabulary into the late Victorian social and economic debate. In the nineties Marshall emerged as the most eminent professional economist in England. His large part in establishing the Royal Economic Society and his creation of the Cambridge School of Economics closely identified him with the growing sense of professional consciousness and solidarity among economists. A study of Marshall's social thought reveals that he was one of the main architects of the New Liberalism. He provided the economic justification and the optimistic vision that made possible a new approach to the old "condition of England question."

The Working Classes of Stockport during the Industrial Revolution Robert Glen, University of Wisconsin, Parkside

In discussing English working class formation, E.P. Thompson has focused particularly on conflict situations arising from industrial agitations and political reform movements. The evidence relating to these topics from Stockport (Cheshire) and its district during the years from 1780 to 1832 points to a conclusion which differs from Thompson's. Stockport district trade unions pursued narrow, sec- tional policies and were largely unconcerned with radical politics or with the industrial objectives of trades different from their own. A tiny radical coterie made up of lesser professionals, shopkeepers, and highly skilled artisans was at the center of all local parliamentary reform agitations. Only sporadically did it obtain mass support, and this came chiefly from the largest category of economically distressed workers, the handloom weavers. Finally, from the early 1 820s to the early 1 830s, the main radical leaders split over ideological issues at the same time as their former base of popular support, the handloom weaving trade, practically disappeared in the face of greatly expanded employment of powerlooms. Thus, in contrast to Thompson's conclusion based on national perspectives, the Stockport evidence points to continued (and possibly heightened) fragmentation of workers and workers' movements during the early years of the Industrial Revolution.


(Abstract of paper given at the Pacific Northwest Conference on British Studies at University of Puget Sound, April 1976.)

The Letters of King James I to King Christian IV: 1603-1625. Ronald M. Meldrum, Washington State University

The letters have been preserved and are in the Danish National Library in Copenhagen. Although a calendar of the letters was published in 1885 they have not been translated from the original Latin and published complete in English. The originals are in good condition although some are curled and yellowed from age. The subject matter of the letters is wide-ranging; a great many of them deal with British trading rights in the North Sea and on the continent and also with the problems of Britishers fishing and whaling in territorial waters under the jurisdiction of Christian. One of the familiar subjects associated with James is that of the Gunpowder Plot; James' personal account of it is contained in a lengthy letter of November 11, 1605. The details are generally familiar but there are a few items including the names of supposed conspirators not mentioned in the account of the plot given in The Harleian Miscellany (Volune IV, 1809).

James reveals through the letters aspects of his character not often noticed. In fact, he emerges as a very human and sensitive person, quite appealing. Something of his innate humanity and breadth shines through the letters. He is tactful when occasion demands, firm when he must be but unfailingly compassionate throughout. The reputation which James rightly merits as a litterateur is con- siderably enhanced by these letters. (The letters will be published as microfiche with fascimilies of the originals in the Summer of 1976 by The Harvester Press.)

American Historical Association Conference on British Studies

Joint Session December 29, 1976 Washington, D.C.

The Conscience of the Victorian State Chair: Samuel C. McCulloch, University of California, Irvine

388 Albion

The Whig Conscience Joseph Hanburger, Yale University

The Nonconformist Conscience R. J. Helmstadeter, University of Toronto

The paper dealt with the period from the Parnell scandal in 1890 until the first world war, the period during which "the nonconformist conscience" became a widely used name for nonconformist opinion on public affairs. The organizing question for the paper was why the nonconformist conscience focussed on such old fashioned, puritanical questions of personal behaviour, questions of sex, drink and gambling. The foremost spokesmen for the nonconformist conscience at this time, men like Hugh Price Hughes and John Clifford, were not at all old fashioned in their theology or social thought. These men were much better educated than the great majority of ordinary nonconformists, they were much less provincial, much more in the mainstream of English cultural life, and much less committed to the individualism and suspicion of the state which were associated with Gladstonian liberalism. For these leading spokesmen, the nonconformist conscience was a social conscience. Sex, drink and gambling were issues which bridged the cultural gap between leaders and followers, for they were issues which involved both personal behaviour and organized campaigns for social reform.

The Conservative Conscience Peter Marsh, Syracuse University

Any brief analysis of the outlook of Victorian Conservatives generally would have to homogenize three distinct generations of Conservative politicians with their attendant values: the generations led by Sir Robert Peel, by Disraeli, and by Lord Salisbury. This paper attempted to convey a sharper impression by concentrating on the last of these generations.

Whatever may be said of other Conservatives, Lord Salisbury showed himself to possess a cloistered conscience, sensitive in a quiet way within its own confines, but stiffly opposed to leaping over them. Whatever may be said of other generations of Vic- torians, the last generation, tired and apprehensive but still at root secure, found such a range of sensibilities admirable, though only until the turn of the century.


Commentary Sheldon Rothblatt, University of Califormia, Berkeley

"The Conscience of the Victorian State" raises the question of whether there was a widely-held, unique set of political ideals and ethics in 19th-century England. Marsh and Hanburger, employing the biographical approach, suggest no special correlation between ethics and politics. Marsh's Lord Salisbury is consistent with the received stereotype of the Conservative politician. While honorable, as a politician, Salisbury was cautious, practical, more interested in tactics than in principles, and distrustful of Glad- stonian moral rhethoric. Hanburger chooses Lord Macaulay (a choice that could be disputed) to represent the Whigs. He concludes that Macaulay, like Machiavelli, was anxious to separate morality from politics. Helmstadter's approach is cultural. He seems to doubt that there ever was an influence that could be called a Non- conformist political conscience; but even if there was, by the Ed- wardian period it was greatly attenuated. Nonconformist leaders were absorbed into the Establishment intelligentsia, and Non- conformist morality was reduced to simple social prohibitions.

Two points should be made. The first is that there was historically a culturally-generated, commonly-held "conscience" that can be called mid-Victorian. It was based on the evangelical belief that individuals not classes or parties have moral responsibilities. These were not always well-defined, nor was the belief itself sufficient to deter would-be offenders. But the belief in a conscience meant that statesmen had to consider beforehand the con- sequences of a particular course of action not as a matter of calculation but as a matter of right and wrong. The second point is that the search for an ethical basis for politics was carried on in Victorian England by the new civil service. Nonconformity destroyed the Erastian conception of the unity of Church and State, religion and politics. But it lived on in secular form in the idea of a politically-neutral, service-oriented, professional administrative class.

'TEE IOOSTEAII CAM'1 This Summer.

Fifty students will converge on the Isle of Wight, England, to participate in a unique holiday school, THE 1000 YEAR CAMP. Based in the residence

of one of Britain's finest sailing schools, the participants will explore the history of the Island in a unique way through the making of a dramatic film. A famous Island home, Swainston Manor,

which has over one-thousand years

of history, is the prime location for the filming. The Swainston estate of rolling fields and woodland with a backdrop of the sea is only one of the many places the campers will explore: there is historic Carisbrooke Castle where Charles I was imprisoned as well as Queen Victoria's sumptuous summer residence, Osborne House.

Michael Asti-Rose, the award winning Canadian film maker, will be directing the film project, though all the way it will be the students who are the script- writers, directors and actors.

A great emphasis will be placed on the centre's activities: there will be regular classes of Modern Dance, Sailing, Pottery and other crafts. Local contacts with historic Island families will take place on a regular basis as part of the investigation and "time- travel" in the period 1000 to 2000 A.D

. And at the end of it, participants in THE 1000 YEAR CAMP will have access to the film they have made.

Age range: 16 to 19 / Fees: $790.00 (this includes a seat on a New York-London Charter return as well as all expenses connected with the Camp in Britain). For brochures on the Camp and The Isle of Wight write to: THE 1000 YEAR CAMP, Moyer, 680 Fairmount Avenue, Oakland, CA 94611.

or Dodnor Creek Christian Sailing Centre, Newport, Isle of Wight, P030 5TE.

albion vol. 8, no. 4, winter, 1976

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