a chinese perspective on sino-soviet relations

A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Shigeo Hiramatsu

Recent arguments over Sino-Soviet relations among many Western Sinologists, Sovietologists, and journalists have focused on the possibilities for reconciliation and restoration of the alliance. They are apt to consider few of the characteristics and aims of the present improvement in Sino-Soviet relations or the means and conditions to develop it.

The first step toward improving present Sino-Soviet relations was the proposal made by Brezhnev at Tashkent on March 24, 1982:

We have never considered the state of hostility and alienation between our countries to be normal. We are prepared to negotiate without any preconditions on measures, acceptable to both sides, to improve Soviet-Chinese relations on the basis of respect for the interests of each other, non- interference in each other's affairs, and mutual advantage, so long, o f course, as third countries are not harmed (emphasis supplied). 1

In the first place, this proposal refers only to the normalization of state- to-state relations, not of par ty- to-par ty relations. In the second place, it states no prerequisi te to normalization while accepting the status quo. Finally, it stresses that normalization should not have any effect on third nations, though this seems somehow incompatible with "without any precondi t ions ." The People 's Republic of Mongolia, Vietnam, and Af- ghanistan are among these "third nat ions."

In Sep tember 1982, the Chinese response to this proposal was made in Hu Yaobang 's political report to the 12th Party Congress:

We note that Soviet leaders have expressed more than once the desire to improve relations with China. But deeds, rather than words, are important. If the Soviet authorities really have a sincere desire to improve relations with China and take practical steps to lift their threat to the security of our country, it will be possible for Sino-Soviet relations to move towards normalization (emphasis supplied), z

SHIGEO HIRAMATSU is a professor at the National Defense College, Tokyo, and the author of numerous articles on the Chinese military and foreign policy, including "An Analysis of Decisions on Military Strategy in China: 1953-57," in Noriyuki Tokuda, ed., The Strategic Formation of Socialism in China: 1953-58 (Tokyo: The Institute of Asian Economic Affairs, 1976).

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52 JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

This statement indicates that the Chinese concept of improving relations with the Soviet Union is one of normalizing state-to-state relations. According to the Chinese, moreover, some conditions must be met before normalization. China requests that the Soviet Union remove threats to her security; concretely speaking, China seeks reduction of military forces deployed along the Sino-Soviet border including Outer Mongolia; discontinuation of Soviet support for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia; and the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan�9 There is no doubt that these three conditions are a response to the Tashkent proposal for normalization without any disadvantage to third nations�9

China and the Soviet Union, then, both regard improved relations as the normalization of their state-to-state relations. The Chinese proposal has some conditions, while the Soviet one has none. But what is this normalization that China and the Soviet Union are attempting to bring about? Is it possible to normalize though preconditions are different between them? This paper will consider these questions, focusing mainly on China's foreign and domestic policies and conditions.

T H E S I N O - S O V I E T T A L K S F O R N O R M A L I Z A T I O N O F S T A T E - T O - S T A T E R E L A T I O N S

In the fall of 1979 talks between Chinese and Soviet vice-foreign ministers took place in Moscow. But after the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan at the end of December 1979, China announced that for the time being there would be no continuance of the talks. The present move toward improving relations is thus a continuance of those interrupted talks to normalize their state-to-state relations. Examined first below are the content, aims, and background of those talks.

The Sino-Soviet Talks in the Fall of 1979 On April 3, 1979, China handed an official note to the Soviet Union

stating that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid, which was to terminate on April 11, 1980, would not be renewed. Simultaneously, however, China proposed to the Soviet Union that the two governments should begin talks to improve relations. The Sino- Soviet talks in 1979 started after the Soviet consent.

The decision not to renew the treaty was made at the seventh session of the Standing Committee of the 5th National People's Congress on April 3, 1979. Immediately, Foreign Minister Huang Hua met with the Ambassador of the Soviet Union to announce this decision, and "re- iterated the consistent stand of the Chinese government":

�9 changes have taken place in the international situation and...the treaty has long ceased to exist except in name owing to violations for which the Chinese side is not responsible . . . . the differences of principle between China and the Soviet Union should not hamper the maintenance and development of their normal state relations on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual

A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 53

non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 3

The position of the Chinese government as pointed out in Huang's statement was that, in the first place, a normalization of relations with the Soviet Union was to be built up through a new state-to-state relationship after the cancellation of the treaty. According to the Chinese side, the nature of state-to-state relations based on this treaty had changed because of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Two points should be made here: the Chinese government was attempting to build a state-to-state-relationship with the Soviet government different from that of the past," and it recog- nized that ideological differences existed between China and the Soviet Union. Hence, Sino-Soviet relations could not possibly be restored to what they were in the 1950's. This is related to the following second point: the Sino-Soviet treaty was aimed at Japan and the United States. In the 1970's, however, after the "Sino-Soviet conflicts" during the 1960's, China came to "cooperate" with the United States, Japan, and Western European nations in such fields as politics, the economy, and military affairs. Among the symbols of this cooperation were the Sino- Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship and rapprochement between China and the United States in 1978. They are what "the great changes in the international situation" in Huang's statement meant. The new state-to-state relationship which the Chinese government is attempting to build with the Soviet Union must be included within or compatible with such "cooperation" with Western nations. Third, five principles for peace were introduced as the basis for building a "new" state-to-state relationship with the Soviet Union. These principles had applied to state-to-state relations with nations whose systems were different from China's, in other words, non-socialist nations. Their application to the Soviet Union, therefore, meant that China no longer regarded her as a socialist nation.

On April 4 the Soviet government immediately sent a statement protesting the Chinese decision not to renew the treaty. On April 17, however, it stated that it was not opposed to the Chinese proposal concerning the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. Several memoranda were exchanged regarding an agenda and purposes of the talks. The Chinese indicated their attitude toward the negotiations in the process of exchanging memoranda, and it was reported later by the Xinhua New Agencyr (1) all unresolved problems including the border question are to be discussed; (2) obstacles to the normalization of relations must be removed. The most serious obstacle is hegemonism; (3) economic, scientific-technological, and cultural exchanges are to be facilitated; (4) a sort of political statement (a declaration or communique) specifying certain principles to rule a state-to-state relationship is to be made and signed; (5) negotiations are to be carried out by vice-foreign ministers at respective capitals by turns.

Several points should be noted concerning the attitude of the Chi- nese government. First, a consensus on negotiating the border question in a separate series of conferences (which had actually been going on


intermittently since 1969) was reached in preparatory conferences from September 27 on. In other words, the border question was to be left out of the negotiations to normalize state-to-state relations. Second, hegemonism was pointed out as an obstacle to normalization. The Xinhua News Agency made a specific reference to hegemonism: in the process of exchanging memoranda, the Chinese side stated that this issue had to be included in any agenda since it would effect relations. Finally, these vice-ministerial negotiations were to be business-like, not political, and appeared likely to last a long time since they were scheduled to take place at respective capitals by turns.

The New Strategy of China's Foreign Policy What was the purpose of China's move toward negotiations with the

Soviet Union? How is it to be understood in the context of her foreign strategy? It is important that China's proposal to improve state-to-state relations with the Soviet Union was presented soon after rapprochement between China and the United States. It is possible to think that the co-occurrence of these events with her decision not to renew the Sino- Soviet Treaty was just a coincidence. But they must be related to each other. Since the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the two military clashes between China and the Soviet Union along the Sino-Soviet border in March and August 1969, China had come to regard the Soviet Union as "socialist imperialist" or "hegemon- ist," and the Soviet Union had become China's major enemy. While making domestic preparations for war with the Soviet Union, China attempted to form a foreign strategy of a united front against Soviet "aggression-expansionist policy" or "hegemonism." The United States as well as Japan and Western Europe were included in this united front. In opposition to the Soviet Union, relations of "strategic cooperation" became established among the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and China. The purpose of this strategy was accomplished through the Treaty of Friendship and Peace between China and Japan in August and the rapprochement between China and the United States in December 1978.

The first round of China's foreign strategy after the Cultural Revolution ended with this accomplishment, and then the second round started. 5 The strategy in this round was to further develop relations with the West under the "anti-hegemonism" policy and to make efforts to build up a new state-to-state relationship with the Soviet Union after 20 years of confrontation. This new foreign strategy has by now been explained systematically. After Hu's report to the 12th Party Congress, some aspects of this strategy were disclosed as the foreign policy of "independence and autonomy."

First of all, Hu's report explained the "external strategy" of "independence and autonomy":

In the 33 years since the founding of our People's Republic, we have shown the world by deeds that China never attached itself to any big power or group of powers, and never yields to pressure from any big power. 6

A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE ON S1NO-SOVIET RELATIONS 55

This strategy, according to his report, is long-standing, and is not changed by passing events, nor affected by any persons. The external strategy of "independence and autonomy" is to be maintained in the future. In this context, it is clear that "strategic cooperation" against the Soviet Union among the United States, China, and Japan will not develop into a military coalition. Nor is there any possibility of the emergence of a Sino-Soviet military coalition through the recent move to improve Sino-Soviet relations.

It was after fall 1982 that the above external strategy took concrete form, but its underlying theoretical tone was related to the denial of the "uninterrupted revolution" theory made at the 3rd Plenum in December 1978. That denial resulted in the denial of the theory of the "inevitability of world war" and in the emergence of the theory of "detente" in the field of external strategy. 7 This shift will be described later in more detail. Under the present external strategy of "independence and autonomy," "anti-hegemonism" is emphasized as a fundamental principle. But it is no longer the axis of the three principles (the other two are the development of normal state-to-state relations based upon the five principles for peace, and that of solidarity and cooperation with the Third World. All three principles are treated the same. 8 In other words, the principle of "anti-hegemonism," which has been the most prominent, is now made little of. The new foreign strategy is thus closely related to the shift of lines at the 3rd Plenum.

The Shift of China's Military Line On March 31, 1979, several days before the decision not to renew

the Sino-Soviet Treaty, Deng Xiaoping presented a new line of socialist modernization, which was substituted for the "four modernizations," called the "Chinese way of modernization.'9 The "four modernizations" under Hua Guofeng's regime was the line of national prosperity and defense aiming at "bringing China into the front line of the world by the total realization of the four modernizations within this century." In contrast, the "Chinese way of modernization" may be called the line of the "people's life and welfare," whose aim is to "build a middle-level country with $1,000 GNP per person." This line is associated with adjustments and reforms in economic policies made after the 3rd Plenum, and also accompanied by criticism of Mao Zedong. This puts two tasks on the external strategy. One is to establish "detente" to secure "long- lasting, peaceful international circumstances." The other is to secure aid and cooperation from advanced nations so as to carry on the modernization projects.

The national security element in the external strategy was very important for the "four modernizations," and yet its importance in the "Chinese way of modernization" is much greater. In the first place, the "Chinese way of modernization" is based upon a theory which denies the "uninterrupted revolution" theory and the theory of the "inevitability of world war." It is thus aimed at "detente." In the second place, it puts less importance on the "modernization of defense" because of its orientation to "the development of the people's life and welfare." It is not that the


present regime does not recognize the importance of the "modernization of defense." In China after the 3rd Plenum, a major shift in the military line was under way in conjunction with the emergence of the "Chinese way of modernization." The trend toward normalizing state-to-state relations with the Soviet Union should be understood in this context.

The military line shifted from the strategy of people's war to that of modern warfare. The existing capabilities of the Chinese military forces are completely inadequate to cope with military threats facing China. What is required is a highly efficient, modernized, regularized army equipped with advanced weapons of high mobility and striking power, though small in size. In order to reach this goal, the domestic production of weapons and equipment was decided on as a defense policy. The size of the army was to be reduced to allow for diversion of capital and resources to the development and production of "new weapons" and "military science-technology. ''1~ This policy, however, will take a long time to put into practice and requires that the external strategy secure long-lasting peaceful international conditions. Since the conditions which would make it possible for the threat of a people's war to serve as a credible deterrent, as it had in Chinese military thinking, are no longer prevalent, it is more than ever necessary that this requirement be met.

Three constituents in the Chinese military force are nuclear, con- ventional, and people's war forces. For several years the nuclear force has been progressively strengthened. Tests of ICBM's, three satellites, and a submarine missile have succeeded. These successes, however, are still far from guaranteeing a minimum nuclear deterrence. The conven- tional force is backward and does not function well as a deterrent because of personnel and budget cuts. Adjustments in the economy have been underway to correct economic contradictions resulting from the "four modernizations" and thereby to facilitate "the Chinese way of modernization"; a reduction of the budget for basic construction and defense and a shake-up of enterprises and military industries through diversion of military products to non-military uses have been carried out. These steps will prevent the smooth and quick modernization of weapons and equipment. 11 The people's war force, though it has many faults, has played the most effective deterrent role. With the prevailing trend toward criticism of Mao Zedong, however, the military thought of Mao and the theory of the people's war are now targets of open attack. The dissolution of the people's communes, which have supported the people's war setup, appears to have further weakened its effectiveness.

Under "the Chinese way of modernization," therefore, the cred- ibility of China's army will decline for the time being. Under such conditions the foreign strategy will be to try to maintain national security through "strategic cooperation" with the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, and normalization of state-to-state relations with the Soviet Union. One of China's conditions for normalization, that the Soviets "take practical steps to lift their threat to the security of our country," is quite reasonable in this context, and in fact is the key to the present Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union.

A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE ON SINO-SOV1ET RELATIONS 57

The introduction of aid and collaboration from advanced nations is one of major tasks of the foreign strategy necessitated by "the Chinese way of modernization." When economic adjustments were first introduced, economic and technological aid from Western nations were stopped. But this does not mean a permanent stop. The policy of the present regime regarding this task is to expand exchanges of foreign trade and technology while keeping firmly to self-reliance. 12 This policy devolves from the failures of the "four modernizations," which attempted to introduce advanced technologies from Western nations without any thoughtful consideration of China's conditions. Hu's report to the 12th Party Congress states:

We must actively import advanced technologies suited to our national conditions, particularly those helpful to the technical transformation of our own enterprises, and strive to absorb and develop them in order to promote our production and construction.13

Special attention should be paid here to Hu's discussion of combining the introduction of advanced technologies with the technical reform of China's existing facilities. He goes on to say,

Most existing enterprises were built in the 1940's and 50's. Their technologies and facilities are old. In comparison to the advanced ones in the world, they are very backward in terms of technological level, efficiency, and cost of raw materials. The introduction of advanced technologies and facilities into these enterprises may facilitate their technical reformsJ 4

Importance should be attached to the fact that this opinion emerged in conjunction with the beginning of "economic adjustments." "Most of the existing enterprises" which "were built in the 1940's and 50's" re- ceived the full aid and collaboration of the Soviet Union. Bo Yibo, a leader in charge of economic construction in the 1950's, made an affir- mative reference in 1979 to Soviet aid in the 1950's which is the first since the Sino-Soviet conflict.~5 The military sphere too was in the same situation.~6 Soviet technology has already been digested. Unless new technologies and facilities are introduced from abroad, China's modernization will remain at a stalemate. The question lies in how to carry out technical reform of the existing facilities (including military ones) built mainly with Soviet aid. Technical reforms have until now depended only upon Western nations. But from now, China's acceptance of Soviet aid is a possibility which must affect the future of Sino-Soviet relations.

From the Suspension to the Reopening of the Sino-Soviet Negotiations Sino-Soviet vice-ministerial talks were held from September 27 to

October 30, 1979. Five preliminary sessions and six official sessions took place. The talks yielded no results, but the next session was to be held in Beijing the next year; China and the Soviet Union had agreed on reciprocal sessions in respective capitals. There is no doubt that both nations did not regard these negotiations as unsuccessful. However, on December 30, 1979, the day after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the


Chinese government issued a statement criticizing the sudden Soviet invasion as another proof of her "hegemonism." From that time on, it carried out a press campaign against Soviet hegemonism. Then, on January 20, a Foreign Ministry spokesman announced in a conversation with a reporter from the Xinhua News Agency China's unilateral decision to suspend the Sino-Soviet negotiations. Yet the Chinese side did not seem to consider them totally closed; if it had, its announcement of the suspension would have been made more directly at a much higher level rather than indirectly at such a low level as that of the Foreign Ministry spokesman. The spokesman's comment said that in the existing circumstances it was not worthwhile to carry on the negotiations, and criticized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, "which has created a new obstacle to normalizing Sino-Soviet relations." This comment indicated the Chinese hope of reopening the negotiations in the future. In spite of the Soviet invasion, moreover, China took no steps to abrogate the Sino-Soviet treaty.

Even after the suspension of the negotiations, China and the Soviet Union both presumably sought for any opportunity to improve their relations. The question was how to grasp such an opportunity. It came in the form of Sino-U.S. friction caused by U.S. weapons sales to Tai- wan. The Soviet Union made use of this opportunity to present the Tashkent proposal to improve Sino-Soviet relations) 7 In terms of the process of Sino-Soviet talks since the spring of 1979, therefore, the reopening of the negotiations in the fall of 1982 is not a big surprise at all.

IS NORMALIZATION POSSIBLE? THREE PREREQUISITES ON THE CHINESE SIDE

Hu's report to the 12th Party Congress, as described before, stated, "If the Soviet authorities really have a sincere desire to improve relations with China and to take practical steps to remove their threat to the security of our country, it will be possible for Sino-Soviet relations to move towards normalization." Three kinds of Soviet threat are mentioned in Hu's report: the concentration of a large Soviet army along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders for 20 years; support of Viet- nam's invasion and occupation of Cambodia and the expansion of Vietnamese influence over Indochina and Southest Asia, and ceaseless provocations of China along the Sino-Vietnamese border; and the invasion of Afghanistan, a neighbor to China.

Does China intend not to "normalize" state-to-state relations with the Soviet Union unless these three kinds of Soviet threat are all removed? Chinese leaders, including Deng Xiaoping, in talks with West- ern leaders and at other times, say, "It is sufficient to take one or two actions. ''18 Which of these three prerequisites is easiest to meet?

Soviet Support of Vietnam It was on April 3, 1979, that the Chinese government decided not

to renew the Sino-Soviet treaty. This decision was made after her war to

A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS 59

punish Vietnam, between February 17 and March 16. In spite of the Sino-Vietnamese war, the Chinese government did not annul this treaty but made a legal decision to terminate it in accordance with its terms. This decision was transmitted through official channels to the Soviet government. In addition, the Chinese government sent a proposal to negotiate to establish a new state-to-state relationship in place of the one based on the Sino-Soviet treaty. This fact suggests that China at that time desired not only to maintain state-to-state relations with the Soviet Union, but also to improve and develop them. The Soviet support of Vietnam, accordingly, seems not to be a decisive obstacle to "normalizing" relations with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Military Invasion of Afghanistan As indicated above, the possibility of a renewal of Sino-Soviet nego-

tiations remained open, though the Soviet invasion suspended it from the fall of 1979. China's willingness for "detente" with the Soviet Union is seen in "The Soviet Military Strategy Aiming at World Hegemony," an article in the People's Daily right after the Soviet invasion of Af- ghanistan. 19 This article suggested that the "military stalemate" in Europe and Asia would make it difficult to stage a war or would limit any war which did occur, 2~ and explained indirectly how the "military stalemate in Asia" came about: " . . . Soviet war preparations in Asia are aimed not only at China but at the United States and Japan as well. ''2~ Hence this article indicates that the military stalemate consists in a military balance among the United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. When compared with the following statement made during the Hua Guofeng regime, a delicate difference in this article would be noted:

Actions of Soviet social imperialism are aimed of course at the United States and Japan. Simultaneously, however, they are also making steady preparations for a war of invasion into our nation. 22

"The Soviet Military Strategy Aiming at World Hegemony," fur- thermore, accuses the Soviets of "hegemonistic" actions but considers those against China not seriously threatening: "The Soviet military strength in Asia is smaller in numbers, weaker as a shock force, and slower in arms replacement than that in Europe. ''23

To sum up, in spite of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Chinese government has seemed to continue to hope for "detente" with the Soviet Union and for the continuance of talks. The question of Afghanistan is still an important topic in the future of those talks, but it will not become the most cruicial factor in deciding the direction of "normalization."

The Soviet Army along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian Borders The remaining problem is the threat of the Soviet army in the areas

along the Sino-Soviet borders including the Sino-Mongolian border. No detailed information is available with respect to the Soviet army along the borders. From time to time China has criticized the Soviet deploy-


ment of a force a million strong in the area. According to The Military Balance: 1982--83 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 47 divisions including four divisions in Mongolia are deployed along the borders. Since the full complement of a division in the Soviet army is 12,000, the total force does not reach 600,000; hence there is a large gap between the Chinese assessment and that of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 24 And yet this gigantic Soviet army is undoubtedly the most crucial threat to China. In taking into consideration China's response to the Soviet support of Vietnam and her invasion of Afghanistan, it seems natural to conclude that the focal question in the Sino-Soviet normalization talks will be its reduction.

Table 1 and other data from The Military Balance for 1963-1983 and Table 2, which is excerpted from the Japanese defense white paper for 1976, show several important points. In the first place, these data reflect the increase in the Soviet army in the border area after the military clashes between China and the Soviet Union in 1969. The increase was rapid from 1973 to 1975, when the possibility of a Sino-Soviet war was discussed in the West. Thereafter, the number of divisions was gradually decreased. But after China's decision not to renew the Sino-Soviet treaty and her proposal to start negotiations for normalization, a gradual increase took place. In 1982 when the Tashkent proposal was presented from the Soviet side, one more division was newly deployed. In the second place, the number of tank divisions was decreased after military clashes in 1969 while a rapid increase of divisions in general was re- corded. Since the new deployment of one tank division upon China's decision to terminate the Sino-Soviet treaty, the number of tank di-

Table 1. Deployment of Soviet Army Divisions along the Sino-Soviet Border since 1980

1980-1981 1981-1982 1982-1983 Central Asian 7 (1) 7 (1) 7 (1) Siberian 5 5 5 Trans-Baikal 10 (3) 10 (3) 10 (2) Far East 21 (1) 21 (1) 22 (1) Mongolia 3 (1) 3 (1) 4 (2) TOTAL 46 (6) 46 (6) 47 (6)

Note: The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of tank divisions. Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance.

Table 2. Deployment of Chinese and Soviet Army Divisions along the Sino-Soviet Border since

1970 Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

Country China 47 51 65 70 75 81 Soviet Union 30 33 44 45 45 43

Note: Soviet divisions are believed to be far superior to Chinese divisions in fire power and mobility. Source: Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1976, p. 13.

A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE ON SINO-SOVIET R E L A T I O N S 61

visions has remained constant at six. In the third place, it was from 1969 that the Soviet army started deployments in Outer Mongolia. The size of the Soviet army in Mongolia has been increasing slightly. One division was added in 1976 when Mao died. One tank division was newly deployed in 1979, although the total number of divisions was unchanged. In 1982, the year of the Tashkent proposal, one more tank division was added. These three points suggest that two factors presumably gave rise to Soviet troop increases in 1979. One was Soviet preparation for some unexpected event due to the annulment of the treaty. The other was a desire to strengthen her bargaining power and to prepare for the reduction of military forces along the border area which would be the main topic in the Sino-Soviet talks. The Soviet military increase in Mongolia should be understood in this context. To put military pressure on China or reduce military forces along the Sino-Soviet borders as a concr the most effective means is the Soviet army in Mongolia.

For national defense purposes, the ideal shape of a territory is round with the capital close to the center. The shape of China when Mongolia was in her territory was very close to this ideal. The independence of Mongolia or her de-facto status as a satellite of the Soviet Union, cut a big gouge out of China's northern territory. Since the Bay of Bohai cuts deeply into China's eastern territory, the distance between the Bay of Bohai and Outer Mongolia is short. (See Figure 1, Chinese and Soviet Troops Deployed along the Sino-Soviet Borders.) If Soviet military forces in Mongolia and the Trans-Baikal Military District were to make a direct attack on Shanhaiguan facing the Bay of Bohai from Inner Mongolia through Outer Mongolia, China would be quickly divided, and northeastern China would be cut off from "Inner China" south from Shanhaiguan. From Mongolia, moreover, Soviet troops could not only conquer Beijing within a few days but also invade the northeast part of China. Moving westward, they could destroy military facilities around Lanzhow and attack Xinjiang. Mongolia would be the best base for the Soviet army if the Soviet Union were to wage war, particularly a limited war, against China. In the summer of 1981, the Chinese army held a series of military maneuvers with 200,000 men, lasting about two months, called the "Military Maneuvers in North China." These maneuvers reflect China's plan to defeat any Soviet army invading from Mongolia by building strong defensive lines in the area of Zhangjiakou in Inner Mongolia. 25

The crucial issue in the Sino-Soviet talks must be the Soviet army in Mongolia. The precise date when Soviet troops began to be stationed there is not known. In the First Session of the 5th National Congress of the People's Representatives in February 1978, Hua Guofeng de- manded: "[The Soviet Union] must withdraw her troops from the Peo- ple's Republic of Mongolia and the Sino-Soviet border area so as to restore the situation to what it was in the early 1960's." Judging from this, the Soviet army presence in Mongolia must date from the 1960's. It is said that the presence of the Soviet army in Mongolia was based upon the Soviet Mongolian Treaty signed in 1966. 26 No clause for the


f SinoSovlel border area troop strength ~ ~

4 I 46 dlvIs,ons 65 divnsions |

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f . - Par East Mnlitary Distrnct \ ' ~ , 4 dwlsuons , - J 11 davlsions ( . \ ~

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.~ . . . . m u .~, f ' " [ Hanyang ~ ) . ~ .,.,," % 3 d,v,sions ~ , . �9 /

�9 ~ .,p" Peking " . Luta ~ ~-~ Wulumuch, M,hlary Zone . " " ~ " * ~ " ~ ~ f

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Figure 1. Chinese and Soviet Troops Deployed along the Sino-Soviet Border

Note: * Locations of Soviet military district and Chinese military regional command headquarters. Source: Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1980, p. 70.


maintenance of Soviet troops in Mongolia is included in this treaty. However, considering that this treaty was signed under the circumstances of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the Cultural Revolution, it is possible that it did mark the beginning of the stationing of Soviet troops in Mongolia.

With respect to the Soviet military presence in Mongolia, one more point should be noted. Whereas the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe was based on offical treaties or agreements with nations con- cerned, no such treaty or agreement between the Soviet Union and Mongolia has been published and no official information is available regarding the name of the commander-in-chief of the Soviet army in Mongolia. This fact may indicate that Soviet troops within her territory such as those of the Trans-Baikal Military District are under the command of this military district. If so, military withdrawal from Mongolia may be an "actual step" which the Soviet Union can relatively easily take, since Soviet military withdrawal from Mongolia would be a matter of her domestic military district. It formally "does not effect any third nation."

Whatever the precise reason and whenever the precise date was, the Soviet presence in Mongolia dates from the 1960's on and resulted from the Sino-Soviet conflict and the Cultural Revolution. Since the Cultural Revolution is now totally discredited in China, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia may not be impossible if the Soviet Union really desires to normalize relations with China.

It is not that the Soviet support of Vietnam and invasion of Af- ghanistan will not be discussed in future sino-Soviet talks. China and the Soviet Union will both press their own positions on questions including the above two issues so as to gain bargaining power. As a matter of fact, on February 24, right before the second round of Sino-Soviet vice- ministerial consultations from March 1 in Moscow, China announced the five-point proposal which had been presented in the first round in Octo- ber. If both of them truly desire to normalize state-to-state relations, the above two prerequisites may be shelved and the remaining prerequisite, the issue of the Soviet military presence, may be resolved through some compromise.

PROSPECTS

The improvement of Sino-Soviet relations in progress is to normalize their state-to-state relationship, to liquidate their relationship based upon the Sino-Soviet Treaty signed in 1950 and instead to build a new state-to-state relationship. Judging from China's recent foreign strategy of seeking her own independence and autonomy, no possibility exists for the establishment of a relationship as solid as the previous one was. There are big differences in their positions and conditions at the normalization talks, and from the beginning both of them expected the talks to last a long time.

There is no prospect of quick results in the talks, and the only likely


success would be the signing of a sort of political statement such as a communique and joint declaration with simple and meaningless content. The following points may be included: (1) based on the Five Principles for Peace, China normalizes relations with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union, based on the Principle of Peaceful Co-Existence, does so with China; (2) China and the Soviet Union will facilitate economic, technological, and cultural exchanges; (3) both nations will continue to make efforts to resolve issues including the Sino-Soviet borders which remain unresolved between them. It will not be easy to get even such a political statement signed. But economic, technological, and cultural exchanges are already underway, and will be gradually expanded, perhaps making possible conditions of detente indispensable to normalization.

FOOTNOTES

1. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Soviet Union, March 29, 1982, p. CC1.

2. Beijing Review, September 13, 1982, p. 31. 3. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, People's Republic of

China, April 3, 1979, p. C1. 4. New China News Agency, October 7, 1979 5. This explanation does not imply that the above-mentioned foreign policy strat-

egy was put into effect as planned. There was also a good deal of intraparty antagonism over it.

6. Beijing Review, September 13, 1982, p. 31. 7. Observer, "What Does the Year of the Afghanistan Incident Imply?" People's

Daily, December 26, 1980. See my article, "Deng Xiaoping's Plan for Mod- ernization of National Defense," Asia Monthly (Tokyo: Kazan Kai), No. 179 (May 1982), pp. 16-17.

8. See Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang's statement at the press conference in Nigeria, People's Daily, December 28, 1982. See also Huang Xiang, "Let's Adhere to the Foreign Policy of Independence and Autonomy," People's Daily, October 30, 1982.

9. "Deng Xiaoping's Report on the Present Situation and Duty," Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), No. 19 (March 1980), p. 19. After the "Chinese way of modernization" was presented, not only were the "four modernizations" seldom used, but also the concept behind them changed remarkably. See my article, "Chi- nese Economic Adjustment and Modernization of National Defense," Chagoku Mondai (Tokyo: Kokusai Zenrin Kyokai), No. 2 (March 1982).

10. This policy had already been presented by Zhang Aiping (the present Minister of Defense) at the Third Plenary Session of the Fifth National People's Con- gress. See my article cited in Note 8, pp. 23-24.

11. See my article cited in Note 8, pp. 18-23. 12. Hu Yaobang's Political Report to the 12th National Congress of the Chinese

Communist Party. 13. Beijing Review, September 13, 1982, p. 20. 14. "Let's Give a Full and Effective Role to the Old Bases," People's Daily,

January 19, 1979. 15. Po Ipo, "We Feel Sympathy for Our Admirable Comrade Zhou Enlai," Peo-

ple's Daily, January 8, 1979. 16. My article cited in Note 8 refers definitely to this question. 17. Brezhnev's Tashkent proposal emphasizes, "We did not and do not accord any

legitimacy to what we call the 'two Chinas' in any form. We have completely accepted the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China, standing in coun-


terpoise to Taiwan.'" On the other hand, a New China News Agency writer who reviewed the proposal described it as "clever but tactical" that Brezhnev pre- ferred the period of Sino-U.S. friction in connection with the Taiwan problem. People's Daily, March 27, 1982.

18. See, for example, Wo Xueqian's statement at the first press conference with foreign correspondents after he took office as Minister of Foreign Affairs. People's Daily, February 11, 1983.

19. People's Daily, January 11, 1980. See my article cited in Note 8, which refers to the problem mentioned below.

20. The discussion of this topic, taken for granted in the West, has been taboo in China so far.

21. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, People's Republic of China, January 15, 1980, p. C5.

22. Xu Xiangqian, "Let 's Take a Defensive Attitude and Prepare against War," Red Flag, No. 8 (August 1978), p. 26.

23. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, People's Republic of China, January 15, 1980, p. C5.

24. The Soviet army is not considered to be up to 100% strength. Therefore, tl-,i~ gap is actually considered to be much larger. One million Soviet troops ~hould be counted as a political number.

25. In reference to these maneuvers, see my article, "On the Military Maneuvers of the Chinese Army in Huapei,'" Kyosan Shugi to Kokusai Seji (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo), Vol. 8, No. 2 (July-September 1983), forth- coming.

26. The description mentioned below is based on the research of my colleague, Professor K. Miyauchi, who specializes in the military strategy of the Soviet Union.

a chinese perspective on sino-soviet relations

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