The overall classification of this briefing is: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SPMAGTF-CRInformation Brief

Colonel S.F. Benedict, USMC

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Special Purpose MAGTF

Crisis Response &

Non-Standard Missions

SPMAGTF-CR is a Marine Air-Ground Task Force

Crisis Response ………..Contingency Ops

Partner and Prevent

Major Combat Operations

Each MAGTF has four Basic Elements

Command Element

(CE)

Ground Combat Element(GCE)

Aviation Combat Element(ACE)

Logistics Combat Element(LCE)

MAGTFs are scalable and/or tailored combined-arms Task Forces for any contingency

Marine Expeditionary

Unit

(MEU) ~2,500Forward Presence

& Crisis Response

With Amphibious Ready Group

Marine Expeditionary

Brigade

(MEB) ~15KSwiftly Defeat the

Enemy

Marine Expeditionary

Force

(MEF) ~30-90KDecisively

Defeat

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Mission is Crisis Response

• Trained and certified to a range of capabilities including: Embassy reinforcement, Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP), Support to non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC)

• Also capable of being the lead element to a larger fly-in echelon (MEU/ MEB/ JTF)

SPMAGTF-CR is one of the forward-deployed crisis response options the U.S. Marine Corps offers AFRICOM/EUCOM AOR.

• Along with the ARG/MEU, FAST, BSRF, SPMAGTF-AF and other episodic rotational forces, as well as MSAU

To differentiate between similar capabilities of forward deployed USMC CR forces it is useful to think in the following terms:

Permissive to Uncertain and NO vertical lift required: MSAU, FAST, SPMAGTF-CR, ARG/MEU

Permissive to Uncertain and vertical lift required: SPMAGTF-CR, ARG/MEU

Hostile: ARG/MEU, MEB

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SPMAGTF-CR provides a self command and controlled, self deployable, and highly mobile maritime force that helps mitigate the gap in the Mediterranean or Gulf of Guinea left by the absence of the MEU due to a lack of amphibious shipping.

It is considered a Rapid Response Force by CCDRs.

CR does not replace an ARG/MEU and lacks the combat power, medical, and logistical sustainment an ARG/MEU provides. However, it complements ARG/MEU capabilities at the lower end of the ROMO.

SPMAGTF-CR fills a critical deterrent / force of choice role due to its high mobility, self deploy capability, ability to self sustain, and vertical lift capability – unique

among crisis response forces in theaters where no ARG/MEU is available

SPMAGTF-CR Uniqueness

SPMAGTF-CR’s marriage of the V-22 and KC-130J organic airlift and small task organized ground combat elements

combine to create an extremely agile force

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Niamey

Operating Area Time / Space Problem Framing

• It is approximately the same flight time from Moron to Gulf of Guinea as a TRANSLANT from Camp Lejeune NC to Moron Spain.

• It is approximately the same flight time from Moron Spain to Camp Lemmonier Djibouti as a flight from Anchorage to Miami. Entebbe is 800 NM further.

• It is approximately the same flight time from Moron to NASSIG as a flight from New York to New Orleans.

• The continent of Africa can fit 3.7 times the contiguous land mass of the United States within its shores

CLNC

MORONNASSIG

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Accra, Ghana

Niamey

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Sigonella

Souda Bay

Moron

CLDJ

Operations Execution

Conducted Multiple Bi-lateral Training Events and Exercises in

Spain and France

Flew 1570 NM to Senegal ISO TSC event and Engagement

Directed to forward stage in NASSIG three times ISO North African unrest

May-July September October

Deployed 3400 NM to Djibouti and additional 800 NM to Uganda ISO South Sudan unrest and partial US Embassy withdrawal

December-Present

Deployed 3400 NM to Djibouti and additional 800 NM to Uganda ISO South Sudan unrest and partial US Embassy withdrawal

December-Present

Dakar, Senegal

Conducted Marine Integration Exercises and Rehearsals

Conducted multiple Key Leader

Engagements with Partner Nations, High Risk Embassies, and Cooperative Security

Location Country Teams 6

New Normal

New Normal Implementation Whole of government strategy DoS commitment to early identification of

security requirements– Implementation of Trip Wires and security coordination

Increased DoD commitment as a stakeholder in USG facility and personnel security abroad– Prevent, Deter, Defeat by offering an array of security

augmentation

Lessons Learned from South Sudan EMB JUBA During NN crisis, need to determine what the US

government’s endstate is, and then: How is the endstate reached? Who will determine when endstate is being met? How much risk are we willing to take to reach the

endstate? Who determines the limits of risk (DoD, DoS) we are

willing to take to reach the endstate? What are the limits of the resources (DoD, DoS, IC,

etc.) we are willing to use to reach that endstate and or to mitigate risk?

Who will determine those resource limits?

• Embassy Reinforcement

• Focus on Deterrence• Host Nation Training• Scalable / Tailor-able

Support• Chief of Mission

Influences

• A Forcible Entry• NEO• Unilaterally DOD• CT Operations• Only a Kinetic

Reaction

New Normal Is…. New Normal Is Not….

AFRICOM TTX Aug13

Within NN construct, as conditions normalize, we must be as aggressive reconstituting rapid response forces as we were deploying them or we will end up with our highest capabilities tied down indefinitely  

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