aftermath of natural disasters: coping through residential mobility

118 AFTERMATH OF NATURAL DISASTERS

Aftermath of natural &asters: Coping through residential wu) bility

John C. Belcher and Frederick L. Bates"

Ikpart nient uf Sociology University of Georgia Athens, GA 30602 U.S.A.

Most studies of population movement have concentrated on the more developed nations and on trends that have not been influenced by man-made or natural disasters. The experience of developing countries in the Caribbean basin, as studied after the Guatemalan earthquake of 1976 and the impact of Hurricane David in the Dominican Republic of 1979, highlights the importance of socio-economic factors in the decision to make permanent migrations after a disaster, regardless of whether the migrant had personally suffered losses. In many cases the opportunities for personal betterment created by the disaster acted as a catalyst and accelerated a previously-existing trend of migration.

Key words: Disaster aftermath: population movement; socio-economic incentives; Dominican Republic; Guate- mala.

INTRODUCTION

An! disaster will undoubtedly produce some movement of population. Often without warning, tens of thousands can lose their homes. I n extreme cases, the entire population of ;in a c a may be forced to flee as a result of war, a volcanic eruption or a flood that inundates everything. Such rcloc;itions may be temporary, but, of course, others may be pcrmanent. Natural disasters such as earthquakes or hurricanes may leave much destruction in their wake, but people are not forced to move away to survive; they tind othcr ways of adapting to their environment.

A serious consequence of many man-made catastrophes such as wars, political oppression, and genocide campaigns n i a y be the 'aimless migration of vast numbers of human

"Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the South Eastern Council of Latin American Studies, Callaway Gardens, GA, 25-27th March 1982.

beings. A major disaster often results in a significant change in the distribution of the population of a society. Disaster studies are replete with descriptions of vast numbers tlocking to refugee centers. The word refugee creates mental images of starvation. honielessness, crime, disease. and poverty - the entire configuration of what is known as the Malthusian population checks.

The purpose of this investigation is to formulate some general principles of migratory movements after a natural disaster. The focus of the analysis is the Caribbean basin which is subject to a broad spectrum of disasters including earthquakes, hurricanes, volcanoes, drought, mud slick\ and tloods. Data come from two case studies each representing a distinct type of disaster. One case is the earthquake in Guatemala in February 1976 and the other is that of hurricanes David and Frederick which lashed thc Dominican Republic within the week s tming 30th August 1979.

Household interview surveys were conducted in both countries. The Guatemalan survey was initiated in 1978 and investigated the impact and reconstruction over a 2-ye;ir time span. The Dominican survey was started only I week after the second hurricane, Frederick, passed through the nation and was completed before the reconstruction process was underway. The area of destruction was vast in both cases. Tens of thousands had their homes destroyed or damaged and, within a short period of time, large numbers sought shelter outside their home communities. Conven- tional wisdom holds that those who eventually return to their original homes do so because they have economic opportunities there but those who permanently relocate lack such opportunity and anticipate rewards in a new setting. Other factors may, however, be more relevant than the economic ones.

Although migration is one of the three main components of demographic processes - the other two being fertility and mortality - and has been the focus of nunierous studies, little is known of mobility patterns after a natural disaster.

Because so much movement is compressed within such ;I

short time span, a disaster provides the specialist in migration with a natural laboratory in which to study the phenomenon. A further advantage of this research situation is that the methodology of the study is simplified. Respondents can easily give information on their place of residence before and after the disaster. Secular economic and other trends may be largely ignored. As a consequence, studies of migration following disasters can makc contributions to demographic theory.

MIGRATION THEORIES

Traditionally, most explanations for migration have been based on the belief that people relocate in search of economic opportunity (Stouffer. 1940; Lee, 1966; Raven- stein, 1885; Bogue, 1969; Weller and Bouvier, 1981). Furthermore, demographers have demonstrated that migration is selective of the young and unmarried who are seeking an economic niche in society whereas the more established, older, married individuals are more sedentary.

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AFTERMATH OF NATURAL DISASTERS 119

Not all move and whether an individual leaves a community is attributed to the interplay between push factors (e.g. unemployment or undesirable social, economic or political conditions) in the home place with pull factors (employment prospects or a favorable subjective evaluation of the potential for an approved style of life) from elsewhere. Any type of disaster, be it a drought, hurricane, earthquake, war, or flood may be considered a push! In addition, however. the reconstruction process which follows major disasters offers economic opportunities not present before the event.

Most scientific investigations of migration have been made in the more developed nations in the absence of major social, political, economic, or natural upheavals. There is a need for studies in the developing world to enrich migration theory and for investigations that relate migration to catastrophes. In this connection, William Petersen (1958) has formulated a typology of migration that is a useful heuristic device when population movements are being made in the Third World. He presents five “Classes of Migration”: Primitive, Impelled, Forced, Free and Mass.

Primitive migration is the result of the sociological push brought about by the interaction of nature and man. This classification includes nomads as well as groups that periodically move a village when soil fertility declines or the supply of game diminishes. Primitive migration also includes “flight from the land” after a disaster. This situation tends to a equated with the absence of a technology permitting people to adapt to nature in the current place of residence.

Impelled or Forced migration is that brought about by the Nation or State through the implementation of population policies. The slave trade, political displacement, or flight from invading armies are examples of this form of movement where decision-making is denied to the migratory person.

By Free migration, residence is changed as an individual seeks to achieve personal aspirations. People are socialized to certain norms such as a standard of living or desired occupational status. Through relocation the individual rationally decides that he can fulfill his aspirations.

Finally, Mass migration is a form of collective behavior brought about by social momentum. Perhaps youth leave a rural community for the city upon graduation from high school because it is expected of them. International migration often has the characteristics of collective behavior such as that which occurred when residents of a given Italian village migrated to a given city in the U.S. early in the present century.

This typology aids in giving insight into migration after a natural disaster. Undoubtedly, much residential movement after a disaster, especially in an underdeveloped country is primitive. Flight from the customary place of residence is essential because the level of technology does not permit survival once needed resources have been destroyed. Neither Impelled for Forced migration are ordinarily associated with a natural disaster nor is Mass migration in the short run, although it could be spawned over a period of time.

In the developed nations migration after a disaster is likely to be of the Free variety. The disaster changes local

situations and becomes a catalyst for movement for people seeking to achieve aspirations previously held. Not all move, however, and it is important to investigate the generalized push and pull factors that account for the selection of migrants.

Relatively few studies have related natural disaster with migration. One exception is the work of Dacy and Kunreuther who generalized the patterns of post-disaster migration as follows:

1 . If families leave the area, they insist on remaining together as a unit while they are in temporary quarters.

2. Whenever possible, families reside with close friends or relatives in the same community and if it is at all feasible, will attempt to restore or repair their own dwelling rather than look for a new one.

3. Residents leave the area voluntarily only when strong warnings indicate possible destruction, and even then many remain.

4. Convergence problems in the disaster area are often caused by the large numbers of immigrants seeking work or just veiwing the damage (Dacy and Kunreuther, 1969).

Other analyses of the aftermath of natural disasters often include statements about population mobility. Some of these are related to the specific situation, but many of the findings would appear to be applicable to other settings.

For example, in discussing the Halifax Explosion of 1917, Dacy and Kunreuther (1969) noted that “Each resident desired to reoccupy his old home just as soon as it was made livable again. Several families even returned before their dwellings were repaired, preferring to live in tents or trailers on their land rather than remain in more distant shelters.” A possible conclusion is that land owners are unlikely to migrate.

Dacy and Kunreuther (1969) also found that after the Alaskan earthquake in 1964, husbands tended to remain in the area to help in the recovery work, while their wives and children went to stay with relatives temporarily in the “lower 48” states, one reason being the threat of recurrent destruction. Thus it would appear that migration is most characteristic of those family members whose labor is not essential in the rebuilding stage. Other people anticipating employment opportunities flocked into the Anchorage area even though officials discouraged them from doing so.

In a similar vein, Davis (1978) notes that many places have experienced an immediate surge of population after a disaster. He reports rural peasants moving into Guatemala City after the earthquake for wages three or four times what they had previously received. Further, such individuals tend never to return to the rural areas. Elsewhere, Davis (1977) points out that a major problem associated with the influx of people into a devastated urban area is the shortage of land of which to construct dwellings.

Resistance to residential mobility seems common. probably a phenomenon which is intensified among home owners. Mitchell (1976) reports that after the Gediz earthquake of 1970 villages were relocated on geologically safer sites. “Many villagers would move into the new houses, stay for a short time, then return to the old site and rebuild

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Table 1. Comparison of housing damage among seven Dominican Villages

Sabana Cambita Cambita Grande Total sample Juan Baron de palanque Pueblo Cruce Yaguate El Cacao Medina

NO. 9'0 NO. '70 NO. '70 NO. '70 NO. 7'0 NO. 9'0 NO. 9'0 NO. '%,

Totally destroyed 178 32.0 56 93.3 53 88.3 22 24.4 23 24.7 19 21.3 2 2.3 3 3.H Partially destroyed 283 50.8 3 5.0 6 10.0 64 71.1 59 63.4 41 46.1 63 73.3 47 59.5 N o tlol11:lge 96 17.2 1 1.7 1 1.7 4 4.4 11 11.8 29 32.6 21 24.4 29 3h.7

7- ot a I 557 100.0 60 100.0 60 100.0 90 99.9 93 99.9 89 100.0 86 100.0 79 100.0 N o answer 1

thcir damaged homes. Consequently, the new houses are in niany instances uninhabited, are deteriorating, and are not being paid for."

These gleanings from the literature indicate that iiunierous problems in the reconstruction process are rclnteti a t times to residential mobility and, again, to a rcluctance to move. More knowledge of these phenomena \houId contribute to the efficacy of future relief programs. 'l'hc present analysis provides a necessary contribution to tlic body of available knowledge.

CASE STUDIES

1, The Dominican case

Data collected in seven communities in the Province of Sari Cristobal in the Dominican Republic 2 weeks after the p o w ~ r 1 U I hurricane David and 1 week after Frederick followed the same path give an opportunity to demonstrate some of the social factors in population mobility after a d is aster .

The eye of the hurricane David went through this province on 30th August 1979. Three communities got the full force of the 150 mile an hour winds: Juan Baron. Sabana Grande de Palenque and Yaguate. In Juan Baron. 93'70 of the homes were completely destroyed by the storm, 88% in Sabana Grande de Palenque and 21% in Yaguate (Table 1). In the latter community, however, 33% remained virtually unscathed after the force of David had passed through. These differences reflected the percentage of the homes in the three centers constructed of concrete or cement blocks. The dwellings that were partially destroyed generally lost their roofs made of corrugated metal. About one-fourth of the houses in both Cambita Cruce and Canibita Pueblo were completely destroyed. These two communities were inland and slightly protected by the terrain. Only one home in twelve suffered no damage in Cambita Cruce and one in twenty five in Canibita Pueblo. Medina did not receive the eye of the hurricane and was partially protected by some mountains. Although 60%) of the houses in this community received some damage, only 3.8% were destroyed. Still more distant from the sea and

Table 2. "Do all the same people live in this home now as before the hurricane?"

Sabana Cambita Cambita Grande

Total sample Juan Baron de Palanque Pueblo Cruce Yaguate El Cacao Medina

NO Yo NO. '70 NO. Yo NO. '70 NO. 7 0 NO. 70 NO. '7u NO. 9'0

Yes, nochange 318 57.3 33 55.9 33 55.0 48 53.3 46 50.0 38 42.2 65 75.6 55 70.5

N o . a l l are i n a refugee center 29 5.2 2 3.4 6 10.0 7 7.8 12 13.0 1 1.1 1 1.2 0 0.0

N o , some have nioved in 120 21.6 3 5.1 10 16.7 31 34.4 24 26.1 29 32.2 11 12.8 12 15.4

N o , some have moved away 63 11.4 15 25.4 8 13.3 4 4.4 8 8.7 14 15.6 4 4.7 10 12.8

N o , \ome have left and others ha\e nioved in 25 4.5 6 10.2 3 5.0 0 0.0 2 2.2 8 8.9 5 5.8 I 1 . 3

'l'otal 555 100.0 59 100.0 60 100.0 90 99.9 92 100.0 90 100.0 86 100.1 78 100.0

N o answer 3 1 1 I

Disasters/ 71 2/ 1 983

with more protection by the mountains from the eye of the storm, El Cacao got less powerful winds than Medina. Still, 73.3% of the homes received some damage, mostly losing roofs, but only one dwelling in fifty was destroyed.

These differences in the amount of damage were reflected in the niobility of the population after the storm. Where homes were intact, there was an influx of people into the dwellings that remained, sometimes from within the community or from nearby areas. The presence of refugee centers was also a factor in these population movements.

Interviews were completed with a representative sample of families in each of the communities 2 weeks after the hurricane David. These surveys were made possible because medical students had been doing internships for 5 months in the seven communities when the storm passed through. A final part of the work of these students was an epidemiological survey based on interviews. Maps had been prepared of all the homes in each community. Samples had been drawn. The interviewing started just a few days before the hurricane. With this base, a new schedule was rapidly prepared and a post disaster survey madf before outside relief agencies had appeared on the scene. At the time, only one of the communities was accessible by car. Five could be reached only by fording rivers as the bridges had been washed out. One was accessible only on foot or by mule.

No evacuation of the population was attempted any place in the country as a result of the threat of the hurricane. In Santo Doming0 and other larger population centers, people did go to schools, churches and other public buildings that were declared to be refugee centers. In the rural areas, however, there are few public buildings. Consequently population movement tended to come only once the storms had passed through the area.

Each respondent was asked if the same people lived in each house who had been there before the storms. Considerable movement of people had taken place in this 2 week period. Only 57.3% of the households in the combined seven samples reported the same people present (Table 2). One home in twenty (5.2%) had all its members in a refugee center. Rather interestingly, one house in five (21.6%) reported that others had moved in. Only 11.4% reported that some members had moved out. However another 4.5% stated that some had moved in while others had left. Certainly, this figure demonstrates a substantial shifting in the population during this period.

The patterns of change varied a great deal from one community to another. Population stability was most characteristic of Medina and El Cacao. These two villages received less damage from the hurricane than the others. Seven out of ten (70.5%) of the households in Medina and 75.6% of those in El Cacao had the same persons present before and after the storms. Any change tended to be for homes in these communities to receive additions to the household. Sabana Grande de Palenque, Cambita Cruce and Canibita Pueblo all reported a substantial portion of their populations in refugee centers. Although Yaguate, Cambita Cruce and Cambita Pueblo all experienced heavy damage, many of the homes were left intact. These communities all reported that many homes had new


residents. The tigures being 32.270, 26.1% and 34.4% respectively of the households in each village (Table 2). Juan Baron reported that 25.4% of the homes had belonged to people who had moved elsewhere. Few, however from Juan Baron sought refuge in the school that served as a refugee center. Most in this center had already moved away as the interviewing was being completed. This contrasts sharply with other localities in the country where people were still in public buildings, especially schools, 6 months after the storms.

The above statistics represent change by households. Related, of course, is the number of people who left each house as compared with the number who came in. In general the greater the damage, the more movement that might have been expected. The pattern however, was for greater change of residence to take place in those communities that experienced heavy damage, but still had many homes that remained intact. I n Yaguate, Cambita Cruce and Cambita Pueblo, there was a heavy exchange of household residents with twice as many reported coming into the homes as leaving. The reverse was true in heavily damaged Juan Baron and Sabana Grande de Palenque where about twice as many people left the sample homes as entered them. Movement in general was less in the less seriously damaged Medina and El Cacao. Not unexpectedly, the direction of movement was into the sample homes with about twice as many coming in as leaving.

Related to these figures, of course, is where the people came from or where they went. Table 3 shows that the vast majority of those coming into the sample houses came from other houses in the same community and in the case of Yaguate and Cambita Pueblo from homes in nearby communities. In other words, dislocated families tended to find shelter with family and neighbors. In addition there was some movement from San CristGbal and Santo Domingo. Most of these coming from the cities arrived not to find refuge but to aid family members who had been victims of the storms.

When some members of a family moved, they tended to locate in refugee centers or other nearby homes. Most of the communities that were heavily damaged reported more going to refugee centers than to nearby homes. Exceptional in this regard was Juan Baron where most of the exodus was to Santo Domingo. An examination of the individual schedules showed that most of those going to Santo Domingo were the children of the household heads. Although the survey data are not available, it may be presumed that children were sent to stay with relatives in the city while the parents completed the reconstruction process. It is significant that in Juan Baron approximately one family in four reported that one or more members had gone to Santo Donlingo. Nearby, Sabana Grande de Palenque which was also almost destroyed had only three homes reporting members in Santo Domingo. There the members went to a refugee center or to a home in this or a nearby community.

Certainly the amount of movement was very substantial in the 2-week period after the storm. A very significant question is whether or not it represents a permanent shift. During the period of interviewing, comments were heard in

Disasters/ 7 / 21 1983


Table 3(a). "If some have moved into the home, where did they come from?"

Sabana Canlbita Cambita Grande

Pueblo Cruce Yaguate El Cacao Medina

No. 9'0 No. 9'0 NO. To No. 'Yo No. 70 No. TO No. 7n No. Tn

Total sample Juan Baron de palanque -

From other house i n thisvillage 61 49.2 1 16.7 4 40.0 16 61.5 15 65.2 14 38.9 7 46.7 4 50.0

From house in nearby village 30 24.2 2 33.3 2 20.0 8 30.8 1 4.3 14 38.9 2 13.3 I 12.5

From Santo Domingo or San C'ristbbal 20 16.1 3 50.0 3 30.0 1 3.9 4 17.4 4 11.1 1 6.7 2 25.0

Froni open country 4 3.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 8.7 0 0.0 4 26.7 0 0.0

From other location 9 7.3 0 0.0 1 10.0 1 3.9 1 4.3 4 11.1 1 6.7 I 12.5

'l'otal 124 100.0 6 100.0 10 100.0 26 100.1 23 99.9 36 100.0 15 100.1 8 100.0 N o t applicable

or no an\wcr 435 54 50 64 70 54 71 71

Table 3(b). "If some have moved from the home, where did they go?"

Sabana Grande Cambita Cambita

Total sample Juan Baron de Palanque Pueblo Cruce Yaguate El Cacao Medina

No. yo No. 70 NO. To NO. To NO. 9'0 No. To No. Tn No. '%)

'1-0 other house

To house in

'1.0 a refugee

'1'0 Santo

i n this village 22

nearby village 9

center 32

Doniingo or San Cristbbal 27

'lo the open

To other location 11 Total 104 N o t a p pl ica ble or no answer 454

country 3

21.2 2

8.7 1

30.8 4

26.0 14

2.9 0 10.6 1

100.2 22

38

9.1 3

4.5 2

18.2 7

63.6 3

0.0 0 4.5 0

99.9 15

45

20.0 5

13.3 0

46.7 4

20.0 1

0.0 0 0.0 1

100.0 11

79

45.5 1 8.3 6 27.2 0 0.0 5 41.7

0.0 1 8.3 1 4.5 3 30.0 1 8.3

36.4 4 33.3 10 45.4 2 20.0 1 8.3

9.1 1 8.3 3 13.6 1 10.0 4 33.3

0.0 0 0.0 1 4.5 2 20.0 0 0.0 9.1 5 41.7 1 4.5 2 20.0 1 8.3

100.1 12 99.9 22 99.7 10 100.0 12 99.9

81 68 76 67

all The communities that most of the occupants of the refugee centers had come in from the countryside. Presumably these were landless peasants whose homes had been destroyed. With the loss of the homes, their only reason for remaining in the country had disappeared. The refugee center was thus a first step in the migration process to a larger community where employment would be sought and a new way of life established.

Thus there was reason to believe that the disasters w o u l d serve as a force or movement from the seven communities. especially by those who stood to benefit socially or economically by migration. One question, therefore, asked of' all the informants was, "Do you th ink you will continue to live in this community?" Of the 552 answers to this question in the combined sample, 85.77~1 expressed a desire to continue living in the survey community, only 8.1%

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AFTERMATH OF NATURAL DISASTERS 123

Table 4(a). “Do you think you will continue to live in this community?”


Total sample Juan Baron de palanque Pueblo Cruce Yaguate El Cacao Medina

NO. 70 NO. % NO. 70 NO. 9’0 NO. 7’0 NO. To NO. To NO. Yo

Yes 473 85.7 54 91.5 60 100.0 77 86.5 64 68.8 82 91.1 64 75.3 72 94.7

No 45 8.1 2 3.4 0 0.0 8 9.0 19 20.4 5 5.6 9 10.6 2 2.6 Undecided 34 6.2 3 5.1 0 0.0 4 4.5 10 10.8 3 3.3 12 14.1 2 2.6

Total 552 100.0 59 100.0 60 100.0 89 100.0 93 100.0 90 100.0 85 100.0 76 99.9

Noanswer 6 1 0 1 0 0 1 3

Table 4(b). “If no, where would you like to live?”


Total sample Juan Baron de palanque Pueblo Cruce Yaguate El Cacao Medina

NO. To NO. Yo NO. To NO. To NO. To NO. 70 NO. 70 NO. 70 ~~

San Cristiibal 19 37.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 22.2 11 52.4 3 60.0 1 11.1 2 40.0 Other locality in this province except San Cristoba I 8 15.7 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 33.3 1 4.8 0 0.0 3 33.3 1 20.0

orother city 21 41.2 1 50.0 0 0.0 3 33.3 8 38.1 2 40.0 5 55.5 2 40.0

nation or other nation 3 5.9 1 50.0 0 0.0 1 11.1 1 4.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0

Total 51 100.1 2 100.0 0 0.0 9 99.9 21 100.1 5 100.0 9 99.9 5 100.0

Not applicable

Santo Domingo

Other places in

or no answer 507 58 60 81 72 85 77 74

wanted to leave but 6.2% said they did not know or were unsure (Table 4). Significantly, these answers were not related t o the amount of damage in the community. Only two of the respondents from Juan Baron and none from Sabana Crande de Palenque wanted to migrate. Nineteen of the 45 people saying they wanted to move were residents of Cambita Cruce, a community that provides considerable non-farm employment and has to some extent an urban atmosphere. Eight individuals in adjacent Cambita Pueblo also expressed a desire to move plus nine from isolated El Cacao which received relatively little impact from the storm.

The principal agricultural product for all three of these communities is coffee. The high winds of David destroyed 80% of the annual harvest in these communities just as the harvest was ready to get underway. With little in the way of subsistence agriculture and mountain lands that do not permit other short cycle crops, many of these families had a

bleak economic future for another year until a new coffee harvest started about September, 1980.

Yaguate is in a cane area. Few of its residents are farmers although many do have jobs in the sugar mill or other forms of nonagricultural employment. With the sugar harvest starting in December, these people could look forward to an income in the near future. Those agriculturalists in Medina, Sabana Grande de Palenque and Juan Baron may have lost a harvest but a new crop could be planted within a matter of days. With the climate of the Dominican Republic these people could have a minimum of two harvests within the year and perhaps as many as three or four, especially from some speciality horticultural crops such as onions, peppers, eggplants, and tomatoes.

People expressing a desire to move were asked where they wanted to go. Of those answering this question, approximately 80% wanted to move to Santo Domingo, San

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CI tst6bal or sonie other city in the Dominican Republic; the residents of Canibita Cruce especially wanted to move to Santo Domingo.

He\pondents who wanted to move were asked for their reasons. Those from Cambita Cruce wanted to find cmployment, urban facilities. or to be near their families. From Canibita Pueblo, the reasons were for employment or urban fxilities. However, for those in El Cacao in addition l o employment a sizeable percentage wanted to find land to farm or to be close to families. Farms are small in the El Ciiciio area. With the pressure of population, only through migration can a person hope to have a larger acreage or, pcrhap$,.to have any land at all.

2. Guatemala

A n earthquake in Guatemala on 4th February 1976 which measured 7.6 on the Richter Scale, killed 25,000 people. injured 75,000 and left over a million homeless. Hundreds of towns and villages were severely affected and many were almost totally destroyed. The earthquake also struck Guatemala City where extensive damage occurred to less modern structures, many people were killed and injured and urban services were disrupted for varying periods of' t I me.

At the time of the earthquake Guatemala had a population of around 5.5 million, one-fifth of whom lost their homes in the disaster which was concentrated in a band over 200 miles long reaching from the Atlantic coast north-westward past Guatemala City towards the Mexican border. This band varied in width up to perhaps 75 miles in \onie regions. I t took in the most populous area of the country. On the periphery of the earthquake zone towards the Pacific coast and in the north-western quadrant of the country there was a relatively undamaged region. This was also the case with the large but more sparsely settled area extending north-east of the Central highlands.

These facts are important to a migration study because the areas to which most of the population movement had been tlowing prior to the earthquake were themselves

heavily affected by the disaster. Furthermore, the extensive- ness of damage was so great and covered such a large area that people on an average could not move to a nearby town and find relief. Another problem was that both city and rural areas were affected and this presented difticulties to migrants. A disaster occurring i n a few communities wi th in a larger, unaffected territory could be expected to produce quite different population movement characteristics than ;I

disaster that affects a very large portion of a given country. The Guatemalan earthquake represents the latter type ot' case.

During the course of a 3-year long study of tlic reconstruction process following the 1976 Guatemalan earthquake a series of questions concerning migration were asked of a sample of 1,472 household heads. This sample was divided into communities which were unaffected by the earthquake (control group) and communities with heavy or light damage (experimental group). The experimental and control group samples were drawn in 22 different communities outside Guatemala City varying in size from small isolated villages (aldeas) to large towns (niunicipios) and departmental capitols. In addition, four Guatemala City housing areas which developed after the earthquake, supposedly to house disaster victims, were also studied. Except in the city the sample was divided between towns which contained Indians primarily and towns that were primarily Ladino, since these are the two ethnic groups found in the Guatemalan population and because there are .major cultural differences between them.

In each of the sample communities a random sample o f household heads was interviewed by a member of a team of well trained Guatemalan interviewers. These interviews took place on average about 2 years after the earthquake. From them certain information concerning population movement following a disaster may be obtained.

When interviews were conducted 2 years after the disaster respondents were asked where they lived at the time of the earthquake. Their responses to this question are given in Table 5. This tabulation divides people according to whether they were living in the same town as they were at

Table 5. Migration of household heads in the control, experimental group and city, following the 1976 Guatemalan earthquake

Control group Experimental Guatemala City (undamaged group (damaged (4 post-earth-

Total areas) areas) quake settlements

No. 7 0 No. YO No. YO No. 7 0

N o n - ti1 i gr a n t s (1 iv i n g i n the same town as

Migrants (living in a different town than

before the earthquake) 1328 90.2 321 92.2 748 93.0 259 80.9

before the earthquake) 142 9.8 27 7.8 55 7.0 60 19.1

Total 1470 100.0 348 100.0 803 100.0 319 100.0

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Table 6. Comparison of tenure status of migrants and non-migrants

Total Non-owners Owners

No. 7 0 No. 070 No. 70

Non-migrants 1328 100.0 463 34.9 865 65.1 Migrants 144 100.0 81 56.2 63 43.8 Total 1472 100.0 544 37.0 928 63.0

the time of the disaster or in a different town. It also divides respondents according to whether they were in the control group, experimental group or city samples.

First, i t can be seen that slightly more than 90% are still living in the same village or town as before the disaster, but that nearly 10% have migrated to a different town. What seems at first to be more surprising is that a slightly higher percentage of migrants is found in the control (unaffected communities) than in the experimental group (damaged communities). I t must be recalled, however, that this question was asked of people living in these areas two years afier the earthquake and of course included only persons remaining in these areas after that event. It is possible therefore that the slightly higher rate of migration in the control group is due to disaster victims moving into this area and that the lower rate in the affected area is due to the fact that people did not move as much from one town to another within the disaster zone, or from outside into it but were likely to move out of it. This becomes apparent when we examine the city figures.

In the city sample all of the people studied were living in new settlements founded as a result of the earthquake. About 81% of them came from somewhere inside Guatemala City where they had lived at the time of the disaster. About 19% came from outside the city.

It is very important not to misinterpret this figure. It does not mean that 19% of the people in Guatemala City are disaster-produced migrants. It means that in the four special disaster-produced settlements, of which there were scores, nearly one-fifth of the people came from outside the city. This constitutes an unknown portion of the city’s total population.

When just these people who moved in from outside the city were examined, it was discovered that almost all (93% came from towns and villages in the Department of

Guatemala City and only 7% came from greater distances. From these data it can be stated that most of the migrants recorded were rural and urban migrants and, of these, most moved to Guatemala City from towns and villages immediately on the fringes of the city. A second finding is that most of the people who showed up in newly formed settlements founded to house disaster victims in the city, actually came from inside the city.

When people who migrated were compared with non- migrants in terms of whether they had owned their houses or not at the time of the earthquake, it was found, as would be expected, that a higher proportion were renters than owners. This is shown in Table 6. As can be seen, 56% of the migrants were non-owners as compared with 35% of the non-migrants. Even so, it is important to note that about 44% of all migrants had owned houses in other towns before the earthquake and nevertheless migrated. This may be accounted for by the loss owners suffered in the earthquake.

When migrants and non-migrants are compared on the amount of damage their houses suffered, Table 7 is obtained.

As can be seen, there was almost no difference between migrants and non-migrants in the amount of damage their houses suffeied in the earthquake. In both cases about half suffered heavy damage or had their houses destroyed. From this table it appears that the impact of the earthquake on housing had little to do with producing migration. When migrants and non-migrants were compared in terms of those who had no damage at all, it was found that more migrants had no damage at all (27%) than non-migrants (21%). With respect to the number whose houses were destroyed, it appears that migrants and non-migrants are very similar: (migrants 38.2% destroyed, non-migrants 36.1% destroyed). Again it appears that migrants are not necessarily people who migrated because they lost heavily in

Table 7. Comparison of housing damage suffered by migrants and non-migrants

Total Migrants Non-migrants

No. 70 No. 7 0 No. 70

Heavy damage or destroyed 763 51.8 74 51.4 689 51.9 Light damage or none 709 48.2 70 48.6 63.9 48.1

Total 1472 !OO.O 144 100.0 1328 100.0

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‘I’able 8. Damages suffered by residents of post-earthquake city housing

Ihmage category No. 9” ~

No damage S ligh t Mcd i uni HC;IVY to destroyed Total

40 12.5 83 25.9 70 21.9

127 39.7 320 100.0

the earthquake. A n additional way of checking on this is to examine the

city sample only. Here we are dealing with people who nioved in to newly formed housing settlements right after the earthquake and were believed to be earthquake victims for t he niost part. I t will be recalled that most (80%) came from w i t h i n the city. Of these residents of new housing areas the cxtcnt of damage to their pre-earthquake houses is shown in Tnhlc 8.

When considering people who moved into post- earthquake settlements in the city, most of whom came t’rom w i t h i n the city itself, it can be seen that only about I 2.S0/0 suffered no damage in the earthquake. In contrast, about 40%) claimed their houses had been destroyed in the earthquake and the remainder suffered various lesser

What are we to conclude from all of these data concerning the Guatemalan case? First, it seems apparent t h a t a fairly substantial movement of people had taken place between the time of the earthquake and 2 years later since almost one in ten ofthe households studied had moved during that period from one town to another. Most of this mwetiient appears to have been to the city.

I’cople from both the control and experimental group displayed movement and, in addition, persons who had hi1 tfered no damage and people who had suffered heavily secnied to have migrated in about the same proportion although those suffering heavy damage tended to move t’roni one house to another within the same town more t’requently. This all seems to mean that damage from the earthquake can not account for migration but perhaps that other disaster related factors may be able to.

The earthquake offered an opportunity for some people to niove and they took advantage of it. First, there were new houses and opportunities to acquire a lot in the city offered by the reconstruction process. Rumors that free housing was available in the city penetrated the countryside and people may have moved to seize this opportunity. This fact is seen by examining changes in land and house tenure before and after the earthquake. For example, in one urban squatters’ settlement called The 4th of February, 79.5% of the people were renters, and another 9.4% were living in “borrowed” housing before the earthquake. Only 11.1% owned the houses they were living in. By moving into the squatters settlement, 97.4% owned their houses 2 years after the

tlegrees of loss.

earthquake and the remainder were living in houses borrowed from others. None was paying rent. In another settlement built by Church World Services and consisting 01‘

substantial cement block houses, 81% had been renter\ before the earthquake and only 5.9% had owned Ihcil- houses. By 2 years later all were de.facto owners of their own houses and land. The actual transfer of title had not ycl taken place but was pending due to disputes over whether nominal payments would be made by the new owners.

Thus, it can be Seen that migration to one of these city housing areas was quite a rational move for those wishing to make an economic gain. In addition to this, the city offered new employment opportunities due to the earthquakc reconstruction process above and beyond those offered i n rural villages.

All of these developments did not run smoothly as Ferrate notes:

The lack of adequate urban land for housing projects in the nietropolotal area of Guatemala City as well as the lack of an adequate infrastructure for public services presented.another problem to the NRC. The NRC found about 35,000 families, only 20,000 of whom were due 10

the earthquake, living in settlements and other refiigec camps. They were landless, homeless and extremely poor. Most of then1 had no way to make a living. This problem denlanded a solution (Ferrate, 1982). The almost inescapable conclusion must be drawn tha t

the migration was produced by economic opportunity created by the earthquake and not by econoniic loss. I n ;in

underdeveloped poor rural coniniunity people often have little to lose in such an event. They are so poor already that a disaster makes little difference, except that i t offers cniploynient opportunity and sonietimes opportunity IO benefit from the aid which pours in from outside.

Of the city areas studied two were permanent housing developments constructed by Church World Services. One was a squatters’ settlement and the other consisted of’ barracks of refugee-style temporary housing regarded as a stop-gap by the Guatemalan government. By 1982, the sixth anniversary of the earthquake, all of the residents of the squatters settlement and all of those in the barracks style housing had been resettled in newly constructed cement block houses in newly formed urban housing developments and all had at least de &to ownership of their dwelling$. Some were niaking nominal mortgage payments but technically owned their houses and the land they occupied. This represented an enormous economic gain for those people who had left their former homes to become member\ of the post-disaster urban settlements which sprung up to house disaster victims.

CONCLUSIONS

The destruction of homes would be expected almost certainly to bring about a displacement of people. I n the immediate period after Hurricane David cut a swathc through the Dominican Republic, followed 5 days later by the storm Frederick that unleashed so much damage on the

Disasters/ 7/ 2/ I 08.3


Gulf coast of the U.S., there was a considerable movement of population. The 1976 earthquake in Guatemala left tens of thousands homeless. Much mobility occurred as these people sought shelter - at times temporarily but often permanently relocated.

The postfactum examination of survey data indicate four principal movements resulting from the disaster. First, and most significant, was the seeking of shelter after homes were destroyed or seriously damaged. Most movement took place in those areas where the damage was severe but some homes were well constructed and remained intact. The better homes received a large influx of neighbors and relatives. Often the people came in from other towns or from the countryside. Others whose homes were destroyed went to stay with friends or relatives living elsewhere. Those communities less seriously affected experienced an immi- gration, with relatively few leaving.

At the other extreme the communities where practically all houses were destroyed had no space to keep their own residents and had few immigrants. Those leaving were often individuals who because of age or health were unable to contribute to the reconstruction effort. Doubling up was a temporary phenomenon which tended to last but a few days until a makeshift shelter could be erected.

Second migratory movement generated by the storm was to refugee centers located in the areas that were seriously affected. However, only the more prosperous communities or governmental towns had the public facilities to serve as centers for many people. Many people came to these centers from the countryside. For the landless peasants in this group, the refugee center represented the first step in a permanent migration to a city or another population center. The hurricane became the catalyst for movement. This is a catalyst that was experienced primarily by those living in isolated plots along the highways and in the mountains. Few of the residents of the survey communities used the refugee center as a step in the migration process.

A third effect of the storms was to create dissatisfaction with the existing economic situation and implant a desire to move. N o information is available on whether this movement actually took place in the Dominican Republic. Some of the economic consequences of the hurricanes, including the destruction of commercial crops, confronted some with a bleak future from which only migration could provide a release.

A fourth migratory stream was from unaffected rural areas to metropolotan centers. Especially in Guatemala there was a tremendous influx of people from zones that had not experienced damage from the earthquake. Whereas international relief programs in the Dominican Republic largely involved providing food, that in Guatemala was focused on the construction of thousands of new homes. This building boom opened the door to employment in the city for large numbers of economically depressed rural peasants.

In the short run the disaster was directly responsible for a substantial redistribution of the population. The more permanent migration seemed to be of those who had been experiencing a “push” from the home communities. New

employment opportunities resulting from the reconstruction process provided the “pull” to the cities. The disasters probably compressed this movement into a shorter time span rather than, over the long run. really enhancing the number of migrants.

Conventional wisdom is that a migratory stream from devastated rural areas is responsible for the influx of people into refugee settlements in a city. The Guatemalan case demonstrates that in this instance a very large percentage of the residents of these new communities were not rural migrants but rather landless urban residents who seized upon the emergency situation to improve their levels of living. Significantly, a large percentage of these urban dwellers became home owners rather than renters within the span of 2 years. Further, their levels of living also improved. The probability is great that this is a common phenomenon in other disaster areas.

The unique ecological patterns of Latin America undoubtedly influence the migration patterns. A common phenomenon in metropolitan areas is the “invasion” by squatters of unoccupied tracts of land on the outskirts of the central city. Once these settlements are established, the occupants tend to receive defacto tenure and cannot be dislodged without great difficulty. Only those with urban experience have the knowledge and contact to benefit from these new settlements.

Considerable evidence exists from throughout Latin America that the rural to urban migration is in two stages. The first is for the rural migrant to live with relatives or rent an urban slum. The second stage is for him to secure a home through invasion in a new settlement. To be a squatter demands that the person have employment and be economically established. The just-arrived penniless rural migrant does not have the resources to acquire even a squatter’s shack.

Certainly in other parts of the world the patterns will differ, but there is no doubt that natural disasters do directly or indirectly accelerate the redistribution of the population. Such catastrophes, however, probably do not alter the general migration patterns but simply speed the process bringing many of the problems associated with reconstruction.

Acknowledgements - The extraordinary efforts of Lic. Mejico Angeles Suarez in his capacity as Director of the Dominican Oficina Nacional de Estatistiea and two of his colleagues, Dr. Amiro Perez Mera and Dr. Julio Cross Beras, resulted in an extensive survey immediately after the Hurricanes David and Frederick. They graciously permitted their data to be used in the Dominican portion of this analysis. The Guatemalan study was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation.

Disasters1 1 1 21 1983


REFERENCES

Bogue D.J., Principles of Demography, pp. 752-756. Wiley, New York (1969). Dacy D.C. and Kunreuther H., The Economics ofNatura1 Disasters, pp. 142-144, 147-151. The Free Press, New York, U.S.A. (1969). Davis I., Some initial lessons from Guatemala, Disasters 1(1), 64--65(1977). Davis I. , Shelter After a Disaster, pp. 20-21. Polytechnic Press, Oxford (1978). Ferrate A., Reconstruction Following the 1976 Guatemalan Earthquake; A Longitudinal Analysis, Chapter 3, p. 112.

Guatemalan Earthquake Study, University of Georgia, At hens, Unpublished manuscript (1 982).

Lee E.S., A theory of migration, Demography 3, 47-57 (1 966). Mitchell W.A., Reconstruction after a disaster, Geogrcr- phical Review 66,292 -293 (1976). Petersen W., A general typology of migration, Am. Sociol- ogical Review 23,256-266 (1 958).

Ravenstein E.G., The laws of migration, J. R. Stutistical Society 48(2), 167-277 (1885). Stouffer S.A., Intervening Opportunities: A theory relating mobility and distance, American Sociological Reveiw 5 , 845-867 (1940).

Weller R.H. and Bouvier L.F., Population: Demography and Policy, pp. 218-221. St. Martins Press, New York (1981).

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aftermath of natural disasters: coping through residential mobility

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