afghan_ied emplacement guide

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


Page iFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Afghanistan IED Emplacement Guide

Distribution Statement F:

Further distribution only as directed by Joint Task Force Paladin. Forward comments or questions regarding this product to Com-manding Officer, Joint Task Force Paladin, APO AE 09354

This guide provides information to help the warfighter identify IED emplacement tactics, techniques and proce-dures. This booklet isn’t intended solely for Explosive Ord-nance Disposal Technicians, but rather those personnel, through necessity, who need to identify IED emplacement patterns in the absence of trained EOD professionals. The materials in this booklet are sensitive and require safeguarding.

How to find them before they find you

Publication date:

20 October 2008



Page ii

Miscellaneous InformationThis reference guide was created to help the warfighter identify IED terrain placement patterns and tactics frequently ob-served in the Afghanistan area of operations. The guide was not intended to cover every possible IED placement method or tactic, but rather illustrates some of the major events and lessons learned from experienced field operators from the Com-bined Explosives Exploitation Cell. The information presented is intended to assist the reader with recognizing terrain and situations that could offer an advantage to an enemy looking to maximize the effect from an IED strike.

Disclaimer/warningRecovery and handling of IEDs or their components is inherently dangerous. The booklet is not designed to train non-EOD personnel in render-safe techniques. Actual EOD personnel must attend school for nearly a year before assignment to an EOD team. For the safety of yourself and your team, call EOD if you believe you have found an IED or a suspicious object.

Background and overviewThis booklet was produced by CEXC Afghanistan, under Joint Task Force Paladin. Information was derived from many sourc-es, but mostly from reports and photographs sent by field operators. CEXC’s mission is to provide technical intelligence on IED techniques, identify trends, and target bomb makers in order to enable both defensive and offensive counter-IED operations. When an incident occurs, all information is passed on to or collected by CEXC investigators. The information is assessed, and any recovered technical material is evaluated. The incident is analyzed and a technical report is produced. The reports are made available as soon as possible and shared at the lowest possible classification. The CEXC team has a mix of skills and experiences: IED and explosives, investigative ability, storage/retrieval/analysis of data, electronic and electrical engineering, operational administration, and of course, desktop publishing (since they pro-duced this booket!)

This page intentionally left blank



Page iii



Page 1

CrossingsIntroductionAmong the most ready-made structures for IEDs are bridges and culverts. In Afghanistan, the difference between the two is that culverts have a much smaller opening than bridges. Culverts have a small tun-nel to allow water to flow under the roadway. The space underneath provides a gap where an emplacer can easily hide a large device without disturb-ing the road surface. Once the main charge is deto-nated, the blast follows the path of least resistance - mostly out the sides, but with enough residual energy upward to destroy any ve-hicles above. Some of the more commonly found types of IED devices at cross-ings include command wires and RCIEDs.



Page 2

CrossingsBridges/Culverts

There are thousands of such crossings in Afghani-stan, so many that it may not be practical to stop at every one. The best bet is to research the local threat situation before heading out. If investigating a suspect crossing, dismount and conduct proper vulnerable point checks.



Page 3

Road HazardsIntroductionSimply driving on what passes for a road in Afghanistan could itself be a hazard. Existing roads were never meant to support routine traffic, much less large, armored vehicles weighing several tons each. The paths are hilly, rough, with dangerous mountain switch-backs, all of which can play into the enemy’s hand.



Page 4

Road HazardsDirt roads can slow convoy traffic, their very nature allows for a quick and easy hiding place for an IED. It would be easy to spot fresh dirt in flat, dry ground, but if everything looks over-turned, the mound made by an emplacer is difficult to find. The local tactical picture could give a convoy com-mander information about whether or not a given area has seen recent activity.

Uneven surface



Page 5

Road HazardsThe tighter the curve, the better for the enemy. Bends in the road force vehicles to slow down or drive single-file, possibly over a pressure-plate IED.

(Right) Fortunately, the IED at this turn detonated before any coalition forces arrived. All that was left was a blast seat and little evidence.

Curves

Blast seat (rifle used for scale)



Page 6

Road HazardsMud

Rain and mud pose significant threats to the warfighter. IEDs have been known to function in soft mud if effectively wrapped by a bomber, and still disable any Coalition vehicle.

If there’s one thing Afghanistan has a lot of, its mountains. Enemy forces can use narrow, curving paths to their advantage. The path up the incline in the picture is non-canalizing, that is, it does not necessarily force traffic into one channel. But any incline will slow down armored vehicles, giving the en-emy the opportunity to guess what distance a pressure plate needs to be from the explosive charge to detonate under the driver’s seat and not the engine compartment. Recommend dismount proce-dures be considered, and have a foot patrol check the hill for any devices before proceeding with the convoy, or where possible, make your own tracks.



Page 7

InclinesNon-canalizing

An incline with a canalizing or “channeling” path is much more restrictive to convoy traffic. The enemy can slow a convoy, then estimate its slower speed, and effectively place an IED with the main charge offset enough to detonate directly under a target vehicle. Electric wires coming out of the road surface led EOD to the site. The main charge for this particular IED (inset) was bur-ied about 45 centimeters below a tire track. It was estimated to be about 15 kilograms of high explosives.



Page 8

InclinesCanalizing

location of IED



Page 9

PlacementThe enemy is studying Coalition tactics, techniques and procedures to get maximum effect from an IED strike. That’s why it’s important to understand the enemy and what they’re thinking. An IED triggerman has three requirements when choosing a location for the next strike: 1. line of sight to the target - to make sure he gets the right target 2. concealment - to ensure he’s not found 3. easy escape - to ensure he’s not captured or killed Understanding his decision-making process will show why some locations are preferred for an IED strike while others aren’t, and why some IEDs just keep showing up at the same place, time after time.

Introduction

(Right) Battery pack wrapped in black electrical tape with clip



Page 10

PlacementBuried

(Left) A buried 105 mm pro-jectile, after it was disrupted, and (above), after it was recovered by EOD. The projectile was covered but found using a metal detector.



Page 11

PlacementThis pressure plate IED was turned in by a local farmer who saw someone burying something in the road. Normally concealed, the remote-control receiver and pressure plate were resting on the road surface. The main charge was partially buried, but positioned in the middle of the road to do the most amount of damage possible.

On the ground

Pressure plate

Mod 5 receiver

Main charge

Stones used as markers

Possible enemy aiming marker

Close-up of pressure plate



Page 12

PlacementOver a wall

The portion of the CWIED in the picture is the part of a 140 meter-long wire that was mostly buried about 20 centimeters deep, except when it ran over a mud wall near the firing point, well away from the blast seat. The wall itself, along with a curve in the road, helped obscure the trig-german from approaching traffic.

Command wire



Page 13

PlacementAlong a wall

Instead of running over the top of a mud wall, this fake command wire is along the bottom in what was previ-ously thought to be a safe area for coalition troops. The wire was strung out in a way that if cut, it would have detonated all of the charges in the IED. If you find anything looking

like a command wire, do not disturb it! Call EOD for assistance.

(Inset) One of the re-covered charges from the site.



Page 14

PlacementOn a dirt road

Electrical wire Main charge

To power source and clothes pin

Tripwire

The tripwire in this photo is run along the width of the road, offset by about 25 feet from the main charge. The charge is detonated when the tripwire snags the treads of a wheel and pulls an insulator inserted between the contacts of a clothespin switch, closing the circuit. The offset is a guess by the enemy as to what distance the charge needs to be from the tripwire to detonate under the target vehicle.



Page 15

PlacementIn a vest (Personnel-borne, or PBIED)

Vest contained primed explosives mixed with TNT and had small arms ammunition for fragmentation.



Page 16

PlacementPBIED #2

Vest in green camouflage pattern cloth had three large pockets, plus a small pocket on the right front pocket above the large one.

Main charge compartmentMain charge compartment Battery compartment

Rocker switch to function vest



Page 17

PlacementVehicle-borne IED (VBIED)A vehicle-borne IED can truly be a deadly weapon since it can carry a large amount of explosives. This particular truck was in reverse gear and had a rock on the accelerator, though the vehicle was destroyed by EOD before the IED could function against its intended tar-get, a prison wall.



Page 18

PlacementSuicide-vehicle borne IED(SVBIED)

Almost like a guided missile on wheels, the SVBIED can be the most devastating kind of attack. Unlike a VBIED, the SVBIED can chase after a target. The SVBIED will likely swerve into a convoy with no notice, sometimes from opposing traffic. A favorite vehicle of the SVBIED bomber is the Toyota Corolla.

Convoys should be on the lookout for vehicles with a single driver, es-pecially those parked on the road shoulder, Previous SVBIED drivers were seen to be wearing a hands-free cell-phone device, per-haps to be in communi-cation with a spotter.

(Left) An actual re-covered SVBIED. This particular vehicle carried various mortars and mines. Any identify-ing marks or numbers were either removed or scratched off the vehicle.

(Left) A bicycle with a suspicious package sits outside a mosque.(Below) The same bicycle after disruption by EOD. The package carried two Type 63 107mm rocket warheads.



Page 19

PlacementOn a bicycle

Hand grenades (inset) were found in a tree by local children. The placing of grenades that far off the ground was possibly an attempt to target the roofs of passing coalition vehicles. The threat is all around you. Re-member to also look up while conducting 5 and 25 checks.



Page 20

PlacementIn a tree



Page 21

PlacementUsed IED siteIn this photo, the bomber emplaced a land mine in the blacktop road right next to debris from a prior IED blast. Traffic was forced to go around the old site and drive over the land mine. There was even a small notch in the road to hide the command wire.

Previous blast debris

Land mine

Path of command wire



Page 22

PlacementUsed IED site

Close-up of land mine site

Blasting cap taped to detonation cord with yellow leg wires



Page 23

Wadis“Wadis” (or Wadi for singular) are dry riverbeds where water flows during Afghanistan’s rainy season. The local population uses water collected in the wadis to fill their cisterns to last the rest of the year. When dry, the wadi’s smoothness makes them a welcome option for vehicle traffic in a country with few passable roads. Coalition vehicles also use them, which also makes them a hotbed of activity for IEDs.

Two wadis



Page 24

Wadis

Exposed command wire in wadi

buried section

Depending on the device, components may be visible in the wadi, such as command wire leading from the main charge to a distant firing point. The buried section would be nearest the main charge to keep the IED hidden.

Main charge?



Page 25

Wadis

Some emplacers use the exact same spot for IED emplacement. Both this and the next page show the same spot months apart, but with two different devices. Emplacers know which routes are used more often and target those areas.

Trip wire

Trip wire line



Page 26

Same place, new device

Suspected pressure plate

Main charge, 18” long, 10” diameter

9 volt battery connectors

A pressure plate, white lamp cord and two 9 volt batteries were found in the same spot months later. A red and yellow wire was also found, but couldn’t be traced to what it connected to. The main charge was eventually found and blown in place.

Wadis

Pressure plate



Page 27

Suspicious ItemsConvoys should always be aware of anything out of the ordinary. If it doesn’t belong there, it might be an indication of an IED. The only way to be sure of what’s dif-frent is to understand what’s normal. Take the time to learn local customs and routines, the presence or absence or people, and even the surroundings. Knowing that, something new might become apparent.

(Right) Rock piles don’t occur in nature, so this might be a clue. They are placed by locals to demark tribal areas, mines, and sometimes, any discovered IEDs. The piles also create a vulnerable point, forcing vehicles to slow down and go around. Anytime rock piles are encountered the patrol should dismount and investigate before pro-ceeding.



Page 28

Suspicious Items

Usually a donkey with a cart is led by somebody, but an unattended animal should raise a red flag, especially one with a cart. The donkey might be towing an explosive device.



Page 29

MethodsEnemy TTPs

Case no. 1 - view from blast seat of IED strike

When planning a strike, the enemy has several factors to consider: - Is the target route used by coalition forces? If so, when and where? - Is there a landmark that can be used as an aiming marker? - Is there a way for coalition forces to escape from an ambush should one vehicle be hit by an IED? - Is there a way to escape, down, out, or even up a mountain? - Is there a sharp corner that could reduce the effectiveness of elec-tronic countermeasures? The enemy wants to make sure no IED gets wasted, so they’re going to be thinking about how the terrain works for them. By learning what they’re looking for, a convoy could be better prepared for a pos-sible IED strike.



Page 30

MethodsEnemy TTPs

Same site, from firing point

Possible aiming marker

Contact point

The bomber had a clear view of the target from behind the rock wall. He only needed to touch the command wire end to the battery terminals to detonate the charge. To escape, the bomber could have gone down a steep hill, across a field and into a village.

Case no. 2 - A CWIED hit the first of a four-vehicle convoy. The CWIED itself was buried along a low wall and led to a firing point about 100 meters away to the opposite side of a hill, where the bomber could slip away unnoticed. The enemy picked this spot because it had two advantages: - a way to aim (the low wall) - someplace to hide and escape (the hill, about 100 meters away)



Page 31

MethodsEnemy TTPs

Firing point

Contact point



Page 32

MethodsEnemy TTPs

Firing point

Contact point

Battery and switch

Egress routes

Insulator



Page 33

MethodsEnemy TTPsCase no. 3 - A CWIED strike hit the trailing vehicle in a convoy. Upon investigation, a buried command wire was found, which led about 150 meters away to a nearby qualat (mud-walled compound). The wire near the contact point was bur-ied, but surfaced partway to the qualat, suggesting the IED was prestaged, all the bomber had to do was attach a power source to initiate the device. This spot offered two things: - A place to hide, far from the contact point. - A possible aiming marker; a metal pole beside the road.

Looking towards firing point from seat of explosion

Splice found here

Firing point

Path of command wire

Close-up of spliced section



Page 34

MethodsEnemy TTPs

View from firing position

End of command wire

Contact point

Possible aiming marker



Page 35