agnia baranauskaite grigas 'explaining lithuania's policy on eu accession, 1991-2002

Agnia Baranauskaite, MPhil in International Relations, University of Oxford, 2006.

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

Explaining Lithuania’s Policy on EU Accession,1991-2002

Agnia BaranauskaiteSt. Antony’s College University of Oxford

April 2006

Supervisor: Dr. Alex Pravda

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master ofPhilosophy in International Relations in the Department of Politics and InternationalRelations at the University of Oxford. The work in this thesis is all my own except

where otherwise indicated.

30,033 words

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To my mother

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A number of people have contributed to this thesis. First of all, I am very grateful tomy supervisor, Dr. Alex Pravda, for his many useful comments during the writing ofthis thesis. Also, I would like to thank Dr. Walter Mattli, Dr. Kalypso Nicolaidis andDr. Jan Zielonka for their suggestions and assistance during various stages of thisproject. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge Prof. Bronislovas Kuzmickas, Prof.Vytautas Landsbergis and Prof. Egidijus Vareikis for sharing their insights on theLithuanian accession process.

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Explaining Lithuania’s Policy on EU Accession, 1991-2002

Contents

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..1Literature Review…………………………………………………………..….4Analytical Framework…………………………………………...………...…11Argument and Project …………………………………………………….….17Methods………………………………………………………………...…….22Structure of Study………………………………………………………….....25

Chapter 2: Economic Factors of Lithuania’s EU Policy ……………………..….27The Changing Salience and Nature of Economic Concerns…………………27Rational Utility Considerations………………………………………………30Domestic Politics……………………………………………………………..42Ideational Considerations………………………………………………….....45Conclusions…………………………………………………………………..49

Chapter 3: Political and Security Factors in Lithuania’s EU Policy…………….52The Changing Salience and Nature of Security Concerns…………………...53Hard Security Needs and Concerns………………………………………...57Soft Security Benefits……………………………………………………...62 Political Voice………………………………………………………………..64Domestic Politics……………………………………………………………..66Conclusions…………………………………………………………………..75

Chapter 4: The Relationship between Material and Ideational Motivations in Lithuania’s EU Policy: 1997 to 2000………………………..…….77

Changes in Domestic and External Conditions from 1997 to 2000………….78Economic Factors…………………………………………………………….79Security Factors…………………………………………...………………….84Domestic Factors………………………………………………...…………...89Ideational Factors………………………………………….…………………93Conclusions…………………………………………………………………..97

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..99

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………….109Books and Articles………………………………………………………….109Interviews…………………………………………………………………...111

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Introduction

In little more than a decade after a difficult secession from the Soviet Union,

Lithuania gained membership into the European Union (EU) in May of 2004. The EU

membership was seen domestically and abroad as validation of Lithuania’s success in

establishing a democratic state, transitioning to a market economy and permanently

leaving the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, it was seen as a means to ensure positive

economic, political, and social developments in the future. Yet it was lamented by

some as a giving up of hard-fought sovereignty from the USSR to yet another Union.

At first glance one might reasonably conclude that Lithuania’s bid for membership

was bound to succeed since Lithuania appears to be a textbook example of rational

motivation for integration. Furthermore, Lithuania’s accession story can be told in an

over-determined way given the complementary economic, security, and ideational

motivations for membership. However, Lithuania’s policies towards EU membership

were much more complex. Lithuania's EU accession process was animated at all times

by tension between material and ideational factors, between the perceived gains of

integration and sovereignty concerns. In the face of seemingly ample arguments in

favour of EU membership, it has often been overlooked that for Lithuania there were

also potent arguments and sentiment against membership in the spheres of economics,

sovereignty, cultural identity; and there was the paradox of joining a new union after

recent secession from another. Nor should one overlook the fact that the population

at large did not embrace the prospect of EU membership immediately. Lithuanian

public opinion over the years was rather fickle regarding the EU despite the

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seemingly apparent economic and security benefits, the compatibility of European

and Lithuanian identities, and the consensus within the political elite on EU

membership.1 There were shifts in the way EU membership was perceived by the

government even though the official national policy of seeking EU membership never

veered. For instance, the 1992 parliamentary election and the 1993 presidential

election brought to power elites cautious of integration to Western structures and

interested in a ‘national’ path for development. The 2000 elections were dominated by

parties that opposed Lithuania’s early entry to the EU. Yet once in power, elected

officials maintained the EU trajectory of foreign policy in 2000 as in 1993 and 1992.

Thus, the Lithuanian accession process was not a straightforward affair of continuous

support for EU membership due to complementary material and ideational

motivations. In fact, in addition to material costs and benefits of membership there

were perceived sovereignty losses to the EU and sovereignty gains due to escaping

the Russian sphere of influence, both of which were often articulated in ideational

terms by the Lithuanian elites.

This thesis explores the various tensions involved in the Lithuanian accession process

in seeking to address the general question: What was the interplay between the

material and ideational factors that shaped Lithuania’s EU policy? More specifically,

to what extent was the Lithuanian accession process driven by material motivations?

If material motivations were not the decisive determinant, to what extent did

ideational aspects play a part in Lithuania’s EU policy? We are also interested in

1 For Baltic public opinion shifts see Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes ‘Central and East Europeanviews on EU Enlargement: Political Debates and Public Opinion’ in Karen Henderson, ed., Back toEurope: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, University of Leicester, Leicester 1999,p. 186

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assessing how domestic conditions came into play and in particular how they related

to the role of material and ideational factors.

Lithuania, a state of less than four million people, may not seem like a very

significant case study of EU enlargement and perhaps for this reason it has not

received much attention from students of EU eastern enlargement. However, as a

former Soviet-occupied Republic and one of the most eastern states geographically

among the new accession countries, Lithuania has its own peculiarities that are

noteworthy and that should be placed in the general context of the recent EU

enlargement. The Lithuanian case can shed light on Baltic states’ accession in general

due to a number of similar characteristics. Moreover, a study of a single case rather

than a regional analysis of the Baltics allows for an in-depth examination of the key

episodes, motives, and discourse that a broader study could not capture. The

Lithuanian case, can not only shed light on the Baltics but also on the recent accession

process of many Central and Eastern European post-communist states, which all

shared a common experience of transitioning to market economies and democratic

governments while seeking EU membership in the 1990s. With three additional

former communist and Eastern European states of Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria on

the timetable for EU accession, it is important to examine former cases of integration

that seem to defy some integrationist logic and assumptions. The accession of post-

Soviet Lithuania may be of comparable use when examining the potential candidature

of Ukraine and Belarus. The case also sheds light on the drivers of EU integration and

enlargement overall and offers the perspective of a small state on regional integration

in general.

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Literature Review

The conventional analysis of the Lithuanian and the Baltic accession process states

that the impetus to EU accession was rationally and materially driven. The principal

rational motivations of Lithuania, and the Baltic states in general, to join the EU can

be combined in three main categories: economic, security, and reform-driven

considerations. The economic calculus was such that EU accession was attractive due

to the opportunities of the common market as it was for Britain or Denmark and

because of growth and development prospects as for Ireland. Security concerns were

an important factor due to Russia’s proximity. Meanwhile, there was a recognised

need for reform for which the EU was seen to be an anchor as was the case for Spain,

Portugal, and Greece.

A competing constructivist perspective holds that Lithuania sought EU membership

due to its European identity and historical legacy. In the sparse literature on the Baltic

accession, a comprehensive analysis on Lithuania’s, or even the Baltic, accession

from all four angles of economics, politics, domestic reforms, and identity is lacking.

Most authors stress either one or the other factor or are limited by the exclusive focus

on either the rationalist or constructivist perspective. Furthermore, most studies

present a linear account of the accession policies and perspectives and do not explain

how motivations changed and evolved over time or manifested themselves in

particular episodes.

Literature on Economic Motivations

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Interestingly, despite the seeming evidence for economic gain from the Union and the

final package that Lithuania received from the accession negotiations in 2002, most

literature on the Baltic accessions holds that in the decade leading up to the

negotiations EU membership was not driven exclusively or even primarily by

economic considerations. Heather Grabbe states that ‘hope for money from Brussels

is not in fact a key motivation for membership’2 She and Kirsty Hughes argue that in

the Baltics ‘benefits through access to markets, trade, investment and transfers … are

secondary motives’.3 Zaneta Ozolina considers Baltic states’ economic motivations

for membership, but focuses on the EU’s transformative power on the Baltic

economies rather than on transfers, capital market integration, or an increase in FDI.4

Ramunas Vilpisauskas, a prominent Lithuanian political economist and current

advisor to President, is the most convinced of the importance of economic factors as

an impetus for raising EU membership to the top of the Baltic state’s foreign policy

goals stating that the EU was viewed ‘as a source of economic opportunities and

resources.’5 Yet Vilpisauskas like Ozolina underlines the economic costs of EU

integration. The two most widely cited concerns of Lithuania related to EU

membership are agricultural reforms and the EU request that the Ignalina nuclear

power plant be closed. In light of these and other costs associated with EU norms and

regulations, Vilpisauskas has noted that it may be economically more advantageous to

be an Associate of the EU rather than a full member. According to Vilpišauskas, EU

becomes advantageous when you consider not only the economic aspects of

2 Heather Grabbe ‘Challenges of EU Enlargement’ in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, eds.,Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and Price of Membership, Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, Washington D.C, 2003, p. 693 Grabbe and Hughes in Henderson, p. 1894 Zaneta Ozolina ‘The EU and the Baltic States’ in Lieven and Trenin, p. 205-95 Ramunas Vilpisauskas, ‘Regional Integration in Europe: Analysing Intra-Baltic EconomicCooperation in the Context of European Integration’ in Vello Pettai, and Jan Zielonka, eds., The Roadto the European Union: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, volume 2, Manchester University Press,Manchester & New York, 2003, p. 172

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accession, but also politic and security considerations.6 In summary, the economic

literature surprisingly places little importance on economic motivations on integration

for Lithuania and the Baltic states. The elements that arise from the literature such as

economic opportunities and costs, the EU’s transformative power on the economy and

Lithuania’s perceptions of the EU as centre of wealth warrant more attention and will

be explored in this thesis.

In contrast to the Baltics, most rationalist literature on Central and Eastern European

(CEE) enlargement stress the motivations of benefits such as access to the EU market,

transfers from the EU budget, increased investment and growth, and increased

entrepreneurship and skills.7 Milada Vachudova in her book Europe Undivided:

Democracy, Leverage, & Integration after Communism builds on political economy

theories and international institution theories and applies them to CEE (with the

exception of the Baltics). Throughout her analysis, Vachudova primarily focuses on

the economic stimulus for integration, particularly the economic costs of exclusion

due to the EU’s harsh treatment of non-members as well as the costs of exclusion that

are created when neighbouring states are joining.8 To what extent Lithuania was

influenced by the potential costs of exclusion has yet to be examined in depth. This

6 Ramunas Vilpisauskas ‘Derybos del Narystes ES : Procesas, Veikejai, ir Rezultatai’ in KlaudijusManiokas, Ramunas Vilpisauskas, Darius Zeruolis, eds., Lietuvos Kelias I Europos Sajunga – EuroposSusivienijimas ir Lietuvos Derybos del Narystes Europos Sajungoje, Eugrimas, Vilnius, 2004, p. 66. Anumber of studies on the Central and Eastern European states’ accession have questioned the presumedeconomic benefits of membership. Vachudova notes small transfer payments and costs of buildinginstitutions and social policy directives to implement the acquis in Milada Anna Vachudova, EuropeUndivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration after Communism, Oxford University Press, Oxford,2005, p.231-3. For a critique of the agricultural policy towards the new entrants see Grabbe in Lievenand Trenin, p. 69, 76. David Ellison and Mustally Hussain have proposed that the Easter Europeanstates ‘may have experienced higher levels of economic growth if they stayed out of the EU, inparticular given the meagre financial assistance that they are receiving upon accession.’ Source:Vachudova, p. 231.7 Vachudova, p. 658 Ibid., p. 65

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thesis will inquire into the material as well as the ideational perceptions of negative

externalities of non-membership.

Literature on Security Concerns

Despite the potential tangible economic gains of EU membership for Lithuania and

the Baltics, most authors have stressed the importance of security concerns for the

Baltic states as one of, if not the primary motivation for seeking membership in the

Union.9 For the Baltic states, these security concerns consist of the desire to maintain

full independence and territorial integrity from the potential threat of Russia. For

Lithuania, there are also the concerns of bordering the highly militarized Russian

enclave of Kaliningrad. Graeme Herd in his article, ‘The Baltic States and EU

Enlargement,’ argued that for the Baltics, the EU had become ‘securitized’ meaning

that ‘the security environment that characterized the Baltic region in the early 1990’s

had both a defining impact upon the ways in which EU membership was to be sought

and upon the expectation of benefits EU membership would provide.’10 According to

Herd, security concerns were so vital to the Baltic states that in fact EU was

considered only a ‘medium-term security generator’ until NATO membership was

secured as NATO was ‘the only viable security panacea for the Baltic states.’11 Yet,

the committed and simultaneous pursuit of both EU and NATO membership by the

Lithuanian elites cannot be fully explained by the view that the EU only represented a

second choice solution to Lithuania’s security concerns.

9 Authors such as Herd, Grabbe and Hughes, Miniotaite, Ozolina, Tiilikainen, Austrevicius, andVilpisauskas have emphasized the primacy of security motivations in Lithuania’s EU policy.10 Graeme Herd, ‘The Baltic States and EU Enlargement,’ in Henderson, p. 26111 Ibid., p. 259, 260.

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Baltic security considerations in the context of the EU are not traditional conceptions

of security advantages, a fact that is recognized but not sufficiently analysed by Herd

and other authors. While the EU could not provide Lithuania with security guarantees

like NATO’s Article V, the Union is considered a provider of soft security since

membership can indirectly deter aggression.12 As Grabbe and Hughes point out, for

the Baltics the security benefit of EU membership is ‘seen more in terms of the EU

being a community of states rather than because of any hopes for the development of

the Common Foreign and Security Policy.’ 13 However, Lithuania’s perceptions of its

security needs and particularly the belief that the EU could address some of these

needs can be better understood by examining Lithuania’s national identity and

historical legacy. Grazina Miniotaite in her article ‘The Baltic States: In Search of

Security and Identity’ addresses this issue by interpreting the security and foreign

policy of the Baltic states as the embodiment of their developing political identity. 14

However her focus is on the broader structures of Euro-Atlantic community,

particularly NATO. She does not address the relationship between the perceived

security benefits of NATO versus EU membership, which is an important point to

differentiate in order to ascertain the claim that Lithuania’s accession was primarily

driven by security concerns.

Literature on Ideational Considerations

Though less common than the rationalist security-driven explanation, an ideational

based argument has also been used to explain Lithuania’s and the Baltics’ EU policy.

The constructivist literature on the Baltics, very similar to that on CEE accession,

12 Ozolina in Lieven and Trenin, p. 20913 Grabbe and Hughes in Henderson, p. 19014 Grazina Miniotaite ‘The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity’ in Charles Krupnick, ed.,Almost NATO, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, London, 2003, p. 263-288

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emphasizes ideational and historical considerations understood as a desire to ‘return

to Europe’ as the driving force in EU enlargement. For example, Pettai argues that the

‘intuitive sense of belonging to this geopolitical region [of Europe] was never in

doubt, and it was largely this belief which propelled the Baltics’ in their quest for EU

membership.15 However, the ideational motivations to join EU viewed as a desire to

be part of Europe captures only part of the story and the literature often misses the

complexities of the Baltic national identity - a weakness that this analysis will seek to

rectify.

Some scholars viewing the seeming ideational compatibility between Baltic states’

national vision and EU integration have concluded that ‘the “integration dilemma” –

the inherent tension between integration gains and sovereignty losses – appears to be

completely lacking in the Baltic region.’16 However, this perspective misses many of

the ideational complexities of the Baltics such as the significance of the anti-Soviet

and sovereignty-focused discourse. Furthermore it underestimates the facts on the

ground such as the Lithuanian Euro-sceptic movement - the National Democratic

Movement. This movement opposed EU admission because it is perceived to

undermine independence and argued that EU membership was not necessarily

beneficial in terms of the economy, national culture, identity and sovereignty.

Pavlovaite has suggested that there may be an integration dilemma in Lithuania where

sovereignty discourse has been particularly potent since 1990.17 However she does not

address why despite the scepticism among some political parties, a rather fluctuating

public opinion regarding the EU, and the sovereignty dilemma, the Lithuanian

15 Pettai and Zielonka, p. 316 Herd in Henderson, p. 27017 Inga Pavlovaite, ‘Paradise Regained: The Conceptualization of Europe in the Lithuanian Debate’ inMarko Lehti and David J. Smith, Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experience,Frank Cass Publishers, London and Portland, 2003, p. 207

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government was firmly committed to seeking EU membership throughout the post-

Soviet years.

In the literature on Lithuania’s and the Baltic accession, the importance of EU as a

facilitator of reforms has not been emphasized but only mentioned in passing.

However, in the general literature on Eastern Enlargement, it has been recognized that

for the CEE states which emerged from planned economies and non-democratic

systems, EU accession offered the benefit of building and strengthening a candidate’s

social, judicial, political and economic institutions (like the independent Central Bank

act) as well as a chance to implement key structural reforms during the chapter by

chapter acceptance of the acquis. 18 Yet what has rarely been noted is that the reform-

anchoring role of the EU can be analyzed from an ideational perspective since the EU

has served as a model for reforms due to its magnetic appeal - the promise of

progress, prosperity and efficiency. As Pavlovaite has argued, Europe ‘has acquired a

near-mystic, taken-for-granted status in the Lithuanian discourse on economic,

political and social transformation.’19

In summary, the literature on the Baltic accession is rather sparse and lacks a

comprehensive study of the economic, security, and ideational motives for

membership. The aim of this study is to provide such a comprehensive analysis and

one that takes into account the evolution of motives over time. The reviewed studies

still leave a number of questions to be answered and room for contribution, thus, the

study will analyze Lithuania’s ideational perspective on soft security to reconcile

Lithuania’s simultaneous pursuit of EU and NATO membership. Furthermore, the

18 Vachudova, p. 181-21919 Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 212

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additional components of national identity - from anti-Russian sentiments to

‘outsider’ complex - will be addressed. Insights from more general literature from

CEE enlargement and regional integration such as appeal of EU reforms and the costs

of non-membership will be applied to enrich the understanding the Lithuanian and

Baltic case. Furthermore, broader theoretical approaches of constructivism and

liberalism will contribute to the field that is largely rationalist in its orientation and

will help to assess the ideational and domestic influences on EU policy.

Analytical Framework

When considering Lithuania’s accession policy, this study will use additional

international relations approaches to regional integration, then the ones common to

the current literature on the Baltic accession. The analytical framework of this thesis

will not rely on a single theoretic approach but rather combine rationalist,

constructivist, and liberal schools of thought which will enable a comprehensive study

of material, ideational, and domestic factors of EU policy.

Rationalist Approaches

The analytical framework of this thesis will rely greatly on the rationalist analyses

from Walter Mattli’s book ‘The Logic of Regional Integration’ and Milada

Vachudova’s book ‘Europe Undivided.’20 Mattli presents a rationalist approach that

views European integration, and regional integration in general, as driven by market

forces and enforced by institutional factors. Though Mattli notes the EU is a ‘unique

confluence of security, political, and economic motives,’ his theory focuses almost

exclusively on the economic motives for integration and enlargement.

20 Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1999 and Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, &Integration after Communism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.

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The economic motives for integration are a good starting point to analyze Lithuania’s

and the Baltic states accession. Mattli points out that integration is generally sought

by ‘outsider’ states with lower growth rates than ‘insider’ states in cases where there

is little difference in economic development between the ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders.’ In

the recent EU enlargement, there was a gap in wealth between the old and new

members, but most CEE states such as Lithuania had higher growth rates than the

existing members of the EU. However, Mattli’s perspective could still be useful in

analysing the case of Lithuania since he argues that for ‘poor states’ such as Spain,

Portugal, and now the CEE countries, the motivation lies in ‘reducing the glaring per

capita income gap between themselves and the Union’21 potentially through gains

from EU’s Regional Development & Structural Re-adjustment Funds.

Mattli argues that the supply of integration depends on the willingness of the leaders

to integrate which in turn depends on the payoffs and costs of integration to political

leaders. The Lithuanian government elite and their interests or costs to integrate in

terms of re-election will be examined using Mattli’s insights. Did Lithuania’s political

leaders step up their efforts for membership in anticipation of the next presidential

election of 1998 or parliamentary elections of 2000? Were the political elites mindful

of the costs of integration – the rising Euro-scepticism of the Lithuanian public during

the late 1990s? Mattli’s insight that economically successful leaders are a lot less

likely to pursue deep integration than economically unsuccessful leaders will also be

tested in the case of Lithuania. The economic downturn of 1998 and 1999 after the

Russian crises followed by the accelerated efforts for EU integration seem to support

this hypothesis.21 Mattli, p. 95

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Mattli and Vachudova both note that the costs of non-integration influences elites

seeking EU membership. According to Mattli, ‘a country seeks to integrate its

economy only when there is a significant positive cost of maintaining its present

governance structure in terms of foregone growth.’22 The analysts’ opinion varies on

whether Lithuania would forego growth if it was not admitted to the EU, with some

analysts predicting higher economic performance through Associate status of EU

rather than full membership, but recent government studies argue that membership

will increase GDP growth.23 The thesis will consider if foregone growth and potential

negative externalities of integration on ‘outsiders’ such as trade diversion, investment

diversion, and aid diversion influenced Lithuania elites thinking particularly as the

prospect of being left out of enlargement emerged after the Commissions decision of

1997.

Vachudova, in considering rational material motivations of EU membership,

addresses the political benefits of integration in addition to the economic ones. She

argues that the EU exerted passive leverage over candidate countries due to the

potential benefits associated with EU membership which included: 1) political

benefits such as the protection of EU rules and a voice in EU decision-making, 2)

economic benefits such as access to EU markets, transfers from the EU budget,

increased investment and growth, increased entrepreneurship and skills, and 3)

conditionality which acts as a catalyst for domestic reforms.24 The political and reform

benefits have been underemphasized in the literature on the Baltics and will be22 Ibid., p. 8123 Vilpisauskas in Maniokas, Vilpisauskas, and Zeruolis, p. 66. See also Edmundas Piesarskas,Lietuvos Integracijos I ES Finansiniu, Ekonominiu, ir Socialiniu Pasekmiu Susiteminimas ir Analize,Europos Komitetas prie Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybes, Ekonomines Konsultacijos ir Tyrimai,Vilnius, 2002.24 Vachudova, p. 65

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considered in this thesis. Vachudova also analyzes how ‘membership (or courtship) of

an international organization transforms state strategies and preferences.’25 Vachudova

employs this concept of active leverage of the EU to explain how the EU had an

impact on domestic outcomes of Visegrad states and argues that organizations such as

NATO did not have the same leverage. 26 EU’s active leverage will be used to consider

Lithuania’s policies towards EU and NATO membership in the key episode post-

Commission’s decision to exclude Lithuania from the first round of negotiation in

1997.

Constructivist Approaches

The rationalist approach is often incomplete to fully explain EU integration or

enlargement and thus, the constructivist school of international relations can shed new

insight into the same studies. Alexander Wendt in ‘Social Theory of International

Relations’ proposes that ‘the structures of human association,’ or international

organizations, ‘are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces’

and ‘the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared

ideas rather than given by nature.’27 While the rationalist approach views the

enlargement on the part of the entrants as a ‘product of a cost-benefit calculation,’

constructivist approaches focus on the appeal of Western European norms and values,

the commonality of European identities, and the legacy of history.28 As Jan Zielonka

highlights ‘We belong to Europe’ was the repeated cry of Eastern Europeans since the

late 80s. ‘In their view, Europe possesses a special kind of identity which is based on

certain cultural and legal traditions, on common principles of democracy and the25 Ibid., p. 726 Ibid., p. 134-13727 Alex Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1999, p. 128 Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, ‘Theorizing EU Enlargement,’ Journal of EuropeanPublic Policy, vol. 9, no. 4, 2002.

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common religious roots of Christianity and Judaism,’ an identity that the Eastern

Europeans feel that they share.29

In this thesis, constructivist approaches will be used to complement the rationalist

perspective and thus, consider the importance of ideational factors in Lithuania’s

interest formation regarding EU membership and their effect on EU policy. As

Tiilikainen argues, state policies have been a reflection of state’s national identities in

the Baltic states:

“As a basis for foreign policy, national identities express themselves asworldviews, that is as subjective interpretations concerning the internationalenvironment and one’s own position in it. These worldviews furthermoreexpress a set of values functioning as the value basis for a given policy.” 30

An analysis of the Lithuanian ‘worldview’ will be useful to understand more clearly

Lithuania’s political, security, and even economic interests in seeking EU

membership. Lithuania’s and EU’s ‘cultural match’ which according to constructivist

institutionalists is the compatibility between outsiders and insiders regarding

collective identity and fundamental beliefs will be examined in this thesis to consider

Lithuania’s pursuit and resistance to the integration process.

Liberal Approach

The liberal approach could bring additional insight into the analysis of Lithuania’s

policy towards EU by opening the ‘black box’ of the state and analysing Lithuania’s

domestic politics. The politics of EU enlargement is an area that has been

underemphasized in the studies of Baltic accession and the liberal approach enables

an analysis of the role played by government elites, interests groups, and public

29 Jan Zielonka, ‘The Assertion of Democracy’ in Ronald J. Hill and Jan Zielonka, eds., RestructuringEastern Europe :Towards a New European Order, Aldershot, Hants, 1990, p. 4630 Teija Tiilikainen, The Political Implications of the EU Enlargement to the Baltic States, RobertSchumann Centre, European University Institute, Florence 2001, p. 15

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opinion. In Lithuania, in particular, there has been a notable divide between the

steadfast government commitment to the EU and the sceptical public. In this thesis,

the liberal/domestic approach is instrumental in explaining to what extent Lithuanian

elites sought EU membership so they could introduce domestic reforms, for political

gains, or due to their desire to compete. Also it allows us to consider to what extent

fluctuating public opinion played a role in EU policy formulation and if it changed the

strategic direction or just the tactics of EU policy.31

Of these perspectives on EU enlargement, the rationalist lens will be one of the two

main approaches of this thesis, especially for examination of the economic factors to

Lithuania’s EU policy and to some extent the political factors. Complementary

explanatory power will be sought from the constructivist approach by considering to

what extent and when Lithuanian policy and choices were a reflection of national

identity. Political, security, and economic motivations for EU membership will be

considered in the light of Lithuania’s worldview. Lastly, a liberal domestic approach

will examine the role of actors below the state level to understand the complexities of

domestic politics and its influence on EU accession. However, this approach will be

complementary to rather than constitutive of the analysis since throughout the 1991-

2002 period, despite the changes in political parties, leadership, and public opinion,

national policy on EU remained consistent.

Argument and Project

31 The liberal approach could also be used to examine to what extent domestic interests groupsinfluenced EU policy, but this line of inquiry will not be attempted in the thesis due to lack ofsupporting evidence that interests groups played a significant role in the Lithuanian accession process.See Vilpisauskas in Pettai and Zielonka, p. 160-73

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Relying on rationalist and constructivist approaches, this thesis will advance the main

argument that ideational factors made material considerations more salient during key

episodes of decision making process and the interaction of the two thus determined

Lithuania’s EU policy. On a stand-alone basis, neither the material nor the ideational

factors played a decisive role in motivating Lithuania to seek EU membership but

when a correlation between material considerations and ideational factors occurred,

integration was accelerated. On the other hand, when only material factors were at

play, integration momentum slowed.32

Furthermore, the thesis holds that Lithuania’s accession strategy was motivated by

different factors in the pre-application and post-application phase.33 Material political

and security motivations were of great importance to Lithuania in the years leading up

to the decision to seek EU membership in 1995. Furthermore, political and security

motivations were decisive for EU membership because they were made more salient

by complementary ideational factors. Calculations of the economic benefits of EU

membership were not central in making the initial decision to seek EU membership in

1995 but came to play an increasingly important role in the late 1990s and particularly

in the early 2000 to 2002. After 1995 ideational factors maintained the salience of

political and security factors, which, if based solely on rationalist considerations, may

have lost relevance. 32 This inquiry greatly utilizes the dichotomy between material and ideational factors, which admittedlyare generally difficult to separate into two distinct categories and in the case of Lithuania’s accessionpolicy. For the purpose of this thesis, material considerations will be understood to include rationaleconomic costs and benefits of EU membership such as transfer payments, FDI, reformimplementation. Political gains such as representation in the European Council and to some extentsecurity benefits are analyzed as material factors. Ideational aspects include the sovereignty concerns,perception of the EU as an ideal model for emulation, soft security gains from being part of Europe,escaping Europe’s periphery and a dangerous sphere of Russia’s influence.33 The application process itself did not significantly alter national motivations. But because Lithuania’snational motivations evolved from 1991 to 2002, the application date is a useful marker which enablesto evaluate on which set of motivations Lithuania’s application was based. Other studies do not makethis distinction and generalize about motivations as whole from 1991 to 2002 providing an imprecisepicture.

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The argument is that ideational factors influenced Lithuania’s perceptions of national

interests and thus, the accession process. Lithuanian ideational motivations for EU

membership are more complex than a sense of common European heritage even

though this is how the literature often interprets the ideational pull of Europe. The

thesis will employ an understanding of the Lithuanian national identity that is not

simply European, but one that is also decisively anti-Russian/Eastern, historically an

‘outsider’ and one that prizes national sovereignty.34 Ideational motivations are based

as much on the ‘pull’ force of the EU as on the ‘push’ force away from the post-Soviet

space. This ‘push’ force is also a ‘protest vote’ demonstrating a desire to escape the

Soviet Union’s legacy rather than simply joining Europe. In line with Pavlovaite’s

argument, for Lithuania the ‘return to Europe’ then takes on a meaning not of

becoming a member of the European community but rather ‘a legitimate, reliable and

safe way of distancing Lithuania from Russia and of overcoming Lithuania’s most

recent communist past’35. I argue that this desire to establish distance from Russia

coupled with the sense of being a historical ‘outsider’ greatly influenced the ultimate

success of the pro-European case in Lithuania since integration particularly after 1997

was driven by a fear that Lithuania would be left out in the process of European

development and thus relegated again to the Russian sphere of influence, in a type of

geopolitical ‘ghetto’ between the EU and the East. This thesis, while utilizing a

rationalist perspective on Vilnius’ economic and security motivations for EU

membership, also relies on ideational factors to elucidate how Lithuanian elites

34 This description of the national identity is formulated from insights from several sources: Miniotaitein Krupnick, p. 263-288; Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 199-213; Egidijus Vareikis,Dinozaurejanti Europa, Stroga, Vilnius, 2002, p. 291-303; Inga Vinogradnaite, ‘Kelias Europon:Europiestiskojo Identiteto Konstravimas,’ in Darius Staliunas, ed., Europos Ideja Lietuvoje: Istorija irDabartis, LII Leidykla, Vilnius, 2002, p. 180-189.35 Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 200

22


perceived the economic and security variables. For instance, Lithuania certainly had

some potent economic and security arguments to join the EU but because ‘the West…

[is] associated with prosperity, security, and democracy, whereas the East is linked

with poverty, unpredictability, and insecurity’36 the EU integration policy was often

perceived as the only viable solution for Lithuania. The idealized perception of the

West and a desire to escape the Soviet past was illustrated by President Adamkus’

statement that the EU ‘is the guarantee of progress and future prosperity…The only

way to escape the backwardness of the province is to board the fast Europe train.’37

Similarly security motivations to join the EU were meaningful only to the extent that

Lithuanian political elites perceived insecurity in their geopolitical position and to the

extent that EU was thought to be able to provide any security solutions. In summary,

if the Lithuanian elites would have had a different national identity and different

perceptions, the EU accession process could have proceeded considerably differently.

Most probably, Lithuania would have still sought EU membership since there were

economic and structural improvements to be gained from membership but it would

have done so without the same fervour and dedication. Also it is arguable that

Lithuania would have sought membership in the case where there was no economic

benefit to be gained from membership and done so motivated by security, ideational,

and reform factors.

This thesis also emphasizes the importance of external events and factors in

cementing Lithuania’s resolve to seek EU membership. For instance the rising

nationalist rhetoric in Russian politics in the mid-1990s, as exemplified by

Zhirinovsky performance in the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary elections, greatly stirred

36 Miniotaite in Krupnick, p. 27837 Adamkus, Valdas, Trys Metiniai Pranesimai 1999-2001, Baltu Lanku Leidyba,Vilnius, 2001, p. 44

23


Lithuania and the other Baltic states to seek security through integration into Western

Structures. The most important external events occurred in the brief time period

between 1997 and 1999: 1) in 1997 the EU Commission made a decision to exclude

Lithuania from the first round of negotiations process for membership; 2) the Russian

financial crisis of 1998 caused a recession for the Lithuanian economy; 3) NATO did

not include any of the Baltic states in its first round of enlargement in 1999. These

three seemingly discouraging events only intensified Lithuania’s elite consensus on

the necessity of EU membership because they were fed on the fears of being left out

of the European structures and left behind in Russia’s unstable backyard. The external

factor of regional competition among the Baltic states pushed all three states towards

integration rather than exploring the option of creating a regional alternative to

integration.

Lastly, this thesis will approach Lithuania’s economic, security, and ideational

motivations in a non-linear fashion arguing that certain motivations were important

during some time periods and not in others, and that the strength of certain

motivations evolved over time. Lithuania’s policy towards the EU cannot be

understood as a static and unchanging set of preferences between the years of 1991

and 2002 as most of the aforementioned literature had attempted. Until 1995, when

Lithuania submitted an official application to the EU, economic considerations for

membership were overshadowed by Lithuania’s security concerns due to the presence

of the Russian army, its geopolitical location, and its new and fragile independence.

From Lithuania’s 1995 application until 1997, the country pursued a mixed strategy of

both officially seeking EU membership while simultaneously pursuing trade

24


opportunities with Russia and the CIS and lagging in the implementation of necessary

reforms for EU accession. The security aspects of EU membership remained salient

but pragmatic economic considerations compelled the Lithuanian elites to maintain

trade with Russia. The coupled external events of EU and NATO exclusion and the

Russian crisis in the late 1990s rekindled some of the greatest ideationally-based fears

of Lithuanian elites - the economic and political consequences of being ‘left out of

Europe’ in a ‘Baltic ghetto.’

From 2000 to 2002 EU policy became increasingly driven by economic motivations

for membership. Though the EU was still regarded in symbolic terms of wealth,

progress and modernity, increasingly a rationalist utility maximizing perspective of

the costs and benefits of EU membership appeared. However, the rationalist

perspective was used more for the negotiation strategy and ensuring that Lithuania

gets the ‘best deal’ in its accession package than for making the decision of whether

or not to seek membership which was already decided in 1995.

The argument is thus that ideational factors mattered as much if not more than

material considerations in determining Lithuanian elites' drive for EU by influencing

Lithuanian elite perceptions of the economic, security, and political costs and benefits

of membership, which came to prominence at different points of the accession

process. In order to demonstrate this I will use discourse analysis and key episode

study methods described in the next section.

Methods

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This thesis combines the historical explanatory and theory-testing categories of Van

Evera’s typology of political science dissertations.38 Consistent with the explanatory

approach, I seek to ‘explain the causes… [and] consequences of [a] historical case.’

The historical case I seek to explain is Lithuania’s accession to the EU. My thesis will

also incorporate elements of the theory-testing approach, applying and testing the

noted elements of rationalist, constructivist and liberal approaches on the case of

Lithuania EU accession. However, the primary purpose of the thesis is not to prove or

disprove any particular theory but rather to explain the historical case of Lithuania’s

accession by using some relevant theoretical tools.

In this thesis, discourse analysis is an important tool for explaining the Lithuanian

case because discourse demonstrates how the EU was perceived and what benefits

and costs were anticipated by the Lithuanian governing elites. Discourse is understood

as a common understanding of self and the world that legitimates and motivates

collection action.39 Discourse analysis will rely primarily on official statements and

speeches on EU and Lithuanian foreign policy by high-level government officials.

Published compilations of speeches such as President Adamkus’ Trys Metiniai

Pranešimai and Penkeri Darbo Metai, Landsbergis’ Lietuvos Kelias Į NATO will be

cited most extensively.40 Noteworthy strands of discourse will be highlighted from the

Lithuanian Constitution as well as the National Law on Defence. Government

38 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, Cornell University Press,Ithaca, NY, 1997, p. 90-239 Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements:Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Feelings, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1996, p. 6. See also Jennifer Milliken, ‘The Study of Discourse in International Relations:a Critique of Research and Methods, European Journal of Internaltional Relations, Vol. 5, No. 2 1999.40 Trys Metiniai Pranešimai is a collection of the President’ national addresses from 1999 to 2001.Penkeri Darbo Metai is a collection of the President’s speeches and interviews from 1998 to 2003.Lietuvos Kelias Į NATO is a collection of Landsbergis speeches, interviews, foreign policyformulations, and articles from 1990 to 2004 and though focused on NATO membership givesnumerous insights on EU membership and the general Western orientation of foreign policy.

26


sponsored studies on the effects of integration41 will be considered. Academic articles

from high-level bureaucrats and influential political scientists who serve as advisors

to the government will be useful not only for the information that they provide but

also because they reveal the perspectives of the inner circle. Interviews with key

officials will fill gaps in the literature and breathe life into the analysis. The discourse

analysis will not focus on public statements or journalistic comments, as the emphasis

of this thesis is on government elites’ consensus. Despite the focus on policy actors,

the divergence between public opinion and pro-EU elite consensus will be considered

when relevant.42

My proposed discourse analysis poses some challenges but also enables me to make

some useful contributions. Admittedly, assessing the impact of discourse on policy

formation is difficult, thus the thesis will not claim to explain policy actions but rather

the thinking behind these actions. The analysis will assume a correlation but not

causality between thinking/discourse and policy. For instance, I am not arguing that

the discourse on ‘the Baltic ghetto’ or ‘periphery’ encouraged Lithuanian government

elites to accelerate the integration process but rather reflected the perceptions of the

elites who steeped in this thinking pursued EU membership.

The thesis will contribute in both theoretical and practical terms to the study of EU

enlargement and the Lithuanian accession case. Theoretically, the in-depth study of

the Lithuanian case can enhance the understanding of the complexities of elite

motivations for EU enlargement and decision-making processes for candidate

countries. Practically, by working with primary materials and conducting interviews,

41 Lietuvos Integracijos Į ES Finansinių, Ekonominių Ir Socialinių Pasekmių Susisteminimas ir Analizé42 Statistics from the Euro-barometer will be used for public opinion analysis.

27


the thesis will gather and process a large amount of data that is still absent from

secondary sources in either Lithuanian or English.

The selected time frame for study is from August 1991 when the EU recognized

Lithuania’s independence to December 2002 when Lithuania successfully concluded

accession negotiations at the Copenhagen European Council.43 Though the thesis is

not structured in a historical or chronological fashion, the two general phases of pre-

and post-decision to submit an EU membership application in 1995 will be

considered. The pre-1995 years demonstrate what initial motivations shaped

Lithuanian EU policy and the decision to submit the EU application. After 1995,

though Lithuania was in the process of deliberation, preparation, and negotiation for

EU membership, the country had already to a great extent the set its trajectory in

foreign policy and was only implementing it.

A key episode between 1997 and 2000 demonstrated that Lithuania’s EU policy was

not predetermined even after the application submission and highlights the importance

of external events in shaping it. This particular episode will be analysed in a

subsequent chapter as a key case which contained an interplay of various elements

such as economic pressures, public scepticism, historical fears, the European

Commission’s (EC) decisions and the Russian financial crisis. This episode is also

worthy of examination because it emphasizes the distinct conditions in Lithuania from

1997 to 2000 in comparison to the other Baltic states. Lithuania was the only state

among its neighbours that experienced the double disappointment of EU and NATO

43 The analysis does not extend to up to when Lithuania officially became a member of the EU in May2004, because after the negotiations were completed in December 2002 Lithuania’s membership wascertain and the nature of Lithuania’s policy motivations could not be analyzed in the same manner as inthe pre-2002 period.

28


exclusion when Estonia was invited to start negotiations with the EU and Latvia had

less reason to expect an invitation from NATO. In addition, Lithuania was the most

affected by the Russian financial crisis. Thus, the years from 1997 to 2000 in

Lithuania were marked by trials and tribulations for its EU and Western-oriented

policy more so than for the other Baltic states and most Central and Eastern European

states. The years from 1997 to 2000 will demonstrate to what extent Lithuania’s

pivotal decision-making episodes were driven by material or ideation factors such as

negative economic externalities or the fear of being left out of European

developments. The case study will prove the main argument of the thesis that

ideational factors made material considerations decisive in Lithuania’s EU policy.

Structure of Study

Following this introduction, the thesis consists of three core chapters. The second

chapter, entitled ‘Economic Factors of Lithuania’s EU Policy,’ examines the changing

salience of economic factors in Lithuania’s EU policy from 1991 to 2002. The

analysis will proceed thematically rather than chronologically, focusing on the role of

rational utility, domestic politics and ideational factors in economic considerations.

The third chapter, entitled ‘Political and Security Factors in Lithuania’s EU Policy,’

examines the evolution of political and security concerns in Lithuania’s EU policy

from 1991 to 2002. The analysis proceeds thematically focusing on hard and soft

security concerns and political voice. The impact of domestic politics and ideational

factors in the sphere of political and security concerns is also examined.

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The fourth chapter, ‘The Relationship between Material and Ideational Motivations in

Lithuania’s EU Policy: 1997 to 2000,’ will consider a crucial period in Lithuania’s

accession process to demonstrate how economic, political, and security considerations

were made more salient by ideational factors. The analysis will reveal the important

role of external conditions for Lithuania’s foreign policy while concluding that

domestic political conditions have played a more modest role.

Lastly, the conclusion will summarize the findings and consider what insights from

the Lithuanian EU accession policy can be applied to Lithuania’s general foreign

policy as well as the Baltic and CEE accession.

30


Chapter 2: Economic Factors of Lithuania’s EU Policy

The following chapter will elucidate the main hypothesis that ideational factors

complemented material considerations and so made them more salient during key

episodes of Lithuanian policy on EU membership. The following analysis will

emphasize the tension in Lithuania’s EU accession process between economic and

ideational factors, between the perceived losses and gains of integration. This chapter

will demonstrate that calculations of economic benefits of EU membership were not

significant in making the initial decision to seek EU membership in 1995 and came to

play an increasingly important but still not decisive role from the late 1990’s onwards

and especially from 2000 to 2002.

First the evolution of Lithuania’s EU policy will be examined to demonstrate the ways

in which economic cost-benefit analysis figured in elite thinking. Second, a thematic

explanation using rational utility considerations, domestic politics and ideational

factors, will be used to identify how ideational factors influenced material

considerations and ultimately ensured the success of Lithuania’s EU policy.

The Changing Salience and Nature of Economic Concerns

Lithuania’s relationship with the EU started at the same time as Lithuania was

establishing its independence and renewing its statehood. The first ‘point of contact’

was political not economic when in August of 1991, the EU recognized the

independence of Lithuania. The economic relationship began only a year later in May

1992 when Lithuania and the European Community signed the Agreement on Trade

and Commercial and Economic Co-operation which came into force in 1993 and

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provided Most Favoured Nation trade status. The first economically significant

accords were the Agreements on Trade and Trade Related Matters, signed by all of

the Baltic states in July of 1994 and activated in the beginning of 1995. In June of

1995, Lithuania, along with the other Baltic states signed the Association (Europe)

Agreement, which explicitly recognized its wish to become an EU member.

In the years leading up to Lithuania’s submission of the EU application, economic

factors and particularly rationalist cost-benefit calculations did not figure significantly

in Lithuania’s policy towards the EU for two main reasons. First, in the early 1990s,

Lithuania had pressing priorities other than economic development. The primary

policy goals at the time were political: the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces,

securing full independence despite being in the Russian sphere of influence, and

establishing relationships with various international organizations.44 Secondly, in the

early 1990s, EU membership was still an abstract and to some extent unattainable

goal, thus, calculations of transfer payments, increased FDI and trade volumes would

have been premature. Throughout most of the 1990s, when economic considerations

were mentioned in political or social discourse they were expressed in vague and

general terms. The EU was often understood as synonymous with Europe and the

West, representing a successful economic model, wealth and efficiency which

Lithuania hoped to emulate and be part of.45 But, before the application for

membership was submitted in 1995, the government had not fully considered the

economic consequences of EU membership: studies on the implications of EU

membership on the Lithuanian economy had not entered the elite or public discourse

44 These factors will be addressed in depth in the following chapter on political and securityconsiderations for EU membership.45 Zaneta Ozolina ‘The EU and the Baltic States’ in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, eds., AmbivalentNeighbors: The EU, NATO and Price of Membership, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,Washington D.C, 2003, p. 208

32


and the government continued to pursue an economic relationship with Russia and the

CIS. Thus the Lithuanian EU application was submitted before economic arguments

gained salience or traction among the political class.

The years between 1997 and 2000 marked a significant shift in Lithuania’s

perceptions of EU which were reshaped by two important external economic events.

The first event was the decision of the EU Commission in 1997 to exclude Lithuania

from the first round of negotiations for membership. The second event was the

Russian financial crisis of 1998, which resulted in difficult economic conditions for

the year of 1999. These two events brought about a shift in perceptions of EU policy

and benefits by the public and the government. Estonia’s inclusion in the negotiations,

arguably due to Estonia’s better economic performance, highlighted the weakness of

some aspects of Lithuania’s economic policy and highlighted the need for greater

economic reforms. Between these turning-point years of 1997 and 2000, the policies

of trying to exploit the economic opportunities offered by Russia and the CIS were

fully abandoned in favour of a clear orientation toward the EU. The need for reforms

and EU membership was emphasized by the effects of the Russian crisis on the

Lithuanian and the Baltic economy. Elite discourse centred on the need to escape a

dependency on unstable Russian markets and a fear of being left out of EU

enlargement, which would position Lithuania in a vulnerable ‘grey zone’ between the

East and the West. However, the public reacted to economic uncertainty of the late

1990s, evincing a Euro-scepticism that was mostly ignored by political forces in

economic policy formulation but at times addressed or exploited in the domestic

political sphere.

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From the time that Lithuania started its negotiations with the EU in 2000 and until the

completion of negotiations in 2002, a rationalist utility approach towards EU

membership began appearing more frequently in government discourse and policy. In

general, the rationalist analysis that appeared in the late 1990s and gained force from

2000 to 2002, demonstrates the thinking behind Lithuania’s negotiation strategy

rather than thinking behind EU membership policy. Government studies such as the

‘Analysis of Financial, Economic, and Social Implications of Lithuania’s Integration

to the EU’ were carried out so the policy class could better understand the economic

dimensions of EU integration and its effects on the Lithuanian economy and society

as EU negotiations commenced in February of 2000. Still, ideational factors remained

influential in elite calculations. Some of the rationalist concerns such as the

downsizing effects of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on Lithuanian

agriculture, which employes 20 percent of the labour force, were were coloured by

Lithuanian national identity as an agrarian nation. The EU-stipulated closure of the

old Soviet Ignalina nuclear plant, which was an important source of energy for the

state, was ideationally appealing due to historical antagonism towards Soviet

enviromental damage.

Rational Utility Considerations

Lithuania’s negotiated EU package was deemed very good by the government. In the

words of Purlys, the Negotiations Delegations First Secretary and head of the

Integration Politics department, Lithuania secured one of the best financial packets for

infrastructure, agriculture and social investments.46 In direct transfers alone, Lithuania

46 Vidmantas Purlys ‘Derybu del Lietuvos Narystees ES Apzvalga (2000 m vasario 15d – 2002gruodzio 13d )’ in Klaudijus Maniokas, Ramunas Vilpisauskas, and Darius Zeruolis, eds., LietuvosKelias I Europos Sajunga – Europos Susivienijimas ir Lietuvos Derybos del Narystes EuroposSajungoje, Eugrimas, Vilnius, 2004, p. 127

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negotiated a sizable assistance package from the EU - around EUR 200 million in pre-

accession assistance during 2003, including assistance for nuclear decommissioning

of its Ignalina plant. After accession, Lithuania was poised to be one of the countries

with the highest rate per capita of EU funds (EUR 769 for 2004-2006, out of which

EUR 208 were devoted to agriculture). In terms of EU allocations, Lithuania was to

be a net beneficiary: its per capita contribution to the EU budget totalling EUR 147,

while receipts were EUR 535. 47 In hindsight it seems that Lithuania was certain to

gain economically from EU membership. At first glance one might therefore conclude

that the Lithuanian membership was over-determined. However, the Lithuanian elites

and public were not privileged with this hindsight and the realities in the pre-

accession decade often differed from the final package. Furthermore, perceptions of

costs and benefits of EU membership were not based solely on numbers.

This section will: 1) outline the changing rationalist and ideational assumptions

surrounding trade with Russia, 2) provide a costs and benefits summary of the ‘final

package’ as it was presented by key Lithuanian studies, and 3) offer an in-depth

analysis of Lithuania’s key issues of accession – agriculture and the closure of the

Ignalina nuclear power plant, which demonstrate that the perceptions of strategic

benefits and costs were significantly coloured by ideational factors.

The Costs of Benefits of Lithuania’s Russian Trade

Lithuania’s geographic location and historical legacy have positioned the state to

benefit from trade and contacts with both Western Europe and Russia. Though

Lithuania has continuously maintained ties with both camps, different rational

calculations and ideational considerations have influenced Lithuania’s trade47 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/lithuania/

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orientation at different times. Comparing and contrasting Lithuania’s trade with

Russia and its trade with the EU is instructive when considering rational and

ideational influences in Lithuania’s economic policies.

Although the official commitment to EU membership was firm after 1995, in the mid-

1990s the governments of the Baltic states still had not given serious consideration to

the economic implications of EU membership. This is evident from government

policies which ‘tried to pursue an economic strategy which sought a balance between

a re-orientation towards the stable market in the West and the continued exploitation

of the opportunities offered by Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS) – a market which was well known and which had a potential for development.

Initially, Russia and the CIS represented 95 percent of all Baltic foreign trade. In the

years immediately after the Soviet collapse, some aspects of this trade greatly

increased.’48 Economic ties with CIS can be understood as a ‘pragmatic approach of

the new Lithuanian government [LDDP] of maintaining and fostering old commercial

ties with the CIS.’ Latvia took a similar approach while Estonia was the only Baltic

state that made considerable strides to reorient its trade to the West.49 The benefits of

trade with the former Soviet Union were enticing all the way until the Russian

financial crises of 1998.50 The fact that Lithuania actively pursued trade with Russia

in the early 1990s weakens the argument that Lithuania’s EU membership was over-

determined from an economic standpoint and demonstrates that Lithuanian elites were

not fully convinced of the economic benefits of EU membership. This supports my

48 Ozolina in Lieven and Trenin, p. 20849 Misiunas J. Romuald, “National Identity and Foreign Policy in the Baltic States,” in S. Fredrick Starr,ed., The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, M.E. Sharpe, New York andLondon, 1994, p. 10650 Kazys Bobelis, Member of Parliament, confirmed that trade with the East was ‘natural’ and offered a‘guaranteed market’ for Lithuanian products before the Russian crisis. Interview by author 11 April2006.

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view that cost-benefit calculations did not determine Lithuania’s early EU policy as

membership was still pursued even without rational economic conviction.

The Russian financial crisis51 rippled through the Baltic economies due to significant

economic ties between the two regions. 1999 was a culmination of economic decline

with a contraction of GDP by 4.1 percent and a rise of government debt to LTL13

billion. The dangers of a close economic relationship with Russia and the CIS became

clear and Lithuanian elites accelerated the accession process with the EU. After 1998,

trade with the CIS declined rapidly and shifted toward EU markets. By 1999,

Lithuania exported considerably more to the EU than to the CIS (EUR 1,616 million

versus EUR 1,164 million) while Lithuania’s imports from EU increased to EUR

2,095 million and from Russia decreased to EUR 534 million in 1999. 52 As these

rationalist motivations reinvigorated Lithuania’s relationship with the EU, the

‘economic chaos to the east’ increasingly became an ideational motivating factor for

the government elites to reform the Lithuanian economy so it could become a part of

the ‘stable and secure economic environment’ of the EU.53 The Lithuanian historical

experience with an unstable Russia further reinforced this ideational motive to escape

economic dependency on the ‘chaotic East.’

Economic Opportunities and Costs of Lithuania’s EU Package

Though Lithuania was due to be a net beneficiary from the EU budget and received

sizable transfers, there were broader economic costs and benefits of integration that

should be considered to understand Lithuania’s EU package. Factors of EU

51 The effects of the Russian financial crisis on Lithuania’s economic and EU policy will be analysed ingreater depth in Chapter Four.52 Ozolina in Lieven and Trenin, p. 20853 Ibid., p. 208

37


integration that had a significant impact on the Lithuanian economy were: ‘the

removal of barriers to trade in goods and services; the removal of barriers to the

circulation of capital; the removal of barriers to movement of labour; regulatory

measures in line with the EU acquis in the area of the internal market; and common

rules in selected sectors including agriculture, the EMU, and external trade policy.’54

It was estimated that due to integration Lithuania’s exports alone will be about 1.9

times higher in 2002-2009 than they would have otherwise been under the

hypothetical scenario of non-integration. However, it was noted in several studies that

it is difficult to isolate the potential effects of EU integration from those that would

have occurred anyway due to globalisation or the transformative process for a

transitional economy.55 Thus some of perceived costs and benefits of EU integration

may have occurred anyway even if Lithuanian had not sought EU membership.

A government sponsored study anticipated that integration to the EU will have a

positive impact on the GDP of Lithuania. Lithuania’s GDP in the period of 2002-2009

would be higher by about LTL 65.9 billion (LTL 11.4 billion in 2009 alone) than it

would have been under the non-integration scenario.56 Furthermore, Lithuania’s

economy will experience net growth even when accounting for the costs of integration

from 2002-2009 of about 1.14 percentage points faster than under the hypothetical

scenario of non-integration. The government study expected that due to the effects of

the accession process from 2002 to 2009 investments in the Lithuanian economy will

54 Ramunas Vilpisauskas and Guoda Steponaviciute ‘The Baltic States: The Economic Dimension’ inHelena Tang, ed., Winners and Losers of EU Integration: Policy Issues for Central and EasternEurope, The World Bank, Washington D.C, 2000, p. 5555 Ibid., p. 53. See also Edmundas Piesarskas, Lietuvos Integracijos I ES Finansiniu, Ekonominiu, irSocialiniu Pasekmiu Susiteminimas ir Analize, Europos Komitetas prie Lietuvos RespublikosVyriausybes, Ekonomines Konsultacijos ir Tyrimai, 2002(a)56 Edmundas Piesarskas, Summary: Systemisation and Analysis of Fianncial, Economic and SocialImplications of Lithuania’s Integration to the EU, The European Committee under the Government ofthe Republic of Lithuania, 2002(b), p. 1-11

38


amount to LTL 23 billion, which will include LTL 9 billion from the EU funds, LTL

4.5 billion of public investments, and the remainder from the private sector. Grants

from EU and donor countries will amount to LTL 15 billion for 2002-2009.

According to this government study the costs associated with integration will amount

to LTL 16 billion from 2002-2009. A significant part of these costs – LTL 4.3 billion -

are payments made by Lithuania to the EU budget. For the years of 2004-2006 it has

been estimated that Lithuanian payments to the EU budget will account for 1.2

percent of GDP annually. However, as previously noted, Lithuania’s receipts from the

EU budget will be higher than its payments to the EU budget, and this positive

difference will gradually increase in the first few years of membership. Excluding the

costs of decommissioning of the Ignalina plant, the net positive difference between

budgetary transfers amounted to EUR 258 million (about LTL 890 million) in 2004,

EUR 392 million (about LTL 1353 million) in 2005, and EUR 525 million (about LTL

1813 million) in 2006.

In addition, many individual sectors in the Lithuanian economy required sizable

capital investments in order to meet EU standards. It was estimated that for

‘agriculture and industries, the total need for investments in approximation to the EU

requirements in the period of 2002-2009 almost seven times exceeds the total amount

of payments to be received from the EU over the same period’. However, it must be

taken into account that ‘a large portion of the investments would have been made

even if Lithuania had not decided to join the EU. The investments would, in any case,

have been necessitated by the globalisation processes, by the goal to achieve

international competitiveness, and by the geographical position.’57

57 Piesarskas, 2002(b), p. 6

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In summary, Lithuania was poised to gain from the effects of EU integration, though

it was difficult to ascertain to what extent the noted gains were from EU accession

and would not have been achieved through the process of transitioning to a market

economy and opening to globalization. However the fact that these studies were

completed and entered the academic and political debate only in 2000 or 2002,

demonstrates that rationalist cost-benefit calculations became salient only in the

period of negotiations but not at the time of application for EU membership.

Furthermore, the numbers often do not tell the story of how each of these benefits and

costs were perceived by the Lithuanian political elites in the years leading up to

accession and if they impacted Lithuania’s EU policy. A closer look at two key

economic issues of accession will fill in the details for the rationalist framework.

Agriculture and Ignalina: Lithuania’s Sensitive Issue Areas

The two main economic concerns that arose specifically for Lithuania regarding EU

membership were agriculture and the closure of the Ignalina nuclear power plant

(NPP). By examining these most sensitive issues, it is possible to get a clearer picture

of the extent to which material and ideational considerations played a role in

Lithuania’s economic aims regarding EU membership. The two cases also reveal how

ideational and material factors interacted.

According to recent official studies the agricultural sector will experience benefits

from integration and the CAP. It was estimated that between 2002 and 2009, there will

be LTL 6 billion investments into the agricultural sector, of which LTL 0.4 billion will

be invested by the Lithuanian government. From 2002 to 2009, the total transfers and

40


support from EU funds for agriculture will be LTL 7 billion. In addition, there will be

LTL 4.5 billion benefits from the increased agricultural product prices and the

increased production capabilities.58 However, the rational EU benefits for the

agricultural sector were rarely mentioned in the Lithuanian political and public

discourse. Instead, concerns were voiced about the social costs of restructuring the

sector and ideational considerations arose due to the agrarian character of Lithuania.

The agricultural sector has traditionally represented a larger share of the Baltic

economies, Lithuania in particular, than is usual in industrial countries. For example,

in 1990, agriculture made up 28 percent of GDP in Lithuania. While agricultural GDP

input decreased to 9 percent by 1999, 20 percent of the Lithuanian population was

still employed in the agricultural sector.59 In fact the agricultural labour force

increased since it absorbed workers made redundant in other sectors. For example in

1990, the agricultural sector accounted for 17.8 percent of labour while in 1997 it rose

to 20.8 percent.60 Due to the disproportional segment of the population living and

working in the Lithuanian countryside, there were thorny issues to be considered

when restructuring the agricultural sector that were not apparent from the positive

statistics of CAP investments and transfer payments. President Adamkus discussed

some of these considerations in 2000:

‘In my opinion, the most difficult challenges lie for our agriculture. Today 30percent of the Lithuanian population lives in the countryside. As you know, inindustrial states like Germany about 2 percent of the population work in theagricultural sector and they feed a population of over 50 million. In Lithuaniathere are 30 percent farmers, while the nation’s population is 3.7 million.Lithuania was traditionally a farming country, but we will have to reduce theworkers in this sector to 10 percent.’61

58 Piesarskas, 2002(a), p. 1659 Ozolina in Lieven and Trenin, p. 21960 Hilary Ingham and Mike Ingham, EU Expansion to the East, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2002, p. 3361 Adamkus, Valdas, Penkeri Darbo Metai, Baltos Lankos, Vilnius, 2002, p. 309

41


Reducing the number of workers in the agricultural sector created social costs and

was difficult to accomplish politically. Farmers, making up a large portion of the

population and one that was politically organized with the Farmers Party (Valstiečiu

Partija) opposed EU membership despite the predicted overall benefits for the sector

from integration. Throughout the late 1990s, Lithuanian farmers – the largest lobby

groups in the country – have managed to receive import protection from the

government, even when such protection contradicted international obligations of

Lithuania in its accession process.62

While for the economists the transformation and reduction of the agricultural sector

may seem like an efficient development, it is important to note that in Lithuania

agriculture retains a certain special and sentimental place in the minds of the public

that stems from the Lithuanian agrarian national identity that was formulated in the

nineteenth century.63 Thus, social and ideational issues have coloured the perception

and policies on Lithuanian agriculture in the face of EU integration. Public discourse

has been filled with calls for protection of farmers against the EU agenda: if farmers

are not protected than ‘agriculture will die in Lithuania’ which will threaten the

foundations of the state since the Lithuanians ‘do not have anything else but land.’64

In summary, though according to rational utility analysis EU integration is beneficial

for the Lithuanian agricultural sector, ideational factors have prevented CAP from

being seen in a positive light in elite and public discourse. From the social and

identity perspective, CAP threatens to destroy the social fabric of the Lithuanian

countryside and jeopardize the Lithuanian national identity.

62 Vilpisauskas and Steponaviciute in Tang, p. 5963 Writers and activists such as Donelaitis, Baranauskas, and others idealized Lithuania as a nation ofsmall farmers living close to their land and avoiding foreign influences. 64 Adamkus, Valdas, Trys Metiniai Pranesimai 1999-2001, Baltu Lanku Leidyba,Vilnius, 2001, p. 51

42


The EU’s request to close the Ignalina NPP due to safety reasons was the other main

concern for Lithuania. The Ignalina Protocol for the Accession Treaty stipulated that

Lithuania is committed, at EU request, to close Unit 1 of Ignalina before 2005 and

Unit 2 by 2009. For Lithuania this was no easy choice since in 1995, the year it

submitted its application to the EU, Lithuania was ranked the world’s most nuclear

dependent country with 85 percent dependency.65 In contrast to the case of agriculture,

in terms of rational utility the closure appeared costly for the Lithuanian state.

However, the public and the government were generally more receptive to this cost of

EU membership than the perceived costs of agricultural reform.

The costs of decommissioning the Ignalina plant were estimated at around LTL 1.8

billion for the period of 2002-2009, excluding investments in construction of new

power plants, modernisation of the existing power plants, and implementation of

environmental measures. In total, due to EU integration the energy sector from 2002

to 2009 would require an investment of LTL 3.7 billion and would experience losses

of LTL 2.2 billion. Most of these investments and costs stem from the closure of

Ignalina and implementation of environmental projects in the energy sector. The

government would experience costs of 655 million, which would be used to finance

the closure of Ignalina and investments into structural funds. 66

Despite the high anticipated costs, the EU was quite parsimonious with regard to

compensation and assistance causing a considerable amount of resentment in

Lithuania during the years of negotiations. In the end, Lithuania negotiated a

65 Mel Huang, Electricity in the Air: The Real Power Politics in the Baltics, Defence Academy of theUK, London, UK 2002, p. 2 66 Piesarskas, 2002(a), p. 4

43


decommissioning package of EUR 285 million for 2004-2006 from the EU, who

initially only offered EUR 210 millions, and continuous support for Lithuania's

decommissioning efforts after 2007.67 In total, Lithuania anticipated receiving funds

of over LTL 2 billion during 2002-2009 from various sources such as EU, donor

countries, and structural funds. 68

However, the above numbers should not be taken at face value and, to a degree, risk

being misleading. In the case of the Ignalina power plant, for instance, EU

subventions covered the cost of closure of the plant and perhaps some social spending

for the unemployed members of the sector while, in the end leaving Lithuania with a

need to find an alternative source of energy and deprived the country of a potential

source of revenue in power export. For instance, in 1998 the Ignalina plant generated

77 percent of Lithuania’s electricity. Also in the 1990’s, Lithuania’s electricity output

doubled between 1994 and 1996 as residential energy consumption increased. In

addition to meeting its growing internal demand of energy, the state had been

generating income from exporting energy to its neighbours such as Latvia,

Kaliningrad, and Belarus.69 Lastly, Ignalina had strategic importance for Lithuania: it

provided electricity even when Russian oil flows were reduced or interrupted.

According to Clemens, ‘many Lithuanians who had wanted after the 1986 Chernobyl

meltdown to close down Ignalina had changed their minds in the 1990s, when Russia

showed it could stop oil deliveries to Lithuania.’70

67 Purlys in Maniokas, Vilpisauskas, and Zeruolis, p. 12468 Piesarskas, 2002(a), p. 1669 Walter C. Clemens, The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security, Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, Landham, NC, 2002, p. 14070 Ibid., p. 141

44


Thus, it is unsurprising that initially some Lithuanian elites were cautious in

complying with EU requests and shutting down the power plant. In 1998, the

government of Prime Minister Vagnorius had second thoughts. The head of the

Nuclear Energy Division in Lithuania’s Economic Ministry, citing an international

study, argued that there were no safety reasons to close the Ignalina plant.71 Rather

than searching for alternative sources of energy, the Vagnorius government wanted to

export electrical energy across Poland to Western Europe and looked for ways to

extend Ignalina’s life to 2015. Opponents said that shutting down Ignalina would spell

economic suicide for Lithuania and said that total costs from the shutdown would run

into billion of dollars – far more than any aid tendered by the EU.72

Yet by 1999, Lithuania’s parliament, led by Western-oriented politicians such as

Landbergis and President Adamkus, agreed to close one of Ignalina’s two reactors by

2005. In 2002 President Adamkus explained the logic behind Lithuania’s willingness

to close the plant by saying ‘our nuclear reactors are not permanent. We will be able

to avoid shutting them down in the future. Perhaps it will be rational to replace them

with newer more modern ones. [The] European Commission is offering us support.

Thus, it is necessary now for Lithuania to negotiate the most beneficial terms.’73

Yet it was not just a ‘rational’ choice to dismantle the reactors. It can be argued that

ideational factors played a role in Lithuania’s decision. Significantly, the

independence movement in the Baltics was greatly associated with the

environmentalist movement against the rampant pollution of the Soviet years. In

71 Grazina Miniotaite, The Security Policy of Lithuania and the ‘Integration Dilemma,’ LithuanianInstitute of Philosophy and Sociology, Vilnius, 1999, p. 3272 Clemens, p. 140-173 Adamkus 2002, p. 246

45


Lithuania, in the late 1980s, there was a strong public movement against the building

of the third nuclear reactor in Ignalina by the Soviets, and many of current

government elites had participated in that movement. It is possible that the general

unpopularity of these Soviet-imposed nuclear reactors made the decision to close

Ignalina easier.

In summary, the sums and differences of rational costs and benefits of EU

membership do not appear to have been decisive in Lithuania’s two key issue areas.

Despite calculated benefits from CAP, the transformation of the agricultural sector

was perceived to be one of the main drawbacks of EU membership for Lithuania. On

the other hand, the seemingly costly closure of Ignalina did not preclude membership.

Domestic Politics

By the mid- to late 1990s, economic factors of EU membership entered the Lithuanian

domestic politics. As has been noted in the previous section, the perceived negative

effects of CAP resulted in the Farmers Party opposing EU membership. However,

from the economic sphere, it was the EU reforms that became one of the most salient

issues of domestic politics. Lithuanian political elites used EU reforms instrumentally:

at some stages using the EU to justify the needed reforms to the public while at other

stages emphasizing the stand-alone necessity of reforms when Euro-scepticism rose

among the Lithuanian public. The elites realized that economic, political, and societal

reforms must be completed for Lithuania to transform itself after fifty years of

planned economy and non-democratic government even without the prospect of EU

membership. However, there was a hope among the policy class that EU membership

and the accession process would accelerate reform implementation through the

46


expertise and pressure of the EU. There was also a tactical use of EU policy to

implement reforms in order to make them politically less costly for the governing

elites. Government officials often presented their reform agendas by stating that this is

a direct request from Brussels. With high public support for EU membership in the

early years of the transition (1990-1993) 74, the government elites sought to gain from

such tactics.

In spite of this instrumental reliance on the EU to speed reforms, the Lithuanian elites

often dragged their feet on implementation. By the mid-‘90s , the Baltic states had

started implementing pre-accession strategies of the Association Agreements and the

White Paper75 which in effect meant implementing costly reforms. The costs of the

acquis were already beginning to be felt in the first years of seeking EU membership,

while the potential benefits still lay far ahead and were still intangible.76 By 1997,

when the Commission made its recommendations, Lithuania and Latvia had

completed fewer reforms than Estonia and because of this some argue, they were not

invited to the first round of negotiations.

The decision of the EU Commission was both a wake up call to the government elites

and a new opportunity to use the EU as an anchor to push through the needed but

costly economic reforms. The discourse on the necessity of economic reforms became

very prominent by the end of 1998. In his Annual Address for the start of 1999,

President Adamkus implied that Lithuania’s rejection from the first round of

negotiations was due to the slow reforms and emphasized the need to speed up74 Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes ‘Central and East European Views on EU Enlargement: PoliticalDebates and Public Opinion’ in Karen Henderson, ed., Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europeand the European Union, University of Leicester, Leicester, 1999, p. 18675 Vilpisauskas and Steponaviciute in Tang, p. 5776 With the exception of the PHARE program which provided funding for the Baltic states and had beenoperating in Lithuania since 1992

47


domestic reforms in the annual address.77 Adamkus emphasized not only the

economic aspects of domestic reform such as improving the tax collection system,

private investment, and the structure of the agricultural sector but also called for a

modernization of the state and its governing, issuance of new laws, improving the

judicial system, fighting corruption, and reforming education.78 Adamkus explained

the poor economic performance of 1999 as – ‘nothing less but the price of non-

implemented reforms. The price of politics biased towards the inertia of the past and

the fear of change.’79 Adamkus’ emphasis on non-implemented reforms as the greatest

ill for the Lithuanian economy and only a brief mention of the Russian financial crisis

during this Annual Address highlights the instrumental usage of the EU reforms in

domestic politics. By 2000, at a high point of Euro-scepticism, there was also a

noticeable change in elite tactics regarding EU reforms. In another Annual Address,

Adamkus addressed the public backlash against EU-driven reforms and the tendency

of politicians to blame the costs of reforms on the integration process. Adamkus

stated:

‘Today I want to emphasize once more what I have said many times: allreforms, which we planned to fulfil before joining the EU, are beingimplemented for our own benefit, not because the EU demands it. Theargument that “Brussels wants this” should be eliminated from the politicalvocabulary – by taking any political decision, first we must answer what weourselves need.’80

While Lithuanian elites adjusted their discourse on reforms to changes in public

opinion on the EU (from high public support in the early 1990s to Euro-scepticism of

the late 1990s), one should not conclude that the Lithuanian elites based their reform

agenda on public opinion. Despite, the high public support for the EU in the early

77 Adamkus 2001, p. 3478 Ibid., p. 7-3479 Ibid., p. 4080 Adamkus 2001, p. 73

48


years of transition (1990-93) 81 elites were slow to implement reforms. The lowest

point in terms of public opinion on EU membership for Lithuania was in the end of

1999 and beginning of 2000, when those ‘against’ exceeded those ‘for’ EU

membership (35 percent versus 29 percent and the remainder voting neutral). Yet this

was also the time when the Lithuanian government reiterated its EU membership goal

and accelerated reform efforts. The following chapters on security factors and the key

episode study will demonstrate that public opinion did not generally play a major role

in Lithuania’s EU policy decisions. In fact, throughout the decade of seeking EU

membership public opinion and elite EU views often clashed. For example, as this

chapter revealed, an opportunistic policy of close economic relationship with Russia

was pursued at times of greatest Euro-enthusiasm among the public.

Ideational Considerations

The ideational factors that underscored economic considerations regarding EU

membership were centred on two complementary constructs: projections of the EU as

a model to be emulated and the fear of being ‘left out of Europe’. From the days pre-

dating Lithuania’s independence movement to 2002, the EU was perceived as a model

of wealth, economic growth, efficiency and social progress. The discourse of the

government elites continuously emphasized the economic benefits of EU in symbolic

ways - viewing the EU as an ideal to be achieved. This hope of emulation stemmed

from the understanding of the EU as an anchor for reforms and Lithuania’s sole

instrument for progress. For example, Adamkus stated in 2000:

‘Today, we could, without the support of others, try to remedy the decades offalling behind the Western worlds’ progress. But let us not forget that the Westdoes not stand still. In many cases it is transforming much faster than us.

81 Grabbe and Hughes, p. 186

49


Thus, the only real chance for Lithuania to escape provincial backwardness isto get on the fast Europe train.’82

Auštrevičius, the Lithuanian EU negotiation team’s second man, called the EU ‘one of

the main drivers of our internal reforms’ and said that ‘no one has come up with

anything better than EU membership. For Lithuania EU means political stability, state

security, economic growth, and social welfare. More than half of Lithuanian people

associate a better life with EU’.83 In 2000, the Foreign minister of Lithuania,

Saudargas clearly linked the foreign policy goal of EU membership to domestic

aspirations and policies by stating that ‘EU membership is an essential means for

Lithuanian economic and societal modernization’.84 The view that EU membership

presented the best available path for Lithuania’s development heavily influenced

foreign and domestic policies. Alternatives to EU membership were never seriously

considered, as ideational considerations made the case for EU membership appear

demonstrably more persuasive than any other options.

Though ideational factors continued to play an important role in the elite thinking, by

2002, a more practical approach started appearing in the discourse of the government

that sought to understand in rational, material terms the potential economic benefits of

EU membership. Auštrevičius, wrote in 2002 that ‘Integration euphoria has been

replaced with a practical concern – how to best prepare for membership, what

membership means and how it is beneficial to us.’85 Yet while the government elites

started considering EU membership in practical terms in addition to ideational ones,

the public and the media continued in their overwhelmingly symbolic interpretation of

82 Italics added. Adamkus 2001, p.4483 Petras Auštrevičius, ‘Tautinis Identitetas ir Vieningos Europos Raida,’ in Darius Staliunas, EuroposIdeja Lietuvoje: Istorija ir Dabartis, LII Leidykla, 2002, p. 17284 Purlys in Maniokas,Vilpisauskas and Zeruolis, p. 98. 85 Auštrevičius in Staliunas, p. 172

50


the Union. The persistence of the euphoric rhetoric presenting the EU as the answer to

all of Lithuania’s economic problems is highlighted by the dialogue between

newspaper Obzor and President Adamkus in 2002:

Obzor: ‘The media from morning to evening announces that our future isthe integration to NATO and EU. All of this is presented as panacea from allillnesses. Can it be that as soon as we have joined these organizations allproblems will be solved? Can it be that ‘uncle foreigner’ will solve ourdifficulties?’

Adamkus – ‘I want to say it clearly – neither NATO nor EU is the kite thatwill bring us fortunes. Everything depends on us. Organizations about whichwe are taking are only a means to create wellbeing and security. For example,the Irish have taken advantage of the opportunities presented by the EU andtoday are one of the economic leaders of EU.86

Even though elites started to analyze EU policies from a rational perspective, not

solely from an ideational one, the importance of ideational factors cannot be

underestimated in Lithuania’s EU policy. The rationalist analysis gained force only in

2002, when Lithuania had already concluded EU accession negotiations and

Lithuania’s EU policy was unlikely to be reversed.

The second important ideational aspect that influenced elites’ understanding of the

economic benefits of EU membership was the perceived political, economic, and

cultural insecurity of Lithuania as a newly independent state on the cross roads of

greater geopolitical divisions and the consequent fear of being left out of the EU. The

ideational arguments were often intertwined with the fear of negative economic

repercussions of non-membership but were often disproportionate in comparison to

the material dangers. Vinogradnaite, in a study of policy class discourse, notes that in

Lithuania Europe was understood as a closed entity and that a state remaining outside

the borders of the EU cannot be called a European state. Thus discourse on the

possibility of staying out of EU utilized phrases such as ‘Lithuania will become the

86 Adamkus 2002, p. 247

51


province of Europe,’ ‘on the outskirts of Europe.’87 At the same time, even before

Lithuania was offered membership, the perception of belonging to an exclusive

European club was to some extent already present at the pre-accession stage when

Lithuania was an associate member. In the words of Landsbergis, Association

membership in the EU, was celebrated almost as membership itself, since it implied

proximity to Europe – ‘we were no longer in the backyard [of Europe] surrounded by

vicious dogs.’88

While this fear of being left out of Europe was pervasive from 1991 to 2002 it became

most marked in the few years from 1997 to 2000. During this episode the gap between

ideational fears and real material losses increased. The possibility of being left out of

the EU while another Baltic State – Estonia was invited to start negotiations marked a

psychological blow to the government elites of Lithuania. Political discourse became

centred on visions of Lithuania as a non-EU member being stuck in a ‘Baltic ghetto’

or a ‘grey zone’ between enlarging EU and revanchist Russia.89 Lithuania’s Prime

Minister Vagnorius warned a meeting of the European Parliament’s Christian

Democrats that barring his country and Latvia from the first wave of enlargement

could stoke security tensions in the Baltic region and create ‘new dividing lines in

Europe.’90 Though Lithuania was only being left out from the first round of the

negotiation process, and its application was being reviewed in just a year’s time, the

EU’s decision was interpreted as monumental and irreversibly detrimental to national

interests. This key episode and the accompanying ideational aspects will be discussed

at length in the last chapter.

87 Inga Vinogradnaite, ‘Kelias Europon: Europiestiskojo Identiteto Konstravimas,’ in Staliunas, p. 18788 Vytautas Landsbergis, interviewed by author, 11 April 2006.89 Herd Graeme, ‘The Baltic States and EU Enlargement,’ in Henderson, p. 262, 26790 Graham Avery and Fraser Cameron, The Enlargement of the European Union, Sheffield AcademicPress, 1999, p. 123

52


In summary, ideational aspects were closely intertwined with the perceived benefits

and costs of EU membership. Since ideational constructs of the EU as a model and the

dangers of non-membership complemented the rationalist motivations for reforms and

the fears of negative economic externalities of non-membership, the ideational factors

we have noted were particularly salient in Lithuania’s EU policy. To be sure, it is

difficult to isolate ideational strands that only influenced economic considerations

since fears such as being left out of Europe came to influence security, political, and

cultural considerations as will be seen in the subsequent chapters.

Conclusions

It has been shown that rational utility considerations were not salient for most of

Lithuania’s decision process of seeking EU membership. Transfer payments and FDI

opportunities were hardly motivating factors in the early 1990s as Lithuania was

trying to establish its independence and was seeking a relationship with the EU for

political recognition and from a desire to move out the Russian sphere of influence.

When economic motivations for EU membership did enter elite calculations, they

were always highly connected to perceptions. As Vilpisauskas notes in his analysis of

Lithuania’s economic motivations for seeking EU membership: the ‘EU has been

perceived as a centre of economic prosperity…Its importance as a source of economic

opportunities and resources…has provided a strong impetus for raising EU

membership to the top of the Baltic state’s foreign policy goals.’91 By the mid-1990s,

the prospects of transforming the Lithuanian economy along the model proposed by

91 Italics added. Ramunas Vilpisauskas, ‘Regional integration in Europe: Analysing intra-Balticeconomic cooperation in the context of European integration,’ in Vello Pettai, and Jan Zielonka, eds.,The Road to the European Union: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, volume 2, Manchester UniversityPress, Manchester & New York, 2003, p. 172

53


the EU was highly appealing, but may not have been enough to keep Lithuania on the

fast track on EU accession. Yet the fear of being left out, a sense of competition with

its Baltic neighbours as well as the consequences of the Russian financial crisis

cemented Lithuanian elites’ resolve for membership.

Even though a mathematical calculation of costs and benefits of EU membership

probably did result in a ‘yes’ vote on EU membership, these calculations were not

completed in Lithuania until 2000 or even 2002. By this point the policies of seeking

EU membership were already a decade old, and thus were motivated by other factors

than a rationalist utility analysis. The rationalist utility arguments for the EU were

more a tool for a negotiation strategy rather than a deciding factor for seeking EU

membership. Furthermore, during the time that rationalist analysis were being

completed Lithuania was already negotiating for EU membership and thus EU-geared

policies were unlikely to be reversed by the government even in the face of potential

costs of membership such as the closure of the Ignalina plant. In addition to the elite

consensus on the necessity of EU membership it seems that there was a phenomenon

of ‘path dependency’ for Lithuanian in its EU policy. Even in 2000 when Euro-

scepticism was high and some politicians questioned the benefits of EU membership,

the existing EU policy prevailed. The perceived lack of alternatives for Lithuanian

development, highlighted by the Russian financial crisis, was the primary reason for

Lithuania’s dependency on the EU path.

Economic considerations lacked salience for most of Lithuania’s EU membership

strategy and process. However, it is not because there were not valid economic

benefits to be gained from membership. The Lithuanian accession package and the

54


economists’ projections demonstrate that Lithuania was poised to experience further

growth and development from membership, despite some costs of integration. The

primary reason that economic considerations by themselves lacked decisive weight is

that Lithuanian identity seems to be a dominant factor in its EU policy. This identity

stems from Lithuania’s geopolitical and economic vulnerability as a new state in

transition and is responsible for the two main ideational drivers: an idealized view of

the EU as a model for Lithuania’s development, and the fear of being left out of

Europe.

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Chapter 3: Political and Security Factors in Lithuania’s EU Policy

Most analyses of the Baltic accession stress political and particularly security

motivations for membership.92 Security however is a complex dimension that

stretches from hard to soft security encompassing factors such as military defence

considerations, entering or exiting certain spheres of influence, economic and social

security, political voice and political access. While security can be analyzed as an

objective condition from a rationalist standpoint, in this case greater insight is gained

from considering its subjective dimension since Lithuanian cultural perceptions and

identity figured greatly in all of the noted security dimensions.

The following chapter will explain Lithuania’s EU policy by focusing on the tension

and concord between ideational and material factors in Lithuanian elite considerations

of EU policy. In examining political and security motivations it is particularly difficult

to separate ideational from material concerns as the two are often intertwined and, in

the case of Lithuania, reinforce each other. The subsequent analysis will not attempt

to separate the political and security motivations into rational and ideational

categories as was done in the chapter on economic motivations but in this case proves

to be rather artificial. Rather the analysis will emphasize throughout the chapter when

ideational factors were at the forefront of security and political considerations. This

chapter will demonstrate that political and security motivations were of great

importance in Lithuania’s aspiration to join Europe, particularly in the years leading

up to the decision to seek EU membership in 1995. It will also argue that political and

92 The work of Herd, Grabbe and Hughes, Miniotaite, Ozolina, Tiilikainen, Austrevicius, andVilpisauskas cited throughout this thesis emphasizes the primacy of security motivations in Lithuania’sEU policy.

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security motivations were decisive in creating an EU membership strategy when they

were reinforced by complementary ideational factors.

First the chapter will document the way security concerns evolved from 1991 to 2002:

becoming less salient after 1995 but at the same time expanding from primarily

military concerns to a preoccupation with the broad benefits of soft security and

political access. Then, an analysis of hard security, soft security, political voice, and

domestic political factors using rationalist and ideational perspectives will follow.

The Changing Salience and Nature of Security Concerns

Almost immediately following independence in 1991, Lithuania was concerned about

its political and economic security as well as cultural autonomy. While the reasons

for, and intensity of, these concerns fluctuated with time, security remained at the

forefront of Vilnius’ EU policy considerations especially in the years leading up to the

submission of the application for EU membership in 1995.

Lithuania’s political relationship with the EU began in 1991 when the EU recognized

Lithuania’s independence from the USSR. While this represented a significant

political gain for the country, it did little to alleviate the county’s immediate security

concerns. Recognising that the country continued to face material risks, particularly

from Russia who still had troops stationed on Lithuanian soil, Lithuania’s leaders

embarked on a course to gain full EU membership as one means of enhancing its

security. At the onset, however, the country’s top foreign and domestic policy

57


objective was to convince Russia to remove its troops which it eventually did in

1993.93

Once Russia withdrew its troops, Lithuania sought and gained entry to the Council of

Europe. Membership in the Council was effectively Lithuania’s first political step

towards EU membership since even though the Council is distinct from the EU no

country has ever joined the Union without being a member of the Council. While

membership had numerous benefits, the Lithuanian government presented Council

membership as an act of security-seeking. According to Landsbergis, the head of

Lithuanian state at the time, Lithuanian membership in the Council of Europe meant

‘western political direction, incorporation in and recognition by European structures,

thus, political security.’94 EU membership, like membership of the Council, was

understood primarily and almost exclusively through the prism of political security

concerns by Lithuania’s policy elites until the application for membership was

submitted. Yet these security concerns were driven often not by an imminent Russian

threat on the ground but rather by Lithuanian historical experience and by Lithuania’s

perception of Russia and itself.

After Russian troops left Lithuania in 1993 and Yeltsin’s brief love affair with the

West ended, Russian bellicose rhetoric returned, giving no end of unease to the

Lithuanians. In 1996, for example, the Russian Duma decided to recall the agreement

regarding the dissolution of the USSR and announced as valid the 1991 referendum

93 See Vytautas Landsbergis , Kryzkele, Lietuvos Aidas, Vilnius 1995 and Vytautas Landsbergis,Lithuania: Independent Again, University of Wales Press, Wales, 2000. The other Baltic states hadsimilar foreign policy priorities. See Romuald, J. Misiunas, “National Identity and Foreign Policy inthe Baltic States,” in Fredrick Starr, ed., The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States ofEurasia, M.E. Sharpe, New York and London, 1994, p. 10694 Landsbergis, 1995, p. 78

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results safeguarding the USSR.95 In another instance, the Russian Defence Research

Institute supported by the Ministry of Defence produced a report in 1996 warning that

Russia might need to fight in the Baltics in the near future. Anton Surikov, a

researcher at the institute, explained that Russia would reoccupy the pribaltika region

if the Baltic states joined NATO or tried to expel Russian speakers and that they did

not expect the world to respond. On a similar note, Zhirinovsky declared in 1996 ‘I

am doing everything to liquidate the Baltic states.’96 While this rhetoric represented

the opinions of a marginal section of Russian ultranationalist elites rather than official

Russian policy, it still caused alarm for the Lithuanians who were all too familiar with

the danger of ignoring Russian antagonism. Bellicose Russian rhetoric was not,

however, all hot air. In fact, Russia made several moves beginning in the late 1990s

that were viewed as decidedly pugnacious by Lithuanian leaders. For instance, in the

summer of 1999, Russian military manoeuvres took place on land and sea near to

Latvia and Estonia. Landsbergis called the 1999 manoeuvres ‘a gesture of

psychological cold war against the Baltic states.’97 In 2000, US satellite photos

showed that Russia had moved short-range nuclear weapons from St. Petersburg to a

storage facility in Kaliningrad.98

While the Russian tactics and rhetoric could have been ignored as posturing by many

Western states, the history of Russian aggression in the Baltics led the Lithuanians to

conclude that they still faced potential danger from the East. President Adamkus’

words as late as year 2000 highlighted the security concerns of Lithuania stemming

95 Klaudijus Maniokas and Gediminas Vitkus, Lietuvos Integracija I ES : Bukles, Perspektyviu irPasekmiu Studija, Eugrimas, Vilnius 1997, p. 5396 Walter C. Clemens, The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security, Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, Landham, NC, 2002, p. 18897 Ibid., p. 19098 Ibid., p. 196

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from its historical experience and the perception that EU and NATO could provide a

solution to these concerns:

‘Can we take risks today regarding NATO and EU issues? I believe, thatneither the Lithuania’s tragic twentieth century experience, nor presentrealities allows us to naively speak about national security without alliances.Let’s not forget Balys Sruoga’s [national poet] warning: history destined us to“build our home on Vesuvius.” …The historical responsibility of allLithuanian citizens is to guarantee a secure future for the nation.’99

Furthermore, Russian rhetoric and actions were often magnified by the local media

and some political parties to emphasize to the Lithuanian public and at times to the

international community the Lithuanian need for international security guarantees

against Russia. Thus, due to a genuine fear of Russian threat and due to tactical

reasons aimed at the international community, Lithuanian elites still viewed EU

membership greatly in security terms and sought security guarantees through

membership in NATO throughout the accession decade.

Yet by the late 1990s, Lithuanian and Baltic leaders were becoming less concerned

about a military Russian threat in the near future as a clear gap existed between

Russia’s capabilities, resolve, and rhetoric. As such, security in a narrow military

sense was less often used to describe the benefits of EU membership. Instead, soft

security conceptions consisting of political, economic, environmental and social

aspects seemed to sway Vilnius towards EU membership in the years after the

submission of the EU membership application. In the late 1990s, another

consideration gained salience - the prospect of having a political voice in European

affairs and participation in the world community through EU membership. Political

voice was seen as both an ideational and rational benefit that was increasingly cited as

the negotiation process drew closer. Along with growing awareness of the political

99 Adamkus, Valdas, Trys Metiniai Pranesimai 1999-2001, Baltu Lanku Leidyba,Vilnius, 2001, p. 43

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benefits of EU membership by 2000, there was a growing concern about the political

costs of joining the EU such as limitations on state sovereignty. By 2000, when

Lithuania entered into membership negotiations with the Union, the hard security

motivations of the early 1990s had greatly given way to broader considerations of the

political benefits and costs of membership.

Hard Security Needs and Concerns

While Lithuanians elites had deep concerns over national security, their fears may

well have exceeded actual security needs. Furthermore, the hard security concerns of

Lithuania often diverged from the EU’s capacity to address them. While Lithuania’s

concerns have been driven by ideational factors, Lithuania’s needs are a result of its

material factors. In this sense, the preoccupation with security concerns in Lithuania’s

motives for membership suggests that ideational factors were more important than

material factors in Lithuania’s accession policy.

The primary hard security objective of Lithuania following 1991 was the desire to

maintain its independence and territorial integrity from the potential threat of Russia

as noted above. As Misiunas argued in 1994, fear of Russia and of Russians continued

to constitute the dominant leitmotif in the foreign and internal policies of all three

Baltic nations.100 Since the ‘Balts generally tend to consider most Russians

incorrigible imperialists who would if circumstances once again proved favourable, as

in 1939-40, move to reincorporate their countries into a greater Russia,’101 Lithuanian

foreign policy priorities focused on securing themselves against such circumstances,

particularly in the early to mid-1990s.

100 Misiunas in Starr, p. 95101 Ibid., p. 107

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Initially, there were several possible security policy options available for Lithuania

and the Baltic states. Neutrality was the first option, a popular idea in the political

discourse in 1989-91 and one that remained an active option until 1994; it was

seriously raised as late as 1996. However, it was considered a potentially dangerous

strategy especially when the Russian Duma elections of 1995 reflected the ideology of

‘return to the empire.’ Neutrality was also seen as an increasingly outdated policy in a

post-Cold War Europe when other neutral countries such as Finland and Sweden

joined the EU 1995.102 Another policy option was to create an alliance of the Baltic

states but though this idea attracted popular support in Lithuania it did not take root

with the political elites.103 As Landsbergis stated, it was ‘impossible to be neither there

[West] nor elsewhere [East].’104 Thus the last viable option and the one Lithuania

chose to pursue was membership in multilateral alliances such as NATO and the EU.

Though Lithuanian elites evoked hard security concerns throughout the 1990s it is

questionable to what extent these concerns were justified. On one hand there were

some valid fears in the mid-1990s when nationalist and imperialist rhetoric and

actions gained popularity in Russia. Thus in 1997, leading Lithuanian political

scholars, Maniokas and Vitkus, argued that despite the current stable relations with

Russia ‘Today it is difficult to contradict that Russia and the uncertainty of its future

developments constitutes one of the greatest possible threats to the security of the

Baltic region and all of Europe.’105 Yet, foreign analysts deemed an imminent threat

from Russia to be unlikely. Kamp has emphasized that ‘given the decrepitude of the

102 Grazina Miniotaite, ‘The Baltic States: In Search of Security and Identity’ in Charles Krupnick, ed.,Almost NATO, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003, p. 275103 Miniotaite in Krupnick, p. 277104 Vytautas Landsbergis interviewed by author, April 11, 2006.105 Maniokas and Vitkus, p. 63

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Russian armed forces, an invasion of the Baltic states was and is probably not even

possible militarily, quite apart from the disaster for Russia’s international position

which would result.’106

Lithuanian security concerns were not generally based on rational calculations of

imminent or probable Russian aggression and thus, often diverged from Lithuania’s

material security needs. Rather, these concerns stemmed from broader historical

perceptions of self and other, national identities and a general feeling of geopolitical

weakness. The role of Lithuanian national identity is best conceptualized as both

European and at the same time anti-Russian – identifying with Europe and seeking

EU integration while at the same actively trying to escape the Russian sphere of

influence. Formal and informal evocations of the Lithuanian European identity are

frequent in Lithuanian security conceptions and policies. For example, the law on the

Basics of National Security of Lithuania (1996) includes a guiding principle: ‘the

Lithuanian State, established many centuries ago and resting on the Christian cultural

foundation unifying Europe, is an integral part of the community of European

nations.’107 An understanding of the ‘other’ as the East or Russia is formalized at the

level of Lithuanian constitutional law with the act ‘On the Non-Alignment of the

Republic of Lithuania with Post-Soviet Eastern Alliances’ (1992), which explicitly

prohibits the Lithuanian state from entering into any alliance with countries in the

post-Soviet space.108 The dualistic Lithuanian identity particularly in the sphere of

security, demonstrates that the Lithuanian accession case was more complex than the

106 Karl-Heinz Kamp ‘The Dynamics of NATO Enlargement’ in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, eds.,Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and Price of Membership, Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, Washington D.C, 2003, p. 197107 Inga Pavlovaite, ‘Paradise Regained: The Conceptualization of Europe in the Lithuanian Debate’ inMarko Lehti, and David J. Smith, eds., Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and BalticExperience, Frank Cass Publishers, London and Portland, 2003, p. 202108 Ibid., p. 201

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‘back to Europe’ motive, and that the fear of Russia was as much of a driving force as

the lure of the EU. In fact, the choice to pursue EU membership can be seen as a type

of ‘protest vote’ against Lithuania’s historical relegation to the Russian sphere of

influence.

Lithuanian hard security concerns – whether based on real needs or perceptions –

could only be met by NATO as the EU does not offer any guarantees against

aggression on state integrity and sovereignty. However in the early 1990s the EU was

often presented in policy and discourse as an additional security guarantee to NATO.

According to Pavlovaite, ‘Although the EU is conceptualized as providing security

guarantees against potential aggression from Russia, NATO membership is seen as the

ultimate and more relevant goal in hard security terms.’109 Thus, both EU and NATO

membership were formally a part of Lithuania’s security strategy as expounded in the

Basics of National Security of Lithuania law of 1996. The law cites membership in

NATO, WEU, and the EU as the primary means of ‘ensuring Lithuanian security and

the country’s habitation in the zone of peace.’110 Broadly then, in the early 1990s, EU

membership was conceptualized and presented in the political discourse as a potential

security guarantee against military aggression from Russia.

Although EU and NATO membership were often understood as complementary tools

to achieve hard security, Lithuania developed an increasingly broader understanding

of the benefits of the two organizations as the 1990s progressed. By the late 1990s and

early 2000s, NATO and the EU were less frequently evoked as guarantors against

Russia. In his 2001 Annual Address, President Adamkus stated that Euro-Atlantic

109 Ibid., p. 202110 Miniotaite in Krupnick, p. 269

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integration ‘is not a balance against Russia. Euro-Atlantic integration means being in

a common values space. It is not directed against anyone.’ President Adamkus

highlighted the economic and social aspects of EU security, which was a noticeable

shift from the discourse on the Russian threat in the early and mid 1990s. He stated

that ‘I am convinced that its not foreign military threats that gives rise to the greatest

danger to Lithuania’s security, but our potential economic and social

backwardness.’111 Landsbergis also broadened the perceived benefits of NATO stating

that it ‘enhances the protection of the market, trust, encourages investment in the safe

space and speeds up the preparations for EU membership.’112 The cited remarks reveal

a change in the articulations of EU and NATO and seem to reflect Lithuania’s

changing security notions.113 However, though the discourse on the Russian threat had

changed, perceptions may not have changed fully. Furthermore, the change in

discourse may have been tactical and aimed at the international community rather

than a result of altered perceptions. Vareikis writes, ‘For Central Europe, Russia and

its allies remain, as it they were, a natural threat’ but continues to say that ‘to speak

about Russia’s threat is old fashioned and simply uncouth. No matter how it really is,

today candidate states say they are seeking NATO membership to increase European

security and stability, not because of any Russian threat. All of this may not matter,

but NATO accession is so difficult particularly because of Russia.’ 114

In summary, Lithuania’s EU membership was motivated to some extent by material

security concerns such as the presence of Russian troops until 1993, and bellicose

rhetoric and provocative military tactics from Russia. However, these concerns were111 Adamkus 2001, p. 69112 Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 202113 The new security outlook was articulated in Lithuania’s new concept of national defence of 2000which based more on a cooperative conception of international relations, less sovereignty focused andless securitized. Ibid., p. 202114 Egidijus Vareikis, Dinozaurejanti Europa, Stroga, Vilnius, 2002, p. 228-245

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made more salient and thus, lasting and decisive due to the ideational considerations

stemming from Lithuania’s historical legacy and national identity.

Soft Security Benefits

Increasingly in the mid-1990s Lithuanian government elites began to broaden the

discussion of the potential security benefits of EU membership beyond the

geopolitical and military. Vilnius recognised that the EU acted as a link between

Lithuania and other European states creating a level of soft security as a complement

to the hard security requirements of the country. In the words of Maniokas and Vitkus

in 1997, ‘the EU like other alliances is not ambivalent about the security of member

states though it does not provide guarantees and does not take responsibility to protect

its members from aggression as does NATO.’115

EU membership was also seen to provide soft political security to Lithuania since it

was a means for Lithuania to move out the Russian sphere of influence. In the early

1990s, Chairman of the Lithuanian parliament, Landsbergis called for true

independence not Russian satellite status for Lithuania.116 The primary instrument for

Lithuania and the Baltic states to achieve this was to underscore their European

orientation and to build up their Western ties.117 EU membership, as well as

membership to NATO and various other international organizations, helped build up

Western ties and reduce ties to the East. According to Misiunas, ‘In view of the their

desire to distance themselves from the CIS as much as possible, the focus of the

foreign policy activity of the Baltic states has concentrated on seeking as wide and as

rapid an integration as possible into the formal structure of the international115 Maniokas and Vitkus, p. 49116 Landsbergis 1995, p. 77, 80.117 Misiunas p. 102

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community.’118 A member of the Lithuanian parliament, Vareikis, confirmed that

political elites sought membership in all possible organizations during the early 1990s

in order to maximize Lithuanian soft security and that EU was only one of the means

to do so.119 Thus, seeking EU membership was driven greatly by ideational factors

such as the perceived need to enter the international community, decrease Lithuania’s

geopolitical isolation and leave the Russian sphere of influence.

While in the early 1990s both the EU and NATO were invoked simultaneously with

regard to Lithuanian hard security concerns, by the late 1990s both organizations were

also seen as complementary tools to social and economic security. For example in

1998, President Adamkus stated ‘EU and NATO are these mechanisms, which ensure

the life and continuation of our principles…Membership in EU and NATO are the

guarantees of our independence and democracy not any less than they are the signs of

our independence and democracy.’120 He expanded this point by saying, ‘Membership

in the EU and NATO for Lithuania and other Central European states means security,

economic growth guarantees, as well as participation in a common values space.’121

In summary, Lithuania’s soft security motivations for EU membership evolved from

1991 to 2002, increasingly broadening to encompass political, social and economic

security. Furthermore, these soft security motivations stemmed from ideational as well

as material factors. Since the EU could not provide hard security guarantees, as

Lithuania moved closer to membership and increasingly analyzed the EU in more

118 Ibid., 103119Vareikis interviewed by author, August 10, 2005.120 Valdas Adamkus, Penkeri Darbo Metai, Baltos Lankos, Vilnius, 2002, p. 272121 Ibid., p. 273

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detailed and rational terms, previous hard security discourse in relation to the EU was

slowly abandoned.

Political Voice

Another benefit of EU membership was political voice or what has been termed ‘a

seat at the table’ of decision making for member states through the forum of the

Union. In Lithuania, this aspect of EU membership was not highlighted in the early

1990s when hard security motives were at the forefront of the EU policy agenda.

However by the late 1990s and early 2000s political voice and access to EU decision

making was increasingly mentioned in the discourse. To some extent political voice

was a rational benefit and its emphasis coincided with a rationalist discussion of the

economic costs and benefits of EU membership. In 2002, the Senior Lithuanian

Negotiator with EU, Auštrevičius, expressed the political empowerment which would

accompany EU membership by stating ‘In reality today we are European but we are

not a part of Europe. We are not yet represented in all main European institutions,

which would guarantee that our word would be important in decisive moments.’122

Vareikis, in making his pro-EU argument also emphasized political voice benefits by

noting that Lithuania will have a high number of votes in the EU based on the Nice

agreement and thus, will be able to use its ‘voice power’ in a globalizing world.123 The

importance of decision making privileges associated with the EU is also apparent

from Lithuania’s negotiation strategy for membership. Auštrevičius and other

Lithuanian government elites had clearly expressed the Lithuanian position against

any form of second-class membership. He stated in 2002, ‘We are prepared to accept

122 Petras Auštrevičius, ‘Tautinis Identitetas ir Vieningos Europos Raida’ in Darius Staliunas, ed.,Europos Ideja Lietuvoje: Istorija ir Dabartis, LII Leidykla, Vilnius, 2002, p. 177123 Vareikis, p. 302

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all membership responsibilities, but at the same time we demand all membership

rights.’124

However, Lithuania’s motivations regarding political voice were not simply a matter

of number of votes, representatives, and capacity to provide input into the Union’s

decision making process, but were greatly driven by ideational factors. Lithuania’s

and Baltics states’ understanding of political benefits of EU membership was closely

related to their historical perspectives on their nation’s role in Europe. Lithuania and

the Baltics have been greatly excluded from the political developments in Europe over

the past several hundred years. This has resulted in a sense of peripheral and

‘outsider’ status. The inability to participate in decision making process and being on

receiving end of the pre-formulated decisions of the great powers such as the

Molotov-Ribbentrop Secret Protocol of 1939 resulted in losses of sovereignty and a

real sense of historical victimhood.

The political voice associated with EU membership offered the ideational means to

mitigate the past injustices by finally leaving the ‘periphery’ and gaining more power

over the national fate. According to Vareikis, ‘if Lithuania will actually become a

developed Western democracy, it will be in the West so powerfully, so close to the

West, as it had never been before.’125 Thus it will finally become an ‘insider.’ Being an

insider of this most exclusive European club was seen as increasing ‘Lithuania’s

influence and prestige in the world’ according to Maniokas.126 As a member, Lithuania

will have greater capacity to address its primary concerns regarding EU relations with

124 Auštrevičius in Staliunas, p. 177125 Vareikis, p. 302126 Klaudijus Maniokas, ‘Lietuva ir Europos Sajungos Bendroji Uzsienio ir Saugumo Politika,’ inManiokas and Vitkus, p. 329

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Russia and neighbouring states such as Belarus and Ukraine which were part of the

historical Lithuanian Grand Duchy.127

In conclusion, Lithuanian recognition of the EU political voice benefits came rather

late in the accession process. Though rationalist benefits such as number of votes

were noted, political voice was greatly an ideational motivation due to Lithuanian

historical experiences and perceptions.

Domestic Politics

Domestic politics also played a role in influencing the political and security

dimension of Lithuania’s policy on EU membership. Party politics and the debate on

state sovereignty constraints due to EU membership subtly influenced Lithuania’s EU

policy though the main course of policy remained unchanged. Thus, domestic factors

had a secondary effect on policy by impacting not why EU membership was sought

but how it was sought.

The Sovereignty Debate

The previous sections outlined the security and political benefits of EU membership

as perceived by the elites in their policy considerations, but there were also political

costs of integration which became voiced primarily in the domestic public debate.

Public Euro-scepticism that centred greatly on the sovereignty debate became

increasingly noticeable in the 1990s. A similar contradiction between wanting the

benefits and security of EU membership but at the same time being cautious about

surrendering newly achieved sovereignty has been characterized as ‘the integration

127 Vareikis, p. 299

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dilemma’128 and was a factor in other Central and Eastern European accession process.

As Inotai has noted, ‘On the one hand, they know that their economic modernization

anchor is the EU. On the other hand, they would like to keep their full political

sovereignty. This is mainly the case in those countries which have a very difficult

historical past, where national sovereignty has been questioned several times or even

abolished.’129 In the Baltics, and particularly in Lithuania, the sovereignty debate and

Euro-scepticism was particularly pronounced due to the legacy of Soviet and Russian

imperial occupation. Thus, the Russian legacy had a dual effect on Lithuania. In

security considerations, fears of Russia motivated Lithuania to seek EU membership.

In the sovereignty debate, the legacy of the Soviet experience and the struggle for

independence caused Lithuania to be cautious in giving up its sovereignty to Brussels.

Thus, in contrast to the other applicants, in the Baltics there was a marked

deterioration of the image of the EU from 1991 until 1996 with positive views falling

27 percentage points in Lithuania, and 14 percent and 19 percent in Estonia and Latvia

respectively.130 In 1999, the Lithuanian public was even against membership, when

those ‘against’ exceeded those ‘for’ EU membership (39 percent versus 28 percent

with the remainder declaring neutrality on the matter). 131 In fact, in Lithuania, unlike

in the other two Baltic states, a Euro-sceptic National Democratic Movement emerged

arguing that EU admission undermines independence. Rimantas Sapronas, leader of

this movement and a member of parliament, argued that EU membership was not

necessarily beneficial in terms of the economy, national culture, identity and

128 Morten Kelstrup, ‘Small States and European Political Integration’ in Teija Tiilikainen and IbDamgaard Petersen, eds., The Nordic Countries and EC, Copenhagen Political Studies Press,Copenhagen, 1991, p. 136-162.129 Andras Inotai ‘The “Eastern Enlargements’ of the European Union’ in Marise Cremona, ed., TheEnlargement of the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 88130 Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes, ‘Central and East European Views on EU Enlargement:Political Debates and Public Opinion’ in Karen Henderson, ed., Back to Europe: Central and EasternEurope and the European Union, University of Leicester, Leicester 1999,’ p. 187131 Grazina Miniotaite, The Security Policy of Lithuania and the ‘Integration Dilemma,’ LithuanianInstitute of Philosophy and Sociology, Vilnius, 1999, p. 31

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sovereignty and instead proposed creating an alternative union that would encompass

states from the Baltic to the Black Sea.132

The Euro-sceptic movement found various and seemingly incompatible partisans:

ethnic nationalists and sympathisers of the old Soviet regime. The result was a type of

unholy alliance of far left and far right of the political spectrum in their protest against

EU membership. On a more moderate side were the self-proclaimed ‘Euro-realists’

who were critical of the perceived unfavourable terms of membership and argued that

Lithuania should strengthen its economy and governance and join EU later as an

equal partner.133 However, one should not consider the Lithuanian public as generally

anti-integrationist but rather as exhibiting a considerable dose of reserve and

scepticism regarding membership.134

The government elites responded to the Euro-sceptics and the sovereignty discourse

by emphasizing the benefits of political voice as well as the EU’s role in safeguarding

Lithuanian sovereignty. President Adamkus emphasized that Lithuanian sovereignty

can be safeguarded rather than threatened by EU saying ‘Lithuanian sovereignty in

the twenty first century is possible only by actively participating in the creation on a

common future. Integrating to Euro-Atlantic structures, we don’t limit but expand our

freedom of choice.’ He addressed the Euro-realist position of postponing membership

132 Graeme Herd, ‘The Baltic States and EU Enlargement,’ in Henderson, p. 265 133 Zaneta Ozolina, ‘The EU and the Baltic States’ in Lieven and Trenin, p. 226134 Interestingly, while between 1991-1996 the Lithuanian public was least responsive to the EU incomparison with the other Baltic states and the rest of CEE candidates, by the 2003 referendum,Lithuanians were much more in favour of joining the EU than Estonia and Latvia. In the May 2003referendum, despite previous public scepticisms, 91 percent of Lithuanians voted for joining the EU, 9percent against, with the turnout being 63 percent. In Latvia and Estonia 67 percent of the voters werein favour. Thus from 1996 to 2003, Lithuanian public went from being one of the greatest sceptics ofEU membership among the CEE candidates to being one of the greatest supporters. Landsbergisexplained the referendum results saying that ‘the people did not want to be deported to Siberia onceagain in their lifetime.’ Interviewed by author on April 11, 2006.

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by noting that ‘If we are late [to integrate] we will have to accept more and more

standards, which we did not create.’135 In response to the presumed reduction of

Lithuanian economic and social autonomy within the EU structure, advisor to the

President, Vilpisauskas argued that ‘because Lithuania is a small and open state, EU’s

decisions will powerfully affect Lithuanian economy and its distinct spheres even if

Lithuania is not a member of the EU.’ 136 From these comments it appears that the

Lithuanian elites viewed sovereignty questions differently than the public. The

Lithuanian elites did not think that Lithuania would be able to maintain full

sovereignty on its own due to either Russian interference, EU’s influence or

globalization. Thus, EU membership was argued to be the best guarantee of

sovereignty despite the sovereignty losses the public feared.

Party Politics and Elite Consensus

Despite the episodic public scepticism and the attempt by some marginal parties such

as the National Democratic Movement to exploit populist sentiments, government

elites remained committed and consistent in their pro-EU policies. As Grabbe and

Hughes note, there was a ‘surprisingly high level of consensus among political parties

in the Baltic states on preparation for EU accession given popular scepticism revealed

in opinion polls’ of 1993-1996.137 However, Lithuanian political parties used EU

accession strategy instrumentally in domestic politics to increase their popularity. At

times some politicians such as the New Union of Social Liberals (Social Liberals)

would take advantage of the public scepticism using populist anti-EU rhetoric. At

other times politicians such as the Homeland Union would critique their opponents

135 Adamkus 2001, p. 33136Vilpisauskas, Ramunas, ‘Lietuvos Narystes ES Kastai ir Nauda’ in Maniokas and Vitkus, p. 202 137 Grabbe and Hughes in Henderson, p. 189

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such as the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDDP138) for not pursuing EU

membership with enough gusto and efficiency. Often, unwilling to bear the political

costs of implementing harsh but necessary reforms for Lithuania’s transition from

planned to market economy, politicians would present reforms as a EU requirement.

Table 3.1: Party Politics in Lithuania

1992-1996 LDDP, formed from former Communist Party of Lithuania, won the elections and shared power

with the Social Democratic Party to create a left-of-centre government.

1996-2000 Homeland Union, a right party supporting market reforms and integration, carried the victory

and formed a conservative coalition government with the Christian Democratic Party. The Homeland

Union actively sought Lithuania’s membership in NATO and EU.2000-2004 New Union of Social Liberals created a centrist coalition with the Liberal Union.

Throughout the decade from 1991 to 2002, EU membership remained Lithuania’s

foreign policy objective despite the changes in parties in power (see Table 3.1 above).

A particularly interesting case was in 1992 when the LDDP won the Parliamentary

election. Though in their election programme they had expressed a desire for state

neutrality, once in power the party continued the EU integration path.139 Furthermore,

in 1993 the presidency was taken over by an ex-communist turned Social Democrat,

Algirdas Brazauskas, who according to his election platform was not a great activist

of integration to European or Transatlantic structures. Thus, it is quite surprising that

during the time period from 1992 to 1996 when political forces ambivalent to EU

membership were in power, the goal of EU membership was not only pursued but that

the application for EU membership was submitted in 1995.

138 Lietuvos Demokratu Darbo Partija139 Lina Peceliuniene, ‘Sunkus kelias I NATO’, in Vytautas Landsbergis, Lietuvos Kelias I NATO,Versus Aureus, Vilnius, 2004, p. 645

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There are six reasons why this policy was maintained, which will be outlined in order

of importance below. While it is difficult to decisively isolate the most important

reasons, the cumulative effect of all five was a consistent EU policy.140 First, the

‘opposition’ was persistent in its efforts of keeping the EU and NATO on the top of

the agenda. Landsbergis who was the leader of the opposition political forces from

1992 to 1996 stated that Lithuania ‘after the 1992 Parliamentary elections maintained

to some extent foreign policy continuation… EU and NATO became a foreign policy

priority only after the opposition’s pressure.’141 However, the opposition’s influence,

as Landsbergis admits, was not powerful enough to have perfect control over foreign

policy and thus, ‘During LDDP governance years much time was wasted due to

several post-communist questioning and double meanings, but the main decision was

maintained.’142 It can be argued that even though Lithuania submitted its application

for EU membership in 1995 under the LDDP government, not much actual progress

towards completing necessary reforms and meeting the acquis was made. The second

reason is that LDDP could not suggest any better alternatives than integration into

Western structures as a path for Lithuania’s development and because the Constitution

of the state explicitly forbids any form of integration with any states of the CIS. Third,

the LDDP, being former communists were always haunted by claims that they will

lead Lithuania ‘back to Moscow.’ Opposing Western integration would have enabled

their opponents to add further fuel to the flames. Fourth, public opinion, though

increasingly critical after 1993, was still marked by high support for the EU strategy.

Lastly, the domestic politics and foreign policies of the other Baltic states may have

140 Bronislovas Kuzmickas, Chairman of the Lithuanian Parliamentary delegation to WEU from 1996to 2000, agreed with these six reasons and their ordering, particularly emphasizing the role of theopposition in an interview with author on March 27, 2006. Egidijus Vareikis agreed with this reasoningand emphasized the cumulative effect of all six factors. Interviewed by author on March 15, 2006.Vytautas Landsbergis also noted that except LDDP all other factions in the Parliament were in favourof EU and NATO membership in an interview with author on April 11, 2006.141 Landsbergis 2004, p. 187142 Ibid., p. 187

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also had an influence on Lithuania. During this time period in Estonia and Latvia

reformers and pro-EU parties were in power and sought EU membership consistently.

Pursuing a diverging path for Lithuania would have been difficult to justify.

The consistency of EU policy despite the change in domestic politics was attributable

to the confluence of the six factors outlined above. However, without most of the six

factors, the EU policy may have been varied. For instance, if anti-EU parties had been

in power and the pro-EU opposition led by Landsbergis marginalized in Parliament as

in the 2000 election, the public highly sceptical as in 1999 and 2000 and the other

Baltic states less resolute on membership, then the EU application might not have

been filed or its filling might have been delayed. As if to secure against such future

threats to the stability of Lithuania’s foreign policy, the pro-EU political forces

included a clause to guarantee against ‘backward gravitation’ in the law on the Basics

of National Security of Lithuania in 1996. The clause safeguarded Lithuanian foreign

policy priorities of EU and NATO.143 Not only would the anti-EU forces have to push

through the change of the law through Parliament but propose an alternative path for

Lithuanian development.

In 1996 the Homeland Union led by Landsbergis won the election and secured the

majority in the Parliament by a coalition with the Christian Democratic Party. In

1998, a Western oriented, non-partisan Adamkus took over the Presidency. From 1996

and 1998 onwards when parties and leaders favourable to Western institutions

presided, a major push towards membership occurred despite the noted increase in

public Euro-scepticism. After great efforts of the elites, in December of 1999

Lithuania was invited to start negotiations at the Helsinki European Council. Yet in143 Landsbergis 2004, p. 319

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1999 and 2000, due to the poor economic conditions related to the 1998 Russian

financial crises and the increasing burden of EU stipulated reforms, the public and

political discourse was increasingly Euro-sceptic. In the 2000 municipal elections

several small populist parties tried to exploit the public’s sentiments in a discreet way.

For example, the National Democrats stated ‘we bowed to Moscow, now we bow to

Brussels’ invoking an image of a new type of imperial control.144

The 2000 new parliamentary elections again brought a sceptical leadership to power –

a coalition of Liberals and Social Liberals. Yet, similarly to the LDDP, once in power

Social Liberals maintained the EU geared trajectory of foreign policy. The Social

Liberals’ continuation of the EU accession process is puzzling given that Euro-

scepticism was at its highest levels. The reasons for the persistent commitment to EU

integration will be explored in greater depth in Chapter Four but some domestic

political reasons will be outlined below. First, it must be recognized that Lithuania

was already on the way to membership. In February of 2000, Lithuania started the

negotiation process and the reversal of this would have been a very radical move, one

apparently that parties like the Social Liberals were not prepared to push for.

Furthermore, President Adamkus was an avid supporter of Lithuania’s integration to

European and trans-Atlantic structures and increasingly sought to address the public

scepticism and misconceptions about membership. Lastly, it seems that the anti-

integrationist election platform was simply a populist move to gain more votes in the

election and that the Social Liberals had no serious intention of staying true to it.145

144 Pavlovaite in Lehti and Smith, p. 211145 Vareikis supports this opinion in an interview with the author on March 15, 2006 as does Kuzmickasin an interview with the author on March 27, 2006.

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Lithuanian domestic politics did not play a role in altering EU policy though it

influenced it subtly. For instance, political parties and elites took notice of the public’s

scepticism and concerns by changing their rhetoric but not their course of action.

Some, such as the LDDP, Social Liberals, or National Democrats, critiqued EU

membership or suggested neutrality but in the end maintained the EU integration

strategy, even if it was half-hearted. Others, such as President Adamkus, sought to

address some of the major criticisms, change discourse on EU, and thus, ease the

scepticism. In the end, the Lithuanian elites’ re-marketing campaign of the EU worked

– the Lithuanian public voted overwhelmingly in favour of membership in the

referendum of 2003. The Lithuanian case suggests that elite convictions and goals

superseded public opinions and outweighed public and some elites’ sovereignty

concerns. Furthermore, the findings seem to support the ‘path dependency’ theory that

once a trajectory for EU membership is drawn it is hard to reverse the process even if

as in the case of Lithuania political parties change and public opinion fluctuates.

However, one should be cautious in drawing such a conclusion since the cases of

Rumania and Bulgaria demonstrate that hurdles in the reform and negotiation process

can greatly prolong the endpoint of membership.146

Conclusions

Our analysis of the political and security factors has shown that ideational

considerations were prominent in Lithuania’s EU policy because they were often as

important as the material factors and because they added salience to material

motivations. From this chapter it is clear that Lithuania’s motivations for membership

and thus, EU policy were highly securitized. However while other analysts have

146 Romania and Bulgaria had applied for EU membership in 1995 along with Lithuania, but wereunable to fully commit to reforms and the EU path and are slotted for membership in 2007.

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concluded that Lithuania and the other Baltic states sought EU membership for

security reasons stemming from a fear of Russia, this chapter has shown that security

motivations evolved over time. Soft security considerations, political voice benefits,

and sovereignty concerns all entered the Lithuanian EU policy decision making but

not all in a complementary manner. While soft security and political voice were

conceived as benefits of integration and thus worked in favour of Lithuania’s pro-EU

policy consensus, sovereignty concerns created mixed effects. Sovereignty was

evoked by both pro-EU politicians and Euro-sceptics, as EU membership was seen as

a guarantor of Lithuania’s security in the face of the Russian threat and globalization

and as a restraint on Lithuania’s full national sovereignty due to Brussels’ rules and

regulations. The sovereignty concerns created perhaps not a full-fledged integration

dilemma for Lithuania’s EU policy but certainly integration tensions. Yet despite

these tensions EU policy remained consistent primarily since broad security

considerations remained on the forefront of Lithuania’s agenda. Soft security concerns

and political voice motives maintained their salience in the decade from 1991 to 2002

due to the complementary ideational and rational security factors. Lithuania’s national

identity as a European ‘outsider’ and historical sense of victimhood made security

considerations still potent even when the threat from Russia was not likely. An

understanding of Lithuania’s national identity as simultaneously European and anti-

Russian demonstrates that Lithuania’s drive to EU membership was driven by a desire

to escape Russia in addition to the ‘back to Europe’ motive.

The analysis of this chapter revealed the persistence of elite consensus on the

necessity of EU membership, which resulted in the ultimate success of EU policy.

Furthermore, the case of Lithuania has demonstrated that once in motion the EU

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integration process gains self-momentum for the applicant states. Lithuanian foreign

policy of seeking Western integration has been consistent not only due to elite

consensus on integration but also due to elite ‘path dependency.’ The EU trajectory of

foreign policy had become difficult to alter even when Euro-scepticism was high

because there was a perceived lack of alternative options. Furthermore, build-in

security measures against changes in foreign policy and thus, guarantees of staying on

the EU path were present in the Constitution and the Law on National Security of

1996. While, ‘rhetorical entrapment’ of enlarging the EU has already been noted by

scholars,147 this same element may exist on the side of the applicant states. The

Lithuanian elite consensus on the necessity of EU membership may be understood in

part by a reverse ‘rhetorical entrapment.’ As had been demonstrated it became very

difficult for elites to suggest staying out of the EU when this had been proclaimed as

Lithuania’s primary goal since the early 1990s.

Chapter 4: The Relationship between Material and Ideational Motivations in

Lithuania’s EU Policy: 1997 to 2000

The years from 1997 to 2000 were crucial for Lithuania’s EU policy. Lithuania went

from lagging behind in its accession strategy to renewing its efforts for a determined

campaign for membership and starting EU negotiations at the end of 1999. The

circumstances in Lithuania between the years of 1997 to 2000, though seemingly

similar to the other Baltic states, were quite unique and help account for the apparent

turnaround on the EU question. Lithuania was the only Baltic state that experienced

the double disappointment of being disqualified from starting negotiations for EU

membership in 1997, and being excluded from the first round of NATO enlargement

147 Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action and the EasternEnlargement of the European Union’, International Organization vol.55, no.1.

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of 1999. Estonia started negotiations for EU membership in 1997, while Latvia

though equally disappointed with EU negotiations’ exclusion had not expected an

invitation from NATO. Lithuania, feeling best prepared for NATO membership and

feeling as qualified as Estonia to start EU negotiations had its expectations shattered.

Furthermore, Lithuania was more exposed than the other Baltic states to the Russian

financial crisis and experienced the greatest decline in public support for EU

membership in the late 1990s. Thus, Lithuania in the period from 1997 to 2000 was

marked by external shocks that reverberated in foreign policy and domestic politics.

In this key episode, economic, security, and ideational factors came to reinforce elite

consensus on EU policy. This key episode demonstrates that ideational factors as well

as external events complemented and made material considerations more salient,

ultimately contributing to the success of Lithuania’s EU policy.

First, a summary of the domestic and external events during this key period will be

provided. Then economic, security and ideational considerations in Lithuania’s EU

policy will be analysed thematically.

Changes in Domestic and External Conditions from 1997 to 2000

During these three years many events transpired that impacted Lithuania’s policy on

the EU. These events can be divided into domestic events and external events for

greater clarity. Though domestic developments set a background for policy making

worth examining, the external developments were the key determinants in Lithuania’s

EU policy. Domestically, in the Presidential elections of January 1998, Adamkus,

supported by the Centre coalition, replaced incumbent Brazauskas of the leftist

coalition. The domestic political constant throughout most of the period was the

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parties in power in parliament. Landsbergis was the Speaker of the Parliament and his

Homeland Union party had a majority of seats since the elections of 1996. However,

the municipal and parliamentary elections of 2000 shook up the incumbents. The

municipal election in March saw the victory of left-leaning parties – New Union of

Social Liberals (Social Liberals) and the Peasants Party, both of which resisted

Lithuania’s early entry into the EU and NATO. The Parliamentary election in October

was marked by similar tendencies and resulted in the victory of centre-right alliance

of the Liberal Union and the Social Liberals. The Homeland Union was marginalized.

Nevertheless, in a surprise turn-around, the dominating alliance agreed on the need to

seek EU and NATO membership once they came into power.

There were three key external events that impacted Lithuania’s EU policy making: the

Commission’s decision in 1997 to delay accession negotiations for Lithuania, the

Russian financial crisis of 1998 and exclusion from NATO’s enlargement round of

1999. The cumulative effect of all three events occurring in the short space of time

added significantly to their importance in impacting Lithuania’s EU policy. By May

of 1997, it had become clear to Vilnius that none of the Baltic states will be invited to

the Washington round of NATO enlargement of March of 1999. Lithuania had placed

high hopes of being the one Baltic state to be invited along with Poland, Hungary and

the Czech Republic. The government elites, led by Landsbergis, had lobbied hard for

membership and had received a somewhat encouraging response from the US though

less so from the European leaders. Then a few months after the bad news from NATO,

the second blow came in July of 1997: the EU Commission excluded Lithuania from

the list of accession candidates that were deemed ready to start the negotiations at the

Luxembourg round of 1998. The Commission’s decision to invite Estonia to

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negotiations made this disqualification particularly acute due to the endemic regional

competition among the Baltic states. Estonia’s inclusion had a multiplier effect on

Lithuania’s disappointment due to exclusion. The two consecutive failures with

NATO and EU could have had caused government elites to question Lithuania’s

foreign policy of Western orientation, yet Lithuanian EU policy remained consistent.

The third external shock came in August 1998 with the Russian financial crisis. The

negative effects of the Russian financial crisis on the Lithuanian economy drove home

the argument that the Lithuania should seek integration with the West rather than with

the East.

Economic Factors

As demonstrated in the second chapter, economic cost and benefit calculations on EU

membership were not of primary importance to Lithuania before 2000. However, in

the 1997-2000 period, several economic arguments came to the forefront. The first

was related to the Commission’s decision to exclude Vilnius from the first round of

enlargement; the second was related to the reconsideration of national economic

strategy after the Russian financial crisis. After Estonia was invited to negotiate and

Lithuania and Latvia were deemed unready, arguments appeared in both states that

being ‘left out’ would be detrimental to their economies. Lithuanian leaders worried

that investments would be directed away from Lithuania towards Estonia and to its

western neighbour, Poland, which was also starting negotiations. These concerns over

the economic ramifications of being left out of the negotiation process are reminiscent

of the Visegrad countries’ concerns over being kept out of the EU. However, as

Vachudova argues, the Visegrad countries were most concerned about access to EU

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markets and EU protectionism towards non-members.148 Lithuanian rhetoric regarding

the redirection of investments demonstrates that economic motivations for seeking

membership stemmed not only from potential benefits of membership but the potential

costs of exclusion, an insight that has often not been recognized in the literature.

The second economic argument during this time period was a reconsideration of

economic and foreign policy strategy due to the Russian financial crisis of August

1998. As noted in Chapter Two, from the mid-1990s until the crisis, not all Lithuanian

elites had fully recognized the benefits of EU membership and were still pursuing an

opportunistic and dualistic economic strategy of maintaining a high level of

commerce with Russia and increasing ties with Western economies. However the

Russian crisis exposed the dangers of economic interdependence with the East. While

1997 had been a year of high economic growth for Lithuania, 1998 resulted in a

slowdown of GDP growth. 1999 was a very difficult year economically with a

contraction of GDP by 4.1 percent and a rise of government debt to LTL 13 billion.149

The Russian economic downturn affected Lithuania more than Latvia or Estonia since

Lithuania traded far more with Russia than did its neighbours. A fourth of all

Lithuanian meat and dairy production went to Russia in the late 1990s, but these

exports were suspended on 1 September 1998 because Russian consumers could not

pay.150 The dismal state of affairs in 1999 was highlighted in President Adamkus’

Annual Address: ‘the highest in a decade level of unemployment, half a billion debt

by Sodra,151 13 billion LTL state debt, more than one thousand bankrupt companies,

148 Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration afterCommunism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 71-2149 Zaneta Ozolina, ‘The EU and the Baltic States’ in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, eds.,Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and Price of Membership, Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, Washington D.C, 2003, p. 208150 Walter C. Clemens, The Baltic Transformed: Complexity Theory and European Security, Rowman &Littlefield Publishers, Landham, NC, 2002, p. 166151 Lithuanian National Social Insurance Fund

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the unfinished land reforms, millions of LTL debt to farmers, the unreformed energy

sector, unpaid debt from Belarus for electric energy, a half-empty fund for the closure

of nuclear station, etc.’152 Still the consequences of the Russian economic crisis could

have been even more severe if Lithuania had not reoriented some of its trade to the

West in the years leading up to 1998 and if investors had not assumed the Baltics to

be outside the Russian economic sphere and therefore not pulled out their investment

to the degree they did in Russia and the CIS.153 Thus, the Russian crisis clearly

demonstrated the costs of trade with the East and the benefits of being perceived by

investors as part of the ‘West.’

The Russian crisis was an unexpected external event that made a major impact on

Lithuanian elite and public perspectives on Lithuania’s economic and foreign policy.

While the elites became more convinced on the necessity EU membership and

integration to the West, the public was increasingly sceptical of the existing

government policies and particularly of EU membership. However, Lithuanian elites

did not heed public opinion and accelerated the EU accession process.

Lithuanian elites’ reinvigorated drive for EU membership in response to the economic

downturn of 1999 could be explained in terms of rationalist enlargement theories.

According to Mattli, economically unsuccessful national leaders are much more likely

to pursue integrationist strategies and integration is generally sought by ‘outsider’

states with lower growth rates than ‘insider’ states. 154 In the mid-90s, while Lithuania

was benefiting from trade with Russia and increasingly with the West and thus

152 Adamkus, Trys Metiniai Pranesimai 1999-2001, Baltu Lanku Leidyba, Vilnius, 2001, p. 65153 Jan Zielonka, Europe as an Empire, Oxford University Press, 2006, Chapter Two; Ozolina in Lievenand Trenin, p. 208154 Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, Cambridge University Press,Cambridge, 1999, p. 95

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experiencing high growth rates, EU membership from an economic perspective was

not on the top of the elites’ agenda. However, when growth rates dropped to negative

digits, Lithuanian elites started actively pursuing EU membership. However, the

correlation between economic decline and re-invigoration of EU policy does not

necessarily imply causation. The decision to accelerate integrationist efforts was made

in 1997 immediately after the Commission’s decision, before the Crisis and economic

downturn. The Russian crisis served to reinforce EU policy but was not the original

cause of renewed efforts for membership.

Lithuanian political elites interpreted the Russian financial crisis and its lessons for

Lithuania not only in economic but also in strategic and ideational terms. The crisis

was used to confirm that Lithuania chose the right strategy of distancing itself from

Russia and choosing the EU as its model and economic partner. Ideologically, the

crisis reinforced the perspective of Russia as unstable and dangerous. Landsbergis,

speaking about the Russian crisis, stated, ‘our national political goal and the goal of

all parties is to finally exit the post-Soviet undefined and threatening space.’155 The

‘economic chaos to the east’ was presented as much of a threat to Lithuania as the

Russian armies had been in the early 1990s. President Adamkus described the

previous dualistic and inconsistent policy of economic relations with the West and the

East as a ‘destructive path’ which demonstrated ‘the powerlessness of our state in the

face of the Russian crisis.’156 Though the EU policy may have cost the ruling

government elites such as Landsbergis and his Homeland Union party re-election in

2000, the EU policy was pursued or at a minimum presented in ideological terms as

well as rational terms. Furthermore, the ideational view of Russia as an unstable and

155 Vytautas Landsbergis, Lietuvos Kelias I NATO, Versus Aureus, Vilnius, 2004, p. 348156 Adamkus 2001, p. 100

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dangerous ally made the economic effects of the Russian crisis even more salient in

the Lithuanian elite calculations on EU policy.

To summarize, the downturn in the Lithuanian economy following the Russian crisis

coupled with the Commission’s decision to exclude Lithuania from the first round of

negotiations, strengthened the resolve of the Lithuanian elites to seek EU

membership. Though both external events posed material costs for Lithuania, elite

discourse was mostly framed in ideational rather than material terms.

Security Factors

Though Lithuania was considerably more secure in 1997 than in the early 1990s,

security objectives continued to figure to some extent in justifying EU membership.

During these key years Lithuania’s security concerns, though not based on material

threats, were reinforced by the economic insecurity of the period and the ideational

fears of being left out of EU and NATO expansion.

Speaking on the improvement of Lithuania’s security conditions in 1997 in relation to

four years ago, Landsbergis stated optimistically that the ‘International situation is

calmer and more stabilized. Lithuania secured its position in European and world

perceptions as a rebuilt state, which has a right to exist. Just this already provides

more security, as does Lithuanian participation in international structures. From these

the most important to us is our association membership in the EU.’157 Thus by 1997,

Lithuania was perceived to be more secure due to the web of participation in157 Landsbergis, p. 246

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international organizations. The Association Agreement with the EU was considered

to be a source of security and stability for Lithuania in the present and full EU and

NATO membership were to provide security in the future.

This positive articulation of Lithuania’s security coincided with Lithuania’s campaign

to be included in the first wave of NATO enlargement. In early to mid-1997, before it

was apparent that Lithuania would not be included in the first round of NATO

enlargement, Lithuania’s rhetoric on security was decidedly changed. As noted in the

previous chapter, Lithuanian political elites, particularly Landsbergis, in their

discourse on the East started diminishing the formerly emphasized Russian threat and

questioning Western perceptions that the Baltics are ‘un-defendable.’ Addressing the

perceived threat from Russia to the Baltics, Landsbergis stated in 1997, ‘We do not

think that far ahead and that negatively, as in the West, about a concrete aggressor to

the Baltic states. All neighbours are a gift from God [!] We only want stability and

reliability from different investors, different cooperation, and do not want that

someone would threaten us or dictate to us.’158 While the efforts to downplay the

Russian threat seem tactical in Lithuania’s quest for NATO membership and geared

towards the West, they still demonstrate the importance of the ‘Russia factor’ in the

discourse. However, the cited remarks also reveal a focus on the emerging concept of

broader stability (rather than security) constituted by investments and relations with

the West.

Vilnius’ instrumental use of the Russian factor to emphasise or de-emphasise the

Russian threat depending on the situation or audience is particularly noticeable in

another episode. In May of 1997, when Lithuania realized that it would not be158 Speaking to Estonian parliament in January 1997. Landsbergis, p. 213

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included in the first round of NATO enlargement it again vocalized its concerns about

Russia. Discussing the consequences of being left out of NATO, Landsbergis stated, ‘I

do not think that currently there is a threat of direct Russian aggression. Nevertheless,

we could be pressured by Russia by various ultimatums. We could be forced to make

concessions and to limit our sovereignty,’ as did Cold War Finland, which had to

make concessions to Russia in economic, military, and political spheres.159 Here

Landsbergis was asking for security guarantees for Lithuania from the broader

potential pressures from Russia. These guarantees came in January 1998 when the

Four State Charter was signed between the Baltics and the US, providing Baltic states

with greater international stability and security prospects. The Charter sweetened the

bitter first enlargement of NATO in March of 1999 when only the Visegrad countries

were accepted.

Lithuania’s security considerations for EU membership can be better understood by

examining the relationship between the goals of EU and NATO membership, which

became particularly apparent during this time period. Scholars such as Herd have

argued that Lithuania’s primary foreign policy goal had been NATO membership

rather than EU until a shift in policy occurred in 1997 after the EU Commission made

a recommendation to exclude Lithuania from the negotiation process. Herd stated that

‘This recommendation caused a dramatic foreign policy reorientation within

Lithuania. Lithuania reiterated that it would attempt to join the first stage of European

eastern enlargement; this was to become the new primary priority of Lithuanian

domestic and foreign policy. Consequently, the central tenet of Lithuanian foreign

policy – NATO membership – was now to be officially down-graded as a priority.’160

159 May 1997 Interview with Danish newspaper in Ibid., p. 277160 Graeme P. Herd ‘The Baltic States and EU Enlargement’ in Karen Henderson,, ed., Back to Europe:Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, University of Leicester, Leicester 1999, p. 267

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However, a closer examination of the discourse of Lithuanian elites, the political

decisions at the time, and interviews with key participants161 does not support Herd’s

argument that a dramatic foreign policy reorientation favouring EU to NATO occurred

in 1997. In the years prior to and after the Commission’s decision, elite discourse

demonstrates the equal importance of EU and NATO membership as Lithuanian

foreign policy goals. Before and after 1997 Landsbergis stated on a number of

occasions that EU and NATO membership should not be viewed as alternative

priorities – ‘they are equal national political goals, ones that do not interfere with one

another, ones that are complementary to each other.’ 162 This policy of giving equal

priority to EU and NATO membership was confirmed in a Foreign Policy

coordination meeting with the President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defence

minister, Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman in early 1997 before the

EU Commission’s decision.

The perception that NATO membership had been of primary importance could have

arisen due to the fact that for a few years up to mid-1997 Lithuanian elites, seeing a

window of opportunity, invested significant efforts to be in the first round of NATO

enlargement of 1999.163 After the realisation that NATO membership will not be

possible in the near future and that Lithuania was not included in the first round of EU

negotiations, the pressing goal for Lithuanian elites was to make sure that Lithuania

would be invited to the next round of EU negotiations at the Helsinki Summit

161 Interview with Vytautas Landsbergis, Speaker of Parliament from 1996 to 2000, on April 11, 2006.Interview with Bronislovas Kuzmickas, Chairman of the Lithuanian Parliamentary delegation to WEUfrom 1996 to 2000, on March 27, 2006. Interview with Egidijus Vareikis, member of ParliamentCommittees on European Affairs and Foreign Affairs, on March 15, 2006.162 Stated in a speech in January 1997. Landsbergis, p. 214, see also p. 423163 Vytautas Landsbergis revealed that his optimal strategy aimed to link Lithuania with the Visegradstates and thus, enter NATO and perhaps the EU at an earlier date along with Czeck Republic, Hungaryand Poland. Interviewed by author April 11, 2006.

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scheduled for 1999. Thus, what Herd interpreted to be a ‘dramatic reorientation’ in

Lithuania’s EU and NATO policies was in fact a shift in emphasis that responded to

external constraints and opportunities. NATO’s decision to exclude Lithuania from the

first round of enlargement was viewed by Lithuanian elites as a political move to

appease Russia. There was not much Lithuania could do in the meantime as the next

enlargement was years away (in fact the next enlargement occurred only in 2004) and

NATO did not have a sole document listing the criteria for membership that Lithuania

could try to implement. The EU, unlike NATO, operated with sticks and carrots,

rewarding compliance to its numerous requirements by invitations to candidates to

begin membership negotiations on an annual basis. Even though Lithuania was not

chosen to start negotiations it was given the incentive to step up its reforms because

the EU was going to reconsider the Lithuanian application within a year. Another

incentive was the known possibility that if Lithuania made progress it could join the

EU at the same time as Estonia and the other Central European states despite a late

start in negotiations. Lithuania’s reinvigorated efforts for EU membership after the

Commission’s negative decision supports Vachudova’s EU’s ‘active leverage’

theory164 and is comparable to Slovakia’s response to being left out of the first round

of enlargement. The contrasting short term Lithuanian response to NATO exclusion

could be elucidated by Vachudova’s argument that NATO, without a meritocracy or

enforcement system, did not have the same active leverage on applicant countries as

EU.165 Thus, Lithuania’s differing tactical approaches to NATO and EU membership

could be explained not by assuming a shift in national priorities but by Lithuania’s

response to NATO and the EU’s differing incentives structures. However, as

explained in the above paragraph, the EU and NATO always remained equally

164 Vachudova, p. 105-139 165 Ibid., p. 134-137

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important strategic foreign policy goals though the short term foreign policy tactics

varied in 1997 to 2000.

Analyzing EU and NATO membership together also demonstrates that both

organisations were considered to be complementary tools to achieve similar goals of

not only security but economic well-being. Increasingly throughout the late 1990s,

economics and security, and thus the EU and NATO, were viewed as indivisible goals

by Vilnius. For instance in December of 1998 Landsbergis argues that both EU and

NATO membership are necessary since in order ‘to increase economic and living

standards we need cooperation and trade; for trade we need investments, for

investments we need security.’166 In February of 1999, Landsbergis emphasized the

indivisibility of security and economics stating that ‘national security is necessary for

various reasons – even purely economic reasons.’167 This perspective helps explain

Lithuania’s simultaneous policy commitment to join both NATO and EU and gives

further evidence against Herd’s argument.

In summary, Lithuania’s pursuit of EU and NATO membership simultaneously can be

understood by the elites’ view that both organizations were complementary in their

capacity to increase Lithuanian security and economic well-being. Furthermore,

Lithuania’s policy on EU and NATO demonstrates that ideational perspectives of EU

as a source of not only economic prosperity but security and NATO as a tool not only

for national security but economic wellbeing, coloured Lithuanian elite considerations

of the material benefits of these two organizations.

166 Ibid., p. 365 167 Landsbergis, p. 378

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Domestic Factors

The analysis of domestic factors that influenced Lithuania’s policy towards the EU in

the period from 1997 to 2000 brings three questions to mind. First, to what extent did

domestic political parties influence Lithuania’s EU policy from 1997 to 2000?

Second, was political leaders’ willingness to integrate based on calculations on re-

election in the presidential elections of 1998, and municipal and parliamentary

elections of 2000? Lastly, was EU membership used instrumentally by domestic

elites? In general, Lithuania’s major political parties accepted the elite policy

consensus which viewed EU membership as the only way forward for Lithuania’s

future development.

There appears to be a link between Lithuania’s domestic political parties and EU

policy during the years of 1997 to 2000. With the Parliament dominated by a pro-EU

Homeland Union from 1996 to 2000, and with a pro-Western integration President

Adamkus from 1998 onwards, Lithuania’s push for EU membership might appear

predictable. However, as the previous chapter argued, domestic politics was not the

decisive factor in Lithuania’s policy on EU. For instance, in 1995, a decision to

submit the EU application was made under Euro-sceptic LDDP leadership. And in

2000, the Parliamentary parties that had won on anti-integration platforms, once in

power maintained their predecessors’ pro-EU and pro-NATO foreign policy. Thus the

success of Lithuania’s EU policy from 1997 to 2000 cannot be explicable solely by

the Homeland Union’s and Adamkus’ support for EU membership.

Mattli has argued that political leaders’ willingness to integrate is motivated by the

political payoffs of re-election. The case of Lithuania, particularly from 1997 to 2000,

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demonstrates that political incumbents and newcomers took a different approach to

the EU policy political payoffs. In light of rising public Euro-scepticism from the late

1990s to 2000, the incumbent government elites, by accelerating integration, were not

acting in the hope of appealing to the public. On the contrary, the 2000 elections

brought new parties to power who with populist slogans had opposed EU and NATO

membership in their platforms. Thus re-election ambitions did not influence the

incumbents’ willingness to integrate but electoral considerations played a tactical role

for the new political entrants who exploited the rising Euro-scepticism. However,

once voted into office, the political newcomers would revert to elite policy consensus

of seeking EU membership. For instance, in the 1998 presidential elections some new

candidates ran on a Euro-sceptic platform.168 However this strategy did not pay off in

1998 with a pro-West Adamkus winning the presidency. But the municipal and

parliamentary elections of 2000 favoured the Euro-sceptics since the end of 1999 and

beginning of 2000 was the lowest point in terms of public opinion on EU

membership, when Euro-sceptics exceeded EU supporters (with a vote of 39 percent

‘against’ versus 28 percent ‘in favour’ of integration).169 On the other hand, the

incumbent government elites such as the Homeland Union party were seeking EU

integration despite the political losses in re-elections which they suffered in 2000.

Landsbergis explained his own and his party’s position by stating that ‘Europhobia or

isolationist tendencies are unreal and without prospects’170 even though his party was

marginalized by the 2000 elections.171

168 Incumbent President Brazauskas chose not to run in the 1998 presidential elections.169 Grazina Miniotaite, The Security Policy of Lithuania and the ‘Integration Dilemma’, LithuanianInstitute of Philosophy and Sociology, Vilnius, 1999, p. 31170 Landsbergis, p. 311171 However, the EU was not the only or most important issue to the voters. The elections brought innew political forces to power because most voters were disappointed by the poor economic conditionsand governance of the preceding years.

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The Lithuanian elites used the prospect EU membership instrumentally for domestic

political gains and this tendency is most evident from the episode following the

Commission’s decision of 1997 to exclude Lithuania from negotiations. Lithuania’s

exclusion, while another Baltic State was included, ‘triggered a frenzy of defensive

posturing and finger pointing throughout the Lithuanian political class.’172 In

December of 1997, several months after the Commission decision and a year after his

party gained power in the Parliament, Landsbergis stated that ‘in the last year through

hard work more was accomplished [towards EU membership] than during the several

years prior.’173 The newly elect President Adamkus also critiqued the poor state of

affairs and economy in Lithuania and blamed it on the uncompleted reforms by his

predecessors, which not only hurt the Lithuanian state but also precluded it from

starting negotiations.174

The instrumental usage by the Lithuanian elites of EU membership failures to critique

their opponents and find support for their policies was influenced by an important

regional factor. Miniotaite has argued that since the withdrawal of Russian troops

from the region, the Baltic states, despite their common initiatives, have engaged in

mutual competition in their pursuits of integration with the West and in strengthening

of respective state’s sovereignty.175 Regional competition among the Baltic states,

similar to the competition among the Visegrad countries, came to a high point after

the Commission decision in 1997. For Lithuania’s political elites, the Commission’s

move to include Estonia but not Lithuania highlighted their failure to manage the

172 Vitalis Nakrosis, ‘Assessing Governmental Capabilities to Manage European Affairs: The Case ofLithuania’ in Vello Pettai, and Jan Zielonka, eds., The Road to the European Union: Estonia, Latviaand Lithuania, volume 2, Manchester University Press, Manchester & New York, 2003, p. 103173 Landsbergis, p. 313174 See details in Chapter 2.175 Miniotaite 1999, p. 24

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accession process as well as their counterparts in Estonia. For example, Landsbergis

blamed LDDP’s years in power from 1992 to 1996 for squandering ‘Lithuania’s

political capital’ since in his view from 1990 to 1992 Lithuania was a leader in the

Baltics.176 The potential beneficial aspects of Estonia’s success was also mentioned -

Estonia was ‘breaking the ice’ for Lithuanian and Latvian membership.177 Still there

was a general atmosphere of failure in Lithuania in the light of Estonia’s success

which stimulated the Lithuanian government elites to catch up with Estonia and enter

the Union at the same time.178

In summary, Lithuania’s EU policy was not altered radically despite the changing

domestic political climate or public opinion. But EU policy did figure in the elections

and was used instrumentally by the elites in power and by the challengers. However,

even Euro-sceptic opponents once in power accepted the pro-EU elite consensus,

most likely due to the perceived lack of alternative options. Regional elite competition

had a multiplier effect on the Commission’s decision to exclude Lithuania from the

first round of negotiations and further cemented elite resolve to seek membership.

Ideational Factors

While each of the previously discussed factors of economy, security and domestic

politics contained ideational elements and were made more potent by Lithuanian elite

perceptions, the following section will specifically elaborate on the ideational forces

at work in Lithuania’s EU policy from 1997 to 2000.

176 Landsbergis’ Statement ran in major Lithuanian newspaper ‘Lietuvos aidas’ after the Commission’sdecision. Landsbergis, p. 289177 Ibid., p. 311178 Interview with Egidijus Vareikis on March 15, 2006.

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After the Commission announced its decision in 1997, elite discourse on Lithuania’s

vulnerable position as a non-EU member gained force. Significantly, despite the

potential negative economic externalities that could result from the exclusion from the

EU, most of the rhetoric was posed in ideational terms. An ideational fear of being

left out of the EU became a greater motivator for membership than the perceived

ideational or material benefits of EU membership had ever been. Political discourse

became centred on visions of Lithuania being stuck in a ‘Baltic ghetto’ or a ‘grey

zone’ between an enlarging EU and revanchist Russia.179 The sense of periphery and

being in the ‘grey zone’ of Europe was only intensified by the double exclusion of

Lithuania from NATO enlargement as well. As its neighbours, Poland and Estonia,

were already in the negotiation process with the EU, Poland – a future NATO

member, Lithuania was left in the regional company of Latvia, Kaliningrad, and

Belarus. This sense of frustration and isolation was all the more emphasized by the

fact that Estonia had managed to ‘escape’ this ‘Baltic ghetto’ and start negotiations

with the EU.

During these years it is interesting to examine how Lithuania was perceived and

presented by its political elites. In the rhetoric, one discerns the aforementioned focus

on the unfortunate geopolitical situation that the Baltic states share. With the former

Warsaw Pact states integrating securely into Western organisations and CIS forming

another bloc, the Baltic states, prevented from early entry into the EU or NATO, were

left out as some sort of ‘special case’ as the Baltic leaders critically noted. But by the

late 1990s, there was also a sense that the Baltic states were in the process of escaping

this inferior position through integration into Western institutions. For example,

Landsbergis speaking in 1998 stated, ‘Our state has left in the past its isolated position179 Herd in Henderson p. 262, 267

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in the Baltic periphery, where we were locked up along with Latvia and Estonia as a

small specific European region…This artificially created isolation problem, created

due to the old Yalta line, is in a way resolved.’180 Recognizing Lithuania’s historically

difficult international position, the elites struggled to present Lithuania as a ‘normal

state’ rather than some ‘special case’ or even more colourfully as a ‘Baltic mushroom

in a basket.’181 A struggle for labels and rhetoric appeared repeatedly during this time

which called for conceptualizing Lithuania as part of ‘Central Europe’182 not ‘Eastern

Europe where we would be in the same basket as Ukraine, Caucasus, and something

else.’183

From 1997 to 2000, ideational considerations also coloured Lithuania’s perception of

the integration process. The idea gained strength that it was Lithuania’s right to

exercise its political voice as an independent state and thus choose integration into

Western organizations. In the discourse, the pursuit of national goals - ‘a fight for a

right to choose to integrate to NATO and EU’ was compared to the fight for

independence.184 In a similar vein, Landsbergis stated that ‘Independence works are

unfinished until Lithuania is able to use Western organizations,’ such as NATO and

EU.185 This perception of integration as a sign of Lithuania’s independent status can

be explained as a stance against the continuous Russian resistance to Baltic

integration into Western organizations, particularly NATO. Thus, Lithuanian political

motivations for membership in EU and NATO can be understood as Lithuania’s

expression of its political voice despite Russia’s resistance. Russia’s hostility and

180 Landsbergis, p. 336181 Speech to Lithuanian Ambassador Conference in 1997. Ibid., p. 217182 Vytautas Lansbergis hoped that Lithuania would join the Visegrad group. Interviewed by author onApril 11, 2006.183 Landsbergis, p. 217184 Ibid., p. 302185 Ibid., p. 248

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resistance, because it was interpreted as a threat to Lithuania’s security and wellbeing,

only further cemented Lithuania’s resolve.

Right after the Commission’s decision, elite discourse was centred on the perceived

lack of alternatives for Lithuania’s future development other than integration into

Western structures. In response to a view that Lithuania could balance between the

East and the West and maintain its political and economic sovereignty Landsbergis

stated that this option was unrealistic: ‘We do not have an alternative other than to

join and integrate to democratic Western states’ trans-Atlantic structures.186 The

argument that Lithuania lacked alternatives to integration was coloured by emotional

perspectives of being in a ‘Baltic ghetto’ and being again a ‘European outsider.’

Furthermore, the elites repeatedly used dramatic comparisons of Lithuania to Albania.

According to Lithuanian parliamentarian and political scientist, Vareikis, ‘a non-

integrated Lithuania would become a “chaotic Albania”, whose identity today is most

problematically definable and which is one of the least wanted nations in Europe.’187

Similarly, Landsbergis, discussing the option of staying out of the Union, stated: ‘Of

course it is possible to become some isolated, hidden state, which would strangely

think that it could survive by avoiding competition and progress, like some new

Albania.’188

In summary, ideational factors came to figure prominently in the discourse of

Lithuanian political elites in the period from 1997 to 2000. They stemmed primarily

from three factors: Lithuania’s perceived geopolitical insecurity, from economic

dependence on an unstable Russia, and from the fear of being ‘left out’ of Europe. All

186 Ibid., p. 412187 Egidijus Vareikis, Dinozaurejanti Europa, Strofa, Vilnius, 2002, p. 294188 Landsbergis, p. 311

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three of these factors flowed from Lithuania’s recent and distant historical

experiences. Ideational fears related to non-membership outweighed in importance the

potential economic costs of non-membership as well as sovereignty concerns in the

calculations of Lithuanian elites.

Conclusions

The years from 1997 to 2000 were filled with numerous events and elements that

seemed to influence Lithuania’s policy on the EU. These included poor economic

conditions, disappointments and successes in seeking security alliances, regional

competition, domestic political shifts and fluctuations in public opinion. The most

important and constant factor throughout this rather turbulent period was Lithuanian

elite consensus on the necessity of EU membership. The stability of this elite

consensus can be explained by the co-variance between Lithuanian economic and

security interest and broader factors of identity, culture and historical legacy. In fact,

ideational factors not only mattered more than material factors in their own right

during this period, but they made material considerations more salient. The result of

the concord of these ideational and ideationally-enhanced material factors contributed

to the ultimate success of Lithuania’s EU policy. While Lithuania’s EU policy lacked

momentum during much of the 1990s, after 1997, Lithuanian elites emerged with new

resolve for entering the Union in the first round of enlargement.

Another crucial aspect to the elite consensus in this period, besides the co-variance in

economic, political, and ideational interests, was the impact on policy by external

factors. The cumulative effect of exclusion in the first wave of EU accession

negotiations, the Russian economic crisis and exclusion from the first round of NATO

enlargement, all occurring during the brief period from 1997 to 1999, hardened the

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elite resolve for EU membership. The fear of being left out of Europe and of being

marginalized in a Baltic periphery on the border on an unstable Russia were more

invoked by the Lithuanian elites during these years than the material benefits of EU

membership. Furthermore, these ideational fears overrode the sovereignty tensions of

EU membership that increasingly entered the public debate during this time period.

Lastly, the elections of 2000 demonstrated that Lithuanian political elites were unable

or unwilling to alter the Lithuanian foreign policy course. There was a noticeable

element of ‘path dependency’ and ‘rhetorical entrapment’ in Lithuania’s EU policy as

the closer Lithuania got to membership the more difficult it was to change the course

of action. Though sovereignty tensions were high and public Euro-scepticism at its

peak, political parties such as Social Liberals continued the foreign policy agenda of

their predecessors. The reasons were numerous: a perceived lack of alternatives,

negotiations with the EU had already commenced earlier in the year, and it was

difficult to renege on a decade worth of statements and actions to the effect that EU

membership is Lithuania’s primary foreign policy goal.

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Conclusion

Lithuania’s rapid accession to the EU in its first decade of independence might at first

sight give the mistaken impression of a clear and materially over-determined story of

integration. Our detailed analysis has demonstrated that Lithuania's EU accession

process was animated at all times by tension and concord between material and

ideational factors. The latter mattered as much if not more than material

considerations in determining Lithuanian policy elites' drive for EU membership for

two reasons. First, ideational factors were often crucial because of their impact on

elite perceptions of the EU. Second, and more importantly, ideational factors made

material considerations more salient in elite decision making on EU policy. The

correlation between ideational factors and ideationally-enhanced material factors

accounted for the success of Lithuania’s EU policy in key episodes such as in the

years between 1997 and 2000.

This study has demonstrated that in addition to the potent correlation between

material and ideational factors, Lithuanian EU policy succeeded because of the

confluence of a number of elements. The most important of these, such as Lithuanian

elite consensus on foreign policy, inverse ‘rhetorical entrapment,’ ‘path dependency,’

foreign policy independence from domestic politics, Lithuanian national identity and

regional competition, are outlined below.

Lithuanian elite consensus on the necessity of integration to Western structures

through membership in the EU and NATO was one of the dominating features of the

story of Lithuania’s accession. Despite some tactical shifts in the way EU membership

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was sought and articulated, and despite the fact that Euro-scepticism entered the

election platforms of some major political parties, Lithuanian foreign policy never

officially deviated from its goal of entering the EU in the first wave of enlargement.

This elite consensus on foreign policy can be attributed to rational motivations such as

security and political benefits of membership, the potential of economic growth and

development within the Union, the fear of negative economic externalities of non-

membership and the necessity of EU expertise and advice to implement the necessary

reforms for a state in transition to market economy and democracy. However, it is the

ideational motivations of soft security benefits, the desire to emulate the idealized

European model, the fear of being left out of European developments and of being

relegated to a permanent ‘periphery’ and ‘ghetto’ that often proven decisive.

Ideational motivations often had an exponential impact on Lithuania’s material

considerations during key policy decision periods.

Lithuanian elite consensus can be best understood by acknowledging its converses –

elite ‘path dependency’ and ‘rhetorical entrapment’ in EU policy formulation.

Lithuanian elites not only chose to pursue EU membership because of its perceived

benefits but during some key episodes were pushed to do so: they increasingly

became dependent on the path of EU membership for Lithuania’s national vision and

increasingly entrapped by their statements that EU membership is Lithuania’s key

foreign policy goal. For instance Lithuania’s EU application was submitted in 1995

under the EU-cautious LDDP leadership and when economic relations with Russia

were still bearing fruit. This was done because of the perceived lack of security

alternatives to Western integration and of already having expressed the desire and

made progress to enter the Union in 1994 when the negotiations of the Europe

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Agreement were started. Indeed, the rejection of Lithuania from the first round of

negotiations for membership in 1997, far from dampening Lithuanian enthusiasm for

membership, had the effect of reinforcing it. This was due partly to the ‘active

leverage’ of the EU, which kept Lithuania on its path to membership with annual

reviews and evaluations. In 2000, when the Euro-sceptic Social Liberals won the

Parliamentary elections, they were bound by the actions and rhetoric of their

predecessors – the clauses in the Constitution and national security conceptions as

well as the negotiations with the EU which had commenced earlier that year. Thus,

Lithuanian elites not only seemed to agree on the necessity of EU membership but

often found themselves in self-propelling motion towards membership.

Lithuanian foreign policy consensus lasted for more than a decade and was impacted

by the forces of ‘path dependency’ and ‘rhetorical entrapment’ due to foreign policy

independence from domestic politics. While Lithuanian domestic politics experienced

shifts in presidents and political parties over this decade – ranging from left to right to

centrist forces, foreign policy remained consistent. Furthermore, despite the shifts in

Lithuanian public opinion from Euro-enthusiasm in the early 1990s to peaking Euro-

scepticism by 1999 to 2000, domestic political parties did not strategically alter

foreign policy by seeking electoral payoffs. Though some political forces such as the

Social Liberals and politicians such as Adamkus changed their tactics and rhetoric

regarding the EU, the former hoping to appeal to the public with a EU-sceptic

platform and the later seeking to frame the EU in a new light to the public in order to

dispel their concerns, the trajectory of foreign policy remained consistent. The

independence of foreign policy from domestic politics ultimately contributed to the

success of Lithuania’s EU policy.

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Another explanatory factor for the consistency and success of Lithuania’s EU policy

was the nature of the Lithuanian national identity which can be identified

simultaneously as European, anti-Russian, and as a historical European outsider.

While Central and Eastern European accession has often been conceived from a

constructivist perspective as a ‘return to Europe,’ the case of Lithuanian national

identity demonstrated that the realities were often significantly more complex. A

desire to be a part of the European community of states as well as a member of the

West was a motivating factor for Lithuania. However, it seems that equally or

possibly even more important, was the desire to escape the Russian sphere of

influence and the post-Soviet space. Furthermore, a fear of being ‘left out of Europe’

once again as many times before in Lithuanian history in a ‘ghetto’ between

Kaliningrad and Belarus was a key motivation for Lithuania particularly in the years

from 1997 to 2000. This sense of being left out was reinforced by that fact that

neighbouring states of Poland and Estonia seemed poised to join the Union. Taken

together these three strands of Lithuanian national identity were all active drivers to

EU membership, though individually they may not have been salient enough.

Regional competition among the Baltic states was another aspect that was

instrumental to the ultimate success of Lithuania’s EU policy. As our analysis of

1997- 2000 highlighted, Lithuania was determined to enter the Union at the same time

as Estonia due to material and ideational concerns. Materially, there were concerns

that FDI invest would flow out of Lithuania to Estonia, while ideationally, the

prospect of being left out fed fears of remaining alone with Latvia in a Baltic

‘ghetto.’

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In addition to identifying the key factors in the success of Lithuanian EU policy, this

study has drawn attention to some significant impediments to EU membership. These

included fluctuating public support for EU membership, the high costs of EU

stipulated reforms and diverging national interests as the case of the agricultural

policy and the closure of Ignalina nuclear power plant demonstrated. But the most

important impediment was the tension created by the sovereignty debate and the

integration dilemma. Lithuania, as a newly independent state, was very concerned

about infringements on its hard-fought sovereignty from Brussels which was often

critically called ‘the new Moscow.’ The public and some politicians considered an

alternative ‘national’ path for Lithuania without EU membership. However, in the

end, the sovereignty debate was not decisive in precluding Lithuania’s EU

membership because the EU was perceived to be a guarantor of Lithuania’s

sovereignty against greater threats than Brussels – Russia and, to some extent,

globalization.

Another important finding of this study is the non-linear account of Lithuania’s

motives for EU membership. Though it may appear that Lithuania was primarily

motivated to join the EU by security concerns we have demonstrated that this was far

from being the case. Lithuanian security concerns reinforced by ideational factors

played an important role in the initial determination to seek EU membership in the

years up to the submission of the application when rational economic motivations

were marginal. However, in the mid- 1990s, Lithuania increasingly looked towards

the broader benefits of soft security, political voice and access of membership. By

2000, when Lithuania started its accession negotiations, rational calculations about the

economic package and the number of votes in the European Parliament played an

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important role as Vilnius tried to secure the best deal for membership. This finding

may be a useful insight into the pre-application and post-application motives of

accession states in general. It seems that in the initial stages of accession states are

guided by broader motives that may include ideational aspects or general

understandings of economic and political opportunities. However, the closer states get

to negotiations and membership the more concerned they get about the specific

implications of membership on their economy and sovereignty.

There are a number of insights from this study of Lithuanian EU policy that can be

applied to Lithuania’s foreign policy in general. Lithuanian foreign policy, as can be

expected for a small and newly independent state, is influenced by its external

environment and external events. This was demonstrated in Lithuania’s EU policy

when the EU Commission’s decision to exclude Lithuania from the first round of

negotiations, the Russian financial crisis and NATO’s decision to exclude Lithuania

from the first round of enlargement proved decisive in cementing Lithuania’s resolve

to pursue EU membership. However, the influence of external parties should not be

overestimated in Lithuania’s foreign policy since NATO membership was achieved

despite the vocal opposition of Moscow and scepticism in many European capitals.

Another inference that can be drawn from this study is that there seems to be a lack of

relationship between domestic politics, public opinion and foreign policy. Foreign

policy is formulated by elites, affected little by changes in the political parties in

power or by shifts in public opinion.

Though the thesis focuses on Lithuania’s EU accession many inferences can be drawn

about Lithuania’s policy towards Euro-Atlantic structures in general. In the

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Lithuanian political discourse EU and NATO were often addressed together and

viewed as inseparable and complementary goals. Furthermore, the public often did

not greatly differentiate between them and thus, public opinion shifts on the EU were

similar to public opinion shifts on NATO. For instance, during the 1999 dip in public

approval for EU membership, those who were ‘against NATO’ outnumbered those

who were ‘for NATO’ in a public opinion survey (32 percent and 31 percent)

accordingly.189 Though NATO membership was driven more by material security

benefits such as Article V, both organizations were initially perceived as doorways to

Western European community of states and to escaping Lithuania’s peripheral

geopolitical position. However, in the later years as Lithuania was completing a

detailed cost-benefit analysis of EU membership it was also weighing the costs and

benefits of NATO membership – particularly the expenditure of 2 percent of its GDP

on defence. The defence spending came under fire from critics in the 2000

Parliamentary elections who felt that this money could be better spent on social

programs. Thus, NATO and EU membership throughout the 1990s and early 2000s

were perceived in many similar ways by the Lithuanian elites.

Insights into the Baltic, Central and Eastern European accession can also be derived

from the Lithuanian case. Viewing the Baltic accession as a whole has been common

in the integration literature due to their many similarities. The Baltic states shared a

similar history during the inter-war and Soviet era, took a common path to

independence and spent the 1990s trying to integrate into Western structures such as

the EU and NATO. Many of the findings in the case of Lithuania such as evolving

motives, the importance of ideational factors, the divide between the public and the

189 Grazina Miniotaite, The Security Policy of Lithuania and the ‘Integration Dilemma’, LithuanianInstitute of Philosophy and Sociology, Vilnius, 1999, p. 31

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elites on integration, the consistency of foreign policy are present in fellow Baltic

states. As this study has highlighted, a number of ideational and material

considerations that might have been be common to the Baltic states were heightened

in sensitivity in the case of Lithuania due to the unique conditions that emerged from

1997 and 2000. The high level of fear of being ‘left out’ and subjugated to a ‘ghetto’

of Europe may have been unique to Lithuania as Latvia did not have the double

disappointment from NATO and the EU and Estonia achieved one of its goals in

1997. It would be interesting to examine if in the case of Estonia, its success to start

EU negotiations in 1997 may have alleviated some of its material and ideational

concerns to prevent the scenario of non-membership.

The assumption that Central and Eastern European accession was driven by a ‘back to

Europe’ argument has to be re-examined in the light of the findings from the

Lithuanian case. It is likely that Poland was similarly driven to pursue EU

membership from broad notions of security in light of proximity to Russia and the

Kaliningrad enclave. A desire to escape the Russian sphere of influence may have

been less of a factor for states such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and

Slovenia which are geographically and geopolitically further removed than the Baltics

or Poland from Russia. However, it is likely that these states like Lithuania had

ideationally tainted fears of being left out of Europe and becoming the new

‘Albanias.’ Yugoslavia’s impact on Slovenia is worth exploring since it is comparable

in some respects to the USSR’s legacy on the Baltic states, both in terms of fuelling a

desire to integrate into Western structures and prompting hesitation due to sovereignty

infringements upon newly won independence. Slovakia may be fruitfully compared to

Lithuania in its accession policy particularly in the years of 1997 to 2000. Both states

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experienced the double disappointment of being excluded from the first round of

negotiations for EU membership in 1997 and from the first round of NATO

enlargement of 1999. Furthermore, just like Lithuania, which was motivated by

Estonia’s achievement, Slovakia’s failure was magnified by the success of its

neighbour, Czech Republic, which started EU negotiations earlier and entered NATO

in the first round of enlargement. Just like Lithuania, Slovakia, intensified its efforts

to seek EU membership and entered the Union in 2004 along with the first-wave of

applicants. Thus, the insights from the Lithuanian case study reveal a number of

aspects worthy of further exploration in the Central and Eastern European accession

states; it demonstrates that the Lithuanian and Baltic states’ accession was not the

‘special case’ some have assumed it to have been.

The findings of this study may provide insight into the ongoing accession process of

Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania as well as the potential accession of Belarus and

Ukraine. After excluding Bulgaria and Romania from the first round of negotiations

for membership in 1997, the Commission opened accession negotiations with these

two states in December of 1999 along with Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and Malta.

However Bulgaria and Romania lagged behind in accepting chapters of the acquis. It

would be interesting to examine if the tensions between ideational aspects and

material considerations have caused a slowdown in the EU policies of these two

states. Furthermore, did domestic politics190, public opinion, and/or regional

competition played a role in their foreign policy? Since Bulgaria and Romania joined

NATO in 2004, it is possible to infer that their membership will be less driven by

190 Vachudova has argued Bulgaria and Romania’s slow progress towards EU membership was a resultof illiberal government elites in non-competitive political systems. Milada Anna Vachudova, EuropeUndivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration after Communism, Oxford University Press, Oxford,2005, p. 25-29; p. 198-217.

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security considerations than the Baltic states which simultaneously pursued EU and

NATO membership throughout the 1990s. Croatia may demonstrate a number of

similarities with the Lithuanian accession process since it is a newly independent state

having emerged from union with Yugoslavia. Furthermore, just like the Baltic

competition stimulated Lithuania and Latvia to catch up to Estonia’s progress in EU

accession, so may Slovenia’s success motivate Croatia. Furthermore, Croatia may

prove to be as or even more motivated than the Baltic states by security benefits of

EU membership due to its recent experience of war. Lithuania’s EU accession

experience may also shed some light on the potential candidatures of Belarus and

Ukraine. The Soviet legacy certainly played a role in Lithuania’s EU policy and will

probably do so for these post-Soviet states.

Another fruitful comparison between the Lithuanian or the Baltic accession as a

whole may be made with the accession process of the Nordic states. There are

certainly some key differences between Nordic and Baltic countries since the Nordic

states are not new states, do not have significant security concerns other than Finland

and are not transition states or post-communist economies. However, the Nordic

states, similarly to the Baltics, experienced a divide between public and elite on

integration. While government elites pitched membership as a precondition for

political influence and continued economic growth, public scepticism was centred on

‘cultural nationalism’ and desire to preserve the welfare state.191 Moreover,

comparative analysis of these two regional sets of states may shed interesting light on

the wider questions of the dynamics animating EU enlargement and regional

integration processes.

191 Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver, European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of theNordic States, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, p. 5

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Interviews by Author

Bobelis, Kazys. Member of Lithuanian Parliament and Parliament’s Committees onEuropean Affairs and Foreign Affairs. April 12, 2006.

Kuzmickas, Bronislovas. Former Member of Lithuanian Parliament, Head ofLithuania’s delegation to WEU. March 27, 2006.

Landsbergis, Vytautas. Speaker of Lithuanian Parliament 1996 to 2000, Leader ofHomeland Union party, European Parliament Member. April 12, 2006.

Vareikis, Egidijus. Member of Lithuanian Parliament, Vice-Chairman of Parliament’sEuropean Affairs Committee. August 10, 2005 and March 15, 2006.

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agnia baranauskaite grigas 'explaining lithuania's policy on eu accession, 1991-2002

Documents