66A military expert on Great

Britain and the UnitedStates, Tatsumi persisted,

in the face of overwhelmingpro-Axis sentiment in theImperial Japanese Army(IJA), in arguing against

Japan's embrace ofGermany and Italy in theyears before Japan's entry

into World War II.

99

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysisexpressed in Studies In intelligence are those ofthe authors. They do not neoessarily reflectofficial positions or views of the CentralIntelligence Agency or any other US Governmententity, past or present. Nothing in the contentsshould be construed as asserting or implying USGovernment endorsement of an article's factualstatetnents and Interpretations.

Stephen Mercado is with theForeign Broadcast InformationService.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SOURCES METHODSEXEMPT ION 3B2B

NAZI WAR CR IMES 01 SCLOSORE ACTDATE 1007

Studies in Intelligence (1997)

A Voice in the Wilderness

A Contrary Japanese Army Intelligence Officer (U)Stephen Mercado

Few figures in intelligence history aremore compelling than military offic-ers who, making assessments thatcontradict policy or the dominantanalytic line, remain trite co theirconvictions. Nowhere are the stakesso high in intelligence as in militarypolicy, which can lead a nation toglory or ruin. In this light, militaryofficers who resist the pressure toplay as a member of the team andstick to their convictions are particu-larly inspiring when proved right bysubsequent events. In the modernhistory of Imperial Japan, Lt. Gen.Tatsumi Eiichi l is such a figure. Amilitary expert on Great Britain andthe United States, Tatsumi persisted,in the face of overwhelming pro-Axissentiment in the Imperial JapaneseArmy (IJA), in arguing againstJapan's embrace of Germany andItaly in the years before Japan's entryinto World War II.

Career History

Tatsumi was born in 1895 inKyushu's Saga Prefecture. In 1915,he received his commission as aninfantry officer after graduating fromthe Imperial Military Academy.

'While he ultimately led troops in theField, assuming command of the33rd Division in China in March1945, Tatsumi spent most of hiscareer in the Army as an intelligenceofficer.

After graduating with honors fromthe Army War College in November1925, Tatsumi spent his postgradu-ate year in England. He returned toLondon in September 1930, wherehe served until January 1933 as

assistant military attache under Lt.Col. Homma Masaharu. After serv-ing concurrently as a KwangtungArmy staff officer and assistant mili-tary attache at the Japanese Embassyin the puppet state of Manchukuo,Tatsumi returned to Japan in March1934 to work for over a year in 6thSection (Europe and America) of theArmy General Staff's (AGS) 2ndBureau (Intelligence). Tatsumi thenreturned to London in August 1936as military attache. On his return toTokyo in mid-1938, he took chargeof 6th Section. Tatsumi assumed hislast post before Japan's war againstGreat Britain and the United Statesin December 1939, when hereturned to London for a secondtour as military attache.2

The succession of posts Tatsumi heldhighlights his experience as an intelli-gence officer and his expertise in"Anglo" affairs (the Japanese usedthc word Anglo to refer to bothGreat Britain and the United States).He worked either in Japan's LondonEmbassy or 2nd Bureau's 6th Sec-tion for roughly 10 years of his 30-year Army career. Almost none of hiscolleagues had accumulated suchexperience.

The German Connection

Tatsumi was also one of a few Angloexperts in an Army built under Ger-man influence to fight the Russiansand Chinese. The Army had takenGermany as its model as early as thelate 19th century. The IA's "Prus-sian" faction had shown itsascendancy, for example, as early as1885 by appointing Maj. Jacob

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Meckel, an experienced member ofthe Prussian Staff College, an ArmyWar College lecturer and militaryadviser. 3 Before the outbreak of warwith China in 1937, the IA's eliteWar College graduates could choosean overseas assignment; they typi-cally chose Germany, the SovietUnion, or China, where they wouldhone their area expertise and lan-guage skills.

Japan's embrace of Nazi Germany inthe late 1930s led to the rise of those1JA officers with German back-grounds. Of the five major generalswho held the Army's top intelligencepost of 2nd Bureau chief betweenJuly 1937 and December 1941, twohad taken their postgraduate assign-ments in Germany and one in theSoviet Union. The two with Germanbackgrounds successively held theposition as Japan began the count-down to war in 1941. Officers with apro-German orientation were alsofound in the War Ministry, includ-ing Lt. Gen. Muto Akira, chief ofthe key Military Affairs Bureau fromSeptember 1939 to April 1942.

An Attache in London

Tatsurni's contacts overseas arguablyhelped turn him into one of the 1JA'sfew intelligence officers who appreci-ated the strategic weight of GreatBritain and the United States. Hiscontact with Ambassador YoshidaShigeru, under whom he served inhis first tour in London as militaryattaché, likely contributed to hisdevelopment.

In the summer of 1936, Tatsumiarrived with a message from Tokyofor Yoshida. In effect, Tokyo assuredthe Ambassador that Japan wouldsuffer no disadvantage by simply join-ing Germany in ideological solidarity

Tatsumi himself was soonengaged in his own lonely

fight against the maincurrent in Tokyo.

99in the proposed Anti-CominternPact. Yoshida rejected Tokyo's argu-ment that the agreement would haveno adverse political or military reper-cussions. The future prime ministerclearly foresaw the danger of the pactleading one day to military alliancewith Germany and ultimately con-flict with the Anglo-Americanpowers.

Tacsumi, either swayed by Yoshidaor already thinking along the samelines, cabled Imperial General Head-quarters (IGHQ) 4 Army Section thathe could not convince the stubbornAmbassador. Tatsumi's counterpartin Berlin, Maj. Gen. OshimaHiroshi, the pact's major backer,arrived in London several days laterto browbeat Yoshida. Oshimareturned to Berlin in a bad mood thenext morning without changingYoshida's opposition. 5 Tatsumi prob-ably was impressed to see theAmbassador hold his ground againstOshima and the consensus inTokyo.6 Tatsumi developed a lastingrelationship with Yoshida who, asJapan's most influential postwarprime minister, made good relationswith the Anglo powers the corner-stone of his foreign policy.

Fighting the Axis Alliance

Tatsumi himself was soon engaged inhis own lonely fight against the maincurrent in Tokyo. An explosive issuearose soon after he returned toTokyo in 1938 to head AGS 2ndBureau's 6th Section. One monthiiito his new assignment, Maj. Gen.Kasahara Yukio returned from a

secret mission to Berlin with a pro-posal from Hitler to forge a tripartitealliance with Italy. From Berlin,Oshima sent numerous cables coTokyo endorsing the proposal.

Tatsumi, all but alone in conferencesof 1GHQ Army Section colleagues,argued against the proposal which hesaw as drawing Japan into a disadvan-tageous European war. His viewsincurred hostility from influentialIJA officers, especially Lt. Col.lwakuro Hideo, chief of the WarMinistry's Army Affairs Section, whoattacked Tatsumi for his "pro-Anglo,weak-kneed arguments."

In the end, Navy opposition to theproposal led to a weak compromisethat Hitler spurned in favor of anonagression pact with Moscow. Tat-sumi, who had gone with Navy andForeign Ministry representatives toBerlin to negotiate, probably wasrelieved. He also had to have appreci-ated the note congratulating him onhis mission's failure from his oldboss, Lieutenant General Homma.7

Monitoring the War in Europe

Tatsumi subsequently left 6th Sec-tion for his second tour as militaryattaché in London, arriving thereduring the "Phony War" period inDecember 1939. Great Britain andFrance had by then already tradeddeclarations of war with Germany,following Hitler's invasion ofPoland, but had yet to fight. In May1940, Tatsumi arranged with theBritish War Department to tourAllied defenses on the Continent andexchange views with his Berlin coun-terpart, Col. 0 kora oto Kiyotomi.

Tatsumi left London on 7 May toobserve the British Expeditionary

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Force's headquarters at Lille andFrench defenses along the MaginotLine. He subsequently met ColonelOkamoto at the Japanese Embassy inBrussels. On 9 May, Okamotobriefed him that there was no evi-dence of German preparations for anoffensive. That night, Okamotoburst into Tatsumi's hotel room withnews of the German invasion of Bel-gium. While Tatsumi made his waysafely back to London, the incidentis likely to have colored his view ofthe competence of theyapanese mili-tary mission in Berlin.'

The German blitzkrieg emboldenedJapanese leaders in Tokyo to act.With the surrender of France andthe Netherlands in June 1940,Tokyo put pressure on FrenchIndochina and the Dutch EastIndies. The Army occupied northernFrench Indochina that summer onthe pretext of blocking supplies tothe Chinese Nationalists in Chung-king. On 27 September 1940, Japantied her destiny to the Axis belliger-ents by signing the Tripartite Pact inBerlin with Germany and Italy.

As German bombs fell on England,Tacsumi continued cabling IGHQhis assessments without regard to thepolitical winds in Tokyo. Moreover,his reporting hit the mark. Oneadvantage for Tatsumi and his staffwas their ringside seat from whichthey observed the Battle of Britain.In Liverpool, for example, AssistantMilitary Attaché Col. NakanoYoshio observed the British smash aGerman raid on 22 October. Hisoffice also cabled Tokyo that the Brit-ish were using radar to devastatingeffect against the Luftwaffe.9

During the Battle for Britain in thefall of 1940, Tatsumi cabled Tokyothat German night bombings werecausing considerable damage but

As Tokyo planned for warin 1941 against the Anglo-

Americans, Tatsumi inLondon continued to

sound the alarm.

9failing to break the British people'sspirit. He also regarded the Germanshift from daytime to night air raidsas evidence of the Luftwaffe's failureto gain air superiority. Conse-quently, he judged that Germanywould not likely execute its plannedinvasion of the British Isles. 1°

In Tokyo, most IGHQ Army offic-ers believed that Germany woulddefeat Britain. Lt. Gen. Tanaka Shin-ichi, chief of AGS 1st Bureau(Operations), expected Hitler tocarry out his plan to invade the Brit-ish Isles. Tanaka also looked forwardto the invasion to clear the way forJapan to advance south. ConqueringSoutheast Asia would then resolvethe war in China by eliminating Brit-ish aid routes to the ChineseNationalists. Maj. Gen. OkamotoKiyotomi, who, after delivering hisspectacularly wrong assessment ofGerman intentions to Tatsumi inBrussels, had become 2nd Bureauchief, also believed that Germanywould invade and defeat Britain.The 2nd Bureau's German Sectionand other analysts backed hisjudgment.' I

Tatsumi thus angered officers in theArmy High Command by contradict-ing the analytic basis on which theywere preparing for war. Army offic-ers in IGHQ muttered that he hadfallen under the spell of British pro-paganda. Okamoto, concerned forhis old classmate from both the Mili--tary Academy and War College,discreetly sent Tatsurni a messagewarning him that his reports were

stirring up a hornet's nest in IGHQ.Tokyo's comprehensive analysis ofthe intelligence from various coun-tries concluded that Hitler could notabandon his planned invasion of Brit-ain. Okamoto thus counseledTatsumi not co cable such weak-kneed assessments, but Tatsumiresolved to continue his reporting.Otherwise, he feared that the over-whelming Army fascination withGermany and disregard for theAnglo-Americans would take Japandown the path to disaster.12

Countdown to War in 1941

As Tokyo planned for war in 1941against the Anglo-Americans, Tat-sumi in London continued to soundthe alarm. As was the case withYoshida Shigeru, Ambassador Shige-mitsu Mamoru proved an ally whoshared Tatsumi's concerns. Shige-mitsu, while not showing Tatsumi'scourage to report his views frankly,did appear influenced by his militaryattaché. In mid-April 1941, theAmbassador indirectly challengedTokyo's direction by posing a seriesof questions in a cable that reads asthough written with contributionsfrom Tatsumi. Shigemitsu ques-tioned whether Germany, "withoutcommand of sea or command of Brit-ish daylight air," would be able toinvade and conquer Great Britainany time during 1941.

Shigemitsu in the same cable alsoquestioned the Tripartite Pact's valuein deterring Washington, askingwhether the alliance made it "morelikely or less likely" that the UnitedStates would enter the war on GreatBritain's side. Finally, Shigemitsusuggested that Italy was more a bur-den than an ally for Germany. Heasked whether the Italian fleet was"as good at sea as on paper," or even

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Japanese Army

as good on paper as it used to he."He warned that Anglo-Americannaval strength, if combined, wouldboth "dispose of the Axis powers inEurope" and "deal with" Japan.13

Heading for Disaster

Tatsumi, for all the accuracy of hisreporting from London, could not in1941 shake Tokyo's faith in the Ger-man war machine. In WesternEurope, the German military hadtaken all objectives but Great Brit-ain. Germany then invaded theSoviet Union on 22 June 1941 inconcert with Finland, Hungary, andRomania. On 16 June, Hitler hadwarned Lt. Gen. YamashitaTomoyuki, head of a military tech-nology survey mission in Germanysince January, about Germany'splanned offensive against the SovietUnion. Hitler also requested thatJapan assist its Axis partner bylaunching an attack on Siberia fromManchukuo. Yamashita immediatelycabled Tokyo from Berlin with thenews, then left to brief the Japaneseleadership in Tokyo.14

Yamashita returned to Tokyo to findthe Army ready co act. At 1GHQ,Army officers awed by Germany'sthrust across the Soviet border laidplans to act before they "missed thebus." That is, rather than questionthe wisdom of their German partnersopening a second front before invad-ing Britain, IGHQ officers wereeager to enter the war before Ger-many extended its gains to Asia.

On 28 June, Yamashita briefed WarMinister Lt. Gen. Tojo Hideki,Army Chief of Staff Gen. SugiyamaGen, and other key IJA staff for overtwo hours on the situation inEurope. Yamashita recommendedthat the IJA honor Hitler's request

Tatsumi counseled thatJapan should at all costsavoid hastily entering the

general war.

99by ordering the Kwangtung Army tolaunch an offensive from Man-chukuo. The Army beganpreparations the following day tostrengthen the Kwangtung Army forinvasion, the activity disguised as spe-cial field exercises.1'

On 9 August, however, Tokyodecided to take the "bus" southrather than north. One reason fordeferring the planned thrust intoSiberia Was that it no longerappeared certain that the Germanmilitary would fulfill Hitler's boastto conquer the Soviet Union byyearend. A second factor was theharmful effect of the oil embargoenacted by the Americans, British,and Dutch, following Japan's Julyoccupation of southern FrenchIndochina. Rather than accept West-ern demands to relinquish itsoccupied territories in Indochina andChina, Japan's leaders decided tograb the Dutch East Indies for its oil-fields. At the same time, Japaneseforces would seize British and Ameri-can possessions in the region.16IGHQ officers judged that theycould invade Siberia later and joinHitler in dividing Soviet territory.

In October, Tatsumi was cablingreports that flatly contradicted thereporting from Berlin and thepremise on which IGHQ was prepar-ing to go to war. Early in the month,Tatsumi predicted that Germanforces, whose offensive was alreadylosing steam as their supply lineslengthened and the Soviets adoptedscorched-earth tactics, would increas-ingly suffer with the advent of"general winter." He judged that the

Germans would almost certainly failto take Moscow in 1941. In contrast,Ambassador Oshima in Berlin wasreporting on 11 October that "theGermans have dealt a devastatingblow to the Soviet forces before thereal winter sets in, as per plan," andthat Hitler was on track to invadeGreat Britain.17

Tatsumi cabled another contraryreport in late October. He judgedthat Germany's offensive against theSoviet Union was lagging, that Amer-ican aid was strengthening Britishconfidence in ultimate victory overGermany, and that the Anglo-Ameri-cans were standing united againstJapan, following the occupation ofsouthern French Indochina. In enter-ing the war on Germany's side,Japan would thus risk fighting alonein Asia against the Americans, Brit-ish, Chinese, and Soviets.

Tatsumi counseled that Japan shouldat all costs avoid hastily entering thegeneral war. Rather, he suggested,Japan had first to resolve the fightingin China. Okamoto replied withIGHQ's analysis that the Germanoffensive would resume in full forcethe following spring and in all proba-bility defeat the Soviets. As forJapan's actions in the Far East, Tat-sumi's old classmate declared, Tokyowould execute its national policyindependently of its Europeanallies. L8

In the end, Tatsumi failed to deterIGHQ from sending Japan into waragainst the Anglo-American powers.Nor did he exercise his expertise dur-ing the war. Following Japan's thrustsouth, Tatsumi remained confinedto the Japanese Embassy as an enemyalien until repatriation in July 1946.In Tokyo, Tojo first put him incharge of Tokyo's air defenses. Tat-sumi ended the war commanding the

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3rd Division in central China. Heand his men were repatriated fromShanghai in May 1946.19

Why IGHO Ignored Tatsumi

In retrospect, few intelligence officershave been so right to so little effect asLt. Gen. Tatsumi Eiichi. A roundtableconference in late 1978 of IJA officerswho had served as military attaches inwartime Europe underscores thispoint. Lt. Col. Katogawa Kotaro, theconference moderator, remarked thatTatsuini's analysis in October 1941had been "right on the mark." Theproblem was that he failed to persuadeIJA policymakers to delay their war ofaggression until Germany conqueredEurope and Japan ended the fightingin China.2()

Moreover, seldom had the conse-quences of ignoring intelligenceproven so dire for Japan. Katogawaindicated as much to the former mili-tary attaches, when he said that Japanhad conducted its national policy,including signing the Tripartite Pact,on the premise that Hitler wouldinvade and defeat Great Britain. Onlyafter the war, Katogawa noted, did itbecome clear that Hitler had begunplanning Germany's disastrous inva-sion of the Soviet Union even beforeTokyo had signed the treary.21

A general suspension of critical judg-ment regarding Germany among IJAsenior officers was behind IGHQ'sintelligence failure. Reading Oshima'sdecrypted "Magic" cables from Berlin,for example, one is struck by the lackof analysis. His reports often read as lit-tle more than detailed repetitions ofwhat Hitler, Foreign Minister Joachimvon Ribbentrop, or one of the Ger-man generals told him in meetings.--Col. Honi Eizo, a young intelligence

officer during the war in 2nd Bureau'sGerman, Soviet, and Anglo-Americansections, decried in his memoirs theIGHQ's "blind faith" in Germany.Compared to the rigorous Soviet anal-ysis of Col. Hayashi Saburo's RussiaSection, Hod found 2nd Bureau's Ger-man Section lacking.23

The Army's failure to assess Germanwartime intentions and prospects

'was also the result of relying toomuch on access to German leaders tothe detriment of other intelligencesources. In effect, Oshima's numer-ous meetings with Hitler and vonRibbentrop took the place of thepainstaking methods, legal and ille-gal, that IJA intelligence officers usedto gather intelligence, say, on theSoviet Union.

While Tatsumi cultivated a wide vari-ety of contacts in London, includingUS Military Attache Brig. Gen. Ray-mond E. Lee and various membersof the British War Ministry, intelli-gence on Germany came largelyfrom Oshima's Nazi friends andfrom the German Embassy inTokyo. As for firsthand observations,Tatsumi was reporting directly onthe Battle of Britain, while Oshimawas chaperoned to various Germanfield headquarters. In monitoringpublished information, Tatsumi hadmuch more to glean from the Britishradio and press than Oshima couldfind in the Nazi media.

Too many IJA intelligence officerscovering Germany lacked objectivity.They had developed over the courseof their careers an uncritical sense ofawe and affection for Germany thatclouded their judgment. Col.Hayashi, for example, ascribed 2ndBureau Chief Okamoto's willingnessto accept information from the Ger-mans at face value to his experiencethere as military attache 24 Maj. Gen.

Onodera Makoto and Col. Kotaniastir), military attaché in Stockholmand assistant attaché in Berlin,respectively, during the war, sug-gested to historian Alvin Coox thatthe years spent as military attachéalso accounted for AmbassadorOshima Hiroshi's inclination toreport as "gospel" the statements ofGermany's leaders. In Coox's words:"Perhaps it was not so much thatOshima was being taken in by theNazis as that he simply did not wantto dwell on matters unfavorable tohis beloved second homeland."25

A Prophet With Honor

During the years when the IGHQ'sAxis faction was dominant, Tatsumiwas a lone voice in the wilderness.But Japan's defeat and occupation bythe United States brought him andother Anglo experts to the center ofpower. Prime Minister Yoshida, inneed of a military man he couldtrust, turned to his former attaché CO

serve as confidential liaison to Gen-eral MacArthur's GeneralHeadquarters in Tokyo. 26 Yoshidaalso relied on Tatsumi for help inselecting IJA veterans to form thecore of the postwar Ground Self-Defense Force. Tarsumi was thusone of the founding fathers ofJapan's postwar military. The war-time prophet had become the primeminister's "most trusted militaryadviser."27

Finally, Tatsumi rose to occupy anhonored postwar position amongformer IJA officers. He becameone of the leading members of theKaikosha, the association of ImperialMilitary Academy officers. He servedas Kaikosha chairman during 1975-78, then held the title of chairmanemeritus until his death at age 93 in1988.28

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NOTES

1. Japanese names in this essayappear in the Japanese order, sur-name followed by given name.Military ranks are those held by theofficers at the time indicated.

2. Hata, Nobuhiko. Nihon Rikukai-gun Sogo Jiten (Dictionary of theJapanese Army and Navy); Tokyo:University of Tokyo Press, 1991; pp.91, 367.

3. Harries, Meirion and Susie. Sol-diers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall ofthe Imperial Japanese Army; NewYork: Random House, 1991; pp. 48-50.

4. 1GHQ, activated in 1937 to prose-cute the war in China, was themilitary high command combiningthe Army and Navy. The Army Sec-tion consisted of key War Ministrybureaus and the Army General StaffCAGS).

5. Takayama, Shinobu. ShowaMeishoroku (Famous Generals of theShowa Era), Vol. 11; Tokyo: FuyoShobo, 1980; pp. 156-157.

6. Despite Yoshida's warnings,Tokyo inked the Anti-CominternPact that November.

7. Takayama, pp. 160-61, 243.

8. Ibid., pp. 163-166.

9. Dab:1.)i Taisen to Zaigai Bukan(The Second World War and Over-seas Military Attaches), Part V ofseries in Kaiko, February 1979;p. 12. Kaiko is the monthly journalof the Kaikosha, the association ofImperial Military Academy alumni.

10. Ibid., pp. 175-176.

11. Takayama, p. 176.

12. Ibid., p. 177.

13. Department of Defense. Supple-ment to Vol. 1 of The "Magic"Background to Pearl Harbor. Wash-ington, DC; 1970; p. A-160. Col.Takayama recalled after the war Tat-sumi's arguing against Hitler's secretalliance proposal in 1938 by sayingthat the combined strength of theUnited States and Great Britainwould far outweigh that of Germanyand Italy. Anglo-American navalstrength, in particular, wouldtogether rule the seven seas (seeTakayama, pp. 162-63).

14. Kaiko (January 1979); p. 12. Inan earlier indication, Yamashitaheard in January from Lt. Col. Shi-manuki Tsneyuki, stationed inBucharest, that the Germans wereworking with the Romanians tobuild an invasion route through theCarpathian Mountains (seeTakayama, p. 181). In another indi-cation, an 1.IA officer in Berlin heardfrom a German counterpart on 22May that Germany would invade(see Kaiko, January 1979; p. 12).

15. Kaiko, January 1979; p. 12. Theexercises were called Kantokuen, orKwangtung Army Special Exercises.Takayama wrote that only theNavy's opposition prevented theArmy from invading Siberia, suggest-ing that together Germany andJapan could have brought down theSoviet Union by mid-1942 (seeKaiko, January 1979;p. 12).

16. Interestingly, Takayama claimedin his book that the Army originallyhad planned to seize only Singaporeand the Dutch East Indies. The

Japanese Navy, believing that anattack on Great Britain would inevita-bly bring the United States into thewar against Japan, convinced theArmy to invade the Philippines as well.

17. Department of Defense. Appen-dix to Vol. 3 of The "Magic"Background ofPearl Harbor; pp. A-437-438.

18. Takayama, pp. 190-91; Kaiko(February 1979), p.13.

19. Takayama, pp. 194, 197-201.

20. Kaiko, March 1979, p. 13.

21. Kaiko, January 1979, p. 5.

22. One example of Oshima's uncrit-ical reporting is a cable of 6 August1941. Oshima first raises the issuesof rumors "to the effect that the warin Russia is not turning out so wellfor Germany." He then dismissessuch speculation by reporting a con-versation of von Ribbentrop'sstatement to the contrary (see Appen-dix to Vol. 3 of The "Magic"Background to Pearl Harbor, p. A-401).

23. Hori, Eizo. Daihonei Sanbo NoJoho Senki (An IGHQ Staff Officer'sRecord of Intelligence Warfare).Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1989; p. 44.

24. Coox, Alvin D. "Japanese NetAssessment in the Era Before PearlHarbor" in Williamson Murray andAllan R. Millett, ed., Calculations:Net Assessment and the Coming ofWorld War II. New York: The FreePress, 1992; p. 283.

25. Ibid., p. 269. Nor was Oshima'sregard for his second homeland unre-ciprocated. Nazi propaganda chief

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Josef Goebbels confided in his jour-nal of 21 March 1941 that Oshimawas "the best of all" the Japanese hehad met. (see The Goebbels Diaries1939-1941. Translated and editedby Fred Taylor. New York: G.P. Put-nam's Sons, 1983).

26. Nakamura, Yuetsu. Paidan: Tai-wan Gun 0 Tsukutta NihongunShokotachi (White Unit: The Japa-nese Military Officers Who BuiltTaiwan's Military). Tokyo: FuyoShot)° , 1995; pp. 105-06.

27. Yoshitsu, Michael. Japan and theSan Francisco Peace Settlement. NewYork: Columbia University Press,1983; p. 61.

28. Hata, p. 91.

67