a framework for absolute morality and relativism

8/8/2019 A Framework for Absolute Morality and Relativism

1/10

Relativism in an Absolute Framework can it exist?Department of Philosophy, Nottingham UniversitySachin Nandha

Relativism in an Absolute Framework can it exist?

As in any essay concerning morality, a certain level of metaphysics and epistemology must be used as a

basis for any argument. Due to the tight constraints of this essay certain epistemological and metaphysical

ideas and notions have been presupposed as they are beyond the core arguments proposed herein. In this

paper, I aim to highlight the Relativist position in two of its forms, Descriptive Moral Relativism (DMR)

and Metaethical Moral Relativism (MMR). I shall highlight supporting arguments as well as significant

shortfalls with each theory. I shall then move onto the Objective standpoint, of a single true morality

referring to Kantian arguments. Finally, leading onto a consolidated position between the Relativist and the

Objectivist and pointing out a third way. A position that states a relative position constrained by Absolute

boundaries.

Relativism is defined as that truth itself is relative to the standpoint of the judging subject (Oxford

Dictionary 2001). DMR takes the following standpoint:

As a matter of empirical fact, there are deep and widespread moral disagreements across different

societies and these disagreements are much more significant than whatever agreements that there

may be. (Harman 2000)

MMR follows that truth and falsity of moral judgements are not absolute or universal but are relative to

convictions or practises of a society. At this point I must highlight that Moral Scepticism which states one

is never justified in accepting or rejecting moral judgements, along with non-cognitive, anti-realism and

nilhism which state that all moral judgements are inherently false, will not be discussed in this essay.

Metaethical Moral Relativism takes the viewpoint that moral contradictions between different people

cannot always be resolved rationally and hence acts as a justification of moral judgements being relative

rather than absolute. Within MMR there is Appraiser relativism and Agent relativism. Appraiser

relativism claims that moral judgements should be made on the basis of ones own moral standards. Agent

relativism states that the moral judgements should be made in accordance with the standards of the subject

being judged. For the purpose of this essay, I will be referring to Appraiser relativism unless otherwise

stated. I have already stated one MMR position above but there are two more that need to be addressed.

1


2/10


First one being, the general relativist thesis, which states the truth or justification ofalljudgements, is not

absolute but relative to a society. This position is often maintained on the grounds that societies may have

different outlooks on life and its meaning which fit into their own conceptual systems that are not

incommensurable with one another. Other relativists often attack this position by pointing out that the

general thesis can only be put forward when in reference to some conceptual system of a society and is

often implausible with regard to science and common sense judgements. The second approach is the more

favourable position for the relativists. Harman (2000) argues that a moral judgement that a person ought to

do something which is an inner judgement implies that the person has motivating reasons to do so and that

the person has come into some type of agreement with a group of people regarding doing that thing. This

implies that a moral judgement can be classed as correct as long as there is agreement between a group of

people and that very judgement can be classed as false under another different agreement. This position

takes up both Appraisal and Agent relativism, assuming that the person making the judgement and the

person to whom the judgement is addressed are both in agreement. Furthering this point, it shows that a

moral decision is not only formed of rationality but is formed in conjunction with intensions/desires and a

general agreement between people.

MMR is deeply rooted on the presumptions of DMR, in that, if DMR was proven to be incorrect then this

would undermine the common rationale for MMR. Those that profess DMR to be correct often rely on

Anthropology and other empirical systems to back their claims and refer to the stark differences present in

the global society. Practices such as polygamy is completely condemned in the USA by law and general

opinion of the people, yet in the Middle east it is a common act to have more than one wife which is

intrinsically connected with the religion that they hold true. It is these types of differences, which the

supporters of DMR use to back their claims that rationally these differences cannot be overcome. Wong

(1984), who is a relativist, has put forward two general propositions, namely, a virtue based morality with

core emphasis on community and rights based morality with focus on individual freedom, one exists in the

developed West and the other in the developing East. He believes that these core differences cannot be

overcome by rationality due to the conceptual frameworks that contain these moral truths and so are only

relevant to their frameworks.

2


3/10


Many philosophers have contested the positions taken up by the relativists on two grounds, a priori

argument and a posteriori argument. A priori knowledge is that which can be known without experience

and can be relied upon by intuition and rationality, whereas a posteriori knowledge is that which can only

be known through experience and empirical data. Davidson (1984) proposes a priori arguments based on

language. He argues that DMR cannot be true as when any language is translated into another, it is

translated on the premise that they must agree with one another on most matters. An example of this would

be if we translated a word from another language, which we thought to mean a house. If arguments

between the two societies pilled up regarding houses, a natural reaction of the translating party would be

that they have mistranslated the word and would continue to look for another word that best suits the

arguments. If this argument were to be taken as correct it would imply that the commonality between

societies is greater than the differences and hence would prove DMR wrong. A counter argument to

Davidson is that his theory is only applicable to empirical things such as language, practices, rituals, etc.

However, it cannot account for the emotional aspect of societies such as what makes an individual in one

society laugh is completely different to what makes another individual from a different society laugh. This

can also be extrapolated to feelings, tastes, sense of justice and morality. For example, in one society a

sense of justice is felt when a thief who has stolen an apple is hanged for his crime and simultaneously in

another society to steal an apple results in a caution given by the authorities. Relativists believe that these

types of issues cannot be rationally solved and outweigh any commonality that may be present.

A second priori argument against DMR was put forward by Philippa Foot (1978), where she claimed that

there is set criteria or limits to what can be classed as brave, funny, depressing, good, bad, justifiable, etc.

The limits are shared by all cultures and societies and hence would restrict the extent of moral

disagreement. A counter to this line of argument is that her position is only valid depending on the

broadness or narrowness of the definitions of the words. For example, if courage means to face struggle to

achieve some good then everyone will agree that courage is noble. However, the problem arises as to what

can be classed as courageous, a warrior may class courage as resorting to the sword while the pacifist

believes being courageous means peaceful resistance. If the word courage were then narrowed in definition

3


4/10


to mean the virtue of a warrior who faces the threat of death in battle (as Aristotle suggests), then there may

be little disagreement about the scope of the concept, but considerable disagreement would arise whether to

value courage as a good, all pacifists would say no and so courage would not be a noble act anymore under

pacifism.

A posteriori attack on DMR comes in two main forms. The first being, that empirical data is always

misinterpreted to suit the biases of the Anthropologist. The question here is, is it possible for a person to

analyse data without bias? This is beyond the scope of this essay, however many critics of DMR would

profess this line of argument. These biases often come from political ideologies or preconceived cultural

differences or disciplinary paradigms. If this is the case, then it can be followed that it is not possible to

objectively analyse a different culture and its sense of morality and any attempt to do so would lead to self-

deception. The second argument based on Empiricism is that Anthropologist and relativist often envisaged

a false reality that cultures and societies are homogenous and static. To support this, recently increasing

amounts of the social sciences are professing that empirical data can only allow snap shots of a culture at

any given time, and so this type of data cannot be used to justify general assumptions on morality regarding

any one culture or society solely based on numbers. All cultures are evolving constantly through time and

often interacting with one another to create dynamic, internally complex set of principles, which then

become the base of morality for that culture. Both of the lines approached would not disprove DMR but

would only show that it is not possible to know moral values of cultures. Indeed this could simultaneously

give grounding for the relativists in that if societies are constantly changing in their moral values than their

sense of right and wrong are relative even though we may never know the truths. An ironic objective

challenge to the relativist position is that they are inconsistent within their proposals, for they believe that

MMR is correct absolutely. This inconsistency stems from the fact the MMR cannot be rationally proved

correct or incorrect, so how is it that relativist hold it to be absolute?

Relativists often take up the stand that they present an interpretation of moral disagreements that cannot be

solved rationally. Objectivists dispute this in that under MMR actions can seem to be simultaneously right

and wrong. For example an action to steal must either be right or wrong but under MMR it can be both,

4


5/10


simultaneously, which does not seem coherent with everyday human experience. A relativist response to

this type of attack would be that any action such as stealing could be wrong under situation X but right

under situation Y. So the action is always relative to some other function and cannot be judged simply in

itself. However, then another problem presents itself, in that MMR can seem to dissolve arguments rather

than offer solutions. If stealing is wrong under a situation X and correct under another situation Y and

if everyone adheres to this rationale then there is no disagreement, however, there is no solution offered

either. This line of thought can lead us onto actions such as the Holocaust. Under relativism, even the

Holocaust can find good reasoning and therefore can be acceptable under situation X. Our intuitions tell

us that this is not the case and the actions of the Holocaust cannot be justified. Finally, the question arises

that if everything is relative, then where does a societies standards originate from? A relativist answer

would be from members of society that are well informed and/or from those that people have agreed to

follow through a social contract (Harman 2001).

The above response brings about the question that what is the moral reason for people in contention to hold

true to their agreement? Must there be a prior agreement to do what we agree to do, but this line leads us to

an infinite digression. Another consideration that the relativist must deal with, is how can an individual

who belongs to more than one group i.e. a nationality and a religion both of which propose contradictory

morality, choose which to follow? For example, if a religion says abortion is immoral and the nationality

permits it, then what can be the deciding factor? Abortion cannot be both right and wrong. The relativist

would probably have to concede that it is just personal intuition or that in this case neither religion nor

nationality should prevail and maybe pragmatism takes over, which still falls far short on the question of

morality. This would however lead us to subjectivism, which proposes that morality is relative to the self

and not a common group, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Moral Objectivists claim that there is one and only one ethical system of moral beliefs. Immanuel Kants

Categorical Imperative, which roughly translates as absolute command, is one of the strongest cases

against relativism. Kant, in his quest to discover what makes an action right, discovered a four step criteria

for analysing every act, which would conclusively prove it to be right or wrong. Unlike Hume, Kant felt

5


6/10


that reason acted independently of inclinations/passions, which guided an individuals action to desired

ends. Kant felt that morality in any act lay not in the desired ends but in the subject itself and so whenever

reason acted without any passions/inclinations to a desired end, one could be said to be acting morally.

Kant believed that the highest good was only achievable when one acted in moral virtue together with

complete happiness (Gardner 2003), where moral virtue is the prerequisite condition for complete

happiness. The limitations of Kantian thought regarding the highest good is that virtue does not necessary

entail well-being and could even conflict with it. Furthermore, relativist can pose the argument that very

few us enjoy the happiness that we truly deserve due to our moral virtues; Kants notion does not

correlate well with real life experiences.

The Categorical Imperative (CI) is based on the concept of having a good will. A person is moral if what

Kant calls moral law determines his/her actions. This moral law is that which is to be taken as an end in

itself. Kant gives three strong reasons as to why this is the case. Firstly, he states that there is no

circumstance where we would forfeit our moral goodness in order to gain some desirable object. Second,

that our moral goodness is the very condition under which anything else is worth having or pursuing and

finally a good will can only be derived from a sense of moral duty and no where else. For example, if one

is motivated to act only in pursuit of happiness then that person will naturally fail to act when there is no

possibility of happiness however, if that person acted for the act itself then the pursuit of happiness no

longer plays a role in the act and hence, the act becomes moral according to Kant. This can lead to the

assumption that consideration of duty must be preceded by all other motivations which would naturally

lead to complete lawfulness. A relativist argument to duty being the foremost motivation to act is that the

term duty can be duped in immorality. If someones duty is to kill innocent people, can we still call his

act of killing moral just because he acted solely on his will based on duty? A Kantian response would be

that individuals are autonomous and therefore have the choice of opting out of immoral laws, so a Kantian

response would be to leave the land where it is a law and duty to kill innocent people. The absoluteness of

Kantian morality comes into focus when this type of digression leads to the fact that the only thing an

individual cannot opt out of is being a rational being. So the law, which prescribed to being rational,

must be the source of all other lower duties. So if ones lawful duty is irrational, then it must be discarded.

6


7/10


This line of inquiry brings out some questions, which Kantian objectivists often struggle to answer. For

example, can rationality will a command or an imperative if the end is indeterminate? And what exactly

is happiness this is an open question that leads most people into the quagmire of attempting to find

objective answers to indefinable questions.

Kants Categorical Imperative states I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my

maxim should become a universal law (Gardner 2003). Kant also created a four-step criterion for

identifying moral acts. Step one was to formulate a truth that enshrines your own reason for acting as you

propose, step two was to recast this truth as a universal law, that all must act this way, third pose the

question, is this proposed truth conceivable if it really were universal? The fourth step was to ask the

question could everyone actually will himself or herself to act in accordance? If the answers to the last

two steps were yes then the act is moral, if no then immoral. The CI can seem extremely enlightening

and efficient in discovering moral acts when discussing extreme acts such as murder, rape, etc. The

problem with the CI formula for identifying moral acts is that it is completely subjective and hence relative.

Becoming increasingly relative as we begin to analyse less extreme but yet significant acts. Every act can

get to steps three and four and based upon my own perspectives, I can follow the criterion to conclude that

an act is moral or immoral. For example, if I consider abortion. Abortion is wrong as it takes human life, a

universal law now comes into being which outlaws abortion. During steps three and four, things become

relative. For me personally this law cannot be conceivable but for a fanatic evangelical Christian it can be

very conceivable and can very much will himself to act accordingly. So under the evangelical Christian

abortion is wrong however under my reasoning it cannot get passed step three; a law to ban abortion is not

conceivable.

Even though the CI is controversial and not absolutely convincing, Kant was definitely onto something. I

propose a third way. I propose that morality is relative under an absolute framework, which rests upon

limitations of the human intellect. This proposal stems from rationality and accepting that just as our

senses are limited in their functions so is our reasoning. PointXis defined as, the point from which all of

time and space can be investigated in its wholeness, it is a theoretical point, which is beyond time and

7


8/10


space and so is unchanging and absolute in its status. The Universe can be described as, that which stems

from point Xand is completely relative. There is absolutely nothing in the universe, which is objective,

everything is in constant flux and transformation and it is within this environment the human intellect exists

along with its rationality. As Einstein discovered that in order for there to be change, there has to be a

relatively changeless platform upon which the changing occurs. So for example, the river flow is changing

in relation to the riverbed on which it flows, however the riverbed is also changing in relation to the Earths

crust or tectonic plates, these plates are changeless to the riverbed but are infact changing in respect to the

Earths core, we can take this digression all the way to time and space which is all in constant flux. The

fourth dimension of time is in change, our intellect measures change in relation to time, but time itself is

relative only to that which is beyond time, maybe a fifth dimension but eventually it leads to pointX.

Our intellect only comprehends four dimensions but only appreciating three, we cannot envisage a fifth

dimension for its qualities and there is no way of knowing whether it exists or not! For example, imagine

that a being is two-dimensional and it exists without height/depth and it lives on a piece of paper. Its

intellect can only ever comprehend direction x and direction y (at any one time) on this paper, but would

never be in a position to appreciate direction z and therefore could never realise the whole piece of paper as

a singular entity upon which the being exists, as this paper exists in a three-dimensional universe and the

being exists according to its limitations in two dimensions. Similarly, we can only comprehend that which

exists in three dimensions and in our dimensions everything is in flux, in change and always in relation to

one another. So there can never be absoluteness, there can only ever be absoluteness in relation to

something else which appears absolute to our intellect but infact is also in constant relativity.

To bring in another concept would be that which is strictly speaking outside the realm of this paper but

needs to be mentioned. Is the human being in its wholeness solely made out of three-dimensional matter or

is there something else that constitutes apart of the being human, which is beyond three dimensions and

maybe even beyond any number of dimension and is infact Absolute? For example, the two dimensional

entity that I had mentioned earlier could not appreciate another perspective due to its two-dimensional

limitations. But that is not to say that it is solely made from matter which is two-dimensional, on the

8


9/10


contrary that being could be composed of matter which is in every dimension possible, but is only aware of

two of them and human beings are only aware of three maybe four (including time) but are infact

composed of matter which is beyond our appreciation and comprehension.

On the question of Morality is it absolute or relative, clearly it is relative according to our intellectual

faculties but due to our own limitations it has a relative absolute framework that it has to adhere too. A

relativist would point to this being the conceptual framework of a society. That is not what I mean. The

framework that relative morality exists in is based upon the limitations of human reasoning, intellect,

rationality, etc. An absolute statement would be know that all things are relative to change in our three

dimensional universe but that there is something, which is inconceivable to our intellect that is absolute.

An absolute moral act would be to develop ones own intellect, rationality, etc. in the hope of

understanding the three-dimensional matter that we live in and are apart off but not necessarily solely

composed off. This leads me to note that the flow of human thought and action is relative but the

direction, which the flow moves towards, is absolute. The flow is towards grasping pointX.

To summarise the key aspects of the third way, that which is relative in an absolute framework is that

firstly, all human acts are relative based upon ones own sense of realisation of the framework within which

the act exists, second, that human rationality/reasoning is limited and in no position to comprehend a single

true morality in an otherwise relative universe. Thirdly, the framework around any act is created due to our

own human limitations by the very fact that we can only realise through perception a very limited scope.

For example, the act of eating meat is constrained within a framework. To determine whether the act of

killing an animal for its meat is moral or immoral one must be able to see the act for its wholeness and the

realisation that this shall naturally bring forth will determine the absolute moral response. This absolute

moral response shall then naturally lead to another moral decision constrained by another framework which

too shall need to be realised in order to act in the most moral manner, and this can go on and on leading

towards realisation of the theoretical pointX. In order to analyse anything for its wholeness, we must put

ourselves in a position whereby we can experience it at a singular moment, so for example, for me to see an

A2 piece of paper in its entirety I cannot hold it as this will only allow me to experience it in a fragmented

9


10/10


reality (as my face will be too close to the paper), however if I can distance myself far enough from it, then

I will be in a position to appreciate the size for its wholeness.

All moral acts are those that increase the realisation of pointX. So for example, to be completely driven by

sense pleasure would be immoral, as these acts do not increase my awareness of point X, which is not to

say that sense pleasure is bad but that to be solely driven by sense pleasure is bad as this would mean that

my actions are driven by my own impulses which are based on a fragmented reality. Another example

would be abortion. Is to abort a foetus immoral? This is relative to the situation in which the pregnancy

occurred. The framework within which the act of abortion exists is the defining factor. If one can realise

the absoluteness of the framework surrounding this act then a moral decision can be taken by surpassing

that framework.

So, to answer the thesis relativism in an absolute framework can it exist, the answer is yes.

References

1. Blackburn, Simon, 2001,Being Good. Oxford University Press

2. Foot, Phillipa, 1978, Moral Relativism, University of Kansas Press

3. Gardner, Sebastian, 2003,Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason. Routledge

4. Harman, Gilbert, 2000, Explaining Value and other essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford

University Press

5. Krishnamurti, 1989, The Way of Intelligence. All India Press

6. Soanes, Catherine, 2001, Oxford Dictionary of Current English. Oxford University Press

7. Wong, David, 1984, Moral Relativity, University of California Press

10

a framework for absolute morality and relativism

Documents