a mid-term appraisal-the reagan presidency: limited government and political administration

A Mid-Term Appraisal-The Reagan Presidency: Limited Government and PoliticalAdministrationAuthor(s): Chester A. NewlandSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1983), pp. 1-21Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/975295 .

Accessed: 14/06/2014 09:56

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Wiley and American Society for Public Administration are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve andextend access to Public Administration Review.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 193.105.154.127 on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 09:56:39 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=black

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aspa

http://www.jstor.org/stable/975295?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


From the Professional Stream PAR

A Mid-Term Appraisal The Reagan Presidency: Limited Government and Political Administration

Chester A. Newland, George Mason University

President Reagan's philosophy of governance has been the unswerving agenda of his administration. It is a tenaciously optimistic faith. Limited central government, with enhanced defense capacity, and some return to state-centered federalism are one side of the president's hope. A relatively unrestrained private economy and individual self-reliance are the flip side of this belief, with variations on themes of deregulation, capital formation, and social services reductions.

This article assesses public administration in the Reagan administration during its initial two years of strategically staged and energetic efforts to implement that philosophy of governance. Except for significant general governmental retrenchment and enlarged emphasis on Carter initiatives to reduce waste, fraud, and abuse, public administration developments have had a low profile. Several of them, however, have been and are important. Some have been positive. Most crucial, however, public administration under President Reagan has been dominated by the presidential agenda and political actions to implement it.

A counter revolution to 50 years of social and political views was proclaimed by Reagan loyalists as the goal at the outset of the new administration. The hope of many was to reverse trends since the New Deal and to erase much of what transpired as a result of the Great Society. The president proclaimed that view with dramatic clarity in his inaugural address: "Government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem."' That was not mere rhetoric for the moment. That outlook, above all else, has expressed during its first two years the Reagan administration's definition of its 1980 electoral mandate. It has been played forcefully and with unsurpassed dramatic skill as a heroic answer to a historic calling. The Reagan philosophy has been pursued to a significant extent as ideology; as the answer to America in search of itself. Theodore White, in his 1982 book of that title,2 stressed that a search for

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1983

national purpose characterized the 1980 election. It was certainly seen that way by Reagan political strategists, both during and following the campaign. Popular dis- illusionment with government of the late 1960s and 1970s was central to the 1976 election, as noted by James Sundquist in a 1979 Public Administration Review appraisal of the Carter administration at mid- term.3 By 1980, voters were desperate for successful national leadership. Public opinion did not generally support libertarian domestic policies which the Reagan administration subsequently sought to implement.4 But it did support some enhancement of defense, and the 1980 election was clearly a mandate to lead the nation- successfully.

Public administration under President Reagan is, to a significant extent, ideological political administration.

The initial political issue in an appraisal of the Reagan administration is whether that relatively open mandate for successful leadership-for government consistent with a society which works-has been or can be facilitated by the actions taken. In part, that issue is whether Reagan's policies have corrected or at least ameliorated economic problems which the president set forth as his primary challenge. His evaluation standard was stated as the first substantive part of his inaugural: "These United States are confronted with an economic affliction of great proportions.... Idle industries have cast workers into unemployment, human misery, and personal indignity.... For decades we have piled deficit

Chester Newland is professor of public affairs at George Mason Uni- versity. He is a former director of the Federal Executive Institute, Charlottesville, and a past-president of ASPA. He is the author of numerous books and articles, and is a frequent contributor to PAR.



2 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

upon deficit, mortgaging our future and our children's future for the temporary convenience of the present."' But the fundamental issue is not simply whether Reagan policies are consistent with a better functioning private economy, although that was promised as a first priority and is crucial. It is also important to ask: Is the government being managed well? For President Reagan, the ultimate answer to that lies in whether he can lead in restructuring the role of government and notions of governance. Can retrenchment of national government involvement in domestic affairs and intervention into the lives of individuals and private organizations be achieved as a result of his presidency? But, given efforts to reduce activities and size, the question remains whether government is being administered in ways that are consistent with long-term excellence or even ade- quacy of the constitutional system.'

a a A despite some libertarian alienation, loyalty as ideological consistency was applied far more extensively as the test for appointment in the Reagan administration than in any other presidency in at least a half century.

For public administration, the core issue may be this: Under President Reagan, a dramatic acceleration of politicization and deinstitutionalization of principal administrative organizations and of program management has occurred throughout the government. That follows a trend which has built since the late 1960s.7 It is an aspect of the old question of the field: the relationship of politics and administration. Under Reagan, most key administrative positions have been staffed on the basis of partisan and personal loyalties, and career professionals have been largely excluded from many leadership networks and responsibilities. In part, that has stemmed from a desire to heighten political responsiveness to produce quick and decisive governmental change. For some, that has reflected a preference for political management by partisans who confront perceived issues head-on to implement a fixed agenda from a predetermined point of view; public managers, by contrast, are considered to be too conservatively oriented to incrementalism and consensus.8 For at least a few, the staffing approach has been justified by a belief in a clear separation of politics and administration according to a perception of Weberian theory.! In part it has been simply a desire for spoils. A result is that, at moderately higher reaches of policy and implementation and above, reliance on career professional expertise is limited. Public administration under Presi- dent Reagan is, to a significant extent, ideological political administration.

Reagan administration developments are analyzed here under two topics which highlight their most significant dimensions for public administration: (1) strategic planning and behavior, focusing on policy management to implement the Reagan agenda; and (2) administrative

management, dealing with the administration's excep- tionally limited attention to governmental operations. The president's philosophy and specific policies are only dealt with incidentally because they are generally well known and much has been written about them."' None- theless, it is Reagan's philosophy/ideology which defines the agenda which has a crucial impact on public administration.

Strategic Planning and Behavior

Three features dominated Reagan administration behavior during the first two years: (1) unswerving adherence to the policy thrust of limiting government and freeing up the economy; (2) strategic political planning and some coordinated tactical behavior on priorities; and (3) nurturing and coordinated use of political networks. The focus was on confident and decisive change-implementing a fixed idea of governance-to the neglect of matters of importance to longer-term success, including governmental management.

The months following the election through August 1981 were a carefully scripted transition drama with respect to promoting and enacting policies to cut back governmental programs, budgets, and-most impor- tantly-taxes. One most basic purpose was, by cutting tax income (as by Proposition 13 in California), to reduce quickly the capacity of government to be involved in social and economic affairs. That script for limiting government largely succeeded. The massive 1981 tax cut accounted for a reorientation of policy debates almost entirely to program and budget cuts to reduce unprecedented, projected deficits, although failure of the economic policy in initial months resulted in a bipartisan tax increase a year later.

That substance of the retrenchment drama, despite all its historic importance, is not the concern here. To this analysis, what is noteworthy is the high reliance on strategic planning and action to define and accomplish administration policies and behaviors to implement the predetermined agenda. Organization for strategic policy management most clearly illustrates this important characteristic of the administration, and for that reason three elements of the Reagan policy apparatus are discussed first. To highlight functions, processes, and behaviors, the focus is on policy network elements rather than on structures. "The three are (1) presidential personnel and agenda politics; (2) the Office of Policy Development (OPD), the Cabinet Councils, and the Of- fice of Planning and Evaluation (OPE); and (3) other Executive Office of the President (EOP) activities- OMB and the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA). Since they are unique to the Reagan administration and central to its strategic policy management, the Cabinet Councils and OPE are highlighted as of special interest to public administration.

JANUARY/FEBRUJARY 1983



FROM THE PROFESSIONAL STREAM 3

Presidential Personnel and Agenda Politics

While the administration "stayed the course" of Reagan's predetermined agenda, being political, it was far from monolithic. Many of the president's actions were strategically scripted, and some of the White House policy machinery which is discussed later best demonstrates that. The presidential personnel process is discussed here first because it illustrates well two other key dynamics of Reagan's presidency: first, during the initial two years, the agenda was pursued largely as ideology, but with pragmatic adjustments; and, two, Reagan politics dominated, but with situational variations ranging from reliance on experienced expertise to selection of personnel based on simple ideological loyalty as the test for office. Generalizations, in short, are easy, but they are nearly as hazardous at this stage of the Reagan presidency as they have been for earlier administrations.

Presidential Personnel Dynamics. Qualifications for Reagan administration appointments came into open conflict during inauguration week. Loyalty, defined as long-term Reagan political support, became an issue as the criterion for selection. The Kitchen Cabinet applied the test which largely dominated the Reagan personnel process at the start and ultimately. That was stated by Henry Salvatori, a member of Reagan's original 1966-67 California Kitchen Cabinet as well as the 1980-81 group, as follows: "The three criteria we followed were, one, was he a Reagan man? Two, a Repub- lican? And three, a conservative? Probably our most crucial concern was to ensure that conservative ideology was properly represented.""

The Reagan presidential personnel process was formally started in April 1980, when Edwin Meese asked his former classmate, Pendleton James, to set up an operation. James had worked in Nixon's and Ford's personnel activities, and he headed an executive personnel firm in Los Angeles at the time. By late summer, 1980, James organized the activity as the "Reagan-Bush Planning Task Force," and it established offices in Alexandria, Virginia, separate from the Reagan campaign headquarters. James Cavanaugh, who had also worked in the Nixon and Ford administrations, became James's deputy. According to James, five criteria were used to select executives with loyalty and proven records: "compatibility with the President's philosophy, integrity, toughness, competence, and being a team player."" Nonetheless, appointees and the process came under heavy criticism by ultra-conservative Reagan supporters within hours of the inaugural. When CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci, a career federal executive, was named as deputy secretary of defense upon recommendation by Secretary Weinberger, Far Right activists were angered. Many were outraged by selection of James Baker, a "Bush Man," as White House Chief of Staff. On January 23, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak titled their syndicated column, "Reaganism Without Reaganites?"9"3 They described the disappointment of "Reagan's faithful followers"


over failure to appoint University of Maryland professor Donald Devine as OPM director. They reported that acting White House Counsel Peter McPherson was at fault. The following month the Conservative Digest published a cover-page letter to the president: "Your mandate for change is being subverted. The very real possibility that this catastrophe could occur is the result of your personnel operation being run by individuals who are politically naive, and, worse still, individuals whose backgrounds reveal a hostility to almost every- thing for which you have so strongly stood over the years."'4 Lyn Nofziger undertook to correct the problem. Fred Fielding became White House counsel. James Cavanaugh was replaced as personnel deputy by John S. Herrington, a choice acceptable to critics. Presidential appointments moved more to the ideological right, and ultra-conservatives were selected for some targeted positions. Dr. Devine was appointed at OPM. By June, Richard Viguerie was pleased. As reported by Lou Can- non, he said: "Lyn manned the barricades and did the work of the Lord.""5 The Far Right did not remain satisfied, however, and the Conservative Digest in February 1982 repeated parts of the letter published a year earlier, while denouncing a long list of appointees ranging from Elizabeth Dole and Donald Regan to Wil- liam Webster."' But despite some libertarian alienation, loyalty as ideological consistency was applied far more extensively as the test for appointment in the Reagan administration than in any other presidency in at least a half century.

A related issue is the extent to which those criteria were followed to the exclusion of experience and expertise. Elizabeth Drew reported at the height of the conflict over personnel appointments in March 1981 that Lyn Nofziger said: "We have told members of the Cabinet we expect them to help us place people who are competent. . . . As far as I'm concerned, anyone who supported Reagan is competent."'7 It was clear in the selection of the Cabinet and later in the appointment of Sandra Day O'Connor to the U.S. Supreme Court that President Reagan did not apply a rigid test to top appointees-at least not as restrictive as the ideological Right wanted. Shortly after the election, however, James Reston reported that Reagan had said, with respect to recruiting appointees, "There's an awful lot of brains and talent in people who haven't learned all the things you can't do.""8 By the end of June 1981, many appointments reflected that philosophy well. Pro- fessor Calvin MacKenzie has reported that, of people confirmed by the Senate as of June 26, 1981, 59 percent (76 of 112) of subcabinet appointees lacked prior governmental experience, as did 78 percent (18 of 23) in independent agencies and 100 percent (7 of 7) in independent regulatory agencies."

Reliance on expertise and political loyalty varied between agencies and functions, however. At the Defense and State Departments, the secretaries resisted pressures for appointment of ideologues, and experienced expertise predominated at DOD. At Transportation, for example, of the top 25 appointees, 14 had previous federal experience, 14 others had transportation experience,




and of the total, 11 had served as career federal executives. On the other hand, nearly all top administrative management positions in domestic departments and many at OPM and OMB were filled over the first two years on the basis of political loyalties, often defined as ideological purity.

At the White House level, expertise and politics were generally combined (except as seen by the ideological Right). For congressional liaison on his basic agenda, for example, the president relied on recognized expertise. He chose Max Friedersdorf as assistant to the president for legislative affairs, reporting through James Baker. That activity was staffed with respected personnel with Hill experience. Friedersdorf had earlier worked in legislative liaison for Nixon, and he served as chief lobbyist for Ford. A legislative strategy group functioned in 1981 to coordinate activities. It generally consisted of Baker, Stockman, Regan, and Meese, along with Baker staffers Friedersdorf, Dole, Gergen, and Darman.

Slowness of Appointments. Aside from ideology and competence issues, slowness was the great problem of the presidential personnel process, breaking all records. At the end of Reagan's first four months, Time reported that of 400 top officials, only 55 percent had been announced, and of those only 36 percent had been formally nominated, with only 21 percent confirmed.20 Delays were such that, at the end of 120 days when transition authorization for double the number of Schedule C appointees in agencies ran out, Dr. Devine of OPM ex- tended the time another 120 days. The administration's reason, stated in the Federal Register three weeks after the initial time had lapsed, was "since a number of key political officials have not yet been appointed to federal agencies, thereby continuing the transition period for the new administration."21

Several factors contributed to the slowness. The disclosure requirements of the 1978 Ethics Act had to be applied for the first time. The presidential personnel office was deficient in staff and operations, and that was complicated by conflicts over the ideological purity issue. Also, the Phase I agenda called for getting the economic program through Congress as a first priority.

Disclosure requirements of the 1978 Ethics Act created some recruiting problems for the Reagan administration, according to White House counsel Fred Fielding. His office helped prospective appointees to comply with the Act. By June 1982, the White House counsel had assisted some 750 people, and Fielding said that "we feel it has inhibited recruitment; talented individuals otherwise willing to serve have concluded that public disclosure is too high a price to pay."22 Lou Can- non, in his 1982 Reagan book, reported two such cases at the Cabinet level.23 One resulted in the second-choice selection of James G. Watt as secretary of Interior when Clifford Hansen, two-term senator from Wyoming, declined the job. James B. Edwards, secretary of Energy, was the other second choice reported by Cannon, selected when Houston geologist Michael Halbouty de-

dined appointment after serving as the transition team leader. Halbouty may have declined more because of the nature of the Energy assignment than because of the Ethics Act, however.

The Justice Department's Office of Legal Policy, under Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Rose, undertook a study of proposed changes or repeal of the 1978 Ethics in Government Act. Although that was announced in June 1982, no action was expected because of the political sensitivity of the issue. Rose noted that such proposals would be most opportune politically at the outset of a president's second term.24

Political clearance requirements slowed the personnel process after the initial weeks. Papers transmitted to the personnel office provided for political clearance on a standard form, with reviews by Dick Allen, Martin Anderson, Lyn Nofziger, Wayne Roberts, and Rick Shelby. Lyn Nofziger's political affairs office became particularly involved, as noted earlier. The political clearance forms required identification of voting domicile; political support; race, sex, and date of birth; position information; and a resume or Form 171, with letters of reference in some cases. Because many subcabinet agency heads were not named until several weeks (or months) had passed, their personnel recommendations did not even enter the process until late. For example, the OPM director's initial appointees were not submitted until the first week of April, and they were sent forward to Martin Anderson for clearance on April 9. Once named, nominees for subordinate positions moved relatively quickly through the process if they had acceptable political sponsorship, regardless of lack of expertise.

The personnel office had to track positions which remained open and those filled, in addition to processing some 18,000 resumes of possible nominees. The quad- rennial "Plum Book," Policy and Supporting Posi- tions, completed by OPM, was issued November 18, 1980, by the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, and that was used as one guide to positions. What was needed, however, was an automated information system to track open positions, nominations in process, appointments completed, and information on possible nominees. Once in the Executive Office Build- ing equipment was available for that, and it came to be utilized. By March, the Office of Policy Development produced a tracking system titled "Key Positions and Status of Appointments." It covered the 13 Cabinet departments in one list and 77 agencies, boards, com- missions, councils, and government corporations in another. At one point informal requests came to OPD to add all SES and other career executive positions to that appointments tracking system, but that was not done by OPD.

The Agenda Priority and Politicization. Delays in appointments were not entirely due to ideological screen- ing, Ethics Act requirements, and deficiencies of processes. They were also, in part, attributable to Phase I agenda priorities. By and large, only a few top agency officials were named in time to have impacts on the

JANUARY/I EBRUARY 1983



FROM THE PROFFSSIONAL STREAM 5

president's economic recovery program as submitted to Congress, and that permitted nearly total White House control over progress of the Reagan agenda during the opening months of the administration. In those terms, appointment delays were at least a mixed blessing from the administration's perspective. The legislative strategy group controlled the 1981 blitz of Congress with little involvement of agency officials.

Two related aspects of Reagan appointments merit note. First, a tendency since the late 1960s has been ex- tended, with many officials in various EOP offices named as special assistants to the president, along with their other position authorities. For example, the deputy director of OMB and various OPD appointees were given dual appointments, continuing a trend since Presi- dents Johnson and Nixon to deinstitutionalize EOP and, instead, structure it politically on personal loyalties. Second, the Reagan administration moved quickly to remove many non-partisan, long-term clerical, secretarial, and other support personnel from OPD and other White House positions. Most Schedule A office personnel had generally been continued in their jobs in other transitions, but Reagan officials replaced many of them with political loyalists. That set a pattern for other top offices.

White House Policy Machinery

Presidential personnel activities reviewed above were oriented to two dominant considerations, as noted: the Reagan agenda and political loyalty. A third quality is the focus here. More than any recent presidency, strategic planning and activities characterized Reagan administration policy management with respect to the economy and general domestic affairs. Much of the planning for the initial months was done before the election and during the transition. Once in office, a White House policy network was formed to facilitate continued strategic direction in presidential leadership. Three key parts of that network are an Office of Policy Develop- ment (OPD), formerly the Domestic Policy Staff in the Carter administration; Cabinet Councils, initially five, then six, and later seven; and a newly created Office of Planning and Evaluation (OPE). Those policy staff organizations were established to support other powerful centers of Reagan policy formulation and implementation: the Cabinet, the White House legislative strategy group, noted above, and ultimately, the president.

It is important to note that those three organizations have functioned largely as a flexible network, although White House vertical bureaucracy has sometimes con- flicted with that. The analysis below deals only in part with each of the three in sequence, since they were interrelated as originally conceived and they do in fact function largely as parts of a larger policy network. The emphasis here is on these Reagan policy organizations because they best illustrate the administration's effort to bring strategic direction to the presidency.

It is also crucial to note three other apparent features of this policy machinery. First, the elaborate under-


pinning for strategic presidential behavior has not functioned much to determine the agenda which guides specific policies. The Reagan agenda remained relatively fixed. This policy machinery was used primarily to help hold the administration to policies and actions which are consistent with Reagan's philosophy of governance and reduced government. Second, much of the network's activity relates to essential secondary-level activities-particularly in the Cabinet Councils-serving to coordinate policy. Third, insofar as work of presidential significance is produced, as by OPE, the products may influence the policy network horizontally, but if they reach the president, it is vertically through the White House bureaucracy (albeit a flexible one) which screens out many vital details and focuses on conclusions and presidential actions. The results have an impact on the president's schedule, but with respect to the details of his policy statements-often found seriously in error by informed observers-they may have little effect. That is, in part, why the first and second points above are crucial. This policy network functions at a level which has been neglected in other recent administrations: coordination of vital secondary-level matters. It helps to keep a government-wide focus on Reagan's agenda, even if it does not result in presidential utterances which are informed about essential details.

Office of Policy Development (OPD). The White House Office of Policy Development appeared to function at two separate levels during the first year: (1) under Martin Anderson as assistant to the president for policy development, and (2) under Edwin Gray as director and Ronald Frankum as deputy director of OPD.

Anderson, a Hoover Institution senior fellow and Stanford University professor, was Reagan's economics advisor during the campaign. As head of OPD, Ander- son was a philosophically consistent opponent of governmental interference with individual liberties. When Attorney General William French Smith and a Presidential Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy recommended a national identity card for aliens, for example, Anderson and his wife, Annelise Ander- son, an influential OMB program associate director, strongly opposed it as a threat to civil liberties. They won. Being philosophically consistent, the Andersons have been reported personally to oppose governmental restraints on marijuana and abortion also.25

Like the president, Anderson was concerned with the big picture and making sure that campaign promises were kept. He understood and held his focus on the agenda of reduced government, without great concern for details. He demonstrated little interest in managing the 40-person OPD staff, and they were left initially to coordination by OPD Deputy Director Frankum, a close associate of Meese from their joint service with Reagan in California. Anderson did provide leadership, however, through consistent involvement in Cabinet Councils, participating in more of those meetings than any other official. After one year, and shortly after the departure of his associate from earlier Nixon days, Richard Allen, Anderson announced his departure from




government, but with continued support of the president. Annelise Anderson remained in OMB.

Edwin Harper, deputy director of OMB during Reagan's first year, succeeded Anderson on February 5, 1982. Harper, a non-ideological conservative, completed his Ph.D. in government at the University of Virginia in 1968, and he served in the Nixon administration as special presidential assistant for domestic budget planning. Harper had a reputation for governmental management and budgetary interests more than general policy expertise before going to OPD.

Scheduling by morning headlines, ticker tape, and the nightly TV news is not ab- ent from this administration, but that "Chicken Little" approach is less conspicuous than it was during much of the past two decades.

In January 1981, the OPD staff initially worked on priority issue assignments. They quickly grouped into five policy areas, however, with a senior staffer in charge of each. That division of labor served the func- tional areas of the original five Cabinet Councils which were established on February 26, 1981. OPD staff members were designated to serve as executive secretaries to the councils, providing "staff support, coordination, and brokerage."2' Additionally, one OPD senior staffer, Melvin Bradley, was designated responsibility for racial minority policy concerns, although titled advisor for urban affairs, and one special assistant to the president, Robert Carleson, served also in OPD with particular interests in federalism issues among other responsibilities.

A special concern of Reagan officials was that White House/OPD staff should serve coordinative roles in support of the Reagan agenda, not displacing departmental and agency leadership but helping to broker consistent government-wide direction. The Cabinet Coun- cils became primary vehicles in that effort.

Reagan's Cabinet Councils. Creation of the president's original five Cabinet Councils was announced only five weeks into his administration. During the campaign Reagan had promised to rely on the Cabinet as his principal vehicle. In November following the election, Meese demonstrated some awareness of the post-Water- gate critique by Frederick Mosher and a National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) panel of Nixon's concentration of power in the hands of White House staffers at the expense of Cabinet and agency involvement.27 He also evinced informed interest in NAPA presidential study recommendations." During the early days following the inauguration, it was clear in OPD staffing and organization that such policy mechanisms as the National Security Council, the various Cabinet-level councils under Nixon, and the Ford administration's Economic Policy Board (EPB) had already been considered by key Reagan officials as they sought to create a workable network organization

for Cabinet involvement at the center of White House policy processes. Notably, for example, Roger B. Porter, named as an aide to Treasury Secretary Regan, was appointed also as the senior OPD staffer assigned to economic affairs. Porter had served in the Ford administration as EPB executive secretary, and when the Reagan Cabinet Councils were created he was assigned the same role for the Cabinet Council on Economic Af- fairs (CCEA). Within three weeks after entering office, Ron Frankum had a basic framework for the Cabinet Councils and OPD's related structure on paper as worked out by Meese and others.

Generalizations about the Cabinet Councils are hazardous, absent some description of their activities. From before the inauguration, Meese and Frankum appeared clear in an intention to create a relatively flexible policy network to interrelate White House and Cabinet departments for purposes of drawing on broad governmental resources for coordinated action on Reagan's agenda. They got a large measure of flexibility in the results. The Cabinet Councils have functioned from the beginning in varied ways, not along one rigid pattern.

Exhibit 1, taken from a 1982 OPE evaluation of the Cabinet Councils, summarizes basic data through mid- May 1982, on the original five councils plus a sixth one created January 29, 1982 on Legal Policy (CCLP). A seventh Council on Management and Administration, announced on September 22, is noted later with other topics on administrative management.

From February 1981 to mid-May 1982, a total of 191 council meetings were held. It is striking, but not sur- prising given both the genesis of the councils and the Phase I priorities, that the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs (CCEA) accounted for 100 of those meetings-52 percent of the total and over three times the number of the next most active council, Commerce and Trade (CCCT). Except for August 1981, when most of the Reagan administration virtually left town in celebration of their congressional successes, both CCEA and CCCT met regularly: six to nine and one to four meetings per month respectively. The Council on Human Resources (CCHR) met only three times from February through June 9, 1981, and then it did not con- vene for five months. Then it met 12 times from November 6, 1981 through April 29, 1982. The Council on Natural Resources and Environment (CCNRE) met 26 times in 1981, including once in August, but then it slacked off to one meeting each in January and Feb- ruary, three in April, and none in March or early May. The Council on Food and Agriculture (CCFA) met once each in the months of March, September, and No- vember, 1981, and in February i982 and twice each in May and December 1981 and in April 1982. The then newly formed Council on Legal Policy (CCLP) met only three times from January 29 through April 16, 1982, and it also met twice between April and mid-July 1982.

Average totals of attendance at the various council meetings are shown as the second data line of Exhibit 1. Attendance by key participants, as reported by OPE, is shown by Exhibit 2, together with a council membership status code. President Reagan participated in 14 percent





EXHIBIT 1 Summary Data on Cabinet Council Meetings

Natural Economic Commerce Human Resources & Food & Legal** Affairs & Trade Resources Environment Agriculture Policy

TOTAL (CCEA) (CCCT) (CCHR) (CCNRE) (CCFA) (CCLP)

Through 5/05/82 (5/05/82 4/29/82 4/29/82 4/21/82 4/16/82

Total Times Met 191 100 31 15 31 10 3 Attendance/Meeting 22.5 23.0 25.6 19.7 23.7 17.2 -

Total Agenda Items 398 228 61 22 66 17 4 Items/Meeting 2.1 2.3 2.0 1.5 2.1 1.7 1.0

Actions on Items.

Review/Discuss 117 77 15 7 14 4 -

% of total 29% 34% 25% 32% 21% 24% -

Further Study 98 57 21 2 17 1 -

% of total 25% 25% 34% 9% 26% 6% -

Strategy 35 20 5 3 7 0 -

% of total 9% 9% 8% 14% 11% 0% -

Council Decision 69 44 10 4 7 4 -

% of total 17% 19% 16% 18% 11% 24% -

Recommendation 42 16 4 4 13 5 -

% of total 11% 7% 7% 18% 20% 29% -

Presidential Policy* 17 3 6 2 4 2 -

% of total 4% 1% 10% 9% 6% 12% -

Postponed 12 7 0 0 4 1 -

% of total 3% 3% 0% 0% 6% 6% -

*Designates agenda items for which the president approved a policy at the council meeting or shortly thereafter as a direct result of the council meeting.

**Minutes were not available to OPE. This exhibit is taken directly from Table 1 of the White House Office of Planning and Evaluation study, Strategic Evaluation Memorandum # 18, Cabinet Councils and Domestic Affairs Management. An LEvaluation (Washington: The White House, OPE, June, 1982), p. 9.

(26) of the meetings. Most frequent in attendance were Martin Anderson, 65 percent (124); Murray Weiden- baum, 60 percent (114); Donald Regan, 59 percent (113); Malcolm Baldridge, 53 percent (100); Drew Lewis, 49 percent (93); and Vice President George Bush, 43 percent (88). The data show that Bush's attendance was most spread across all the councils.

Each of the original five councils consists of from six (CCHR and CCFA) to ten (CCCT) Cabinet secretaries and heads of EOP Cabinet-level offices as principal members, including a departmental secretary as chairman pro tempore. (The president is the chairman of each council.) Every council is open, however, to all the Cabinet, and all are members of all councils as shown on Exhibit 2. Members may send alternates, and under secretaries and even assistant secretaries have participated for absent principals.

Two categories of staff assist the individual councils. First, as noted earlier, OPD staff members are designated as executive secretaries to the councils, and, in conjunction with the Office of Cabinet Administration (OCA), are responsible for coordinating the councils' activities. An executive secretariat for each council consists of staff of the departments and White House of-


fices of the principal members. That means that each council draws on departmental resources outside the White House, linking into operating agency levels to support the policy process. In those support staffs, working groups have also been established to provide interdepartmental expertise and research capacity.

The Office of Cabinet Administration (OCA) manages the flow of materials between the Cabinet, the councils, and departments, agencies, and offices. For the Cabinet and the councils, it assigns, tracks, and manages issues. OCA is sometimes a bottleneck to OPD staff trying to get materials to their council members. A few criticisms have also arisen that OCA channels matters prematurely to senior White House staff. Such criticisms have been common of Cabinet services activities of other administrations also, particularly as powers exercised by presidential staffers have expanded with time in office.

Exhibit 1 reports totals of agenda items dealt with by the councils. The most frequent agenda topics were: thrift industry, 22 times (CCEA); economic outlook, 15 (CCEA); federal credit policy, 10 (CCEA); international investment policy, 9 (CCEA); enterprise zones, 9 (CCCT); natural gas decontrol, 8 (CCNRE); Polish




EXHIBIT 2 Attendance at Cabinet Council Meetings by Key Participants

TOTAL CCEA CCCT CCHR CCNRE CCFA CCLP*

No. of Meetings: 190 100 31 15 31 10 3 Through: 5/05/82 5/05/82 4/29/82 4/29/82 4/21/82 4/16/82

Reagan 26 C 7 C 8 C 4 C 5 C 2 C 0 14% 7% 26% 27% 16% 20%o 0%Y

Bush 83 E 52 E 13 E 5 E 11 E 2 E 0 44% 52% 42% 33% 35% 20%o 0O

Block 79 M 33 P 17 P 5 P 14 C 10 M 0 42% 33% 55% 33% 45% 100% 0%

Baldridge 100 P 62 C 30 M 0 M 7 P 1 M 0 53% 62%o 97% 0%70 23% 10%0 0%70

Weinberger 13 M 4 M 5 M 0 M 3 M 1 M 0 7% 4% 16% 0% 10%0 10%0 0%0,

Bell 14 M 5 M 0 P 8 M 1 M 0 M 0 7% 5% 0%70 53% 3% 0% 0O

Edwards 56 M 20 P 10 M 1 P 23 M 2 M 0 29% 20%o 32%o 7% 74% 20% 0%70

Schweiker 51 M 27 M 4 C 15 M 3 M 2 M 0 27% 27% 13% 100% 10%0 20% 0O

Pierce 27 M 11 M 7 P 3 P 6 M 0 M 0 14% 11% 23% 20%o 19% 0%N 0O

Watt 47 M 7 M 5 M 0 C 31 P 4 M 0 25% 7% 16% 0% lo0o 40%o 0%0

Smith, W. F. 25 M 4 P 5 P 4 P 12 M 0 C 0 13% 4% 16% 27% 39% 0O 0O

Donovan 73 P 56 P 12 P 4 M 0 M 1 M 0 38%o 56% 39% 27% 0O 1 0%0 0%Y

Haig 9 P 4 P 4 M 0 M 0 P 1 M 0 5% 4% 13% 0% NO 10% lO 0%Yo

Lewis 93 P 64 P 21 M 0 P 5 P 3 M 0 49% 64% 68% NO 16% 30% 0O

Regan 113 C 95 P 11 M 3 M 3 M 1 M 0 59% 95% 35% 20%1oO 010% NO

Stockman 59 P 47 M 3 M 2 M 4 M 3 M 0 31% 47% 10%0 13% 13% 30% 0%Yo

Weidenbaum 114 P 82 P 18 M 3 P 8 M 3 M 0 60% 82% 58%o 20% 26% 30% NO

Brock 81 P 53 P 21 M 2 M 4 P 1 M 0 43% 53% 68% 13% 13% 1NO% 0%

Hill 21 - 0 - 0 - 0 P 19 - 2 - 0 11% NO NO 0% 61% 20% NO

Meese 35 E 13 E 10 E 4 E 6 E 2 E 0 18% 13% 32% 27% 19% 20% NO

Baker 13 E 2 E 6 E 3 E 1 E 1 E 0 7% 2% 19% 20% 3% 10% 0%N

Anderson, M. 124 E 66 E 23 E 9 E 22 E 4 E 0 65% 66% 74% 60% 71% 40% 0O

Harper 51 E 30 E 11 E 3 E 5 E 2 E 0 27% 3 0% 35% 20% 16% 20% 0%

Member Codes: C = Chairman (the President) or Chairman Pro Tempore P = Principal Member M = Other Member E = Ex Offilcio Member

*Attendance data not available. This exhibit is taken from Table 2 of the White House Office of Planning and Evaluation study, Strategic Evaluation Memorandum # 18, Cabinet Councils and Domestic Affairs Management: A n Evaluation (Washington: The White House, OPE, June, 1982), p. 15.





debt, 7 (CCEA); tax policy: Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 7 (CCEA); and the Clean Air Act, 7 (CCNRE).2' Given the general Reagan agenda, the pre- ponderance of economic and business issues is not sur- prising. A caution is due on these and other Cabinet Council statistics. They provide only partial indicators. A one-time agenda item may be of greater consequence than some recurring ones. Also, some policy issues and activities of great importance are not matters of Cabinet Council activities.

Disposition of Council agenda items is crucial. Ex- hibit 1 shows seven sorts of Cabinet Council actions on agenda items. Only the categories of "Presidential Policy actions" and "Recommendations" are noted here. The dates and topics of presidential actions are shown as Exhibit 3. Because the White House policy process is necessarily complex, involving many dimensions which are beyond this brief analysis, these data must also be understood to be limited indicators. They signify when Council minutes report that "the President attended a Council meeting and made a decision on the agenda item there or shortly thereafter."30 Such decisions were made on 17 out of 398 agenda items.

Tracing impacts of "Recommendations" is like ex- ploring histories of ideas, but the OPE Cabinet Council evaluation grouped 10.8 percent of actions in that important category. OPE also concluded, with documen-

tation, that "the President has acted on virtually all of them. "31 Examples of Councils' recommendations acted on presidentially are: CCEA = the Cancun Sum- mit (10/1/81); Employment and Training Policy (2/2/82 and 2/11/82); CCCT = Maritime policy (11 /3 /81); CCHR = Pro-competition Health Care Pro- posals (2/24/82 and 3/10/ 82); CCNRE = Natural Gas Decontrol (4/22/81, 7/30/81, 8/5/81, and 10/8/81); and CCFA = Surplus Cheese Disposal (12/21 /8 1); and Sugar (4/21 / 82). Combined, it appears that presidential decisin making occurs with respect to about 15 percent of Cabinet Council agenda items.

Further assessment of the Cabinet Councils requires knowledge of how they relate to the Cabinet per se and to other parts of the White House policy network besides OPD. Only limited public information of that sort is available, but enough is generally known for some description and conclusions.32

The Reagan Cabinet was first convened in December 1981 for initial briefings. Following the inauguration, it met frequently in sessions noted for presidential focus through stories on his philosophy of self governance and limited government and for disciplined work on Phase I priorities. By mid-July 1982, the full Cabinet had met 50 times, an average of three meetings a month for the entire 18 months. Cabinet sessions were disciplined by agendas, with Richard Darman, deputy

EXHIBIT 3 Specific Presidential Policy Actions

Council Date Presidential Policy Actions

CCEA (3 of 224 items: 1% 3/23/8 1 Youth Differential Minimum Wage 10/1/81 Thrift Industry 3/26/82 Housing Policy

CCCT (6 of 61 items: 10%) 5/20/8 1 Multilateral Development Banks 5/20/8 1 Ottawa Summit-East/West Relations 5/29/81 Trade-Mexico 6/23/81 Trade-Shoe Imports 12/22/81 Enterprise Zones 3/23/82 Trade-Reciprocity Legislation

CCHR (2 of 22 items: 9%) 5/1 1/81 Social Security-1981 Proposals 11/13/81 Department of Education

CCNRE (4 of 66 items: 6%) 8/5/81 Synthetic Fuels Projects 10/8/81 Nuclear Policy 11/12/81 Coal Slurry Pipelines 12/15/81 Department of Energy

CCFA (2 of 17 items: 12%) 2/2 3/82 Trade-Agriculture Export Policy 4/13/82 Dairy Price Supports-1982

CCLP Action data not available

Except for the tallies in the left column, this exhibit is taken from Table 8 of the White House Office of Planning and Evaluation study, Strategic Evaluation Memorandum #18, Cabinet Councils and Domestic Affairs Management. An Evaluation (Washington: The White House, OPE, June, 1982), p. 24.





assistant to James Baker, monitoring Cabinet Council paperwork and other relevant policy materials, and Craig Fuller, under Meese, directing the Cabinet Ad- ministration Office. Detailed policy work quickly became the function of the Cabinet Councils particularly CCEA and CCCT. During the initial weeks, besides the Cabinet Councils and OPD, a legislative strategy group emerged, as noted earlier. That group guided activities to secure congressional enactment of specific policies in support of the Economic Recovery Program and other agenda priorities. In that implementation role, the group clearly influenced policy powerfully during the first year, and its power remains central.

Reports are common that matters are pulled up to the legislative strategy group from Cabinet Councils while still under consideration. Some issues promptly reach the president via such routes as Meese and Baker without rigid adherence to dominant patterns of the elaborate policy network. Decisions are sometimes made by the president as a result of such staff initiatives, and some decisions have been announced at Cabinet meetings without prior Cabinet discussion. Also, on some important matters of concern to only one or two departments or agencies, actions have been taken without recourse to Cabinet Councils or the Cabinet. The administration has been criticized because many major decisions are not determined as a result of Cabinet deliberation." Those criticisms seem based on some romantic conception of "Cabinet Government"- one which has not functioned in any recent administration and one which the Reagan administration wisely did not attempt. Instead, Reagan officials sought to create a policy network, with Cabinet Councils as focal points to pull together departmental and White House resources and policy processes. It appears that they have largely accomplished that, particularly with respect to CCEA and CCCT. A structured but situationally adap- table White House/departmental policy network has been formed which accomplishes three purposes: (1) key departmental and White House officials and staffers are brought together in work on important issues, minimizing (but not eliminating) we/ they White House/ agency divisions which plagued most recent administrations; (2) the Cabinet Councils, together with other network organizations, take initiatives and facilitate actions on vital second-level policy issues without compel- ling personal presidential attention to details, thus minimizing two problems of some recent administrations while compensating, in part, for President Reagan's orientation to generalization; and (3) the Councils and the policy network help to keep the entire administration focused on the president's general agenda, resulting in unprecedented unity of direction.

Office of Planning and Evaluation (OPE). Besides the Cabinet Councils, the principal Reagan administration policy management innovation has been creation of a White House Office of Planning and Evaluation. Planning for the office was largely completed before the inauguration, and Dr. Richard S. Beal was appointed on January 20, 1981, as special assistant to the

president and OPE director. OPE's purpose has been formally stated as "assisting the counsellor in projecting strategic activities for the president, based on evaluations of significant national, international, and political phenomena and conditions."34 Consistent with that function, OPE is also guided by a formal mission statement: "To do planning at the level of the president, which gives focus to presidential behavior that can be communicated publicly, and gives perspective to the domestic, foreign, budgetary, and political activities of the president.""`

Reagan, with his inexpwienced partisan appointees, has given a far greater unprofessional cast to OMB than Carter.

Beal performed some similar functions for Reagan during the campaign. As a professionally educated political scientist and a former Fulbright Scholar and Brigham Young University professor, he brought expertise to the Reagan group in assembly of strategically vital political data and analysis to yield relevant information. He also brought to the White House a devotion to the concept that the president should be provided organizational support to facilitate and to maximize strategic behavior in support of his philosophy of governance.

OPE is a tiny White House organization to do that, interrelating with the entire Reagan policy network, but relating to the president mostly through Edwin Meese and his deputy, James Jenkins.3" OPE was originally allocated only five positions, not counting Beal, from the OPD personnel ceiling, and it lost one of those slots early in FY-1982. Consequently, it has relied on interns and detailed personnel to perform some functions.

One conclusion about OPE merits attention before highlights of its activities are noted: The need is great, but the market is small. Or, in jargon, the White House needs enhanced systems support to facilitate informed, strategic presidential behavior, but relatively modest value is placed on the products except as they focus on current or imminent priority actions, like speaking schedules and elections. Put simply again, in the White House, the immediate tends to drive out the long term. That is less true of the Reagan presidency than of other recent administrations. Scheduling by morning headlines, ticker tape, and the nightly TV news is not absent from this administration, but that "Chicken Little" approach is less conspicuous than it was during much of the past two decades. In part that reflects the president's personality. It also stems from having a relatively fixed agenda. But it appears also to be due to a strategically- oriented policy network of which OPE is a nearly invisi- ble but vital part.

OPE's most important products are major planning and evaluation documents (classified Type I). They include several series of analyses: Strategic Planning Memoranda (SPMs), related to current and future phases of the president's overall agenda; Strategic





Evaluation Memoranda, including analytical assessments of presidential activities and policies, survey data, policy audits, and implementation of the strategic plan; Public Opinion Digests, providing data summaries (these were discontinued at the end of 1981); The Outlook, a one-time 1982 report tried as a replacement for PODs; and National Indicator Reports, products of a Decision Information Decision System (DIDS). With these products, OPE's activities fall into three categories: (1) strategic planning, (2) strategic analysis and evaluation, and (3) applications of technology to enhance performance of those functions. Only one example of each of these is noted here.

OMBO's FY-1953 budget projections for all outlay categories other than the big three ... showed an incredible reduction in real

dollars from $81.6 billion in FY-19N to $59.4 billion in FY-1985 . .. Those projections are unbelievable, unless most of the government is to be eliminated.

Beal worked with others on the Phase I plan during the transition, and the final document was delivered on January 29, 1981. Entitled The Final Report of the Ini- tial Actions Project, that plan set forth strategically- oriented actions required at the outset of the administration to implement the Reagan philosophy of governance and government. Work on a Phase II plan started in OPE on February 13, 1981, and a first draft strategic plan design was completed by mid-March. Two vol- umes, Phase II Strategic Plan Summary and Phase II Strategic Plan-Detailed Descriptions of Presidential Priority Policy Areas, were delivered in June. A Phase III plan was prepared for the period, October 1, 1981- January 25, 1982; Phase IV was planned for January 25-May 15, 1982; and Phase V carried through the fiscal year. Essentially, these phase plans are designed to orient the Reagan presidency to upcoming future requirements and to help focus on longer-term vital issues and behaviors to carry out the president's agenda. The products were initially prepared for the president and Meese, primarily, and they were oriented to a largely horizontal policy network. Over time, more vertical structure has emerged, and it appears from an outside perspective that most of OPE's strategic planning products only reach the president indirectly.

OPE's analysis and evaluation products include studies like the assessment of the Cabinet Councils, noted earlier. Besides the June 1982 evaluation, OPE also produced an assessment of the actions and decisions of the Cabinet Councils during their first four months.37 Those evaluations reflect a large measure of objectivity, but gaps in access to essential information for evaluation are evident, and they do not call in question elements of the core Reagan agenda.

Development of White House domestic policy support technology may turn out to be a major OPE con- tribution to this and subsequent administrations. The

JANUARY/F EBRUARY 1983

NSC has long had sophisticated support systems, aided by automated and other communications technology. On the domestic side a manual alpha-numeric central filing system has served the White House since it was installed under President Taft and, in recent years, an assortment of unrelated information/communications systems have been utilized. The EOB library was served at the start of the Reagan administration by terminals linked to several systems, including the Congressional Research Service as a result of former Vice President Mondale's initiative. With OPE leadership and detailed DOD expertise, contemporary information and com- munication technology are presently being installed to serve domestic policy analysis and briefing needs. Con- trol and uses of the system remain to be determined.

One conclusion about OPE was stated earlier: the White House need for future-oriented strategic information and planning is great, but the market is generally small. The fact that OPE has survived at all for the first two years of the Reagan administration, functioning relatively apart from day-to-day concerns, tells much that is important about it. The unswerving orientation is to strategic information needed to implement the president's philosophy of governance.

OMB and CEA

How OMB and CEA have functioned in support of Reagan's agenda are only noted briefly here. Both of these EOP organizations have had extensive public coverage.38 Also, administrative management responsibilities of OMB are dealt with later.

The Budget and OMB's Politicization. During the first two years, the Reagan agenda dominated the budget, and the budget and tax reduction dominated all other policy considerations. OMB Director Stockman initially exercised extensive influence over budget processes. OMB controlled initial domestic affairs policy through the budget more than the domestic policy staff did. Some full Cabinet meetings focused on broad budgeting and fiscal issues. But the Cabinet Councils and OPD devoted little time to Reagan's crucial budgets, except for specific funding issues, such as the credit budget, considered by CCEA. The overall FY-1983 budget was reviewed by CCEA, for example, only three days before it was officially transmitted to Congress-too late to influence the contents. Instead of going through the policy network described above, Reagan budgets have been "handled through long- standing mechanisms and procedures under the Office of Management and Budget, supplemented by some new innovations, such as the Budget Review Board, with occasional review by the full Cabinet."39

Despite cross-cutting responsibilities, Stockman's participation in policy processes apart from the crucial budget activities has been relatively limited. As shown on Exhibit 2, he attended less than one-third of Cabinet Council meetings, reflecting the second-order character of much of their work.

According to the Atlantic Monthly report by William




Greider, Stockman lacked conviction about many aspects of the 1981 budget and tax measures for which he served as chief administration point man. More important, he was less than candid with the president. Stockman said that "the supply-side formula was the only way to get a tax policy that was really 'trickle down' " and that the president's tax legislation was "a Trojan horse filled full of all kinds of budget busting measures and secondary agendas."4 While many agree, that is not what he earlier told Congress. After that interview broke in the Congressional Record in November 1981, Stockman's failure to recant those and other damaging remarks about Reagan's policies did not result in his removal from OMB. He merely retreated from the spotlight to an accompaniment of remarks about damaged credibility.

OMB . . . has now been transformed almost entirely by the Reagan administration into an unbelievable political arm of the president.

That damage was not merely limited personally to Stockman. That exceptional interview bruised OMB's remaining credibility after over a decade of growing politicization; but more significantly, its credibility was largely destroyed by its unreliable budgetary projections. The politicization of OMB since the 1960s is not a matter of partisan use of reliable expert information; it is a deterioration of capacity to produce believable information due to displacement of professional expertise by political partisans at levels below the director. Reagan, with his inexperienced partisan appointees, has given a far greater unprofessional cast to OMB than Carter. Stockman brought his own politically skilled budgetary amateurs with him from his congressional office: David Gerson as his executive assistant and Frederick Khedouri as associate director. The Deputy Director, Edwin Harper, was experienced, but as noted he was also named concurrently as an assistant to the president, diminishing OMB's institutional integrity. For ten months, nonetheless, OMB seemed to prosper again under Stockman's high-profile, partisan leadership, re-emerging from shadows which had lingered from Bert Lance's days and the earlier 1970s. The Stockman confession ended that for those who had not already scrutinized OMB's unprofessional products. Already, knowledgeable people had turned to the Con- gressional Budget Office and other sources for reliable information, since OMB's projections were clearly unrealistic. OMB's FY-1983 budget projections for all outlay categories other than the big three (defense, space international; income security, education, health, VA; and interest) showed an incredible reduction in real dollars from $81.6 billion in FY-1980 to $59.4 billion in FY-1985. Like the 1981 OMB projections of a budgetary surplus in FY-1984, when in fact deficits are likely to be triple any deficit prior to Reagan, those projections are unbelievable unless much of the government is to be

eliminated. That assessment is neither academic nor partisan; the Senate Budget Committee unanimously rejected the president's FY-1983 budget. OMB, an important public organization with respect as an institution of high integrity prior to the 1960s, has now been transformed almost entirely into an unbelievable political arm of the president.

OMB and Regulatory Reform. Regulatory reform is a major part of Reagan's agenda, and it has been pushed with considerable though mixed success on three fronts: (1) limits on proposed rules; (2) revision of existing rules; and (3) proposed legislation.4' The president issued Executive Order 12291 in February 1981 and created a task force to oversee the effort, directed by Christopher DeMuth, head of OMB's Office of Infor- mation and Regulatory Affairs. A major new OMB staff was created for this purpose by drawing positions out of its management side. OMB reported in April 1982 that during the project's first year the administration had reduced new rule making by one-half and Federal Register pages by one-third. Through revision of existing rules, to August 1982 the administration claimed savings of $9 to $11 billion in one-time investment costs and $6 billion in annual recurring costs.

President Reagan's regulatory reform has both substantive and management significance, and, despite major faults, it may stand as the most extraordinarily successful effort of OMB. The program has greatly affected how government agencies manage policy implementation. It has also elevated political pressures from agencies to OMB, further politicizing day-to-day affairs there.

The task force designated 111 programs for review, and it stressed four principles: (1) harnessing of market incentives, (2) reducing burdens on state and local governments, (3) modifying regulations where social costs exceed benefits, and (4) streamlining regulatory procedures. Despite aggressive deregulation efforts and success in reducing the volume of rules, by Fall 1982 set- backs of two sorts stymied this Reagan priority.42 First, business and industry critics complained about the administration's failure to push regulatory reform legislation. That was neglected in the administration's singular drive for its Economic Recovery Program. Second, and more crucial in terms of capacity to govern, in the second year actions started failing judicial scrutiny due to violations of required administrative procedures and inadequacy of legal work. Political amateurs without expertise and limited resources in agencies combined to undercut the success of this fundamental part of the Reagan agenda. Also, substantive expertise in OMB is limited, and yet industry lobbying and decisions have tended to shift to that level.43

Reagan Federalism. Reagan's regulatory reform was only moderately crippled during the first two years by its secondary place behind economic and ideological staffing priorities. Another major program-Reagan Federalism-was seriously damaged, however, by failure during the first two years of the Reagan





economic program and by the hasty and ideologically uncompromising formulation of intergovernmental and urban policy proposals, without regard for realistic state and local political considerations. But despite the initial failures, the federalism agenda may have been Reagan's most far-reaching and fundamentally important policy and management initiative.

The division of responsibilities between the federal government and states and localities was under question by the Big Seven public interest groups well before the Reagan administration, and readiness for change among them and their constituents was high. The Big Seven, however, were largely by-passed by the administration as "government Establishment" in the initial formulation of federalism and urban policy proposals, and the first meeting of the president with their representatives as a whole was not held until September 30, 1982, after administration proposals had floun- dered.44 Yet, Reagan proposals for a swap of Medicare to the national government and of AFDC and Food Stamps to the states and of a turnback of several functions to states with transition funding was close to some priorities of state and local leaders. But Reagan fiscal priorities and their vast deficits reinforced a rigid administration stance which largely undermined its potentially important federalism agenda. Nonetheless considerable success was achieved in reducing and grouping categorical federal funding into block grants.

CEA: Conflicting Monetary and Fiscal Policies? OMB's Stockman appears to have functioned more per- suasively as the Reagan administration's economist than the professionals of the Council of Economic Advisors. Murray L. Weidenbaum, Reagan's first CEA chairman, was selected after the 1981 budget course had been largely set. Treasury Secretary Regan had already been identified during the transition as the administrations chief economics spokesman. Before he resigned in the Summer 1982, Weidenbaum attended 60 percent of all Cabinet Council meetings, second only to participation by the president's other trained economist, Martin Anderson. But, as noted, the policy network of the councils dealt largely with important second-level issues while OMB's Stockman and Treasury's Regan were out front with the president's economic recovery program.

Under Weidenbaum, the CEA strongly supported Reagan's fiscal policies, although the chairman did not identify as a supply sider. In the February 1982 Economic Report of the President, however, the first emphasis was on the administration's strong support of a reduced growth of money supply: "Continued monetary restraint and a reduction of within-year variability of money growth, . . . are necessary both to reduce in- flation and provide the basis for sustained economic growth."45 Only secondarily to its advocacy of tight money, CEA also endorsed Reagan's tax cuts: "The series of tax cuts enacted in 1981 provides the founda- tion for increased employment, spending, saving, and business investment.... At the time this report was prepared, it appeared that the recession which started in August .. . will be over by the second quarter of


1982."46 To many, those Reagan monetary and fiscal policies were devastatingly inconsistent.

Following Weidenbaum's departure, Harvard Pro- fessor Martin Feldstein was appointed to chair the CEA. Earlier, as a conservative, free-market advocate, he had been critical of supply side theory. Feldstein brought with him several young economists, mostly conservative academicians. Otto Eckstein described the new group as "certainly the most capable collection of young economists in Washington."47

Administrative Management

Three features which have dominated the Reagan presidency were identified at the outset of the foregoing discussion: (1) the Reagan agenda, (2) strategic planning, and (3) presidentially centered politics. Those were all characteristic of the policy management process. Until September 1982, by comparison, administrative management was largely characterized by (1) a narrow control approach, (2) inactivity or neglect of positive management, and (3) presidentially partisan politics. Actions in September spelled an end to the neglect.

Before analysis of specific actions, some constructive aspects of Reagan inactivity in administrative management merit attention. Inaction is not necessarily negative, and in at least two respects it appeared to be positive. First, during its first months, the administration did not undertake to impose a rigid One-Best-Way management approach like PPBS or ZBB on all of the government, at least not while Edwin Harper was OMB deputy director. Those who had experienced such cen- tralized absolutes in federal management knew their faults, and, except for tight political and accounting controls, agencies were left to deal with their own needs. Second, despite proposals from varied quarters to launch a major reorganization project the administration declined to do that sort of time-consuming and potentially destabilizing project. It held instead to single-focus reorganization plans, like the successful abolition of the Community Services Administration and unsuccessful proposals to terminate the Depart- ments of Education and Energy.

Reagan imposed a federal hiring freeze as his first act following the inaugural speech. He described that action, which followed an earlier freeze by Carter, as "a first step toward controlling the growth and the size of government and reducing the drain on the economy for the public sector.'948 Such dramatic freezes are now cus- tomary, but that first management action set a tone which persisted through the election period in 1982.

Except for retrenchment and administrative dimensions of deregulation and federalism proposals, the president's only sustained management initiative in the early months of the administration was a program to reduce waste, fraud, and abuse, following on Carter's efforts. That activity is the first topic here. Then highlights of OMB, OPM/MSPB/FLRA, and other administrative management developments are briefly dis-




cussed. Finally, late 1982 actions which may have spelled some end to White House and OMB neglect of internal governmental management are reviewed: The President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control and creation of a Cabinet Council on Management and Administration.

Anti-Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

On March 26, 1981, President Reagan announced a government-wide commitment to reduce fraud and waste in federal programs. He named a 23-member President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) to guide that effort-the only major White House internal management initiative of the first year.

When Reagan fired the IGs in 1981 . . . he exerted presidential control as the appropriate model rather than the statutory plan, limiting the potential for institutional independence of the IGs. The House Government Opeirawons Commit- tee charged that Reagan's actions had violated the intent of the 1978 IG law.

The March announcement followed criticisms of Reagan for earlier firing all of the inspectors general (IGs) appointed by President Carter. Under the Inspectors General Act of 1978, 12 independent IG offices were created, building on experience with statutor- ily created IGs in four departments before that time. The 1978 act had sought to make the IGs independent, with requirements to report to both Congress and their departmental secretaries. When Reagan fired the IGs in 1981, he said, "It is vital that I have the full confidence in the ability, integrity and commitment of each ap- pointee."49 In short, he exerted presidential control as the appropriate model rather than the statutory plan, limiting the potential for institutional independence of the IGs. The House Government Operations Committee charged that Reagan's actions had violated the intent of the 1978 IG law. Criticisms were rife that Reagan had acted to politicize the IGs because they would be responsible for oversight of activities of the president's appointees. Six of the fired IGs were subsequently rehired -three in their former positions and three in different agencies. Ten new IGs were appointed-all with government experience.

The PCIE originally consisted of the 16 IGs, six other officials, and the deputy OMB director as the chairman. The IGs and their top staffs had worked during the Carter administration to create a professional network to enhance their performance,50 and the new group quickly formed into an expanded working relationship through Reagan's council. The PCIE coordinated reporting of IG's activities, and it issued a comprehensive summary for the first half of FY-1982 claiming $5.8 billion in direct savings and improved use of funds.51 Of that total, $4.9 billion represented reductions in nego-

tiated prices of government purchases, resulting from auditors' recommendations. The General Accounting Office subsequently said that the claimed savings totals were inaccurate and misleading, but OMB defended them as correct.52

OMB: The Management Fragment

During Reagan's first 18 months, the "management side" of OMB, never large, withered to a tiny fragment. When the PCIE, chaired by OMB's deputy director, issued its 1982 report, it also summarized "related Reagan administration efforts." It started out: "The administration's focus on improving government management is not limited to the inspector general program or the President's Council on Integrity and Effi- ciency."" It then listed only four efforts under OMB's leadership:

* developing solutions to government wide management and systems deficiencies in an interagency forum of the assistant secretaries for management;

* improving the quality of program operations by implementing strong internal control systems in each of the departments and agencies;

* strengthening federal efforts to collect debts and other monies owed the government; and

* eliminating abuse of federal travel.54

As should be apparent, those important though meager efforts were oriented largely to reasonably expected accounting controls. OMB's Circular No. A-123, issued October 23, 1981 represents a needed emphasis on elementary accountability in government. The debt collection efforts continued a priority started by Carter, as did the travel controls. All of those accountability improvements were important, but it is also important that that was all there was on the Reagan management list by Summer 1982.

Actually, while not publicized as much, a little more than that was done. Growing out of the Carter administration and 1979 legislation, OMB issued a major federal procurement system proposal in February 1982.55 A 1980 report submitted under Carter was dis- carded, and the 1982 report proposed a comprehensive procurement and management system, together with recommended legislative language. Senate Bill 2127 was later introduced by U.S. Senator William Cohen, drawing on OMB proposals for increased procurement competition, but no legislation resulted in 1982. On March 17, 1982, however, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12352 changing procurement requirements. Working-level procurement personnel perceived efforts to orient contracts more politically.

In late Summer 1982, OMB made two moves toward broader involvement in governmental management: (1) a study of deregulation of federal management, and (2) "Reform 88," described by OMB as a "major, far- reaching project to restructure the management systems of the federal government. 9956

Proposed internal management deregulation is not





directly related to Reagan's regulatory reform agenda for federal relationships with private business and state and local governments. OMB, OPD, and OPE were urged in February 1981 to consider a project to reduce unnecessary red tape which constrains federal managers,57 but no action resulted at that time, except for creation of the assistant secretaries for management group. It was out of discussions between some of the assistant secretaries and NAPA representatives that the "Deregulation of Government Management" project developed. It was announced August 12, 1982.58 Dwight Ink was named to chair a NAPA panel to oversee the project; a council of federal officials from the 15 spon- soring departments and agencies was established to facilitate implementation; and Don Wortman, retired SSA and CIA career executive, was named project director. The project was launched with OMB's "en- couragement and leadership." It called for implementation of recommended changes as the project pro- gressed, with an initial report due in November 1982. It is too early to assess that development.

Reform 88 was formally announced on September 22, 1982, but it was presented by OMB Deputy Director Joseph Wright on August 2 for White House adoption. Essentially, Reform 88 lacked precise definition as announced except for two important dimensions: (1) it recommended that "a major reform of the federal government management process is overdue," in effect recognizing that the Reagan administration had given little high-level attention to government management, and (2) it pulled together existing activities and developments into a consolidated program. The name Reform 88 denoted that it would require a long period to implement-through a second presidential term.

For the most part, briefing materials dwelled on size, costs, and deficiencies of government, with only sketchy outlines of what would be done. Phase I actions were listed through March 1983, however. Those included nine previous retrenchment and accountability activities: "Increase Debt Collection; Improve Case Management; Increase Excess Property Sales; Reduce Fraud, Waste, and Abuse; Reduce Non-Defense Employment by 75,000 by 1985; Procurement Reforms; Reduce Unliquidated Obligations; Paperwork Reduc- tion; Other Ongoing Projects."5" Three "linking" efforts "between the short-term and longer-term phases" were also listed: "Electronic Information System between White House and Departments; Internal Controls Directives; Implement PPSSCC recommendations through online communications system." What would follow in Phases II and III of Reform 88 was altogether vague. Essentially, OMB promised "a coordinated effort to organize the management systems of the federal government." On October 14-15, a working conference of IGs, assistant secretaries for management, OMB, and other management officials met at Quantico, Virginia to try to bring some workable definition and substance to Reform 88 and related efforts. It is too early to assess prospects, except in two respects. First, after 1?2 years of relative inactivity, the Reagan administration showed ill-defined but high-level interest in governmental man-

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1 983

agement. Second, the proposal to link the White House and departments to one "electronic information system," in a control context, is interesting, given the complexities of American government. Given the con- glomerate character of a single department, like DOT for example, such an effort would be challenging and not necessarily constructive even at that level. Govern- mentwide? It merits watching.

Personnel Politics and Administration

Only four aspects of many important personnel administration developments under Reagan are briefly noted here: (1) presidential political control; (2) retrenchment; (3) equal opportunity/affirmative action; and (4) the Senior Executive Service.

In an evaluation of OPM and MSPB under Carter and Reagan, former U.S. Civil Service Commission Executive Director Bernard Rosen, an original opponent of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, concluded that CSRA has been "a disaster for merit."" He provided details and persuasive analysis to support the conclusion that traditional merit values have been undermined. Here, limited space only permits discussion of a flip side to that: Under Reagan, responsibility of the personnel system to the political system is largely defined as responsiveness to ideological executive control. That contrasts with the traditionally neutral civil service responsibility to statutory provisions in a constitutional system of separation of powers and a rule of law.

Politics. The CSRA has facilitated presidential political domination of the federal government's personnel management. The OPM director was selected on ideological criteria; his personal aides were selected on similar grounds, most initially from associates in Mary- land politics. Other key OPM positions, starting with the general counsel and executive personnel management, have been staffed largely on the basis of political considerations, with little evidence of related experience, specialized expertise, or professional interests related to the positions filled. One hard-working political activist who was originally appointed to head the former Bureau of Executive Personnel and later OPM management as well as the Senior Executive Service left to manage a losing GOP senatorial campaign in Mary- land. He then returned to his same OPM position the week following the 1982 election, rather in the pattern of old-time politics. Although the Hatch Act prohibits holding open a job for an official who leaves to work in a political campaign, OPM's Devine was quoted as say- ing, "There is nothing illegal or wrong about that, as long as no agreements are made beforehand.961 Also, the day following the mid-term elections, Devine announced five political appointees as "director's regional representatives," each responsible for liaison with two OPM regions, management of the combined federal campaign, and work with Federal Executive Boards, transferred by the Reagan administration from OMB to OPM leadership. In other reorganizations announced that day, OPM's political director for public affairs,



16 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIFW

Patrick Korten, was elevated to executive assistant director for policy and communications, with a new chief of public affairs, Mark Tapscott, editor of the Conservative Digest, reporting to him. Among other major post-election changes, OPM's labor relations function was further downgraded in a second such move since the Reagan administration took office.

Remaining senior career personnel in OPM's headquarters have felt largely excluded from significant involvement in matters related to policy. By December 1982, only two senior career OPM managers remained in headquarters functions previously performed by them. In short, CSRA has been highly successful in facilitating partisan presidential control of personnel management: Ideological politics and politicians now clearly control OPM and effectively dominate the federal government's personnel system.

The MSPB operated expertly, albeit with inadequate funding, under Carter, but the Office of Special Counsel was a shambles, largely due to political staffing (and non-staffing) of the position. Under Reagan, White House Counsel Fred Fielding has influenced appointments there, and political criteria have continued to prevail, but not to the exclusion of general competence, as in some appointments. The long-vacant Of- fice of Special Counsel, for example, was filled by an inexperienced young Republican who had graduated at the top of a UCLA law class and then clerked two years for Chief Justice Warren Burger. He knew nothing about personnel, but he was well educated, energetic, and bright-and only at MSPB a year before moving on, still an amateur, to another political position in a completely different activity. FLRA fared both better and worse. Serious controversies arose over two sorts of issues: (1) large expenditures for furnishing new offices of the FLRA members, all Carter holdovers, excoriated by Congress;`3 and (2) allegations among the three members of improper contacts related to the PATCO/air controllers strike decision, necessitating public ALJ hearings." The Reagan administration publicly ignored all three FLRA members at that time and they continued in office until the Fall 1982, when one vacancy was to be filled. The respected career general counsel, untouched by the controversies, was removed from office at the time, however. The first Reagan political nominee for the position was unable even to win consideration by GOP senators due to deficient qualifications. An acting general counsel was finally named. In short, in the important counsel positions in both MSPB and FLRA, CSRA has succeeded in facilitating presidential political domination except where incapacity was unacceptable to GOP senators.

The question for public administration which these Reagan examples raise is not whether political authority should determine directions of administration. No informed person disputes the wisdom of that. The issue is how politics is to control the personnel system. Dr. Devine of OPM has written a clearly stated case, well- informed by one view of political theory, for directly partisan political executive control.6" As the Reagan administration personnel spokesperson, he argues well a

position taken by many academic political scientists who favor political administration. Advocates of the politics paradigm have long opposed such non-partisan administrative systems as the city management form of government and neutrally-controlled professional civil service built on expertise. With respect to the organizational structure of OPM and, to a lesser extent, the Senior Executive Service, they prevailed in the Civil Ser- vice Reform Act of 1978, and the Reagan administration has aggressively implemented the partisan leadership model at OPM fully informed of the political theory and practical consequences.

. .a. the proposal to link the White House and departments to one "Electronic Infor- mation System," in a control context, is interesting, given the complexities of American government.... Government- wide? ft merts watching.

Retrenchment. Along with many line agencies, all three central personnel organizations have experienced major budget and personnel reductions under Reagan: 16 percent budget cuts in FY-82, for example. MSPB appealed the cut but OPM and FLRA did not. Major retrenchments resulted.

"Back to Basics" has been Dr. Devine's approach in OPM. At the outset of the administration, that quickly translated into termination of Intergovernmental Per- sonnel Act programs, consistent with Reagan's state- centered federalism. Devine also moved in 1981 to terminate enforcement of Federal Merit Systems Standards on state and local governments, but Congress resisted. Probably the most consequential retrenchment decision was OPM's failure to seek funding to deal with consequences of the Carter administration's inaction in Luevano v. Devine (earlier, Campbell), the Professional and Administrative Career Examination (PACE) Case." On January 12, 1982, the full Reagan Cabinet considered seven options that OPM prepared to deal with that.'7 The administration decided that "the cost of developing validated competitive examinations consistent with the decree would be prohibitive."68 The decision was to exempt the positions formerly filled by PACE from the competitive service and place them in Schedule B. OPM oversight of agency compliance is another important area of retrenchment in 1982. GAO criticized Carter administration oversight as deficient. OPM increased funding for that function by $700,000 in FY-8 1, but it then cut back in the budget crunch of FY-82, again with no effort to appeal massive budget cuts. Dr. Devine's "Back to Basics" promised that "Agency money would be saved by eliminating many of the 'frills' which have little to do with basic personnel functions."69 Competitive examinations and compliance oversight were trimmed in the process; most research and productivity improvement programs were abolished. Decisive improvements were made, however, in one formerly neglected activity: Processing time for

JANUARY/F4EBRUARY 1983




retirement claims was cut from an average of 120 days to 35, and the backlog was cut by 60 percent.

OPM's FY-82 retrenchment management started slowly. In a January 5, 1982, memo to Dr. Devine from Michael Sanera, then OPM's political assistant director for planning and evaluation, the situation was stated as follows:

To date, OPM has not followed its own guidance to other agencies in the FPM Bulletin entitled Personnel Actions During Budget Reduc- tions.

The Bulletin quoted the president's August 25, 1981, statement to heads of departments and agencies: 'I am determined to minimize as much as possible the adverse impact of these reductions on the individuals involved.'.

The budget resolution was passed a month ago. To date, we are not aware of any major management actions which will allow OPM to better cope with the budget situation. It is almost as if we are deliberately denying ourselves cost-saving opportunities other than RIF and furlough.7

OPM executive staff were originally told that, while 117 jobs would equate to needed FY-82 dollar cuts, 277 people would need to be separated due to such RIF-incurred costs as severance pay and unemployment compensation costs. That information spread quickly through OPM, encouraging attrition of mobile people. Others were involuntarily separated; many others were bumped down several grades, disrupting staffing throughout the organization. Furloughs of one day per two-week pay period were invoked. FLRA and MSPB were similarly hard hit, and MSPB had already lacked funds under Carter to perform legal responsibilities adequately. OPM was not an isolated case but an example of how the Reagan administration handled personnel retrenchment. Attrition reduced non-postal, non-defense jobs by 90,000 in 1981 alone,71 according to OPM statistics, but RIFs were still required to meet Reagan's target of 75,000 fewer total federal employees by FY-84 due to enlarged Defense and other hiring. OPM formulated a draft of new RIF rules to emphasize performance and to limit disruptions of bumping. Those were prepared for release June 15, 1982, but a decision was made to defer such action until after the November election due to political sensitivity of the issue.

Besides reduced employment, retrenchment affected federal employment in other important ways. As in the Carter administration, compensation was hit: pay in- creases of only 4.8 percent in 1981-82 and 4 percent in 1982-83, reflecting continued emphasis on total compensation comparability; reductions in retirement benefits, with once-a-year COLA and expectations of proposals for more retirement cuts in 1983, with former CSC Chairman John Macy,72 Democrat, and others recruited to support modifications; addition of a 1.3 percent Medicare tax; and reduced health benefits at higher costs. Training and development opportunities were also reduced, along with prospects for career advancement.

From EO/AA to eo/aa. With respect to internal governmental management, not much is to be said on the Reagan administration posture on equal opportuni-


ty and affirmative action. It has paralleled actions in EEOC and Civil Rights Commission appointments, where nominees (some rejected and withdrawn) have reflected ideological commitment to Reagan's general agenda and commitment to changed policies consistent with that. Besides the quality of political appointees, four actions reflect an eo/aa posture. First, President Reagan has acted in several dramatically well-staged public events to state a personal belief in equality of opportunity as an individual matter, based on brother- hood and self-responsibility, without much governmental involvement. Second, funding and expertise for former EO/AA activities have been reduced. Third, in OPM, the EEO activity was moved from the director's office, where it was a high priority in the Carter administration, to become a unit two levels down in the Workforce Effectiveness Directorate. That was justified on the basis of a reduced span of control in a reorganization which barely reduced it. Fourth, in the PACE Case, the Carter administration inaction was based on a political decision in support of EO/AA. Reagan's inaction, likewise political, was by contrast justified as necessary to save money.

The OPM director was selected on ideological criteria.... Other key OPM positions, starting with the general counsel and executive personnel management, have been staffed largely on the basis of political considerations, with little evidence of related experience, specialized expertise, or professional interests related to the positions filled.

Senior Executive Service (SES). The SES was viewed as the keystone of the CSRA by authors of the 1978 act. Official OPM executive work force statistics indicate that the SES survived well the test of transition to the Reagan administration. Independent research, however, indicates problems with SES, extending from the Carter administration but deepening under Reagan. For example, a "longitudinal investigation of the SES, among employees in Grade Levels 13 and above in five federal agencies, reveals that after the first two years virtually none of the major objectives of the architects of the SES are perceived as having been met.""7 Researchers of that detailed study concluded that "a number of factors appear to be producing an increasingly stronger negative affect towards the program."9

A March 1982 OPM study of SES found that "the flexibilities available in the SES were used in the transition and that there was no evidence of significant abuse of protections provided career employees."74 According to the OPM study, at the end of FY-1981, 8,593 SES positions were allocated (of the legal limit of about 10,775), but only 8,136 of those were used. Of those, 822 were noncareer appointment authorities, of which only 467 were then filled. For FY-1982, agencies re-




quested 8,623 SES positions, 937 of them noncareer, and OPM allocated 8,236, including 679 noncareer. Under Carter, 22 SES career personnel received presidential appointments, and of those, in the transition 12 left government, two remained in presidential appointments, six IGs returned briefly to SES and were then re- appointed, and two returned to SES career appointments. Between January 20 and September 30, 1981, the Reagan administration used 47 SES positions for appointments requiring Senate confirmation: 39 noncareer, six limited term, and two emergency. Nineteen career SES members took Reagan presidential appointments in that period: six Carter appointees (the IGs) plus 13 newly appointed.

I N . CSRA has been highly successful in facilitating partisan presidential control of personnel management: Ideological politics and politicians now clearly control OPM and effectively dominate the federal government's personnel system.

According to OPM, reassignments of career SES personnel totaled 697 under Carter from January 20 through September 30, 1980 and 520 under Reagan from January 20 through September 30, 1981. Of those under Reagan, 195 occurred during the first 120 days, but as of May 20, only nine of 47 noncabinet agencies with SES members had new heads due to slowness of the Reagan appointment processes, and therefore the re- assignment restriction did not apply. MSPB surveyed reassignments which were covered by the 120-day limit and concluded that they were voluntary.75 Besides SES reassignments, 53 career executives voluntarily took positions below the SES level from January 20 through September 30, 1981, compared to 124 during the pre- ceding 18-month period.

Senior career executives and merit pay managers were already negative toward SES when Reagan entered office.7' The new administration acted early to raise the executive pay ceiling to signal support for political and career executives. After 18 months of delays and some political interventions, the administration also supported a program that many SES personnel favored: the Federal Executive Institute facility was purchased by the government and a qualified career dean was appointed, following a decline which started with a lack of Carter administration support and which was initially accen- tuated under Reagan. But despite relatively sustained and visible support for the SES by Edwin Meese and a few other key officials, a perception of hostility between political and career personnel persists. Highly publicized political incursions account for that in part. For example: the Carter administration appointment of a deficient political official to head Geological Survey, a position historically staffed with expertise (as in the Reagan administration); also, the replacement of respected SES careerist Norman A. Berg by a Reagan politician to head the Soil Conservation Service, a posi-

tion historically managed apolitically by professional experts; also, the abrupt transfer in April 1982, of 24 of GSA's 117 SES employees, 17 of them from Washing- ton to other cities. Such negatively publicized events, common in the Carter and Reagan administrations, constitute an anecdotal history which, combined with the much-publicized politicization of OPM, is non- scientific but powerful in impact. Even where employees have performed well in retrenchment efforts,77 recipro- cal institutionalized support has been lacking in a personnel system which has been politicized. Twice in reorganizations, at the Community Services Ad- ministration in 1981 and at Energy in 1982, Congress has intervened with special legislation to force the administration to provide some mobility support to riffed SES personnel.78 Furthermore, some systematic, objective research indicates that negative conclusions about SES are based on general experience and are wide- spread: that federal managers "perceive that SES appointments are somewhat more political in nature"; "that newly appointed members of the SES did not have skills appropriate for the positions they had assumed"; and "a shift away from merit system principles."79 Vastly more objective, non-governmentally controlled research on this subject is needed prior to the required five-year review of SES and CSRA as a whole.

1982 White House Management Initiatives

Two major White House actions in 1982, besides Reform 88, marked a change in Reagan priorities from neglect to concern with governmental management: the "Grace Survey" and the creation of a Cabinet Council.

P2S2C2. On February 18, 1982, the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control (PPSSCC, officially) was announced under the leadership of J. Peter Grace. Reagan's announcement placed it four square with his agenda: "I expect them to roll up their sleeves and search out waste and inefficiency wherever it is to be found in the federal establishment."8 On June 30, by Executive Order 12369, the objectives were expanded to include evaluation of potential managerial improvements. Operating with $1.8 million in business contribu- tions, the PPSSCC set up 35 task forces, using executives and employees of businesses involved, along with some former civil servants. The project became involved in controversy over a September 7, 1982, memo from J. P. Bolduc, the survey's chief operating officer and vice president of Booz-Allen and Hamilton Inc., to PPSSCC desk officers and project managers, which stated in part: "We'd like to begin compiling a listing or an accounting of three to five of the most horrifying and ridiculous events, anomalies, conditions and practices found by your task force.... We'd like to have these available to support and reinforce our final product. While I'm asking for three to five, I'll gladly take more. . . . " But despite the negatives, the serious in- quiries and analyses that some task forces undertook impressed some public administration professionals. An impression of a few observers was that some of the





business executives involved, while relatively unin- formed at the outset, were interested in improved governmental operations, not simply politically useful horror stories. An assessment must await a final report, due toward the end of 1982 and actions on the recommendations.

The Seventh Council-CCMA. The second major White House initiative was announcement on Septem- ber 22, 1982, of creation of a Cabinet Council on Management and Administration (CCMA) to be chaired by Edwin Meese. Also on the Council are Wein- berger (DOD), Regan (Treasury), Schweiker (HHS), Lewis (DOT), Baldridge (Commerce), Edwards (Energy), Stockman (OMB), Carmen (GSA), Devine (OPM), and Smith (Administrative Conference of the U.S.). On September 30, Ralph Bledsoe of OPE, a professional public administrator, was selected by Meese to be the Council's executive director, and that was announced at the first CCMA meeting on October 4.

Although CCMA was announced together with Reform 88, its genesis reached back to recommendations of political and career people at OPD/OPE in February 1981; a well-crafted memo from OPE's Richard Beal to Meese on May 8, 1981; and reiteration of the proposal in OPE's Cabinet Council evaluation of June 9, 1982, among others. It is too early to assess the new Cabinet Council, except in two respects. It includes as members some Cabinet secretaries who have been most involved in making a couple of the other councils function well. Also, Meese, CCMA's leader, has demonstrated some interest in quality management and respect for traditional roles of career service profes- sionalism and expertise.

The Reagan Presidency and Political Administration

Characteristics of the Reagan administration reviewed here present two interrelated issues. One concerns public administration and the old questions of politics and administration. The other relates to larger governmental concerns and ancient issues of ideology and politics.

Responsible political control and competence in administration of government are one dimension of the politics/administration question. How policy and implementation intermix is a key aspect of that relationship. The dominant view of the political control question in American political theory and practice reaches back to the Western constitutional maxim, "government of laws and not of men." Traditionally, that has been interpreted to mean that by constitutionally- limited politics officials are selected; by ordered processes policies are formulated into legal provisions; and that the legal provisions and processes consistent with constitutional standards govern. The principal view of public administration within that paradigm of Western constitutional government is equally basic: that politically elected and appointed officials and professionally disciplined career personnel are required to work

JANUARY/F"EBRUARY 1983

together in different roles in policy formulation and implementation to maximize effectiveness, efficiency, and economy.

For a while some almost came to understand that it cannot function in that way. In the name of a New P.A. in the '60s, a few sometimes were heard to suggest more activist roles for non-political administrators in policy making, reaching well beyond assistance to political officials in formulation of alternatives and practical exer- cise of reasonable discretion in implementation. At its best, however, the message of the New P.A. was that, while public administrators may serve as neutrals with respect to partisan politics, the expertise and profes- sionalism which they bring to public service are in- evitably disciplined by values. Like legal realism of a generation earlier (except for surrealist dimensions for a while in the frenzied 1960s), that became not so much a case for subjective activism as a wise caution against it.

Now some politicians of the Left and Right increasingly assert that the old academic dichotomy of politics and administration is real and that it must translate into a concentration of policy and much of executive-level implementation in the hands of politicians, regardless of lack of expertise and professional discipline, political or otherwise. The issue is whether that view of the relationship of politics and administration is more constructive in terms of America's vital heritage than the alternative P.A. paradigm, based on realistic experience and informed theory. While this American public administration theory recognizes and respects essential distinctions between responsible roles of politicians and career civil servants, it accepts the reality of interdependence of political/career responsibility for policy and implementation under law. That is a sublime view of politics and administration, consistent with American constitutional ideals.

. . .despite relatively sustained and visible personal support for career service excellence by Edwin Meese and a few other key officials, the perception of hostility toward government employees persists.

This is not simply an academic matter. Following on a trend which has grown since the 1960s, under Presidents Carter and Reagan, a dramatic acceleration of politicization and deinstitutionalization has occurred with respect to such organizations as OMB and OPM and in program and administrative management at operating levels throughout the national government. That has detracted from less visible but vitally important actions, such as the Reagan administration's impressive development of policy management machinery to cope strategically with complexities of the presidency and national leadership.

A second issue that this review raises extends beyond public administration to a larger concern of government and politics. That is the place of ideology in American politics. To a significant extent, though far from totally,




the Reagan agenda has been pursued and implemented as ideology. More optimistically, it is a respected and widely-shared philosophy of limited government and self-governance. But in the hands of the Far Right, that agenda has been advanced as one which requires ex- clusive dominance by a closed political elite of true believers: "Reaganites." To some, limited government nearly translates into libertarian absence of government. They would exclude many Republican political professionals, business people, and responsible career specialists who have not been partisans from leadership roles in the Reagan administration. Those ideologues claim a monopoly on the most basic principle of the

American Constitution: popular sovereignty and limited government. That serves Reagan's presidency and the nation badly. If the Reagan agenda must be defined as ideology, it represents more than a reasonably debatable break with trends of 50 years since the New Deal. If it is ideology, Reaganism is a revolutionary break with all of America's distinctive political traditions. The Reagan agenda may instead be consistent with classic American values of limited government and self-governance and the sublimely symbiotic relationship which is essential between politics and administration. That remains to be seen.

Notes

1. "Inaugural Address of President Ronald Reagan," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (Washington: GPO, Week ending January 23, 1981), pp. 1-5 at p. 2.

2. Theodore White, America in Search of Itself: The Making of the President, 1956-1980 (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).

3. James L. Sundquist, "Jimmy Carter as Public Administrator: An Appraisal at Mid-Term," Public Administration Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 (January-February 1979), pp. 3-11.

4. Gregory B. Markus, "Political Attitudes during an Election Year: A Report on the 1980 NES Panel Study," American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No. 3 (September 1982), pp. 538-560.

5. Reagan Inaugural, supra, p. 5. 6. During the transition and early in the administration, ap-

proaches for reconciling retrenchment and quality in public administration were presented to Reagan officials by ASPA and NAPA leaders in several ways. One was organization of the entire 1981 annual conference of the National Capitol Area Chapter of ASPA around the theme of "Less Government and Quality Government," with participation of key Reagan officials.

7. Margaret Jane Wyszomirski, "The De-Institutionalization of Presidential Staff Agencies," Public Administration Review, Vol. 42, No. 5 (September-October 1982), pp. 448-458.

8. Interview with Charles S. Davis, associate administrator for policy and management systems, General Services Administra- tion, September 2, 1982.

9. Donald J. Devine, Reagan's director of the U.S. Office of Per- sonnel Management, stated that view clearly at the national ASPA Conference in Detroit: "Public Administration and the Reagan Era," paper presented April 13, 1981, Detroit, Michigan. Dr. Devine also presented the case for a political executive system in "Escape from Politics," in a symposium on civil service reform in The Bureaucrat, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Winter 1982-83), page listings not available.

10. The most informed general assessment may be Lou Cannon, Reagan (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1982). Short biogra- phies and assessments from a Ralph Nader orientation are provided in a less balanced book: Ronald Brownstein and Nina Easton, Reagan's Ruling Class (Washington: The Presidential Accountability Group, 1982). On Reagan policies, see: John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill, The Reagan Experiment (Wash- ington: The Urban Institute, 1982).

11. Dom Bonafede, "Regan and His Kitchen Cabinet Are Bound by Friendship and Ideology," National Journal, Vol. 13, No. 15 (April 11, 1981), p. 608.

12. Hendrick Smith, "Conservatives Cite Gains in Top Posts," New

York Times (March 8, 1981), p. 24. 13. The Washington Post (January 23, 1981), OpEd page. 14. John Lofton, Conservative Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2 (February

1981), p. 1. 15. Lou Cannon, "Appointments by White House Take Right

Turn," The Washington Post (June 18, 1981), pp. 1, 12-13. 16. Conservative Digest, Vol. 8, No. 2 (February 1982), p. 1. 17. Elizabeth Drew, "A Reporter at Large," The New Yorker

(March 16, 1981), pp. 91-92. 18. James Reston, "Reagan's Recruiting Philosophy," New York

Times (November 12, 1980), syndicated. 19. G. Calvin MacKenzie, "Cabinet and Subcabinet Personnel

Selection in Reagan's First Year: New Variations on Some Not- So-Old Themes," Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 2-5, 1981, p. 19.

20. "Molasses Pace on Appointments," Time (May 11, 1981), p. 9. 21. Federal Register, Vol. 46, No. 115 (June 16, 1981), p. 31405. 22. Fred Fielding, quoted in an Associated Press report in The

Washington Post (June 9, 1982), p. A9. 23. Lou Cannon, Reagan, supra, pp. 311-312. 24. The Washington Post (June 9, 1982), p. A9. 25. Lois Romano, "Reagan's Ranking Couple," The Washington

Post (November 29, 1981), pp. Hi, H4, 5, 6, 7. 26. Office of Planning and Evaluation, Strategic Evaluation

Memorandum #18 (SEM #18), Cabinet Councils and Domestic Affairs Management: An Evaluation (Washington: The White House, OPE, June 8, 1982), p. 9.

27. National Academy of Public Administration, Watergate: Its Im- plications for Responsible Government (Washington: NAPA, March 1974).

28. National Academy of Public Administration, A Presidency for the 1980's (Washington: NAPA, November 1980).

29. OPE, SEM #18, supra, p. 19. 30. Ibid., p. 23. 31. Ibid., p. 25. 32. David Hoffman and Lou Cannon, "The Reagan Cabinet," The

Washington Post, Part I (July 18, 1982), pp. 1 and A14; Part II (July 19, 1982), pp. 1 and 18. Dick Kirschten, "Reagan's Cabi- net Councils May Have Less Influence Than Meets the Eye," The National Journal, Vol. 13, No. 28 (July 11, 1981), pp. 1242-1247; Dick Kirschten, "Decision-Making in the White House: How Well Does It Serve the President? The National Journal, Vol. 14, No. 14 (April 3, 1982), pp. 584-589.

33. Idem. 34. Memorandum from Richard S. Beal to Jim Jenkins, "Informa-

tion on OPE," June 15, 1982.





35. Idem. 36. Admiral Robert Garrick preceded Jenkins as Meese's deputy.

Jenkins has brought greater energy, organization, and management to the counselor's office, along with a common consequence of some increased hierarchy and reduced horizontal relationships.

37. OPE, Strategic Evaluation Memorandum, Number 1. 38. The annual Brookings analyses are excellent on economic poli-

cies generally and the Reagan budgets: Joseph Pechman, et al., Setting National Priorities: The 1982 Budget (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1981) and Setting National Priorities: The 1983 Budget (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1982).

39. OPE, SEM #18, p. 36. 40. William Greider, "The Education of David Stockman," The

Atlantic Monthly (December 1981), p. 47. 41. Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, Reagan Ad-

ministration Achievements in Regulatory Relief (Washington: Task Force, August 1982), 37 pp.

42. Caroline E. Mayer, "Regulatory Campaign Falters," The Washington Post, August 22, 1982, pp. Hi, H2, and H4.

43. Felicity Barringer, "Feud Tests OMB as Regulatory Watchdog," The Washington Post, November 26, 1982, p. A15.

44. Howard Kurtz, "Local Officials Urge Major Changes, New Federalism Gets Qualified Support," The Washington Post, Oc- tober 1, 1982, p. A6. The Big Seven are the public interest groups which represent state and local government: Council of State Governments; International City Management Association; Na- tional Association of Counties; National Conference of State Legislatures; National Governor's Association; National League of Cities; and U.S. Conference of Mayors. The author worked with the ICMA Committee on Future Horizons of the Profession which examined federalism, among other issues, as well as with others of the Big Seven during the period before and after Reagan's election.

45. Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the Presi- dent, Transmitted to the Congress, February, 1982 (Washington: GPO, 1982), pp. 24-25.

46. Ibid., p. 25. 47. Caroline Atkinson, "Martin Feldstein's Economic 'Brain

Trust,' " The Washington Post (October 3, 1982), p. MI. 48. "Federal Employee Hiring Freeze and Nomination of Cabinet

Members," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Week ending January 23, 1981, p. 6.

49. Pete Earley, "Inspectors General: Effective Watchdogs," The Washington Post, July 13, 1982, p. 17.

50. The Inspectors General worked with the Federal Executive In- stitute to conduct a special three-week program oriented to their needs in 1980. The IGs also met regularly in Washington.

51. President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, Addressing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, A Summary of Inspector General Ac- tivities, Fiscal Year, 1982, First Six Months (Washington: PCIE, 1982).

52. The Washington Post (July 13, 1982), p. 17. 53. PCIE, supra, p. 41. 54. Idem. 55. OMB Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Proposal for a

Uniform Federal Procurement System (Washington: OMB, February 26, 1982).

56. OMB, "Reform 88," an internal OMB briefing paper dated August 17, 1982.

57. Copies of a Federal Executive Institute seminar report were hand-delivered by Chester Newland to Meese, Stockman, Harper, Beal, Frankum, and others: Charles F. Bingman and Frank P. Sherwood, eds., Management Improvement Agenda


for the Eighties (Charlottesville: OPM/FEI, February 1981). Charles Bingman, Dwight Ink, and Ralph Bledsoe, among others, urged consideration of a positive management program early in the Reagan administration.

58. National Academy of Public Administration, "Deregulation of Government Managers," August 12, 1982.

59. OMB, "Reform 88," an internal OMB briefing paper dated August 2, 1982, p. 12.

60. Bernard Rosen, "Federal Civil Service Reform: A Disaster for Merit," The Bureaucrat, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Winter 1982-83), page listings not available.

61. Cass Peterson, "Devine Bolsters His Plan For OPM Reorganiza- tion With Political Appointees," The Washington Post, November 22, 1982, p. A13.

62. OPM, "Policy and Communications Merged at OPM; Regional Representatives To Strengthen Field Staff," News (Washington: OPM, November 3, 1982).

63. Sheila Hershaw, "FLRA Posh Furniture Draws Threat of 1983 Fund Cut Off," The Federal Times, May 24, 1982, p. 3.

64. March 4-17, 1982, by ALJ John M. Vittone, upon direction of the Court of Appeals. Findings and Recommendations appear in full text as an Appendix to the June 11, 1982, decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit, Case No. 81-2135, In Re PA TCO v. FLRA, with FAA as intervenor.

65. Devine, supra, f.n. 9. 66. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, decree entered

November 19, 1981, No. 79-271. 67. Cabinet Affairs Staffing Memorandum, Number 050131 CA

(January 9, 1982), Full Cabinet Meeting, January 12, 1982, PACE Examination Consent Decree.

68. Federal Register, Vol. 47, No. 169 (August 31, 1982), p. 38257. 69. Efstathia A. Siegel, "Back to Basics and Looking Forward: A

Personnel Management Perspective," Management, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Spring 1982), p. 9. Management is OPM's house organ magazine.

70. Memorandum, "Strategy for OPM Budget Reduction," January 5, 1982, p. 2.

71. Siegel, supra, p. 11. 72. John W. Macy, Jr., "The Quiet Pension 'Crisis,' " Manage-

ment, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 1982), p. 20. 73. Peter Smith Ring and James L. Perry, Reforming the Upper

Levels of the Bureaucracy: A Longitudinal Study of the Senior Executive Service (Irvine: University of California, Irvine, Graduate School of Management, Research Report, August 1982), 29 pp.

74. OPM, SES Special Study: Managerial Flexibility During a Change in Administration (Washington: OPM, March 25, 1982), 25 pp.

75. Merit Systems Protection Board, A Report on the Senior Execu- tive Service (Washington: MSPB, September 1981), p. 22.

76. MSPB, ibid.; Ring and Perry, op. cit.; Rosen, op. cit. 77. Dwight Ink, "CSA Closedown-A Myth Challenged," The

Bureaucrat, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 39-43. 78. Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, 5USC 3595 and 7543. OPM,

"Reduction in Force in the Senior Executive Service," un- published memo dated July 30, 1981. Also, Karlyn Barker, "Riffed Members of SES Get Reprieve From Hill," The Wash- ington Post, October 2, 1982, p. A8.

79. Ring and Perry, op. cit., p. 15. 80. President Reagan quoted in the "Statement of Felix E. Larkin,

PPSSCC, before the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service," September 15, 1981, p. 2.

81. PPSSCC Memorandum, To: Desk Officers, Project Managers, From: J. P. Bolduc, September 7, 1982.

