aesthetic theory - theodor w. adorno

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Theodor Adorno (1903-69) was undoubtedly the foremost thinker of the Frankfurt School, the influential group of German thinkers that fled to the US in the 1930s, including such thinkers as Herbert Marcuse and Max Horkheimer. His work has proved enormously influential in sociology, philosophy and cultural theory. Aesthetic Theory is Adorno's posthumous magnum opus and the culmination of a lifetime's investigation. Analysing the sublime, the ugly and the beautiful, Adorno shows how such concepts frame and distil human experience and that it is human experience that ultimately underlies aesthetics. In Adorno's formulation ‘art is the sedimented history of human misery'

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Aesthetic TheoryThis page intentionally left blank Aesthetic TheoryTheodor W. AdornoGretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, EditorsNewly translated, edited, and with a translator'sintroduction by Robert Hullot-KentorcontinuumL O N D O NN E WY O R KContinuumThe Tower Building370 Lexington Avenue,11 York Road,New York,NY,London,SE1 7NX10017-6503www.continuumbooks.com1997 by theRegents of the University of MinnesotaAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any formorby any means, electronicor mechanicalincluding photocopying,recordingor any informationstorage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing fromthe publishers.Originally published as Asthetische Theorie,1970 Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am MainThis translation published1997 by The Athlone PressLtdThis editionpublished 2002 by ContinuumBritish Library Cataloguing-in-Publication DataA cataloguerecordfor this bookis available fromThe British LibraryISBN0826467571Printedand boundby MPG Books Ltd, BodminTranslator's AcknowledgmentsixTranslator's IntroductionxiArt, Society, Aesthetics1Art's Self-EvidenceLost1Against the QuestionofOrigin 2Truth Content andtheLifeofWorks3OntheRelationofAnandSociety4CritiqueofthePsychoanalyticTheoryofArt8The ArtTheoriesofKantandFreud9"ThePleasureofArt"13AestheticHedonismandthe HappinessofKnowledge14Situation16DisintegrationoftheMaterial16DeaestheticizationofArt,CritiqueoftheCultureIndustry16LanguageofSuffering18TheNew:ItsPhilosophyofHistory19On theProblemofInvariance;Experiment(I)23DefenseofIsms24IsmsasSecularizedSchools25FeasibilityandAccident;ModernityandQuality26"SecondReflection"26TheNewandDuration27DialecticofIntegrationand the"SubjectivePoint" 29The New,Utopiaand Negativity32ModernArtandIndustrialProduction33AestheticRationalityandCriticism34CanonofProhibitions35Experiment(II),SeriousnessandIrresponsibility37Blackas an Ideal39RelationtoTradition40SubjectivityandCollective41Solipsism,MimeticTaboo,andMaturity42Metier43ExpressionandConstruction44VContentsviCONTENTSOn the Categories of the Ugly, the Beautiful, and Technique45On theCategory oftheUgly45Ugliness: Its Social Aspectand Its PhilosophyofHistory48OntheConceptoftheBeautiful50MimesisandRationality53OntheConceptofConstruction56Technology58DialecticofFunction-alism 60Natural Beauty61Condemnationof NaturalBeauty61Natural Beautyas a"SteppingOut into theOpen"63OnCulturalLandscape64NaturalBeautyandArtBeautyAreInterlocked65TheExperienceofNatureIsHistoricallyDeformed68Aesthetic ApperceptionIs Analytical69NaturalBeautyasSuspendedHistory70DeterminateIndeterminateness71NatureasaCipheroftheReconciled73Hegel'sCritiqueofNaturalBeauty:ItsMetacritique74TransitionfromNaturalto Art Beauty77Art Beauty: Apparition, Spiritualization, Intuitability78"More"asSemblance78AestheticTranscendenceandDisenchantment79Enlightenmentand Shudder79Art andthe Art-Alien81The Nonexistent82ImageCharacter83"Explosion"84ImageContentIsCollective85ArtasSpiritual86ImmanenceofWorksandtheHeterogeneous88OnHegel'sAesthetics ofSpirit90DialecticofSpiritualization91SpiritualizationandtheChaotic 93Art'sIntuitabilityIs Aporetic94IntuitabilityandConceptuality97Semblance and Expression100Crisis of Semblance100Semblance, Meaning,and"tour deforce"105TowardtheRedemptionofSemblance107ExpressionandDissonance110Subject-Object111Expressionas Eloquence112DominationandConceptualKnowl-edge113ExpressionandMimesis114DialecticofInwardness;AporiasofExpression115Enigmaticalness, Truth Content,Metaphysics118CritiqueandRedemptionofMyth118The MimeticandtheRidiculous118Cui bono119EnigmaticalnessandUnderstanding120 "Nothingshall beleftunchanged"122Enigma, Script, Interpretation124Interpretation as Imitation125"Block"126FracturedTranscendence126OntheTruthContentofArtworks127ArtandPhilosophy;CollectiveContentofArt130TruthasSemblanceoftheIllusionless131MimesisoftheFatalandReconciliation133Methexisin Darkness134CONTENTSCoherence and Meaning136Logicality136Logic,Causality,Time137PurposefulnesswithoutPurpose139Form140FormandContent143TheConceptof Articulation (I) 146OntheConceptofMaterial147TheConceptofSubjectMatter;IntentionandContent149IntentionandMeaning151TheCrisisofMeaning152TheConceptofHarmonyandthe IdeologyofClosure157Affirmation159CritiqueofClassicism160Subject-Object163SubjectiveandObjectiveareEquivocal;On AestheticFeeling163CritiqueofKant'sConceptofObjectivity165PrecariousBalance166LinguisticQualityandCollectiveSubject166Subject-ObjectDialectic168"Genius"169Originality172Fantasyand Reflection173Objectivityand Reification174Towarda Theory of the Artwork175Aesthetic ExperienceIsProcessual175Transience178ArtifactandGenesis178TheArtworkasMonadandImmanentAnalysis179ArtandArtworks181HistoryIsConstitutive;"Intelligibility"182TheNecessityofObjecti-vationandDissociation183UnityandMultiplicity186TheCategoryofIntensity187"Whyaworkcanrightfullybesaidtobebeautiful"188"Depth"189TheConceptofArticulation(II)190OntheDifferentiationofProgress191DevelopmentofProductiveForces192TheTransformationofArtworks193Interpretation,Commentary,Critique194TruthContentIsHistorical;The Sublimein Natureand Art194The Sublimeand Play197Universaland Particular199NominalismandtheDeclineofGenres199OnAntiquity'sGenre-Aesthetics202PhilosophyofHistoryofConventions203OntheConceptofStyle205The Progressof An207The Historyof Art Is Inhomogeneous209Progress andDominationoftheMaterial210"Technique"212ArtintheIndustrialAge217NominalismandOpenForm219Construction,StaticandDynamic222Society225DoubleCharacterofArt;faitsocialandAutonomy;OntheFetishCharacter225ReceptionandProduction228ChoiceofThematicMaterial;ArtisticSubject;Relationto Science229Art asComportment232IdeologyandTruth233"Guilt"234OntheReceptionofAdvancedArt235MediationofArtandSociety236CritiqueofCatharsis;KitschandtheVulgar238AttitudetoPraxis;Effect,LivedExperience,"Shudder"241Commitment246Aestheti-viicism, Naturalism,Beckett248AgainstAdministeredArt 250The PossibilityofArtToday251Autonomy and Heteronomy252Political Option 254ProgressandReaction256ArtandthePovertyofPhilosophy258PrimacyoftheObjectand An258The ProblemofSolipsismand False Reconciliation259Paralipomena262Theories on the Originof Art325Draft Introduction332TheObsolescenceofTraditionalAesthetics332TheChangingFunctionofNaivete335IrreconcilabilityofTraditionalAestheticsandContemporaryArt338Truth-ContentandtheFetishCharacterofArtworks340TheNeedforAesthetics341AestheticsastheRefugeofMetaphysics343AestheticExperi-enceasObjectiveUnderstanding345Work-ImmanentAnalysisand AestheticTheory348OntheDialecticsofAestheticExperience348UniversalandParticular350CritiqueofthePhenomenologicalResearchofOrigin351Relationto Hegel'sAesthetics352The Open Characterof Aesthetics;AestheticsofFormandAestheticsofContent(1) 353AestheticsofFormandAestheticsofContent(II);NormsandSlogans355Methodology,"SecondReflection,"History357Editors' Afterword361Notes367Index379viii CONTENTSTranslator'sAcknowledgmentsIt is not recordedthat Job was working on a translation, but I wouldn't doubtit.Whatever could interfere in this project interfered: illness, earthquake, and unem-ployment took turns with lesserscourges. The translation stretchedyears beyondtheyearplanned.Thatitdidnotfinallygetleftona doorstep orslidbehindabookshelfI owe in part to friends, to Steve Babson, Jery Zaslove,Marty Jay, BillDonoghue, Milton Cantor, and most of all to my wife, OdileHullot-Kentor. Andevery reader of this book is indebtedto Juliane Brand, who painstakinglycheckedthetranslationagainsttheoriginal,wordbyword,suggestedinnumerableim-provements, and, as its copy editor as well, helped bring the translation to an alto-gethernew level.Her expertise,generosity, and calm goodwillmade her a won-derfulandindispensableally.IalsowanttothankShierryNicholsen,MikeRichardson, and Don Shumaker for their variouscontributions.ixThis page intentionally left blank Translator's IntroductionEverytranslationmustfitoneworldinsideanother,butnoteveryworktobetranslated has been shaped by emphatic opposition to the world into which it mustbe fitted. This is, however, the case with Aesthetic Theory, which TheodorAdornowasabletowriteonlybyleavingtheUnitedStates,wherehehadlivedforadecade during the war years, became a citizen, and oftenthought he might need toremain. Any review of the many American phrases that Adorno scornfullyquotesthroughout AestheticTheorythe"tiredbusinessman,"the"pin-up,"the"whatdo I get out of it?"will confirm that not least of all the book was written in re-fusalofa country that it depictsas a completelycommercialorder.Even so un-problematicallyscannablea phraseas "Onlywhat is useless can stand in for thestuntedusevalue"drawsonthetransformation ofdistinctly Europeanexperi-ences of aristocracy. In the UnitedStates,such an idea, if it getsas far as cogni-tion, fallsaskanceof theinheritancesofa puritanical mind that hasalways sus-pectedthat art doesnot properly work for a living and might encourage others todo the same. And just opening to any page, without bothering to read a word, oneseesthatthebookisvisibly antagonistic. Noonefromthelandof edutainmentwouldcomposethesestarkly unbeckoning sheersidesof type, uninterrupted bychapter titles or typographic markers, that have severedand jettisonedevery ap-proach and patched over most every apparenthandhold.The book's stylistic peculiarities derive, as a whole, fromwhat makes AestheticTheoryinimicalto an Americancontext:that it is orientednot to its readers but tothething-in-itself. Thisisnot,aswillbeimmediatelysuspected,motivated byindifferenceto its readers. On the contrary, the bookmakes itselfremotefromitsxiconsumptionoutofinterestin,andbyitspowerof,self-immersion.AestheticTheoryis an attempt to overcome the generally recognized failing of aestheticsits externality to its objectthat Barnett Newman once did the world the favor ofputting in a nutshell when he famously quipped, speaking of himself as a painter,that "aesthetics is for me likewhat ornithologymust be like for the birds."1 Art-works areafterall unique, not leastin that, when they are experienced,they areexperiencedfromwithin. It is possibleto vanish into a novel or a painting and behalf-surprised,lookingaway for a moment, that the world was everthereatall.Anyone turning to aestheticswould expect that, to callitselfaesthetics,it wouldbe alliedwith what is exceptionalin the experienceof its object. But what is dis-coveredinsteadis a disciplinethat throughout its history has workedat the con-ceptualundergirdingof standards of beauty, the sublime,taste, art's dignity, andso on, while failing to achieve the standard of the experienceof what it purports totreat. Thesuspicionis irrepressiblethat eitheraestheticsis the work of the will-fullydeaf, blind, and insensateor that art is under a spellthat prohibitsits innercomprehension,as if here one is permitted entry as nowhere else only on the con-dition that one leave empty-handed and never be able to say what the differenceisbetween it and just having beendistracted.Adorno's Aesthetic Theorymeans to breach this externality of aesthetics to art.Itis hardlythe first effortto do so. Butwhen aesthetics has becomedissatisfiedwith itself and tried to escape its externality it has almost always taken the form ofpretending to be art in a pictorial, effusivevoice, or it has offeredto act as maitre d'to a specialized domain of pleasure. Either effort, however, only camouflages thepresuppositionthatintellectmust renounceknowingartfromwithin. AestheticTheory,bycontrast,isorientedtoanearlyaphorismthatAdornowroteaboutmusic that was seminal to his thinking about art as a whole: "We don't understandmusic, it understands us."2The aestheticsrequired by this perception would be re-mote to all art appreciation;its sight lines would run opposite thoseangled by theintensifyingneed for art that makes people mill around art museums in constantlygreaternumbers: it would be art's own understanding; the presentationof its truthcontent.Conjuringthisgenieoutofthebottlewouldseemtorequirethesacrifice ofsubjectivity to what is beyond itself. If the thing-in-itselfis to speak, subjectivity'sown voice must only interfere. This thesiscould perhapslook for confirmation inDialectic ofEnlightment in which Adorno and Horkheimershow that fascism didnot simply coax corneredreason into delirium but was itselfa potential implicit inreason's own compulsiontowardall-encompassingdomination.Yet theauthorsnever sought to subvert subjectivity or to countermand enlightenment, the courseof subjectivity's development as reason. If enlightenment had come to a dead endinfascism,itsabrogationwouldmaketerrorpermanent.Rather,AdornoandHorkheimertook the side of enlightenment and tried to discern the logic of its fail-ure. Whattheyshowedwas thatitmisseditsaimof human emancipationfromxii TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTIONnatural necessityand the secondnature of socialconstraint becausethe domina-tionofnature unwittingly requiresthesacrifice ofsubjectivity. Therecognitionthat in maxima potentia minima licentia is millennia old. But Dialectic ofEnlight-enment took this thought in a strictly modern direction:if the self is progressivelylimited and deprivedthrough the domination of its object, if humanity is subordi-nated to necessityby the struggle against it, then the emancipation of the subjectdepends on its capacity to emancipate its object, and this requires all possible sub-jectivespontaneity.Adomo's thesis that subjectivity could only be transcended by way of subjec-tivity, and not by its limitation, is one way of formulating his seminal insight: thatidentity is the power of nonidentity. The philosophicalmeans for giving shape towhat is more than subjectivity would be, paradoxically, those of conceptual cog-nitionthat, sinceKant'sCopernicanturn, specificallylimitedknowledgeto theworld constitutedby subjectivity this side of the thing-in-itself. As Adorno wrotein the introduction to Negative Dialectics, he consideredit the task of his thought"to use the strength of the subject to break through the fraudof constitutive sub-jectivity."3 The power of identitymanifestin Kant's transcendentalismas con-cepts that constitutively definethe likeness of the world with thesubjectwouldgo beyond constitutive subjectivityif concepts could be developed in such a wayas to presentwhat is more than conceptual in them. That conceptsare more thantheir definitional content is implicit in the idea of a dialectic of enlightenment: forifenlightenmentregressestothenatural necessitythatitattempts todominate,then concepts, which ostensiblyservetoidentifythe worldwithits knower, areactuallyartifactsmostdeeplyshapedbywhatenlightenmentnevermastered.Identity must be more than identity in that it draws back into itself what it purportstoovercome.Theconcealedcontentof enlightenment, thecontent ofconcepts,would be that nature that subjectivity sought to dominate in its own rise to power.ThisdefinesAdorno'sapproachinAestheticTheorytothepossibilityofbreaching the externality of aesthetics to art: an aestheticsthat wants to know artfromwithintopresentwhatartitselfunderstandswouldconsistofwhatacontemporary nominalist intelligence, always verging on irrationalism, dismissesas theoppressive, overstuffed furnishings ofan age credulous of absolutes: nat-ural beauty, art beauty, truth, semblance, and so on, the fundamental concepts ofaesthetics.Although these concepts emerged in the effortto master their material, they aremore than that. Freed fromthe compulsionof domination they would potentiallyreveal their participationin what they sought to dominateand the impress of thatthrough which they developed. Aesthetic concepts would becomethe memory ofnature sedimented in art, which for Adorno takes shape in Aesthetic Theoryas theunconscious, mimeticallywrittenhistoryofhuman sufferingagainstwhich en-lightenment elsewhereseals itselfoff. Only this content could possibly bring rea-son's struggle for domination to its senses and direct its power to what would ac-TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION xiiituallyfulfillit. Thus Adorno organized AestheticTheoryas a paratactical presen-tationofaesthetic concepts that,by eschewingsubordinatingstructures,breaksthemawayfromtheirsystematicphilosophicalintentionsothattheself-relinquishment that is implicit in identity could be critically explicatedas what isnonintentional in them: the primacy of the object.Throughouthis yearsin the United States,Adornoon many occasionsmet withthe rejectionof hiswork by publisherswhosaw hiswritingssimplyasdisorga-nized. It was obvious to Adorno that what he was pursuing requiredhis return toGermany if only because in the1950s publishing was still less commercially uni-fied than in the United States and permittedwriters greater control over their workthan here.4 One event did, however, finally prompt him to leave. When the editor-ial boardat thePsychoanalytic SocietyofSan Franciscofinishedwith hisessay"PsychoanalysisRevised,"hefoundthat"theentiretextwas disfigured beyondrecognition,the basicintention couldnot be discerned."5As Adornorecounted,the head editor explained that the standards to which the essay had been adjusted,which made it look like every other essay in the journal, were those of the profes-sion: "I would only be standing in my own way"Adorno was told"if I passedup its advantages. I passed them up nevertheless."6 Adorno moved back to Europe.Adorno'ssensethatstaying herewouldhaveimpossiblyburdenedhisworkwasconfirmedlongafterthefactbythefirstEnglishtranslationofAestheticTheoryin1984.7Thepublisher, partiallyagainstthewillofthetranslator,dis-cardedthe book's formas a superstitiously imposedimpediment that would onlystymiethe book'sconsumption.8Diametricallyopposedto the coursethebooktook in its various drafts in Adorno's own hands, a processthat led in the final ver-sion to the rejection of the division of the book into chapters, the1984 translationarrived on bookstoreshelves dividedinto numbered chapters with main headingsand subheadings inserted in the text. Paragraph indentations were distributed arbi-trarily throughout, completingthe imageof a monodirectionalsequenceof topicsentences that could be followed step wise from chapter1 through chapter12. Thissubordinated the text's paratacticalorder to a semblance of progressiveargumen-tationthatofferedtopresentthe book'scontentconveniently. Thisdevicepro-videda steadyexternalgripon thebookwhilecausingit to collapseinternally.For in lieu of any argumentative structure in the text itself, because it contains nohomogeneoussubstance that can be followed fromstart to finish, the flaring clar-ityofparagraphindentations onlyproducedacontrastbywhich thesimulatedparagraphs appearedmurky in their refusal to parseinto stages of thesis and evi-dence.And whereas the paratacticaltext demandsthat everysentenceundertaketo be the topic sentence and that the book be composedof long, complex phrases,each of which seems under the obligation to present the book as a whole, the 1984translationcarvedupsentencesin theimageof declarativevehiclesofcontent.Theoriginalparatacticaltextisconcentricallyarrangedaroundamutemiddlexiv TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTIONpoint through which every word seeks to be refracted and that it must express. Thetextcannotreferforwardorbackwardwithoutdisturbingthisnexus throughwhich the parts becomebinding on each other. The linear argumentative structureimposedon the text by the translationthus dismissedthe text'smiddle point as adetour and severedits nexus. Compulsoryunificationserves only to fragment: theimposedstructureset whole passagesadriftwhosesuddenly evident isolationre-quiredfurtherapparatusto span them. Therefore,transitionalphrases were inter-polatedsuch as: "as we saw" or "as we said" or "letus remember." The narrativepersona that was projectedinto the text at these points and elsewherewas credibleinsofaras it seemedto substantiatean argumentative modelof knowledge and itstransmission. But this furthercontributedto mufflinga text that, by its own stan-dards, succeeds onlyinsofaras what is particularin it begins tospeakfor itself.Therejectionof thework'sformas a superstitionwas carriedoverto the treat-ment of the original'smany Greek, Latin, and French concepts and phrases. Theywererendered literally, in English, and withoutany marking, as if theircontentwas clear enough once they had been freedfrom their alphabetical inconvenience.Thus, for instance, chorismosthe contrary of methexis'was translated as "sepa-ratism," obfuscating the articulation of the problem of the participation of idea andobjectfromPlatoto Benjamin thatis, so tospeak,the topic of AestheticTheoryand the whole of Adorno's writings. The many American phrases, which have suchabrupt expressivepowerin the original,werelikewiseseamlesslyabsorbedintothe scenery. Almost ingeniouslythe language of the 1984 text pulls away from themovementofthoughtthatcanstillbesensedgesturingunderneath, givingthebooka disembodiedquality, as if it were dubbed rather than translated. Subordi-nated to the principle of exchange by its coerced identitywith the subject'sformofconsumption, AesthetischeTheorieintranslationbecameamodelofwhat itprotestsagainst:the primacyof the constitutive subject. Theirony is, ofcourse,thatbynarrowingthe distance of thebookfromits readers, ostensiblyfortheirown good, butfundamentallyto sellit to them, the work was put beyond them.9This volume is an entirely new translation of Aesthetische Theorie. The spatial or-ganization of the text is identical to the original. The majorsections of the Englishtext are divided only where the original divides. The sentence structure and phras-ing of the originalwere maintained wherever possible, given the tremendous dif-ferencesof Englishsyntaxfromtheoriginal.Allwords foreigntotheoriginal,including Englishwords, occur herein italic. This translation, however, tookitsleadnotso much fromtheaim to copy theappearanceof the original, but ratherfromAdorno's description of the hearingimplicitto Mahler's music: an "ampli-tude of a hearing encompassingthe far distance, to which the most remoteanalo-gies and consequencesare virtually present."10 In Aesthetic Theorythis amplitudeoccurs,however, not in themimetic responseof musical passages to eachotherbut in the medium of conceptsas their subterranean, dynamic relations.TRANSLATOR'SINTRODUCTION xvThe coherenceof thesesubterranean relations depends on the text's paratacti-cal form and survives only by a density of insight, not by external structure. Thisdefinesthetext'sanditstranslation'sparticularvulnerability:theslightestslackeningof intensity threatensto dissolvethetextintoa miscellany. Nothingsupports the text except the intensity with which it draws on and pushes against it-self. With few exceptions paratactical works are therefore short, fragmentary, andcompacted by the crisis of their own abbreviation. Paratactical texts are intensive,almost to the denial of their quality of extension; and the more extensive the para-tactical work actually isand Aesthetic Theoryis almost unparalleled in thisthegreater the potential for its unraveling at each and every point. The text thereforerequiresarhetoricthatwillheightenconcentrationanddensityandabsorbthedozens of ways in which it is constantly exposed. Every reader will note the work'srecurrenceto abrupt, staccato, sometimesdelphicallyabbreviated expression thatheightensthe push-pull of the text. Becauseit rejectscertitudeas a standard oftruthinfavorofexactnessofinsight, itnecessarilytendstowardtheapodictic.Adorno is alsoable to produceconcentrationout of nowhere by beginningsen-tences with long-haul subordinate clauses that engage with a "That..." that gripscognitionlikethe ratcheton a rollercoaster with a demand for cooperativeanti-gravitationalstruggle to the top of the first slope so momentum can bediscoveredshootingdownthemainclauseintoanynumberofconcludingsubordinatesweeps. A paratacticaltextis inimicalto exposition,and Adornouses the mostcondensedgesturesto invoke ratherthan propoundrelevant philosophical argu-ments: a single "sickness unto death" does the work of all of Kierkegaard, "posi-tive negation" all of Hegel and any phrasing that even subliminally hints at "in theage of" is expectedto conjure the entire argument of Benjamin's "Artwork in theAge of MechanicalReproduction,"to which the bookis, as a whole, a response.Outofthesame demand fordensity, Adorno refers wherever possibletoartistsand artworks in the familiar: Recherche is more than enough for Proust's title, theMarriagecould not be anything but that of Figaro, and George is plenty for StefanGeorge.WhereverparallellinguisticresourceswereavailabletheseandAdorno'smany other techniques of condensationand heightening have been used to main-tain the density of this translation. In the case of some titles and authors, however,especiallyofGermanauthorsandworksthathavebecomeprogressivelyun-known in the aftermathof World War II, they are too improbably remote even topretend they could be recognizedand had to be provided with first names andfulltitles. And there is another technique of condensedreference, used constantly byAdorno, that could not be incorporatedat all because it is uniquely a potential ofthe originalvis-a-vis English. As is well known, German is able to refer by pro-nouns with specificity acrossany distance of text, long or short, and jugglemanynouns with referential consistency. Adorno employs this linguistic resource to anextreme in orderto avoid the repetitionof nouns in a text that is allergicto evenxvi TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTIONthe few millimetersof slacksuch repetitionwould feedin. In some passagestheweave of pronouns becomesso remoteand tenuous that it seems it could only befollowed by someone who would comprehend their referents anamnestically, as ifknown frometernity. They demand a level of concentration that inhabits the textcompletely.Since Englishhas no comparablepronominalstructure, this internalweave of reference could not possiblybe matched in translation. It has, therefore,throughout beennecessaryto choose between potential glibness and precision ofreference.Withoutexceptionthelatterwas preferred, however ungainly the re-sult. This is the recognitionof an aporia of translation and its result is not entirelya betrayal of Adorno's text. For howeverdifficulthis writing may be, it is nevervague or simply evocative.Thistranslationhasnotsupposedthat it issimply a failed replicaof the perfec-tions of the original. The original has plenty of problems of its own that it imposeson the translation. Some of these problems are reciprocal with the capacitiesof theoriginal. On one hand, for instance, this paratactical text provides unmatched free-dom: Since the text does not labor under schematic requirements it can and musttakea decisivelynew breathforeveryline; thoseinsights that authors of tradi-tional forms know to be some of the best of what they have thought but must con-stantly reject as structurally inapposite are what at every point motivate a paratac-tical text. But, on the other hand, this paratacticalstyle is, by that same measure,unableas mentionedto refer backwardor forward: Adorno never writes,"asmentioned." Every transition must be a transition in the object itself if it is not tounhinge thetext. Thus the text is deprivedof a major technique for building onwhat has been, or of explicitlyorganizingitselftowardwhat will be, developedelsewhere;and it cannot take the sting out of repetitionby acknowledging it. In-stead, Adorno is constantly compelled to start anew saying what has already beensaid. The text produces a need for repetition that is its innermost antagonist. ThusAdorno throughout repeatedly restates major motifs: that the artwork is a monad,thatit is a socialmicrocosm,that societyis most intensely activeinan artworkwhere it is most remotefromsociety. If Adorno is a master of thematicvariationandabletousethedynamic energyoftheserepeatedmotifs not justtojustifywhat is waiting to be said, but as a catapult for new insights, all the same, anyonewho actuallystudiesthe bookwill rankleat a repetitiveness that reallyis as in-evitable as it comes to seem. The text is single-mindedly concerned with escapingjargon and developing what is potentially new in concepts that have become rigid-ifiedand obsolete, but the obligatoryrepetitiveness of its formulations courts jar-gon and makes the central motifs of the work vulnerable to facile trivialization byanyone who cares to do so. The paratacticalcapacity that prompts the text's pro-teaninsightsengendersrepetitionthat becomesdisorienting:allthosemarkersthat measure out spaceand time longitudinally in traditional forms are discardedand there is a constantly looming sense of being caught in a vortex, as if there isTRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION xviino knowing whether one has been through a particular passagebefore, or if per-haps one hasnever leftthe spot. Thevirtual presenceof the whole of the text atany one point is impeded by the form in which it is maintained.This levelof repetitivenessis damaging to the originaland it takes its toll on thetranslation. More regrettable, however, because it does not derive fromany capac-ityof thetext, isthe repetitionthat originatesin thefactthat itis an opus post-humous. Adorno completedAestheticTheory, but he did not finish it: everysec-tion that he intended to write for the bookwas written; the main body of the textwasforthemostpartcompleteandcomposedatthehighestlevelthat Adornoachieved in any of his work. Yet Adorno did not live to carry out the final, crucialrevision of the text. In this revision he would have rewritten a significant numberofpassages,inserteda group of passagesthat hadaccumulated in various waysexternal to the main text in the decadeduring which the book was written, and hewouldhavewrittena newintroductiontothebookthatwould have replacedadraftwith which hewasdissatisfied.11AfterAdorno'sdeath, thiseditingworkcould only partially be fulfilledby his longtime student and friend, Rolf Tiedemann,and by Adorno's widow, Gretel Adorno. They decipheredAdorno's handwritingin the main text, collectedthe fragments into the Paralipomenathat in this editioncomesafter the main text, and appended the "Draft Introduction" and an excursusentitled"TheoriesontheOriginofArt."Attheendofthisvolumethey haveprovidedanafterwordinwhichtheydescribeindetailthestateofthetextatAdorno's death and how they constructed the present volume. As they point out,theycouldnot rewritepassageseven when theneededimprovements were self-evident. And the intense philologicalpressuresin a country whose Protestantisminvented the disciplineand where there are, for instance, left-wingand right-wingeditionsofHolderlin, prohibitedtheexclusionofevenobviouslycontradictoryformulations. What weighs most on this text, weighs on it literally: there is muchmore herethan is needed, by aboutone-fifth.In his final revision Adorno wouldhave been able to discard a great deal. The repetitive discussions of classicism andgenius, forinstance, which nowseemstrewnaround, couldhave beengroupedand condensed.And had Adorno had the chance to definitivelyposition three ex-tensive sections that were still external to the text at the time of his death, he wouldhave beenable to exclude duplicatepassages that permit their integrationat sev-eral differentpoints. The editorscombinedand insertedthese extensivesectionsin plausibleways, but there is no doubt that this has resultedin severaloverlongmain parts that disturb the organizationof the book. For instanceas TiedemannandGretelAdornopointoutvariousaspectsof"Situation"areneededinthebook's developmentfrom"Art, Society, Aesthetics"to "On the Categoriesof theUgly, the Beautiful, and Technique."But the sheer girth of "Situation"combinesso much material that it diffuselyinterferes with the tightly wrought organizationof the first five main parts. It is, furthermore, questionablewhether the excursus,xviii TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION"TheoriesontheOriginofArt,"couldhave beenincludedinthefinalversion.Although it is obviously germane to the problemsAdorno treats throughout Aes-thetic Theory, it is a research essayand in majoritystylisticallyat oddswith therest of the text; and it doesn'tmake sense to have an "excursus"in a text that is allparatactical divagation anyway. As a guess,however,it is easyto imaginehowparts of the excursuscouldhave beenusedin the newintroduction that Adornowanted to write.Nothing is to be done about these layers of repetitiveness in the text. They bur-den the bookat everypoint. Butit is worth knowing that however overlong thebook is, there is nothing to skim. There is, for instance, much in the Paralipomenathat is not to befoundanywhere else in the text. And if Adorno foundthe "DraftIntroduction" inadequate, it may takesome yearsof research to figure out why.Itis inany caseprobablythebestplaceto begin reading AestheticTheory.Theparatactical organizationof the bookdoes notmeanthatitcan bereadequallywell in any direction.It is not argumentative; it doesnot seekto convince; but itdoes present a logic of insightthat has a distinct forward directionthat developsconcentrically, and, as indicated, this is best perceivedby initially reading "Situa-tion" separate from the first five main parts.Thelessfinishedmainparts,suchas"Situation,"wereoftenmoredifficulttotranslate than the more finished parts, though this was only a slightdifference ofdegree.No readerwill imagine the linguistic mayhem out of which this transla-tion is built. And the ditches, craters, and rubble over which each Englishsentencepassesare morethan crushedsyntax. Thehistoricalbreachon theotherside ofwhich Germannowstands makes even this translator involuntarily prefer to saythe "original" rather than the German, and made it necessary to say, page by page,that it is, or was, a Jewish language, too. This translation is allied with Adorno'sreturn to Germany in that his need to return there to be able to write works such asAesthetic Theorywas inseparablefroman impulse to pick up the severedthreadsofwhat was notfascistin Germany'spastand thevalueofwhich, howeveral-loyed, henever doubted.His enormousimportancein the postwardecadeswasthat he succeeded in helpingto reestablish Germany'sown relation to that past,notin thesearchof theprimalor in alliancewith any antihumanism, butas inAesthetic Theoryindefense of a modernism that would not betray the hopes ofthe past.12Thisis not tosay that Adornoreturnedto Germanyto fit in and helprestorethe nation to what it once was. What he wrote was completelyunpalatable to theformer-Nazifaculty,stillinitsprime,thatcontrolledFrankfurtUniversityafterthe war. Theyrejectedwritingssuchas Minima Moraliaas unscholarlyand thewhole of Adorno's work as essay istic and fragmentaryand saw to it that he wasnot offered a professorship.Onlyunder coercion did they grudginglybestowonhim what becameknown as aWiedergutmachungsstuhl,a facultyposition madeTRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION xixnot because he merited it as a philosopher, but in reparation to a Jew who had beendeprived by the war of his property, his teaching post.13 Barely two decadesafterhis return, leftiststudents who had idolized him and embraced his works rioted inhis seminars because he refused to lead them to the barricades. Adorno's freedomto teach was forcibly rescinded, as it had been in the thirties. In the summer recessfollowing the student demonstrations of1969, he died of a heart attack while try-ing to finish this book.After Adorno's death, interest in his writings soon dissipated, and today, whenhe is studied in Germany, he is regarded mainly as a historical curiosity and morelikelytobediminishedthanadmired.Foroveradecade,themostthorough,widely read, and esteemed history of his workRolf Wiggershaus's TheFrankfurtSchooldismisseshimasabitter,hyperemotionalcomplainer,monotonouslyprejudiced in his views, irresponsibly protean in his thought, and unable to formu-late testable hypotheses.14 Wiggerhaus's book, in that it embodiesa generation'srejectionofAdorno echoedindozensofsimilarworks, pointsupthefactthatAesthetic Theoryis currently as obliquely remote to Germany as it is to the UnitedStates. And this remoteness is requisite to any plausible value it may have. For asAdorno wrote in constantly varied formulations, only what does not fit in can betrue. He would not have been interested in seeing this book "received" here. LikeallthoseworkswhosestrandsAdornoreturnedtoGermanytopickup,whenAesthetic Theoryis seen for what it is, it stands outside and looks in. Although thebook does in many ways appear obsoleteto ustoday no one would try a dialec-tical reversal, now nothing seems precisely the opposite of anything else, and thatshift of quantity into quality such as when water cooling becomes ice is no longeraninspiringmysterythisperspectivethatcondescendsfromthevantageofbeing up-to-dateas to the odd cut of an old coat or dress reveals its delusivenesswheninsteaditiswonderedhowwelooktoit.Foreven though students oncecomplained that Adorno had no interest in praxis but was preoccupiedonly withart, fromthe book's perspectiveit will be noticedthat the word hascompletelydisappearedfromcontemporarylanguage, whereas for this bookon art, "Praxiswould be the ensemble of means for minimizing material necessity, and as such itwouldbeidenticalwith pleasure,happiness, and that autonomy in which thesemeansaresublimated."Much ofwhat catchestheeyeas obsoletein AestheticTheoryiswhat would benewifitwere not blocked; herewhat is perceivedasold hat masks the disappointment of what can no longer be hopedfor. AestheticTheorywants to be what is German that is not German, and if it finds realreso-nance here, it will be with what is American that is not American, none of whichcould be put on a list of national character traits.What is hard about translation is notas those who have never tried it imaginefinding therightword. The right word is always there, it just can'tbe used: in-evitably it starts with the same letter as the three words on either side of it and, in aXX TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTIONtranslation, pullingfourorangessays fake,not jackpot. Line by line, the wrongword is always, unbearably, coming to the rescue. The sureness with which trans-lation taps fateputs the I-Ching to shame: the word neededat any one point hassomehowalways justbeenusedinthepreviousclausetocoverforsomeotherright word that would not fit. If translation were just pinning the tail on the donkeyitwould be easy, butthedonkeyis running and thetranslatoris ridinganotherbeast,goinginsomeotherdirection:eachlanguage, and eachand everyword,has its own momentary vector. So, for instance, even when the originalwants todictate the right worde.g., Programmdirectly into English, with only a slightshiftofspelling,it turns outthat theEnglish equivalent nowinstinctually sum-mons up computersnot the self-understood political sense of the originalwithbarely containable textual implications. Since the right word was alwayswaiting,and had to be leftwaiting, this translationis made of whatever else was handy: acarrotfor the nose, lightbulbs for eyes, some feathers for the mustache. Proppedon a bench in the distance with its back to the sunset, perhaps it even looks alive.But it is not to be leaned againstand neither will it bear all that much scrutiny. InGermanthis bookisalmosttoointeresting to read;forthosemany passagesinEnglish where this is no longer the case, where it was just not possible to find anybetter way to do it, for the many sentences that were each finally acceptedas notreally but sort of what it means, I can only say, it was not for lack of trying.TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION xxiThis page intentionally left blank Aesthetic TheoryThis page intentionally left blank It is self-evidentthat nothing concerning art is self-evidentanymore, not its innerlife, not its relationto the world, not even its right to exist. The forfeitureof whatcould be done spontaneously or unproblematically has not been compensatedforbytheopeninfinitudeofnewpossibilitiesthatreflectionconfronts.Inmanyregards, expansion appears as contraction. The sea of the formerly inconceivable,onwhich around1910revolutionary art movementsset out, didnotbestowthepromisedhappinessofadventure. Instead, theprocessthatwasunleashedcon-sumed the categories in the name of that for which it was undertaken. More wasconstantly pulledinto the vortex of the newly taboo; everywhere artistsrejoicedless over the newly won realm of freedom than that they immediately sought onceagainafterostensibleyetscarcelyadequateorder.Forabsolutefreedominart,always limited to a particular, comes into contradiction with the perennialunfree-domofthewhole.Inittheplaceofartbecameuncertain.Theautonomyitachieved, afterhaving freeditselffromcultic functionand its images, was nour-ishedbytheideaofhumanity. Associetybecameeverlessahuman one, thisautonomywasshattered.Drawnfromtheidealofhumanity, art'sconstituentelements withered by art's own law of movement. Yet art's autonomy remains ir-revocable. All effortsto restore art by givingita socialfunctionofwhichartisitselfuncertainandbywhich itexpressesitsownuncertaintyaredoomed.Indeed, art's autonomy shows signs of blindness. Blindness was ever an aspect ofart; in theage ofart'semancipation, however, this blindness has begun topre-dominate in spite of, if not because of, art's lost naivete, which, as Hegel alreadyperceived, art cannot undo. This binds art to a naivete of a second order: the un-certainty over what purposeit serves. It is uncertainwhether art is still possible;whether, with its completeemancipation, it did not severits ownpreconditions.This question is kindled by art's own past. Artworks detach themselves fromtheempiricalworldandbringforthanotherworld,oneopposedtotheempiricalworld as if this other world too were an autonomous entity. Thus, however tragicthey appear, artworks tend a priori toward affirmation. The cliches of art's recon-cilingglowenfoldingthe world are repugnant not only because they parodythe1emphaticconceptofartwithitsbourgeoisversionandclassitamongthoseSunday institutionsthat provide solace. These cliches rub againstthe wound thatart itself bears. As a result of its inevitable withdrawal from theology, fromthe un-qualifiedclaim to the truth of salvation, a secularizationwithout which art wouldnever have developed,art is condemnedto providethe worldas it existswith aconsolationthatshorn of any hope of a world beyondstrengthens the spell ofthatfromwhich theautonomy of art wants tofreeitself. The principleof auton-omy is itself suspect of giving consolation: By undertaking to posit totality out ofitself,wholeandself-encompassing,thisimageistransferredtotheworldinwhichart existsand that engendersit. By virtue ofits rejection of theempiricalworlda rejectionthat inheres in art's conceptand thus is no mere escape, but alaw immanentto itart sanctions the primacyof reality.In a work dedicated tothepraiseofart,HelmutKuhnwarrantedthatart'seachandeveryworkisapaean.1 His thesis would be true, were it meant critically. In the face of the abnor-mityintowhichrealityisdeveloping,art'sinescapableaffirmativeessencehasbecomeinsufferable. Art must turn against itself, in opposition to its own concept,and thus becomeuncertain of itselfrightinto its innermost fiber. Yet art is not tobe dismissedsimply by its abstract negation. By attacking what seemedto be itsfoundationthroughout the whole of its tradition, art has been qualitatively trans-formed;ititselfbecomesqualitativelyother.Itcando this becausethroughtheages by means of its form, art has turned against the status quo and what merelyexists just as much as it has come to its aid by giving form to its elements. Art canno more be reduced to the general formula of consolationthan to its opposite.The conceptof art is locatedin a historicallychanging constellationofelements;it refuses definition.Its essence cannotbededucedfromitsoriginasif thefirstwork were a foundation on which everything that followed were constructed andwouldcollapseifshaken. Thebeliefthatthefirstartworksarethehighestandpurest is warmed-over romanticism; with no less justification it could beclaimedthat the earliest artistic works are dull and impure in that they are not yetseparatedfrommagic, historicaldocumentation, and such pragmaticaimsascommunicat-ing over great distances by means of calls or horn sounds; the classicalconceptionofartgladlymadeuseofsucharguments. Inbluntlyhistoricalterms,thefactsblur.2 The effortto subsume the historicalgenesis of art ontologicallyunder an ul-timate motif would necessarily flounder in such disparate material that the theorywouldemergeempty-handedexceptfortheobviouslyrelevantinsightthatthearts will not fit into any gapless concept of art.3 In those studies devoted to the aes-theticdp%ai, positivisticsampling of materialandsuch speculationas isother-wise disdainedby the sciencesflourishwildly alongsideeachother; Bachofen isthebestexampleof this. If, nevertheless,one wanted in theusualphilosophicalfashioncategoricallytodistinguishtheso-calledquestionoforiginasthat ofart's essencefrom the question of art's historical origin, that would amount onlyto turning the concept of origin arbitrarily against the usual sense of the word. The2 ART, SOCIETY, AESTHETICSdefinitionofartis at every point indicatedby what art once was, butitis legiti-mated only by what art became with regard to what it wants to, and perhaps can,become. Although art's difference fromthe merely empirical is to be maintained,this difference is transformed in itself qualitatively; much that was not artculticworks, for instancehas over the courseof history metamorphosedinto art; andmuch that was once art is that no longer. Posed from on high, the question whethersomething such as film is or is no longerart leads nowhere. Because art is what ithasbecome,its conceptrefers to what it doesnot contain. Thetension betweenwhatmotivatesartandart'spastcircumscribestheso-calledquestionsofaes-thetic constitution. Art can be understoodonly by its laws of movement, not ac-cordingto anyset of invariants. It is definedby its relationto what it is not. Thespecificallyartisticinartmustbederivedconcretelyfromitsother;that alonewouldfulfillthe demandsof a materialistic-dialectical aesthetics. Art acquiresitsspecificity by separating itself fromwhat it developedout of; its law of movementis its law of form. It exists only in relationto its other;it is the processthat tran-spireswith its other. Nietzsche's lateinsight,honedin oppositionto traditionalphilosophy, that even what has becomecan be true, is axiomatic for areorientedaesthetic. The traditionalview, which he demolished, is to be turned on its head:Truth exists exclusivelyas that which has become. What appears in the artwork asitsownlawfulness isthelateproductofaninner-technicalevolutionaswell asart'spositionwithinprogressivesecularization;yetdoubtlessartworksbecameartworksonlyby negatingtheirorigin. Theyare not to be called toaccountforthedisgraceoftheirancientdependencyonmagic, theirservitude tokings andamusement, as if this were art'soriginalsin, for art retroactivelyannihilated thatfromwhich it emerged.Dinnermusic is not inescapablefor liberated music, norwas dinner music honestservicefromwhich autonomous art outrageously with-drew. Theformer'smiserablemechanicalclatteringis onnoaccount improvedbecause the overwhelming part of what now passes for art drowns out the echo ofthat clatter.The Hegelian vision of the possibledeath of art accordswith the factthat art is aproduct of history. That Hegelconsideredart transitory while all the same chalk-ing it up to absolute spirit stands in harmony with the double character of his sys-tem, yet it prompts a thought that would never have occurred to him: that the sub-stance of art, accordingto him its absoluteness, is not identicalwith art's life anddeath. Rather, art'ssubstancecouldbe its transitoriness. It is thinkable,and notmerely an abstract possibility, that greatmusica late developmentwaspossi-bleonlyduringalimitedphaseofhumanity. Therevoltofart,Ideologicallypositedin its "attitudeto objectivity"4 toward the historicalworld, has become arevoltagainstart;it isfutileto prophesywhether artwill survive it. What reac-tionarycultural pessimismonce vociferated against cannot besuppressedby thecritique of culture: that, as Hegel ruminated a hundred and fifty years ago, art mayhaveenteredtheageofitsdemise.5JustasRimbaud'sstunning dictum6oneART, SOCIETY, AESTHETICS 3hundred years ago divined definitivelythe history of new art, his later silence, hissteppingintolineasanemployee,anticipatedart'sdecline.Itisoutsidethepurview of aesthetics today whether it is to become art's necrology; yet it must notplay at delivering graveside sermons, certifying the end, savoring the past, and ab-dicating in favor of one sort of barbarism that is no better than the culture that hasearnedbarbarismasrecompenseforitsownmonstrosity. Whetherartisabol-ished,perishes,ordespairinglyhangson,itisnotmandatedthatthecontent[Gehalt]1of past art perish. It could survive art in a society that had freeditself ofthe barbarism of its culture. Not just aestheticforms but innumerable themes havealready become extinct, adultery being one of them. Although adultery filled Vic-torian and early-twentieth-century novels, it is scarcely possibleto empathize di-rectly with this literature now, given the dissolutionof the high-bourgeoisnuclearfamilyand thelooseningofmonogamy; distortedand impoverished, thislitera-ture lives on only in illustrated magazines. At the same time, however, what is au-thenticin MadameBovaryandwasonceembeddedinitsthematiccontenthaslongsinceoutstrippedthiscontentanditsdeterioration.Obviouslythisisnotgrounds for historicophilosophical optimism over theinvincibility ofspirit. It isequallypossibleforthe thematicmaterialinits own demiseto take with it thatwhich is more than merely thematic. Art and artworks are perishable, not simplybecause by their heteronomy they are dependent, but because right into the small-est detail of their autonomy, which sanctions the socially determined splitting offof spirit by the division of labor, they are not only art but something foreign andopposedto it. Admixed with art's own concept is the ferment of its own abolition.Thereis noaestheticrefraction without somethingbeingrefracted; no imagina-tion without something imagined. This holds true particularly in the case of art'simmanent purposiveness.8 In its relation to empirical reality art sublimates the lat-ter's governing principle of sese conservare as the ideal of the self-identity of itsworks;as Schoenbergsaid, one paintsa painting, not what it represents. Inher-ently every artwork desires identity with itself, an identity that in empirical realityis violentlyforced on all objects as identity with thesubject and thus travestied.Aesthetic identity seeks to aid the nonidentical, which in reality is repressed by re-ality's compulsion to identity. Only by virtue of separation from empirical reality,whichsanctionsart to modelthe relationof the whole and the part accordingtothe work'sown need, does the artwork achievea heightenedorderof existence.Artworks are afterimages of empirical life insofar as they help the latter to what isdenied them outside their own sphere and thereby freeit fromthat to which theyarecondemnedbyreifiedexternalexperience.Althoughthedemarcationlinebetween art and the empirical must not be effaced,and least of all by theglorifica-tion of the artist, artworks nevertheless have a lifesui generis. This life is not justtheirexternalfate.Important artworks constantly divulgenewlayers; theyage,growcold,and die. Itis a tautology to point out that as humanly manufacturedartifacts they do not live as do people. But the emphasis on the artifactual element4 ART, SOCIETY,AESTHETICSin art concerns less the fact that it is manufactured than its own inner constitution,regardlessof how it came to be. Artworks are alive in that they speak in a fashionthat is deniedto natural objects and the subjects who make them. They speak byvirtueofthecommunicationofeverythingparticularinthem. Thustheycomeinto contrast with the arbitrariness of what simply exists. Yet it is precisely as arti-facts,as productsof sociallabor, that they also communicatewith theempiricalexperiencethat they rejectandfromwhich they draw theircontent[Inhalt].Artnegates the categorial determinationsstamped on the empirical world and yet har-bors what is empiricallyexisting in its own substance. If art opposestheempiricalthrough the elementof formandthe mediationof formand content is not to begraspedwithout theirdifferentiationthemediation is to be sought in therecog-nitionof aesthetic form as sedimented content.Whatare takento be thepurestforms(e.g., traditionalmusicalforms)canbetracedbackeveninthesmallestidiomaticdetailtocontentsuchasdance.Inmanyinstancesornamentsinthevisualartswereonceprimarilyculticsymbols.Tracingaestheticformsbacktocontents, such as the Warburg Institute undertook to do by following theafterlifeof classicalantiquity, deservesto be more broadly undertaken. The communica-tionof artworkswith what is externalto them, with theworldfromwhich theyblissfullyorunhappilysealthemselvesoff, occursthroughnoncommunication;preciselytherebythey prove themselvesrefracted. It is easy to imagine that art'sautonomousrealmhasnothingincommonwiththeexternalworldotherthanborrowedelementsthat have enteredinto a fullychanged context.Nevertheless,there is no contesting the cliche of which cultural history is so fond, that the devel-opmentofartisticprocesses, usually classedundertheheadingofstyle,corre-sponds to socialdevelopment. Even the most sublime artwork takes up a determi-nateattitudeto empiricalrealitybysteppingoutsideoftheconstrainingspellitcasts, not onceand forall, but rather everandagain, concretely,unconsciouslypolemicaltoward this spellat each historical moment. That artworks as window-less monads "represent" what they themselves are not can scarcely be understoodexceptinthattheirowndynamic,theirimmanenthistoricityasadialecticofnature and its domination, not only is of the same essenceas the dialecticexternalto them but resemblesit without imitating it. The aestheticforce of production isthe same as that of productive labor and has the same teleology; and what may becalledaestheticrelations of productionall that in which the productive force isembeddedand in which it is activearesedimentationsor imprintings ofsocialrelations of production. Art's double character as both autonomous and fait socialis incessantly reproducedon the level of its autonomy. It is by virtue of this rela-tion to the empirical that artworks recuperate, neutralized, what once was literallyand directly experiencedin life and what was expulsed by spirit. Artworks partici-pate in enlightenment becausethey do not lie: They do not feign the literalness ofwhat speaksout of them. They are real as answers to the puzzle externallyposedto them. Theirown tension is binding in relation to the tension external to them.ART,SOCIETY,AESTHETICS 5The basic levels of experience that motivate art are related to those of theobjec-tive worldfromwhich they recoil. The unsolvedantagonisms of reality return inartworksas immanent problemsof form. This, not the insertion of objectiveele-ments, definesthe relation of art to society.The complex of tensions in artworkscrystallizesundisturbedintheseproblemsofformandthroughemancipationfromtheexternalworld'sfactualfacadeconvergeswiththerealessence.Art,%CGpi