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G.R. No. 152611 August 5, 2003 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO LISTANA, SR., respondent. YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276 dated December 11, 2001, 1 which annulled the Orders dated January 29, 2001 and April 2, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51. 2 Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 246.0561 hectares, located in Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20193. He voluntarily offered to sell the said land to the government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), 3 under Section 20 of R.A. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03, which was however rejected by the respondent. Hence, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine the just compensation of the land. On October 14, 1998, the DARAB rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the foregoing computation, the prior valuation made by the Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby set aside and a new valuation in the amount of TEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED FIFTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE PESOS AND 25 CENTAVOS (P10,956,963.25) for the acquired area of 240.9066 hectares. The Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the same to the landowner in the manner provided for by law. SO ORDERED. 4 Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued by the PARAD directing the manager of Land Bank to pay the respondent the aforesaid amount as just compensation in the manner provided by law. 5 On September 2, 1999, respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the PARAD, alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ of Execution issued on June 18, 1999. He argued that such failure of the petitioner to comply with the writ of execution constitutes contempt of the DARAB. Meanwhile, on September 6, 1999, petitioner Land Bank filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the determination of just compensation, as provided for in Section 16 (f) of the CARL. 6 On August 20, 2000, the PARAD issued an Order granting the Motion for Contempt, as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for contempt is hereby GRANTED, thus ALEX A. LORAYES, as Manager of respondent LAND BANK, is cited for indirect contempt and hereby ordered to be imprisoned until he complies with the Decision of the case dated October 14, 1998. SO ORDERED. 7 Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order, 8 which was however denied by the PARAD on September 20, 2000. 9 Thus, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the PARAD, manifesting its intention to appeal the decision to 1

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Page 1: Additional Cases

G.R. No. 152611 August 5, 2003

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.SEVERINO LISTANA, SR., respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276 dated December 11, 2001,1 which annulled the Orders dated January 29, 2001 and April 2, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.2

Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 246.0561 hectares, located in Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20193. He voluntarily offered to sell the said land to the government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),3 under Section 20 of R.A. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). The DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03, which was however rejected by the respondent. Hence, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine the just compensation of the land.

On October 14, 1998, the DARAB rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the foregoing computation, the prior valuation made by the Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby set aside and a new valuation in the amount of TEN MILLION NINE HUNDRED FIFTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE PESOS AND 25 CENTAVOS (P10,956,963.25) for the acquired area of 240.9066 hectares. The Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the same to the landowner in the manner provided for by law.

SO ORDERED.4

Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued by the PARAD directing the manager of Land Bank to pay the respondent the aforesaid amount as just compensation in the manner provided by law.5

On September 2, 1999, respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the PARAD, alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ of Execution issued on June 18, 1999. He argued that such failure of the petitioner to comply with the writ of execution constitutes contempt of the DARAB.

Meanwhile, on September 6, 1999, petitioner Land Bank filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 52, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the determination of just compensation, as provided for in Section 16 (f) of the CARL.6

On August 20, 2000, the PARAD issued an Order granting the Motion for Contempt, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for contempt is hereby GRANTED, thus ALEX A. LORAYES, as Manager of respondent LAND BANK, is cited for indirect contempt and hereby ordered to be imprisoned until he complies with the Decision of the case dated October 14, 1998.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order,8 which was however denied by the PARAD on September 20, 2000.9 Thus, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the PARAD, manifesting its intention to appeal the decision to the DARAB Central, pursuant to Rule XI, Section 3 of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure.10

On the other hand, the Special Agrarian Court dismissed the petition for the determination of just compensation filed by petitioner Land Bank in an Order dated October 25, 2000. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of said dismissal was likewise denied.

In a Resolution dated November 27, 2000, PARAD Capellan denied due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal and ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the payment of the adjudged amount of just compensation to respondent.11 On January 3, 2001, he directed the issuance of an arrest order against Manager Alex A. Lorayes.12

Petitioner Land Bank filed a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain PARAD Capellan from issuing the order of arrest.13 The case was raffled to Branch 51 of said court. On January 29, 2001, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead is enjoined as it is hereby enjoined from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before RTC Branch 52, Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by the Land Bank.

SO ORDERED.14

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s order, which was denied in an Order dated April 2, 2001.15

Thus, respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,16 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65276. On December 11, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision which nullified the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.

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Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN ENTERTAINING THE RESPONDENT’S SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE FINAL ORDER OF THE RTC WHICH, HOWEVER, WAS SUBJECT TO APPEAL UNDER THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE RTC FINAL ORDER OF INJUNCTION, CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE PARAD DID NOT ACQUIRE COMPETENT JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS INASMUCH AS IT WAS INITIATED BY MERE MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND NOT BY VERIFIED PETITION, IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 2, RULE XI OF THE NEW DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE AND OF RULE 71 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.

B. THE PARAD CONTEMPT ORDER CANNOT BE CONSIDERED FINAL AND EXECUTORY, BECAUSE THE PARAD ITSELF DISALLOWED THE PETITIONER’S APPEAL TO THE DARAB CENTRAL OFFICE, IN DISREGARD OF THE BASIC RULE THAT THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DETERMINES THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL.

C. THE PARAD ORDER OF ARREST AGAINST LBP MANAGER ALEX LORAYES WAS IN GROSS AND PATENT VIOLATION OF HIS PERSONAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS AGAINST UNJUST ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT, INASMUCH AS, UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, ONLY JUDGES CAN ISSUE WARRANTS OF ARREST AGAINST CITIZENS, AND THE PROPER SUBJECT OF THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDING WAS THE PETITIONER ITSELF AND NOT THE LBP MANAGER, AND YET THE CONTEMPT ORDER WAS AGAINST THE LBP MANAGER.

D. THE PARAD ORDER OF CONTEMPT WAS PATENTLY NULL AND VOID, AS IT ATTEMPTED TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PARAD DECISION THAT WAS ADMITTEDLY NOT FINAL AND EXECUTORY, AS THE MATTER OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT WAS ON APPEAL WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS.17

As regards the first issue, petitioner submits that the special civil action for certiorari filed by respondent before the Court of Appeals to nullify the injunction issued by the trial court was improper, considering that the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court was a final order which is appealable to the Court of Appeals via a notice of appeal.18

Petitioner’s submission is untenable. Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one’s substantive right or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. Thus, it has been held that an order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order. As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.19

Clearly, the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction is in the nature of an interlocutory order, hence, unappealable. Therefore, respondent’s special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the correct remedy under the circumstances. Certiorari is available where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.20

The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; as such, it cannot by itself be subject of an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by such an order is to bring an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in the main case, citing therein the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party concerned may file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently erroneous and appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.21

On the substantive issue of whether the order for the arrest of petitioner’s manager, Mr. Alex Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid, Rule XVIII of the 2003 DARAB Rules reads, in pertinent part:

Section 2. Indirect Contempt. – The Board or any of its members or its Adjudicator may also cite and punish any person for indirect contempt on any of the grounds and in the manner prescribed under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In this connection, Rule 71, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which deals with the commencement of indirect contempt proceedings, provides:

Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.

x x x x x x x x x

The requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Vice-Chairman of the Revision of the Rules of Court Committee that drafted the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explains this requirement:

1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as a special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts,

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has been for any party to file a mere motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor and without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this amended section.

x x x x x x x x x

Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefor and shall be disposed of in accordance with the second paragraph of this section.22

Therefore, there are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1) through a verified petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the court motu proprio.

In the case at bar, neither of these modes was adopted in charging Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.

More specifically, Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, referring to indirect contempt against quasi-judicial entities, provides:

Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. — Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as may be filed therefore. (emphasis supplied)

The foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for all the questions regarding the applicability of these rules to quasi-judicial bodies, to wit:

1. This new section was necessitated by the holdings that the former Rule 71 applied only to superior and inferior courts and did not comprehend contempt committed against administrative or quasi-judicial officials or bodies, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in the second paragraph of Sec. 580, Revised Administrative Code. The provision referred to contemplates the situation where a person, without lawful excuse, fails to appear, make oath, give testimony or produce documents when required to do so by the official or body exercising such powers. For such violation, said person shall be subject to discipline, as in the case of contempt of court, upon application of the official or body with the Regional Trial Court for the corresponding sanctions.23 (emphasis in the original)

Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.

Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons:24 First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from respondent’s "Motion for Contempt," specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276, dated December 11, 2001, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51, dated January 29, 2001, which enjoined the Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46613 February 26, 1990

SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs.LUCIO BENARAO, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Region VII, and the SECRETARY OF LABOR, respondents.

Jose V. Montebon, Jr. for petitioner.

Fructuoso S. Villarin for private respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, Silliman University, an educational institution duly organized and registered under Philippine laws with principal office at Dumaguete City, seeks the annulment of a decision rendered by the Workmen's Compensation Commission (WCC, for brevity) on 28 July 1975, solely on jurisdictional grounds.

The antecedents are uncontroverted:

Private respondent Lucio Benarao was employed as a carpenter, on a piece work basis, for Silliman University thru a job contract executed between the latter and Petronilo Nazareno. On 29 May 1969, while repairing the university's shop building, a falling piece of wood hit and

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broke Benarao's spinal cord resulting in his temporary disability which lasted for one hundred fifty (150) days. A claim for compensation benefits was filed by him before public respondent WCC, docketed as WCC Case No. R-13632 against Nazareno. On 5 April 1974, an award of Three Thousand Five Hundred Twelve Pesos and Fifty One Centavos (P3,512.51) was rendered in Benarao's favor. 1

More than five (5) months thereafter, or on 9 October 1974, Benarao, thru a "Memorandum of Settlement" entered into by him and Nazareno, accepted the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as final, complete and full settlement of the award he (Benarao) previously obtained. 2

Later, Nazareno appealed from the order or award granting compensation benefits to Benarao. Nazareno reasoned, among others, that under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 3 he could not be made liable for Benarao's claim because his (Nazareno's) contract with the Silliman University was merely a "labor only" contract and that his capital was below P1,000.00. 4 After a review of the petition, the WCC rendered a decision on 28 July 1975, finding the petitioner university liable for the compensation claim of Benarao. 5 The following statements in the WCC decision were the basis of the ruling against Silliman University, to wit:

We hold that Silliman University was the statutory employer and therefore liable for the compensation claim (Republic v. WCC, et al., L-22650, April 28, 1967). Whether the term used to describe the kind of actual work of the claimant at the time of the accident was 'remodelling' or 'repairing', such services of a carpenter are indispensable in any institution of learning. ... .

It is evident that what was entered into by and between Petronilo (Nilo) Nazareno and the Silliman University was labor-only contract. That made Petronilo Nazareno virtually a laborer if not an agent of Silliman University.

WHEREFORE, the award appealed from should be, as it is hereby SET ASIDE, and a new decision entered finding the Silliman University the statutory employer of the claimant liable to pay the latter's compensation benefits ... .

Thereafter, a writ of execution dated 8 October 1976 was served by the Department of Labor upon petitioner University in the amount of Three Thousand Five Hundred Twelve Pesos and Fifty one Centavos (P3,512.51 ) 6 followed by an alias writ of execution issued on 21 February 1977. 7 In response to said writs of execution, an Urgent Motion to Quash was not resolved by the Writ of Execution was filed by petitioner 8 on the ground that the school never became a party in WCC Case No. R07-13632 and, therefore, the WCC did not acquire jurisdiction over it. It further alleged that the 'University had no knowledge or information of an existing compensation case against it, as it never received copies of any complaint, summons, award or decision.

The said Urgent Motion to Quash was not resolved by the Department of Labor which instead delivered to petitioner in November 1976, a copy of the WCC decision i.e. the 28 July 1975 decision in WCC Case No. R08-13632, 9 and basis of the questioned writs of execution.

Hence this petition for certiorari. 10

Public respondent WCC submitted its Comment reiterating the statements it made in the 28 July 1975 decision. 11 Private respondent Benarao likewise filed his Comment wherein he averred that the filing of the instant petition is premature in the absence of a prior motion for reconsideration of the questioned WCC decision. 12

The vital issue in the instant case centers on the jurisdiction of the WCC over petitioner Silliman University. We find the petition impressed with merit.

The WCC's second decision dated 28 July 1975 is void for two (2) evident reasons. First, it was a substantial amendment of a prior ruling which had already become final and, in fact, already executed. Second, it is a decision rendered in violation of the rules on jurisdiction and due process.

It will be noted that the first WCC award was issued on 25 April 1974. While an appeal therefrom was interposed by Nazareno (respondent therein), this was after he had entered into a settlement agreement with Benarao (claimant) on 9 October 1974 or more than five (5) months after said WCC award. The next event that took place was the rendition by the WCC of a second decision in the same case dated 28 July 1975, or after one (1) year and three (3) months from the date of the first decision.

Given the above antecedents, there is no other way but to view the second decision as an entire reversal of the first ruling, which could no longer be disturbed. And, Nazareno had unconditionally settled his liability thru the execution of the "Memorandum of Settlement", the existence of which was never denied nor its validity questioned. A portion of the said memorandum reads as follows:

... and by way of full settlement of the claim of Lucio Benarao, and to his entire satisfaction, Petronilo Nazareno, by these presents, tenders and presents the amount of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) unto Lucio Benarao, who hereby accepts and acknowledges this amount, and further states that this said amount represents final, complete and full settlement of whatever award he might obtain from his claim ...

The above stipulations point to only one thing, i.e. the award of the WCC on 25 April 1974 was accepted by the parties thereto. And this acceptance of said award, on the part of Nazareno, rendered his later appeal therefrom moot from the beginning.

It should also be stated that during the hearings in the case, there was no instance when Nazareno challenged the averment that he was Benarao's employer. Why then was he later allowed for the first time to invoke numerous non-jurisdictional defenses in his petition for review before the respondent Commission He is deemed to have renounced his right to controvert the claim for the reason that he never denied being Benarao's employer and more, because of his voluntary discharge of hability in his capacity as employer of the claimant.

But even assuming arguendo that the Commission could still alter its first ruling, the 28 July 1975 decision is still null and void for having been issued without any jurisdiction first acquired over Silliman University and for lack of due process. Records show that the respondents never contested the allegation of petitioner that it was never notified of any disability claim filed against it.

Pertinent to this issue is a section in the Workmen's Compensation Act, to wit:

Section 49. Procedure. — Any dispute or controversy concerning compensation under this Act shall be submitted to the Commissioner as provided herein.

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... He shall cause reasonable notice of such hearing to be given to each party interested, in service upon him personally or mailing a copy thereof to him ... . All parties in interest shall have the right to be present at any hearing in person or by counsel or by any other agent or representative, to present such testimony as may be pertinent to the controversy before the Commissioner and to cross-examine the witness against them. ...

Quite clearly, the above provision was not followed vis-a-vis Silliman University. Fully aware that the latter was not made a party to the case at the instance of either Benarao, the claimant, or Nazareno, the respondent Commission nevertheless held it liable for the payment of disability benefits. At the very least, WCC should have notified the petitioner of its involvement in the case before it rendered any decision against it; WCC should have given petitioner an opportunity to refute the burden clearly being shifted to it, as required by due process. As petitioner never became a party to the case, logically, it can not be bound by the judgment subsequently rendered against it by the respondent WCC which, in the first place, acquired no jurisdiction over it.

Lastly, it is incorrect to state that since petitioner had not resorted to a prior motion for reconsideration of the decision, subject of controversy, its filing of the instant petition for certiorari is procedurally erroneous. While we support respondent Benarao's reasoning that a motion for reconsideration is needed to enable a judicial body issuing the questioned order, in the first instance, to pass upon and correct its mistakes without the intervention of a higher court, we, however, held in BA Finance Corporation v. Pineda, et al. 13 that in case of a final order or judgment, a motion for reconsideration, prior to taking an appeal, is not always required. In the case at bar, the 28 July 1975 order was not interlocutory; it was a final one as it disposed of the action for compensation benefits and there was nothing more to be done in the proceedings as to the merits of the case. On the other hand, in the cases cited by respondent Benarao, 14 in his effort to justify and support his arguments, the orders complained of were merely interlocutory and, therefore, a motion for reconsideration had to be filed before certiorari could be availed of.

Likewise, the theory of exhaustion of administrative remedies can not be invoked or applied where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal (as in the present case) amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 15

Having ruled that the questioned decision of 28 July 1975 is a void judgment, we do not find any need to resolve or even discuss the matter of whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between Benarao and Silliman University.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 28 July 1975 decision of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-48594 March 16, 1988

GENEROSO ALANO, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The only issue in this case is whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an employment accident.

The facts as found by the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission are as follows:

Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter.

On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of the deceased, filed the instant claim for in come benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent's children. The claim was, however, denied on the same date on the ground that the "injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law." On July 19, 1977 appellant requested for a reconsideration of the system's decision, but the same was denied and the records of the case were elevated to this Commission for review. (Rollo, p. 12)

The respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System. It stated that Section I (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation specifically provides that: "For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all the following conditions (1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; and (3) The employee must have been performing his official functions." (Rollo, p. 13)

According to the respondent Commission, the deceased's accident did not meet any of the aforementioned conditions. First, the accident occured at about 7:00 a.m. or thirty minutes before the deceased's working hours. Second, it happened not at her workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school principal nor was she on a special errand for the school. The case, therefore, was dismissed.

The petitioner then went to this Court on petition for review on certiorari. He alleges that the deceased's accident has "arisen out of or in the course of her employment."

The respondent Commission reiterates its views and contends that the present provision of law on employment injury is different from that provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428) and is "ategorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at the workplace, or elsewhere while executing an order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 44)

The Government Service Insurance System which received a copy of the Court's resolution requiring the parties to submit their memoranda, however manifests that it does not appear to be a party to the case because it had not been impleaded as a party thereto.

We rule in favor of the petitioner.

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This case does not come to us with a novel issue. In the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 260,263,264) which has a similar factual background, this Court held:

It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death.

The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.

In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.

As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation, we hold that it is not fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as a party respondent. As early as the case of La O v. Employees' Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413) and recently, Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. L-47521, August 31,1987), this Court has ruled that the Government Service Insurance System is a proper party in employees' compensation cases as the ultimate implementing agency of the Employees' Compensation Commission. We held in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects of employee compensation including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules)."

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) as death benefit and the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 96787 May 8, 1992

PEDRO TRIA, petitioners, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

Agustin V. Velante for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

This petition seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated September 13, 1990 of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 4661, entitled "Pedro Tria vs. Government Service Insurance System (Bureau of Posts)" which affirmed the decision of the respondent Government Service Insurance System, hereinafter referred to as GSIS, denying petitioner's request for conversion of his disability benefits from Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) to Permanent Total Disability (PTD) under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner entered the Bureau of Posts as a letter carrier in August, 1964. He was promoted to the rank of Postmaster I in November, 1987 and served said government entity for almost twenty (20) years until his retirement on October 1, 1984.

Medical records showed that several months before his retirement, petitioner began to experience recurring attacks of fainting accompanied by headache, occasional loss of consciousness and amnesia. Upon consultation with a private medical practitioner, petitioner's ailment was diagnosed as Ischemic Heart Disease. The electrocardiogram (ECG) subsequently taken of petitioner by the GSIS' medical clinic showed a tracing of non-specific ST-R changes.

Consequently, petitioner filed on April 26, 1985, a claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, and was awarded permanent partial disability benefits for a period of eight (8) months from October, 1984 up to May, 1985. Not satisfied with such award, petitioner sent a series of letters to the GSIS claiming additional benefits. The GSIS denied his requests.

Thereafter, in a letter dated April 10, 1987 and addressed to the Regional Director, Postal Region IV, San Pablo City, petitioner sought to re-enter the postal service. Said letter reads:

After my retirement, I undertook a thorough medical treatment and I am happy to report to you that I fully recovered last 1985. Since then I have been engaged in farming and poultry but now that I am fully recovered I have decided to go back to government service and dedicated (sic) the rest of my life to the Postal Service, my first love.

The above-quoted request for reemployment was however denied due to lack of a vacancy.

On February 25, 1988 or about four (4) years after his retirement, petitioner wrote the GSIS another letter asking for a conversion of his disability benefits from permanent partial to permanent total, on the ground that he still had recurrent attacks of fainting, accompanied by headache and occasional loss of consciousness, amnesia and his consequential in ability to perform his official duties. Petitioner supported this claim with two medical certificates attesting that there is a recurrence of petitioner's ailment.

In a letter dated April 22, 1988, the GSIS denied the request of petitioner on the ground that his case does not satisfy the criteria for permanent total disability. Two subsequent letters of reconsideration of the denial of his claim were sent by petitioner to the GSIS but were likewise denied with the explanation that "the amount of benefit granted to petitioner is already commensurate to the degree of his disability at the time he was separated from the service based on the evidences submitted and physical examination administered on him" and that "petitioner's disability benefit was based on his physical condition at the time he was separated from the service and not from contingencies that arose after he was separated from the service." — (Comment of respondent GSIS, p. 4)

Upon his request, petitioner's case was elevated for review to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) which affirmed the decision of the GSIS.

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Aggrieved, petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari.

It is admitted that the GSIS found the Ischemic Heart Disease suffered by petitioner to be compensable, as in fact he was awarded permanent partial disability benefits equivalent to eight (8) months salary beginning October 1, 1984. Thus, there is no more question as to whether or not the cause of the disability is work or service-connected. Thus, the issues left for Us to resolve are the following: 1) whether or not petitioner's disability benefits may be converted from permanent partial to permanent total, and 2) whether or not the Workmen's Compensation Law must be liberally construed in his favor.

Petitioner's case is covered by Sec. 2, Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, which provides that "a disability is permanent partial if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body."

Based on the aforecited rule, petitioner's ailment was classified as permanent partial disability and not a temporary total disability since his ailment did not result in total loss or impairment of his physical or mental functions as a result of his illness. Thus, granting that he had recovered, that is, that his partial disability was only temporary and not permanent, any recurrence meant that his original condition of permanent partial disability merely recurred. Therefore, his ailment cannot be reclassified as permanent total disability if it merely recurred. Besides, Ischemic Heart Disease, the disability for which petitioner has already been compensated and which he claims to have recurred, is a partial and not a total disability.

Petitioner cannot take comfort under the second rule laid down in Sec. 2 of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation that at any time after 120 days, as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions to be determined by the GSIS, the GSIS may declare disability total and permanent, because (1) the provision specifically refers to a "continuous temporary total disability," and (2) the GSIS has made no declaration finding petitioner's disability to be total.

The disability allegedly suffered by petitioner after he was already granted benefits and after he had left the service cannot be regarded as a total disability, whether temporary or permanent. "A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a period exceeding 120 days except as provided for in Rule X of these Rules,"(emphasis supplied) (Sec. 2, Rule VII, Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation)

Section 2 of Rule X of the same rules reads:

Sec. 2. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System. (emphasis supplied)

Viewed in the light of the aforequoted rules, petitioner's ailment could not have been classified as temporary total disability which could be converted to permanent total disability. The claimed conversion is thus untenable and cannot be granted.

Moreover, it will be recalled that when petitioner sought his re-employment with the Bureau of Posts in April, 1987, he categorically stated in his letter to the Regional Director, Postal Region IV that he has "fully recovered" from his ailment as of 1985 and he had been engaged in farming and poultry-raising. It must be stressed, however, that after petitioner was denied re-entry in the service due to lack of a vacancy, he requested the GSIS for a conversion of his disability benefits from permanent partial to permanent total. To support this claim, petitioner presented two medical certificates, one dated February 15, 1988 and the other dated January 23, 1991, issued by the Municipal Health Officer of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, both of which certify that petitioner had a recurrence of his ailment in 1985 and recommend that he be granted total disability benefits.

It must be emphasized that the contents of the medical certificate directly and flatly contradict the allegations made by petitioner in his letter for re-employment. While petitioner admits having "fully recovered" for the period beginning the year 1985 up to at least April 10, 1987, the doctor certifies that petitioner's illness has continued unabated since 1984 and the same totally incapacitated him from gainful occupation. The doctor certifies that petitioner had a recurrence of the heart ailment from 1984 to 1988.

While normally the courts give credence to a doctor's certification as to the nature of a claimant's disability, We are hesitant to do the same in this case where petitioner himself submits an absolutely contradictory evidence. Certainly, the inconsistent evidence presented by petitioner is detrimental to his cause.

Also, petitioner stated in the same letter for re-employment that he has since 1985 been engaged in farming and raising poultry, which are apparently more taxing than being a postmaster. These circumstances would show that his ailment resulted merely in partial disability, not in temporary total disability if the inability to perform gainful employment exceeds 120 days. It may not be amiss to stress too that petitioner's inability to get re-employed was not due to any ailment but due to lack of a job vacancy.

Even assuming that petitioner's ailment had indeed recurred, it must be pointed out that such a recurrence must have been caused by new and distinct attendant conditions and not on account of circumstances related to his previous employment. Petitioner can no longer be compensated for these new and distinct causes which are not work-connected. The causes are not work-connected but may be precipitated by his inability to find employment due to lack of job availability.

Thus, Sec. 2(b), Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, which covers the rules on temporary total disability, provides that:

After an employee has fully recovered from an illness as duly certified to by the attending physician, the period covered by any relapse he suffers, or recurrence of his illness, which results in disability and is determined to be compensable, shall be considered independent of, and separate from, the period covered by the original disability in the computation of his income benefit for temporary total disability.

The recurring ailment is thus considered separate illness from the original one. And as aptly argued by the Solicitor General, the statement in the above-said rule that "the recurrence of his illness . . . is determined to be compensable" could only mean that a separate determination must be made whether the recurring ailment is compensable or not.

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In the case at bar, petitioner has already been awarded permanent partial disability benefits while being employed as postmaster of the Bureau of Posts. The recurrence, if any, of his ailment many years after his retirement (particularly after the rejection of his April 10, 1987 letter for re-employment), would be considered a completely new illness which arose long after his service and was caused by circumstances not connected with his previous employment, and, therefore, could not have been brought about as a result of unusual strain or fatigue by reason of the nature or quality of his work.

The case of Vicente vs. ECC, 193 SCRA 190 cannot be squarely applied here because in said case it was held that petitioner Vicente's disability should have been classified as permanent total and not permanent partial based on clear findings that the illness suffered by petitioner after he was already granted partial disability benefits "was a direct result of his other ailments as previously diagnosed (before his retirement)." In the present case, however, the alleged recurrence of petitioner's illness has not been established by clear and convincing evidence. His application for re-entry in the service casts serious doubts on, if not wholly discredited the medical certificates attesting to the alleged recurrence of his ailment. Further, petitioner has, by his own admission, gainfully engaged himself in industrial activity during the period he was allegedly suffering from ailment, as he stated that he was engaged in farming and raising poultry. Such allegation negates petitioner's claim that he was or is suffering from permanent total disability.

Finally, while the Court has consistently ruled that labor, social and welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, We cannot do the same in the present case. The GSIS very clearly ruled that the ailment suffered by petitioner merely falls under the category of permanent partial disability. Besides, with petitioner's admission, there is no recurrence of any disability to speak of which can be the basis of any conversion of disability benefits.

After a careful review of the records of the case, it seems clear to Us and We quite agree with the Solicitor General that what prompted petitioner to ask for a conversion of his disability benefits was "not a perennial heart ailment but the grim prospect of losing a source of income, the limited disability pension, and the rejection of his application." The medical certificate was an afterthought intended to legitimize petitioner's request for conversion. (Rejoinder of respondent GSIS, p. 9)

Likewise, on January 1, 1975, the former law on compensation, the Workmen's Compensation Act, was replaced by a novel scheme in the New Labor Code under the title "Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund." The new law discarded, among others, the concept of 'presumption of compensability and aggravation' and substituted one based on social security principles. The new system is administered by social insurance agencies — the GSIS and the SSS — under the ECC. The purpose was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability. (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Raro vs. ECC, 172 SCRA 845; and Sante vs. ECC, 174 SCRA 557).

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 78617 June 18, 1990

SALVADOR LAZO, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES), respondents.

Oscar P. Paguinto for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2883 which affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's claim for compensation against the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).

The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice.

On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25 July 1986.

For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended. His claim, however, was denied by the GSIS for the reason that —

It appears that after performing your regular duties as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M. to 10:00 P.M. on June 18, 1986, you rendered overtime duty from 10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of the following day; that at about 5:06 A.M. after asking permission from your superior you were allowed to leave the Office to do certain personal matter — that of bringing home a sack of rice and that, while on your way home, you met a vehicular accident that resulted to (sic) your injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is evident that you were not at your work place performing your duties when the incident occurred. 1

It was held that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied.

Upon review of the case, the respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision since the accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while he was attending to a personal matter.

Hence, the present recourse.

The petitioner contends that the injuries he sustained due to the vehicular accident on his way home from work should be construed as "arising out of or in the course of employment" and thus, compensable. In support of his prayer for the reversal of the decision, the petitioner cites the case of Pedro Baldebrin vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 2 where the Court awarded compensation to the petitioner therein who

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figured in an accident on his way home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. In the accident, petitioner's left eye was hit by a pebble while he was riding on a bus.

Respondents claim that the Baldebrin ruling is a deviation from cases earlier decided and hence, not applicable to the present case.

The Court has carefully considered the petition and the arguments of the parties and finds that the petitioner's submission is meritorious. Liberally interpreting the employees compensation law to give effect to its compassionate spirit as a social legislation 3 in Vda. de Torbela u. ECC, 4 the Court held:

It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.

Again in Alano v. ECC, 5 it was reiterated:

Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A-M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. ...

In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.

More recently, in Vano vs. GSIS & ECC, 6 this Court, applying the above quoted decisions, enunciated:

Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July 31, 1983, a Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his motorcycle with his son as backrider allegedly on his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the following day, Monday. As they were approaching Hinawanan Bridge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown overboard. Vano's head hit the bridge's railing which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood Hospital where he was declared dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage.

We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in these two (2) aforementioned cases, it was established that petitioner's husband in the case at bar was on his way to his place of work when he met the accident. His death, therefore, is compensable under the law as an employment accident.

In the above cases, the employees were on their way to work. In the case at bar, petitioner had come from work and was on his way home, just like in the Baldebrin case, where the employee "... figured in an accident when he was ping home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur ...." 7 Baldebrin, the Court said:

The principal issue is whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment.'(Section 2, Workmen's Compensation Act). In Philippine Engineer's Syndicate, Inc. vs. Flora S. Martin and Workmen's Compensation Commission, 4 SCRA 356, We held that 'where an employee, after working hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a service truck of the company near his place of work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell to the ground and was run over by the truck, resulting in his death, the accident may be said to have arisen out of or in the course of employment, for which reason his death is compensable. The fact standing alone, that the truck was in motion when the employee boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been notoriously negligent, where it does not appear that the truck was running at a great speed.'And, in a later case, Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that '(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey.

While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act (under which the Baldebrin case was decided) may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, 8 it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman still subsists. As agent charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the Employees Compensation Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to the accident.

This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that 'all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.'

The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (PD 626) to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. 9

There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. 10

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If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who was on his way from home to his work station one day before an official working day, there is no reason to deny compensation for accidental injury occurring while he is on his way home one hour after he had left his work station.

We are constrained not to consider the defense of the street peril doctrine and instead interpret the law liberally in favor of the employee because the Employees Compensation Act, like the Workmen's Compensation Act, is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and women in our society.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be remanded to the ECC and the GSIS for disposition in accordance with this decision. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-47414 December 11, 1987

ELIODORO T. ISCALA, petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Dept. of Education & Culture, Bureau of Public Schools), GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, ET AL., respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

Before her death, Nena S. Iscala was employed as an elementary school teacher in Buruanga Elementary School, Buruanga Aklan for fifteen years. In September of 1969, in the course of her employment, she underwent medical treatment for stomach ailment diagnosed by the examining physician as peptic ulcer. On several occasions thereafter, i.e., on February 3, May 18, July 6, December 10, 1970, January 12, 1972, October 10, 1973, January 10 and May 16, 1974, she was treated by the same physician for the same illness. On Feb. 25, 1975, she was confined at the Community Hospital and Health Center for Amoebic Abscess and on March 1 of the same year, she succumbed to Acute Pancreatitis and Recurrent Duodenal Ulcer.

For the death of Nena Iscala her surviving spouse, the petitioner herein, filed a claim for income benefit under Presidential Decree (PD) 626 with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The claim was denied. The petitioner then appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission which dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the GSIS. In deciding thus, the Employees Compensation Commission applied the new employees compensation program and held that the sickness which caused the death of Nena Iscala was not listed as an occupational disease under the Rules Implementing PD 626. Neither did the petitioner prove that the risk of contracting the ailment was increased by the deceased's working condition as a teacher, a proof required for compensability under the new law,

We do not agree with the Commission, We hold that the petitioner is entitled to his claim for income benefit by virtue of his wife's death. For although the deceased passed away on March 10, 1975, just two months and ten days after the effectivity of the new law, on January 1, 1975, the sickness which caused her demise could be traced way back in 1969 when she first had her medical treatment for peptic ulcer. The cause of action for the income benefit claim, therefore, has arisen as early as 1969 before the new law had even been conceived. Following the principle that "rights accrued and vested while a statute was in force ordinarily survives its repeal," 1 we must apply the old Workmen's Compensation Law. Under the said law, whenever an illness was contracted by an employee in the course of his employment, there existed a legal presumption of causation, i.e., that the sickness was caused by and/or aggravated by the nature of the job. The onus to rebut this presumption was on the employer who was required to show convincing proof that while the illness of the employee supervened in the course of employment, it did not necessarily follow that it also arose from such employment or was at least aggravated by it. 2

The opinion of the deceased's attending physician that the sickness which caused the death of Nena Iscala was not directly caused by the employee's duties, thus, disconnecting the deceased's ailment from her employment is not sufficient to overthrow the presumption of compensability mandated by law. In Agana v.. Quisumbing, 3 we said:

... [U]nder the law, it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of his disease. It has been repeatedly held that under the Workmen's Compensation Law, it is not necessary for a claimant to carry the burden of proof to establish his case to the point of demonstration. It is sufficient to show that the hypothesis on which he bases his claim is probable."

Furthermore, the applicable law being in the nature of social legislation, its provisions must be interpreted liberally in favor of employees because the law was intended to protect their rights. 4

Inevitably there is no other recourse but to grant the claim of the herein petitioner for income benefits.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission dated October 12,1977 denying petitioner's claim for compensation for the death of Nena Iscala is hereby SET ASIDE and the GSIS is hereby ordered to AWARD to the petitioner such compensation as provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act. NO COSTS. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 46395 October 2, 1992

ARSENIA LACATAN-NUÑEZ, petitioner, vs.WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE, respondents.

MELO, J.:

This has reference to a petition for review on certiorari, filed in forma pauperis, of the Decision dated October 27, 1975, of the Employee's Compensation Commission in R05-W.C. Case No. 1993, entitled "Arsenia Lacatan Nuñez vs. Canlubang Sugar Estate, C.J. Yulo & Sons", which denied the grant of death compensation benefits to petitioner for the demise of her husband under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Petitioner Arsenia Lacatan-Nuñez filed the present petition in her capacity as the widow of the late Victorino Nuñez who had been employed by private respondent Canlubang Sugar Estate as a locomotive driver with a monthly salary of P325.00. On February, 22, 1967. Victorino was unable to continue with his work due to severe headache and dizziness. Three days thereafter, or more specifically, on February, 25, 1967, he

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developed paralysis of the left half of the body and right half of the face with inability to speak and eat properly. His left upper extremity was completely paralyzed. Since complete recovery was impossible, he was retired from the service for cerebral apoplexy (stroke) on March 16, 1967. At that time, the deceased was already 65 years old, with 18 years and 6 months service to his credit.

On December 31, 1970, or three (3) years and nine (9) months after retirement. Victorino died due to "bleeding peptic ulcer". As a consequence thereof, the widow, herein petitioner, filed on August 13, 1973, a claim for death compensation benefits with the Regional Office No. 5, Department of Labor, San Pablo City.

Private respondent Canlubang Sugar Estate controverted the claim on the ground that (a) the claim was filed beyond the reglementary period; (b) his death was not due to work-connected cause, said death occurring nearly four (4) years after separation from service; and (c) payment of retirement benefits amounting to P6,012.50 was made to his heirs as of March 16, 1967.

Acting Referee Bonifacio I. Marasigan rendered a decision dated October 10, 1974, granting disability benefits to the claimant but at the same declaring that death benefits cannot be granted for the reason that Victorino Nuñez died beyond the 2-year period from date of disability and/or retirement. the dispositive portion of the said decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding, the above-claim to be meritorious, judgment is rendered in favor of the claimant/heirs and the respondent is directed to:

1. Pay the claimant, thru this Unit, the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) as compensation benefits under Section 14 of the Act, as amended, computed as follows:

Claimant for the decedent is entitled to 60% of his average weekly wage of P75.00 for the period of disability from March 16, 1967 (date of medical retirement) up to December 31, 1970 (date of death), a period of 197 2/7 weeks. Sixty (60%) percent of his average weekly wage of P75.00 is P45.00 multiplied by 197 2/7 weeks is P8,877.84, reduced to P6,000.00, the maximum amount of compensation allowed by law, the full amount of what is now due and demandable.

2. Pay Feliciano Reyes his attorney's fees, the sum of THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) (Sec. 31).

3. Pay this Office the sum of SIXTY ONE PESOS (P61.00 as fee (Sec. 55).

SO ORDERED.

From the aforesaid decision, private respondent filed a "Petition for Reconsideration and/or Review." Treated as an appeal, the case was elevated to respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission.

In a decision dated October 27, 1975, respondent Commission reversed the decision of the acting referee and dismissed the claim of petitioner, ruling as follows:

The instant claim for death compensation should be rejected. Deceased died more than three (3) years after retirement due to bleeding peptic ulcer. In order to hold respondent liable under the claim it must be shown that the death of the deceased was linked to his employment with the respondent. And the only possible connection with which to bridge his relations to prove that the deceased suffered an illness during his employment. His illness was hypertension due to arteriesclerosis. Death due to bleeding peptic ulcer occuring after almost 4 years from retirement or separation from the service definitely is not proximate, hence, any factor that may have predisposed his illness which led to his death cannot be related to his employment. (p. 27 Rollo).

Hence, the instant petition, with the petitioner raising this lone issue that:

THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE CLAIM ON THE GROUND THAT THE ILLNESS WHICH CAUSED THE DEATH OF PETITIONER'S HUSBAND WAS NOT WORK-CONNECTED.

Petitioner argues that no blood chemistry examination was taken of her husband at the time he was medically retired and that, therefore, it could have been possible that even at the time he was already suffering from a bleeding peptic ulcer. This gives rise, so petitioner argues, to the presumption that Victorino's ailment was work-connected.

Petitioner also claims that the decision of respondent Commission is contrary to the liberal spirit of the law. We have no quarrel with petitioner on this point and we certainly sympathize with her, for the Workmen's Compensation Act being a social legislation aimed at protecting the rights of the workingman in consonance with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution, its provisions must be interpreted liberally in favor of laborers or workers (Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230). We have tried hard to find some factual and legal basis to enable us to decide in her favor, but our efforts have been in vain. Much as we symphatize with petitioner's plight, we are constrained to deny her claim.

It is not disputed that Victorino Nuñez died more than three (3) years after retirement. Under Section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, it is required that before death benefits can be awarded to the heirs of a deceased employee, the death of the employee due to a work-connected disease, must occur within two (2) years from such sickness. In the cases of International Oil Factory vs. Doriz (109 Phil. 553) and Central Azucarera Don Pedro vs. de Leon (L-9449, July 29, 1959), this Court ruled that the 2-year period shall be counted from the time of the aggravation of the employee's ailment or the time he was forced to stop working or became physically disabled to work. This doctrine was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Vda. de los Santos vs. WCC (88 SCRA 134); Delana vs. WCC (83 SCRA 528); and Tolosa vs. ECC (136 SCRA 335). Since Victorino Nuñez stopped working or became physically disabled to perform his duties at the time of his retirement on February 25, 1967, the 2-year period spoken of by Section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act should be counted from that date. Victorino, however, died on December 31, 1970, or more than two years after his retirement. Obviously, no death benefits can be granted under the law.

Regarding the contention that claimant should at least be allowed to recover disability benefits from the date her husband ceased working May 16, 1967, to the time of his death on December 31, 1970, this contention has no legal basis because when the late Victorino Nuñez retired by reason of old age (65 years) on May 16, 1967, the employee-employee relationship between him and private respondent was terminated and absent such tie or relationship, the grant of compensation benefits cannot be justified. Thus, in Alatco Trans. Inc. vs. WCC, et al. (42 SCRA 391), it was held:

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The record reveals that the Commission computed the amount due from the petitioner from June 16, 1965; the date of the claimant's disability, however, actually started on September 6, 1964, when his illness compelled him to stop working. Disability compensation represents lost or unpaid earnings of a claimant due to his illness and becomes due from the time his earnings power is lost or impaired. The liability therefore of the petitioner to pay the disability compensation accrued in September 6, 1964 (when the claimant's illness impaired his earning capacity) and subsided only until June 16 1965 when the claimant was actually separated from service or, more particularly, when the employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the claimant ceased). . . We find no basis to sustained the grant of compensation after June 16, 1965 — the date of the termination of the employer-employee relationship between petitioner and claimant. (p. 397)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 96844 January 23, 1992REMUS A. DIOPENES, petitioner, vs.GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) (Development Bank of the Philippines) and the EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION (ECC), respondents.Salvador T. Sabio for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:Two years after his retirement, Remus A. Diopenes filed an application for the conversion of his compensation benefits from permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. The application was rejected by the Government Service Insurance System, which held that it had no more jurisdiction over the matter because the applicant was no longer in the service. 1 On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the Employees' Compensation Commission on the ground that the alleged permanent total disability was not service-connected. 2 Dissatisfied, the petitioner has come to this Court for relief.

Diopenes joined the government service in 1959 as a clerk and eventually rose to Branch Attorney of the Development Bank of the Philippines in Catarman, Northern Samar. On April 5, 1978, he suffered a stroke and was found to have sustained a cardio-vascular accident (CVA) with light hemiparesis. He was hospitalized from May 8 to June 15, 1978, and went on sick leave of absence from February 28 to March 1, 1979.

As a result of the CVA, the GSIS granted the petitioner compensation for temporary total disability for 240 days from May 1 to December 26, 1978, 3 and permanent partial disability for 19 months beginning January 1, 1986, until July 1, 1987. 4

On December 28, 1985, the petitioner retired.

When on November 23, 1986, he requested the change in his compensation benefits, he was required by the GSIS to undergo not only one but three medical examinations.

The first examination was conducted by Dr. Victor L. Cortez, Chief of the Gov. Valeriano M. Gatuslao Memorial Hospital, who diagnosed the petitioner's ailment as "post CVA with residual left hemiplegia," referring to the earlier stroke in 1978. The medical report described as total and permanent the patient's "left hemiparesis (which) has persisted since then up to the present." 5

The second examination was conducted by Dr. Felix Jardenico, GSIS medical officer for its branches in Iloilo and Bacolod, who found that the left side of the petitioner's body had been paralyzed since 1978 and recommended that "the claim of Atty. Remus A. Diopenes, former Branch Attorney, DBP, Catarman Branch, Northern Samar, be given preferential and favorable consideration and the action thereat be done soonest." 6

The third examination was conducted by Dr. Lucila Lazaro, resident physician of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Hospital, who reported that the petitioner started his illness as early as "April 1978 as high blood pressure with left hemiplegia which persisted up to the present" and said that the degree of disability was "total and permanent." 7

Despite these reports, the GSIS denied the petitioner's request, holding that since the hemiplegia was contracted after his retirement, he was not entitled to the benefits claimed. Echoing this finding, the ECC stressed that the petitioner's "hemiplegia occured two years after he retired from the service" and thus could not be considered service-connected under the Employees' Compensation Law.

There is no evidence that the hemiplegia occurred two years after the petitioner's retirement, as concluded by the respondents. On the contrary, the three doctors who examined the petitioner were one in the finding that the disability began in 1978 and continued even after the petitioner's retirement in 1985. Significantly, one of these doctors was the medical officer of the GSIS itself in Bacolod and Iloilo.

All of these doctors actually examined the petitioner. By contrast, the conclusion of the GSIS medical staff in Manila was based on an arm-chair evaluation by doctors who had not personally examined the petitioner.

Even if the Petitioner did suffer a second attack after his retirement, as the respondents contend, this supervening event would not defeat his claim. The reason is that the second stroke was only the consequence of the first stroke which he suffered in 1978, when he was still in the service. There is no question that that first stroke was service-connected as categorically admitted in the Employees Report made by the GSIS thus:

Immediately prior to his CVA attack on April 8, 1978, employee was supervising court cases of DBP, he being on special detail at Catarman DBP, Northern Samar, from his regular position as Assistant Branch Attorney, DBP Dumaguete Branch. He was in his office preparing pleadings to be filed in court in order to meet the deadline set by the Rules of Court in the numerous court collection cases of the DBP Catarman, which prior to and during the attack of his CVA, employee was working overtime to beat the prescriptive period of filing same in court; the tension thereof triggered his CVA on April 8, 1978. 8

The following ruling in Mondejar v. Workmen's Compensation Commission 9 is applicable to the case at bar:

It is also noteworthy as stated in the referee's decision that because of his illnesses brought about by his work and his first attack in 1972, petitioner's condition had worsened to such an extent that he was constrained to retire at age 60 on August 13, 1974, soon after which he suffered in January, 1973 his second and near-fatal attack which "reduced him to a complete wreck" — in the commission's own language. This second attack was but the consequence of the illnesses which he suffered in the course of his employment. It is patent, therefore, that contrary to the commission's speculation, these illnesses were the "precipitating factors that triggered the stroke" which were "attributable to

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his employment" and consequently petitioner's claim to compensation under the Act must be upheld, in accordance with the law and settled jurisprudence.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the GSIS had earlier granted the petitioner temporary total disability benefits for 240 days and permanent partial disability for nineteen months, thus in effect acknowledging that he was suffering from permanent total disability. Under Section 192 of the Labor Code, "(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days" shall be deemed "total and permanent."

We agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioner's request should not have been denied by the respondents. Their posture cannot be sustained against the uncontroverted medical evidence that the petitioner's incipient permanent and total disability was incurred during his incumbency in the government service and merely continued and aggravated after his retirement.

The GSIS and the ECC should be commended for their vigilance against unjustified claims that will only deplete the funds intended to be disbursed for the benefit only of deserving disabled employees. Nevertheless, we should caution against a too-strict interpretation of the rules lest it result in the withholding of full assistance from those whose capabilities have been diminished if not completely impaired as a consequence of their service in the government. A humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to the legitimate appeals of disabled public servants like the herein petitioner. Compassion for them is not a dole but a right.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decisions of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission are SET ASIDE and petitioner Remus A. Diopenes is declared to be entitled to permanent total disability benefits under Article 192 of the Labor Code and shall be compensated accordingly. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-41301 December 15, 1986PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.HERMINIO DE LA ROSA and the WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents. Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner. Feliciano B. Sabares for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

Submitted on March 31, 1976 for Our decision is this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission dated July 31, 1975 in R04-WC Case No. 11376, which: (a) reversed the Decision of Acting Referee Tomas G. Montesines of the then Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor and Employment) dismissing the claim of herein private respondent for lack of cause of action and (b) granted private respondent's disability compensation.

As found by the respondent Commission, the facts of this case are the following —

Claimant was employed by respondent as a laborer working 8 hours a day, 5 days a week with a daily salary of P28.24. While in the service sometime on May 13, 1969, claimant contracted illness with symptoms of gradual numbness of the body, which prompted him to consult Dr. Romeo Tamayo who advised him that his sickness was due to lack of vitamins. Despite his sickness, claimant continued working. On June 2, 1969, claimant, notwithstanding his complaint about his illness, was transferred by respondent to its branch in Davao with the same kind of work. After working there for about 15 days, he was again transferred to the respondent's branch in Butuan City where he worked as a laborer rolling drums of gasoline under varying weather conditions. While at the respondent's Depot in Butuan City, claimant suffered a stroke. He was brought by his supervisor to the San Pedro Hospital, Butuan City where he was examined. After which, claimant was sent back to Manila where, upon the instance of respondent, he was hospital at the Marian General Hospitalized under the medical care of Dr. Lourdes Mabanta who diagnosed his ailment as transient ischemic attack secondary to vascular insufficiency. He was confined therein from July 1, 1969 to July 5, 1969, after which he was discharged therefrom and was given two months vacation leave. After the expiration of his vacation leave, respondent separated him from the service because of his sickness. Respondent paid him his retirement gratuity and special benefit pursuant to its retirement plan and collective bargaining agreement and consideration of which, claimant signed a document entitled 'Release' releasing respondent from all claims whatsoever including the Workmen's Compensation Benefit to which he may be entitled under the Act. Then claimant continued having himself treated by Dr. Carino after his separation from the service. (WCC Decision, Rollo, pp. 32-33).

On February 24, 1970, private respondent filed a claim for disability compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act against the petitioner with Regional Office 4, Workmen's Compensation Unit, Department of Labor (Private Respondent's Memorandum, Rollo, p. 85). After the case was heard on its merits, the Regional Office rendered a decision dismissing the claim on the following grounds: (a) that the Rules of Retirement Gratuity Scheme of herein petitioner are not contrary to law and inconsistent with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended; (b) that private respondent was given the option to make his choice and by his choice in favor of the retirement plan, he has thereby waived his right to receive benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended; (c) and that since private respondent has been paid his salary in full during the period of his disability up to the time of his retirement, he shall no longer be entitled to temporary total disability (Decision of Regional Office, Rollo, pp. 23-24).

On May 26, 1975, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the respondent Commission contending that the Decision of Regional Office 4 was contrary to law and evidence adduced at the trial of this case (Annex B, Rollo, p. 25).

Finding private respondent's petition to be meritorious, the respondent commission rendered a Decision dated July 31, 1975 (Annex C, Rollo, pp. 32-36) reversing the Regional Office's decision and granting private respondent disability compensation in the amount of P6,000.00; P600.00 to private respondent's lawyer, and ordering petitioner to pay an administrative fee of P61.00.

Taking exception to the foregoing decision, petitioner filed the present petition on the following ground:

THE PAYMENT BY PETITIONER TO RESPONDENT HERMINIO DE LA ROSA OF GRATUITY BENEFITS UNDER ITS RETIREMENT GRATUITY SCHEME AMOUNTING TO P15,889.00 WHICH BENEFITS INCLUDED BENEFITS UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT, AS AMENDED, DISCHARGED IN FULL ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SAID ACT AND THEREFORE THE RESPONDENT WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY IN REVERSING THE DISMISSAL OF THE CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION FILED BY RESPONDENT HERMINIO DE LA ROSA AND IN

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AWARDING HIM DISABILITY BENEFITS OF P6,000.00 — BENEFITS WHICH HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED FROM PETITIONER. (Petition, Rollo, p. 10).

On October 8, 1975, this Court, without giving due course to the petition, required respondents to comment. Private respondent's comment was filed on October 28, 1975 (Rollo, pp. 43-48) that, of the respondent Commission, on January 5, 1976 (Rollo, pp. 64-70).

In a resolution of the First Division dated November 5, 1975 (Rollo, p. 72), this Court resolved: (a) to give due course to the petition; (b) to treat the petition for review as a special civil action; (c) to consider the comment as answer; and (d) to require both parties to submit simultaneous memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice. Thereafter, this case was declared submitted for decision on March 31, 1976 (Rollo, p. 118). The crucial issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the amount termed as special payment can be considered as payment for compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The law to be applied in this case is the Workmen's Compensation Act following the principle that in Workmen's Compensation cases the governing law is to be determined by the date on which the claimant contracted his illness (Cepeda v. Bacolod, 135 SCRA 505). Since claimant's illness commenced in 1969, the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act should apply. At the time of his separation from the service, private respondent was paid the sum of P15,889.00. Petitioner alleges the amount represents private respondent's retirement benefits as well as a special payment covering P9,762.35 of the P15,889.00 (Petition, Rollo, p. 12).<äre||anº•1àw> In the assailed decision of respondent Commission, petitioner was required to pay compensation benefits to private respondent in the amount of P6,000.00. To this, petitioner takes exception on the argument that private respondent has already received the same under the category of "special payment" (12th line, Rollo, p. 13).

This, however, is hardly convincing. The records disclose that the payment of P15,889.00 is evidenced by two separate documents: Exhibit " 1 " entitled "Release" for P10,389.87 and Exhibit "l-A" entitled "Supplementary Release" for P5,500.00. Exhibit "1" specifies that it is a payment for private respondent's retirement gratuity while Exhibit "1-A" states it is for "special payment" (Rollo, pp. 87-88).

Retirement gratuity and disability compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, are indeed different benefits. Precisely, they were segregated in the 'Release', executed by respondent Herminio de la Rosa. He received both benefits totalling P15,889.00 although the retirement gratuity was specified in the 'Release,' the compensation benefits were merely denominated 'special payment.' But that did not change the nature of such payment. It was a payment of disability benefit under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended. (Rollo, p. 13).

Very significant is the fact that in the Release Document executed by private respondent, the retirement gratuity was clearly and definitely categorized while the alleged compensation benefits were vaguely called "special payment." The term is so broad and general it could encompass any or all liability the petitioner would be subjected to pay.

As correctly pointed out by respondent Commission, "the payment made by respondent entitled 'special payment' does not refer to disability benefits for if it did, it would have been definitely stated" (WCC Decision, Rollo, p. 34). This opinion is in accord with the ruling of this Court in the case of Limos v. Fernandez Hermanos, Inc. (84 SCRA 646, 652) which states:

We agree with referee Sagun that the aforesaid document which We quoted earlier, is worded 'in broad terms,' from which We deduce that the P15,000.00 paid to Mariano Limos was given as separation pay or in the form of gratuity for his twenty years of faithful service. In fact, respondent employer offered as its Exh. 3, a letter of petitioner wherein the P15,000.00 paid to him was mentioned as a 'retirement pay' (See p. 28, Ibid.).<äre||anº•1àw> The document 'Release of claim' did not expressly include compensation for any illness petitioner may have contracted in the course of employment and the disability arising therefrom; in the absence of such a provision, the employer cannot now evade liability for compensation due to the employee under the Workmen's Compensation Act which was the law in force at the time.

In its effort to avoid liability, petitioner relied heavily on the "release" document signed by private respondent releasing it from all claims including that under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It insists there is nothing illegal or objectionable in any of the provisions of its Retirement Gratuity Scheme nor in the Release because it did not exempt the petitioner from liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, neither did it lessen such liability (Petition, Rollo, p. 13).

Petitioner's view is untenable.

Section 7 of Act No. 3428, as amended, (otherwise known as the Workmen's Compensation Act) expressly condemns such contracts like "Document of Full Satisfaction" (Centeno v. WCC, 72 SCRA 115 [1976]), or "Release" (Phil. International Shipping Corp. vs. NLRC, 136 SCRA 605 [1985]), or "Release of Claim" (Limos v. Fernandez Hermanos, Inc., 84 SCRA 646 [1978]). The law provides:

Sec. 7. Contract prohibited. — Any contract, regulation, or device of any sort intended to exempt the employer from all or part of the liability created by this Act shall be null and void.

Thus, petitioner, having failed to prove that private respondent was paid the compensation benefits as mandated by WCA, it should be held liable therefor, the Release document executed by private respondent being null and void.

The case of Koppel (Phil.) Inc. v. Javellana (13 SCRA 677) cited by petitioner to support its argument is inapplicable in this case. In the cited case, the agreement is clear that "with respect to any workmen's compensation to which employee may be entitled and in the event that the Workmen's Compensation Commission awards employee an amount greater than P1,237.50, the said sum of P1,237.50 shall be considered an advance against the amount so awarded to employee." In the case at bar, the amount denominated as special payment did not definitely state what it was for. Considering the rule that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a social legislation designed to give relief to the working man (Vda. de Galang v. WCC, 76 SCRA 153) every possible interpretation that would uplift the already unfortunate condition of the working masses should be favored.

Also of equal significance is the fact that private respondent was involuntary separated from the service. It does not appear from the records that he was paid his separation pay pursuant to the separation pay law which leads to the logical conclusion drawn by the respondent Commission that the special payment stands aptly more as a consideration for his involuntary separation.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 89217 September 4, 1991JUANITA NITURA, petitioner, vs.

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EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (PHILIPPINE ARMY), respondents. Public Attorney's Office for petitioner. Jose T. Apolo and Cesar R. Vidal for G.S.I.S

PARAS, J.:pThis is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as ECC for brevity) dated May 24, 1989 in ECC Case No. 3470 entitled "Juanita Nitura, Appellant, vs. Government Service Insurance System (Philippine Army), Respondent", which affirmed the denial by the Government Service Insurance System (hereinafter referred to as GSIS for brevity) of the claim of herein petitioner Juanita Nitura for the benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, on account of the death of her son, Pfc. Regino S. Nitura.

The facts of the case are as follows:

The deceased Pfc. Regino S. Nitura, 681349 PA, started his military service on October 5, 1978 when he was caged for military training in the Philippine Army. At the time of his death on March 3, 1986, he was assigned to the "D" Coy 44th Inf. Bn., lst Inf. (TABAK) Division, stationed at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte.

In the evening of March 2, 1986, he was instructed to go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City, which is more or less one (1) kilometer from the Command Post of his Company, to check on several personnel of the Command who were then attending a dance party. This instruction was attested to by his Battalion Commander, Col. Loreto M. Deus, 0-90573 Inf. (GSC) PA in his affidavit dated July 8, 1986 (Annex "A" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 15). On his way back to the camp, he passed, crossed and fell from a hanging wooden bridge connects Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City and Barangay Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, his head hitting the stony portion of the ground. His death certificate (Annex 'B" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 16) shows that he died of "cardiorespiratory arrest, shock, traumatic due to hemorrhage, intracranial due to severe concussion of the brain due to accidental fall".

Herein petitioner Juanita Nitura filed a death claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with the GSIS. In a letter dated October 27, 1986 signed by Oscar R. Marcelino, Manager, Employees' Compensation Department (Annex "C" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 17), petitioner's claim was denied on the ground that the condition for compensability, that the injury and the resulting disability or death must be the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, has not been satisfied. Her request for reconsideration was likewise denied on the ground that her son was not at his place of work nor performing his official function as a PA soldier when the accident occurred (Annex "D" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 18).

On July 15, 1987, petitioner's claim was elevated to the respondent ECC for review and docketed as ECC Case No. 3470.

As aforementioned, respondent ECC affirmed the denial of petitioner's claim by the GSIS. Respondent ECC reasoned out that:

The deceased was not at his place of work nor was he performing his official function as member of the Philippine Army when the incident occurred. He was, as appellant admits, coming from a dance party. Despite appellant's contention, recreation is no longer an employee's duty nor is it connected to the performance of an employee's official function. For to rule otherwise, would negate Rule III, Section 1.

Furthermore, even assuming that attending a dance party is still a work-connected activity, we believe that the deceased acted with notorious negligence, for although he was already intoxinated, he still proceeded to attend the dance at a nearby barrio with full knowledge that it would be dangerous to cross the hanging bridge in the dark. (ECC Decision, Rollo, p. 23).

Hence, this petition.

The sole issue in the case at bar is whether or not the death of Pfc. Regino S. Nitura is compensable pursuant to the applicable statutes and regulations.

Respondent ECC avert that it is undisputed that when the incident happened, the late Pfc. Regino S. Nitura had just come from a dance party and was on his way back to the camp. Attending a dance party is not a part of an employee's duty nor is it connected with the performance of his official functions. To rule otherwise would negate the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, that for the injury to be compensable, it must be the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. While his Battalion Commander, Col. Loreto Deus attested to the fact that the deceased was instructed to check on several personnel of the command then attending the dance party, he failed to state in his affidavit the reason why the deceased was given such instruction. This is fatal to petitioner's case as it cannot be determined if the instruction was indeed official and had something to do with his duties as a soldier.

Respondent ECC insisted that even assuming that the deceased was performing his duty when the incident occurred, he was at that time intoxinated and acted with notorious negligence in crossing the bridge. These facts according to the respondent ECC bar petitioner's claim for benefits pursuant to Section 1, Rule IV of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation which provides that:

Section 1. Limitation — No compensation shall be allowed to the employee or his dependents when the injury, sickness, disability or death was occasioned by any of the following:

(1) his intoxication;

(2) his willful attention to injure or kill himself or another;

or

(3) his notorious negligence.

(Memorandum for Public Respondent, Rollo, pp. 107-109).

Public respondent ECC concurs with public respondent GSIS that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment as it happened when the deceased was crossing the bridge after attending a dance party. Although the deceased had been instructed to check on several personnel of the command then attending the party, the incident happened after the same had purportedly been accomplished. The ECC continues — assuming that he was not notoriously negligent in crossing the bridge, still, the same cannot be removed from the prohibitive

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mantle of Section 1, Rule IV of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation which considers the employee's intoxication as a ground for denial of the claim (Memorandum for Respondent GSIS, Rollo, pp. 119-121).

The petition is impressed with merit.

In resolving this issue in a similar case, this Court ruled that the Employees' Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and women in our surety. While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the working man still subsists. As an official agent charged by law to implement social justice guaranteed and affirmed by the Constitution, the ECC should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection with the incident. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of labor." The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (P.D. 626) to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder, which includes protection to employees for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the work premises (Lazo v. ECC, 186 SCRA 574-575 [1990]).

Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation provides that:

Section 1. Grounds — (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work require him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order of the employer.

The concept of a "work place" referred to cannot always be literally applied to a soldier in active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. A soldier must go where his company is stationed (Hinoguin v. ECC, 172 SCRA 350 [1990]). In the case at bar, Pfc. Nitura's station was at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. But then his presence at the site of the accident was with the permission of his superior officer having been directed to go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. In carrying out said directive, he had to pass by the hanging bridge which connects the two places. As held in the Hinoguin case (supra.), a place where soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer.

As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official function at the time of the incident, it has been held that a soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status. Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on an approved vacation leave. Even vacation leaves may, it must be remembered, be pre-terminated by superior orders (Hinoguin v. ECC, supra.). In the instant case, the deceased was neither on vacation leave nor on an overnight pass when the incident occurred. In fact, he was directed by his superior to check on several personnel of the command then attending the dance party, as attested to by his Battalion Commander. Hence, since Pfc. Nitura was not on vacation leave, he did not effectively cease performing "official functions."

More than that, it was correctly pointed out by petitioner Juanita Nitura that the contention of the GSIS and the ECC that the deceased did not sustain the injury while performing the instructions of his superior would put to naught an actual fact-finding and evaluation undertaken by the military that the death of Pfc. Regino S. Nitura was in line of duty. She pointed out that the Line of Duty Board of Officers which convened on March 4, 1986 at the Hqs. 44th W Bn 1st Inf. (TABAK) Division, PA at Anastacio, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte made the following findings:

... a careful analysis of the situation surrounding the death of Pfc. Regino S. Nitura 681349 PA of the Delta Coy 44th Inf. Bn., IID PA proves that he was performing official duties with this unit. (Annex "F" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 24).

Hence, General Orders No. 109 dated November 19, 1986 declared that:

3. Death of Private First Class Regino S. Nitura 681349, Philippine Army of 44th Infantry Batallion, lst Infantry Division, Philippine Army who died on March 3,1986 due to cardiorespiratory arrest at Katipunan, San Jose, Zamboanga del Norte is declared in Line of Duty.

(Annex "G" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 25).

Consequently, Leon O. Ridao Assistant Secretary, Legal Affairs, in his 3rd Indorsement to the Administrator, Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, dated January 26, 1988 (Annex 'H" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 26) ordered the payment of the death gratuity under the provisions of Republic Act NO. 610, as amended, to his rightful heirs, as may be determined by the Claims Division, OTJAG AFP (Memorandum for the Petitioner, Rollo, pp. 9395).

With regard respondents' contention that the claim is precluded by the fact that the deceased was drunk and acted with notorious negligence, it has been held that even if it could be shown that a person drank intoxicating liquor it is incumbent upon the person invoking drunkenness as a defense to show that said person was extremely drunk. This is so because a person may take as much as several bottles of beer or several glasses of hard liquor and still remain sober and unaffected by the alcoholic drink. Thus, intoxication which does not incapacitate the employee from following his occupation is not sufficient to defeat the recovery of compensation, although intoxication may be a contributory cause to his injury. It must be shown that the intoxication was the proximate cause of death or injury and the burden of proof lies on him who raises drunkenness as a defense (Vda. de Yohanan v. Balena and WCC, 78 SCRA 348 [1977]). While it may be admitted that the deceased drank intoxicating liquor at the dance party, respondents ECC and GSIS have not established that the state of drunkenness of the deceased is the proximate cause of his death.

On the other hand, notorious negligence has been defined as something more than mere or simple negligence or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own personal safety. Disobedience to rules, orders, and/or prohibition does not in itself constitute notorious negligence, if no intention can be attributed to the injured to end his life (Luzon Stevedoring Corporation v. WCC, 105

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SCRA 675 [1981] reiterating Paez v. WCC, 7 SCRA 588 [1963]). As stressed by the petitioner, it was not shown that the deceased had any intention to end his life. Crossing a hanging bridge may seem dangerous to an ordinary man but the deceased was a soldier who had been trained and prepared for this kind of work. As explained by his mother, petitioner herein, the deceased had seen the worse and was not afraid or intimidated by the fact that he had to pass through a hanging bridge. Facing danger had become second nature to him (Rollo, pp. 98-99).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED, the decision of respondent ECC dated May 24, 1989 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petitioner and the illegimate minor children of the deceased, namely Regina and Rogian, are AWARDED the full benefits pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46654 August 9, 1988LUPO S. CARBAJAL, petitioner, vs.GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Municipality of San Julian, Eastern Samar), and EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents. Pompeyo V. Tan.

PARAS, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside and annul the decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 0168 dated June 27, 1977, which affirmed the decision of respondent Government Service Insurance System, denying petitioner's claim for benefits under the New Labor Code as amended (P.D. No. 626) for the death of his spouse, Nenita P. Carbajal (Rollo, Annex "A," p. 14).

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

The late Nenita P. Carbajal was employed as Campaign Clerk in the Municipal Treasurer's Office of San Julian, Eastern Samar. On February 2, 1976 while typing tax declarations and making entries in their books, which were her duties aside from campaigning for tax collections, she suffered from bleeding per vaginum due to incomplete abortion. Her hospitalization and treatment at the Bagacay Mines Hospital due to profuse hermorrhage of one month duration secondary to complete abortion and shock were of no avail for on March 8,1976, petitioner's wife died.

On May 12, 1976, he filed his claim for benefits for the death Of his wife with the respondent Government Service Insurance System under P.D. No. 626, as amended.

On June 3, 1976, the Senior Assistant General Manager of the Underwriting and Claims Department of GSIS, Mr. Domingo N. Garcia, denied the petitioner's claim stating that the ailments of his wife were not occupational.

Petitioner requested reconsideration of respondent's adverse ruling. However, his request was also turned down by respondent GSIS reiterating its previous stand that ailment which resulted in his wife's death is not causally related to her duties and conditions of work. From this decision, a petition for review was filed by petitioner before the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC).

On June 27, 1977, the respondent ECC rendered its questioned decision in ECC Case No. 0168 based upon the findings of its Medical Officer, Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica, that there is no proof to establish the compensability of the sickness in relation to claimant's occupation. Neither was there an increased risk arising from the working conditions affirming the GSIS decision denying the claim.

Hence, this petition.

The sole issue raised in the case at bar is the compensability of petitioner's wife's ailments.

Section 1, P.D. No. 626, amending Article 165 of the Labor Code, defines a compensable sickness as "any illness definitely accepted as occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions."

Respondent ECC in its decision denying petitioner's claim, stressed that the causes of abortion are: (1) fetal, as when there is defective development of the fertilized ovum; (2) maternal, as in acute infections, disease, and when the spermatozoa is inadequate to give ovum the necessary generative impulse (Obstetrics, J.P. Greenhill, 12th Edition, 1060).

Respondent ECC asserted that there is absence of any proof that the abortion suffered by petitioner's wife was caused by her employment and that petitioner failed to establish risk of his wife's contracting it was increased by working conditions attendant in her employment.

Petitioner contends that the decision of the ECC overlooked the nature and conditions of employment of his late wife. Petitioner claims that the risk of contracting the disease was aggravated/increased by the working conditions as evidenced by Report of Injury/Sickness/Death, Municipal Mayor Matilda A. Operario of San Julian, Eastern Samar (ECC, Records, p. 11); Medical Certificate of the two attending physicians of the deceased (ECC, Records, Annex "A," p. 15; Annex "B," p. 14); and the affidavit of the Municipal Treasurer of the aforementioned town (ECC, Records, Annex "C," p. 13) which confirmed that the illness was connected with her work as Campaign Clerk in the Municipal Treasurer's Office.

Further, petitioner cites the travels of his wife and the of heavy tax declaration books in connection with her work thereby causing her "two attacks of vaginal bleeding and hypogastric pain."

Claimant's contention is meritorious.

Under Article 1167 (I), Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, a "compensable sickness means (1) any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC; or (2) any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions."

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Records reveal that petitioner's wife while working as Campaign Clerk in the Treasurer's Office of San Julian, Eastern Samar, suffered "two attacks of vaginal bleeding and hypogastric pain" attributing said ailment to the lifting of heavy tax declaration books, due to abortion incomplete.

This opinion of the decedent's physicians is in accord with the findings/analysis of medical authorities which read as follows:

Pregnant women become tired more readily, therefore, the prevention of fatigue must be stressed very emphatically. The body is made up of various types of cells, each type with a specific function. Depletion of nerve-cell energy results in fatigue, and fatigue causes certain reactions in the body that are injurious. (Maternity Nursing 12th Edition, by Fitzpatrick, Reeder and Mastroianni, Jr.).

It is not considered desirable for pregnant women to be employed in the following types of occupation and they should, if possible, be transferred to lighter and more sedentary works:

(a) occupation that involve heavy lifting or other heavy work;

(b) occupation involving continous standing and moving about. (One of the Standards for Maternity Case and Employment of Mothers recommended by the Children's Bureau of the United States). (Rollo, p. 12,).

Moreover, spontaneous abortion may result from the influence of periodicity as the uterine muscle reaches a certain state of detention; or in various accidents as a fall, strain or overmuscular exertion when the uterus reacts and expels its load. (Emphasis supplied; "Anatomy and Allied Sciences for Lawyers, W.F. English, p. 181).

Therefore, the opinion of the ECC Medical Officer (ECC Record, p. 20) that there was no causal relation between the ailment of petitioner's spouse and the nature and/or conditions of his wife's employment cannot overcome the substantial evidence submitted by petitioner (See Calvero v. ECC et al., 117 SCRA 461 [1982], cited in Parages v. ECC, 134 SCRA 73; Ovenson v. ECC, GSIS; G.R. No. 65216, December 1, 1987).

Additionally, medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially when there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection (Delegente v. ECC, 118 SCRA 67; San Valentin v. ECC, 118 SCRA 160 cited in Sarmiento v. ECC, Sept. 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 421).

Thus, in the cases of Mercado, Jr. v. ECC, 139 SCRA 270 and Mora v. ECC and GSIS, G.R. No. 62157, December 1, 1987 citing Cristobal v. ECC, 103 SCRA 329, this Court ruled as follows:

While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation espoused under the Workmen's Compensation Act may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law in general still subsists.

... As agents charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by both 1935 and 1973 Constitutions respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensability specially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection. (Cristobal v. ECC, supra).

Moreover, "this kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.'" (Cristobal v. ECC, supra). The policy is to extend the applicability of the decree to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor (Acosta v. ECC, 109 SCRA 209 cited in Sarmiento v. ECC and GSIS, L-65648, September 24, 1986, 144 SCRA 421).

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of respondent Employees Compensation Commission is hereby SET ASIDE and another rendered ordering respondents to pay herein petitioner the full amount of compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152058 September 27, 2004SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE RAGO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

This is a petition for the review of the decision1 of 18 October 2001 and the resolution of 30 January 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63389 entitled Jose Rago vs. Social Security Commission and Social Security System. The decision reversed the 20 December 2000 Resolution of the Social Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15009-2000 denying respondent Jose Rago’s request to convert his monthly pension from permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. The resolution denied the motion to reconsider the decision.

Private respondent Jose Rago (hereafter Rago) worked as an electrician for Legend Engineering in Basak, Pardo, Cebu City. On 1 December 1993, at about 6:15 p.m., while working on the ceiling of a building, he stepped on a weak ceiling joist. The structure gave way and he crashed into the corridor twelve feet below. The x-rays taken that day revealed that he had a (1) marked compression fracture of L1 vertebra without signs of dislocation and bone destruction; and (2) slight kyphosis at the level of L1 vertebrae, with the alignment of the spine still normal.2 He was confined at the Perpetual Succour Hospital in Cebu City for twenty-four (24) days from 1 December 1993 to 24 December 1993,3 and, thereafter, he was confined in his home from 25 December 1993 to 25 August 1994.4

On 20 May 1994, Rago filed a claim for permanent partial disability with the Cebu City office of the Social Security System (SSS). Since he had only 35 monthly contributions, he was granted only a lump sum benefit.5 He made additional premium contributions on 6 November 1995, and sought the adjustment of his approved partial disability benefits from lump sum to monthly payments. The adjustment was resolved in his favor on 18 October 1995.6

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On 9 November 1995, Rago filed a claim for Employee’s Compensation (EC) sickness benefit, which was supported by an x-ray report dated 1 December 1993. This was approved for a maximum of 120 days to cover the period of illness from 1 December 1993 to 30 March 1994.

On 7 June 1996, Rago filed another claim to convert his SSS disability to EC disability. Again, it was resolved in his favor on 14 June 1996.7

Two years later, on 16 June 1998, Rago claimed for the extension of his EC partial disability. A rating of 50% OB (of the body) was granted corresponding to the maximum benefit allowed under the Manual on Ratings of Physical Impairment.8

Thereafter, Rago filed several requests for the adjustment of his partial disability to total disability. This time, his requests were denied by the Cebu City office of the SSS in its letters of 11 April 1999, 10 September 1999, 28 September 1999, 4 April 2000, and 17 April 2000. The denial was based on the medical findings of the Cebu City office that he was not totally prevented from engaging in any gainful occupation.9

Undaunted, on 3 April 2000, Rago filed with the petitioner Social Security Commission (SSC) a petition for total permanent disability benefits based on the following grounds:

1. his convalescence period from the time of his hospital confinement to home confinement totaled 268 days and under SSS guidelines, if the injury persisted for more than 240 days, the injury would be considered as a permanent total disability;

2. his x-ray results showed a deterioration of his condition without any visible improvement on the disabilities resulting from the accident; and

3. he had lost his original capacity to work as an electrician and has been unemployed since the accident.

The petition was docketed as SSC Case No. 4-15009-2000.10

In its position paper dated 24 August 2000, the SSS argued that Rago had already been granted the maximum partial disability benefits. The physical examination conducted by the Cebu City office of the SSS showed that he was more than capable of physically engaging in any gainful occupation and that there was no manifestation of progression of illness. Thus, the SSS recommended the denial of Rago’s petition.11

In a resolution dated 20 December 2000, the SSC denied Rago’s petition for lack of merit. The SSC ruled that he was not entitled to permanent partial disability more than what was already granted, more so to permanent total disability benefits since he was already granted the maximum allowable benefit for his injury.12

Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Rago appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review and reiterating his claim for permanent disability benefits under Section 13-A (g) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 8282.13 The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63389.

In its decision of 18 October 2001, the Court of Appeals reversed the SSC’s resolution, and decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Social Security Commission is hereby reversed and set aside. Petitioner’s plea for conversion of his disability status from permanent partial to permanent total is granted. The SSS is hereby directed to pay him the necessary compensation benefits in accordance with the proper computation.

The SSS seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the Court of Appeals should have considered an order issued by the SSC dated 11 July 2001 which affirmed, but clarified, its 20 December 2000 Resolution under appeal. The SSS then referred to the findings and conclusions of the SSC in said 11 July 2001 order, which emphasized that: (1) Rago failed to file a motion for reconsideration with the SSC, which is mandatory, before filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals; (2) the manual verification of the monthly contributions of Rago revealed that he had only 35 contributions and not 59; and (3) thus, whether or not the sickness or disability of Rago had showed signs of progression, a conversion of the same from permanent partial disability to permanent total disability could not be granted. This is because Rago lacked the required number of contributions mentioned in Section 13-A (a) of R.A. 1161, as amended, which reads:

SEC. 13-A. Permanent disability benefits. – (a) Upon the permanent total disability of a member who has paid at least thirty-six (36) monthly contributions prior to the semester of disability, he shall be entitled to the monthly pension: Provided, That if he has not paid the required thirty-six (36) monthly contributions, he shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the monthly pension times the number of monthly contributions paid to the SSS or twelve (12) times the monthly pension, whichever is higher. A member who (1) has received a lump sum benefit and (2) is re-employed or has resumed self-employment or has resumed self-employment not earlier than one (1) year from the date of his disability shall again be subject to compulsory coverage and shall be considered a new member.

With that, the SSC ordered the SSS to re-compute the lump sum benefit due Rago and his EC benefit on the basis of the actual monthly contributions remitted in his behalf and to collect all excess payments made to him.14

In its resolution of 30 January 2002, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. It explained the denial in this wise:

At the outset, the Court strikes down the Commission’s July 11, 2001 clarificatory order as an exercise of grave abuse of authority amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction. The said Order was issued at a time when the Commission itself was knowledgeable of the petition for review pending before this Court. …It must be pointed out that when petitioner timely filed his petition for review, [the] appeal from the Commission’s resolution had thus become perfected, and it is this Court which therefore had jurisdiction over the matter, and sole authority to make any affirmation or modification of the assailed resolution. Once appeal is perfected, the lower tribunal loses its jurisdiction over the case, in favor of the appellate tribunal. The Court deems it the height of injustice for the Commission to add to and bolster its final ruling with additional observations and justifications, not otherwise embodied in the original ruling, after the losing claimant had already perfected and was actively pursuing his appeal. It behooves upon the Commission, therefore, to refrain from making any substantial addition, or modification of its assailed ruling, such authority in law, now having been transferred to this Court. What prompted the Social Security Commission to issue its clarificatory order is not made clear in its motion for reconsideration, nor in the clarificatory order itself. In any case, any modification of the tenor and justification of the assailed resolution of the Commission by the same body effectively altered the tenor of the earlier ruling, amounting to a violation of the petitioner’s right to due process and fair play, and, therefore, null and void.

Moreover, the specific arguments raised by the Commission are not convincing to encourage a reversal of our earlier decision.

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To be sure, the alleged failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the Commission’s December 20, 2000 resolution is not a fatal mistake, it appearing that the same was in clear violation of the petitioner’s rights and claims, as a member of the Social Security System. It is the established rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with when the assailed ruling is a patent nullity. Furthermore, the fact that the petitioner as credited by SSS monthly contributions short to entitle him to be qualified for permanent total disability benefits appear to be largely due to the SSS’ and its branches’ failure to accurately account the petitioner’s total payments, and not on the petitioner’s or his employers’ failure to do so. The same July 11, 2001 Order shows that the SSS Cotabato City Branch and the SSS Davao Hub Branch Office were unable to account for the complete contributions of the petitioner while he was employed by the San Miguel Corporation.15

Thus, in their petition in the case at bar, the SSS and the SSC pray to set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision of 18 October 2001 and resolution of 30 January 2002 and to remand the case to the SSC for further proceedings.16

In support of their prayer, the petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the established jurisprudence that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a petition for review to enable the tribunal, board or office concerned to pass upon and correct its mistakes without the intervention of the higher court. Failure to do so is a fatal procedural defect.17

The petitioners likewise argue that they had not violated Rago’s rights; hence, his case does not fall within the purview of Arroyo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal18 where we held that a prior motion for reconsideration could be dispensed with if fundamental rights to due process were violated.

Additionally, the petitioners contend that the SSC’s 11 July 2001 clarificatory order was issued to rectify its perceived error in the 20 January 2000 resolution relative to the number of Rago’s contributions which directly affected the computation of his disability benefits. Petitioners further maintain that the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the x-ray reports which contained no statement that Rago could no longer work. However, a certain Alvin C. Cabreros attested in an affidavit that Rago went out "disco[e]ing" after the accident, for which reason, Rago is not totally helpless as he portrayed himself to be.

On 20 March 2003, we received a handwritten letter from Rago informing us that his lawyer had withdrawn from the case and of his difficulty in securing a new counsel. After naming Attys. Pedro Rosito, Arturo Fernan or Fritz Quiñanola of the IBP Cebu City at Capitol Compound as his "informal lawyers," he asked us to consider, in lieu of his Comment, an attached copy of the opposition to the motion for reconsideration he filed with the Court of Appeals. In said pleading, Rago argued that the word "may" as used in the provision concerning the filing of a motion for reconsideration in the SSC’s 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure is not mandatory but merely permissive. He also agreed with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that a very strict interpretation of procedural rules would defeat the constitutional mandate on social justice.

We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their Memoranda, which they did.

We shall first dispose of the procedural issue of prematurity raised by petitioners which is Rago’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration. Section 5, Rule VI of the SSC’s 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure provides:

The party aggrieved by the order, resolution, award or decision of the Commission may file a motion for reconsideration thereof within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the same. Only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed any party.

The filing of the motion for reconsideration shall interrupt the running of the period to appeal, unless said motion is pro forma.

The ordinary acceptations of the terms "may" and "shall" may be resorted to as guides in ascertaining the mandatory or directory character of statutory provisions. As regards adjective rules in general, the term "may" is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion, while the word "shall" is imperative and operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.19 However, these are not absolute and inflexible criteria in the vast areas of law and equity. Depending upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other, the convertibility of said terms either as mandatory or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory construction.20

Conformably therewith, we have consistently held that the term "may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise.21 If he chooses to exercise the right, he must comply with the conditions attached thereto.22

Applying these guidelines, we can construe Section 5, Rule VI as granting Rago, or any member of the System aggrieved by the SSC’s resolution, the option of filing a motion for reconsideration which he may or may not exercise. Should he choose to do so, he is allowed to file only one motion for reconsideration within fifteen days from the promulgation of the questioned resolution.

This is as far as we go in construing the provision in isolation because a second procedural rule now comes into play: the requirements for appeals filed against the rulings of quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.

Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC rules provides:

[A]ny order, resolution, award or decision of the Commission, in the absence of an appeal therefrom as herein provides, shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the date of notification to the parties, and judicial review thereof shall be permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted his remedies before the Commission….

It now becomes apparent that the permissive nature of a motion for reconsideration with the SSC must be read in conjunction with the requirements for judicial review, or the conditions sine qua non before a party can institute certain civil actions. A combined reading of Section 5 of Rule VI, quoted earlier, and Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC’s 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure reveals that the petitioners are correct in asserting that a motion for reconsideration is mandatory in the sense that it is a precondition to the institution of an appeal or a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. Stated differently, while Rago certainly had the option to file a motion for reconsideration before the SSC, it was nevertheless mandatory that he do so if he wanted to subsequently avail of judicial remedies.

This rule is explicit in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Sec. 1. Scope – This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the…Social Security Commission….

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Sec. 4. Period of appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed.

The policy of judicial bodies to give quasi-judicial agencies, such as the SSC, an opportunity to correct its mistakes by way of motions for reconsideration or other statutory remedies before accepting appeals therefrom finds extensive doctrinal support in the well-entrenched principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The reason for the principle rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly.23 The principle insures orderly procedure and withholds judicial interference until the administrative process would have been allowed to duly run its course. This is but practical since availing of administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.24 Even comity dictates that unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and appropriate authorities given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum, judicial recourse must be held to be inappropriate, impermissible,25 premature, and even unnecessary.26

However, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule. It may be disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,27 (12) when no administrative review is provided by law, (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.28

Fortunately for Rago, his case falls within some of these exceptions as discussed below.

Petitioners’ attempts to distinguish Arroyo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal29 from this case is misplaced. The ground relied upon by the Court of Appeals for exempting this case from exhaustion of administrative remedies was not the denial of due process but of the patent nullity of the SSC decision in question.

It is true that Rago disregarded procedural and curative rules in taking immediate recourse to the appellate court. The Court of Appeals similarly erred in taking cognizance of Rago’s appeal. We likewise do not subscribe to issuing rulings or decisions that do not acknowledge or give reason for the disregard of the procedural defect of the petition, especially when it was specifically raised as an issue in respondent’s answer.30

Nevertheless, to require Rago to comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies at this stage of the proceedings would be unreasonable, unjust and inequitable. It would prolong needlessly and uselessly the resolution of his claim.

Petitioners SSS and SSC have consistently shown their obstinacy in their stand to deny Rago’s request to convert his permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. The SSC’s reliance on the SSS recommendations, which did not consider other evidence of the illness’ progression and its disregard of long-standing jurisprudence, made for the patent nullity of the SSC decision. The error was made more blatant when, in the SSC’s clarificatory order, it classified the disability based on the amount of contributions Rago had paid.31

To give the SSC another chance to rectify its error in accordance with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies would inevitably result in the same inflexible stance in defense of its error. We say another chance because we can consider the SSC’s clarificatory order as in the nature of a judgment on Rago’s motion for reconsideration as if he had filed one. Otherwise, to admit the misnamed order which was issued when the SSC no longer had jurisdiction over the case, and which modified and altered the contents and tenor of its original resolution, would have amounted to a violation of Rago’s right to due process. To this extent we give imprimatur to the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, and uphold its factual determination that Rago is entitled to the conversion of his permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. Thus:

There is merit in the petition. Evidently clear from the recitals of the assailed decision some indicia of petitioner’s state of permanent total disability. To emphasize, he was granted sickness benefit for a maximum period of 120 days from December 1, 1993 to March 30, 1994. Then he was awarded lump sum permanent partial disability benefits paid on June 15, 1994, which was then adjusted on October 18, 1995 to monthly pension benefit covering the period of 30 months from May 20, 1994 to October 1996. More, the permanent partial disability benefit was extended for another eight (8) months from July 3, 1998 to February 1999, all in all covering a period of 38 months. If temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days is deemed total and permanent, it is not therefore amiss to consider the payment of permanent partial disability benefits for 38 months as recognition of permanent total disability. Award of permanent partial disability benefits for 19 months was considered by the Supreme Court as an acknowledgment that the awardee was suffering from permanent total disability. (Diopenes vs. GSIS (205 SCRA 331[1992]).

x x x

The test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. (IJARES v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 141 [1999]). The cited radiologic report under date of February 26, 1999 is demonstrative of the fact that petitioner is still in a state which at the time of the taking deters him from performing his job or any such related function. It is evident that the pain caused to petitioner by his injuries still persists even after more than 5 years when the accident occurred on December 1, 1993. The disability caused thereby which had earlier been diagnosed as permanent partial had possibly became permanent total. (GSIS vs. CA 260 SCRA 133, [1996]). Also in the case of Tria vs. ECC, (supra) – a disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury, the employee is not able to perform any gainful occupation for a period exceeding 120 days.

Moreover, prior payment of compensation benefits for permanent partial disability may not foreclose his right to compensation benefits for permanent total disability. Otherwise, the social justice policy underlying the enactment of labor laws would lose its meaning.

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Caution should be taken against a too strict interpretation of the rules lest the constitutional mandate of social justice policy calls for a liberal and sympathetic approval of the pleas of disabled employees like herein petitioner. Compassion for him is not a dole out. It is a right. (GSIS vs. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 430 [1998]).32

The Court of Appeals correctly observed that Rago’s injury made him unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days. The SSS had granted Rago sickness benefit for 120 days and, thereafter, permanent partial disability for 38 months. Such grant is an apparent recognition by the SSS that his injury is permanent and total as we have pronounced in several cases.33 This is in conformity with Section 2 (b), Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation which defines a disability to be total and permanent if, as a result of the injury or sickness, the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, and Section 1, b (1) of Rule XI of the same Amended Rules which provides that a temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days, shall be considered permanent.

In Vicente vs. Employees Compensation Commission,34 we laid down the litmus test and distinction between Permanent Total Disability and Permanent Partial Disability, to wit:

[W]hile ‘permanent total disability’ invariably results in an employee’s loss of work or inability to perform his usual work, ‘permanent partial disability,’ on the other hand, occurs when an employee loses the use of any particular anatomical part of his body which disables him to continue with his former work. Stated otherwise, the test of whether or not an employee suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which, in a more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability), then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.

We further reiterate that disability should be understood less on its medical significance than on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness.35 Moreover, a person’s disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause.36

With this, petitioners’ additional arguments that the x-ray reports lacked a physician’s finding that Rago could no longer work and that Mr. Cabrero’s affidavit attested to the contrary lose persuasive worth. X-ray reports and its confirmation by a physician are simply appraised for their evidentiary value and are not considered as indispensable prerequisites to compensation.37 Even then, the three x-ray reports submitted by Rago clearly show the degenerative condition of his injury, viz.

(a) Radiology report stated 1 December 1993 revealed "Mark compression fracture o L1 vertebra without signs of dislocation and bone destruction and slight kyphosis at the level of L1 vertebra but the alignment of the spine is normal";

(b) Radiology report dated 4 may 1994 showed that "consistent with compression fracture with mild posterior dislocation of the L1"; and

(c) Radiology report dated 26 February 1999 showed anterior wedging or compression fracture of L1 with gibbus deformity and thoraco-lumber junction and suggested lumbo-sacral AP for further study. [emphasis supplied]

Clearly, Rago is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

One final note. Although the SSS and the SSC should be commended for their vigilance against unjustified claims that will deplete the funds intended to be disbursed for the benefit only of deserving disabled employees, they should be cautioned against a very strict interpretation of the rules lest it results in the withholding of full assistance from those whose capabilities have been diminished, if not completely impaired, as a consequence of their dedicated service. A humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution under its social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to the legitimate appeals of disabled workers like Rago. Compassion for them is not a dole out but a right.38

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 October 2001 and its resolution of 30 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63389 reversing the Social Security Commission’s Resolution of 20 December 2000 in SSC Case No. 4-15009-2000 are hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 83568 July 18, 1991PROSPERO NAVAL, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.Elpidio M. Borja for petitioner.The Government Corporate Counsel for respondent GSIS.

PADILLA, J.:p

In this petition for review, petitioner seeks the reversal and annulment of the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (Commission for brevity), dated 10 May 1988, 1 denying permanent total disability benefits to petitioner.

The facts, as culled from the decision of the respondent Commission, are as follows:

Petitioner, Prospero Naval, started his government service on 1 July 1950 when he was appointed Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Camarines Sur. Five (5) years later, he transferred to the ACCFA, Naga City, where he held the position of Audit Examiner until 5 February 1962 when he transferred to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Naga Branch, where he started as a clerk-typist. He served the DBP for nineteen (19) years, earning for himself several promotions, from bookkeeper to Financial Planning Supervisor, Accountant and finally as Chief of the Planning Staff. He was holding the last mentioned position at the time of his retirement on 31 December 1985.

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His medical records show that as early as 1977, Prospero Naval was already suffering from bronchiectasis, emphysema and hypertension. On 24 June 1985, he was hospitalized in the Mother Seton Hospital upon a complaint of "on and off" difficulty of breathing, easy fatigue and cough associated with weight loss, under the management of a certain Dr. Ruben Chavez. His condition did not improve compelling him to retire at the early age of fifty-five (55).

On account of his disability, Naval filed a claim for compensation benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Acting on the claim, the GSIS awarded the petitioner permanent partial disability benefits for eight (8) months starting on 1 January 1986 on account of his essential hypertension. Petitioner's other ailments, bronchiectasis and emphysema, were not considered work-connected, hence, were held not compensable. Petitioner requested for a reconsideration of the System's decision awarding only permanent partial disability benefits. He insisted in his claim that he is entitled to permanent total disability benefits, considering that he was evaluated to be under permanent and total disability for the purpose of retirement by the GSIS itself. The request for reconsideration was not given due course by the GSIS, hence, petitioner appealed to the respondent Commission. His appeal before the Commission was dismissed; hence, the present petition for review.

In resolving the appeal, respondent Commission, considered only essential hypertension suffered by petitioner as work-connected. It held that the other ailments, namely bronchiectasis and emphysema, were not the result of petitioner's employment but were largely attributable to cigarette-smoking by petitioner as medically determined by the GSIS. Referring to petitioner's medical records, respondent Commission declared that his permanent total disability may have been brought about by these two (2) non-work related illnesses, for which reason he is not entitled to the claimed benefits. According to respondent Commission, Article 166 of PD 442 provides for compensation only for work-connected disability or death. In the present case, the Commission held that petitioner was properly compensated for his work-related ailment, namely, essential hypertension.

Petitioner submits that even if bronchiectasis and emphysema were not considered work-connected, yet he was found to be suffering from Essential Hypertension by the GSIS itself when it acted favorably on his disability claim on 4 June 1986. Hence, he maintains that he is entitled to a lifetime of monthly income benefits as provided in Article 192 of the Labor Code. 2 A year after June 1986, he said he was again examined and found by a cardiologist of the Philippine Heart Center for Asia, Dr. Esperanza Icasas Cabral, to be suffering from bronchiectasis, emphysema and hypertension. The same doctor certified that his disability is considered permanent and total. 3

On the other hand, the Solicitor General counters that petitioner was awarded, on account of his essential hypertension, partial disability benefits for eight (8) months starting on 1 January 1986, which is considered the maximum benefit allowed under P.D. 626 for said disease, and that the denial of his claim for permanent total disability benefits was based on the finding of the Chief Medical Examiner of the GSIS that bronchiectasis and emphysema were causes of his permanent total disability. These ailments, the Solicitor General points out, were found by both the GSIS and the Commission to be due to petitioner's chronic cigarette-smoking and were not work-connected.

Both the GSIS and the Commission maintain that petitioner failed to present evidence to prove that it was hypertension, and not the non-work-related illnesses of bronchiectasis and emphysema, which caused his permanent total disability. Since under the Labor Code, the burden is on the petitioner to prove that it was his newly-acquired hypertension, and not his more advanced but non-work-related illnesses of bronchiectasis and emphysema, which caused his permanent total disability, petitioner's failure to overcome said burden of proof calls for a dismissal of this petition.

The main issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not respondent Commission erred in affirming the decision of the GSIS which denied total permanent disability benefits to petitioner.

In denying petitioner total permanent disability benefits, respondent Commission relied on the finding that petitioner's bronchiectasis and emphysema were not work-related but the result of chronic cigarette-smoking as determined by the Chief Medical Examiner of the GSIS. Since said ailments were not work-related, the Commission denied compensation for permanent total disability, pursuant to Article 166 of PD 442 (Labor Code), as amended. 4 However, the Commission concurred with the GSIS that essential hypertension, of which petitioner was also suffering, was compensable. He was thus granted permanent partial disability benefits for eight (8) months starting 1 January 1985, which benefits petitioner actually received.

The new Labor Code has abolished the presumption of compensability for illnesses contracted by a worker during employment. 5 Indeed, to be entitled to disability benefits, petitioner had to present evidence to prove that his ailments, bronchiectasis, emphysema and hypertension, were the results of, or the risk of contracting the same were aggravated by, working conditions or the nature of his work. Unfortunately, except for a sweeping statement that his "long years of service in the government exposed him to dust and the elements and to viruses, mycoplasmas and bacteria," petitioner failed to prove that bronchiectasis and emphysema were work-related. Besides, these two (2) ailments, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, are not listed as occupational diseases in the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.

Sensing that his argument to justify compensability for his lung ailments was unconvincing, it is then urged by petitioner that the said lung ailments were not really the causes of his permanent total disability but hypertension. 6 He alleges that after his medical treatment of these two (2) ailments, bronchiectasis and emphysema, he was still able to work efficiently for six (6) years and earned two (2) promotions, namely, Chief, Planning Staff (1983) and Chief, Collection and Acquired Assets Division which position he was holding when he was forced to retire on 31 December 1985. According to petitioner, the duties and functions of these last two (2) positions held by him were the causes of his hypertension which rendered him permanently and totally disabled.

The records do not support the aforesaid argument of petitioner. It is apparent from the evidence he presented, i.e., the medical certificate of Dr. Esperanza Icasas-Cabral and the Action on Disability Claim, that his lung ailments were always mentioned together with essential hypertension. In fact, as observed by public respondent, petitioner's lung diseases are mentioned or listed first, thereby indicating that the said lung diseases are the primary causes of petitioner's claimed permanent and total disability. As for essential hypertension —

The term essential hypertension has been employed to indicate those cases of hypertension for which a specific endocrine or renal basis cannot be found, and in which the neural element may be only a mediator of other influences. Since even this latter relationship is not entirely clear, it is more properly listed for the moment in the category of unknown etiology. The term essential hypertension defines simply by failing to define; hence it is of limited use except as an expression of our inability to understand adequately the forces at work. 7

Simply put, the term essential hypertension is commonly used to describe a rise in the blood pressure of an individual when no specific factor is attributed to its development.

We do not believe that essential hypertension alone caused petitioner's total and permanent disability. As abovestated, bronchiectasis and emphysema were found by the GSIS Medical Director to have been caused by petitioner's chronic cigarette-smoking. These ailments, together

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with essential hypertension, contributed to his weakened bodily condition. Petitioner himself admits that after he was treated of these two (2) ailments, i.e., bronchiectasis and emphysema, his health did not improve and was, in fact, aggravated by the development of essential hypertension as the years passed. 8 The nature and condition of this work cannot be said to have caused or contributed to his hypertension. The positions he held prior to his retirement did not entail stressful activity. They were "desk jobs." As a division chief, he was not exposed to the elements or exerted physical strain such as driving a taxicab (Abana vs. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1278); or like a school teacher whose strenuous work of teaching school children of tender age or assignment to barrios for community work therein contributed to or aggravated his ailments (De Castro vs. Republic, 75 SCRA 372). While ample jurisprudence has indeed established that where an illness or disease intervened or was contracted by the employee in the course of his employment, said employee is entitled to disability compensation, yet, said decisions were promulgated under the former Workmen's Compensation Act where the presumption of compensability was the rule. Under the Labor Code, petitioner has the burden of proving that his illness is work-related and hence compensable. We agree with the counsel for respondent GSIS that no evidence was adduced by petitioner to show that he would still be permanently and totally disabled even in the absence of his non-work connected lung ailments of emphysema and bronchiectasis.

The respondent Employees' Compensation Commission, therefore, did not err in affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission denying petitioner's claim for permanent total disability benefits, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 87590 November 12, 1991PURIFICACION R. QUIZON, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, and PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE, respondents.Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

Petitioner, mother of Rolando R. Quizon, a Technical Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force, seeks a reversal of the Decision 1 of 23 November 1988 of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying her claim for death benefits arising out of the death of Rolando due to the absence of conclusive proof that he died of cardio-pulmonary arrest secondary to cerebro-vascular accident.

The factual and procedural antecedents in this case are as follows:

Rolando Quizon joined the Philippine Air Force on 30 June 1967. He was assigned to the Southern Command in Zamboanga City. On 15 December 1981, he was promoted to the rank of Technical Sergeant and held such position until his demise on 17 July 1986. He had been on continuous active duty since his enlistment Medical records show that on 15 July 1986 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, due to his inability to speak, stand up or walk, Rolando was brought by his fellow soldiers to the Regional Unified Command General Hospital in Camp Navarro, Zamboanga City. As shown in the Clinical History prepared by the Medical Officer thereat, Maj. Jose del Rosario, dated 23 July 1986, the following were the findings made, the medicines given, and the course taken at the ward until Rolando died on 17 July 1986:

This is a case of Tsgt. Rolando R. Quizon who was brought in at this hospital by his fellow soldiers on 15 July 1986 at 2100H because of inability to talk, walk or stand up after they allegedly claimed the patient had been drinking the night prior to this confinement.

On P.E. the patient is semi-unconscious with a blood pressure of 110/70mm Hq EENT, pupils readed (sic) to light normally, not dilated nor (sic) constricted. Heart is normal GUT-there is involuntary micturition Reflexes Knee jerk absent. Plantan or Babinoks reflex is hyperactive in both.

Medicines given or ordered: D5LR, Bemtex-CO2 inhalation and a close observation was done. An indwelling catheter retained. On 16th July 1986 Pen G. Sodium 3,000,000 "U" was started of 6 hrs I-V-T.T. ANST. Anaroxyl and Bipyrine in action were also administered, Constant follow-up of I-V-Fs using Normosol -M Suction of throat and oral secretion was done. CBC & Urinalysis were ordered.

Course in the Ward: On 17th July 1986 at 0830H the patient developed severe coma with no urine out put a (sic) anymore. Pupils appears (sic) dilated with a blood pressure of 120/80 mm Hq. At 1420H there was no respiration nor (sic) cardiac sounds whatsoever, there was complete uremia.

At 1440H a Cardio pulmonary resuscitation was done with the following findings:

BP/0/0 mm Hq

C R-Absent

Pupils dilated

Nailbeds Cyanotic

Pronounced Death: Cardio

Pulmonary/Arrest secondary to

cerebro-Vascular Accident. 2

As stated in said history, the cause of death is cardio-pulmonary arrest secondary to cerebro-vascular accident.

Petitioner filed a claim for payment of benefits with the GSIS. 3 At the back of the claim, Maj. del Rosario wrote in his own hand the clinical history, and on the space for diagnosis, he made the following entry: Cardio-Pulmonary arrest secondary to cerebro-vascular (CVA) accident. 4

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In a Summary of Finding and Recommendation evaluated and reviewed on 21 October 1986, the Medical Services Center of the GSIS denied due course to the claim "since there is no conclusive proof that the claimant died of above illness," and that "there was not (sic) ecg done to the claimant while he was still alive. There was no history of hypertension, or any record of treatment or by hospitalization for hypertension." 5 The "above illness" referred to is cardio-pulmonary arrest secondary to CVA.

Petitioner appealed this denial to the ECC. In its decision of 23 November 1988, 6 ECC sustained the GSIS, holding:

We scrutinized the records of this case and uphold the respondent's denial decision. It is very clear that appellant was apparently well as the records show that there was no history that he was treated or hospitalized for hypertension, and no ECG was done to prove the existence of a heart disease, hypertension or CVA, during his stint as serviceman of the Philippine Air Force. Without these proofs, this claim cannot be given due course. The information given by his fellow soldiers that the deceased has (sic) been drinking alcoholic drinks the night before his confinement, led us to conclude that the excessive intake of alcohol had aggravated the death of the former soldier. This claim therefore, does not fall within the purview of P.D. 626, as amended.

IN VIEW THEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and this instant case is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition for review raising this lone issue:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT(S) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THIS CLAIM DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF P.D. 626, AS AMENDED. 7

Petitioner argues that respondents' ruling to the effect that there was no substantial proof that Rolando died of cerebro-vascular accident, an illness included in the List of Occupational Diseases and thus compensable, is not supported by the records of this case, On the contrary, the Clinical History issued by the attending government physician of the hospital where Rolando was confined and later died, categorically stated that the cause of death was cardio-pulmonary arrest secondary to cerebro-vascular accident.

Petitioner further contends that respondents' conclusion that Rolando's death was aggravated by excessive intake of alcoholic drinks the night prior to his confinement is not supported by evidence. The Clinical History prepared by Maj. del Rosario makes no observation that Rolando was indeed drunk. It does not indicate the percentage of alcohol in the deceased's body to determine whether or not he was intoxicated. Respondents' only basis for assuming the intoxication of the deceased was the allegation of his fellow soldiers which was not even reduced into writing and, therefore, should not have been taken into consideration in the absence of any medical examination that would lead one to conclude that there was an excessive intake of alcohol.

In Our Resolution of 12 February 1990, We required the respondents to comment on the petition. 8

In the Comment filed on 6 April 1990 for respondent ECC, 9 the Office of the Solicitor General argues that although it is true that death arising from cerebro-vascular accident is among the occupational diseases included in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, compensation may be granted subject to the following conditions:

a. There must be a history, which should be proved, or trauma at work (to the head specially) due to unusual and extra-ordinary physical or mental strain or event. or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry.

b. There must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of the employment and the worker's collapse.

c. If the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage, the injury may be considered as arising from work. 10

Respondent ECC submits that there is no showing in the records that the foregoing conditions concur in the instant case, hence the claim for compensation must be denied.

In Our Resolution of 17 April 1991, 11 We ordered the Comment of respondent GSIS expunged from the records for having been filed out of time notwithstanding the numerous extensions given by this Court, gave due to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, which GSIS complied with on 7 May 1991 12 and the petitioner on 24 May 1991. Respondent ECC was allowed to adopt its Comment as its Memorandum. In its Memorandum, the GSIS argues that no reversible error was committed by respondents since: (1) Petitioner failed to prove casual relation between the death of the deceased and his work as technical sergeant in the Philippine Air Force. Furthermore, she failed to show compliance with the conditions for compensability set forth in the Implementing Rules. (2) Payment of Petitioner's claim is prohibited by Section 1, Rule IV of the Amended Rules on Employees'Compensation which reads, to wit:

1. Limitation. — No compensation shall be allowed to the employee or his dependents when the injury, sickness, disability or death was occasioned by any of the following:

(1) his intoxication;

(2) his willful intention to injure or kill himself or another; or

(3) his notorious negligence.

(Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondents have adopted new theories to justify their respective prior actions. When the case was at their level, they denied the claim for reasons other than that which they now espouse before Us. GSIS disapproves. the claim primarily because "there is no conclusive proof 'that the claimant died of the above illness — meaning cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to cerebro-vascular accident. In upholding the GSIS' denial, the ECC ruled, in effect, that for recovery of claims there should be proof that there was a history that Rolando was treated or hospitalized for hypertension, and that an ECG was done to prove the existence of a heart disease, hypertension or CVA during his stint as serviceman of the Philippine Air Force. None was offered. Besides, the "excessive intake of alcohol," as he had been drinking alcoholic drinks the night before his confinement per information given by his fellow soldiers, had aggravated his death. Before Us, however, the GSIS pursues a new tack: denial of the claim because petitioner failed to prove the causal relation between the

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death of Rolando and his work as Technical Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force and show the compliance with the conditions for compensability. Moreover, it is alleged that payment of the claim is prohibited by Section 1, Rule IV of the Amended Rules aforesaid because of Rolando's intoxication. On the other hand, ECC demands proof of concurrence of the conditions for compensability of cerebro-vascular accident.

If respondents GSIS and ECC had already in mind these theories at the time they separately acted on the claim, they should have expressly asserted them instead of treating the claim in a cavalier fashion, leaving the petitioner at a loss as to why the death of her son, who had served his country for nineteen (19) years, would be for naught.

Under the law, 13 a compensable sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions. Otherwise stated, for sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. 14

Undoubtedly, cerebro-vascular accident is an occupational disease in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules. In such a case, proof of causal relation between the disease which resulted in Rolando's death and his work is not necessary. In Rodriguez vs. ECC, 15 We ruled:

If the disease is listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation, no proof of causation is required. . . .

In Abellara vs. Secretary of Labor, 16 We held:

. . . The new scheme of employees' compensation establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees and applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. . . .

It is to be noted, however, that although cerebro-vascular accident is a listed occupational disease, its compensability requires compliance with all conditions set forth in the Rules, to wit: (a) there must be a history, which should be proved, of trauma at work (to the head specially) due to unusual and extraordinary physical and mental strain or event, or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry, (b) there must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack, and (c) the trauma or exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. In short, cerebro-vascular accident is a qualified occupational disease.

Only substantial evidence is required to prove the concurrence of the conditions. This is consistent with the liberal interpretation accorded the provisions of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee in favor of the workers. 17 For, it is a well-settled rule that in carrying out and interpreting these provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules, the workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration, and any doubt as to its proper interpretation and application must be resolved in favor of the employee whose rights must be protected. 18

The foregoing notwithstanding, where there is no compliance whatsoever with any of the conditions set forth in the Rules, as in this case, We cannot justify a pronouncement of compensability.

However, it is apparent from the records of the case that the GSIS acted on the claim solely on the basis of the evaluation of the clinical history prepared by Maj. del Rosario. Petitioner was not given the opportunity to submit any other evidence or be heard. As earlier stated, the denial was made in a very cavalier fashion. There was undue haste in denying the claim. Worse, despite an absence of credible basis, the GSIS and ECC have in effect, although unintentionally, blackened the memory of Rolando by insinuating that excessive intake of alcohol, or intoxication, as bluntly put by the GSIS in its Memorandum, caused or aggravated his death. This is a rather unfair attribution which Rolando can no longer rebut as death has sealed his lips. Petitioner was deprived of due process.

The demands of simple justice, taken in the light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances, 19 dictate that under the circumstances obtaining in this case, where it is shown beyond cavil of doubt that Rolando did in fact die of cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to a cerebro-vascular accident, which is a listed occupational disease, petitioner be allowed to present evidence to prove the concurrence of the conditions for compensability of the subject disease.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the Resolution of the GSIS denying due course to the claim of petitioner and the challenged Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission of 23 November 1988 in ECC Case No. 3365, and REMANDING this case to the Employees' Compensation Commission for further proceedings, more specifically for the reception of petitioner's evidence on the basis of which it shall render a decision.

No pronouncement as to costs. IT IS SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-62207 December 15, 1986JUAN BONIFACIO, petitioner-appellant, vs.GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM [Ministry of Education & Culture] and EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents-appellees. Cenon, Roncesvalles, Reyes & Leus for petitioner-appellant.

FERNAN, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission dated August 19, 1982, affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of petitioner's claim for benefits under PD No. 626, as amended, for the death of his spouse, Lourdes Bonifacio.

The facts are undisputed.

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The late Lourdes Bonifacio was a classroom teacher assigned to the district of Bagamanoc, Division of Catanduanes, Ministry of Education and Culture from August, 1965 until she contracted carcinoma of the breast with metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs which caused her death on October 5, 1978.

Dra. Corazon Yabes-Almirante of the Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan certified that the late Lourdes Bonifacio underwent radical mastectomy for cancer of the breast in 1973. In 1976, when her ailment was noted to have metastasized to her abdomen, she submitted herself to an operation known as "exploratory laparotomy" in March of the same year. On September 1, 1978, she complained of "abdominal pain, abdominal enlargement, vomiting, and failure to pass stools inspite of laxatives." Upon operation it was found that her entire gastrointestinal tract was enveloped by carcinoma. Despite chemotherapy, she died on October 5, 1978 from carcinoma of the breast metastatic to gastrointestinal tract and lungs.

Thereafter a claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, was filed by petitioner with the GSIS. The same was however denied on the ground that the decedent's principal ailment, carcinoma of the breast with metastases to gastrointestinal tract and lungs, is not an occupational disease for her particular work as a teacher, nor is the risk of contracting said disease increased by her working conditions.

The Employees Compensation Commission, on appeal affirmed the decision of the respondent System.

Petitioner now assails the decision of the respondent Commission on the following grounds:

a] The respondent Commission's affirmance of the denial by respondent System totally ignored the Supreme Court's pronouncements on compensation cases; and

b] Under the law, in case of doubt in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, the same shall be resolved in favor of the laborer.

We hold that the GSIS and the Employees Compensation Commission did not err in denying petitioner's claim.

A compensable sickness means "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Employees Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment." [Art. 167(1) Labor Code as amended by P.D. No. 1368, effective May 1, 1978].

Thus, for the sickness or the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an accepted occupational disease fisted by the Employees Compensation Commission [Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation], or any other sickness caused by employment subject to proof by claimant that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. [Sec. 1, Rule 11, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation].

Carcinoma of the breast with metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs is not listed by the Commission as an occupational disease. As to the "metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs" the Commission lists such disease as occupational only in the following employment:

Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment 16. Cancer of stomach and other lymphatic and blood forming vessels; nasal cavity and sinuses Woodworkers, wood products industry carpenters, loggers and employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills 17. Cancer of the lungs, liver and brain. Vinyl chloryde workers, plastic workers.

[Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, see p. 38, Rollo.]

The cancer which affected the deceased not being occupational in her particular employment, it became incumbent upon petitioner to prove that the decedent's working conditions increased the risk of her contracting the fatal illness. This onus petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge. We note the following medical report on breast cancer which the Employees Compensation Commission cited in its decision and which the petitioner failed to controvert:

... Recent observations on the epidemeology of breast cancer suggest that it is intimately linked to "estrogenic hormones" [W.A.P Anderson, Mosby, Pathology 5th edition, pp. 1217-1218]. Mammary carcinoma is likely to metastasize relatively early to the regional lymph nodes-axillary and supra clavicular, if the primary site is in the outer half of the breast. From thence it spreads primarily to the bones, lungs, skin and subcutaneous tissues generally; less frequently to the brain. [Wintrobe et. al., Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 7th edition, pp. 584-585]. (pp. 3-4, ECC decision dated August 19, 1982).

Petitioner's contention that the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission totally ignored the Supreme Court's pronouncements on compensation cases is unmeritorious. The petitioner evidently overlooked that his claim is now within the ambit of the Labor Code and the rulings under the old law, Act No. 3428, as amended, no longer control.

The old law as embodied particularly in Section 43 of RA No. 772 amending Act No. 3812, provided for "the presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness, which favor the employee," and "paved the way for the latitudinarian or expansive application of the Workmen's Compensation Law in favor of the employee or worker." [Sulit v. ECC, 98 SCRA 483, 489] The presumption in essence states that in any proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act "it shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary that the claim comes within the provisions of the said Act, that sufficient notice thereof was given, that the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another, that the injury did not result solely from the intoxicatiojn of the injured employee while on duty, and that the contents of verified medical and surgical reports introduced in evidence by claimants for compensation are correct."

Thus, under the Workmen's Compensation Law, it is not necessary for the claimant to carry the burden of proof to establish his case to the point of demonstration [Abana vs. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1278]. It is "not necessary to prove that employment was the sole cause of the death

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or injury suffered by the employee. It is sufficient to show that the employment had contributed to the aggravation or acceleration of such death or ailment." [Fontesa vs. ECC, 22 SCRA 282] "Once the disease had been shown to have arisen in the course of employment, it is presumed by law, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that it arose out of it." [Hernandez vs. ECC, et. al. L-20202, May 31, 1965].

With this legal presumption in the old law, the burden of proof shifts to the employer and the employee no longer suffers the burden of showing causation. Under the present Labor Code, the "latitudinarian or expansive application of the Workmen's Compensation Law in favor of the employee or worker" no longer prevails as the burden of showing proof of causation has shifted back to the employee particularly in cases of sickness or injuries which are not accepted or listed as occupational by the Employees Compensation Commission. As stated in Sulit vs. Employees Compensation Commission [supra] "the Labor Code abolished the presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of the employment. "

While we do not dispute petitioner's contention that under the law, in case of doubt in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, the doubt shall be resolved in favor of the laborer, we find that the same has no application in this case since the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code leave no room for doubt either in their interpretation or application.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the decisions of the GSIS and the Employees Compensation Commission denying the claim are affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-46454 September 28, 1989NICETAS C. RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (BUREAU OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION), respondent. Rodrigo V. Coquia for petitioner.

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner's late husband, Hector P. Rodriguez, was a public school teacher assigned at Salaan Elementary School in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. On November 19, 1975 he went on sick leave and was confined at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital after complaining of severe stomach pains accompanied by nausea and vomiting, later diagnosed as "Intestinal Lipomatosis of the Large Colon with Obstruction of the Ascending Colon." His ailment called for a surgical operation which was performed on November 27,1975 but this proved unavailing. A few days thereafter, on December 2, 1975, he expired.

On January 28, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for death compensation under the Labor Code with respondent Government Service Insurance System (hereinafter referred to as GSIS). In a letter-decision dated February 23, 1976, the GSIS denied the claim finding that the cause of the death of petitioner's husband is not an occupational disease since the nature of his duties as a teacher, as well as the working conditions of his employment, could not have directly caused his ailment which eventuated in his subsequent death. 1 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, dated August 11, 1976, was denied upon the finding that the evidence failed to establish that the decedent's employment had any causal relationship with the contraction of the ailment and there was no showing that the same directly arose therefrom or resulted from the nature thereof. 2 A second motion for reconsideration filed on October 18, 1976 having been denied by the GSIS, petitioner's claim was elevated for review to the respondent commission where it was docketed as ECC Case No. 0266.

On March 16, 1977, respondent commission affirmed the ruling of the GSIS and denied the claim of petitioner. The case is now before us on a petition for review.

The applicable rule established in law and jurisprudence concerning claims based on the provisions of the Labor Code on employees' compensation, particularly on death benefits under Article 194, is that they must result from an occupational disease. A compensable disease means any illness accepted and listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission or any illness caused by the employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions. 3

If the disease is listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex A of the Rules on Employees' Compensation, no proof of causation is required. However, if it is not so listed, it has been held that the employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove, a positive proposition, that is, that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. The fact that the cause of the disease was not positively identified does not dispense with this burden of proof. 4

The observations heretofore made do not mean that proof of direct causal relation is indispensably required. It is enough that the claimant adduces proof of reasonable work connection, whereby the development of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. Strict rules of evidence are not demanded, the degree of proof required being merely substantial evidence, which has been held to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. 5

After the surgical operation performed by Dr. Arturo de Vera, he gave the clinical impression that the deceased was suffering from "Intestinal Obstruction Partial, due to Lipomatosis of the Colon and Adhesion," explained by respondent commission as follows:

... As established in medical science, intestinal obstruction is a condition in which the passage of intestinal contents is arrested or seriously impaired. This is due to causes which are either mechanical, vascular or neurogenic. Mechanical causes are intrinsic factors as adhesions and tumors, such as what happened in the instant case, and hernia, and such factors as impacted foreign body or feces, parasites and gallstones. Vascular causes include embolism or trombosis of a large blood vessel. The neurogenic causes consist of those seen in pneumonia and peritonitis and following abdominal surgery or injuries to the spinal cord. (The Merck Manual-8th edition: Principles of Internal Medicine by Harrison). ... 6

Public respondent GSIS in its letter-decision also gave this explanation to petitioner:

Intestinal Obstruction is failure of progression of intestinal contents due to mechanical causes or to inadequacy of intestinal muscular activity. In your husband's case, it was due to Lipomatosis and Adhesions. Lipomata are benigned (sic) tumors characteristically found in middle adult life, although they may have been growing slowly for many years before making clinical mischief. They arise from adipose or fatty tissue anywhere in the body. The mesentery of the colon contains a large amount of such tissue and this may produce obstruction by compression of the intestinal wall. Worthy of note is the fact that the abdomen of your late husband was markedly obese. 7

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Petitioner does not dispute the fact that the principal duties of her husband as a classroom teacher alone would not have any connection with his disease. However, she posits that the deceased's auxiliary activities as a classroom teacher directly affected his physical constitution and indubitably caused him to have sustained some trauma in his abdominal cavity and other parts of the body. According to petitioner, the deceased was a member of the basketball team of the public school teachers in their school for the last five years prior to his death and had served as a coach in basketball for three years. He was also said to have been an active member of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines serving as committee chairman of Unit 671 of the Pangasinan council. 8

It is our considered view that the circumstances alleged by the petitioner and the evidence she presented are not enough to discharge the required quantum of proof, liberal as it is. There is no clear evidence as to when the disease commenced and supervened; the tumors which developed in the deceased's colon may have been growing for many years even before he was employed as a teacher. Neither was there any indication as to what really caused the disease: in fact, the nature of the disease as described militate against a finding of a causal nexus. The "trauma" that was supposed to have caused or at least contributed to the disease was neither satisfactorily clarified nor adequately proved. Surely, the activities relied upon by the petitioner, being outside the regular or primary functions of a teacher, could not have been done every working day. It is safe to assume that they were done only for certain limited periods of time and on isolated occasions as, for instance, during competitions. Thus, it cannot be said that decedent's work as a teacher exposed him to hazards different or greater from those involved in ordinary or normal life-styles. There is no showing that he did not engage in other extraneous activities, aside from playing basketball or being a member of the Boy Scouts. Of further note is the observation that the abdomen of the deceased was markedly obese, which circumstance may also have been a causative or contributive factor considering the etiological and pathological particulars of said ailment.

Additionally, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that said co-curricular activities can be considered as "hazards," as theorized by petitioner, exposure to the same was on the voluntary choice of the deceased. As pointed out by respondent commission, the decision to engage therein was at decedent's option since, not forming part of his work as teacher, there was no compulsion on him to participate in said activities.

UNDER THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 149571 February 21, 2007GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs.BENJAMIN NONOY O. FONTANARES, Respondent.D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated February 6, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 54995, which reversed and set aside the Decision dated August 19, 1999 of the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. MG-10489-499 affirming the judgment of the Government Service Insurance System (petitioner); and the CA Resolution2 dated August 21, 2001 which denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.

This case originated from a claim for compensation, income, and hospitalization benefits filed by the respondent before the petitioner on September 15, 1998 due to Rheumatic Heart Disease and Pulmonary Tuberculosis Minimal.

The facts of the case, as aptly summarized by the ECC, are as follows:

x x x [Respondent] first joined government service as Storekeeper I at the Archives Division of Records Management and Archives Office, Department of Education, Culture and Sports in Manila on March 16, 1987. In March 1989, he was promoted to the position of Archivist I. On December 1, 1994, he transferred to the Maritime Industry Authority as Maritime Industry Development Specialist II.

As Archivist I, his duties were as follows:

1. Processes notarial documents by preparing index guides, accession numbers and labels by bundles according to the names of notary public.

2. Retrieves notarial documents requested for on a first come first serve basis.

3. Prepares replies, written communication from the public.1awphi1.net

4. Assists in sorting out incoming archival records and performs such other function/duties as may be assigned from time to time by his supervisors.

As Maritime Industry Development Specialist II, his duties are as follows:

1. Prepares technical report, program and budget.

2. Inspects ships in the overseas and domestic trade.

The records of the case further reveal that [respondent] was confined at the Chinese General Hospital from January 8 to 10, 1998 due to Rheumatic Valvular Disease with AS, MR, Cardiomyopathy and PTB Minimal. His chest x-rays taken on July 11, 1998 and October 2, 1998 showed findings consistent with PTB, minimal and Cardiomegaly.

On account of his ailment, [respondent] filed with the [petitioner] a claim for compensation benefits under PD 626, as amended. Finding his ailment compensable, he was awarded Temporary Total Disability (TTD) benefits from January 8 to 10, 1998. However, [respondent’s] claim for compensation benefits on account of his Rheumatic Heart Disease was denied on the ground that the said ailment is not work-connected. Dissatisfied with the decision, [respondent] requested for the elevation of his case to [the ECC] for review pursuant to Section 5, Rule XVIII of the Rules of PD No. 626, as amended.3

On August 19, 1999, the ECC rendered herein assailed Decision affirming in toto the ruling of the petitioner. The ECC held that Rheumatic Heart Disease is not a compensable ailment under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended; that the respondent failed to prove by

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substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the said ailment had been increased by his working conditions; and, that respondent failed to show any causal relation between his ailment and his working conditions.

Respondent appealed to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. On February 6, 2001, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered giving due course to the petition. The assailed decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission dated August 19, 1999 is hereby SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the illness Rheumatic Heart Disease compensable and directing the payment of the claim therefore [sic].

SO ORDERED.4

The CA held that the working conditions exposed the respondent, then Storekeeper I and Archivist II, to chemical hazard, as certified by the Secretary of Health, which lowered his body resistance; that when he transferred to the Maritime Industry Authority and assumed the position of Maritime Safety Inspector/Surveyor, he was likewise exposed to toxic fumes and gas coming from the residue of cargoes and was oftentimes made to work in 24 hour shifts; that, in view of these, the illness of respondent supervened during his employment and, therefore, the presumption arises that he acquired such ailments from his employment; that the Maritime Industry Authority failed to contest or controvert respondent’s claim within the proper period and, hence, it in effect admitted the compensability of the illness.

Hence, the instant Petition raising the following issues:

I.

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring respondent entitled to compensation benefits even though there was no showing that his working conditions had increased the risk of his contracting Rheumatic Heart Disease.

II.

Whether the illness Rheumatic Heart Disease is compensable when such disease is clearly not included in the list of compensable diseases under PD 626, as amended.5

The petition has merit.

The principal question is whether the respondent is entitled to compensation benefits under existing law due to the condition of Rheumatic Heart Disease.

Respondent avers that the toxic fumes, overcrowded passengers, and animal cargoes in the vessels he inspected, exposed him to streptococci infection which, in turn, afflicted him with Rheumatic Heart Disease; and, that the employee’s compensation law is social legislation and, hence, it should be interpreted liberally in favor of the worker; and to substantiate these allegations, he submitted the Certifications issued by the Department of Health, to the effect that the Records Management and Archives Office, including all (Medical Services) Divisions, is found to be exposed to chemical hazard, in performing its actual duties and responsibilities;6 that all the employees of the Records Management and Archives Office at T.M. Kalaw St., Manila are at risk of developing respiratory illnesses due to their direct/indirect exposure to dust, biological hazards (such as fungi, yeast, etc.) producing noxious odor emanating from ancient files/vends which are preserved; that they are exposed to chemicals usually used as preservatives;7 and, that the employees of the Records Management and Archives Office, Region XI, Davao City are at risk/danger to their health and safety due to the following findings/observations:

1. Risk from exposure to dangerous, noxious odors/toxic chemicals/gas in the conduct of processing, pressuring and fumigation of old files and records; and,

2. Risk from exposure to biological hazards and other substances like dust, molds, ticks, silver fish and other insect and vectors located in the ill-ventilated and cramped workplace.8

A review of the findings of facts of the CA and the agencies a quo fails to show that the respondent discharged his burden of proof, under the measure of substantial evidence, that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting Rheumatic Heart Disease. In particular, the records show no medical information establishing the etiology of Rheumatic Heart Disease that would enable this Court to evaluate whether there is causal relation between the respondent’s employment and his illness.

In Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals,9 this Court comprehensively discussed the principles and policies of the existing compensation law, P.D. No. 626, as amended, viz:

At the outset, certain basic postulates governing employees’ compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 need be reviewed. First, said Decree abandoned the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Second, for the sickness and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant must prove either of two (2) things: (a) that the sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees’ Compensation; or (b) if the sickness is not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant’s working conditions. Third, the claimant must prove this causal relation between the ailment and working conditions by substantial evidence, since the proceeding is taken before the ECC, an administrative or quasi-judicial body. Within the field of administrative law, while strict rules of evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings, nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of substantial evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded. Finally, in case of doubt in construction and interpretation of social legislation statutes, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman prevails in light of the Constitution’s social justice policy.

On the other side of the coin, however, there is a competing, yet equally vital interest to heed in passing upon undeserving claims for compensation. It is well to remember that if diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur. This stems from the development in the law that no longer is the poor employee still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer, hence the necessity of affording all kinds of favorable presumptions to the employee. This reasoning is no longer good policy. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not

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entitled under the law. The employer joins the employee in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment. Moreover, the new system instituted by the new law has discarded, among others, the concept of "presumption of compensability and aggravation" and substituted one based on social security principles. The new system is administered by social insurance agencies – the GSIS and the SSS – under the ECC. The purpose of this innovation was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer’s obligation to pay workmen’s compensation and the employee’s right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.10 (Emphasis supplied)

There is no dispute that Rheumatic Heart Disease is not included under the P.D. No. 626, as amended, as an occupational disease. Hence, under P.D. No. 626, as amended, the employee must demonstrate through substantial evidence (1) that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant’s working conditions, and (2) the causal relation between the ailment and working conditions.

The petitioner correctly points out that the respondent failed to discharge his burden of proof. The Certifications of the Department of Health bear no relevance to the claims of the respondent for a number of reasons. First, the Certifications clearly state the purpose and period for which it may used, i.e., "for the purpose of claims for hazard pay" and for the years "1995" and "1996" only, thus indicating that the conditions may not necessarily exist before or after 1995 or 1996; and, second, the Certifications show that he had been exposed to "toxic chemicals" and "biological hazards" but do not go any further—they do not indicate the causal relation between the exposure and Rheumatic Heart Disease.

In its Decision, the ECC, quoting medico-legal authorities, explained the nature of Rheumatic Heart Disease, thus:

x x x either resulted from or ascribed to previous rheumatic fever. With the declining incidence of acute rheumatic fever, other etiologies are increasingly recognized; congenital defects that may become apparent until late childhood or adult years, myxomatous, scleroris and calcifications. Whatever the etiology, valve obstruction or regurgitation causes characteristic physical and laboratory findings. Secondary infective endocarditis is a continuing hazard for these patients. Antistreptococcal prophylaxis is advisable. (Reference: Merck’s Manual, 14th Edition, page 526).11 (Emphasis supplied)

The respondent failed to prove that his work conditions had predisposing factors that caused Rheumatic Fever which, in turn, led to Rheumatic Heart Disease, the subject ailment. Exposure to toxic chemicals and biological hazards does not by itself constitute the cause of respondent’s ailment. Moreover, respondent failed to present evidence that he ever contracted Rheumatic Fever which could have led to Rheumatic Heart Disease.

The ECC correctly held:

It is well-settled under the Employees’ Compensation Law that when the claimed contingency is not the direct result of the covered employee’s employment, as in the instant case, and the claimant failed to show proof that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the covered employee’s employment and working conditions, the claim for compensation benefits cannot prosper.

Since there is no causal relation between [respondent’s] ailment, Valvular Heart Disease, and his employment and working conditions; nor are there indications that the nature of his work had increased the risk of contracting the said disease, [the petitioner] is correct in denying [respondent’s] application for compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as amended.12

The Court affirms the findings of the agencies a quo. The CA erred in disregarding the findings of the ECC on the technical matter concerning the nature of respondent’s illness.

This is one instance when, pursuant to prudence and judicial restraint, a tribunal’s zeal in bestowing compassion must yield to the precept in administrative law that in [the] absence of grave abuse of discretion, courts are loathe to interfere with and should respect the findings of quasi-judicial agencies in fields where they are deemed and held to be experts due to their special technical knowledge and training.13

The CA likewise erred when it ruled that where the illness supervened during employment, the presumption is that such illness arose out of the employment. Before P.D. No. 626, as amended, the employee need not present any proof of causation. It was the employer who should prove that the illness or injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment.14 However, P.D. No. 626, as amended, changed the system of compensation. As discussed in Government Service Insurance System, this Court explicitly held that the concept of "presumption of compensability and aggravation" has been discarded by the new system. The purpose of this innovation was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer’s obligation to pay workmen’s compensation and the employee’s right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability. This principle has been affirmed in a line of cases.15

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Employees Compensation Commission dated August 19, 1999 is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-48580 July 6, 1990APOLINARIO KIRIT, SR., ALICE K. MATURAN, ROSELYN K. BIGLETE, APOLINARIO A. KIRIT, JR., WILLIAM A. KIRIT and LORNA A. KIRIT, petitioners, vs.GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Department of Education and Culture) and EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.Marcelo G. Flores for petitioners.

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioners seek a review of the decision of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), dated March 1, 1978, which affirmed the denial by respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) of petitioners' claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.

The findings of respondent commission are as follows:

The late Eugenia A. Kirit was a classroom teacher of the Department of Education and Culture assigned at the Inalad Elementary School, Siaton, Negros Oriental. Her clinical record reveals that on March 25, 1976, she was confined at the Siliman University Medical Center on

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complaints of pain on the left shoulder for six (6) months prior to admission, with limitation of motion, accompanied by numbness at the left side of the face, shoulder and arm. Her ailments were diagnosed as "Osteoarthritis and Giant Cell Tumor, left humerus." She died on July 1, 1976 at the age of fifty six (56). 1

On December 17, 1976, a claim for employees' compensation benefits was filed by the decedent's husband, Apolinario Kirit, Sr., with respondent Government Service Insurance System. Said claim was denied by the GSIS in its letter-decision dated December 21, 1976, 2 stating that the cause of Mrs. Kirit's death, osteoarthritis and giant cell tumor, left humerus, are not occupational diseases, taking into consideration the nature of her particular work. The GSIS further stated that the evidence submitted by petitioners had not shown that said ailment directly resulted from her occupation or employment as a teacher.

Apolinario Kirit, Sr. filed a motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1977, which was likewise denied by the GSIS on the same grounds stated in its decision of December 21, 1976. 3

On appeal, respondent Employees' Compensation Commission affirmed the decision of the GSIS holding that:

Osteoarthritis and Giant Cell Tumor, are definitely not accepted as occupational diseases. Both are not included in the list of occupational diseases. In the case of Osteoarthritis, medical authorities believe that it is the result of physiologic process of aging. It is characterized by thinning or degeneration of cartilage and degeneration of bone in some parts of the joint. Osteoarthritis usually develops slowly and gradually in the latter half of life. It involves degeneration and in one sense is a part of the aging process of the people afflicted with it. The same could be said of Giant Cell Tumor, which is precipitated by extrinsic factors unrelated to employment. 4

The sole issue presented for resolution in this case is whether or not the death of Eugenia Kirit caused by osteoarthritis and/or giant cell tumor is legally compensable.

There is no dispute that the provisions of the Labor Code apply to the case at bar, as admitted by the petitioners 5 and as shown by the evidence on record that the illness and death of the decedent occurred after January 1, 1975.

Thus, the contentions of petitioners, which are anchored on presumptions of compensability and aggravation provided under the former Workmen's Compensation Act, cannot be upheld. The said presumptions have been abandoned under the compensation scheme in the present Labor Code. 6

Article 167(1) of the Labor Code, as amended, defines a compensable sickness as "illness definitely acceptable as an occupational disease listed by the Commission or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions."

For the sickness or the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant must either show that it is a result of an occupational disease listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission or, if not so listed, he must present proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. 7

In the case at bar, the cause of decedent's death, osteoarthritis and/or giant cell tumor, are not listed by the ECC as occupational diseases. Consequently, to be compensable it was incumbent upon petitioners to prove that the decedent's working conditions as a teacher increased the risk of her contracting the fatal illness.

A careful review of the record shows that petitioners did not present any evidence to prove work connection. They relied solely on the theory of aggravation and presumptions of compensability under the old compensation law which have no application in this case. In the absence of proof, we cannot conclude that it was the employment of the decedent which increased the risk of her contracting the disease. 8 The burden of proof is upon petitioners, as awards of compensation cannot be made to rest on presumptions.

As ruled in Tanedo vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al.: 9

Neither may an award in petitioner's favor be justified upon any presumption that illness causing death or disability arose out of the employment or was at least aggravated by such employment. That presumption was laid down by the old statute. It is however now a thing of the past, abolished on effectivity of the new law on January 1, 1975. Awards of compensation benefits for death or disability can now no longer be made to rest on presumption, but on a showing that the causative disease is among those listed by the ECC, or on substantial evidence that the risk of contracting said disease is increased by the employees' working conditions.

Petitioners having failed to discharge the burden of proof placed upon them by the Labor Code, the claim for death benefits was correctly denied by public respondent.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decisions of respondents Government Service Insurance System and Employees' Compensation Commission denying the claim are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-45833 June 20, 1988ROMAN MOSQUERRA, petitioner, vs.WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE C-YULO & SONS, respondents.

PADILIA, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered by the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission in R05 Case No. C-2799, entitled: "Roman Mosquerra, claimant, versus Canlubang Sugar Estate C-J. Yulo & Sons, respondent," which reversed the decision issued by the Hearing Officer of the Workmen's Compensation Unit in said case, and absolved the respondent from liability.

The records of this case show that the petitioner, Roman Mosquerra, is a former employee of the respondent. Canlubang Sugar Estate C-J. Yulo & Sons. He started to work with the respondent in 1947 and his work was to plow, plant and weed sugarcane in fields owned by the respondent. He was paid a weekly wage of P37.63. Sometime in 1960, while he was at work in the field, he felt acute stomach pains. He asked permission from his capataz and went to the Canlubang Sugar Estate Hospital. Upon examination by the company physician, Dr. Zoilo Bunye, he was found to be suffering from peptic ulcers, for which medicines were prescribed to relieve the pains. In December 1966, however, he was retired from the service upon recommendation of the company physician due to the persistence of the ailment. But, he continued to receive

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medical treatment from Dr. Eusebio Panganiban in Calamba, Laguna, who opined that the petitioner's work had contributed to the development or aggravation of the disease. 1

On 31 March 1975, the petitioner filed a claim against the respondent employer before the Workmen's Compensation Unit in San Pablo City, seeking benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, due to disability resulting from peptic ulcers which he claimed to have incurred in the course of his employment or were aggravated by the nature of his employment. 2

The respondent company opposed the claim mainly on grounds of prescription, no knowledge of the illness and payment of retirement benefits in the amount of P800.00. 3

Thereafter, the parties were required to submit affidavit and counter-affidavit supportive of their respective claims in order to expedite the disposition of the case. But, only the herein petitioner complied. The case was then deemed submitted for decision . 4

After evaluating the evidence presented, the Hearing Officer of the Workmen's Compensation Unit found that the ailment of the petitioner, which supervened during his employment with the respondent company, arose out of, or at least, was aggravated by, his employment, and that the respondent company failed to controvert the petitioner's claim. Consequently, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered for the claimant and against the respondent, the latter is ordered to pay:

1. To the claimant, thru this Unit, the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00), reduced, representing disability benefits computed as follows: "Claimant's disability began on December 31, 1966 and up to October 15, 1975, date of the decision, is 3,285 days or 468 weeks. 60% of P34.73, claimant's average weekly wage, is P20.84 and for 468 weeks equals P9,773.12, reduced to P6,000.00, the maximum amount allowed by law. (Section 14)

2. To pay Mr. Feliciano Reyes, 339 Elizondo Street, Quiapo, Manila, the sum of THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) as attorney's fee under Section 31.

3. To pay this unit the sum of SIXTY ONE PESOS (P61.00) as fee under Section 55 of the Act, as amended. 5

The respondent company appealed. Acting on the appeal, the Workmen's Compensation Commission reversed the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Unit and absolved the respondent company from liability. The reason given was that: "Aside from claimant's claim and his affidavit, the record is bereft of any documents that will support the claim. 6

The petitioner now seeks a review of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. He claims that the Commission seriously erred in dismissing his claim. He contends that, while he failed to submit a physician's report in support of his claim, it has been shown that the disease supervened during his employment and is presumed to have arisen out of, or was aggravated by, his employment; and besides, according to petitioner, the respondent company failed to controvert his claim seasonaly so that the employer is deemed to have waived his right to interpose any defense and he can not prove anything in relation thereto.

We find merit in the petition. It is a well settled rule under the Workmen's Compensation Act that once the claimant has established that the illness supervened in the course of his employment, there arises a presumption that the illness arose out of, or was aggravated by, his employment and the burden to overthrow the presumption rests upon the employer. The presumption, rebuttable in its inception, becomes conclusive upon the failure of the respondent employer to destroy the same. 7

In the instant case, the Hearing Officer found that the illness of the petitioner supervened in the course of his employment and that the respondent company failed to present substantial evidence to overthrow the presumption that the ailment so supervened. He said:

Undoubtedly, claimant was physically healthy in 1947 when he was admitted in the service otherwise if he had been afflicted of any illness, respondent that has hospital of its own with complete facilities would not have admitted him for employment. It was, however, after more than 13 years of continuous hard labor that he complained of stomach pain while at work. No doubt his illness supervened in the course of employment giving rise to a rebuttable presumption that said illness arose out of employment or was at least aggravated by his employment. To overcome this presumption of law, respondent should prevent substantial evidence which it miserably failed to accomplish.

Such being the case, there was no more need for the presentation of evidence by the petitioner.

Besides, the test of compensability under the old Workmen's Compensation Act is probability and not certainty. In Bello vs. W.C.C., 8 the Court said:

... Moreover, laboratory reports are not indispensable prerequisite to compensability of claim and the absence of an x-ray report cannot prejudice such claim. This Court even went to the claim of declaring that to be compensable, it is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded. Indeed, the niceties and refinements of technical rules on procedure must give way to effect substantial justice to the claimant.

Moreover, the findings of fact of the Workmen's Compensation Unit are like findigs of fact of the lower courts, which must be upheld and taken as true and correct and not to be undermined or ignored by the appellate courts in the absence of strong and cogent reasons. 9 But what is most significant is that the respondent company failed to seasonably controvert the petitioner's claim. It is well settled that the failure of the employer to controvert the claim within the prescribed period after knowledge of such disability, amounts to a waiver of the right to controvert and a renunciation of all defenses, like the defense that the claim is not compensable. 10

It is claimed by the respondent company, however, that the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, which is sought to be reviewed, is already final and can no longer be reviewed. Counsel for the respondent company alleges that Mr. Feliciano Reyes, counsel for the petitioner, received a copy of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission on 23 March 1976 so that it was already final when the petitioner filed on 18 March 1977 his petition before the Court for an extension of time within which to file a petition for review.

It appears, however, that the decision in question is dated 30 December 1976 so that it could not have been served upon and received by petitioner's counsel on 23 March 1976, some eight (8) months before it was promulgated. It is true that in a Manifestation filed with the Court on 15 April 1976, 11 counsel for the respondent company stated that the decision in question was rendered on 30 December 1975. But, this

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mere manifestation is not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the writing (decision) was truly dated. 12 And the date on said decision is 30 December 1976.

We also find no merit in the respondents' contention that the claim had already prescribed since the petitioner was taken ill sometime in October, 1960 and filed his claim only on 31 March 1975. The determining point of the accrual of the cause of action is the time the employee becomes disabled or incapacitated to do his regular work because that is the time when the benevolent mantle of the law commences to cover him. 13

Finally, counsel for the respondent company claims that the petitioner had opted to retire and had received benefits so that he can no longer recover Workmen's Compensation benefits.

The contention is also devoid of merit. It is well settled that the optional retirement of an employee does not militate against the success of his claim for disability benefits . 14

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission in R05-W.C. Case No. C-2799, entitled: "Roman Mosquerra, claimant, versus Canlubang Sugar Estate C-J. Yulo & Sons, respondent," on 30 December 1976, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered upholding the decision rendered by the Workmen's Compensation Unit, Batangas Branch, Batangas City, in said case. With costs against the respondent company. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 167572, July 27, 2007] GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, PETITIONER, VS. MELVIN I. PALMA, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 28 March 2005, which reversed the Decision[2] of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) denying respondent Melvin I. Palma's claim for permanent disability benefits in ECC Case No. GM-16302-0323-04.

Respondent Melvin I. Palma started his teaching vocation in the government as a Practical Arts teacher in Zamboanga City High School from 17 July 1967 until 2 December 1970. Later on, he became an English teacher at Jose Abad Santos High School in Manila from 3 December 1970 until 16 December 1997.

On 15 to 18 April 1980, respondent underwent surgical excision of the cervical lymph node at the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital, Sta. Cruz, Manila, for thyroid carcinoma which was diagnosed as papillary cancer of the thyroid. Not long after, on 22 to 30 April 1980, respondent went through a radical neck dissection with Total Thyroidectomy at the Ospital ng Maynila. Respondent's travail continued as two years later, or on 24 to 27 May 1982, he was made to undergo another surgical excision of the cervical lymph node at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong City.

On 3 March 1984, respondent filed with petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, otherwise known as the Employees Compensation Act. Petitioner denied the said claim in its letter dated 3 May 1984, the relevant portion of which reads:Please be advised that on the basis of the proofs and evidences submitted to this Office, your ailment "Total Thyroidectomy", is not considered an occupational disease as that your position as High School Teacher, Division of City Schools, Manila, had increased the risk of contracting said ailment.[3]Respondent requested petitioner to reconsider its decision, but the latter stood firm in denying his claim reasoning that:We regret to inform the claimant that we reiterate the disapproval of his claim under P.D. 626, as amended because there is no concrete and substantial proof to show that the illness was brought about by the performance of his duties while still in the service.[4]Then, in September 1997, he was subjected to Tracheostomy. This operation worsened respondent's condition which forced him to retire in December of 1997.

On 24 November 2003, respondent sent a letter to the GSIS General Manager and requested that his partial disability be converted to total and permanent disability. Respondent also wrote a letter dated 30 January 2004, which contained the same request, to the ECC Executive Director.

In a letter dated 14 February 2004, the ECC Director requested the GSIS to elevate the records of respondent's case to the ECC for review.

In a Decision dated 24 June 2004, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS denying respondent's claim for disability benefits. It stated:Medical science relative to the claimed ailments provides that:

"Thyroid cancer is the most common endocrine-related cancer. The outlook for patients with thyroid cancer is excellent in that safe and effective therapy is available in most cases. A lump (nodule) in the thyroid is the key sign of its presence. Most thyroid cancers do not cause any symptoms, and only rarely do they cause pain, difficulty in swallowing, or hoarseness."

Thyroid cancer is more common in people who have a history of exposure of the thyroid gland to radiation, have a family history of thyroid cancer, and are older than 40 years old."

To warrant compensability of an ailment and its resulting disability, sickness, or death under P.D. 626, as amended, Rule III, Section 1(b) thereof, specifically provides that: (1) The ailment must be listed by the ECC as an occupational disease. (2) There must be a showing by substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the ailment is caused or increased by the employees' work and working conditions.

Appellant's ailment, Thyroid cancer is not an occupational disease under Annex "A" of the aforementioned rule. Under the increased risk theory, compensation may still be had, provided substantial proof is shown that the risk of contracting the ailment was caused or increased by the nature of his work and working conditions.

In the case at bar, there is no indication that the ailment was brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of his job. In fact, the records of his case merely asserted that it was his work as a Teacher that caused him to contract the ailment. However, appellant offered no

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evidence that would establish a causal link between the ailment and his work. Such allegations of appellant would not constitute work-connection. There must be some real and concrete evidence that would link the ailment to appellant's nature of work and working conditions, which appellant however, failed to satisfy with.

Based on medical science, the ailment, Thyroid cancer is more common in people who have a history of exposure of the thyroid gland to radiation, have a family history of thyroid and are older than 40 years of age. These are the factors that medical authorities of this Commission believed have caused appellant's ailment and the same cannot be connected with his employment. Thus, the action taken by the respondent System is well taken.[5]On 3 September 2004, respondent filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

In a Decision dated 28 March 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the ECC.

The Court of Appeals did not agree with the ECC's opinion stating that respondent's ailment was caused by the following factors: family history of thyroid cancer; a history of exposure of the thyroid gland to radiation; the victim is older than 40 years old. According to the Court of Appeals, these factors just enumerated are merely the specific situations or "risk factors" that increase an individual's chance of developing said ailment. Even as respondent's age is a risk factor, as he was 43 years old during his first operation, still the ECC erred in surmising that his ailment is attributable to his age, and not to his work. The appellate court also cited an authority stating that some persons exposed to the said risk factors do not get thyroid cancer and that other persons who get the disease have none of the said risk factors. In other words, persons exposed to the risk factors react differently. It concluded that respondent's illness could have been brought about by a combination of causes including that to which respondent was exposed, i.e., the strenuous use of his vocal cords when he trained his students for declamation and his exposures to chemicals such as muriatic acid and paints when respondent supervised the cleaning of the comfort rooms and when he painted the classrooms every summer vacation.

Hence, the instant recourse.

Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals decided the case based on the principles of aggravation and presumption of compensability, which principles have been abandoned by the passage of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, thus, deciding the same contrary to law and jurisprudence. It argues that the intention of the law is that the work or working condition itself should cause the disease and not merely aggravated what was already being suffered by the claimant.

Petitioner also posits that the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was not supported by positive evidence proving that the claimant's working conditions caused his ailment, there being none presented by respondent, except his bare allegations to support his claim.

Furthermore, petitioner maintains that respondent's exposure to paints and muriatic acid could not have caused his disease as exposure to radiation, which is one of the risk factors in contracting thyroid cancer, is not the same as exposure to paints and muriatic acid.

There is no merit in the petition.

Section 1(b) of Rule III of the Implementing Rules of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, provides:For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.Based on the foregoing Rule, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant must prove that (a) his/her sickness was the result of an occupation disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules of Employees Compensation, or (b) the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his/her working conditions.

This increased risk theory can be made applicable in compensation cases, when the claimant can adduce reasonable proof of the connection between his work and the cause of the disease, or that that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions.[6] Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to claims for compensation.[7] The degree of proof required under Presidential Decree No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."[8] What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation.[9] Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection.[10] It is sufficient that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable since probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.[11]

Respondent was diagnosed as having thyroid cancer. Although this disease is not one of those listed as Occupational Diseases under Annex "A" of the ECC Rules, respondent may nonetheless be entitled to compensation if he can prove that the risk of contracting thyroid cancer was increased by his working conditions.

While medical research has pinpointed the risk factors which increase an individual's chance of acquiring thyroid cancer, namely: (1) exposure of the thyroid gland to radiation; (2) family history of thyroid cancer; and (3) advanced age, which ECC claims to be the sole risk factors that cause thyroid cancer, medical experts, however, have admitted that the exact causes of this disease escape their scrutiny, thus:No one knows the exact causes of thyroid cancer. Doctors can seldom explain why one person gets this disease and another does not. x x x. (NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, U.S. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, www.cancer.gov.)[12]In fact, some experts are bewildered by the phenomenon that there are individuals who have these risk factors yet do not develop thyroid cancer. Thus, the following observations:Many patients naturally want to know "Why did I get thyroid cancer?" Most patients have no known risk factors or family history and were often previously in good health. Scientists and physicians do not have good answers to this question yet, but many research programs are looking into this issue. A substantial number of thyroid cancers appear to exhibit genetic abnormalities in one or more chromosomes, but the reason for these types of chromosomal abnormalities remains obscure. (www.mythroid.com.)[13]It is further observed:Most people who have known risk factors do not get thyroid cancer. On the other hand, many who do not get the disease have none of these risk factors. (NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE, U.S. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, www.cancer.gov.)[14]From the foregoing disquisitions, it is notable that experts are open to the probability that development of thyroid cancer may be increased largely by any other causes such as that to which respondent was exposed while carrying out his duties, such as: (1) his constant involvement in the training of his students in declamation and oratory contests wherein his vocal cords were extremely utilized; (2) painting the classrooms during vacation; and (3) long exposure to and frequent inhalation of muriatic acid while supervising the cleaning of the school comfort rooms. With these special tasks being performed by respondent and his continued exposure to a detrimental work environment and the constant fatigue that his body accumulated, the strong probability that respondent's thyroid cancer developed in the process is not far-fetched. We thus

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find that the probability of petitioner contracting the disease in his workstation has been substantiated. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:We find it probable that [respondent], indeed, develop thyroid cancer through strenuous use of his vocal chords like when he trained his students for local and division-wide declamation and oratorical competitions.

x x x We find it also probable that [respondent's] chances of developing thyroid cancer was aggravated when he was regularly exposed to chemicals such as muriatic acid and paints which, in turn, caused the constant irritation of his throat.[15]There is no dispute that Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, abandoned the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Despite such abandonment, however, the present law has not ceased to be an employees' compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.[16] Moreover, we are not talking here of mere presumption or theory, but probabilities based on substantial proofs.

Respondent merits this compassion considering that he has been suffering and incurring medical expenses since 1980; and after having been forced to give up his teaching vocation, he is now totally dependent upon his children for meager support. Now, he totally depends on a tube inserted in his esophagus for normal breathing. After 30 years of dedicated public service, respondent deserves the compassion that the fundamental law extends to the working class, especially to disabled public servants.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 March 2005 is AFFIRMED. Petioner Government Service Insurance System is hereby ORDERED to pay respondent Melvin I. Palma the compensation benefits due him under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. No costs. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 148308, September 21, 2007] ROBERTO D. DEBAUDIN, Petitioner, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS) and EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION (ECC), Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

AZCUNA, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules on Civil Procedure seeks to review the August 17, 1999 Decision[1] and May 18, 2001 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 44670 which affirmed respondents Social Security System (SSS) and Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in denying petitioner's claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended.

Petitioner is a seaman by profession. He joined the United Philippine Lines (UPL) on April 13, 1975 and was separated from his employment on May 21, 1993 at the age of 62.[3]

During his eighteen (18) years of service with UPL, he boarded various foreign ocean-going vessels[4] while performing his duties and responsibilities that included cleaning chemical-spill-oil on deck, slat dislodging, and spraying naphtha chemical and washing dirt and rusts inside the tank.

Petitioner's medical record shows that his illness started in May 1993 when he experienced episodes of bilateral blurring of vision. While in Singapore then, he consulted Dr. Richard F.T. Fan, an ophthalmic surgeon, and he was diagnosed to be suffering from advanced glaucoma.[5] His condition recurred even after his separation from service, prompting him to seek further eye consultations and treatments in the Philippines.[6] His eye disease was finally diagnosed as chronic open angle glaucoma.[7]

On account of his ailment, petitioner filed before the SSS a claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended. The application, however, was denied on the ground that there is no causal relationship between the illness and his job as a seaman.[8] When his motion for reconsideration was also denied, petitioner elevated the case to the ECC which later on affirmed the assailed decision. The ECC ratiocinated, thus:

Following a careful review of the documents on record, the Commission is inclined to rule against the compensability of [petitioner's] ailment. The present employees compensation program, which is embodied in P.D. 626, as amended, requires[,] and we quote, that:

"For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions" (Rule III, Section 1[b] of the Implementing Rules of P.D. 626, as amended)

Definitely, [petitioner's] Chronic Open Angle Glaucoma is not an occupational disease under the law. Thus, he is required to show by substantial evidence that the nature of his job as a Seaman had increased the risk of contracting the disease. However, appellant failed to discharge the burden of proof required by the law.

Based on medical findings, Open Angle Glaucoma arises as a complication of chronic obstruction of aqueous humor reabsorption in the trabecular meshwork. It is usually asymptomatic and only rarely causes ocular pain or corneal edema. The treatment is primarily medical. Surgery to prevent permanent visual loss is necessary in only a minority of patients (Ref.: Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 11th edition, p. 71).

As suggested by the foregoing medical findings, the cleaning of chemical-spill-oil on deck and the spraying of [naphtha] chemical inside the tank were not predisposing factors in the contraction of Open Angle Glaucoma. Thus, we believe that the respondent System correctly ruled against the compensability of [petitioner's] ailment.[9]

An appeal from the adverse decision was filed before the CA.[10] On August 17, 1999, however, the petition was denied due course and the CA accordingly dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the working conditions as a seaman increased the risk of contracting his chronic open angle glaucoma.[11]

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied;[12] hence, this recourse.

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The lone issue presented for consideration is whether the work of petitioner as a seaman contributed even in a small degree in or had increased the risk of contracting his chronic open angle glaucoma.[13]

While petitioner admits that chronic open angle glaucoma is not one of those listed as occupational diseases under the law he nonetheless maintains that the cause of glaucoma is still unknown and predisposition thereto is due to both physical and emotional factors. In his case, petitioner asserts that he had been exposed to these elements for 18 years during his employment. He claims that as a utility staff he performed odd jobs without fail such as cleaning chemical-spill-oil on deck, slat dislodging, and spraying naphtha chemical and washing dirt and rusts inside the tank. According to him, these strenuous tasks required climbing, bending over and running for so many times - acts which a medical book considered as contributory factors that would increase intraocular pressure which causes glaucoma. Aside from the physical demands of the job, petitioner contends that he was also subjected to emotional strains of going through the perils of the sea and homesickness for being away from his family during the entire duration of the contracts. He, thus, alleges that his employment as a seaman contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of his ailment.

In fine, petitioner stresses that, as a social legislation, P.D. No. 626, as amended, should be interpreted to give meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the 1987 Constitution and the Labor Code.

The petition lacks merit.

Under the Labor Code, as amended, an employee is entitled to compensation benefits if the sickness is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation; or in case of any other illness, if it is caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions.[14] This is as it should be because for an illness to be compensable, it must be (1) directly caused by such employment; (2) aggravated by the employment; or (3) the result of the nature of such employment.[15] Jurisprudence provides that to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection and not direct causal relation is required.[16] It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable.[17] Probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings[18] since in carrying out and interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations the primordial and paramount consideration is the employees' welfare.

In the present case, petitioner's chronic open angle glaucoma is not listed as an occupational disease; hence, he has the burden of proving by substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, that the nature of his employment or working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment or that its progression or aggravation was brought about thereby.

Perusal of the records, however, regrettably reveals petitioner's failure to adduce any proof of a reasonable connection between his work as a seaman and the chronic open angle glaucoma he had contracted. At the most, he merely claims that he performed odd jobs without fail - cleaning chemical-spill-oil on deck, slat dislodging, and spraying naphtha chemical and washing dirt and rusts inside the tank - strenuous tasks which according to him required climbing, bending over and running for so many times. Adding thereto were the perils of the sea and the homesickness he said he experienced which allegedly caused emotional strains on his part.

Other than positing the foregoing, petitioner presented no competent medical history, records or physician's report to objectively substantiate the claim that there is a reasonable nexus between his work and his ailment. Without saying more, his bare allegations do not ipso facto make his illness compensable. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions. The claimant must present concrete evidence to prove a positive proposition.[19]

The necessity of establishing the supposed work connection is all the more crucial in the face of the fact that the readily-available medical literature would appear to consistently indicate that open angle glaucoma is brought about by several factors other than the purported "physical and emotional strains," such as aging, race, family history, nearsightedness or farsightedness, prolonged corticosteroid use, nutritional deficiencies, brain chemical abnormalities, injuries, infection or abnormalities in the eye, and medical conditions such as diabetes, high blood pressure or heart disease.[20] Therefore, to easily attribute to the "physical and emotional strains" allegedly attendant in petitioner's job as a seaman the chronic open angle glaucoma he is currently suffering is evidently to oversimplify an otherwise complex fact-finding process that should have taken place to determine the true cause of the ailment.

In Sante v. Employees' Compensation Commission,[21] this Court ruled that "... a claimant must submit such proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real ... not merely apparent."

Moreover, petitioner cannot conveniently rely on the invocation that the Employees Compensation Act, as a social legislation, must be liberally construed in favor of the ordinary working person. While the sympathy of the law on social security is toward the employees or their beneficiaries, it is imperative to remember that such compassion must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for compensation benefits. Thus, GSIS v. CA[22] held:

x x x [T]here is a competing, yet equally vital interest to heed in passing upon undeserving claims for compensation. It is well to remember that if diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur. This stems from the development in the law that no longer is the poor employee still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer, hence the necessity of affording all kinds of favorable presumptions to the employee. This reasoning is no longer good policy. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins the employee in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment. Moreover, the new system instituted by the new law has discarded, among others, the concept of "presumption of compensability and aggravation" and substituted one based on social security principles. The new system is administered by social insurance agencies - the GSIS and the SSS - under the ECC. The purpose of this innovation was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.[23]

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WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 1999 Decision and May 18, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-42731 February 28, 1985BETTER BUILDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs.SEVERO M. PUCAN, DIOSCORA C. ARELLANO and ROGELIO FERNANDO, respondents. Esperanza Doroja for petitioner. Ernesto H. Cruz and Enrique V. Español for respondent WCC.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission which affirmed a letter- award issued by Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor, awarding compensation benefits to private respondent Rogelio Fernando pursuant to Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Rogelio Fernando was hired by the petitioner as janitor in 1971 and subsequently was promoted as maintenance supervisor receiving P8.00 per day with P1.25 per hour of overtime work, working six (6) days a week. On April 18, 1974, he stopped working due to his illness diagnosed as "Hansen's Disease Lepromatous positive with claw hands on both." Consequently, he filed a notice of claim for workmen's compensation benefits.

The petitioner submitted its controversion upon the ground that the alleged ailment did not arise out of employment, was not the direct result thereof, nor was it aggravated by the same, but was caused by factors not related to private respondent's employment. To prove its allegation, the petitioner presented a certification of the Officer-In-Charge of the Leprosy Research and Training Center, Bureau of Disease Control, San Lazaro Hospital, showing that private respondent had been suffering from advanced Lepromatous (positive) since 1963. The petitioner claims further that Hansen's Disease is not an occupational disease and is not among those which have been held compensable.

The private respondent countered that when he joined the company in 1971, he was assigned as a janitor in Funeraria Paz, Claro M. Recto Street, Manila, and then at Funeraria Paz, Quezon City, and later on at the Manila Banking Corporation. As janitor of the two funeral parlors, the nature of work he performed was to sweep, scrub, and clean the parlors where cadavers lay in state. He also helped in dressing up the dead after they were embalmed; he gathered and disposed of the trash and garbage after the embalmer had done his job. He further averred that when he joined the company he was negative of Hansen's Disease. He admits that he was found positive of the disease in 1963 but he underwent treatment in the Central Luzon Sanitarium and on July 10, 1969, was declared negative of the disease and released from said hospital. To support his allegation, he submitted a certification (p. 47, Rollo) of the Medical Specialist, Chief, O.P.D. Central Luzon Sanitarium, to the effect that he was declared negative of the disease and eventually released on July 10, 1969. On April 15, 1974, he noticed his hands beginning to cripple like that of a claw, so he stopped working. Thereafter, he began to have facial disfigurement, claw hands on both hands, resulting in permanent disability for labor. When he submitted himself for examination he was declared by Dr. Vicente Noblejas, a leprologist, positive of Hansen's Disease Lepromatous with claw hands on both. Therefore, according to him, his ailment reappeared in a more aggravated form during the period he worked with the company and as a result of the performance of his duties as janitor.

We find the petition to be without merit. While it is true that the private respondent was found to be suffering from Hansen's Disease in 1963, there is likewise evidence that after undergoing treatment in the Central Luzon Sanitarium he was declared negative of the disease and released from the said hospital. Obviously, private respondent's illness was either non-existent or dormant prior to his employment in 1971 and its reappearance and aggravation may be traced to his weakened resistance to the disease due to his exposure to germs and bacteria and other stresses and infections while performing his duties as janitr in the two funeral parlors. �

Moreover, this case falls under the provisions of the former Workmen's Compensation Act. It is already settled under that law that when an ailment is contracted and/or aggravated in the course of one's employment the burden of refuting the same by substantial evidence is upon the employer. In refuting the claim that the ailment of the private respondent was contracted and/or aggravated in the course of his employment, the petitioner relied on the physician's report of Dr. Vicente H. Noblejas of the Tala Leprosarium. The petitioner states that it is not categorically stated in the statement that the disease was due to the private respondent's employment with the petitioner.

The Physician's Report reads:

9. (a) Was the injury or illness caused by accident due to and in pursuance of the employment? Maybe

(b) Or the result of the nature of such employment? Maybe

(c) Or aggravated by the employment most probably.

10. (a) Was the illness or injury contracted directly cause by the workmen's employment? Maybe

(b) Or the result of the nature of such employment? Maybe

(c) Or aggravated by the employment most? probably

11. Give your findings to support items 9 and 10. Please see attached result of Blood Smear.

It is likewise settled that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 103 SCRA 336; De Vera v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., G.R. No. L48669, promulgated, December 26, 1984). Probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is test of proof in compensation proceedings (National Housing Corp., v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 79 SCRA 281). The very evidence of the petitioner shows probability of causation by the employment.

With respect to the contention of the petitioner that Hansen's Disease is not among the ailments which have been declared compensable, this Court in the case of Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (99 SCRA 710) said:

The contention that the Workmen's Compensation Commission erred in considering Hansen's disease (leprosy) compensable is without merit.

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It appears from the evidence of the claimant that his illness is traceable to his employment. Dr. Amado Ramos, as specialist on skin disease who diagnosed the illness of Leonardo Kalaw, testified that leprosy, like tuberculosis, is a system disease; that the specific cause is bacteria and the same can be acquired through body contact with a person harboring the germs; and that some of the participating factors leading to the development of the disease are the exposure to sudden changes of environment and temperature and the lessening of the body resistance of the person affected. (Rollo, p. 24).

xxx xxx xxx

In G.B. Francisco, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (87 SCRA 22, 30) this Court held:

The Workmen's Compensation Act which governs the present situation expressly provides in its Section 44 that in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that a claim comes within the provisions of this Act. Time and again this Court stated that under this declaration of a benign and sound public policy, an employee is freed from the burden of proving that his illness or injury was caused or aggravated by the nature of his work. In fact, the cause of the ailment is immaterial; what is important is that it occurred or was aggravated in the course of employment and disabled the workman from pursuing his ordinary occupation.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to read as follows:

The petitioner is hereby ordered —

1. To pay the private respondent the sum of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS as disability compensation benefits;

2. To pay SIX HUNDRED (P600.00) PESOS as attorney's fees; and

3. To pay SIXTY-ONE (P61.00) PESOS as administrative costs to the Ministry of Labor and Employment. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159060, November 28, 2007Gina Leviste vs Social Security System (Solid Mills, Inc.)

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In her Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Gina Leviste (petitioner) assails the February 24, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66223, which affirmed the dismissal of her claim for death benefits by the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in its March 2, 2001 Decision;2 and the July 9, 2003 CA Resolution3 which denied her motion for reconsideration.

There is no dispute over the facts.

Petitioner is the widow of Ronald Leviste (decedent) who suffered "Sudden Cardiac Death"[sic] at 11:50 in the evening of September 9, 1999.4 At the time of his death, the decedent was a Supervisor at Solid Mills, Inc. (Solid Mills) at Sucat, Muntinlupa City, and a member of the Social Security System (SSS).5

Petitioner filed with the SSS a claim for death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Law (P.D. No. 626).6 In a letter dated August 9, 2000, the SSS dismissed her claim based on the following findings:

A cursory re-evaluation of the benefit claim records of your husband disclosed the following:

1) Mr. Ronald Leviste last reported for work on Sept. 9, 1999 on a day shift and timed out at 4:00 p.m., as certified by his employer SOLID MILLS INC., located at Sucat, Muntinlupa City.

2) That after his tour of duty at 4:00 p.m., he left the company premises and immediately proceeded home to join his family at Brgy. Poblacion, Malvar, Batangas;

3) That at about 11:50 p.m. on the same date, he was rushed to a hospital nearby his residence and was pronounced dead on arrival, the immediate cause of which is "CARDIAC SUDDEN DEATH" as per death certificate Reg. No. 99-107 issued at Malvar, Batangas.

From the facts aforementioned, it appears that the circumstances surrounding the death of Ronald Leviste does not fall within the ambit of PD 626 which requires death or injuries to be considered work related must satisfactorily comply [with] the following:

1) The employee is injured or dies at the place where his work requires him to be;

2) The employee is performing his official functions;

3) If the injury or death is sustained elsewhere the employee is executing an order for his employer

In view therefore, we affirm our stand that the death of your husband Ronald Leviste is NOT work related and thus, is not compensable under ECC.7

On appeal by petitioner, the ECC rendered a Decision on March 2, 2001, affirming the dismissal of her claim, thus:

x x x Based on his medical records, the deceased had no previous heart problem. Although the overexertion of vigorous exercise may precipitate heart attack, there is, however, no evidence on record that he was subjected to strenuous or vigorous activities on account of his employment.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is dismissed for lack of merit.8 (Emphasis supplied.)

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Petitioner impugned the findings of the ECC in a Petition for Review before the CA.9 She pointed out that the ECC completely glossed over evidence extant in the records that, due to the nature of his work, the decedent was constantly exposed to harmful elements like fumes and heat, and that, at work in the afternoon before he died, the decedent performed an extremely strenuous activity of helping carry "a 100-kilo air-conditioning compressor from the rooftop of the three-storey administration building" down several flights of stairs and out to a workshop located 300 meters from the administration building.10

The CA dismissed the petition in its February 24, 2003 Decision. It also dismissed petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Hence, petitioner's recourse to this Court on the sole ground that:

The Court of Appeals had decided the instant dispute in a way not in accord with law and jurisprudence when it refused to consider that the death of the petitioner's husband was service-connected and compensable.11

Petitioner is correct.

By Resolution No. 432 approved on July 20, 1997, the ECC included cardio-vascular diseases in the List of Occupational and Compensable Diseases (Annex "A") appended to the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. The significance of the inclusion of cardio-vascular diseases in Annex "A" is that it relieved petitioner of the burden of proving a causal relation between the "sudden cardiac death" of the deceased member and the latter's work. Instead, Annex "A" established a presumption that "sudden cardiac death" is work-related.12 Thus, on this score, the SSS was obviously mistaken when, in its August 9, 2000 letter, it dismissed petitioner's claim for lack of evidence of causal relation of "sudden cardiac death" to the work of the deceased member.13 The ECC was quick to correct such mis-impression by pointing out that under Resolution No. 432, "sudden cardiac death" is now considered work-related.14 The CA arrived at that same conclusion.15

However, while the diseases listed in Annex "A" are presumed to be work-related, not every death resulting therefrom automatically entitles a claimant to death benefits.16 Annex "A" requires that, for the statutory presumption of causal relation to arise, it must be established beforehand that the listed disease was contracted under certain working conditions.17

With reference to cardio-vascular diseases, the same must be proven to have been contracted under any of the following conditions:

a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment there must be proof that an acute exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work.

b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within twenty four (24) hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.

c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain of work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship.18

Petitioner accepts that the "sudden cardiac death" of the decedent did not occur under the first condition. She does not question the entry in the report of death submitted by Solid Mills to the SSS which reads:

CAUSE OF INJURY/SICKNESS

Cardiac Arrest Secondary to overfatigue. Px however does not have any previous cardiac problem.19 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner maintains, however, that the evidence she presented established that the decedent succumbed to "sudden cardiac death" under the second and third conditions. Her evidence consists of the following:

First, the report of death itself in which Solid Mills acknowledged that the decedent died from "cardiac arrest secondary to overfatigue."20

Second, the job specification issued by Solid Mills which describes the working conditions of the decedent, to wit:

WORKING CONDITIONS:

- Six (6) days a week, regular time

- Continuous exposure to several disagreeable elements with occasional relief, such as dust, dirt, fumes, grease and heat.21

Third, the joint affidavit of Oscar Sanchez and Renato Linga, co-workers of the decedent, in which they vividly described the nature of the work they (including the decedent) regularly engage in:

2.2 Kung kinakailangang baklasin namin, upang kumpunihin, and isang supply air fan, kinakailangang buhatin namin and napakalaking propeller nito na tumitimbang ng higit 60 kilo. Para sa gawaing ito, kinakailangang gumamit ng chain block.

2.3 Kapag may kinukumpuni kaming anumang problema sa rotary filters, na siyang humihigop ng mga bulak, halos inuulan kami ng bulak.

2.4 At kung may aayusin naman kami sa IR compressor, na oil-cooled, halos naliligo naman kami sa langis.22

Affiants also confirmed that, on the day of his death, the decedent supervised the repair of a supply air fan and assisted in lifting a 100-kilo air compressor from a building rooftop to the repair workshop. They observed that the decedent skipped lunch in order to rest for, as the latter explained, he was not feeling well.23

Finally, the affidavit of petitioner in which she recalled that, in the afternoon before he died, the decedent came home from work extremely exhausted.24

Yet, incredibly, the ECC found the foregoing evidence insufficient to establish that the decedent was "subjected to strenuous or vigorous activities on account of his employment."25

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We are unable to accept such assessment of the ECC and the erroneous affirmance thereof by the CA.

Strict rules of evidence do not govern claims for workmen's compensation for under P.D. No. 626; the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, it suffices that such claims be based on mere probability, not certainty, of causal relation.26

There is no question that the high-grade uncontested documentary evidence presented by petitioner established with a reasonable probability - even certainty - that the decedent succumbed to "sudden cardiac death" within twenty-four (24) hours from undertaking backbreaking work and after manifesting signs of over-fatigue. His death took place under the second condition, giving rise to the presumption that it was work-related and therefore compensable.

The "sudden cardiac death" of the decedent may also be considered to have taken place under the third condition covered by Item No. 18 of Annex "A" which refers to the situation of persons who are asymptomatic or "symptomless" and "presenting no subjective evidence of disease."27

It appears that the CA overlooked the third condition when it affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's claim merely because the decedent "had no heart problem prior to his cardiac arrest."28 Such view is obviously amiss for the third condition under Item No. 18 of Annex "A" precisely covers persons not previously diagnosed to be suffering from a cardio-vascular disease but who, after undergoing strain of work, show signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of their work; and whose symptoms and signs persisted. We applied this concept to Ranises v. Employees' Compensation Commission, viz.:

Records show that petitioner falls under the third condition. In September 1997, when he was diagnosed to be suffering from myocardial infraction, he was employed as a driver-messenger by Data Craft Systems and subsequently by ADCOMS International, Inc. Prior to his employment, both companies’ doctors certified that he was in good health and fit to work. As a driver and messenger, he spent virtually his whole day driving around Metro Manila, delivering equipment, collecting checks, and picking up company guests at the airport and driving them to designated places. Obviously, petitioner in the performance of his job, was subject to severe strain and fatigue and exposed to the stress and strain of everyday traffic. We thus agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner’s ailment, being work-connected, is compensable.29

The uncontroverted evidence presented by petitioner convinces us that the physical strain to which the decedent was subjected in his regular work schedule and, more particularly, on the day of his death, proved too extreme that his heart, seemingly normal before undertaking such labors, simply succumbed.

In all, contrary to the ruling of the CA, the evidence of petitioner sufficiently demonstrated that the "sudden cardiac death" of the decedent occurred under both the second and third conditions of Item No. 18, Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, and is therefore presumed to be work-related and compensable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 24, 2003 Decision and July 9, 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66223 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Social Security System is ORDERED TO PAY Gina Leviste, petitioner, the compensation benefits due her under P.D. No. 626, as amended. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158268 April 12, 2006RHODA CASTOR-GARUPA, herein represented by attorney-in-fact, MS. IMELDA C. ELECTONA, Petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bayawan District Hospital), Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Workers, whose capabilities have been diminished, if not completely impaired, as a consequence of their service, ought to be given benefits they deserve under the law. Compassion for them is not a dole-out, but a right.1

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67866 dated 17 December 2002 dismissing petitioner Rhoda Castor-Garupa’s petition for review and affirming respondent Employees’ Compensation Commission’s (ECC) decision in ECC Case No. MG-11703-800, and the resolution3 dated 12 May 2003 denying her motion for reconsideration.

The antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Rhoda Castor-Garupa joined the government service on 1 January 1979 as Resident Physician at the Bayawan District Hospital which has a fifty-bed capacity located at Zamora Street, Bagawan City, Negros Oriental. On 1 January 1990, she was promoted to Medical Officer III.4

Sometime in 1994, petitioner started to experience high blood pressure and started to take medicines by way of self-medication with the help of her husband, Dr. Patrocino G. Garupa.5 In December 1998, she started to suffer from extreme fatigue and lost her appetite causing her to lose weight. Fearing that petitioner might be suffering from a more severe disease, her husband brought her to Cebu City where she was confined at the Chong Hua Hospital from 1 to 8 February 1999. Petitioner was initially diagnosed with Chronic Renal Failure secondary to Intrinsic Renal Disease.6 As a result, she underwent hemodialysis twice a week.7 She was transferred to the National Kidney and Transplant Institute (NKTI) where she was confined from 9 to 18 March 1999. The diagnosis was End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis. On 11 March 1999, she underwent a kidney transplant with her brother as donor.8

On 16 September 1999, petitioner filed with respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, otherwise known as the Employees Compensation Act.9

In a letter dated 4 October 1999, respondent GSIS denied the claim in this wise:

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Please be informed that the same cannot be given due course on the ground that Chronic Renal Failure and Chronic Glomerulonephritis are not among those diseases listed under "Annex A" of PD 626, as amended.

Section 1(b), Rule III of PD 626, as amended, is explicit in its requirements for compensability, to wit:

"For the sickness and the resulting disability to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under "Annex A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions."

A study of Chronic Glomerulonephritis, the disease that led to your Chronic Rental Failure, reveals that the disease is not a single entity but a mélange of different diseases which predominantly affect the glomerular tufts, causing inflammatory changes and subsequent scarring. It affects all ages but is more frequent before forty. Affects both sexes but more common in men.

Only a few patients give a clear-cut history of acute nephritis following infection, some cases of chronic nephritis probably originate in an inapparent infection with streptococcus following which edema or bloody urine was not noticed, it seems likely that most instances represent some disease other than poststreptococcal glomerulonephritis. In other instances evidence for an infectious origin is absent and the beginning of the disease can be dated only by the last normal examination. Many patients progress into the terminal stage without even having experienced edema. An occasional patient develops clear-cut acute glomerulonephritis following respiratory infection, succeeded by a "nephrotic stage" which yields over a period of years to slowly progressive renal insufficiency and mounting hypertension, but it is not usual to observe this full sequence of events in one individual.

The explosive course presents fatigue, anemia and breathless quickly appear, hypertension is prominent eventhough the heart may not be initially enlarged, the urine contains large quantities of proteins and red blood cells and may be grossly bloody.

In the slowly progressive course, abnormal urinary findings may be detected in a completely asymptomatic patient in the course of a routine physical examination.

In view of the foregoing, we regret to deny this claim for benefits under PD 626, as amended. Criteria for compensability under said law has not been satisfied.10

Petitioner filed a letter for reconsideration11 but respondent GSIS treated the same as an appeal and forwarded the records of the case to respondent ECC.12

The appeal was docketed as ECC Case No. MG-11703-800. In its decision dated 6 April 2001, respondent ECC affirmed respondent GSIS’s finding of non-compensability of petitioner’s disease and denied the appealed claim. It stated:

The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing - that the illness was caused by employment and that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed.

Glomerulonephritis is not an occupational disease considering her employment as a Resident Physician. She must, therefore, prove that her ailment was caused by her employment or that her working conditions increased the risk of contracting her ailment.

Medical literature describes the nature of Glomerulonephritis as follows:

"Of the many observed forms of Glomerulonephritis, most show evidence of deposits of antibody-antigen complexes in the glomeruli, the kidney’s filtering units; thus one common form of the disease occurs two (2) to three (3) weeks after an infection of the throat or skin with streptococci (a type of germ). Most cases are temporary, but a few become chronic, leading to kidney failure and Uremia (a serious illness caused by the inability of the kidneys to eliminate waste products of metabolism." (Robbins, Pathologic Basis of Disease, 4th edition)

As can be gleaned from the foregoing medical facts, the predisposing factor that might have given rise to the development of the ailment is not inherent in her working conditions. Except for the bare allegation that the disease was caused by her employment and that the risk of contracting the same was increased by her working conditions, the appellant makes no allegations of essential facts that caused her disease and how and why her working conditions increased the risk of contracting said disease, nor was any evidence submitted by appellant to substantiate and support her claim for benefits under PD 626, as amended. Specifically, she failed to allege in her claim as to how her employment caused her to contract Glomerulonephritis.

As there was not even a single allegation as to these matters, this Commission has no basis at all to rule that the appellant got the said disease as a result of or from her job, and/or that the risk of her contracting said disease was increased by her working conditions.13

Aggrieved, petitioner, pursuant to Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed her petition for review with the Court of Appeals raising as the sole issue the compensability of chronic glomerulonephritis under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.14 In its decision15 dated 17 December 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed in toto the decision of respondent ECC. The motion for reconsideration16 filed by petitioner was denied in a resolution dated 12 May 2003.17 Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner reiterates the sole issue of whether or not her disease, End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis, is compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. She argues that (1) she was afflicted with the disease during her employment with the Bayawan District Hospital; (2) there is substantial evidence to sustain that her employment increased the risk of contracting the disease; and (3) the law requires merely substantial proof of the risk of contraction and not proof of the actual or direct causation of the disease.

As required, respondent GSIS filed its Comment on 10 October 200318 to which petitioner filed a reply19 dated 16 December 2004. As regards respondent ECC, the Court dispensed its filing of a reply.20 Petitioner and respondent GSIS filed their respective memoranda.21

Petitioner maintains that she was afflicted with the disease during her employment with the Bayawan District Hospital. Though she admits that Chronic Glomerulonephritis that eventually led to End Stage Renal Disease is not listed as an Occupational Disease under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, she argues that the Court of Appeals and respondent ECC should have considered the nature

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and character of the bacterium that caused her affliction. In fact, she alleges that the letter of respondent GSIS already emphasized the attendant risk of contracting the disease in her working environment. She says that since the origin of Glomerulonephritis is not clear-cut and is hard to determine, the symptoms thereof may be established and recorded. In her case, the Physician’s Certification and the Employer’s Certification which she submitted to respondent GSIS clearly established that she suffered hypertension as early as 1994 and displayed sudden loss of appetite, edema and general fatigue in 1998 consistent with symptoms of chronic glomerulonephritis. All these, she claims, establish that she contracted the debilitating disease during her employment with the Bayawan District Hospital.

Petitioner argues that there is substantial evidence that shows that her employment increased the risk of contracting the disease. She says that respondent ECC found the cause of glomerulonephritis to be the bacterium streptococcus, while respondent GSIS declared that chronic glomerulonephritis is not a single entity but a mélange of different diseases which predominantly affect the glomerular tufts. She explains that if respondents GSIS and ECC, as well as the Court of Appeals, only reviewed the nature and character of the bacterium streptococcus, they could have easily found out that same can be easily contracted by mere inhalation, by direct contact by hands, by aerosol droplets and by secretions from patients and carriers.1avvphil.net She adds that as a practicing rural doctor for almost 20 years, it is inevitable that her duty exposes her to direct contact with patients. Thus, she claims that the increase in risk or probability of contracting the disease is neither a mere allegation nor a product of conjecture when one works in a hospital where a mélange of diseases abound.

In proving risk of contraction, petitioner asserts that only substantial or reasonable proof, not actual or direct causation of the disease between the work and the ailment, is required since probability and not certainty is the touchstone.

The Court of Appeals declared that since chronic glomerulonephritis is not an occupational disease, there is a need to prove the risk of contracting the disease. It posed the question: Was petitioner successful in proving that the disease she contracted was work related or connected?

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to demonstrate how her working conditions caused her disease and that she did not attempt to show any evidence that would support her claim for benefits. It added that since petitioner failed to introduce evidence that would support her position, she cannot rely on the "Increased Risk Theory."

We find merit in the petition.

Under Section 1(b) of Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. Petitioner was diagnosed as having End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis. Admittedly, said disease is not one of those enumerated as an Occupational Disease under Annex "A" of the ECC Rules. This fact, however, will not prevent petitioner’s claim from being granted as long as she can show that the risk of contracting said ailment was increased by her working conditions.

Respondent GSIS stated that petitioner’s Chronic Glomerulonephritis, the disease that led to her Chronic Rental Failure, is not a single entity but a mélange of different diseases which predominantly affect the glomerular tufts, while respondent ECC found the cause of glomerulonephritis to be the bacterium streptococcus. From such findings of both respondents, it is apparent that glomerulonephritis was caused by an infection. The classic clinical presentation of poststreptococcal glomerulonephritis is full-blown nephritic syndrome with oliguric acute renal failure. Physical examination reveals hypervolemia, edema and hypertension.22

For the increased risk theory to apply in compensation cases, the claimant must adduce reasonable proof between his work and the cause of the disease, or that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant’s working conditions.23 Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation.24 The degree of proof required under Presidential Decree No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation.25 It is sufficient that the hypothesis on which the workmen’s claim is based is probable since probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.26

Inasmuch as petitioner’s disease was not listed as an occupational disease, it is incumbent upon her to adduce substantial proof that would show that the nature of her employment or working conditions increased the risk of End Stage Renal Disease or Chronic Glomerulonephritis. The evidence presented by petitioner shows that her Chronic Glomerulonephritis that led to End Stage Renal Disease was caused by a streptococcal infection. She attached the Physician’s Certification and the Employer’s Certification which clearly established that she suffered hypertension as early as 1994 and displayed sudden loss of appetite, edema and general fatigue in 1998 consistent with symptoms of chronic glomerulonephritis.

Petitioner is a practicing doctor in a public rural hospital from 1 January 1979 until she underwent a kidney transplant on 11 March 1999. As a doctor who was in direct contact with patients, she was more exposed to all kinds of germs and bacteria, thus increasing the risk of contracting glomerulonephritis. Given the nature of her work, and considering further that resident physicians work for extended hours, the likelihood of petitioner being infected by the streptococcus bacterium is, without a doubt, increased. We thus find that the probability of petitioner contracting chronic glomerulonephritis in her workstation has been substantiated.

Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Despite such abandonment, however, the present law has not ceased to be an employees’ compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.27

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 December 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Government Service Insurance System is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Rhoda Castor-Garupa the compensation benefits due her under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-56191 May 27, 1986JESUS DE JESUS, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Philippine National Railways), respondents.

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GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, of petitioner Jesus de Jesus, surviving spouse of the late Ester P. de Jesus.

On April 13, 1945, Ester P. de Jesus was employed by the Philippine National Railways (PNR) as a telephone operator assigned at its San Fernando, Pampanga railway station. She was transferred in 1964 to the switchboard 'of the PNR Hospital at Caloocan City. De Jesus worked every other day during the night shift, for continuous periods of 16 hours starting from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. of the following day.

From November 10, 1978 to April 5, 1979, she was hospitalized four times at the PNR hospital. Her attending physician, Dr. Juan Pineda, Chief of Clinics, PNR hospital, diagnozed her ailments as chronic pyelonephritis, diabetes mellitus, anemia and modular pulmonary metastases which is also known as lung cancer.

According to Dr. Pineda, the ailments of Mrs. de Jesus started sometime in August, 1978 when she experienced progressive loss of weight and sudden loss of appetite accompanied by body weakness and easy fatigability with no other accompanying signs and symptoms except frequent urination. Despite medications, no improvement was noted and she soon complained of non-productive cough and mild lumbar pains. On December 8, 1978, after more than 33 years of service and at the age of 55 years she applied for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Act 1616 and Republic Act 4968 which was approved effective March 1, 1979. Retirement benefits were thereafter given under Retirement Gratuity No. 65520. Ester P. de Jesus died of her ailments on June 20, 1979. Petitioner Jesus de Jesus, the deceased's husband, filed a claim for death benefits under P.D. 626, as amended, on August 17, 1979. The claim was denied by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) on the ground that the deceased's ailments were not occupational diseases under the Labor Code. According to the GSIS

Diabetes mellitus is a hereditary disorder of carbohydrate metabolism due to inadequate production of insulin by the pancreas. Contributing factors for its occurrence are obesity, excessive consumption of sugar and fat disorders of endocrine glands and most important, hereditary. Symptoms include excessive thirst and urination, itching, hunger, weakness and loss of weight.

Anemia is a condition in which the normal amount of red blood cans is reduced. This may be a complication of the above diseases.

Chronic pyelonephritis is a slowly progressive infection in the renal pelvis and parenchyma frequently bilateral. It is associated with some obstructive lesions such as kidney stones and structural abnormalities in the renal tract.

Moreover, there is also no showing that your position as telephone operator in the Philippine National Railways, Manila, had increased the risks of contracting said ailments.

This decision was affirmed on review by the Employees' Compensation Commission on January 15, 1981.

Hence, the instant petition.

Since the ailments of the deceased, as found by her attending physician, manifested themselves in 1978 or beyond January 1, 1975, the law governing the petitioner's claim is the New Labor Code (Art. 208, P.D. 442, as amended).

Under Article 167 (L) of the New Labor Code and Section I (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.

In this case, it is the petitioner's contention that the condition of the deceased's work increased the risk of her contracting the diseases which caused her death.

After a careful examination of the case, we find the petitioner's claim without merit. The petitioner has failed to prove by competent evidence that the risk of contracting said diseases was indeed increased by the working conditions concomitant with the deceased's employment.

In affirming the GSIS' decision, the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission cited the following medical discussions to negate causal relation of the deceased's work to her ailments.

Nodular pulmonary metastases' is a phenomenon which results from infection with tumor emboli carried by the peripheral veins. Sarcomas, hypernephromas, melanomas and tumors of the breast, thyroid, and pancreas seem to find the lung an especially favorable site for the growth of metastases. On x-ray, nodular pulmonary metastases may appear as a solitary 'cannonball' nodule, multiple nodules, or military dissemination known as lymphangitis carcinomatosis. Dyspnea and pleuritic pain are the cardinal symptoms of lung metastases. (Reference: Harrison, T.R. Principles of Internal Medicine, McGraw Hill N.Y.: 5th Edition, 1966, pp. 945-946). On the other hand, 'anemia' is a condition in which the amount of blood in the body is decrease From a practical standpoint, the term means a reduction in the number of and the amount of hemoglobin per unit of blood. The Medical Division of this Commission discusses the etiologic classification of - as follows: '(1) loss of blood, (2) deficiency of factors in is; (3) excessive construction of red corpuscles; (a) Congenital -or hereditary, (b) Acquired; (1) infection (2) chronic diseases; (3) plumbism following irradiation, drug sensitivity; (4) endocrine deficiencies; (5) myelophthisic anemia; (6) hypersplenism (7) Idiopathic bone marrow failure; (c) miscellaneous hypersideremic anemias. Reference: Harrison, T.R.: Principles of Internal Medicine; McGraw Hill N.Y. 5th edition, 1966, p. 153.'

The decedent's other aliments, namely: diabetes mellitus and chronic pyelonephritis are likewise not traceable to her employment and employment conditions. 'Diabetes mellitus', according to medical science is:

A hereditary or developmental disorder of carbohydrate metabolism due to an absolute or relative insufficiency of the action of insulin appearing at any age as hyperglycemia, glycosuria, polyuria, polydipsia, polyphagia, pruritus weakness and weight loss. Etiology and incidence: Insufficient insulin action from causes still unknown is responsible for most cases of diabetes mellitus. Decreased effectiveness of insulin, which may or may not be associated with the presence of antagonist to insulin, is probably of greater etiologic importance than is an inadequate production of insulin by the B-cells of the islets of Langerhans.

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Although the exact cause of diabetes has not been found, some contributory factors are recognized. Hereditary is important, since there is a familiar history of diabetes in as many as 50% of cases. Obesity has been indicted. Disorders of endocrine glands other than the pancreas may be associated with the development of diabetes mellitus. Infection is a common precursor to the appearance or exacerbation of the disease, probably making a latent diabetes manifest. Pancreatitis, pancreatic tumors and hemochromatosis are responsible for occasional cases of diabetes. In certain persons who may be more susceptible to the eventual development of diabetes (e.g. strong positive family history) the use of certain drugs may be associated with the appearance of overt diseases. Such drugs include adrenocortical steroids and thiazide diuretics.

Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, M.S.D.; N.J. llth ed., 1966,. pp- 325-326.

Chronic pyelonephritis refers to a slowly progressing infection in the renal pelvis and parenchyma frequently bilateral The condition may have its origin in an acute pyelonephritis in childhood, especially in females, or during pregnancy. In males, it is usually associated with some obstructive lesion, such as renal calculi or prostatic hypertrophy. The common etiologic agent is the colon bacillus, P. vulgaris, or a related organism. Less frequently, one of the gram-positive cocci may be responsible. Reference: C.E. Lyght: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy, M.S., N.J. 1lth ed., p. 255.

On the other hand, the petitioner alleges that the deceased's continuous night shift duties coupled with the offensive odor of some medicine and dirty linens that were dumped regularly near her office, afflicted her weakening lungs and induced the development of lung cancer and anemia.

To bolster his claim, he submits a clinical history of the deceased and a letter certification both prepared by Dr. Juan Pineda, who was the attending physician of the deceased,

We regret to note, however, that the allegations have not been substantiated by the petitioner. While this court has always maintained that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation (Neri v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 127 SCRA 672), the basic rule that a mere allegation is not evidence (Topweld Manufacturing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 44944, August 9, 1985; Lagasca v. de Vera, 79 Phil. 376) should not be disregarded.

As to the medical view of Dr. Pineda, his endorsement that the deceased's working condition "contributed immeasurably to the insidious development of her lung lesion" and that her 11 unusual and prolonged working hours finally sapped her strength leading to physical exhaustion" which, together with diabetes and anemia, provided a "groundwork for pulmonary metastases" (Rollo, p. 16), implies aggravation of the disease rather than its direct causation.

We are, therefore, powerless under the law to reject the respondents' view that the diseases which the deceased suffered are not caused by employment. As the medical authorities reveal, those ailments are common to all mankind whether employed or unemployed, and if employed, irregardless of the nature of the employment.

Under the old Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, which provided for the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" it was possible to stretch the work related nature of an ailment beyond seemingly rational limits.

In this case, however, there is no dispute that the governing law is the New Labor Code, which according to settled jurisprudence (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483; Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Felipe U. Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, GSIS, Metro Manila, G.R. No. L45662, August 20, 1985), discarded the aforesaid concepts to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's rights to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.

The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.

On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fund under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent.

The Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund was established after actuarial studies and on the basis of the provisions of the new law. I commiserate with the claimant but compassion should be for all beneficiaries and not specific claimants. If we endanger the stability and liquidity of the Fund through orders compelling payment of benefits where the law never intended such benefits to be paid, we are not compassionate. We endanger the scheme.

WHEREFORE, we hold that the decision appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115243 December 1, 1995GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, (GSIS), petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NICOLAS FLORES, respondents.

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FELICIANO, J.:

Private respondent Nicolas Flores started his government service on 30 April 1967 when he joined the Philippine Constabulary at Camp Sergio Osmeña, Sr., Cebu City. In August of that same year, Flores was transferred to the 361st PC Co., Camp Lukban, Samar where he served as Clerk Typist. Later, in June 1968, he was transferred to the 1363rd PC Dental Detachment, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City and there he served as Dental Aide Technician.

In 1971, private respondent was promoted to the position of Supply Sergeant, Regional Dental Service, Unit VII, and was placed in charge of the acquisition and disposition of all kinds of medicines. He also worked as a Dental X-Ray Technician and as a Dental Xerox Machine Operator and Clerk Typist.

Sometime in February 1989, private respondent commenced experiencing headaches associated with blurring of vision, reddening of the eyes and nausea. On 27 March 1989, he was admitted to the Tacloban City Medical Center. The Certifications issued by his attending physician 1 and that issued by the Tacloban City Medical Center 2 reveal that his ailments were diagnosed as "Chronic Angle Closure Glaucoma OS; Acute Angle Closure Glaucoma OD; and Anterior Polar Cataract OU." Flores underwent surgical procedures which were described as "S/P Filtering with Trabuculectomy" on the left eye and "Peripheral Iridectomy" on the right eye. He was discharged from the hospital on 15 April 1989 in an improved condition. On 2 February 1990, Flores was again admitted to the PC-INP General Hospital in Camp Crame, Quezon City and diagnosed as suffering from "Cataract OU" and as requiring "S/P removal of after or secondary cataract." He was discharged from this hospital on 15 May 1990.

On 27 August 1990, Flores filed with petitioner Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") a claim for income benefits under the Employees' Compensation Law (Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended). The GSIS disapproved his claim upon the ground that his "chronic angle closure glaucoma" was not an occupational disease within the contemplation of the Labor Code and that there was no showing that his occupation had increased the risk of contracting that ailment. Private respondent Flores appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission ("ECC"); the latter affirmed the decision of the GSIS.

Flores then went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the ECC and declared private respondent's "chronic angle closure glaucoma" a compensable illness under the Employees' Compensation Law, as amended. The Court of Appeals said:

After considering the compassionate attitude that We have to adopt in determining the appeal in this case, and adhering to the liberal interpretation of PD 626 as amended, We rule that the law itself, being basically a social legislation, should be treated as such in order to afford relief to the working men and women in Our society (Lazo v. ECC, et al., 186 SCRA 569). In the instant appeal, the petitioner could no longer work because of loss of vision. This occurred during his occupation or performance of his job in the government for a very long time. Since the cause of Glaucoma is still uncertain or undetermined by medical science, the requirement of causal link should indeed be understood liberally so that substantial justice will be served to Our working men and women who looked at their job with devotion and dedication.

ACCORDINGLY, in the light of the foregoing, the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered declaring petitioner's Chronic Angle Closure Glaucoma as a compensable illness under PD No. 626 as amended, and directing the respondent GSIS to pay herein petitioner the benefits due him under the existing law. 3

Disputing the result reached and the basis relied upon by the Court of Appeals, GSIS filed the instant Petition for Review.

Petitioner GSIS avers that Flores's "chronic angle closure glaucoma" is not work-connected and that Flores had not shown that the risk of contracting that ailment had been enhanced by his working conditions. GSIS relies on medical findings indicating that "chronic angle closure glaucoma" is caused by an inherited anatomic defect which has no causal relationship with his occupation either as a Clerk Typist, or a Supply and Procurement Officer, or as a Dental X-Ray Technician, or as a Dental Copying Machine Operator:

Medical findings disclosed that Closure Glaucoma is an abnormality in which intraocular pressure increases because the outflow of aqueous humor from the [a]nterior chamber is mechanically impaired by contact of the iris with the trabecular drainage meshwork and the peripheral cornea. This is a type of glaucoma in which the patient never has a severe, acute, congestive attack but has an intermittent periods of increased pressure. The disease occurs because of an inherited anatomic defect that causes a shallow [a]nterior chamber. (Reference: Ophthalmology, Principles and Concepts, 5th Edition by Frank Newell, pp. 349-352). 4

We note at the outset that private respondent Flores is not only suffering from glaucoma but from cataract as well. 5 The Hospitalization Claim for Payment Form and the Medical Certificate issued by the Tacloban City Medical Center show that Flores was, from the start, diagnosed to be suffering, as already noted, from glaucoma on the left eye, glaucoma on the right eye and anterior polar cataract on both eyes. 6 Further, as also noted earlier, within a year after his first surgery, Flores was again hospitalized for removal of an after and secondary cataract. Thus, although apparently the precise issue raised and resolved below by the Court of Appeals and earlier by the ECC and the GSIS, related to the compensability of private respondent's glaucoma, the fact that he had, at the same time, cataract which required surgery must be considered by the Court.

The Employees' Compensation Law as set out in the Labor Code as amended, grants disability benefits to those who suffer loss or impairment of a physical or mental function resulting from injury arising out of, or in the course of employment, or from any illness accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC or any illness subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same was increased by the claimant's working conditions. 7 Thus, where the claimant's illness is not listed in the table of occupational diseases embodied in Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation, he bears the burden of proving by substantial evidence reasonable work-connection, if not direct causal relationship between his ailment and his working conditions. 8

In the case at bar, there is no question that angle closure glaucoma is not among the occupational diseases or illnesses set out in the list attached to the Employees' Compensation Law. Clearly, however, that list includes "cataract produced by exposure to the glare of or rays from molten glass or molten or red hot metal" and what is known as "Glass Blower's cataract" common among furnace men, glass blowers, bakers, blacksmiths, foundry workers and other workers exposed to infra-red rays. 9

Medical literature describes the nature and underlying causes of cataract of the eye as follows:

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Cataract is a disease of the crystalline lens with the clinical appearance of clouding. Cataracts are caused by the action of chemical or physical factors disturbing the internal respiration and the metabolic processes in the lens, thus inhibiting its nutrition and giving rise to the atrophy of epithelial elements of the capsule.

xxx xxx xxx

Acquired cataracts also include lens opacities caused by occupational factors such as electricity, ionizing and non-ionizing radiation, toxic substances.

xxx xxx xxx

Radiation cataract. Ionizing radiation (X-rays, gamma radiation, neutrons) is a serious cataractogenic factor. Cataract develops after exposure to both high doses and repeated small doses. The latency varies between 6 months and 2 years; it may extend to 8-12 years in certain cases. The higher the dose, the shorter is the latent period of cataract . . . . . Radiation cataract is encountered in persons employed in x-ray services, radiographic testing, nuclear power plants, and also in workers handling radioactive isotopes. . . . . Ionizing radiation also causes retinal damage. Radiation cataracts generally progress slowly. The initial opacities remain unchanged for years without noteworthy loss of sight. Signs of radiation disease are not necessarily evident.

Preventive measures to protect workers from ionizing radiation include lead shields or containers, spectacles with leaded glasses and observance of safe distances. During x-ray or gamma-ray treatment in the face region, the eyes are protected by lead masks. 10 (Emphasis supplied)

The literature is also consistent in naming exposure to x-ray radiation as among the recognized causes of cataract formation. 11 Although x-ray radiation is distinct from glare or rays from "molten glass" or "red hot metal," we consider that the former is closely analogous to the latter and that cataracts due to the former are reasonably assimilated to cataracts ascribable to the latter.

It is not disputed that private respondent Flores had been working at various PC-INP dental clinics or dispensaries, where part of his work consisted of operation of dental x-ray machines. This work, of course, involved exposure to x-ray radiation. 12 In support of his claim, private respondent Flores submitted to the ECC a letter setting forth the professional opinion of an ophthalmologist, Dr. Norma Berbano, to the effect that one of the causes of cataract formation is "over exposure to x-ray and radioactive material." 13

The state of medical opinion finds reflection in the case law of the Court. In Jarillo v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 14 the Court held that the nature of claimant's duties as a construction worker, which involved exposure to the sun's glare and heat as well as to excessive dirt and dust, had undoubtedly increased the risk of his contracting cataract of the eye. Again, in Loyola v. Government Service Insurance System, 15 the Court held as compensable the illness of a district supervisor of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) which was diagnosed as cataract with glaucoma. The duties of the claimant and as district supervisor included attending athletic meet as well as supervising and managing the training of division athletes. The Court said:

From the foregoing, it is clear that while the ailment of petitioner of cataract with glaucoma may be attributed to his aging, his exposure to the environment because of his work under the direct heat of the sun, strong winds, dirty dust, rains and unfavorable conditions must have contributed to if not aggravated his illness. Hence petitioner is entitled to compensation. 16

In the case at bar, the Court finds sufficient proof of work-connection, if not direct causal relationship, between the ailment of private respondent Flores consisting of cataract formation and his working conditions. His work as anx-ray machine operator for almost twenty (20) years must have substantially contributed to his illness. The circumstance that Flores's cataract was associated with glaucoma — the latter not being listed as an occupational disease in our statute books — is of no moment. We believe and so hold that the incidence of a listed occupational disease, whether or not associated with a non-listed ailment, is enough basis for requiring compensation. It remains only to note that the causes of angle closure glaucoma appear to be still unknown although some predisposing factors, such as vasomotor and emotional instability, hyperopia and heredity, appear to have been identified. 17 Should medical science be able in the future to ascertain those causes, courts may then be in a position to determine the presence or absence of the element of causal relationship or work-connection in particular cases.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 30521 is AFFIRMED so far as the result reached is concerned, but MODIFIED so as to declare Nicolas F. Flores's ailment of anterior polar cataract (not glaucoma) compensable under the Labor Code, as amended. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93003 March 3, 1992CARMELITA REYES, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision of public respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which was affirmed by the Employee Compensation (ECC) on January 17, 1990, denying death compensation benefits to herein claimant-petitioner.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner's late husband, Ernesto Reyes was a public school teacher since 1967. He first taught in the towns of Taal and Tanawan, Batangas. In 1973, he was transferred to Pinamalayan, Mindoro and to Calapan Mindoro in 1974 where he taught until 1987 (Annex "A," Petition).

On May 11, 1987, Ernesto was hospitalized at San Antonio General Hospital in Lipa. Batangas. He was discharged on May 19, 1987. On May 25, 1987, he died. His death certificate showed that he died of "aplastic anemia, complications, genito-urinary tract infection, acute renal failure, acute pulmonary insufficiency."

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Petitioner filed a claim for death benefit under PD 626, as amended, with the GSIS but the same was denied on July 28, 1987 on the ground that the cause of his death was not considered an occupational disease nor was there any showing that his position as teacher had increased the risk of contracting such ailment (p. 24, Rollo). The GSIS stood pat on its decision and denied the reconsideration sought by petitioner.

The appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission. From the records submitted by her, it was revealed that Ernesto Reyes was confined at the Oriental Mindoro General Hospital on March 19, 1987 for dry cough, easy fatigability and headache. It was also revealed from a chest x-ray film taken on March 8, 1987 that the late Ernesto Reyes had pulmonary tuberculosis. Hence, the ECC ordered the remanding of the appeal to the GSIS with a favorable recommendation, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

We hereby recommend that this new evidence (Chest x-ray film) in support of appellant's claim be remanded to the system together with the records for appropriate study and interpretation by their radiologist. If the radiologist findings is positive for pulmonary tuberculosis, the case is considered compensable under P.D. 626, as amended, is a contributory factor, if not the main factor of the pulmonary insufficiency, which is listed as one of the causes of his death. As per Cecil and Loeb's Textbook of Medicine, pulmonary tuberculosis among other conditions, may cause pulmonary insufficiency.

xxx xxx xxx

(pp. 28-29, Rollo).

Upon re-evaluation of the new evidence (Chest x-ray film), the GSIS found that the deceased suffered "minimal PTB, right lower lobe," and considered the illness compensable but only for permanent partial disability for nine (9) months starting from March 6, 1987, the date the chest x-ray was taken (p. 9, Rollo).

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision awarding her permanent partial dissability only, relying on the Order of the Commission recommending the granting of death benefits if the chest x-ray film would show that the deceased was positive for pulmonary tuberculosis. No reconsideration was granted. The petitioner again appealed the denial of the reconsideration to the Employee Compensation Commission and the case was docketed as ECC Case No. 4855.

In a decision dated January 17, 1990, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS. It held therein that:

Medical research show that aplastic anemia is a normochomic normocytic anemia, usually with associated leukpenia and thrombopenia, resistant to treatment and almost always fatal. Certain chemical and physical agents cause refractory anemia by toxic depression of blood formation. The chief toxic agents are benzal, gold, arsenic, dinitropenol, trinitrotohnol, radium and x-rays.

The causative factors in the development of aplastic anemia is the exposure to chemical and physical agents as stated in the medical findings. Since the deceased was working in an environment where exposure to chemical and physical agents are almost nil, we considered the said ailment as non-work-connected, and not compensable. (pp. 34-35, Rollo).

In this petition, the only issue presented for the resolution by this Court is whether or not public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the cause of death of petitioner's husband is not work connected and therefore not compensable under PD 626, as amended.

Petitioner, through counsel, argued that respondents confined the teaching profession simply to the discharge of the teacher's duty within the four walls of the classroom. They allegedly failed to consider that the duties of a teacher do not start nor end within the school premises. The going to and coming from the place of work must still be considered as working time as this Court did in Alano v. ECC, 158 SCRA 669. Petitioner seeks to prove in this petition that the deceased's illness was work-connected because as a teacher,

. . . (her) husband was teaching in one of the remote barrios of Pinamalayan, Mindoro. He stayed in said place during weekdays and went home only during week (ends). On the next school year, he was transferred to Calapan, Mindoro. He was assigned in Bo. Parang and later at Bo. Palhi, both situated in the hinterlands of Calapan, Mindoro. The deceased had to walk about 2 to 3 kms. everyday from the highway in going to these places exposing himself to the heat of the sun, rain, flood and other climatic changes.

Likewise, in going to these barrios, the deceased had to pass (through) ricefields and vast plantations of native citrus fruits locally known as "dalandan" or "sintores." It is of common knowledge in ricefields or in big plantations, the palay or the fruits are being sprayed with certain chemicals. Thus, the deceased must have inhaled or exposed (himself) to these chemicals which are health hazard(s).

Records further show that the deceased was assigned as an industrial art teacher. Being as such, his activities involved teaching gardening, woodcraft or furniture making and other carpentry jobs. Thus, he came in contact with paints, varnish, thinner or rugby and pesticides in discharging this activities.

xxx xxx xxx

(pp. 7-8, Petition)

The allegation regarding the work conditions of the deceased, specifically the polluted environment in going to and coming from work, was supported by a sworn statement of the deceased's co-teacher in Mindoro, dated May 23, 1990 (p. 20, Rollo).

Public respondents, on the other hand resisted the claim of petitioner on the ground that the cause of death of the deceased is not an occupational disease listed in Annex "A" of the rules implementing P.D. 626, as amended. And, contrary to petitioner's claim, aplastic anemia, the cause of the deceased's death was not work-connected. The alleged exposure of the deceased to chemicals from pesticides sprayed on ricefields and fruits where he used to pass in going to and from work is not sufficient to cause aplastic anemia. Moreover, there is no showing that the farmers in the fields where pesticides were sprayed contracted aplastic anemia. Likewise, the alleged exposure of the deceased to chemicals as Industrial Arts Teacher is insignificant to acquire aplastic anemia as there is no showing that any of his pupils died of aplastic anemia. In the sum, the petitioner failed to prove that her husband's working condition as a public school teacher increased the risk of contracting aplastic anemia.

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It is true that aplastic anemia is not an occupational disease for public school teachers as listed under Annex "A" of the amended rules implementing PD 626. The list states that aplastic anemia is contracted when an employee is exposed to x-rays, ionizing particles of radium or other radioactive substances or other forms of radian energy. Thus,

Occupatioal Disease Nature of Employment

8. Ionizg radiation disease, in Exposure to x-ray ionzng flammatonn ulceraton or ma- partcles of radum or other lgnant disease of the skin or radioactive substance or other subcutaneous tissues of the forms f radiant energy. bones fo leukemia, or anemia of the aplastic type due to x-rays, ionzng particale radium or other radio-active substances.

(Annex "A," Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation)

This fact however, does not totally preclude the petitioner from claiming death benefits for the death of her husband. If the cause of death is not listed as an occupational disease, recovery or compensation may still be had upon satisfactory proof that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working condition (Nazaro v. ECC, G.R. 80517, February 6, 1990. 181 SCRA 874, Magistrado v. ECC, et al., G.R. NO. 62641, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 605).

It should be emphasized at the outset that the evidence submitted by petitioner which consisted only of an affidavit executed by an alleged co-teacher of the deceased, tending to show that the risk of contracting aplastic anemia was increased by the deceased's working conditions was attached only to his petition before this Court. There is therefore no basis to charge public respondents of having acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's claim for death compensation benefits. It cannot be expected to engage in guesswork and rendered judgment on the basis of evidence not submitted to it nor brought to its attention.

At the administrative level, the petitioner relied solely on the favorable recommendation of the ECC that if the chest x-ray taken on the deceased is positive for pulmonary tuberculosis, his death case is compensable. When remanded to the GSIS, the x-ray film showed that the deceased was positive for minimal PTB. The GSIS then correctly awarded partial disability benefits only. Since the petitioner was not satisfied with the decision, she now comes to Us on a different theory. The problem however, is that this Court is not in the position to determine the authority of the affiant to make those statements and the veracity thereof.

While insecticide is listed as a possible cause of the disease (T.R. Harrison, Principles of Internal Medicine. 7th ed., p. 1533) there was no showing that afiant Mrs. Lourdes Agua, allegedly a co-teacher of the deceased, had the personal knowledge to attest to the facts stated in her affidavit. She stated in her affidavit that:

This is to certify that Mr. Ernesto I. Reyes, an Elementary Grades Teacher at Calapan East District, Division of Oriental Mindoro was assigned as Intermediate teacher at Maxima M. Kalaw Memorial School at barrio Palhi which is eight kilometers from his residence. It is further certified that during the SY 1974-1977 he used to walk everyday morning and afternoon from his residence to his assignment passing along the ricefield and fruit trees and of course could not avoid the pollution brought about by insecticides and fertilizers used by farmers like malathion, urea and ammonium sulfate. After these years of exposure to such chemicals he was then transferred to Calapan Central School where he was assigned as Practical Arts Teacher a was again exposed to other sorts of chemicals like thinner and paint which later on developed sickness (sic) as dizziness and vomiting. He didn't bother going to the doctor thinking that it was just an ordinary thing because as a teacher and father of four children, he must think of earning additional amount aside from his meager salary as teacher in order to give his children better education and future.

Because of the above activities of Mr. Ernesto I. Reyes as teacher who devoted his time, talents and efforts to serve the school children he was without his knowing developed (sic) such illness which later on became so serious causing his death and leaving his wife to work alone so their four children could be given what their father dreamed of.

SGD.Mrs. Lourdes Agua

(p. 20, Rollo)

In claims for compensability under P.D. 626, as amended, the claimant must show at last, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease was brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (Magistrado v. ECC, supra). The affidavit of Mrs. Agua is, to Our mind, not substantial to support petitioner's claim. It is doubtful whether the alleged exposure of the deceased to insecticides in going to and from school during the period from 1974-1977 was the immediate cause of his illness. We cannot pretend to be experts in this field and rule that indeed, his exposure to these substances caused his illness almost ten years later. This matter should have been resolved at the administrative level which had the expertise to determine the validity of the claims of petitioner.

While this Court sympathizes with the plight of petitioner who is now saddled with the burden of raising and sending her children to school on her own. We cannot grant her prayer. As a rule, administrative proceedings are not bound by rigid rules of procedure, however, total disregard of basic procedures cannot be countenanced. Claims cannot be raised for the first time at this very late stage in a petition for certiorari.

Lastly, it should be emphasized that the immediate cause of the death of Ernesto Reyes was aplastic anemia. That he also had genito-urinary tract infection, renal failure and acute pulmonary insufficiency do not detract from the fact that these latter disorders were merely the complications of the main culprit which is aplastic anemia.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the ECC is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 126352 September 7, 2001GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs.

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COURT OF APPEALS and GLORIA A. BARRAMEDA, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case is an appeal via certiorari1 from a decision of the Court of Appeals2 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission3 (hereafter, "ECC") and the letters-decisions of the Government Service Insurance System4 (hereafter, "GSIS") which denied respondent Gloria A. Barrameda’s claim for compensation benefits under P. D. No. 626.5

The Facts

Gloria A. Barrameda (hereafter, "Gloria") started in the government service on July 1, 1971, as a typist in the Court of First Instance of Manila.6 On January 3, 1985, she transferred to the Sandiganbayan and held the position of "clerk". On July 1, 1989, she was promoted to the position of Clerk III at the same office.7

As Clerk III, Gloria would file and keep the records of Associate Justice Augusto M. Amores. All files were kept in old steel cabinets which would jam from time to time because of rust and misalignment of the cabinet’s rollers. Part of Gloria’s job was to pull out the drawers of the cabinets where the folders of cases with varying thickness and weight were filed. Because sometimes the cabinets would jam, Gloria would have to exert extra effort in pulling and pushing the cabinets’ handles.

On August 26, 1992, as Gloria was pushing the drawer of one of the steel cabinets, she felt an excruciating pain in her wrists as the drawer unexpectedly jammed midway. She cried out in pain, calling the attention of her officemates, Court Attorney Paulino P. Santiago and Court Stenographer Elenita C. Jasul.8

From then on, Gloria experienced pain in both of her hands and gradually lost grip in both hands and could no longer keep house or carry heavy objects.9

On September 14, 1992, Gloria consulted Dr. Efren de los Santos of De Los Santos Medical Center, who diagnosed her condition as "TENDONITIS EXTENSOR POLLICE’S (sic) LONGUS THUMB, BILATERAL." Gloria was placed on medication and therapy.10

On March 23, 1993, Gloria filed a claim for compensation benefits with the GSIS11 in the amount of twenty thousand nine hundred twenty two pesos and ninety one centavos (P20,922.91) broken down as follows: seven thousand five hundred pesos and ninety one centavos (P7,500.91) for medicine;12 four thousand eight hundred and seventy pesos (P4,870.00) for physiotherapy13 and eight thousand five hundred and fifty two pesos (P8,552.00) for professional fees.14

On April 2, 1993, in a pro-forma letter, the GSIS denied Gloria’s claim on the grounds that: First, the ailment is a non-occupational disease, and Second, Gloria did not present any proof that her position as Clerk III at the Sandiganbayan increased the risk of her contracting the disease.15

On April 19, 1993, Gloria filed with the GSIS a letter request for reconsideration of the aforementioned letter-decision.16

On May 20, 1993, the GSIS denied Gloria’s letter-request.17

On June 1, 1993, Gloria filed with the GSIS a notice of appeal signifying her intention to appeal the denial of her claim to the ECC.18

On September 9, 1993, the ECC board resolved19 to affirm the decisions of the GSIS.20 According to the ECC, First, there was no proof that the closing of the steel cabinet’s drawers on August 26, 1992 triggered Gloria’s ailment as Gloria sought medical assistance a month after the incident. Second, medical research reveals that Gloria’s ailment21 is seen as the result of trauma, rheumatoid arthritis or infection. It is usually the result of strenuous or unaccustomed use of the adjacent joint. From this the ECC concluded that the ailment could not have been contracted in the course of Gloria’s employment, and denied her appeal. We quote the dispositive portion of the decision:22

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and the instant case is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

"SO ORDERED."

On November 29, 1993, Gloria appealed from the ECC’s dismissal of her claim to the Court of Appeals.23

On September 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision finding that there existed substantial evidence to grant Gloria’s claim. The Court of Appeals recalled Gloria’s tasks as Clerk III of the Sandiganbayan and concluded that such activities were strenuous enough to cause the ailment complained of. However, while the Court of Appeals ruled that the ailment suffered by Gloria was work related, the Court of Appeals found that the amount claimed by Gloria was more than the amount allowed to be reimbursed under the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled:24

"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Petition is hereby GRANTED ordering the GSIS to reimburse petitioner of the proper amount compensable under the rules implementing PD 626.

"SO ORDERED."

Hence, this petition.25

The Issue

Whether or not Gloria was entitled to compensation for work related ailment under P.D. No. 626.

The Court’s Ruling

We rule in the affirmative, and consequently, find the petition without merit.

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Under P. D. No. 626, if an ailment or sickness is not listed as an "occupational disease," the claimant must prove that the risk of contracting the illness suffered was increased by his or her working conditions.26 The degree of proof required is "substantial evidence." Jurisprudence defines "substantial evidence" as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion.27 In the case at bar we find that the evidence met the degree of proof required.

The affidavits submitted by Gloria as well as certifications with respect to the injuries she suffered and the nature of her work justified her claim.

The following are Gloria’s functions as Clerk III in the Sandiganbayan:28 First, types drafts and final copies of decisions, resolutions, as well as correspondences emanating from the Office of her Justice, and second, files and keeps records of the same.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that it is reasonable to conclude that the aforementioned activities which entail the opening and closing, pushing and pulling of rusty steel drawers, which sometimes jam and misalign; the lifting and filing of voluminous files and expedientes and the typing of various drafts and resolutions caused strain and the overstretching of her wrists’ joints and tendons.

Jurisprudence provides that to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof and not direct proof of a causal connection between the work and the ailment is required. To require proof of actual causes or factors which lead to the ailment would not be consistent with the liberal interpretation of the social justice guarantee in favor of workers.29

We thus do not find any error in the Court of Appeals’ ruling reversing the decision of the ECC. The ECC, as an agency charged by law to implement social justice must adopt a more liberal attitude in favor of claimants like Gloria when it decided her claim for compensability, especially as in this case, when there was basis for inferring a work-connection to the ailment she suffered. The policy of the State is to give maximum aid and protection to labor.30

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32703 is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-84415 June 29, 1989DIONISIA C. SANTE, in representation of her deceased husband SEVERINO T. SANTE, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

FELICIANO, J.:

Severino T. Sante, husband of petitioner Dionisia C. Sante, was, before his death on 23 February 1984, a driver of the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways, stationed in San Fernando, La Union. Severino Sante started his government service as a mechanic/helper in July 1962.

Sometime in 1979, Severino Sante experienced the physical weakening of his right hand, which condition gradually progressed to include his right upper arm. Two years later, he experienced difficulty in breathing and speaking, and algo dysphagia or difficulty in swallowing. This condition compelled him to seek medical attention at the Baguio General Hospital where he was confined from 6 to 14 May 1981 and from 17 to 25 June 1981. Dr. Servando Liban, attending physician of Severino T. Sante at the said hospital, diagnosed the latter's illness as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. 1

Severino Sante's condition continued to deteriorate. He was then forced to retire from his employment on 1 October 1981. He thereafter filed a claim for disability benefits under the Labor Code as amended by P.D. No. 626. The Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") however denied his claim upon the ground that his illness was not among those listed under the Regulations of the Workmen's Compensation Commission as an occupational disease, and that he had failed to present evidence showing that the conditions under which he worked as a driver of the Ministry of Public Works and Highways had increased the risk of his contracting that ailment. Upon appeal by Severino Sante, the Employees' Compensation Commission ("ECC") affirmed the decision of the GSIS. In an order dated 6 November 1985, the ECC held that the GSIS had correctly ruled that Severino Sante's illness, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, was not an occupational disease in respect of his particular job as a driver. The ECC went on to say that since the illness was not listed as an occupational disease, claimant Severino Sante must show proof that the risk of contracting that illness had been increased by his working conditions. The ECC noted that the claimant had not submitted any such proof. Accordingly, the ECC remanded the records of the case back to the GSIS for reception of additional evidence from claimant Sante and thereafter for re-evaluation by GSIS and determination of whether the illness of Sante was a compensable one under the theory of aggravation of risk

Meantime, however, Severino died on 23 February 1984. Petitioner Dionisia Sante picked up and continued to prosecute Severino's claim. On 15 February 1988, petitioner Dionisia Sante wrote to the GSIS requesting the latter to reconsider its stand on the basis of the Supreme Court decision in Mercado, Jr. vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 2 Which held according to petitioner, that when the cause of the disease is unknown, there is no duty to prove the causal link between the deceased's working conditions and the ailment. GSIS, in a letter dated 24 March 1988, advised petitioner that her request could not be acted upon in view of her failure to present factual and medical evidence to show a link between the disease and the decedent's working conditions. On 12 April 1988, petitioner wrote to the ECC again requesting re-evaluation of her earlier claim and once more invoking Mercado, Jr. vs. Employees' Compensation Commission. The ECC referred petitioner's letter to the GSIS. Petitioner, however, instead of presenting additional evidence before the GSIS, filed the present Petition for Certiorari.

The sole issue presented by this case is whether or not petitioner has a duty to establish facts and circumstances showing that her late husband's illness had been caused or aggravated by the conditions under which he had worked as a driver of the Ministry of Public Works and Highways, even though the cause of his disease was still unknown.

Petitioner stresses that the cause of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis is not known to medical science and quotes the following material:

Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis implies muscle wasting combined with signs of damage to the cortico-spinal tracts in the lateral columns of the spinal cord. It is common for wasting of the arms to be followed by spasticity of the legs, but rarely the latter may be present feature (sic). There is no sensory loss, which is a point of distinction from many other causes of progressive spastic paraparesis ....

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. . . The speed of deterioration varies greatly but few patients have more than three years from the first symptom, bulbar paralysis being obviously the most dangerous as it immediately threatens life. No cause has been found or reasonably conjectured .... (Matthews and Miller, Diseases of the Nervous System, Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1975, p. 286.

. . . The disease runs a slow course, but makes steady progress. It lasts an average of 3-4 years and ends lethally.

The cause of the disease is unknown; there are some indications that it is of infectious nature. (Mozorov and Romasanko, Neuropathology and Psychiatry, Moscow: Peace Publishers, p. 95.)

Petitioner, however, invokes the decision of this Court in Mercado, Jr. vs. Employees' Compensation Commission:

. . . The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment-the cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science-was, in fact caused or the risk of contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, especially considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of the employment compensation schemes the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been imposed. (139 SCRA, pp. 275-276.)

Petitioner also relies upon the case of Flaviano Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System, 3 where this Court stated:

Thus the requirement that the disease was caused or aggravated by the employment or work applies only to an illness where the cause can be determined or proved. Where the cause is unknown or cannot be ascertained, no duty to prove the link exists. For certainly, the law does not demand an impossibility.

We must note at once that Mercado, Jr. and Nemaria, to the extent they dispense with proof of work-connection as a requirement for payment of compensation, have been reversed and set aside by this Court in the recent case of Raro v. Employees' Compensation Commission . 4 The claimant in Raro was a clerk in the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences. She had been diagnosed as suffering from a brain tumor which impaired her memory, sense of time, vision and reasoning power. Her claim for compensation was denied by the GSIS, a denial which was affirmed by the ECC Petitioner there argued that, on the basis of the same doctrine embodied in Mercado Jr. and Nemaria, since medical science had not yet positively Identified the causes of various types of cancer, there was no obligation on the part of the claimant for disability benefits to prove that the risk of contracting those types of cancer had been aggravated by the conditions of employment of petitioner. The Supreme Court in Raro ruled that:

The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing-that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working condition. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of proof cannot be presumed.

xxx xxx xxx

To understand why the 'presumption of compensability together with the host of decisions interpreting the 'arising out of and in the course of employment' provision of the defunct law has been stricken from the present law, one has to go into the distinctions between the old workmen's compensation law and the present scheme. On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of 'presumption of compensability' and 'aggravation' and substituted a system based on security principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies-the Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System-under the Employees' Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmens compensation and the employee's right to receive separation for work-connected death or disability. (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., G.R. No. 65680, May 11, 1988).

Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.

xxx xxx xxx

The non-adversarial nature of the employees compensation proceedings is crucial to an understanding of the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fired and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment. It is a government institution which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund against the payment of non-compensable claims. The employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove a positive proposition, that the risk of controlling the disease is increased by the working conditions.

The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature which distinguishes it from the old and familiar system.

Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered employers throughout the country are required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund At the time the amount of contributions was being fixed, actuarial studies were undertaken. The actuarially determined number of workers who would probably file claims within any given year is important in insuring the stability of the trust fund and making certain that the system can pay benefits when due to all who are entitled and in the increased amounts fixed by law.

We have no actuarial expertise in the Court. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases, and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if increased contributions or premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to those

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who are now excluded, it is Congress which should amend the law after proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial legislation on such a complex subject with such far reaching implications.

We trust that the public respondent and the Social Security System are continually evaluating the actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer: In this way, more types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered occupational diseases. Or legislation may be recommended to Congress either increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing benefit payments, or making it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of this Court to accomplish.

For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practicing lawyers concerned, this decision expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees' Compensation Commission (128 SCRA 473 [1984]); Mercado v. Employees' Compensation Commission (127 SCRA 664 [1984]); Ovenson v. Employees' Compensation Commission (156 SCRA 21 [1987]); Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission (155 SCRA 166 [1987]) and other cases with conclusions different from those stated above. (Emphasis supplied)

Since amyotrophic lateral sclerosis is not included in the of occupational diseases which forms part of the present Amended Rules of the ECC, and because petitioner did not present to the GSIS additional evidence showing that the deceased Severino Sante's working conditions as a driver at the Ministry of Public Works and Highways had aggravated the risk of contracting that illness, we must regretfully deny petitioner's claim. We agree, however, with the Solicitor General that petitioner should be given another opportunity to present whatever evidence she may have to show work-connection or work-aggravation.

It will be seen that while Raro held that under the law as it stands today, the claimant must prove a positive thing-that is, that the illness was caused by the conditions of employment or that the risk of contracting such ailment was increased by such working condition, the court in Raro did not require that work-causation or work-connection be proved by direct evidence. We believe that what the court in Raro required is that a claimant must submit such proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real (and this is the thrust of Raro) not merely apparent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED and the Order of the Employees' Compensation Commission dated 6 November 1985 is hereby AFFIRMED. This decision is without prejudice to the right of petitioner to present additional evidence to prove the work-connected character of the illness of her late husband. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 144665 September 8, 2004GAU SHENG PHILS., INC. and BESTOW OCEAN UNIA TRADING PTE. LTD., petitioners, vs.ESTELLA JOAQUIN, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us for review is the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54596, holding the petitioners solidarily liable for compensation arising from the death of Roberto L. Joaquin.

The Antecedents

Bestow Ocean Unia Trading Pte. Ltd. (Bestow) is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines through its agent Gau Sheng Philippines, Inc. (Gau Sheng), a licensed manning agency.

On June 8, 1993, Roberto L. Joaquin signed a contract with Bestow, through Gau Sheng, under which he was hired as a fisherman on board the MV Bestow Ocean with a salary of US$250, with working time of forty-eight hours a week for a period of one year.3 Roberto boarded the vessel on September 23, 1993. After twenty-eight (28) days at sea, he fell ill and had to be repatriated to the Philippines on October 21, 1993, per his request. Upon his arrival in the Philippines, he and his wife, Estella Joaquin, went to the office of Gau Sheng and requested medical treatment for his illness and financial assistance, which was, however, rejected. They went home to Pangasinan, their home province. Roberto’s illness worsened and he had to be confined and treated at the Villaflor Hospital in Dagupan City. He later became an outpatient at the National Kidney Institute. On August 25, 1994, or eight (8) months after his repatriation, he succumbed to chronic renal failure.4

Estella filed a complaint before the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA)5 against Gau Sheng and Bestow for death compensation, docketed as POEA Case No. ADJ(M) 94-08-2608.6 She claimed that she and her children by her deceased husband were entitled to compensation, considering that her husband became ill during his employment with Bestow and died during the effectivity of their contract. She invoked Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1994 of the POEA.7

For their part, Bestow and Gau Sheng denied any liability for the death of Roberto, contending that it was impossible for the latter to have acquired and developed chronic renal failure on board the vessel MV Bestow Ocean for a period of less than a month. They averred that the complainant failed to prove that Roberto contracted the said illness while on board the said vessel and that the risk of contracting the said illness was increased by his working conditions. Moreover, the Employees’ Compensation Commission did not include chronic renal failure as an occupational disease. They pointed out that Roberto was given financial assistance for his medical check-up, and that Memorandum Circular No. 5 did not apply to Roberto because he died eight (8) months after he was repatriated.8

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On February 28, 1997, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision declaring Roberto’s death compensable and holding Gau Sheng and Bestow solidarily liable for the payment of death compensation to the complainant:

In fine, respondents are liable in solidum to the complainant in the following amounts less whatever had already been extended to him by way of financial assistance.

a) death benefits in the sum of US$1,000.00 or its peso equivalent;

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b) four (4) months’ pay at US$200 a month or US$1,000 or its peso equivalent; and

c) medical expenses incurred in the Philippines which was not quantified.

CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents in solidum to pay the complainant the peso equivalent of the disposition above which is hereby incorporated herein less the amount of financial assistance already received by complainant.9

The LA declared that Roberto was already suffering from chronic renal failure while on board the vessel MV Bestow Ocean and was repatriated to the Philippines while his contract was subsisting. He rejected the claim of Gau Sheng and Bestow that Roberto was already suffering from kidney renal failure even before his employment, as the latter was issued a clean bill of health by the designated physician who conducted a physical examination on him prior to embarkation. The LA based the award on the POEA Standard Employment Contract in force at the time of Roberto’s death.

Gau Sheng and Bestow appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In a Resolution dated July 26, 1999, the NLRC granted the appeal and dismissed the complaint:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby given due course. This case should be, as it is, hereby dismissed for lack of merit.10

The NLRC ruled that under Subsection 4-C, Section C, Part II of the POEA Standard Employment Contract,11 Roberto was required to submit to a post-medical examination conducted by the company-designated physician, but failed to do so. It held that aside from the death certificate indicating that Roberto died of chronic renal failure, the complainant failed to present any medical certificate or any documentary evidence to support her claim for death compensation. Further, Roberto was repatriated twenty-eight (28) days after his deployment and died of chronic renal failure several months thereafter; although his pre-employment medical examination showed that he was fit to work, it did not necessarily mean that he did not have kidney trouble before he sought employment from Bestow. Since there was no evidence to show that he contracted the disease during the term of his employment, the same cannot be said to be compensable.

The NLRC, likewise, pointed out that the death benefits awarded to the four children of Roberto had no basis because the complainant failed to show their filiation.12

Aggrieved, Estella filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54596.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA, in a decision dated April 28, 2000, reversed and set aside the July 26, 1999 Resolution of the NLRC. The dispositive portion is quoted, infra:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission dated July 26, 1999 is SET ASIDE, and the decision of Labor Arbiter Melquiades Sol D. Del Rosario is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as follows:

"In fine, private respondents, Gau Sheng Phils., and Bestow Ocean Unia Trading Pte., Ltd., are liable in solidum to the complainant in the following amounts less whatever had already been extended to him by way of financial assistance:

a) death benefit in the sum of US$11,000 or its peso equivalent;

b) funeral benefit in the sum of US$1,000 or its peso equivalent; and

c) four (4) months’ pay at US$250 a month or US$1,000 or its peso equivalent."13

In reversing the resolution of the NLRC, the CA ruled that the compensability of an ailment does not depend on whether the injury or disease is work-related or aggravated his condition. It stressed that in order for an employee to recover compensation, it is not required that an employee be in perfect condition or health at the time he received the ailment or that he be free from disease.14 Citing the case of More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,15 the CA stated that while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he finds them; he assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy person. If the injury is the proximate cause of his death or disability for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant and recovery may be had for injury, independent of any pre-existing weakness or disease. The CA went on to say that there was at least a reasonable connection between Roberto’s job and his kidney infection, which eventually developed into chronic renal failure and ultimately caused his death.

The CA also held that Roberto’s failure to comply with the seventy-two-(72)-hour post-medical examination, as required by the provisions of the POEA Standard Employment Contract, cannot be used to avoid payment of death compensation benefits. Estella could not be expected to travel from Lingayen, Pangasinan to Manila to inform Gau Sheng and Bestow of her husband’s condition.

The CA stressed that the POEA Standard Employment Contract is designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provision must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally or for the benefit of the seamen and their dependents.

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was dismissed.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Present Petition

The petitioners allege that the appellate court committed the following errors:

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I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE COMMISSION’S DECISION, THERE BEING NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE COMMISSION.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEATH OF ROBERTO JOAQUIN WAS COMPENSABLE FOR LACK OF FACTUAL BASIS.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING DEATH BENEFITS. BURIAL BENEFITS AND THE AMOUNT EQUIVALENT TO FOUR (4) MONTHS’ SALARY OF ROBERTO JOAQUIN.16

According to the petitioners, the respondent failed to show that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying her claim. The petitioners emphasize that the cause of Roberto’s death was not among those listed as compensable under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. Considering that Roberto himself requested for his release from the contract of employment and was, thus, repatriated on October 21, 1993, he was no longer an employee of the petitioners at the time of his death. They contend that the respondent failed to show that Roberto’s death was compensable, and that his death certificate is insufficient to show that he was ill when he was repatriated; that he was admitted to the hospital for the same illness; and that said illness caused his death.

The petitioners stress that Roberto’s failure to comply with the post-medical examination requirement under Subsection 4-C, Section C, Part II of the POEA Standard Employment Contract prevented the allowance of the respondent’s claim for death compensation.

For her part, Estella, the respondent, insists that the CA had judiciously resolved the pivotal issue of the compensability of Roberto’s death; hence, it did not commit any error in ruling that it was compensable.lavvphil.net

The pivotal issue for resolution is whether or not Roberto’s death is compensable.

In petitions for review, only questions of law may be raised, except, if the factual findings of the appellate court are mistaken, absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings culled by the court of origin.17 Due to the irreconcilable findings of the LA and the CA on the one hand, and the NLRC on the other, we are constrained to review the petition.

A review of Roberto’s employment contract revealed that provision number two (2) specifically provided that the terms and conditions of the revised employment contract for seafarers approved by the POEA/DOLE on July 14, 1989 under Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989, and amendments shall apply.18

Pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989, as incorporated in the Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen On Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which was in force during the employment of Roberto, the beneficiaries of an employee who died during the effectivity of the contract may claim compensation and benefits in case of death during the term of his contract:

7. Compensation and Benefits:

a. In case of death of the seaman during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the PHILIPPINE CURRENCY EQUIVALENT TO THE AMOUNT OF:

b. …

c. IN ALL CASES, THE EMPLOYER SHALL PAY THE BENEFICIARIES OF SEAMEN THE PHILIPPINE CURRENCY EQUIVALENT TO THE AMOUNT OF US$1,000 FOR BURIAL EXPENSES AT THE EXCHANGE RATE PREVAILING DURING THE TIME OF PAYMENT.

d. The employer shall pay the seaman his basic wages from the time he leaves the vessel for medical treatment. After discharge from the vessel, the seaman is entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of his basic wages until he is declared fit to work of the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. For this purpose, the seaman shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by the company-designated physician within THREE WORKING DAYS upon his return EXCEPT WHEN HE IS PHYSICALLY INCAPACITATED TO DO SO, IN WHICH CASE A WRITTEN NOTICE TO THE AGENCY WITHIN THE SAME PERIOD IS DEEMED AS COMPLIANCE. FAILURE OF THE SEAMAN TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REPORTING REQUIREMENT SHALL RESULT IN HIS FORFEITURE OF THE RIGHT TO CLAIM THE ABOVE BENEFITS.19

In order to give effect to the aforequoted benefits, it must be shown that the employee died during the effectivity of the contract of employment. Per Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989, as incorporated in the Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen On Board Ocean-Going Vessels, employment is deemed terminated in the following instances:

SECTION H. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

The employment of the seaman shall cease upon expiration of the contract period indicated in the Crew Contract unless the Master and the Seaman, by mutual consent, IN WRITING, agree to an early termination. IN WHICH CASE THE SEAMAN IS ENTITLED TO EARNED WAGES AND BENEFITS ONLY.20

Upon the mutual consent of Roberto and the petitioners, he (Roberto) was repatriated on October 21, 1993, or merely twenty-eight (28) days after he was deployed. Thus, his employment had been effectively terminated on that particular date. Based on Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989, Section 5(a), as incorporated in the Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen On Board Ocean-Going Vessels, Roberto is only entitled to earned wages and benefits. Considering that his employment had been terminated on October 21, 1993, he was no longer an employee of the petitioners when he died on June 25, 1994. Thus, the CA erred in applying Section 7 of Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989.

Moreover, death compensation benefits cannot be awarded unless there is substantial evidence showing that (a) the cause of Roberto’s death was reasonably connected with his work; or (b) the sickness for which he died is an accepted occupational disease; or (c) his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease for which he died.21

We note that Roberto died of chronic renal failure,22 a disease not listed as a compensable illness under Appendix 1 of the Standard Employment Contract. In fact, the list is limited only to the loss of kidney and spleen and residuals of impairment of intra-abdominal organs

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which require regular aid and attendance that will unable the worker to seek any gainful employment and hernia secondary to trauma or strain. Similarly, the Employees’ Compensation Commission does not list chronic renal failure as an occupational disease.23

For the increased risk theory to apply in compensation cases, we held in Riño v. Employees’ Compensation Commission24 that the claimant must adduce reasonable proof between the work of the deceased and the cause of his death, or that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the deceased’s working conditions:

Under the Labor Code, as amended, the beneficiaries of an employee are entitled to death benefits if the cause of death is sickness listed as occupational disease by the ECC; or any other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions.

The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Riño’s death are not listed as occupational diseases. Hence, petitioner should have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, showing that the nature of her husband’s employment or working conditions increased the risk of uremia, chronic renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis. This, the petitioner failed to do.

Petitioner did not adduce any proof of a reasonable connection between the work of the deceased and the cause of his death. There was no showing that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions in Virgilio’s job. Indeed, petitioner presented no medical history, records or physician’s report, in order to substantiate her claim that the working conditions at the Port Area increased the risk of uremia, renal failure or glomerulonephritis.

As we ruled in Sante v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, "x x x a claimant must submit such proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real x x x not merely apparent. …"25

It, thus, behooved the respondent to show a reasonable connection between Roberto’s work and the cause of his death; or that the risk of contracting chronic renal failure was increased by Roberto’s working conditions. The respondent must submit such proof as would constitute as a reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. However, the respondent failed to do so. There is no showing that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions in Roberto’s job as a fisherman. His medical history, medical records, or physician’s reports, were not even presented in order to substantiate the respondent’s claim that the working conditions on board MV Bestow Ocean increased the risk of contracting chronic renal failure.

In Harrison’s Principles of Internal Medicine, chronic renal failure is described in the following manner:

Chronic renal failure results from progressive and irreversible destruction of nephrons, regardless of cause (Chap. 237). This diagnosis implies that GFR is known to have been reduced for at least 3 to 6 months (see Table 233-1). Often a gradual decline in GFR occurs over a period of years. Proof of chronicity is also provided by the demonstration of bilateral reduction of kidney size by scout film, ultrasonography, intravenous pyelography, or tomography. Other findings of long-standing renal failure, such as renal osteodyastrophy or symptoms of uremia, also help to establish this syndrome. Several laboratory abnormalities are often regarded as reliable indicators of chronicity of renal disease, such as anemia, hyperphosphatemia or hypocalcemia, but there are not specific (Chap. 235). In contrast, the finding of broad casts in the urinary sediment (Chap. 44) is specific for chronic renal failure, the wide diameters of these casts reflecting the compensatory dilation and hypertrophy of surviving nephrons. Protenuria is a frequent but nonspecific finding, as is hematuria. Chronic obstructive uropathy polycystic and medullary cystic disease, analgesic nephrophaty, and the inactive end stage of any chronic tubulointerstitial nephrophaty are conditions in which the urine often contains little or no protein cells, or casts even though nephron destruction has progressed to chronic renal failure.26

We do not agree with the respondent’s claim that by the issuance of a clean bill of health to Roberto, made by the physicians selected/accredited by the petitioners, it necessarily follows that the illness for which her husband died was acquired during his employment as a fisherman for the petitioners.

The pre-employment medical examination conducted on Roberto could not have divulged the disease for which he died, considering the fact that most, if not all, are not so exploratory.27 The decrease of GFR, which is an indicator of chronic renal failure, is measured thru the renal function test.28 In pre-employment examination, the urine analysis (urinalysis), which is normally included, measures only the creatinine,29 the presence of which cannot conclusively indicate chronic renal failure.

The respondent claims that Roberto was repatriated due to illness. She relates that upon Roberto’s arrival in the Philippines, he was already seriously ill and that his body was bloated.30 She, however, failed to adduce substantial evidence that the aforesaid illness which led to Roberto’s request to be repatriated was also the same disease that caused his death. Neither was it shown that Roberto’s illness at the time he was repatriated was related to the cause of his death. In the absence of substantial evidence, Roberto’s working conditions cannot be assumed to have increased the risk of contracting chronic renal failure. In its July 26, 1999 Resolution, the NLRC stated that the respondent should have submitted Roberto to a post-medical examination within three (3) working days upon his return or in case of his incapacity, a written notice to the agency within the same period, in accordance with Section 4-C, Section C, Part II of the Standard Employment Contract.

While we agree with the CA that compliance with Section 4-C, Section C, Part II of the Standard Employment Contract can be dispensed with, there must be a basis for the award of death compensation. The death of a seaman several months after his repatriation for illness does not necessarily mean that (a) the seaman died of the same illness; (b) his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the illness which caused his death; and (c) the death is compensable, unless there is some reasonable basis to support otherwise.

The respondent insists that as held by the CA, Roberto’s condition prevented him from undergoing a medical examination and that she could not be expected to travel from Lingayen, Pangasinan to Manila to notify the petitioners of her husband’s condition. This may well have been the case; however, without a post-medical examination or its equivalent to show that the disease for which Roberto died was contracted during his employment or that his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the aforesaid ailment, the petitioners cannot be made liable for death compensation.

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Similarly, the other benefits, such as burial benefits and those allegedly owing to the deceased’s children cannot be made, especially considering that the respondent failed to substantiate her claim that the four (4) children are the minor children of deceased.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54596 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The July 26, 1999 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is hereby REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158846 June 3, 2004GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs.TEODOSIO CUANANG, represented by MARC DENNIS CUANANG, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated November 21, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 69305, which set aside the decision2 dated December 4, 2001 of the Employee’s Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. MG-11995-1200.

Carmen T. Cuanang, deceased wife of respondent Marc Dennis Cuanang, was formerly employed as a teacher in the Division of City Schools, Manila. She was first appointed on October 1, 1972, as Elementary Grade Teacher. She was later promoted to Teacher I on July 1, 1989 and later on to Teacher II. Carmen Cuanang served as Teacher II until she applied for early optional retirement on November 9, 1998, after completing almost twenty six years of government service.3

From September 14 to September 18, 1997, Carmen Cuanang was confined at the University of the East Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Medical Center, for Bronchial Asthma and Pneumonia, Rheumatic Heart Disease (RHD) and Mitral Stenosis.4 She filed a claim with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for sickness benefits under Presidential Decree 626, as amended.5 The GSIS awarded her Temporary Total Disability (TTD) benefits from November 14-25, 1998. Subsequently, Cuanang was also granted Permanent Partial Disability benefits equivalent to nine months.

Carmen Cuanang died on May 7, 2000 at the age of 65. The immediate cause of her death6 was determined to be Cardio Pulmonary Arrest with Acute Myocardial Infarction as the antecedent cause, and Bronchial Asthma and Hypertension as underlying causes.

Consequently, respondent filed with petitioner GSIS a claim for death benefits under PD 626, as amended. Petitioner denied the said claim in its letter of July 20, 2000,7 the pertinent portion of which reads:

After a careful study, the Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Department, submitted its findings and recommendations as follows:

"Death due to Myocardial Infarction is not compensable under PD 626 since it occurred after retirement and beyond PPD period."

Based on the recommendation of our Medical Department, this office regrets to inform you that your claim can not be favorably considered. x x x.

Respondent sought a re-evaluation of his claim, which the GSIS denied in a letter dated September 5, 2000.8

Respondent then appealed the denial of his claim to the ECC. In its December 4, 2001 decision,9 the ECC affirmed the denial by the GSIS of the respondent’s claim, thus:

The ailment Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) can not be considered work-connected since it is a complication of Rheumatic Heart Disease, which is a result of her (Carmen Cuanang’s) Rheumatic Fever, acquired during childhood. In the same vein, Bronchial Asthma can not be given due course since Cuanang’s death took place beyond the PPD period. Moreover, the fact that Hypertension was developed after Cuanang’s retirement negates compensability since it may be due to factors other than her work or working conditions.

Undeterred, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, challenging the above decision of the ECC. On November 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals made the following findings:

The degree of proof required under PD 626 is merely substantial evidence, which means, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The claimant must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development of the disease is brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work connection and not direct causal connection. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen’s claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded, especially where there is some basis in the fact for inferring work connection. Probability, not certainty is the touchstone.10

Hence, the Court of Appeals set aside the assailed decision of the ECC and ordered the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to pay respondent’s claim for death benefits under the Employee’s Compensation Act.

The basic question presented in this petition is whether the resulting death of Carmen Cuanang is compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.

We hold in the affirmative.

Petitioner contends that the ailments which brought about the death of respondent’s wife, Carmen Cuanang, do not fall within the ambit of the coverage of PD 626, considering that when they occurred she had long retired from government service.

We are not persuaded.

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We take our bearings from our pronouncements in the case of Consorcia F. Manuzon v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, et al.,11 In said case, the Employees’ Compensation Commission denied petitioner’s claim because the cause of death of her husband, an assistant professor at the Mindanao State University, which was myocardial infraction, came four and one half years after his retirement. We held:

We believe otherwise. The evidence clearly shows that during his employment, the deceased suffered from a stroke, a cardio vascular accident. It was caused by thrombosis or blockage of the arteries. He had to retire because of paralysis caused by that cardio vascular attack or myocardial infraction. Stated otherwise, the cause of his compulsory retirement due to paralysis arising from cardio vascular accident is closely related to the cause of his death, which was also a cardio vascular attack or myocardial infraction. That heart disease developed when he was still working as a professor. It caused his paralysis and his total permanent disability. The disease was work oriented because of the nature of his employment as a professor. The same disease eventually caused his death, contrary to the conclusion of both the GSIS and the Employees’ Compensation Commission. The Court holds that the heirs of Mr. Manuzon are entitled to the benefits they are claiming.12

In the instant case, the wife of the respondent died a year after her retirement. Clearly, the period between her retirement and demise was less than one year. Indeed, if a death which occurred almost four and one half years after retirement was held to be within the coverage of the death benefits under PD 626, as in the Manuzon case, with more reason should a death which occurred within one year after retirement be considered as covered under the same law. A claim for benefit for such death cannot be defeated by the mere fact of separation from service.13

Further, we agree with the pronouncements of the Court of Appeals that there was substantial evidence to support respondent’s claim. Hence, the degree of proof required under PD 626 was satisfied, i.e., "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."14 Probability and not ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.15

In the case at bar, the requisite substantial evidence came from the expert opinion of Dr. Arsenio A. Estreras Jr., a Diplomate in Internal Medicine who issued the Death Certificate, thus:

Acute Myocardial Infarction generally occurs with the abrupt decrease in coronary blood flow that follows a thrombotic occlusion of a coronary artery previously narrowed by astherosclerosis. It is common knowledge among medical practitioners that hypertension is one major risk factor among multiple coronary risk factors that can precipitate an acute coronary acclusion. (Harrison’s Principle of Internal Medicine, 14th ed., pp. 1066, 1110) Mrs. Carmen Cuanang was hypertensive and also had bronchial asthma. Therefore Acute Myocardial Infarction which she suffered can be a consequence also of her chronic hypertension vis-à-vis her rheumatic heart disease.16

The aforequoted expert opinion deserves credence considering that we have previously held that no physician, who is aware of the far reaching and serious effects that his statement would cause on a money claim filed with a government agency, would issue a certification indiscriminately without even minding his own interests and protection.17

Moreover, this expert opinion is fully supported by the facts leading to Carmen Cuanang’s deteriorating health condition, and ultimately, her death. When the deceased joined the government service on October 1, 1972, she was in perfect health. It was only in 1997, while she was still in the service, that her condition started to worsen. Her fragile condition necessitated her confinement at the University of the East Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center from September 14, 1997 to September 18, 1997 for Bronchial Asthma and Pneumonia; Rheumatic Heart Disease and Mitral Stenosis.18

Myocardial Infarction, also known as coronary occlusion or just a "coronary", is a life threatening condition. Predisposing factors for myocardial infarction are the same for all forms of Coronary Artery Disease, and these factors include stress. Stress appears to be associated with elevated blood pressure.19 It is of common knowledge that the job of a teacher can be very stressful. Carmen Cuanang’s responsibilities were never limited to the four corners of the classroom. Aside from teaching students, she also prepared lesson plans, attend seminars, conferences and other school activities, within and outside the school premises, such as tree planting for the beautification of the school premises and the community, sportsfest programs and parades, year after year throughout her almost 26 years in government service. During election periods, she was also deputized by the Commission on Elections to act as an election registrar. In addition, in going to and from the school, she was constantly exposed to the ravages of the natural elements such as heat, rain and dust.20 Needless to say, the collective effect of all these factors can indeed be very stressful especially for someone afflicted with Rheumatic Heart Disease as Carmen Cuanang. It goes without saying that all these conditions contributed much to the deterioration of her already precarious health.

The first law on workmen’s compensation in the Philippines was Act No. 3428, otherwise known as the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which took effect on June 10, 1928. This Act works upon the presumption of compensability which means that if the injury or disease arose out of and in the course of employment, it is presumed that the claim for compensation falls within the provisions of the law. Simply put, the employee need not present any proof of causation. It is the employer who should prove that the illness or injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment.21

P.D. No. 626 further amended Title II of Book IV on the ECC and State Insurance Fund of the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 442, as amended). This law abandoned the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.22 For the sickness and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant must prove that: (a) the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees’ Compensation, or (b) the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant’s working conditions.23 In other words, if the claimant’s illness or disease is not included in the said Annex "A," then he is entitled to compensation only if he can prove that the risk of contracting the illness or disease was increased by his working conditions.24

The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies – the Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System – under the Employees’ Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer’s obligation to pay workmen’s compensation and the employee’s right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.25

Notwithstanding the abandonment of the presumption of compensability established by the old law, the present law has not ceased to be an employees’ compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability,26 especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.27 Elsewise stated, a humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of disabled public servants.28 Verily, the policy is to extend the applicability of the law on employees’ compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.29

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Therefore, claims falling under the Employees’ Compensation Act should be liberally resolved to fulfill its essence as a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working man and woman in our society. It is only this kind of interpretation that can give meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code, which states that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations should be resolved in favor of labor.30

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69305 dated November 21, 2002, which set aside the decision of the Employees’ Compensation Commission, is AFFIRMED. The claim of Teodosio Cuanang for compensation benefits for the death of his wife, Carmen Cuanang, is GRANTED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132761 March 26, 2003NORMA ORATE, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS, INC.), respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the May 14, 1997 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42280, and its January 29, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

On December 5, 1972, petitioner Norma Orate was employed by Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc., as a regular machine operator.4 Her duties included the following:

A) Doffing:

1) Obtain empty cones from storage prior to doffing; incl. patrol round trip.

2) Prepare empty cones to each spindle prior to doffing; incl. attention to condition of empty cones.

3) Doff full cones to bank over machine.

4) Take empty cones by L. H. drop ends inside cone or wrap around cones and load to spindle then start spindle.

B) Creeling:

1) Remove empty bobbins from creel pin to conveyor.

2) Obtain one-full cop from bank and remove tail ends.

3) Fit full cop to creel pin and thread to guides

4) Find end from running cone and joint-end from full cop; incl. keep clearer free from accumulated cone.

5) Remove tail from empty bobbin when necessary. 20%

6) Stop spindles. (occasionally when stop motion malfunction. 10%)

C) Repair Breaks:

1) Patrol to break-end.

2) Stop spindle. (occasionally) 10%

3) Get end from full cop and thread to guides.

4) Find end from running cone by R.H. and joint ends by knotter on L. H., then start spindle; including keep cleaner free from accumulated cone.

D) Machine Cleaning Duties once per shift (start of shift):

1) Patrol to obtain brush.

2) Brush ends of machine.

3) Brush creel bar.

4) Brush frame beam and stand.5

On March 22, 1995, she was diagnosed to be suffering from invasive ductal carcinoma (breast, left),6 commonly referred to as cancer of the breast. Consequently, she underwent modified radical mastectomy on June 9, 1995.7 The operation incapacitated her from performing heavy work, for which reason she was forced to go on leave and, eventually, to retire from service at the age of 44.

On November 17, 1995, petitioner applied for employees compensation benefits8 with the Social Security System (SSS), but the same was denied on the ground that her illness is not work-related. On January 22, 1996, she moved for reconsideration contending that her duties as machine operator which included lifting heavy objects increased the risk of contracting breast cancer.9 The SSS, however, reiterated its denial

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of petitioner's claim for benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program. Instead, it approved her application as a sickness benefit claim under the SSS,10 and classified the same as a permanent partial disability equivalent to a period of twenty-three (23) months.11 Thus –

Respectfully referred is a letter and copies of EC-Sickness Benefit Claim of subject employee for your further evaluation and review.

Said claim was not considered as EC, however, sickness and disability benefit claims under SSS were approved, computer print-out hereto attached.12

Petitioner requested the elevation of her case to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed on June 20, 1996, the decision of the SSS in ECC Case No. MS-7938-296. The ECC ruled that petitioner's disability due to breast cancer is not compensable under the Employees' Compensation Program because said ailment is not included among the occupational diseases under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation; and it was not established that the risk of contracting said ailment was increased by the working conditions at Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc.13 The dispositive portion of the ECC's decision reads –

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant case is accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.14

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42280. On May 14, 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the ECC, and granted petitioner's claim for compensation benefit under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428).15 It held that petitioner's breast cancer must have intervened before the effectivity of Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code on Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund on January 1, 1975, hence, the governing law on petitioner's claim for compensation benefit is Act No. 3428, which works upon the presumption of compensability, and not the provisions of the Labor Code on employees' compensation. The Court of Appeals further ruled that since Manila Bay Spinning Mills, Inc. failed to discharge the burden of proving that petitioner's ailment did not arise out of or in the course of employment, the presumption of compensability prevails, entitling her to compensation. The dispositive portion of the said decision states:

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the contested Decision (ECC Case No. MS-7838-296) is hereby set aside; petitioner instead should be entitled to the benefits under Act No. 3428, as amended, together with the medical-surgical expenses, including doctor's bill.

SO ORDERED.16

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration17 arguing that it is the Labor Code which should be applied to her case inasmuch as there is no evidence that the onset of her breast carcinoma occurred before January 1, 1975. She claimed that the basis of the computation of her compensation benefits should be the Labor Code and not the Workmen's Compensation Act.

On January 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied her motion for reconsideration.18

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition insisting that her disability should be compensated under the provisions of the Labor Code and not under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The resolution of the instant controversy hinges on the following issues: (1) What is the law applicable to petitioner's claim for disability benefits? and (2) Is she entitled under the applicable law to be compensated for disability arising from breast carcinoma?

The first law on workmen's compensation in the Philippines is Act No. 3428, otherwise known as the Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect on June 10, 1928. This Act works upon the presumption of compensability which means that if the injury or disease arose out of and in the course of employment, it is presumed that the claim for compensation falls within the provisions of the law. Simply put, the employee need not present any proof of causation. It is the employer who should prove that the illness or injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment.19

On November 1, 1974, the Workmen's Compensation Act was repealed by the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442). On December 27, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 626 (which took effect on January 1, 1975) was issued. It extensively amended the provisions of Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code on Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund.20 The law as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – that the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.21 It discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies – the Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System – under the Employees' Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.22

In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al.,23 we explained the nature of the new employees' compensation scheme and the State Insurance Fund, as follows –

The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.

On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fund under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

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Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent. . . .

In workmen's compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date when the claimant contracted the disease. An injury or illness which intervened prior to January 1, 1975, the effectivity date of P.D. No. 626, shall be governed by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while those contracted on or after January 1, 1975 shall be governed by the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. No. 626.24 Corollarily, where the claim for compensation benefit was filed after the effectivity of P.D. No. 626 without any showing as to when the disease intervened, the presumption is that the disease was contracted after the effectivity of P.D. No. 626. 25

In the case at bar, petitioner was found to be positive for breast cancer on March 22, 1995. No evidence, however, was presented as to when she contracted said ailment. Hence, the presumption is that her illness intervened when P.D. No. 626 was already the governing law.

The instant controversy is not on all fours with the cases where the Court applied the "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" under the Workmen's Compensation Act, even though the claim for compensation benefit was filed after January 1, 1975. In the said cases, the symptoms of breast cancer manifested before or too close to the cut off date – January 1, 1975, that it is logical to presume that the breast carcinoma of the employee concerned must have intervened prior to January 1, 1975. Thus –

(1) In Avendaño v. Employees' Compensation Commission,26 the Workmen's Compensation Act was applied to a claim for disability income benefit arising from breast carcinoma, though the said claim was filed only in 1976, after the effectivity of the Labor Code. Per certification of the physician of the claimant, her breast cancer was contracted sometime in 1959, although the clinical manifestations thereof started only in 1969.

(2) In Cayco, et al. v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al.,27 the deceased employee's breast carcinoma first showed up in 1972 or 6 years before she died on April 26, 1978. We ruled therein that the presumption on compensability under the Workmen's Compensation Act governs since her right accrued before the Labor Code took effect.

(3) In Ajero v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al.,28 the claimant was confined and treated for pulmonary tuberculosis and cancer of the breast from January 5 to 15, 1976. In granting the employee's claim for income benefit, it was held that her ailments, especially pulmonary tuberculosis, must have supervened several years before, when the Workmen's Compensation Act was still in force.

(4) In Mandapat v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al.,29 we held that since the deceased underwent radical mastectomy on May 10, 1975, it is obvious that the tumor in her right breast started to develop even before 1975. We further noted "[t]hat the onset of cancer is quiet and gradual, in contrast [to] many diseases … It takes six to twelve months for a breast cancer to grow from a size which can just be found to the size actually encountered at the time of surgery."

(5) In Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al.,30 the deceased employee was confined for cancer of the liver, duodenal cancer, and cancer of the breast, from September 8-25, 1978, before she succumbed to death October 16, 1978. In the said case, we recognized that cancer is a disease which is often discovered when it is too late. Hence, we surmised that the possibility that its onset was even before the effectivity of the New Labor Code cannot be discounted.

(6) In De Leon v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al.,31 we ruled that the governing law on the claim for income benefit filed by the mother of the deceased on June 8, 1976 is the Workmen's Compensation Act. The modified radical mastectomy conducted on the deceased on September 16, 1968 obviously showed that she contracted breast carcinoma before the effectivity of P.D. No. 626.

Clearly therefore, the "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" under the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot be applied to petitioner's claim for compensation benefit arising from breast cancer. We are not experts in this field to rule that the onset of her breast carcinoma occurred prior to January 1, 1975, or almost twenty years ago. Hence, the provisions of the Labor Code govern. For breast carcinoma and resulting disability to be compensable, the claimant must prove, by substantial evidence, either of two things: (a) that the sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation; or (b) if the sickness is not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the claimant's working conditions.32

There is no dispute that cancer of the breast is not listed as an occupational disease under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation. As such, petitioner has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the causal relationship between her illness and her working conditions.

Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.33 In the case at bar, petitioner argued before the SSS and the ECC that her job as machine operator, which required lifting of heavy objects increased the risk of her contracting breast carcinoma. In addition, she contended that her job in the winding department exposed her to cancer-causing dyes used in coloring threads.34 In support thereof, she cited the following:

Some industrial chemicals create a cancer hazard for people who work with them. Such chemicals include aniline dyes, arsenic, asbestos, chromium and iron compounds, lead, nickel, vinyl chloride, and certain products of coal, lignite, oil shale, and petroleum. Unless industrial plants carefully control the use of such chemicals, excessive amounts may escape or be released into the environment. The chemicals then create a cancer hazard for people in surrounding areas. (World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 3, 1992 ed., p. 119)35

Regrettably, however, said bare allegations and vague excerpts on cancer do not constitute such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that there is a causal relationship between her illness and her working conditions. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions. The claimant must prove a positive proposition.36 A perusal of the records reveals that there is no evidence that she was indeed exposed to dyes. Even assuming that she was dealing directly with chemicals, there is no proof that the company where she worked did not implement measures to control the hazards occasioned by the use of such chemicals.

Indeed, cancer is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the deep bowels of the earth. It makes no difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.37

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It is not also correct to say that all disability or death resulting from all kinds of cancer are not compensable. There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.38 This was not satisfied in the instant case.

Hence, while we sustain petitioner's claim that it is the Labor Code that applies to her case, we are nonetheless constrained to rule that under the same code, her disability is not compensable. Much as we commiserate with her, our sympathy cannot justify an award not authorized by law. It is well to remember that if diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur. This stems from the development in the law that no longer is the poor employee still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer, hence the necessity of affording all kinds of favorable presumptions to the employee. This reasoning is no longer good policy. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law.39

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42280, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. MS-7938-296, dismissing petitioner's claim for compensation benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132558 May 9, 2000BEBERISA RIÑO, petitioner,vs.EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Death benefits under the Labor Code, as amended, are awarded only when the cause of death is listed as an occupational disease by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or when the claimant presents proof that the working conditions increased the risk of contracting the fatal disease.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the June 30, 1997 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) 2 in CA-GR SP No. 41257. The dispositive portion of the challenged CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission is AFFIRMED, and the petition DISMISSED. 3

The Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed by the CA disposed as follows:

Based on the foregoing medical findings, it would appear that the etiology of deceased's ailment which caused his death is not attributable to his employment. Since the ailment is not deemed work-connected, the instant claim for death benefits cannot be given due course.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Social Security System appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and the instant case is dismissed for want of merit. 4

Petitioner also assails the January 29, 1998 Resolution 5 of the appellate court denying reconsideration.

The Facts

Virgilio T. Riño Sr., husband of herein petitioner, was employed by Allied Port Services Inc. as stevedore since July, 1982. His duties included: (1) handling of steel cargoes; (2) loading and unloading of silica sand; (3) handling, loading and unloading of lumber products; (4) supervising other stevedores; and (5) performing other related work. 6

On July 19, 1992, Virgilio Riño collapsed while working at the South Harbor, Manila. He was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) because of "melena, fever, chills and abdominal pains 8 days [prior to confinement] . . . ." He died three days later. According to the Medical Certificate issued by Fe B. Bais, chief of the PGH Medical Records Division, the cause of death was "uremia [secondary] to chronic renal failure. Chronic glomerulonephritis. . . ." 7

Petitioner Beberisa Riño, his spouse, filed a claim for death benefits before the Social Security System (SSS). However, the SSS denied the claim in this wise: 8

The cause of death of your husband cannot be considered work-connected because based on the clinical abstract you submitted, your husband had already on and off attack of edema and hypertension which are signs of kidney disease even before his employment with the company. 9

On appeal, the ECC affirmed the findings of the SSS. 10 Ruling that petitioner failed to present relevant evidence to establish the causal connection between the deceased's ailment and his work as stevedore, the ECC held:

Moreover, medical evaluation suggests that Uremia is the sine qua non of chronic renal failure. It results from the retention in the blood of urea and other end products of metabolism normally excreted into the urine. Chronic Renal Failure on the other hand, is a toxic clinical condition associated with renal insufficiency and retention in the blood of nitrogenous waste products. It may be due to the following:

a) nephritis

b) congestive heart failure

c) couch syndrome

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d) poison

(Reference: Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 11th Edition p. 1155).

Based on the foregoing medical findings, it would appear that the etiology of deceased's ailment which caused his death is not attributable to his employment. Since the ailment is not deemed work-connected, the instant claim for death benefits cannot be given due course. 11

After the ECC denied the Motion for Reconsideration, 12 petitioner appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the ECC, the Court of Appeals ruled:

Since petitioner failed to establish any causal connection of the disease which led to the death of her husband with the nature of his working conditions, and, in particular, that said working condition had increased the risk of contracting the disease, then the claim for death benefits must fail.

The former law on compensation, the Workmen's Compensation Act, was replaced by a novel scheme in the New Labor Code under the title "Employees" Compensation and State Insurance Fund.' The new law discarded, among others, the concept of "presumption of compensability and aggravation" and substituted one based on social security principles. The purpose was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability. . . .

While as a rule, labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, such liberal construction of labor laws may not be applied where the pertinent provisions of law are clear and leave no room for interpretation. 1

Hence, this Petition for Review. 14

Issue

The lone issue submitted for this Court's resolution is:

Whether . . . petitioner's claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, shall prosper under the increased risk theory. 15

This Court's Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:

Compensability of Riño's Death

Under the Labor Code, as amended, 16 the beneficiaries of an employee are entitled to death benefits if the cause of death is a sickness listed as occupational disease by the ECC; or any other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions. 17

The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Riño's death are not listed as occupational diseases. Hence, petitioner should have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, showing that the nature of her husband's employment or working conditions increased the risk of uremia, chronic renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis. 18 This the petitioner failed to do.

Petitioner did not adduce any proof of a reasonable connection between the work of the deceased and the cause of his death. There was no showing that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions in Virgilio's job. Indeed, petitioner presented no medical history, records or physician's report in order to substantiate her claim that the working conditions at the Port Area increased the risk of uremia, renal failure orglomerulonephritis. 19

As we ruled in Sante v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 20 ". . . a claimant must submit such proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real . . . not merely apparent." At most, petitioner merely claims that:

. . . The nature of his work required physical strength in handling cargoes and at the same time giving full attention in supervising his men as the group's leadman assigned at Del Pan Area. It is worth mentioning that in the place where the deceased was assigned, there were no available comfort rooms to enable him to answer the "call of nature". In effect, delayed urination was a reality, coupled with the fact that being the leadman of his group, his continuing physical presence at the work's premises was indispensable. . . . 21

Such bare allegation does not ipso facto make Virgilio's death compensable. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions. 22 The beneficiaries must present evidence to prove a positive proposition. 2

While this Court has ruled that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, 24 it is likewise important to note that such sympathy must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for compensation. "Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families to look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur." 25 In this case, this Court has no other course but to apply the clear provisions of the law. 26

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WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-55464 November 12, 1981MIGUEL ACOSTA AND CESAR ACOSTA, petitioners, vs.EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and MINISTRY OF CULTURE, respondents.

DE CASTRO, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated September 18, 1980 of the Employees Compensation Commission.

Miguel Acosta filed a claim for employees' compensation benefit with the GSIS relative to the death of his wife, Fe Acosta due to carcinoma of the ovary. The System denied the claim on June 4, 1979 on the ground "that the fatal ailment is not in the least casually related to the employment of the deceased and hence, the case falls outside the compensable purview of the Employees Compensation law."

The deceased was a classroom teacher under the Ministry of Education and Culture. She started working for the government on July 11, 1949. At the time of the contraction of her ailment, she was assigned to Asingan Central School in Pangasinan.

On the first week of March 1978, the deceased complained of lumbar pain and enlargement of the abdomen. On April 18, 1978, she was confined at the UST Hospital, and her illness was diagnosed as "endometrioid carcinoma ovaries, stage III," which compelled her to retire at the age of 51. The patient's case reached its terminal stage, and she succumbed to her ailment on October 2, 1978.

The GSIS in turning down the claim of Acosta, alleged that the ailment is not an occupational disease, and neither was the risk of contracting the ailment increased by her working conditions as a classroom teacher, and as pointed out by its medical officer, the ailment has something to do with "hormonal influence, infection and familial tendency, " and that there has been no proof yet that a certain type of occupation can directly cause the said malignancy since it may occur in any adult female human being whether employed or not.

Unable to secure reconsideration, Acosta appealed to the Commission which affirmed the System's denial of the claim for compensation benefits, pertinent portions of the Commission's assailed decision being hereunder quoted as follow. 1

We have thoroughly studied the records of this case and we believe there appears more than sufficient basis to warrant the conclusion that (sic) the decedent's death does not fall within the compensable coverage of the law. Ovarian carcinoma, according to medical science, is a "relatively frequent disease, ranking next to the various forms of uterine cancer insofar as the female reproductive organs are concerned. It may be primary in the ovary or secondary to cancer in other organs. Malignant ovarian neoplasms may be solid or cystic and our own laboratory material would suggest that the latter is about twice as common. Due consideration must be given to the cystic degeneration which certain solid tumors undergo as well as the proliferative tendencies of the primary cystic lesions. It is not easy to distinguish between certain cystic and solid various neoplasm. It is manifestly impossible to cite the actual incidence or carcinoma of the ovary because of the varied interpretation between the benign and malignant. Randall however, using figures from the New York State where cancer is a reportable disease. estimates that at age 40 the probability of a woman's developing ovary cancer is approximately 0.9%, although the actual incidence rises to a peak of 4% at age 70, after which it decreases." (Reference: Novak E.R. Novak's Textbook of Gynecology; Scientific Book Agency, Calkutta,, 7th edition, 1966, pp. 440). Like all other carcinomas, the cause of ovarian carcinoma is unknown. (Textbook of Medicine, R.C. Cecil Saunders, P.A.; 10th edition, 1959, p. 915).

From the foregoing, it is clear that the predisposing factors deemed largely responsible for the development of the fatal disease were not inherent in or to the decedent's employment or occupation as a classroom teacher assigned to Asingan Central School in Asingan Pangatinan Appellant's allegation that the decedent's ailment is work-connected is (sic) therefore conjectural and bereft of medical or legal basis. No evidence could substantially prove that the deceased's employment as teacher played a role in the genesis of cancer of the ovary. There was likewise no showing that the deceased's working conditions increased her risk of contraction of the fatal disease. Even the decedent's attending physician, Dr. Jesus Y. Alcid of the UST Hospital disclaims a causal relationship between the decedent's fatal disease and her employment. Thus, when confronted with the query, "Was the injury or illness caused by the employee's duties," (Attending Physician's Certification, Part III, GSIS Form) the doctor answered "No." Strengthening further our conclusion of non-compensability of this case under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, is the report of the Medical Division of this Commission, viz:

Findings: Carcinoma of the ovary may be primary or secondary. Primary carcinoma occurs at the usual cancer period. It is bilateral in about 50 percent of cases. This does not mean that the growth commences primarily in both ovaries. The second ovary is most probably always infected from the first; the tumors are of different size.

Metastatic growth are common owing to the tendency of the carcinoma to break through the tunica albuginea of the ovary. The metastases are scattered over the peritoneum and are largely responsible for the characteristic ascites. Secondary growths may be found in the uterine muscle owing to the passage of the cells along the fallopian tubes.

The origin of ovarian carcinoma is a matter of uncertainty. Many of the tumors arise from the malignant transformation of cystadenoma, usually serious, occasionally pseudomucinous. Such tumors may still retain their cystic character, or the cysts may be completely replaced by solid tissue. The origin of the primary solid types is still more obscure. The germinal epithelium the epithelium of the follicles and wolffian rests have been suggested. Some cases are believed to have arisen in areas of ovarian endometriosis (Pathology for the Surgeon, by W. Boyd, 7th edition, 1955, pp. 393-395).

Recommendation:

The disease is not within the compensatory coverage of PD 626, as amended and therefore cannot be considered compensable.

The decision of the GSIS denying the instant claim should be affirmed.

Much as we desire to grant compensation to the appellant for the demise of his beloved wife, we cannot do so as the decision of the respondent System is fully butressed by law and evidence.

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xxx xxx xxx

Not satisfied with the said decision, Miguel Acosta, impleading Cesar Acosta, the surviving minor child of the deceased, as co-petitioner, filed the instant petition and alleged that the duties of the deceased consisted not only of classroom work but also field work such as YCAP, Girl Scouts Camporals done in open fields, physical education programs, and some activities in connection with the barangay development program; that she performed said activities even during her menstrual periods, exposing her to all kinds of weather, to the elements of heat, rain, and moisture which lowered her body resistance; that the fatal disease contracted by the deceased, cancer of the ovary, is akin to "rectal cancer" which the Commission in its Resolution No. 233, dated March 16, 1977, found to be compensable disease; that from the Commission's conclusion wherein it admitted that the cause of the cancer of the ovary is unknown and uncertain, it is highly absurd and illogical for said Commission to rule as it did, that said disease was not caused by the nature of the employment since the ailment surfaced in March 1978 and the record shows that the deceased completed the term of her duties up to the closing of the school year 1977-78. Petitioners, likewise, raised the issue whether the mere opinion of the attending physician of the deceased would disconnect the latter's death from her employment and prevail over the presumption established by the law that the illness which supervened, arose out of, or aggravated by, her employment.

Under PD 626, as amended, the present law on compensation, the listed occupational diseases are compensable when the conditions contained therein are met, and certain diseases are allowed to be compensable whenever the claimant can prove that the risks of contracting the disease are increased by the working conditions of the employment of the deceased. As to the degree of proof required, the claimant must show at least by substantial evidence that the development of the disease is brought largely by the conditions present in the nature of the job.

It appears that the deceased was in perfect health when she joined the government service in 1949, but her various out-of-campus activities, exposing her to the elements of heat and rain, contributed to the deterioration of her health, and her body resistance weakened due to the stress brought about by the nature of her work.

The GSIS itself was inclined to believe that the ailment of the deceased was aggravated by the nature of her work when it stated in the comment 2 that "it has no relation at all to the work of the deceased as a public school teacher except perhaps by way of aggravation." If this is so, there would be no consistency in respondent denying the claim for compensation on the ground that the risk of contracting the disease was not increased by her working conditions. It is more in keeping with reason to hold that once a situation of aggravation arises, there exists a causal relation between her work and her ailment which caused her death, as shown, respondent GSIS has conceded the possibility of aggravation being present.

Likewise, the Medical Officer admitted that one of the causes of the ovarian cancer is "infection," then it follows that when the body resistance of the deceased lowered because of the strain of her out-of-campus activities, her physical constitution weakened, thus making her more susceptible to contract infection. leading to a dreadful ailment.

In the case of Cristobal vs. ECC, 3 the Court stated that —

... the respondent Commission under Resolution No. 223 dated March 16, 1977, adopted as a policy, the institution of a more compassionate interpretation of the restrictive provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, by its administering agencies, the Social Security System and the Government Service Insurance System, with respect, to among others, Myocardial Infarction and other borderline cases. ...

The aim of the resolution is to extend the applicability of the decree to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. The ailment of the decease is classified as one of the "borderline cases" previously mentioned. Petitioners have substantially complied with the condition as to the degree of proof required under the theory of increased risk, hence, their claim should be given favorable consideration. To deny them the benefits would render meaningless the constitutional guarantees in favor of the workingmen.

Further, to require petitioners to prove the actual causes or factors which led to the development of the ovarian cancer of the deceased would be inconsistent with the liberal interpretation of the labor law. In compensation cases, the evidence of the test as to the relation of the work to the ailment is probability and not certainty.

It is generally accepted that the exact origin of practically all types of cancer is not yet determined. Scientists and medical experts are still in the process of discovering the most effective cure for that malady. With this backdrop, one should not expect ordinary persons like petitioners to prove the real cause of the ailment of the deceased when the experts themselves are still in the dark.

The records do not show the date when the deceased contracted the ailment since it was only found out in April 1978 when she was confined in hospital, which took place after the effectivity of the New Labor Code and construing the law liberally in favor of the workers, the petitioners should be awarded the benefits prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated September 18, 1980 of the Employees Compensation Commission is hereby SET ASIDE and the GSIS is DIRECTED to pay petitioners the amount of twelve thousand (P12,000.00) pesos as death benefits and the amount of one thousand two hundred (P1,200.00) pesos as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-58445 April 27, 1989ZAIDA G. RARO, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences), respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a source of confusion among the claimants and the government agencies enforcing the employees' compensation law. The strongly lingering influence of the principles of 94 presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found in the defunct Workmen's Compensation Act but expressly discarded under the present compensation scheme has led to conflict and inconsistency in employees' compensation decisions.

The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of "proof of increased risk." There are two approaches to a solution in cases where it cannot be proved that the risk of contracting an illness not listed as an occupational disease was increased by the

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claimant's working conditions. The one espoused by the petitioner insists that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection because the causes of the disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment. On the other hand, the respondents state that if there is no proof of the required work connection, the disease is not compensable because the law says so.

The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on March 17, 1975. About four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and then, she sought medical treatment in Manila. She was then a Mining Recorder in the Bureau.

The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had been lost.

A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. An appeal to the Employees' Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission's affirming the GSIS decision.

The following issues are raised in this petition:

1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted during employment is compensable under the present compensation laws.

2. Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely inapplicable under the present compensation laws when a disease is not listed as occupational disease. (p. 17, Rollo)

The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science cannot, as yet, positively identify the causes of various types of cancer. It is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It makes the difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.

It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of occupational diseases prepared by the Commission includes some cancers as compensable, namely —

Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment

xxx xxx xxx xxx

16. Cancer of stomach and other Woodworkers, wood products lymphatic and blood forming vessels; industry carpenters, nasal cavity and sinuses and employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills.

17. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers, and brain plastic workers.

(Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation)

The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the Commission's allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated for brain cancer. There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust, among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of contracting specific cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.

The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself.

Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines defines "sickness" as follows:

ART. 167. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is by working conditions. For this purpose, the Co on is empowered to determine and approve occupational and work- related illnesses that may be considered compensable sable based on hazards of employment. (PD 1368, May 1, 1978).

Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly defines who are entitled. It provides:

SECTION 1.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease under Annex A of these rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increase by the working conditions. (Emphasis supplied)

The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed .

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In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988) this Court recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes; people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a particular form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e. g. chemical fumes, nuclear radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that it was the employment which increased the risk of contracting the disease .

To understand why the "Presumption of compensability" together with the host of decisions interpreting the "arising out of and in the course of employment" provision of the defunct law has been stricken from the present law, one has to go into the distinctions between the old workmen's compensation law and the present scheme.

On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on social security principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies — the Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System — under the Employees' Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for work- connected death or disability. (Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., GR No. 65680, May 11, 1988).

Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.

In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (supra), we affirmed the validity of the new law by explaining the present system as follows:

We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attack against the constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It must be noted that the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was only when his claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of this law on appeal by certiorari.

The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected claims according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the worker's constitutional rights.

xxx xxx xxx

The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.

On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own fund to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a fired under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent.

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. There is no serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.

The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that should be addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the former workmen's compensation program with its presumptions, controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present scheme must be decided by the political departments. The present law was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate on social justice and is more advantageous to the greater number of working men and women. Until Congress and the President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply it. (at pp. 4, 5, and 6)

The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial to an understanding of the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that the poor employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer. Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment. It is a government institution which protects the stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund against the payment of non-compensable claims. The employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to prove a positive proposition, that the risk of contracting the is increased by working conditions.

The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature which distinguishes it from the old and familiar system.

Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered employers throughout the country are required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. At the time the amount of contributions was being fixed, actuarial studies were undertaken. The actuarially determined number of workers who would probably file claims within any given year is important in insuring the stability of the said fund and making certain that the system can pay benefits when due to all who are entitled and in the increased amounts fixed by law.

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We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to winch the tens of millions of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, salary and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if increased contributions or premiums must be paid in order to give benefits to those who are now excluded, it is Congress which should amend the law after proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial legislation on such a complex subject with such far reaching implications.

We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are continually evaluating the actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In this way, more types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered occupational diseases. Or legislation may be recommended to Congress either increasing the contribution rates of employers, increasing benefit payments, or making it easier to prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of this Court to accomplish.

For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers concerned, this decision expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees' Compensation Commission [128 SCRA 473 (1984)]; Mercado v. Employees' Compensation Commission [127 SCRA 664 (1984)]; Ovenson v. Employees' Compensation Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)]; Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with conclusions different from those stated above.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED The questioned decision of the public respondents is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 86020 August 5, 1994RAMON CORPORAL, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari questioning the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission which denied petitioner's claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.

I

Norma Peralta Corporal was employed as a public school teacher with assignment in Juban, Sorsogon. On November 28 to November 30, 1977, she was confined at the Esteves Memorial Hospital for acute coronary insufficiency and premature ventricular contractions.

On June 30, 1983, she was assigned to the Banadero Elementary School in Daraga, Albay. Norma had to walk three kilometers to and from said school as no transportation was available to ferry her and other teachers from the national highway to the school. During her fourth pregnancy, Norma suffered a complete abortion and was hospitalized for two days at the Albay Provincial Hospital. After her maternity leave, Norma reported back to work.

In March of 1984, she again conceived. However, in September of the same year, she was transferred to the Kilicao Elementary School, where she had to walk more than one kilometer of rough road. On December 2, 1984, she gave birth to a baby boy with the help of a "hilot." An hour later, she was rushed to the Immaculate Conception Hospital due to profuse vaginal bleeding. She underwent a hysterectomy but unfortunately, she died on the same day due to "shock, severe hemorrhage" resulting from a "prolapse(d) uterus post partum." Norma was 40 years old when she died.

Her husband, Ramon Corporal, petitioner herein, filed a claim for compensation benefit with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The GSIS denied petitioner's claim thus:

Please be advised that on the basis of the proofs and evidences (sic) submitted to the System, the cause of death of your wife, Shock secondary to Severe Hemorrhage, Uterine PROLAPSE is not considered an occupational disease as contemplated under the above-mentioned law (P.D. No. 626). Neither was there any showing that her position as Teacher, MECS, Albay had increased the risk of contracting her ailment (Rollo, p. 23).

Petitioner filed several motions for the reconsideration of the denial of his claim to no avail, because a re-evaluation of the claim by the Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Group of the GSIS showed that there was "no basis to alter its previous action of denial for the same reason . . . that her cause of death is non-work-connected as contemplated under the law" and neither did her job as a teacher increase the risk of contracting her ailment (Rollo, p. 25).

Petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC). The ECC requested the GSIS to re-evaluate petitioner's claim and to finally determine compensability, with instruction that in case the claim is denied once more by the System, the entire record of the case be elevated to the ECC. The GSIS reiterated its denial of petitioner's claim.

On September 7, 1988, the ECC rendered a decision also denying petitioner's claim. It said:

Medical studies show that Prolapsed Uterus may occur in infants and nulliparous women as well as multiparas. Defects in innervation and in the basic integrity of the supporting structures account(s) for prolapse(d) in the first two and childbirth trauma for the latter. The cervix usually elongates because the weight of the nagging vaginal tissues pulls it downward, whereas the attached but weak cardinal ligaments tend(s) to support it. In third degree or complete prolapse(d) both the cervix and the body of the uterus have passed through the introitus and the entire vaginal canal is inverted. (Obstetrics and Gynecology, Wilson, Beecham, Carrington, 3rd Edition, p. 585).

On the other hand Acute Coronary Insufficiency are terms often used to describe a syndrome characterized by prolonged substernal pain, usually not relieved by vasodilators of a short period of rest due to a more severe inadequacy of coronary circulation. The symptoms in this condition are more intense and prolonged than in angina pectoris, but abnormal ECG and other laboratory findings associated with myocardial infarction are absent. The syndrome is covered by a temporary inability of one's coronary arteries to supply sufficient oxygenated blood to the heart muscle. (Merck, Manual of Diagnosis & Therapy, pp. 100-101).

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Based on the above medical discussion of the subject ailments, we believe that the development of the fatal illness has no relation whatsoever with the duties and working conditions of the late teacher. There is no showing that the nature of her duties caused the development of prolapse of the uterus. The ailment was a complication of childbirth causing profuse vaginal bleeding during the late stage. We also consider Acute Coronary Insufficiency as non-work-connected illness for the reason that it is caused by temporary inability of one coronary arteries (sic) to supply oxygenated blood to the heart muscle. There is no damage to heart muscle. In view thereof, we have no recourse but to sustain respondent's denial of the instant claim (Rollo, pp. 29-31).

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition, asserting compensability of the death of his wife.

II

Petitioner contends that although prolapsed uterus is not one of occupational diseases listed by the ECC, his claim should proper under the increased risk theory. He anchors such claim on the fact that as early as January 1984 or before Norma's fifth pregnancy, he had noticed a spherical tissue which appeared like a tomato protruding out of Norma's vagina and rectum. He avers that such condition was attributable to Norma's long walks to and from her place of teaching — Banadero Elementary School, which is situated on the side of the Mayon Volcano. Moreover, the roads leading to the school are full of ruts and rocks, and, during the rainy season, are flooded and slippery. Petitioner asserts that inspite of these, Norma continued to discharge her duties as a public servant, notwithstanding her pregnancy and her prolapsed uterus.

Petitioner also contends that the findings of the respondents contravene the constitutional provision on social justice. He alleges that since the workmen's compensation law is a social legislation, its provisions should be interpreted liberally in favor of the employees whose rights it intends to protect.

Under P.D. No. 626, as amended, for sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable, the claimant must show either: (a) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (b) that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (Santos v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 221 SCRA 182 [1993]; Quizon v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 203 SCRA 426 [1991]). Clearly, then, the principle of aggravation and presumption of compensability under the old Workmen's Compensation Act no longer applies (Latagan v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 213 SCRA 715 [1992]).

Since petitioner admits that his wife died of an ailment which is not listed as compensable by the ECC and he merely anchors his claim on the second rule, he must positively show that the risk of contracting Norma's illness was increased by her working conditions. Petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge the onus imposed by law.

The fact that Norma had to walk six kilometers everyday and thereafter, a shorter distance of more than one kilometer just to reach her place of work, was not sufficient to establish that such condition caused her to develop prolapse of the uterus. Petitioner did not even present medical findings on the veracity of his claim that Norma had a tomato-like spherical tissue protruding from her vagina and rectum.

Norma developed prolapse of the uterus because she was multiparas, or one who had more than one child, and quite beyond the safe child-bearing age when she gave birth to her fifth child — she was already forty years old. Novak's Textbook on Gynecology describes prolapse of the uterus (descensus uteri) as follows:

An extremely common condition, being far more frequent in elderly than in young patients. This is explained by the increasing laxity and atony of the muscular and fascial structures in later life. The effects of childbirth injuries may thus make themselves evident, in the form of uterine prolapse, many years after the last pregnancy. Pregnancies in a prolapsed uterus may lead to numerous complications, as noted by Piver and Spezia.

The important factor in the mechanism of the prolapse is undoubtedly injury or overstretching of the pelvic floor, and especially of the cardinal ligaments (Mackenrodt) in the bases of the broad ligaments. Combined with this there is usually extensive injury to the perineal structures, producing marked vaginal relaxation and also frequent injury to the fascia or the anterior or posterior vaginal walls, with the production of cystocele or rectocele. Usually, various combinations of these conditions are seen, although at times little or no cystocele or rectocele is associated with the prolapse. Occasional cases are seen for that matter, in women who have never borne children, and in these the prolapse apparently represents a hernia of the uterus through a defect in the pelvic fascial floor (Emphasis supplied).

The 1986 Current Medical Diagnosis & Treatment also describes the condition as follows:

Uterine prolapse most commonly occurs as a delayed result of childbirth injury to the pelvic floor (particularly the transverse cervical and uterosacral ligaments). Unrepaired obstetric lacerations of the levator musculature and perineal body augment the weakness. Attenuation of the pelvic structures with aging and congenital weakness can accelerate the development of prolapse.

The determination of whether the prolapse of Norma's uterus developed before or after her fifth pregnancy is therefore immaterial since this illness is the result of the physiological structure and changes in the body on pregnancy and childbirth.

With the evidence presented in support of the claim, petitioner's prayer cannot be granted. While as a rule labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, (Tria v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 208 SCRA 834 [1992]), there is also the rule that such liberal construction and interpretation of labor laws may not be applied where the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and P.D. No. 626, as amended, are clear and leave no room for interpretation.

The Court commiserates with the petitioner and his children for the loss of a loved one. We also recognize the importance of the services rendered by public elementary school teachers inspite of their meager salaries which are not proportionate to their immense responsibility in molding the values and character of the youth in this country (De Vera v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 133 SCRA 685 [1984]).

But under the legal milieu of the case, we can only suggest, not mandate, that respondents grant ex gratia some form of relief to their members similarly situated as petitioner's wife. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-62300 September 25, 1987ANGELITA TAÑEDO, petitioner, vs.

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EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Agrarian Reform), respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Subject of the instant petition is the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) dated September 11, 1980 which affirmed the denial by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) of petitioner's claim for benefits arising from the death of her husband, Francisco Tanedo, under P.D. No. 626, as amended.

Francisco Tanedo was a Janitor-Laborer in the District Office of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform at Tarlac, Tarlac. His duties included the cleaning of the comfort rooms of the office and the watering of plants. Prior thereto, he worked as laborer in the former Bureau of Public Highways commencing in February, 1955, then as "Capataz Timekeeper," and "Construction Capataz" before transferring to the Agrarian Reforms Ministry on June 29, 1972.

In December, 1976 he was found to be suffering from "puffiness of face, pedal edema and progressive abdominal enlargement." He was accordingly confined at the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital where his ailment was diagnosed as "renal insufficiency secondary to chronic renal disease." An apparent recurrence of his illness caused his hospitalization again, in January, 1978, this time at the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. He however failed to respond to the administered treatment; his condition gradually retrogressed. In September, 1978 he sought and obtained admission at the Tarlac Provincial Hospital where, twenty days later, he finally died.

His widow, petitioner herein, filed a claim for death benefits with respondent GSIS. The latter denied her claim on the ground that the disease which caused her husband's death, "chronic glomerulonephritis," was not one of the compensable illnesses under the law; this, on the basis of the report (findings and recommendations) of its Medical Director dated May 7, 1979. 1 It overuled her claim that the final diagnosis and effective cause of death was "glomerulonephritis; renal hypertension and Koch's pulmonary." 2 Her motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner elevated the matter to the ECC which, as aforestated, affirmed the decision of the GSIS. She is now before us, praying for reversal of those decisions of the GSIS and the ECC and the award to her of the death benefits she has applied for.

A compensable sickness according to the law, 3 is "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the game is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable based on the peculiar hazards of employment." That list referred to, of illnesses definitely accepted as occupational diseases, is set out in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. 4

It is clear that in order that "sickness and the resulting disability or death .. be compensable," the claimant must show either:

1) that it is "the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of .. (the ECC) Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied;" or

2) if not so listed, that "the risk of contracting the disease is increase by the working conditions. 5

It being at once apparent that "chronic glomerulonephritis" is not among the listed compensable illnesses in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules, it behooved the petitioner to adduce persuasive proof that her decease husband's death was caused not only by said disease but also and additionally by renal hypertension and that Identified by her as "Koch's pulmonary," as was the theory upon which she had founded her application for death benefits, and that, additionally, "the risk of contracting" those diseases was "increased by the working conditions" attendant upon her husband's duties as janitor-laborer.

Regrettably, even under the less stringent evidentiary norm of substantial evidence obtaining in employees 'compensation proceedings, 6 petitioner has failed to adduce such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that she has urged the GSIS and the ECC to make. 7 What the evidence does establish, as the ECC observes, is that the disease and its complications from which petitioner's husband died bore no causal relation to the nature of his employment. His hypertension was only a manifestation of his chronic glomerulonephritis, was in other words "simply a complication," and was "not brought about by employment factors." 8 We perceive nothing in the record to warrant reversal of these findings.

Neither may an award in petitioner's favor be justified upon any presumption that illness causing death or disability arose out of the employment or was at least aggravated by such employment. That presumption was laid down by the old statute. 9 It is however now a thing of the past, abolished on effectivity of the new law on January 1, 1975. 10 Awards of compensation benefits for death or disability can now no longer be made to rest on presumption, but on a showing that the causative disease is among those listed by the ECC, or on substantial evidence that the risk of contracting said disease is increase by the employee's working conditions. 11

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismiss, without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. L-60346 October 11, 1985JOSE P. MERCADO JR., petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Refuse & Environmental Sanitation Center, City of Manila), respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

MAKASIAR, C.J.:

Before Us is a motion for reconsideration filed on March 22, 1984 by the respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) on the following arguments:

Reasonable work-connection is required by the law for all employees' compensation claims, the alleged fact of impossibility of proof notwithstanding.

xxx xxx xxx

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No reasonable work-connection exists in petitioner's case (pp. 155 & 158, rec.)

Respondent contends

... that to declare as compensable all ailments whose causes are unknown, would be to place the claimants with such types of ailments in a far better position than those whose causes are known but cannot be connected to the employment.

... that the standard of reasonable work-connection established by this Honorable Court becomes meaningless if ailments with unknown causes be made compensable; for, in such cases, all ailments will and should logically become compensable-an interpretation which is not yet contemplated by law.

... that under the facts presented ... there is absolutely no reasonable work-connection between his ailment and his employment (pp. 154-155, rec.).

Significantly, the motion cites three resolutions of the First Division which apparently run counter to the decision now under review. The three resolutions-Timbang vs. ECC (G.R. No. 59676, February 15, 1984); Planas vs. ECC (G.R. No. 65020, February 20, 1985); and Ceballo vs. ECC (G.R. No. 63816, February 29, 1984)-denied employee compensation claims there being no proof that the ailments in question were work-connected, i.e., either the ailments were contracted as a result of the employment or the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions. Planas-promulgated on exactly the same day the decision under review was promulgate-implied agreed with therein respondents proposition that:

... The fact that the cause of the ailment is unknown, cannot relieve a claimant of the burden of proof; otherwise, we arrive at the illogical or absurd result that claimants with ailments whose causes are unknow, are better off than those whose causes are known and cannot be connected to the employment. The petition itself recognizes that there should at least be a reasonable work-connection between the ailment and the employment. That standard becomes meaningless if ailments with unknown causes are complensable. For, in such a case, all ailments will and should become compensable. We respectfully submit that at this time, such an intepretation is not yet contemplated by the law (pp. 4-5, Comment in G.R. No. 65020).

WE cannot reverse.

It is not disputed that the etiology of intracranial new growth or brain tumor is as obscure as that of neoplasm elsewhere in the body; that (brain) tumor is a disease of such nature that the developments of medical science up to now cannot fully explain its causes and the factors that may aggravate or alleviate its causes and progress.

Neither is it disputed that the petitioner, who had served the government for 34 years prior to his forced retirement, entered the government service and, for the most part, stayed therein, free from any kind of disease.

Finally, it is also not disputed that petitioner was exposed to unhygienic working conditions during his tenure in government, and specially at least during his early employment as laborer, special laborer and watchman with the Department of Health of Manila in 1945 when Manila was still in ruins, dusty, unsanitary, with destroyed water system and without any system of garbage collection.

The present case is similar to Cristobal vs. ECC (L-49280, Feb. 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 329). There, We granted compensation consonant with the following observations:

The deceased died of rectal cancer on May 27, 1977. Concededly, the exact cause or etiology of this disease is- still unknown. ... Its cause and development are insidious, imperceptible to the naked eye, and defies expert analysis. Therefore, whether or not the disease rectal cancer was caused or the risk of contracting the same was increased by the decedent's working conditions remains uncertain. This uncertainty, of course, cannot eliminate the probability that the ailment was work-connected as it had been established that the deceased was exposed to unhygienic working conditions, various chemicals and intense beat which are generally considered as predisposing factors of cancer. At this point, there is need to reiterate that when the deceased started working in 1964, he was free from any kind of disease.

Concededly, in the case at bar, petitioner failed to provide direct proof that his brain tumor was work-connected. This failure however was simply due to the undisputed fact that the causes of intracranial new growth is not known even to medical science.

Nonetheless, the probability that petitioner's brain tumor was work-connected is bolstered by the facts that the petitioner had been working with the government for 34 years before he was forced by his ailment to retire from employment, that he joined the government service in good health, and that he was undoubtedly exposed to unhygienic working conditions (generally considered as a predisposing factor of cancer) during his tenure with the government.

This probability coupled with the constitutional guarantees of social justice and protection to labor lead Us to no other conclusion but to grant petitioner's compensation claims. Again, in Cristobal We said:

In urging that the disease rectal cancer is not compensable since its nature or cause is unknown and petitioner was not able to show proof of direct causal relation, respondents would instruct us to ignore the (above) provision of law and the policy of the State of giving maximum aid and protection to labor (as We have stated earlier in the main decision). As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee secured by both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially when there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection (103 SCRA 329, 336; italic supplied).

While the presumption of compensability and the theory of aggravation espoused under the Workmen's Compensation Act "may have been abandoned under the new Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law, in general still subsists. All these factual and legal grounds were considered in relation to each other constituting substantial evidence clearly convincing Us to resolve that rectal cancer is compensable" (Cristobal vs. ECC, supra).

It is non sequitur to state, as respondent avers, "that to declare as compensable all ailments whose causes are unknown, would be to place the claimants with such types of ailments in a far better position than those whose causes are known but cannot be connected to the employment." The point is that it is grossly inequitable to require as a condition for an award of compensation that the claimant demonstrate that his ailment-the cause or origin of which is unknown to and undetermined even by medical science was, in fact caused or the risk of

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contracting the same enhanced by his working conditions. Plainly, the condition would be an impossible one, specially considering that said claimant is most probably not even conversant with the intricacies of medical science and the claimant invariably bereft of the material resources to employ medical experts to demonstrate the connection between the cause and the disease. Considering the liberal character of employment compensation schemes, the impossible condition should be deemed as not having been intended and/or imposed.

Verily, by permitting compensation notwithstanding the absence of any showing of causal link between the ailment whose causes are unknown and the working conditions which may be the probable origins of said ailment, We merely accede to the dictates of the social justice provision of the Constitution. Where the causes are known determined or determinable, the claimant must prove reasonable work-connection in order to receive compensation otherwise, the parity or balance between the competing interests of employer and employee with respect to workmen's compensation is destroyed (Sulit vs. ECC, L-48602 [June 30, 1980]). Where however the causes of an ailment are unknown to and/or undetermined even by medical science, the requirement of proof of any causal link between the ailment and the working conditions should be liberalized so that those who have less in life will have more in law.

Henceforth, the standard of reasonable work-connection established by this Court is hereinabove read in its proper perspective. And the same is not rendered meaningless by the grant of compensation in the present case.

Considering that the causes and/or origin of intracranial new growth is unknown and undetermined, it is easy to see that respondent's contention that "... there is absolutely no reasonable work-connection between his — ailment and his employment" is without basis. Because the causes and/or origin of the ailment are unknown and undetermined, then it cannot categorically be stated that there is absolutely no reasonable work-connection between petitioner's ailment and his working conditions. The probability that petitioner's ailment is work-connected cannot be completely and totally disregarded.

Even the Employees' Compensation Commission recognizes this probability. While it is a universally accepted fact that the exact etiology of cancer, of which intra-cranial new growth or brain tumor is a specie is still unknown, We take judicial notice of the fact that even the ECC has expanded its list of occupational diseases to include certain types of cancer. The proggressive stance of ECC persuades Us to be more liberal in allowing compensation in the case at bar.

The conservative posture of respondent GSIS is not consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee embodied in the Constitution in favor of the workers (Cabanero vs. ECC, et al., L-50255 [January 30, 1982]; Cristobal vs. ECC, et al., supra). It clashes with the injunction in the Labor Code (Article 4, New Labor Code) and the Civil Code (Article 1702, New Civil Code) that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the claimant-employee.

The degree of proof required to establish work-connection between the disabling ailment and the working conditions is merely substantial evidence, or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" (Cristobal vs. ECC, supra; Ang Tibay vs. The Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 69 Phil. 635). Probability not certainty is the touchstone in testing evidence of work-connection (Laron vs. WCC, 73 SCRA 84).

And as We have earlier discussed, the probability that the petitioner's brain tumor is work-connected is supported by the facts of the case,

Basic rules of equity and fair play behoove Us to grant petitioner's claim. Petitioner, by law and by virtue of his employment with the City of Manila, had been a member of the System since 1945 (Section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended). As such, he had contributed (by compulsion of law Sec. 5, Commonwealth Act No. 186) to the funds of respondent for 34 years until his forced retirement. In turn the respondent should comply with its duty to give him the fullest protection, relief and compensation benefits as guaranteed by law. Under the Employees' Compensation Act (Article 168) and its predecessor, the Workmen's Compensation Act (Section 3), petitioner, by virtue of his membership in the respondent System, is entitled to the benefits he now claims under the Employees' Compensation Act. The claimant is not asking for a dole-out, nor for charity; he is simply demanding for what is his by law.

Finally, respondent urges Us to reduce the award of attorney's fees to five percent (5%). WE are not persuaded.

There is no prohibition against imposing attorney's fees on the employer for the benefit of claimant's counsel (Marte vs. ECC, L-46362 [January 30, 1982]). In Cristobal, supra, We ruled:

A close examination of the aforequoted provision (Art. 203, Labor Code) reveals that the intent of the law is to free the award from any liability or charge so that the claimant may enjoy it to the fullest. It is the claimant who is exempt from liability for attorney's fees. The defaulting employer or government agency remains liable for attorney's fees because it compelled the claimant to employ the services of counsel by unjustly refusing to recognize the validity of the claim of petitioner. This actually is the rationale behind the prohibition. Nothing is wrong with the Court's award of attorney's fees which is separate and distinct from the other benefits awarded. Besides, in the instant case, the participation of petitioner's counsel was not limited to the preparation or filing of the claim but in appealing petitioner's case before this Court necessitating submission of pleadings to establish his cause of action and to rebut or refute the arguments of herein respondents. Fairness dictates that the counsel should receive compensation for his services; otherwise, it would be entirely difficult for claimants, majority of whom are not learned in the intricacies of the law, to get good legal service. To deny counsel compensation for his professional services would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.

Respondent's reliance on the case Duran vs. ECC (L-52363, 113 SCRA 389 [March 30, 1982]) is misplaced. The award of five percent attorney's fees in said case was subsequently increased to ten percent (10%) in a later resolution in the consolidated cases of Corales, Villones, Caneja, Barga ,(Duran), Calvero, Delegente, Cenita vs. ECC and GSIS (126 SCRA 136 [Nov. 29,1983]).

WE find it apropos to reiterate Our instructions in Godizano vs. ECC (No. 62354, May 9,1985):

Issues already resolved by Us in very similar cases as the case herein should not be repeatedly raised. Time is most essential for the claimants and their counsel. The currency has repeatedly suffered depreciation and may depreciate again as time passes. Its purchasing power has tremendously diminished.

WHEREFORE, FOR LACK OF MERIT, THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS HEREBY DENIED WITH FINALITY. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 85024 January 23, 1991DOMINGO VICENTE, petitioner, vs.

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EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.Olandesca Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:p

Central to this petition for certiorari which assails the decision 1 dated August 24, 1988 of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 3764, affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), is the question on whether the petitioner suffers from permanent total disability as he claims, or from permanent partial disability as held by the respondent Commission.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

The petitioner, Domingo Vicente, was formerly employed as a nursing attendant at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center in Quezon City. On August 5, 1981, at the age of forty-five, and after having rendered more than twenty-five years of government service, he applied for optional retirement (effective August 16, 1981) under the provisions of Section 12(c) of Republic Act No. 1616, giving as reason therefor his inability to continue working as a result of his physical disability. 2 The petitioner likewise filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) an application for "income benefits claim for payment" under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626, as amended. Both applications were accompanied by the necessary supporting papers, among them being a "Physician's Certification" issued by the petitioner's attending doctor at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center, Dr. Avelino A. Lopez, M.D., F.P.C.S., ** F.I.C.S. *** (Section Chief, General, Thoracic & Peripheral Surgery, Surgical Department, Veterans Medical Center, Hilaga Avenue, Quezon City), who had diagnosed the petitioner as suffering from:

Osteoarthritis, multiple;Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease;Cardiomegaly; andLeft Ventricular Hypertrophy;

and classified him as being under "permanent total disability." 3

The petitioner's application for income benefits claim payment was granted but only for permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation or for a period of nineteen months starting from August 16, 1981 up to March 1983. 4

On March 14, 1983, the petitioner requested the General Manager of the GSIS to reconsider the award given him and prayed that the same be extended beyond nineteen months invoking the findings of his attending physician, as indicated in the latter's Certification. 5 As a consequence of his motion for reconsideration, and on the basis of the "Summary of Findings and Recommendation" 6 of the Medical Services Center of the GSIS, the petitioner was granted the equivalent of an additional four (4) months benefits. 7 Still unsatisfied, the petitioner again sent a letter to the GSIS Disability Compensation Department Manager on November 6, 1986, insisting that he (petitioner) should be compensated no less than for "permanent total disability." On June 30, 1987, the said manager informed the petitioner that his request had been denied. Undaunted, the petitioner sought reconsideration and as a result of which, on September 10, 1987, his case was elevated to the respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Later, or on October 1, 1987, the petitioner notified the respondent Commission that he was confined at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center for "CVA probably thrombosis of the left middle cerebral artery." 8

There was nothing he could do but wait and hope.

Finally, on August 24, 1988, the respondent rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the GSIS Employees' Disability Compensation and dismissed the petitioner's appeal.

Hence this recourse.

Before us, the petitioner maintains that his disability is "permanent total" and not "permanent partial" as classified by the respondent Commission. In support of his position, the petitioner points to the clinical evaluation and certification earlier adverted to issued by his attending physicians at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center. He likewise contends that contrary to the respondent's ruling, his subsequent confinement in the hospital from August 31, 1987 to September 6, 1987, when he was found suffering from "CVA probably thrombosis," was a direct result of his other ailments as previously diagnosed (before his retirement) by his attending physician and the Personnel Physician of the Center, Dr. Salud C. Palattao.

On the other hand, the respondent Commission argues that the petitioner only suffers from "permanent partial disability" and not from "permanent total disability." The findings of the petitioner's attending physician is not binding on the GSIS, nor on the Commission, as the proper evaluation of an employee's degree of disability exclusively belongs to the GSIS medical experts who have specialized on the subject.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Employee's disability under the Labor Code is classified into three distinct categories: (a) temporary total disability; 9 (b) permanent total disability; 10 and (c) permanent partial disability. 11 Likewise, in Section 2, Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, it is provided that:

Sec. 2. Disability—(a) A total disability is temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided in Rule X of these Rules.

(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.

(c) A disability is partial permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body.

Here, there is no question that the petitioner is not under "temporary total disability" as defined by law. The respondent Commission's decision classifying the petitioner's disability as "permanent partial" attests, albeit indirectly, to this fact. Our focus therefore, as stated earlier, is only in resolving out whether the petitioner suffers from "permanent total disability" as he claims, or from "permanent partial disability" as the respondent Commission would have us believe.

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On the subject of "permanent total disability," the Court has stated, on several occasions, that:

Other authoritative comments on the coverage of the term "permanent total disability" as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, are (a) Comments and Annotations on the Workmen's Compensation Act by Severo M. Pucan and Cornelio R. Besinga, that "total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness, but means disablement of the employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or a work of similar nature, that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do;" (b) Philippine Labor and Social Legislation by Justice Ruperto Martin, that "permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any other kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do . . .;" and (c) Labor Standards and Welfare Legislation by Perfecto Fernandez and Camilo Quiason that "permanent total disability means an incapacity to perform gainful work which is expected to be permanent. This status does not require a condition of complete helplessness. Nor is it affected by the performance of occasional odd jobs" (cited in Marcelino vs. Seven-up Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 47 SCRA 343). 12

It may therefore be inferred from the Court's pronouncements that while "permanent total disability" invariably results in an employee's loss of work or inability to perform his usual work, "permanent partial disability," on the other hand, occurs when an employee loses the use of any particular anatomical part of his body which disables him to continue with his former work. Stated otherwise, the test of whether or not an employee suffers from "permanent total disability" is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which, in a more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability), then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from "permanent total disability" regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.

In the case at bar, the petitioner's permanent total disability is established beyond doubt by several factors and circumstances. Noteworthy is the fact that from all available indications, it appears that the petitioner's application for optional retirement on the basis of his ailments had been approved. The decision of the respondent Commission even admits that the petitioner "retired from government service at the age of 45." 13 Considering that the petitioner was only 45 years old when he retired and still entitled, under good behavior, to 20 more years in service, the approval of his optional retirement application proves that he was no longer fit to continue in his employment. 14 For optional retirement is allowed only upon proof that the employee-applicant is already physically incapacitated to render sound and efficient service. 15

Further, the appropriate physicians of the petitioner's employer, the Veterans Memorial Medical Center, categorically certified that the petitioner was classified under permanent total disability. On this score, "the doctor's certification as to the nature of the claimant's disability may be given credence as he normally would not make a false certification." 16 And, "[N]o physician in his right mind and who is aware of the far-reaching and serious effect that his statements would cause on a money claim filed with a government agency, would issue certifications indiscriminately without even minding his own interests and protection." 17

The fact that the petitioner was granted benefits amounting to the equivalent of twenty-three months shows that the petitioner was unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days. This kind of disability is precisely covered by Section 2(b), Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensability which we again quote, to wit:

Sec. 2. Disability—(a) . . .

(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of those Rules.

xxx xxx xxx

There being no showing, as we mentioned earlier, that the petitioner's disability is "temporary total" as defined by the law, the inescapable conclusion is that he suffers from permanent total disability.

The court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern for the welfare of government workers, especially the humble rank and file, whose patience, industry, and dedication to duty have often gone unheralded, but who, in spite of very little recognition, plod on dutifully to perform their appointed tasks. It is for this reason that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its own terms, 18 requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. It is likewise for this reason that the Court disposes of this case and ends a workingman's struggle for his just dues.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is SET ASIDE and another one is hereby ENTERED declaring the petitioner to be suffering from permanent total disability. Respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is accordingly ORDERED to award the petitioner the benefits corresponding to his permanent total disability. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-45785 March 21, 1988EDUARDO LAGINLIN, petitioner, vs.WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE, C.J. YULO and SONS, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the now defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission absolving private respondents Canlubang Sugar Estate and C.J. Yulo and Sons from any liability to the petitioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Petitioner Eduardo Laginlin started his employment with the private respondents as a field worker on 12 December 1955, with specific duties to plant sugarcane and weed the sugarcane plantation owned by respondents, working seven (7) days a week from Monday to Sunday, with a salary of P4.60 a day. In 1967, and while working for the private respondents, petitioner started to suffer an illness which, according to the diagnosis of private respondents' physician, Dr. Bunye, was pulmonary tuberculosis. Petitioner was treated as an outpatient and was given free medicine by private respondents while he continued to perform his work. Despite said treatment, petitioner's health failed to improve, and as a consequence, Dr. Bunye recommended his retirement and, on that basis, he was retired effective 30 January 1970, receiving a disability retirement benefit from the private respondents in the amount of P1,800.00. 2

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On 15 February 1975, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act for the ailment which he contracted as a result of his employment, docketed as R05-W.C. Case No. C-2772. 3 To facilitate the disposition of all unresolved cases pending before the Workmen's Compensation Unit of San Pablo City, the parties were required to submit their affidavit and counter affidavit to sustain their respective stands. Private respondents failed to seasonably controvert the claim of petitioner by not submitting their counter affidavit; thus, the case was deemed submitted for resolution on the merits. 4

On 15 October 1975, a decision 5 was rendered by the hearing officer in favor of petitioner. The dispositive part of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the claimant and against the respondent, the latter is directed as follows:

1. To pay to the claimant, thru this Unit, the sum of FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE AND FORTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P 4,963.45) representing disability benefits computed as follows:

Claimant's disability began on January 30,1970 and up to October 15, 1975, date of decision, is 2,183 days or 296 6/7 weeks equals P4,963.45. (Section 14)

2. To pay to the claimant, thru this Unit, a weekly compensation of Pl6.72 beginning October 16, 1975 and weekly thereafter until his illness is declared arrested by competent authority but in no case shall the total benefits exceed P6,000.00 including the first lump sum; (Section 14)

3. To pay Mr. Feliciano Reyes, 339 Elizondo St., Quiapo, Manila, the sum of TWO HUNDRED FORTY-EIGHT PESOS AND TWENTY CENTAVOS (P248.20) as attorney's fee under Section 55 of the Act, as amended.

Respondent is further ordered to pay to this Unit, the sum of P 50.00 by way of decision fee pursuant to Section 55 of the Act, as amended.

SO ORDERED.

Private respondents appealed said decision to the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On 30 December 1975, the Commission reversed the decision of the hearing officer, thus absolving private respondents from any liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act; hence, this petition for review on certiorari. 6

The main issue presented for resolution in this case is whether or not the Workmen's Compensation Commission erred in reversing the decision of the hearing officer holding private respondents liable to petitioner.

Before resolving the main issue in this appeal, we will resolve the incidental issue of the timeliness of the filing of this petition. Private respondents allege that this petition was filed out of time. In turn, petitioner claims that he received a copy of the WCC decision, dated 30 December 1975, only on 4 March 1977, after he went to the Department of Labor office in San Pablo City to verify the status of his claim. Under the rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, the decision of a Commissioner or referee is appealable to the Commission en banc within ten (10) days from receipt of the decision; however, an appeal from the decision of the Commission en banc, through a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court may be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt or notice of the Commission's decision. 7 The petitioner, in the case at bar, filed with this Court on 14 March 1977 his first motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari. The petition itself was filed on 13 April 1977, or within the extended period granted by the Court.

It is further alleged by private respondents that copy of the WCC decision was served upon petitioner's representative, Mr. Feliciano Reyes, 8 on 18 February 1976, as evidenced by a copy of the notice of the decision. 9 Upon careful examination of said notice of decision addressed to both petitioner's representative and to private respondents' counsel, we note that there is only one initial of the recipient thereof, and this appears at the bottom part of said notice together with the date and time of receipt, but it does not state as to whether it was received on behalf of petitioner's representative or for private respondents' counsel. Neither does the certification issued by the Workmen's Compensation Unit of San Pablo City that the case was terminated and considered closed as of 21 December 1976, 10 prove that copy of the 30 December 1975 decision of the Commission had been served upon the petitioner or his representative.

Another piece of evidence presented by private respondents to prove their claim that the decision of the Commission has already become final and unappealable is a xerox copy of the registry return receipt addressed to petitioner's representative which is not, however, numbered or postmarked at all by the post office. 11

But assuming that this petition for certiorari was filed out of time, a few days of delay in filing the petition should not deprive herein petitioner of his right to appeal, based on a mere technicality and where the decision appealed from is blatantly erroneous in denying the petitioner his right to disability compensation under the law.

Dismissal of appeals based on purely technical grounds should be frowned upon. A hearing, on the merits, of bona fide appeals should be encouraged. Rules of procedure are intended to promote not to defeat substantial justice; therefore, they should be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. 12 In Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, 13 it was held that:

And even assuming that a petition for review is filed a few days late, where strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest in the petition, this Court may relax the stringent application of technical rules in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. In addition to the basic merits of the main case, such a petition usually embodies justifying circumstances which warrant our heeding the petitioner's cry for justice, inspire of the earlier negligence of counsel.

Furthermore, the objective of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to secure workmen and their dependents from becoming objects of charity, by providing for a reasonable compensation for such accidental calamities as are incidental to their employment. 14 As a social legislation, its provisions should be interpreted liberally to give effect to its purpose and the Rules of Court are merely suppletory in the application of such Act.

Coming now to the merits of the case, it is evident that the Workmen's Compensation Commission committed a grave error in absolving private respondents from liability. Ample jurisprudence has now been established that, where the illness or disease was contracted by the employee in the course of his employment, said employee is entitled to disability compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Compensability is presumed where illness supervened during employment and, with the presumption of compensability of illness, the burden of proof is shifted to the employer and the employee is relieved of the duty to show causation. 15

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An x-ray examination is not even essential to prove the claim of the petitioner for disability compensation due to illness which he contracted while under the employ of private respondents. In fact, it was private respondents' company physician who examined the petitioner and, finding him to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis, made a recommendation for petitioner's retirement before he reaches the retirable age under the law. In view of the approval by private respondents of the petitioner's early retirement, the fact of his disability was placed beyond question or doubt. 16 Furthermore, the disease of tuberculosis is an occupational disease or work-connected in such occupations, as that of a teacher, laborer, driver, land inspector and other similar occupations; hence compensable. 17 As held in Aribon v. WCC, (139 SCRA 492):

In this case, however, it is patent from the records that the diagnosis of the petitioner's illness was clinically obvious. The petitioner had undergone examination by three doctors who uniformly attested to the fact of his ailment was peptic ulcer. The petitioner was initially treated by the respondent company's Canlubang Hospital and no less than its own company doctor diagnosed his ailment as peptic ulcer and recommended him for retirement. There was no need, therefore, for the petitioner to produce any G.I. Series. Since the case of Vallo v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (73 SCRA 623 [1976]) this Court has categorically ruled in unbroken line of cases, the most recent of which is Donato Jereza v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (G.R. No. L- 42916, August 7, 1985) that a medical report of an attending physician may be received as evidence and used as proof of the fact in dispute and that an x-ray or some other laboratory report may sometimes be dispensed with.

Moreover, private respondents during the initial stage of the case before the hearing officer of the Commission, failed to controvert or refute the claim of petitioner, as a result of which, the presumption of compensability became conclusive, and the claimant was no longer required to substantiate his claim for compensation. 18

The holding of the Commission to the effect that it finds no valid reason to sustain the grant of disability benefit to petitioner because the report of Dr. Eusebio Panganiban, the attending physician with a finding that the petitioner is suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis far advanced, appears to be tampered and that no other evidence was presented, is not sufficient to overthrow the presumption of compensability. As held by this Court, the evidence necessary to destroy the legal presumption of compensability must do more than create a doubt. It should be such as a reasonable mind must accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 19

The early retirement of an employee due to work-related ailment proves that indeed the employee was disabled totally to further perform his assigned task, and to deny permanent total disability benefits when he was forced to retire would subvert the very essence and purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act to implement the social justice provision of the Constitution. 20 Where an employee was forced to retire at an early age due to his illness, and illness persisted even after retirement, resulting in his present unemployment, such condition amounts to total disability which should entitle him to the maximum benefits allowed by law. 21

The fact that petitioner received a retirement benefit from his employer does not bar him from being entitled to a disability compensation benefit under the Workmen's Compensation Act, having in mind that the purpose of the disability benefit is separate and distinct from the retirement benefit given to an employee upon reaching the age of retirement. The disability benefit under the Act is to compensate the worker for his actual loss, for his disablement to earn wages in the same kind of work which he is engaged in, or work of similar nature. On the other hand, the retirement benefit is intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of worrying for his financial support and as a form of reward for his loyalty and service to the employer.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, dated 30 December 1975, is REVERSED and a new one is hereby entered AFFIRMING the decision of the hearing officer of the Workmen's Compensation Unit of San Pablo City, dated 15 October 1975, This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.

G.R. L-47175 December 15, 1986 VICENTE BERENGUEL, petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (Bureau of Public Schools), respondent.Alberto Simeon for petitioner.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission which dismissed the claim for disability benefits of the petitioner-claimant in R04 W.C. Case No. 166853 and the order of the Compensation Appeals and Review Staff which denied his motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Berenguel was a teacher with the respondent Bureau of Public Schools since 1946. In the course of his employment, he was confined at the Tuberculosis Sanitarium of Quezon Institute in Quezon City from November 16, 1957 up to April 17, 1958 due to chronic and active pulmonary tuberculosis. Before he retired from the government service at the age of 63 in 1969, he was treated at the St. Luke's Hospital from July 16 to October 25 for his minimal fibrotic lesion and he underwent an operation of his right thyroid lobe due to the presence of nodules.

On March 31, 1975, Berenquel filed a claim for disability benefits for various illnesses, namely, indirect inguinal hernia on the left, varicose veins, minimal pulmonary tuberculosis, atelectasis of the right lung and chronic cholecystitis.

After considering the evidence presented before him, the Acting Referee in the regional office where the claim was filed granted petitioner-claimant the disability benefits corresponding to the actual period he was not able to work on account of his pulmonary tuberculosis, that is, from July 16, 1969 up to October 25, 1969. Petitioner-claimant was also reimbursed his medical expenses in the amount recommended by the Compensation Rating Medical Officer. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Acting Referee reads:

WHEREFORE, respondent Republic of the Philippines (Bureau of Public Schools) is hereby adjudged:

1. To pay claimant the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR & 43/100 (P854.43) PESOS, as disability benefits;

2. To pay claimant the amount of TWO THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE & 48/100 ( P2,375.48 ) PESOS, as medical expense reimbursement;

3. To pay this Office the sum of P9.00 as fee pursuant to Section 55 of the Act, as amended.

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On appeal to the Workmen's Compensation Commission, the Associate (Medical) Commissioner reversed the above decision of the Acting Referee and dismissed the petitioner's claim for lack of merit. In dismissing the claim for disability benefits, the Commissioner ruled that the chest x-ray presented by the petitioner-claimant was taken only on October 6, 1975 and did not show any illness of pulmonary tuberculosis and that even if it reflected the presence of said illness, the x-ray result that was submitted cannot support the alleged pulmonary tuberculosis in 1969. The Commissioner advised the petitioner-claimant to avail himself of his terminal leave prior to retirement during the period when he did not actually report for work from July 16, 1969 to October 25, 1969. The grant of medical expense reimbursement was likewise rejected on the ground that the receipts for the medical expenses sought to be reimbursed were all dated after the petitioner-claimant's retirement.

A motion for reconsideration was later denied.

The petitioner-claimant raises two assignments of errors in this petition, namely:

I

THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE REFEREE OF THE OFFICE A QUO THAT NOTED, FOUND AND RESOLVED THAT CLAIMANT'S PTB IS CAUSALLY RELATED TO HIS EMPLOYMENT AND THE OTHER SICKNESS INCURRED IN THE COURSE OF SAID EMPLOYMENT.

II

THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION ERRED IN REVERSING THE GRANT OF REIMBURSEMENT OF MEDICAL EXPENSES BY THE REFEREE OF THE OFFICE A QUO.

On the first assigned error, the petitioner argues that the certificate of confinement and the case record of said confinement at the Tuberculosis Sanitarium of Quezon Institute in 1958 clearly showed that he contracted the pulmonary tuberculosis while he was employed by the respondent. He further alleges that when he retired on October 25, 1969, he was still very sick and was not allowed to return to work so as not to contaminate the school children with the contagious disease that had afflicted him. The application for leave of absence of the petitioner covering the period from July 16, 1969 to October 25, 1969 contained a medical certificate to the effect that he was found suffering from (1) nodules, moderate size, right lobe of the thyroid and (2) minimal fibrotic lesion koch, right apex and that it was advisable that he should have surgery because of the nodule in the right thyroid lobe and he should have medical treatment and rest for his right lung lesion.

It is a well-settled rule under the Workmen's Compensation Act that once the claimant has established the illness as supervening at the time of his employment, there exists a rebuttable presumption of the illness having arises out of or at least having been aggravated by his employment. (Aribon v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 139 SCRA 492; Villavieja v. Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corp., 132 SCRA 622; Abcede v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 53; Labenia v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 140 SCRA 437).<äre||anº•1àw> The claimant, thus, is relieved from the burden of proving causation once the illness is shown to have arisen in the course of employment. The burden to overthrow the presumption and to dislodge, by substantial evidence, the causal relation between the illness and the employment rests on the employer. (Monsale v. Republic of the Philippines, 80 SCRA 448; Ceniza v. Employees Compensation Commission, 118 SCRA 137; and Vda. de Tumolva v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 141 SCRA 78).

The respondent contends that when the petitioner contracted pulmonary tuberculosis in 1957, he was not yet covered by the Workmen's Compensation Commission Act because it was only on June 24, 1964 when public school teachers came within the coverage of said Act by virtue of Republic Act 4119. We find this contention untenable. The fact that the petitioner was not yet within the coverage of the law in order to be compensated does not alter the established fact that his illness was contracted during his employment. The records show no evidence having been presented by the respondent to overcome the presumption of compensability in favor of the petitioner who even presented a medical certificate attesting to the fact that in 1969, he still suffered from the same ailment.

The respondent also maintains that although it was on October 25, 1969 that the petitioner stopped working, he reached the age of 63 on October 26, 1969 so that his retirement was not because he had a disabling ailment but because he had chosen to retire under the retirement law. It can be gleaned from the records of this case that on October 25, 1969 which was the end of the petitioner's leave of absence, he was still very sick and he was not allowed to return to work. It was in the interest of the school children that the petitioner was required to retire from his employment so as not to contaminate them with his pulmonary tuberculosis. We reiterate our previous ruling in the case of Galang v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (72 SCRA 454) wherein we held that:

xxx xxx xxx

... Considering that petitioner was forced to retire from the service due to his disability to continue with his work with private respondent, he should be entitled to disability compensation benefits authorized by the Workmen's Compensation Act for persons suffering from permanent disability. ('SEC. 14. Total disability. In case the injury or sickness causes temporary total disability for labor, the employer shall, during such disability, pay to the injured employee a weekly compensation equivalent to sixty per centum of his average weekly wage but not less than fourteen pesos per week, except in the case provided for in the next following paragraph. No compensation shall be allowed for the first three calendar days of incapacity resulting from an injury except the benefits provided for in the preceding section; but if the incapacity extends beyond that period, compensation shall be allowed from the first day of such incapacity. Such weekly payments shall in no case continue after the disability has ceased, nor shall the aggregate sum paid as compensation exceed in any case six thousand pesos. But no award of permanent disability shall take effect until after two weeks have elapsed from the date of injury.

In the case of an employee whose average weekly wages are less than fourteen pesos per week, the weekly compensation shall be the entire amount of such average weekly wages, but if the disability is permanent, the compensation shall be fourteen pesos in such case, in the event that the total disability begins after a period of partial disability, the amount of compensation due for the latter and for any other disability shall not exceed the maximum amount of six thousand pesos)

It is also noteworthy to state once again our pronouncement in the recent case of Buyco v. Hon. Secretary of Labor, et al., (G.R. No. L-47276, November 10, 1986) citing the case of Espiritu v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (84 SCRA 636) that:

As to petitioner's optional retirement at the age of 63 years, this Court has already ruled that the same does not militate against her claim. ...

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As regards the respondent's claim that the chest x-ray submitted by the petitioner was taken only on October 6, 1975, six years after his retirement in 1969, we rule that this Court has consistently held that an x-ray result is not an indispensable prerequisite to compensation. (Fedillo v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 134 SCRA 56; Canete v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 136 SCRA 302; Jereza v. Mondia, 138 SCRA 58; and Bautista v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 88 SCRA 121).

On the second assigned error, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the findings of fact of the Workmen's Compensation Unit of Regional Office No. 4 of the Labor Department are like findings of fact of the lower courts which must be upheld and taken as true and correct and not to be undermined or ignored by the appellate courts in the absence of strong and cogent reasons. The amount of medical benefits as evaluated by the Compensation Rating Medical Officer ought to be upheld. The fact that the medical expenses were all dated after the petitioner's retirement is of no moment because it has been established that the petitioner's illness is compensable for the simple reason that the test of compensability under the old Workmen's Compensation Law is probability and not certainty. (Matta v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 133 SCRA 635). That test has been satisfied here.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, subject of this petition for review, is hereby REVERSED and the original award made under the decision of the Acting Referee in R04-WC Case No. 166853, granting disability benefits and medical expense reimbursement to the petitioner herein is reinstated with the modification that the disability benefits should be SIX THOUSAND PESOS ( P6,000.00 ) and that the respondent should now pay the prescribed fees of SIXTY-ONE PESOS (P61.00 ) to the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Attorney's fees are also awarded in the sum of SIX HUNDRED PESOS ( P600.00 ) SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-43292 March 18, 1987MAURICIO BELLO, petitioner, vs.WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, BENEDICTO DINGLASAN & SONS, INC. AND HECTOR LAGMAN, respondents.Juan D. Blancaflor for petitioner.Wilfredo Dizon for respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Petitioner Mauricio Bello seeks a review of the decision of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission rendered on February 23, 1976 in R04-WCU Case No. 161021 which granted petitioner only the lump sum of P178.28 as disability compensation benefit in contrast to the award made by the Acting Chief of the Workmen's Compensation Section, RO4, Manila on March 19, 1975 requiring private respondent Hector Lagman to pay petitioner the amount of Seven Hundred Ninety Six Pesos and 80/100 (P 796.80) and the weekly compensation of P33.60 beginning March 20, 1975 until his illness is cured or arrested or his liability for labor ceases provided it does not exceed P6,000.00.

From the findings of the respondent Commission, it appears that petitioner was an employee of respondent Lagman, a jeepney operator. Petitioner was found sick with "pulmonary tuberculosis, chronic, moderately advanced predominantly fibrotics," by his attending physician Dr. Fabian Medina, who declared on October 30, 1974 that said illness was aggravated by his employment. Petitioner was confined at Quezon Institute from May 27, 1971 up to June 20, 1971 when he was discharged, much improved, after which he resumed working. He was again found sick, this time, of bacterial conjunctivities from September 20, 1974 to October 16, 1976.

On November 8, 1974, petitioner filed a claim for disability compensation, so an award was made by the Acting Chief, Workmen's Compensation Section of Region 4 on the ground that respondent did not controvert said claim. Respondent Lagman moved to set aside the award. This was granted despite the opposition of petitioner and the case was treated as a controverted claim before the Hearing Officer who dismissed petitioner's claim for lack of merit. On appeal, the Workmen's Compensation Commission applied the legal presumption under Section 44 of the WCC Act as amended, sustained the compensability of the claim, absolved Benedicto Dinglasan and Sons, Inc. from any liability, made respondent Lagman liable being claimant's employer at the time he was afflicted with tuberculosis and granted temporary total disability to claimant from May 27, 1971 to June 20, 1971 and from September 20, l974 to October 16, 1974 amounting to P178.28 which is 60% of his weekly average pay of P 40.00 (See Annex A, Petition, page 21, Rollo).

It is undisputed that petitioner was afflicted with pulmonary tuberculosis during the course of his employment. The only issue to be resolved here is whether or not under the circumstances obtaining in this case, he should be granted full compensation benefits.

We find the petition meritorious and so hold that full compensation benefit is in order.

While it may be true, as respondent Commission points out that no chest x-ray report was submitted to establish petitioner's illness of pulmonary tuberculosis and confinement at Quezon Institute, it has been resolved in many cases of this nature that the doctor's certification as to the nature of claimant's disability may be given credence as he normally, would not make a false certification. 1 Moreover, laboratory reports are not indispensable prerequisite to compensability of claim and the absence of an x-ray report cannot prejudice such claim. 2 This Court even went to the extent of declaring that to be compensable, it is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded. 3 Indeed, the niceties and refinements of technical rules on procedure must give way to effect substantial justice to the claimant. 4

The WCC's decision under review, granted disability benefits to petitioner solely for the period he was confined at the hospital. The Commission in granting a meager amount stated thus: "... claimant is entitled to temporary total disability for labor from May 27, 1971 up to June 20, 1971, and then September 20, 1974 up to October 16, 1974. ... "

This should not be so. In proving his entitlement to compensation benefits, petitioner submitted the following:

1. Physician's Report of sickness, signed by petitioner's attending physician, Dr. Fabian Medina of the Quezon Institute, on October 30, 1974;

2. Certification of the Chief, Out-Patient Service of Q.I. dated October 25, 1974 showing that petitioner had chest x-ray examinations on various dates from May 27, 1971 to July 11, 1974;

3. Medical Certificate signed by Dr. Gregorio Noriega, Medical Specialist of the National Tuberculosis Center Clinic, Manila, dated March 7, 1975;

4. Memorandum for the Acting Chief of the Workmen's Compensation Section, by Dr. Edmund Calaycay, Compensation Rating Medical Officer of said Section, dated March 10, 1975.

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It is noted that all said certifications declared tuberculosis as petitioner's ailment. The disease occurred not only on May 27, 1971 but recurred on various dates in 1974 and 1975. 5 It is therefore error for the respondent Commission to award only the sum of P178.28 to petitioner especially considering that Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as amended, provides that an employee who suffers from tuberculosis "directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment," is entitled to compensation. There are numerous cases 6 involving substantially similar conditions as that of herein petitioner, wherein this Court ruled that tuberculosis is an occupational disease, hence, compensable.

In the present case, petitioner is entitled to full compensation. He has been rendered incapable of further pursuing his usual work because of his weakened bodily condition due to illness contracted in the course of employment.

Finally, the Court observes that the award of P178.28 is so unsubstantial and unrealistic considering present-day economic standard and financial realities. To sustain such a petty award would render meaningless the purpose of the law and the social justice precept it guarantees.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission dated February 23, 1976 is SET ASIDE and respondent Hector Lagman is hereby ordered to pay petitioner the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) as disability compensation and to pay Counsel of petitioner attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the recoverable amount, with costs against respondent Lagman. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152058 September 27, 2004SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE RAGO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

This is a petition for the review of the decision1 of 18 October 2001 and the resolution of 30 January 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63389 entitled Jose Rago vs. Social Security Commission and Social Security System. The decision reversed the 20 December 2000 Resolution of the Social Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15009-2000 denying respondent Jose Rago’s request to convert his monthly pension from permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. The resolution denied the motion to reconsider the decision.

Private respondent Jose Rago (hereafter Rago) worked as an electrician for Legend Engineering in Basak, Pardo, Cebu City. On 1 December 1993, at about 6:15 p.m., while working on the ceiling of a building, he stepped on a weak ceiling joist. The structure gave way and he crashed into the corridor twelve feet below. The x-rays taken that day revealed that he had a (1) marked compression fracture of L1 vertebra without signs of dislocation and bone destruction; and (2) slight kyphosis at the level of L1 vertebrae, with the alignment of the spine still normal.2 He was confined at the Perpetual Succour Hospital in Cebu City for twenty-four (24) days from 1 December 1993 to 24 December 1993,3 and, thereafter, he was confined in his home from 25 December 1993 to 25 August 1994.4

On 20 May 1994, Rago filed a claim for permanent partial disability with the Cebu City office of the Social Security System (SSS). Since he had only 35 monthly contributions, he was granted only a lump sum benefit.5 He made additional premium contributions on 6 November 1995, and sought the adjustment of his approved partial disability benefits from lump sum to monthly payments. The adjustment was resolved in his favor on 18 October 1995.6

On 9 November 1995, Rago filed a claim for Employee’s Compensation (EC) sickness benefit, which was supported by an x-ray report dated 1 December 1993. This was approved for a maximum of 120 days to cover the period of illness from 1 December 1993 to 30 March 1994.

On 7 June 1996, Rago filed another claim to convert his SSS disability to EC disability. Again, it was resolved in his favor on 14 June 1996.7

Two years later, on 16 June 1998, Rago claimed for the extension of his EC partial disability. A rating of 50% OB (of the body) was granted corresponding to the maximum benefit allowed under the Manual on Ratings of Physical Impairment.8

Thereafter, Rago filed several requests for the adjustment of his partial disability to total disability. This time, his requests were denied by the Cebu City office of the SSS in its letters of 11 April 1999, 10 September 1999, 28 September 1999, 4 April 2000, and 17 April 2000. The denial was based on the medical findings of the Cebu City office that he was not totally prevented from engaging in any gainful occupation.9

Undaunted, on 3 April 2000, Rago filed with the petitioner Social Security Commission (SSC) a petition for total permanent disability benefits based on the following grounds:

1. his convalescence period from the time of his hospital confinement to home confinement totaled 268 days and under SSS guidelines, if the injury persisted for more than 240 days, the injury would be considered as a permanent total disability;

2. his x-ray results showed a deterioration of his condition without any visible improvement on the disabilities resulting from the accident; and

3. he had lost his original capacity to work as an electrician and has been unemployed since the accident.

The petition was docketed as SSC Case No. 4-15009-2000.10

In its position paper dated 24 August 2000, the SSS argued that Rago had already been granted the maximum partial disability benefits. The physical examination conducted by the Cebu City office of the SSS showed that he was more than capable of physically engaging in any gainful occupation and that there was no manifestation of progression of illness. Thus, the SSS recommended the denial of Rago’s petition.11

In a resolution dated 20 December 2000, the SSC denied Rago’s petition for lack of merit. The SSC ruled that he was not entitled to permanent partial disability more than what was already granted, more so to permanent total disability benefits since he was already granted the maximum allowable benefit for his injury.12

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Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Rago appealed to the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review and reiterating his claim for permanent disability benefits under Section 13-A (g) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended by R.A. No. 8282.13 The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63389.

In its decision of 18 October 2001, the Court of Appeals reversed the SSC’s resolution, and decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Social Security Commission is hereby reversed and set aside. Petitioner’s plea for conversion of his disability status from permanent partial to permanent total is granted. The SSS is hereby directed to pay him the necessary compensation benefits in accordance with the proper computation.

The SSS seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the Court of Appeals should have considered an order issued by the SSC dated 11 July 2001 which affirmed, but clarified, its 20 December 2000 Resolution under appeal. The SSS then referred to the findings and conclusions of the SSC in said 11 July 2001 order, which emphasized that: (1) Rago failed to file a motion for reconsideration with the SSC, which is mandatory, before filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals; (2) the manual verification of the monthly contributions of Rago revealed that he had only 35 contributions and not 59; and (3) thus, whether or not the sickness or disability of Rago had showed signs of progression, a conversion of the same from permanent partial disability to permanent total disability could not be granted. This is because Rago lacked the required number of contributions mentioned in Section 13-A (a) of R.A. 1161, as amended, which reads:

SEC. 13-A. Permanent disability benefits. – (a) Upon the permanent total disability of a member who has paid at least thirty-six (36) monthly contributions prior to the semester of disability, he shall be entitled to the monthly pension: Provided, That if he has not paid the required thirty-six (36) monthly contributions, he shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the monthly pension times the number of monthly contributions paid to the SSS or twelve (12) times the monthly pension, whichever is higher. A member who (1) has received a lump sum benefit and (2) is re-employed or has resumed self-employment or has resumed self-employment not earlier than one (1) year from the date of his disability shall again be subject to compulsory coverage and shall be considered a new member.

With that, the SSC ordered the SSS to re-compute the lump sum benefit due Rago and his EC benefit on the basis of the actual monthly contributions remitted in his behalf and to collect all excess payments made to him.14

In its resolution of 30 January 2002, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. It explained the denial in this wise:

At the outset, the Court strikes down the Commission’s July 11, 2001 clarificatory order as an exercise of grave abuse of authority amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction. The said Order was issued at a time when the Commission itself was knowledgeable of the petition for review pending before this Court. …It must be pointed out that when petitioner timely filed his petition for review, [the] appeal from the Commission’s resolution had thus become perfected, and it is this Court which therefore had jurisdiction over the matter, and sole authority to make any affirmation or modification of the assailed resolution. Once appeal is perfected, the lower tribunal loses its jurisdiction over the case, in favor of the appellate tribunal. The Court deems it the height of injustice for the Commission to add to and bolster its final ruling with additional observations and justifications, not otherwise embodied in the original ruling, after the losing claimant had already perfected and was actively pursuing his appeal. It behooves upon the Commission, therefore, to refrain from making any substantial addition, or modification of its assailed ruling, such authority in law, now having been transferred to this Court. What prompted the Social Security Commission to issue its clarificatory order is not made clear in its motion for reconsideration, nor in the clarificatory order itself. In any case, any modification of the tenor and justification of the assailed resolution of the Commission by the same body effectively altered the tenor of the earlier ruling, amounting to a violation of the petitioner’s right to due process and fair play, and, therefore, null and void.

Moreover, the specific arguments raised by the Commission are not convincing to encourage a reversal of our earlier decision.

To be sure, the alleged failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the Commission’s December 20, 2000 resolution is not a fatal mistake, it appearing that the same was in clear violation of the petitioner’s rights and claims, as a member of the Social Security System. It is the established rule that the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with when the assailed ruling is a patent nullity. Furthermore, the fact that the petitioner as credited by SSS monthly contributions short to entitle him to be qualified for permanent total disability benefits appear to be largely due to the SSS’ and its branches’ failure to accurately account the petitioner’s total payments, and not on the petitioner’s or his employers’ failure to do so. The same July 11, 2001 Order shows that the SSS Cotabato City Branch and the SSS Davao Hub Branch Office were unable to account for the complete contributions of the petitioner while he was employed by the San Miguel Corporation.15

Thus, in their petition in the case at bar, the SSS and the SSC pray to set aside the Court of Appeals’ decision of 18 October 2001 and resolution of 30 January 2002 and to remand the case to the SSC for further proceedings.16

In support of their prayer, the petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the established jurisprudence that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a petition for review to enable the tribunal, board or office concerned to pass upon and correct its mistakes without the intervention of the higher court. Failure to do so is a fatal procedural defect.17

The petitioners likewise argue that they had not violated Rago’s rights; hence, his case does not fall within the purview of Arroyo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal18 where we held that a prior motion for reconsideration could be dispensed with if fundamental rights to due process were violated.

Additionally, the petitioners contend that the SSC’s 11 July 2001 clarificatory order was issued to rectify its perceived error in the 20 January 2000 resolution relative to the number of Rago’s contributions which directly affected the computation of his disability benefits. Petitioners further maintain that the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the x-ray reports which contained no statement that Rago could no longer work. However, a certain Alvin C. Cabreros attested in an affidavit that Rago went out "disco[e]ing" after the accident, for which reason, Rago is not totally helpless as he portrayed himself to be.

On 20 March 2003, we received a handwritten letter from Rago informing us that his lawyer had withdrawn from the case and of his difficulty in securing a new counsel. After naming Attys. Pedro Rosito, Arturo Fernan or Fritz Quiñanola of the IBP Cebu City at Capitol Compound as his "informal lawyers," he asked us to consider, in lieu of his Comment, an attached copy of the opposition to the motion for reconsideration he filed with the Court of Appeals. In said pleading, Rago argued that the word "may" as used in the provision concerning the filing of a motion for reconsideration in the SSC’s 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure is not mandatory but merely permissive. He also agreed with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that a very strict interpretation of procedural rules would defeat the constitutional mandate on social justice.

We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their Memoranda, which they did.

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We shall first dispose of the procedural issue of prematurity raised by petitioners which is Rago’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration. Section 5, Rule VI of the SSC’s 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure provides:

The party aggrieved by the order, resolution, award or decision of the Commission may file a motion for reconsideration thereof within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the same. Only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed any party.

The filing of the motion for reconsideration shall interrupt the running of the period to appeal, unless said motion is pro forma.

The ordinary acceptations of the terms "may" and "shall" may be resorted to as guides in ascertaining the mandatory or directory character of statutory provisions. As regards adjective rules in general, the term "may" is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion, while the word "shall" is imperative and operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.19 However, these are not absolute and inflexible criteria in the vast areas of law and equity. Depending upon a consideration of the entire provision, its nature, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other, the convertibility of said terms either as mandatory or permissive is a standard recourse in statutory construction.20

Conformably therewith, we have consistently held that the term "may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise.21 If he chooses to exercise the right, he must comply with the conditions attached thereto.22

Applying these guidelines, we can construe Section 5, Rule VI as granting Rago, or any member of the System aggrieved by the SSC’s resolution, the option of filing a motion for reconsideration which he may or may not exercise. Should he choose to do so, he is allowed to file only one motion for reconsideration within fifteen days from the promulgation of the questioned resolution.

This is as far as we go in construing the provision in isolation because a second procedural rule now comes into play: the requirements for appeals filed against the rulings of quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.

Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC rules provides:

[A]ny order, resolution, award or decision of the Commission, in the absence of an appeal therefrom as herein provides, shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the date of notification to the parties, and judicial review thereof shall be permitted only after any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted his remedies before the Commission….

It now becomes apparent that the permissive nature of a motion for reconsideration with the SSC must be read in conjunction with the requirements for judicial review, or the conditions sine qua non before a party can institute certain civil actions. A combined reading of Section 5 of Rule VI, quoted earlier, and Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC’s 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure reveals that the petitioners are correct in asserting that a motion for reconsideration is mandatory in the sense that it is a precondition to the institution of an appeal or a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. Stated differently, while Rago certainly had the option to file a motion for reconsideration before the SSC, it was nevertheless mandatory that he do so if he wanted to subsequently avail of judicial remedies.

This rule is explicit in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Sec. 1. Scope – This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the…Social Security Commission….

Sec. 4. Period of appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed.

The policy of judicial bodies to give quasi-judicial agencies, such as the SSC, an opportunity to correct its mistakes by way of motions for reconsideration or other statutory remedies before accepting appeals therefrom finds extensive doctrinal support in the well-entrenched principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The reason for the principle rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly.23 The principle insures orderly procedure and withholds judicial interference until the administrative process would have been allowed to duly run its course. This is but practical since availing of administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.24 Even comity dictates that unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and appropriate authorities given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum, judicial recourse must be held to be inappropriate, impermissible,25 premature, and even unnecessary.26

However, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule. It may be disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,27 (12) when no administrative review is provided by law, (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.28

Fortunately for Rago, his case falls within some of these exceptions as discussed below.

Petitioners’ attempts to distinguish Arroyo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal29 from this case is misplaced. The ground relied upon by the Court of Appeals for exempting this case from exhaustion of administrative remedies was not the denial of due process but of the patent nullity of the SSC decision in question.

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It is true that Rago disregarded procedural and curative rules in taking immediate recourse to the appellate court. The Court of Appeals similarly erred in taking cognizance of Rago’s appeal. We likewise do not subscribe to issuing rulings or decisions that do not acknowledge or give reason for the disregard of the procedural defect of the petition, especially when it was specifically raised as an issue in respondent’s answer.30

Nevertheless, to require Rago to comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies at this stage of the proceedings would be unreasonable, unjust and inequitable. It would prolong needlessly and uselessly the resolution of his claim.

Petitioners SSS and SSC have consistently shown their obstinacy in their stand to deny Rago’s request to convert his permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. The SSC’s reliance on the SSS recommendations, which did not consider other evidence of the illness’ progression and its disregard of long-standing jurisprudence, made for the patent nullity of the SSC decision. The error was made more blatant when, in the SSC’s clarificatory order, it classified the disability based on the amount of contributions Rago had paid.31

To give the SSC another chance to rectify its error in accordance with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies would inevitably result in the same inflexible stance in defense of its error. We say another chance because we can consider the SSC’s clarificatory order as in the nature of a judgment on Rago’s motion for reconsideration as if he had filed one. Otherwise, to admit the misnamed order which was issued when the SSC no longer had jurisdiction over the case, and which modified and altered the contents and tenor of its original resolution, would have amounted to a violation of Rago’s right to due process. To this extent we give imprimatur to the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, and uphold its factual determination that Rago is entitled to the conversion of his permanent partial disability to permanent total disability. Thus:

There is merit in the petition. Evidently clear from the recitals of the assailed decision some indicia of petitioner’s state of permanent total disability. To emphasize, he was granted sickness benefit for a maximum period of 120 days from December 1, 1993 to March 30, 1994. Then he was awarded lump sum permanent partial disability benefits paid on June 15, 1994, which was then adjusted on October 18, 1995 to monthly pension benefit covering the period of 30 months from May 20, 1994 to October 1996. More, the permanent partial disability benefit was extended for another eight (8) months from July 3, 1998 to February 1999, all in all covering a period of 38 months. If temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days is deemed total and permanent, it is not therefore amiss to consider the payment of permanent partial disability benefits for 38 months as recognition of permanent total disability. Award of permanent partial disability benefits for 19 months was considered by the Supreme Court as an acknowledgment that the awardee was suffering from permanent total disability. (Diopenes vs. GSIS (205 SCRA 331[1992]).

x x x

The test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. (IJARES v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 141 [1999]). The cited radiologic report under date of February 26, 1999 is demonstrative of the fact that petitioner is still in a state which at the time of the taking deters him from performing his job or any such related function. It is evident that the pain caused to petitioner by his injuries still persists even after more than 5 years when the accident occurred on December 1, 1993. The disability caused thereby which had earlier been diagnosed as permanent partial had possibly became permanent total. (GSIS vs. CA 260 SCRA 133, [1996]). Also in the case of Tria vs. ECC, (supra) – a disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury, the employee is not able to perform any gainful occupation for a period exceeding 120 days.

Moreover, prior payment of compensation benefits for permanent partial disability may not foreclose his right to compensation benefits for permanent total disability. Otherwise, the social justice policy underlying the enactment of labor laws would lose its meaning.

Caution should be taken against a too strict interpretation of the rules lest the constitutional mandate of social justice policy calls for a liberal and sympathetic approval of the pleas of disabled employees like herein petitioner. Compassion for him is not a dole out. It is a right. (GSIS vs. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 430 [1998]).32

The Court of Appeals correctly observed that Rago’s injury made him unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days. The SSS had granted Rago sickness benefit for 120 days and, thereafter, permanent partial disability for 38 months. Such grant is an apparent recognition by the SSS that his injury is permanent and total as we have pronounced in several cases.33 This is in conformity with Section 2 (b), Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation which defines a disability to be total and permanent if, as a result of the injury or sickness, the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, and Section 1, b (1) of Rule XI of the same Amended Rules which provides that a temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days, shall be considered permanent.

In Vicente vs. Employees Compensation Commission,34 we laid down the litmus test and distinction between Permanent Total Disability and Permanent Partial Disability, to wit:

[W]hile ‘permanent total disability’ invariably results in an employee’s loss of work or inability to perform his usual work, ‘permanent partial disability,’ on the other hand, occurs when an employee loses the use of any particular anatomical part of his body which disables him to continue with his former work. Stated otherwise, the test of whether or not an employee suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which, in a more detailed manner, describes what constitutes temporary total disability), then the said employee undoubtedly suffers from ‘permanent total disability’ regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.

We further reiterate that disability should be understood less on its medical significance than on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness.35 Moreover, a person’s disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same cause.36

With this, petitioners’ additional arguments that the x-ray reports lacked a physician’s finding that Rago could no longer work and that Mr. Cabrero’s affidavit attested to the contrary lose persuasive worth. X-ray reports and its confirmation by a physician are simply appraised for

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their evidentiary value and are not considered as indispensable prerequisites to compensation.37 Even then, the three x-ray reports submitted by Rago clearly show the degenerative condition of his injury, viz.

(a) Radiology report stated 1 December 1993 revealed "Mark compression fracture o L1 vertebra without signs of dislocation and bone destruction and slight kyphosis at the level of L1 vertebra but the alignment of the spine is normal";

(b) Radiology report dated 4 may 1994 showed that "consistent with compression fracture with mild posterior dislocation of the L1"; and

(c) Radiology report dated 26 February 1999 showed anterior wedging or compression fracture of L1 with gibbus deformity and thoraco-lumber junction and suggested lumbo-sacral AP for further study. [emphasis supplied]

Clearly, Rago is entitled to permanent total disability benefits.

One final note. Although the SSS and the SSC should be commended for their vigilance against unjustified claims that will deplete the funds intended to be disbursed for the benefit only of deserving disabled employees, they should be cautioned against a very strict interpretation of the rules lest it results in the withholding of full assistance from those whose capabilities have been diminished, if not completely impaired, as a consequence of their dedicated service. A humanitarian impulse, dictated by no less than the Constitution under its social justice policy, calls for a liberal and sympathetic approach to the legitimate appeals of disabled workers like Rago. Compassion for them is not a dole out but a right.38

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 October 2001 and its resolution of 30 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63389 reversing the Social Security Commission’s Resolution of 20 December 2000 in SSC Case No. 4-15009-2000 are hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-38569 March 28, 1988B.F. GOODRICH PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs.WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION and LEANDRO M. CASTRO, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution of the Workmen's Compensation Commission dated March 29, 1974 dismissing petitioner's appeal on the ground that the same should have been filed with the Workmen's Compensation Unit, Regional Office No. 4, Department of Labor, Manila. The dispositive portion of the aforesaid resolution reads:

After a careful review of the record of the case and consideration of the points by the respondent, the Commission En Banc failed to find any valid reason or sufficient justification to alter, modify, much less reverse the aforestated order.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant motion should be as it is hereby, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

This case stemmed from a claim for disability benefits under Workmen's Compensation Act as amended by Republic Act No. 4119 filed by private respondent Leandro M. Castro against petitioner company for pulmonary tuberculosis alleged to have been contracted in the course of his employment resulting in disability for labor on March 1 8, 1968 onwards.

Thus, on April 19, 1968, private respondent filed a claim for Workmen's Compensation with the Workmen's Compensation Section, docketed as W.C. Case No. RO 4-3894.

On September 23,1968, the chief of the Section of Workmen's Compensation Section requested the petitioner to file W.C. Claim Forms 3 and 4 and W.C. Form No. 5, Employer)s Supplementary Report of Accident or Sickness.

Subsequently, petitioner filed W.C. claim forms 3 and 4 on October 2,1968. A Stipulation of Facts, Agreement and Release was entered into between the private respondent as claimant and his ex-officio counsel, Atty. Manuel Asuncion of the Department of Labor, Quezon City, Sub Regional Office No. 4, and the petitioner as respondent through its counsel on October 25, 1968. In the aforestated stipulation, the party agreed on the following:

1. The Claimant wall retired from the service of the Company on June 11, 1968, with average weekly wages of P70.50.

2. The Claimant accepts the medical findings of the Respondent's physician that the Claimant, at the time of his retirement, was fully cured of his pulmonary tuberculosis, minimal; that, prior thereto, he had been totally disabled for labor due to the said illness, from March 20 to May 27, 1968; and that, as of now, he is not suffering from any other illness or any permanent disability whatsoever.

3. The Claimant hereby acknowledges receipt of his full workmen's compensation, and acknowledges that all expenses for medical services, appliances and supplies defined in Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, have been paid by the Respondent.

4. The Claimant declares that he hall no further claims or action of whatever nature against the Respondent arising from his employment or relationship with the latter, and, therefore, discharged and released the said Respondent from any and all of its obligations to him.

5. The Claimant and the Respondent respectfully pray that this Stipulation and Agreement be approved and Decision be rendered in the abovementioned case with prejudice.

On same date, private respondent received from the petitioner the sum of P1,327.35 in full payment of his Workmen's Compensation claim in RO 4 W.C. Case No. 951 (QC SRC).

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On October 28, 1968, a decision was rendered by the hearing officer and acting referee of the Workmen's Compensation Section whereby the agreement was approved. The dispositive portion of said decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the foregoing compromise agreement and release. Respondent is ordered to pay direct to the office the sum of P14.00 as fee pursuant to Section 35 of the Act as amended.

SO ORDERED,

On February 27, 1969, the private respondent filed another claim for Workmen's Compensation on the basis of the same illness, docketed as RO 4- W.C. No. 8805, (1983). A motion to dismiss was filed by herein petitioner on the ground of res judicata. On February 27, 1969, the Department of Labor Regional Office 4 thru its Acting Referee, Vivencio Escarcha dismissed the aforementioned claim RO 4 W.C. No. 8805 (983) on the ground of res judicata. The order further stated that the aforesaid case was heard and decided on its merits by Acting Referee Pedro P. Pelaez of the defunct Quezon City Sub-Regional Office in which decision the Acting Referee held that the sum of P 1,377.35 paid by herein petitioners to the private respondent as disability compensation to have been computed in accordance with law and not contrary to morals or public policy.

On November 27, 1973, private respondent filed his third claim for Workmen's Compensation on the basis of the same illness docketed at; RO W.C. Case No. 147215 with the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 4 Workmen's Compensation Section. On January 7, 1974, the Acting Chief Referee, Atty. Ernesto A. Cruz, of the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 4 Workmen's Compensation Section, issued an award in favor of private-respondent Leandro M. Castro, order g petitioner to pay the claimant, the sum of six thousand pesos ( P6,000.00 ) as compensation and the Workmen's Compensation Fund, the amount of P61.00 as administrative fee pursuant to Section 55 of the Act as amended. However, the award was rendered without giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard in a public hearing, thereby barring it from presenting its evidence.

Accordingly on January 17, 1974, petitioner appealed the s aid award to the Workmen's Compensation Commission praying that the same be reversed and rendered null and void and aforesaid Claim No. RO 4 W.C. Case No. 147215 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. However, the aforementioned appeal was dismissed by the Commission in an order dated February 18, 1974 on the ground that the appeal should have been filed - with the Workmen's Compensation Unit, Regional Office No. 4, Department of Labor, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission which reads:

A party who is not satisfied with the decision or order on the merit of the Hearing Officer or Referee may, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice thereof, file with the Hearing Officer or Referee having control of the case a petition for the review or motion for reconsideration of said decision or order.

On March 5, 1974, petitioner moved for reconsideration thereof but the said motion was dismissed by the Workmen's Compensation Commission En Banc, in a resolution dated March 29, 1974.

Hence, this petition.

In a resolution of July 29, 1974, this Court resolved to give due course to the petition.

In its brief petitioner raised the following assignment of errors:

I

THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION SECTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR REGION NO 4, MANILA THROUGH ITS CHIEF ERRED IN PROMULGATING A WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AWARD ON JANUARY 7,1974 IN RO-W.C. CASE NO. 1457215 WITHOUT JURISDICTION, WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, AND WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

II

THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISPUTED AWARD WHICH MAY BE ATTACKED AT ANY TIME DIRECTLY OR COLLATERALLY IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE SAID AWARD WAS VOID AB INITIO AS ALLEGED ABOVE.

The main thrust of this petition is on the issue of res judicata and its applicability to workmen's compensation cases.

The petitioner alleged that the respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing its appeal from the decision in RO 4 W.C. Case No. 147215 which awarded to the respondent the benefits provided for under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It claimed that it was not given an opportunity to be heard and hence prevented from presenting evidence that the disputed claim had been the subject of two valid final judgments. As above-stated, one is in RO 4-WC Case No. 951 (3894) dated October 28, 1968, based on the parties' Compromise Agreement and Release and the other in RO 4-WC Case No. 8805 dated March 31, 1969 dismissing the claim on the basis of res judicata involving the same parties, cause of action, issues and facts.

For res judicata to apply, the following elements must be present: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must be rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; (d) there must be, between the first and the second actions Identity of parties, of subject matter, and cause of action (Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. NLRC, 126 SCRA 526; Gatus v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 530; Pagsisihan v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 540; Meralco v. Gaulan, 97 SCRA 840; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 742; Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503; Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113; Aroe v. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, 81 SCRA 350; Anti-camara v. Ong, 82 SCRA 337; Dacasin v. Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA 89; Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 73 SCRA 507; Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Pfeider 65 SCRA 13; Ibabao v. IAC, 150 SCRA 76, Bayang v. CA, 148 SCRA 91; Arguson v. Miclat, 135 SCRA 678.)

There appears to be no dispute that in the case at bar, there is a judgment on the merits rendered by a quasi-judicial body having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties and that, between the previous actions and the case at bar, there is Identity of parties, of subject matter, and cause of action.

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Although the hearing officer and acting referee of the Workmen's Compensation Section cannot be considered as an ordinary court, it has long been settled as early as 1956 that "the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. ... It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata." (Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497, 503). Still later, this Court further elucidated that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof 'The more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred" (Ipekjian Merchandising Co., Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 9 SCRA 75).

"The basic rule of finality of judgments is ... grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law." (Carreon v. W.C.C. 77 SCRA 297; Soliven v. W.C.C. 77 SCRA 518; Bibao v. WCC 80 SCRA 177).

However, in the instant petition, the former judgment is based on a prohibited or null and void contract. Therefore, there is no valid judgment which can be predicated on res judicata. While it may be true that respondent claimant Leandro M. Castro received the sum of P1,377.00 from petitioner which the former acknowledged as full payment of Ms Workmen's Compensation, on a Stipulation of Facts, Agreement and Releases, nonetheless, such is not his full compensation under the law and the aforesaid document is null and void under Section 7 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Aquino v. Conato 15 SCRA 631).

Such law provides:

Sec. 7. Contract prohibited. — Any contract, regulation or device of any sort intended to exempt the employer from all or part of the liability created by this Act shall be null and void.

Although as a general rule, admission by the prevailing party of satisfaction of the judgment of the court a quo would be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the claim, the rule is different in Workmen's Compensation cases for the law protects the workingman, his family and his dependents by providing safeguards against dubious agreements. Thus, the provisions of Sections 7 and 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Act are clear and unmistakable expressions of public policy. The agreement being invalid, cannot be invoked for the dismissal of the case (National Mirror Factory v. Amure 27 SCRA 719).

The law frowns upon any agreement, scheme, or device which seeks to exempt the employer from any liability under the Workmen's Compensation Commission either partially or totally and condemns such schemes as nullities (Sec. 7, Act 3428 WCA; National Mirror Factory v. Vda, de Amure, supra). The fact that the worker had signed a satisfaction receipt cannot result in a waiver and the same is a nullity. The law does not consider as valid any agreement to receive less compensation than what the worker is entitled to recover under the Act (Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines v. Alillana 21 SCRA 12471). Further, in order that the agreement covering compensation be valid, the amount agreed upon must be at least equal to that provided by the Act, and the agreement must be approved by the Workmen's Compensation Commission or his authorized representative (National Mirror Factory v. Vda. de Amure, supra). Clearly, in the instant petition, the amount given to the private respondent was not his full compensation under the law. In addition, a document, agreement, release or waiver of claim for compensation executed by an employee cannot be viewed as an ordinary simple contract for it is one imbued with public interest, Any construction to be given to an agreement or document which would in effect approve the employee's contracting out of the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be avoided as being contrary to public policy (Limos v. Fernandez Hermanos, Inc., 84 SCRA 646).

Petitioner further contends that the claim was awarded without affording the petitioner the right and opportunity to a formal hearing and counsel. The contention is untenable. In the case of Fuentes v. Binamura, 2 SCRA 1133, this Court aptly stated that where the award of the Commission is already final and executory, questions regarding the denial of the right to a hearing and lack of notice of the award or decision, should be taken up in a proper proceeding, as in a petition for relief Petitioner's filing of an appeal (in effect a motion for reconsideration or petition for review), with the Workmen's Compensation Commission instead of the Workmen's Compensation Unit as required under Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, did not toll the running of the prescriptive period within which to file the appeal by petition for review or motion for reconsideration. Thus, the award of the Workmen's Compensation Section dated January 7, 1974, has become final and executory. Once the judgment has become final, the issues therein should be laid to rest (Zansibarian Residents Association v. Municipality of Makati, 135 SCRA 235).

WHEREFORE, the petition filed, is Dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 109853. October 11, 2000]PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, represented by GOV. ISAGANI S. AMATONG, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PARDO, J.:

Which government agency has jurisdiction over a complaint for illegal collection of power bills by an electric cooperative? Petitioner submits that jurisdiction is vested with the Energy Regulatory Board or the regular trial courts, while respondents position is that jurisdiction lies with the National Electrification Administration.

What is before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals,[1 that reversed the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Zamboanga del Norte denying petitioners motion for dismissal of the complaint.[2

On July 8, 1991, petitioner Province of Zamboanga del Norte (represented by Gov. Isagani S. Amatong) filed with the Regional Trial Court, Zamboanga del Norte a complaint against Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) for Illegal Collection Of Power Bills And Preliminary Injunction With Restraining Order.[3

Petitioner in its complaint alleged that as per electric bills issued by ZANECO for the month of May 1991, respondent increased the Fuel Compensating Charge (FCC) by P0.29 and Interim Adjustment by P0.02, or a total of P 0.31. This amount is added to the basic charge of P 1.90 per kilowatt.

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By June 1991, ZANECO increased the FCC once more to P1.39 instead of only P0.29. The Interim Adjustment also increased to P0.06 instead of only P 0.02.

Petitioner claimed that the increase was arbitrary and illegal, and that the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) did not sanction the collections.

As a result, the electric bills of the consumers almost doubled in amount.

Further, petitioner alleged that ZANECO cannot increase the bills since the power rate increase from the National Power Corporation (NPC) of P0.17 per kilowatt hour was not implemented yet due to a restraining order issued by the Supreme Court.[4

On July 22, 1991, ZANECO filed its answer to the complaint. It assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject of the case.[5

On July 26, 1991, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction[6 ordering respondent to desist from imposing, charging, billing and collecting the FCC and other additional charges upon its end-users in Zamboanga del Norte and the cities of Dipolog and Dapitan. The court also ordered respondent to refrain from cutting off the electric lines of those who refused to pay the questioned charges, pending determination of the litigation.

On October 8, 1991, respondent ZANECO filed with the trial court a motion requesting the court to set for hearing the affirmative defenses set in its answer, asking for the dismissal of the case.

On March 27, 1992, respondent filed with the trial court a third-party complaint[7 against the National Power Corporation (NPC) praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or a restraining order. On the same date, the trial court issued an order restraining respondent to refrain from disconnecting its electric service on March 28, 1992 or any other date, effective until recalled.[8 Respondent ZANECO alleged that despite NPCs knowledge of the restraining order against the collection of the FCC, which later[9became known as Incremental Cost Charge (ICC), NPC sent a demand letter[10 with notice of disconnection of electric service if ZANECO did not pay the FCC/ICC bills and extra-hydro rates.

On April 14, 1992, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against NPC.[11

On March 28, 1992, the trial court denied respondent ZANECOs motion to dismiss.[12 The court ruled that (1) the nullity of the charges imposed are matters not capable of pecuniary estimation and thus fall within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court; and (2) it is futile to file a complaint with the National Electrification Administration (NEA) or the NPC considering that charges imposed by respondent emanated from these agencies.[13

On April 18, 1992, respondent ZANECO filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the order dated March 28, 1992.[14

On October 9, 1992 the trial court denied ZANECOs motion for reconsideration.[15

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, on November 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, let a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining public respondent, its agents and representative from proceeding with the case and from enforcing all the questioned orders until further notice from this Court.

In addition, private respondent is hereby given five (5) days from notice to show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should be issued for the purpose.[16

On January 28, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing that of the trial court. The decretal portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED, the order dated March 28, 1992 and October 9, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE and the respondent Court ordered to DISMISS the complaint.

SO ORDERED. [17

Hence, this petition.[18

Petitioner assails the imposition of the FCC and Incremental Costs Charge (ICC) as void, illegal, and unconstitutional for lack of notice, hearing and consultation of the parties affected, and without prior authority from the Energy Regulatory Board. Petitioner finally prays that the case be remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits.[19

Petitioner rationalized that the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) has jurisdiction by virtue of Executive Order 172, Section 3 (a) in that ERB is empowered to fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products. It argued that diesel fuel is embraced within the term petroleum products. Since the Fuel Compensation Charge was imposed to compensate the cost of diesel fuel, then such imposition must be approved by the ERB.[20

We disagree.

The real issue is not the compensation of the cost of diesel fuel used to feed the generating set in Mindanao.[21 Precisely, the complaint was for Illegal Collection of Power Bills.[22

Since the complaint is one questioning the increase in the power rates, the proper body to investigate the case is the NEA.

The regulation and fixing of power rates to be charged by electric cooperatives remain within the jurisdiction of the National Electrification Administration,[23 despite the enactment of Executive Order No. 172,[24 creating the Energy Regulatory Board.[25 The issue raised in the complaint is the legality of the imposition of the FCC or ICC. Despite the fact that diesel fuel was used to run its machinery, the fact is that respondent charged its consumers to compensate for the increase in the price of fuel. Petitioner did not question the price of diesel fuel. Rather, it questioned the charges passed on to its end users as a result of increase in the price of fuel. And the body with the technical expertise to determine whether or not the charges are legal is the NEA.

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Electric cooperatives, such as the respondent, are vested under Presidential Decree No. 269[26with the power to fix, maintain, implement and collect rates, fees, rents, tolls, and other charges and terms and conditions for service. However, the NEA requires that such must be in furtherance of the purposes and in conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 269.[27

NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other borrowers, supervised or controlled entities, is empowered to issue orders, rules and regulations. It may also, motu proprio or upon petition of third parties, conduct investigations, referenda and other similar actions in all matters, affecting electric cooperatives and other borrower, or supervised or controlled entities.[28

Thus, a party questioning the rates imposed by an electric cooperative may file a complaint with the NEA as it is empowered to conduct hearings and investigations and issue such orders on the rates that may be charged.[29 Consequently, the case does not fall within the jurisdiction of the ERB.

In case a party feels aggrieved by any order, ruling or decision of the NEA, he may file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.[30

Petitioner next maintains that the case qualifies as an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, basing its argument on the unconstitutionality and arbitrariness of the imposition of the charges.

We are not persuaded.

The Court in a long line of cases has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the courts power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to ones cause of action.[31 Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.[32

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without its practical and legal reasons. Indeed, resort to administrative remedies entails lesser expenses and provides for speedier disposition of controversies. Our courts of justice for reason of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.[33

True, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies has certain exceptions as embodied in various cases. This doctrine is a relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. It is disregarded: (1) when there is a violation of due process;[34 (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question;[35 (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction;[36 (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;[37 (5) when there is irreparable injury;[38 (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;[39 (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;[40 (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;[41 (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;[42 (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention;[43 and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant;[44 (12) when no administrative review is provided by law;[45 (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies;[46 and (14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.[47

Petitioner fails to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptions. Mere allegation of arbitrariness will not suffice to vest in the trial court the power that has been specifically granted by law to special government agencies.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.[48

We have held that while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of our resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establishes the basic rule that the court will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.[49

In fact, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention.[50 The underlying principle of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance machinery, is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly.[51

The premature invocation of the jurisdiction of the trial court warrants the dismissal of the case.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29361, promulgated on January 28, 1993 setting aside the trial courts orders dated March 28, 1992 and October 9, 1992, in Civil Case No. 4386 and ordering the trial court to dismiss the complaint. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-61628 December 29, 1982BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH XXII, AND ANTONIO SY, respondents. Valera, Urmeneta and Associates for petitioner. Eulogio P. Flores for respondents.

VASQUEZ, J.:

Private respondent Antonio Sy was adjudged liable in favor of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7379 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija for damages resulting from a vehicular accident involving a cargo truck supposedly owned by him. Claiming that the adverse decision in said case was due to the mishandling of the same by the counsel who represented him therein, he filed on December 1, 1981 Civil Case No. 43869 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which was assigned to the sala presided over by the respondent Judge. Named as defendants in

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said Civil Case No. 43869 are herein petitioner BA Finance Corporation whom private respondent claims to be the real owner of the cargo truck involved in the accident; the Metro-Taisho Insurance Corporation, which issued the insurance policy covering the same; Atty. Ireneo Calderon, the counsel who represented him in the case filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija; and Robert Chua, the driver of the other vehicle that figured in the accident.

Petitioner BA Finance Corporation was served summons on December 18, 1981. Eleven days later, or on December 29, 1981 petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion for extension of time to file answer and/or motion to dismiss. In an order dated January 4, 1982, served on petitioner's counsel on January 12, 1982, the respondent Judge gave the petitioner a period of 15 days, counted from January 2, 1982 and to expire on January 18, 1982 (sic), within which to file its answer or motion to dismiss the complaint,

On January 13, 1982, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action. In his order dated March 1, 1982, a copy of which was served on the petitioner on March 8, 1982, the respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss, for being "devoid of merit."

On March 17, 1982, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated March 1, 1982. On March 24, 1982, petitioner received a copy of private respondent's motion to strike out the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the alleged ground that the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time. It was argued by counsel for the private respondent that when the petitioner filed its motion to dismiss on January 13, 1982, it had already used 11 days out of the 15 days' extension granted to it by the Court in the order of January 4, 1982; that having received the order denying its motion to dismiss on March 8, 1982, the petitioner had only the remainder of 4 days or up to March 12, 1982 within which to file its answer to the complaint; consequently, the filing of the motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1982 was already beyond the reglementary period for filing the answer.

In the order of the respondent Judge dated April 5, 1982, the motion to strike out was granted, and the petitioner was declared in default for having failed to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, and private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte.

On April 19, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion to lift order of default. The order of the respondent Judge dated May 4, 1982, served on the petitioner on May 18, 1982, denied the petitioner's motion to lift order of default and directed the issuance of a pre-trial order for the other defendants who were not declared in default.

On May 28, 1982, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated May 4, 1982.

On June 16, 1982, petitioner received a copy of an order dated June 10, 1982 setting aside the declaration of default of the herein petitioner and ordering it to file its answer to the complaint within 15 days from notice thereof. The petitioner had by then, or on May 11, 1982, already filed its answer.

The proceedings taken subsequent thereto are not clear from the record. According to the petitioner, on August 12, 1982, it received an order dated July 14, 1982, which reads as follows:

O R D E R

For failure to file answer within the reglementary period despite due summons, as prayed for by plaintiff, defendant Roberto Chua is hereby declared in default and plaintiff is allowed to present evidence ex-parte against said defendant.

Anent plaintiff's Motion to Remove From the Records Answer of Defendant BA Finance Corporation, the record shows on March 1, 1982 this Court issued an order denying defendant BA Finance Corporation's Motion to Dismiss. On March 17, 1982 counsel for BA Finance received the order denying the motion to dismiss. Under the new Rules, if the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof, is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the reglementary period under Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless commences to run all over again from the time the defendant receives notice of the denial of his motion to dismiss. In the case at bar, since defendant received notice of the denial of its motion to dismiss on May 17, 1982, it had fifteen (15) days from March 17, 1982 or up to April 1, 1982 to file its answer. But on March 17, 1982 defendant filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss. The motion for reconsideration is without proof of service; the registry receipt attached to the motion is not the proof of service required by the Rules. Without proof of service, a motion is nothing but a scrap of paper. It did not merit the attention of the court; it was stricken out of the record. Defendant allowed the reglementary 15-day period to answer to elapse without filing its answer. It failed to file its answer on or before April 1, 1982. Since this fact had supervened, this Court, when it issued the order dated April 6, 1982, properly declared defendant BA Finance Corporation in default.

On April 19, 1982, said defendant filed its Motion to Lift Order of Default which on May 4, 1982 was denied.

On May 28, 1982, said defendant filed its Motion for Reconsideration which on June 10, 1982 was granted and the order of April 5, 1982 was lifted. On June 11, 1982, said defendant filed its answer. Hence, plaintiff's Motion To Remove From the Records the Answer of Defendant BA Finance Corporation. Plaintiff observes BA Finance Corporation's Motion for Reconsideration filed May 28, 1982 is Identical with that of its Opposition (To Plaintiff's Motion to Declare Defendant BA Finance Corporation in Default and Motion to Strike Out Motion for Reconsideration of BA Finance) filed on March 29, 1982, and thus concludes that the former (Motion for Reconsideration) is a pro-forma motion resorted to solely to gain time and delay proceedings whereby in this case said defendant was able to file its answer on June 11, 1982. lt is a settled rule that pro-forma motion for reconsideration is disallowed and is not worth the attention of the court for it is mere scrap of paper. And the order of the Court based on such motion pro-forma is null and void.

In view of the foregoing, the order of this Court dated June 10, 1982 is hereby set aside and declared null and void. And the answer filed on June 11, 1982 is hereby stricken out of the record.

Let the pre-trial be set anew on August 6, 1982, at 2.00 P.M.

SO ORDERED.

Pasig, Metro Manila, July 14, 1982.

[s] Gregorio G. Pineda

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[t] GREGORIO G. PINEDA J u d g e (Rollo, pp. 77-78.)

Petitioner further alleged that on August 31, 1982, it received a copy of the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 43869 dated August 17, 1982 which orders the defendants therein, including herein petitioner, but excluding Atty. Ireneo Calderon, to pay unto the private respondent the total sum of P 228,255.64 as moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

In their "Opposition" to the petition which they intended as their Comment thereon, the respondents claimed that after private respondent Antonio Sy filed an opposition to the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the petitioner succeeded by false representations in securing the order lifting the order of default and allowing it to file an answer to the complaint; that upon discovering such irregularity, private respondent filed a "Motion to Remove From the Records Answer of Defendant BA Finance Corporation"; and that it was on the basis of said motion that the respondent Court issued its order of July 14, 1982 which declared its previous order of June 10, 1982 as null and void and ordered the answer to be stricken out from the record.

After the respondents have filed their comment to the petition, We issued a temporary restraining order in the Resolution of October 11, 1982 enjoining the respondent Judge from further acting on Civil Case No. 43869 until further orders from this Court.

It is distressing to note that a provision of the Revised Rules of Court which had been in force since January 1, 1964, or for the last 19 years, on a subject as significant or as commonplace as the period to file an answer to the complaint could be misapplied and misconstrued by a court of first instance in a major metropolitan area. It can only be hoped that a similar unfamiliarity with the Rules is not true with other courts in more remote areas of the country. The provision in question, Section 4 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, cannot be any clearer:

SEC. 4. Time to plead. — If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period.

Admittedly, the above provision is a departure from the doctrine previously upheld as to the period when to file an answer in case a motion to dismiss the complaint is denied. While the above- quoted provision is new, there being no similar provision in the Rules of Court of 1940, the language thereof is clear and leaves no doubt as to the intendment thereof. It has received a categorical interpretation from the Supreme Court since January 31, 1969 in Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768, wherein this pronouncement was made:

Rule 11, section I of the Revised Rules of Court gives the defendant a period of fifteen (15) days after service of summons within which is file his answer and serve a copy thereof upon the plaintiff, unless a different period is fixed by the court. However, within the period of time for pleading, the defendant is entitled to move for dismissal of the action on any of the ground enumerated in Rule 16. If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he receives notice of the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period (Rule 16, section 4). In other words the period for filing a responsive pleading commences to run e all over to again from the time the defendant receives notice of the denial of his motion to dismiss. (See also, Acosta-Ofalia v. Sundiam 85 SCRA 412.)

Had the respondent Court, exhibited a modicum of awareness of the law and jurisprudence directly applicable to the question presented for its determination, this proceeding would not have been filed at all. It is undisputed that the petitioner was given an extension of time within which to file its answer which was to expire on January 18, 1982. On January 13, 1982, it filed a motion to dismiss which was denied, and notice of which was served on the petitioner on March 8, 1982. When the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1982, it was well within the 15-day period within which to file the answer counted from the date it received notice of the denial of its motion to dismiss which was on March 8, 1982. Yet, on the erroneous belief that the petitioner had only to its credit the balance of the period to answer that it did not consume by the time it filed its motion to dismiss, the respondent Judge ruled that the filing of the motion for reconsideration on March 17, 1982 was already beyond the reglementary period and forthwith declared tile defendant in default.

We could have stopped further discussion of the instant petition at this point. However, We cannot allow to pass unnoticed the subsequent developments in the case which had been characterized not only by obscurity, but also by actuations which are less than commendable. After declaring the petitioner in default in the order of April 5, 1982 and after denying the motion to lift order of default in the order of May 4, 1982, the respondent Judge made a complete turnabout in his order of June 10, 1982 by setting aside the default declaration of the petitioner, giving no reason therefor except the catch phrase "in the interest of justice." Then, another change of mind on the part of the respondent Judge was manifested in his order of July 14, 1982 which reiterated the order of April 5, 1982 declaring the petitioner in default. This time, the respondent Judge woke up to his mistake and ruled that the petitioner had 15 days from the date it received notice of tile denial of its motion to dismiss on March 11, 1982 within which to file its answer.

Nonetheless, respondent Judge stubbornly persisted in maintaining his view that the answer of the respondent to the complaint was filed out of time by alleging two new grounds, namely: (1) the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner against the denial of its motion to dismiss is a mere scrap of paper for lack of proof of service; and (2) the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner against the order of May 4, 1982 which denied the petitioner's motion to lift order of default is pro-forma for being Identical to petitioner's opposition to the plaintiff's motion to declare the petitioner in default. The lack of palpable merit of said grounds leads to a natural impression that the respondent Judge was determined to prevent the petitioner from being given a chance to defend itself in the case filed against it by the private respondent, contrary to repeated exhortations and pronouncements from the Supreme Court frowning upon judgments by default on purely technical grounds. The new arguments resorted to by the respondent Judge were not even mentioned in the motion of the private respondent to strike out the answer, nor were they mentioned by the respondent Judge in his first order declaring the petitioner in default. The motion to strike out filed by the private respondent and the order of respondent Judge dated April 5, 1982 declaring the petitioner in default made reference only to the alleged fact that the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss was filed beyond the reglementary period. Such ground, as aforementioned, had been acknowledged by the respondent Judge himself in his order of July 14, 1982 to be erroneous.

The allegation that the motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner lacks the requisite notice of hearing and proof of service is a factual distortion. On page 4 of said motion for reconsideration which has been attached as Annex "F" of the petition (Rollo, pp. 51-54), it clearly appears that the petitioner's counsel set the said motion for hearing on April 16, 1982 and that a copy of the same was sent by registered mail to the counsel for the private respondent on March 17, 1982. The private respondent filed a motion to strike out the said motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 55-58 dated March 24, 1982), thereby showing that private A. respondent had notice of the motion for reconsideration long before the scheduled hearing thereof on April 16, 1982.

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The imputation that the motion to reconsider the order of May 4, 1982 which denied the petitioner's motion to lift order of default is pro-forma reveals a misconception of the concept of pro-forma motions for reconsideration. It is not every motion for reconsideration that reiterates grounds or arguments aired in a previous motion that may be declared pro-forma. It will be noted that the motion for reconsideration herein involved is of an interlocutory order, and not of a final judgment or final order. There should be a distinction in determining whether a motion for reconsideration may be declared pro-forma depending on whether it is directed against a final judgment or order, or only against an interlocutory order. In the case of the former, a repetition of arguments or grounds already sufficiently discussed in prior incidents may properly be categorized as being merely for purposes of delay. In the case of interlocutory orders, a reiteration of the ground or argument previously advanced is not necessarily indicative that the movant filed the motion merely for gaining delay. It must be remembered that, normally, when an interlocutory order is sought to be reviewed or annulled by means of any of the extra legal remedies of prohibition or certiorari, it is required that a motion for reconsideration of the question order must first be filed, such being considered a speedy and adequate remedy at law which must first be resorted to as a condition precedent for filing of any of such proceedings (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 65, Rules of Court). There is no similar requirement in taking an appeal from a final judgment or order should the questioned interlocutory order be subject to attack only on one ground, as in the case of the default declaration herein involved, a motion for reconsideration against the order complained of would necessarily and inevitably contain a repetition of the ground previously alleged. In so doing, the movant is praying the court to give his motion a second look, in the hope that the court would realize its supposed error, correct the same, and thereby preclude the necessity of seeking relief in a higher tribunal.

In the case presently considered, the reiteration of the argument that the respondent Judge committed error in his computation of the period to file an answer after a motion to dismiss shall have been denied becomes a necessity in view of the fact that, although the first motion for reconsideration of the order of default was granted, the respondent Judge subsequently revoked his favorable action thereon. The motion to reconsider the order of revocation must necessarily invoke the same ground showing why the ground upon which the default order is based is erroneous. That said argument is no Idle reiteration of the reason previously alleged, or that the motion for reconsideration was not filed for purposes of delay is indubitably shown by the fact that the respondent Judge sustained the same and corrected his error with respect to the period of time within which to file an answer on the basis thereof.

By and large, it adequately appears that the questioned actuations of the respondent Judge in this case have been characterized not only by palpable error but also by grave abuse of discretion which should be corrected and warned against.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. All the proceedings conducted by the respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 43869, including the judgment rendered therein dated August 17, 1982, insofar as the herein petitioner is concerned, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The answer with counterclaim filed by the petitioner dated June 10, 1982 shall be deemed ADMITTED. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

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