A R T I C L E

Afghanistan: the ‘failed state’as status quo?

Teresa de los Reyes Vazquez del Pino

Published online: 8 November 2011� Centre for European Studies 2011

Abstract Since the breakdown of the bipolar system, there has been arenewed interest in so-called failed states. Initially, this interest could be attrib-uted to a post–Cold War enthusiasm for addressing outstanding issues hithertoblocked by the stand-off between superpowers. After 9/11, the focus shifted tofailed states that could potentially harbour a new type of asymmetric threat thathas proliferated in the form of insurgencies and terrorism. Afghanistan is anexample of such a failed state. Ten years after 9/11 and the start of the conflicton its territory, the security and political situation in Afghanistan remainsunstable and the Islamist insurgency continues to represent the principal threat.The 10th anniversary of 9/11 presents an appropriate moment to review thereasons why Afghanistan is considered to be a failed state, the challenges facedby the international community and the Afghan authorities in the short tomedium term and, more importantly, the issues that should be addressed ifAfghanistan is to shed its label as a ‘failed state’.

Keywords Afghanistan � Challenges � Failed state � Insurgency � Legitimacy �Threats

Introduction

After the Cold War, the sudden lack of support from one of the two superpowersfor many governments around the world plunged numerous countries intoferocious and protracted civil wars. Several governments proved incapable of

T. de los Reyes Vazquez del Pino (&)University of Granada, Avenida HOSPICIO, S/N, Granada, Spaine-mail: tvazquezdelpino@gmail.com

123

European View (2011) 10:187–194DOI 10.1007/s12290-011-0175-1

confronting these new threats and challenges effectively, leading to a violentseries of coups d’etat or dangerous power vacuums. These took place mainly indeveloping regions, where the concept of sovereignty was a vague notion andreal political authority was absent. The result was the emergence of areas ofinstability and the proliferation of so-called failed states [11].

The international conflicts that characterised the fall of the bipolar balance ofpower, exemplified by intra-state, ethno-cultural disputes, prompted theinternational community to take an interest in these failed states, which becamean issue of moral altruism. This altruism was manifested in enthusiastic UnitedNations missions to address long-term ‘pending tray’ problems—states such asWestern Sahara, Somalia and Cambodia—with varying results.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Western perceptionof how to deal with failed states shifted from peacekeeping and/or peacemak-ing and humanitarian operations to addressing the multitude of problems thatmade failed states security threats.

The case of Afghanistan

Following the definition proposed by the Washington-based Fund for Peace, afailed state is one in which the government cannot physically control its territory;that has only a limited monopoly, or none at all, on the legitimate use of force; isunable to provide basic public services; and cannot represent the whole countryin the international community [6].

Observing the situation in Afghanistan at present, it is not difficult to identifythe reasons why Afghanistan ranks seventh in the Fund for Peace’s annual FailedStates Index of 177 countries, published by the Foreign Policy journal [5]. Amongthose reasons are the Afghan central government’s lack of legitimacy; theincompetence shown by many of the country’s public institutions; pervasivecorruption; illegal narcotics trafficking; long-standing and well-documentedinter-ethnic tensions; a disputed third-party-imposed border (the Durand Line);the absence of public support for the government; and the persistent threat ofviolence posed by insurgents.

The unstable nature of the political system, clearly evident to the internationalcommunity, is also reflected in the Afghan population’s own perception of itspoliticians and political institutions, which are often considered to be the‘puppets’ of foreign powers. After the discredited December 2009 presidentialelections and September 2010 parliamentary elections—in which security andfraud were major concerns—the lack of legitimacy of the Afghan centralgovernment (whose authority barely extends outside its offices in Kabul) wasfully exposed both within and beyond the country’s borders.

The Afghan government (which survives largely on foreign direct investmentand international aid) is often constrained by pressures from donors and plays asecondary role in decision-making processes. Thus, the demands of the Afghanpopulation are not always taken into account, giving rise to social divisions and aperception of discrimination and exclusion in certain parts of Afghan society.

188

In addition, public institutions must rely on an almost non-existent opera-tional capability. Government employees in charge of assigning resources andadministering international aid in many cases suffer from inadequate training,and personal interests often prevail over professionalism.

A perfect storm of distrust created by complex ethnic differences, bordersthat fail to reflect the complex realities on the ground, social inequalities andwidespread corruption is exacerbated by the climate of insecurity fostered bythe Taliban insurgency. The insurgency in Afghanistan does not correspond tothe classic definition of revolutionary war, since the main objective of thefighters involved is not to obtain a certain share of power in order to eventuallyoverthrow the established government. The principal ambition of the Afghaninsurgency is to perpetuate a failed state where they can operate in so-calledsafe havens with impunity. As noted above, the government’s ability to secure amonopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a country’s borders—through instruments such as the police and the army—is an essentialrequirement for a state to be considered functional.

All these factors contribute to an explanation of why Afghanistan shouldlargely be considered a failed state. Whether Afghanistan’s status quo fulfils thecriteria of a failed state remains to be seen; whether authorities in Afghanistanand among the international community are ready to recognise this also remainsto be seen.

A failed state or a failure of expectations?

Since the Bonn Agreement in December 2001 and agreements reached at thesubsequent International Conferences on Afghanistan—with the leitmotiv ofimproving the situation in Afghanistan—efforts to help the country seek a betterfuture for its citizens have slowly borne fruit. Measures taken have beentranslated into tangible improvements in the quality of life for a significantpercentage of the Afghan population. And the energy and resources invested onthe ground have undoubtedly facilitated a more secure environment. Never-theless, the facts enumerated above that qualify Afghanistan as a failed statehave multiple and multifaceted consequences, and the challenges faced byAfghan authorities and the international community in addressing them havebeen equally complex.

The good intentions of participants in this long-term project of Afghanreconstruction have repeatedly clashed with reality. On many occasions,measures taken have suffered from a lack of focus on medium- to long-termexpectations, with the result that improvements are undercut by significantlimitations. Throughout the last decade, such short-sightedness has ranged froman incorrect identification of actors, and their limited vision in the decision-making process and strategy implementation, to a lack of sufficiently deepknowledge of the country, its culture and idiosyncrasies.

In order to make a functional state out of Afghanistan, the ultimate goal forboth the Afghan authorities and the international community should be to

123

European View 189

establish a stable national government that can guarantee its own security andthat of its citizens against internal and external threats. In order to achieve thisexpectation, however, both actors will have to face an important series ofchallenges.

Challenges to be overcome

If, after a short war, it had become clear that no political stability could bereached without a minimal and indispensable amount of guaranteed security,now, almost 10 years later, the situation has changed beyond question. At thepresent time, in order to guarantee security and confront safe havens and theinsurgency, governance reform is equally necessary.

Since the war in Afghanistan is a political as well as a military campaign, theinternational community and the Afghan authorities should pay specialattention to developing a durable strategic concept at the national and regionallevels, rather than putting all their efforts in to operational tactics [2]. The battletoday has to be fought not just against insurgency and terrorism but againstinefficiency and corruption as well.

Combating insurgency

As previously mentioned, the insurgency in Afghanistan seeks to establish afailed state in which safe havens allow the insurgents to manoeuvre with totalimpunity. The insurgents try to accomplish this by taking advantage of porousborders, transnational dynamics and timing. This kind of insurgency, which isflexible, globalised and decentralised in nature, has forced the Coalition forces,as well as the Afghan security forces, to revise and adapt counter-insurgencymethods (COIN).

An insurgency of this nature obliges all actors involved in COIN efforts toconstantly refine their methods, placing expectations on them that are difficultto fulfil. The willingness of coalition governments to make a long-termcommitment to the Afghan conflict often clashes with growing publicdisaffection in Western societies, which do not always understand the economicand human costs or the ethics behind such a ‘far-away war’. As Peters [10] says:

The one historical truth in counterinsurgency is that defeating insurgenciestakes time… The twin lessons would be that, while insurgencies generallyfail, there is no quick or easy formula for suppressing them—other thanruthlessness at a level we cannot presently permit ourselves.

There is no way of developing valuable counter-insurgency policies thatrequire a long-term vision without the public support of the societies backingand financing them. To invoke the well-worn British slogan ‘winning hearts andminds’, the governments involved in the Afghan campaign should try to win notonly the hearts and minds of the Afghan population but also those of their owndomestic populations back home. Taking into account the natural disposition of

190

post-heroic societies to retreat from a ‘war of exhaustion’, it is worth reflectingon what the German political theorist Herfried Munckler has described as ‘theproblem of what society is willing to sacrifice in order to assert itself and itsvalues’ [1].

Combating inefficiencies and corruption

A consensus exists with regard to the major reversals the Taliban has suffered inrecent years. Furthermore, it is accepted that the new build-up in Afghanistanmust now also focus on political, economic and social reforms. Nevertheless,these kinds of reforms are far from easy to achieve. In order to make progress, acompromise between the Coalition and the Afghan central government on theone hand and the local authorities on the other is essential. However, thatrelationship of understanding and collaboration is likely to be fragile. In somecases, such reforms could be perceived by local powers as a greater threat thanthe insurgency itself. Political reforms could be interpreted as an attempt toreduce their share of power; economic reforms could be seen as an effort todiminish the traditional, corrupt practices on which their livelihoods depend; andlast but not least, social reforms, such as the implementation of anti-discriminatory policies, could threaten customary tribal, family and even malemonopolies on leadership.

A further complication in this inclusive vision of Afghan development is theunavoidable necessity of negotiations with the Taliban. In 2010, President Karzaigained international and domestic support to initiate peace talks in theframework of a reconciliation process with the Taliban Senior Leadership (TBSL).This resulted in the establishment of the High Peace Council (HPC), led byBurhanuddin Rabbani. Following the assassination of Rabbani on 20 September2011, the prospect of peace talks, and a potential legal and political role in theAfghan government for former Taliban members who have renounced their linkswith terrorism, look unattainable.

In a statement published on the Voice of Jihad website on 28 August 2011,Taliban leader Mullah Omar posted a message to mark Eid ul-Fitr (the end ofRamadan). In the message, he congratulated the mujahedin for their ‘continuousvictories’ in Afghanistan, and spoke of the immediate withdrawal of all forcesand the establishment of an Islamic regime as the single solution forAfghanistan. However, he particularly criticised the upcoming Bonn InternationalConference on Afghanistan in December 2011, rejecting any possibility of peacetalks [4].

In addition, the Taliban are able to exploit the central and local authorities’lack of legitimacy, inefficiencies and perceived corruption by engaging withtribal structures in restoring order in a closer and more compromised way thanthe Afghan government would be able to do. This reality brings with it the risk ofpart of the Afghan population being willing to accept the return of the Talibanregime.

123

European View 191

Changing Afghanistan’s ‘failed state’ label

During the London International Conference on Afghanistan in January 2010 [7],a new commitment was made between the Afghan government and theinternational community. The key tenets of the agreement, as set out in theconference communique, were

• the maintenance of a long-term pledge to Afghanistan that could beprolonged for the next 15 years;

• the support of the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and theAfghan National Police (ANP);

• the honourable integration into society of those willing to renounce violenceand respect the principles of the Afghan constitution;

• the development of an economic strategy involving increased progress onagriculture, human resources and infrastructure; and

• the strengthening of Afghan financial management systems.

Implementing these goals will not be a simple task for any of the 70 countriesinvolved in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, there are some measures that could helpto fulfil them.

Reinforcing the legitimacy of the Afghan government is one such measure.This should be done both at the internal and external level. It is necessary tobuild up the belief that the Afghan government is a better option than theTaliban. Improving employment conditions, boosting the economy and imple-menting more effective social policies to reduce inequalities would represent agood start in this.

The legitimacy of the central government is closely tied to the role played bylocal authorities. Local authorities have always had a tendency to be closer to theneeds, perceptions, traditions and customs of the Afghan population. Recogn-ising the needs of the population and extending democratic means to includeactors who could provide ideas to meet those needs is vital. This aim could bemet by promoting a feeling of local ownership as part of a sustainableAfghanistan. Encouraging local institutions to become gradually responsible forthe security, governance and development of their own regions would also help.This could be achieved by enforcing mechanisms that oblige the government totake economic, political and social measures, even if these measures sometimesconflict with the personal interests of government members.

As acknowledged in the communique of the Kabul International Conferenceheld in July 2010 [8], transition is a conditions-based process, not a calendar-driven event. This process should not mean the complete withdrawal of theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from the ground in the near future,but a gradual shift to a supporting role as the Afghan National Security Forces’capabilities develop. A successful transition involving the handing over ofresponsibility for security to the central government and the local authorities willrequire the Afghan National Security Forces to be prepared to track both existingand new security challenges [9]. Obviously, this should be completed bypersuading repentant insurgents and moderate Taliban to play a role in those

192

institutions, as long as they respect Afghan laws and principles enshrined in theAfghan constitution, regardless of the difficulties that tracking the real success ofthis strategy might imply.

Despite Mullah Omar’s speeches, the TBSL intends to prevent moderateTaliban from joining the reintegration programme, and despite the frustrationsexpressed by President Karzai in the statement he issued on 1 October 2011 [3],the strategy of seeking peace talks with the Taliban should not be abandoned.Nor should one underestimate the potential effectiveness of the cooperationand support of Afghanistan’s nearest neighbours, especially India and Pakistan.Good relations with the government of Pakistan are essential to maintainstability in the region.

It is also important to realise to what extent the mass media can play a role ininternational conflicts. The international community and the Afghan authoritiestherefore need to consider how the media affect public opinion and its knowledgeabout the world, helping to constitute the public sphere of society. Wise foreignpolicy choices should rest upon a foundation of citizen knowledge of often-intractable conflicts in order to obtain public support for long-term interventions.

These challenges and new ones will certainly be addressed during the nextInternational Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn in December 2011. Neverthe-less, the real challenge will be to translate the goals agreed upon by all actorsinvolved in Afghanistan into measures capable of having a significant impact onthe reality on the ground.

Conclusion

As of November 2011, Afghanistan can still be considered a failed state. Theprospects for stability in the country are uncertain. The situation is constantlyevolving. The government does not exercise widespread control across thecountry. The risk that part of the Afghan population will accept the return of theTaliban regime is a real one. In short, the complexities of reality often overtakethe goals and strategies carefully designed to help Afghanistan grow into afunctional state.

After a decade of war in Afghanistan and with a commitment from theinternational community on the ground that could last at least 15 more years, ithas been proven that the stability of Afghanistan is not going to be achievedonly by military means but by a combination of governance, rule of law, andeconomic, social and security measures. However, it is important not to deny theachievements made during the past 10 years, about which a cautious optimismshould remain. That is why the international community and Afghan govern-ment should try to find an honest way to make clear to their audiences not onlythe challenges and compromises the future might present but also the resultsthat can be reached.

A balance, then, must be found between the need to inform public opinion ina comprehensive way and the need to manage ‘war fatigue’ in many Westernsocieties. This balance should be found by explaining the need for international

123

European View 193

intervention in long conflicts and the economic and human costs it implies,while reassuring the Afghan population and its representatives of the interna-tional community’s willingness to continue its involvement. The role of the massmedia in realising this task will be undeniable and very powerful.

Only then might the international community be inclined to changeAfghanistan’s ‘failed state’ label.

References

1. Bessing J (2006/2007) The post-heroic society according to Herfried Munkler. 032c(12 Win-ter):50–63. Available at http://032c.com/2006/the-post-heroic-society-according-to-herfried-munkler/. Accessed 2 October 2011

2. Carleton-Smith M (2008) You are the country that produced Wilfred Thesiger and Richard Burton,what happened? ‘Campaign in Afghanistan in 2008’, All Souls seminar, 28 April

3. CNN (2011) Karzai seeks peace talks with Pakistan, not Taliban. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/01/world/asia/afghanistan-karzai/. Accessed 1 October 2011

4. Flashpoint Partners (2011) Islamic emirate of Afghanistan (the Taleban): Mullah Omar’s Eid ul-Fitrmessage. Available at www.flashpoint-intel.com. Accessed 29 August 2011

5. Foreign Policy (2011) The failed states index 2011. ForeignPolicy.com. Available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/17/2011_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings.Accessed 1 October 2011

6. Fund for Peace (2011) The failed states index 2011. Available at http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/. Accessed 1 October 2011

7. NATO–ISAF (2010) Communique of Afghanistan: the London conference. Available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets/Documents_Communique%20of%20London%20Conference%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf. Acces-sed 29 January 2010.

8. NATO–ISAF (2010) Communique of the Kabul international conference on Afghanistan. Available athttp://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/official-texts/Communique%20-%20Kabul%20International%20Conference%20on%20Afghanistan%20-%2020%20July%202010.pdf. Accessed 20 July 2010

9. NATO–ISAF (2010) Transition: Inteqal. Available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets/1667-10_Inteqal_LR_en.pdf. Accessed 30 September 2011

10. Peters R (2006). No silver bullets: fighting the insurgency in Iraq. Arm Forces J. Available athttp://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/01/1380018/. Accessed 19 October 2011

11. Vazquez del Pino T, Garcıa Guindo M, Pena Ramos JA (2009) Afganistan y el futuro de la OTAN:retos y desafıos de una estrategia comun. In: El Laberinto Afgano XVII curso Internacional deDefensa: Jaca 21 al 25 de septiembre de 2009. Ministerio Espanol de Defensa, Madrid,pp 341–348

Teresa de los Reyes Vazquez del Pino is a Research Fellow at the Universityof Granada, Spain; Research Fellow at the Spanish think tank Grupo de estudiossobre Polıtica y Seguridad Internacional; and Member of the European ExpertNetwork on Terrorist Issues. In 2009, she obtained the executive certificate incounter-terrorism studies from the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacyand Strategy: International Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel.

194