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Shahzad Eriugena & Ibn ArabiTRANSCRIPT
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QAISER SHAHZADQAISER SHAHZADQAISER SHAHZADQAISER SHAHZAD
DEPARTMENT ODEPARTMENT ODEPARTMENT ODEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHYF PHILOSOPHYF PHILOSOPHYF PHILOSOPHY UUUUNIVERSITY NIVERSITY NIVERSITY NIVERSITY OF THE OF THE OF THE OF THE PPPPUNJABUNJABUNJABUNJAB,,,,
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CertificateCertificateCertificateCertificate
This is to certify that the research work described in this thesis is the original work of
the author and has been carried out under my direct supervision. I have personally gone
through all the data/results/materials reported in the manuscript and certify their
correctness/authenticity. I further certify that the material included in this thesis has not
been used in part or in full in a manuscript already submitted or in the process of
submission in partial complete fulfillment of the award of another degree from any other
institution. I also certify that the thesis has been prepared under my supervision
according to the prescribed format and I endorse its evaluation for the award of PhD
degree through the official procedures of the University.
SignatureSignatureSignatureSignature_________________
NameNameNameName: Prof. Dr. Sajid Ali
DesignationDesignationDesignationDesignation: Chairman,
Department of Philosophy
University of the Punjab
Lahore
iii
ContentsContentsContentsContents
Abstract viii
Acknowledgements x
Abbreviations xi
List of Tables and Figures xii
A Note on Sources xiii
ONE ONE ONE ONE
IntroductionIntroductionIntroductionIntroduction
1111
1.1 Preliminary
1.2 Review of Literature
1.3 Methodological Considerations
1.3.1 The Method of Comparison
1.3.2 Critique of Socio-Historical Method
1.4 Theoretical Framework
1.4.1 Pre-modern- modern Break
1.4.2 Metaphysics-Religion Dichotomy
1.4.3 Reason- Intellect
TWO TWO TWO TWO
The Ontological FoundationsThe Ontological FoundationsThe Ontological FoundationsThe Ontological Foundations
17171717
2.1 Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> on Totality
2.1.1 Eriugena’s Concept of Totality
2.1.2 Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Concept of Totality
2.2 Ontology-Intelligibility Connection and Perspectival Ontology in Eriugena
2.3 Ontology-Intelligibility Connection and Perspectival Ontology in Ibn ‘Arabi>
2.3.1 Ibn ‘Arabi> on Ontology and Intelligibility
2.3.2 Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Perspectival Ontology
iv
THREE THREE THREE THREE
Metacosm Metacosm Metacosm Metacosm ––––I: GodI: GodI: GodI: God
38383838
3.1 Defining God
3.1.1 Eriugena on the Definition of “God.”
3.1.2 Ibn ‘Arabi> on the Definition of “God.”
3.2 Divine Self-Creation
3.2.1 Eriugena’s Standpoint
3.2.2 Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Standpoint
3.3 Divine Knowability
3.3.1 Eriugena on Divine Knowability
3.3.2 Ibn ‘Arabi> on Divine Knowability
3.4 Divine Unity and Trinity
3.4.1 Eriugena on Trinity
3.4.2 Ibn ‘Arabi> on Unity, Trinity and Multiplicity
3.5 Talking About God
3.5.1 Eriugena’s Affirmative, Negative and Superlative Theologies
3.5.2 Incomparability, Similarity and their Synthesis in Ibn ‘Arabi>
3.6 Divine Nothingness
3.6.1 Nihil as a Divine Name in Eriugena
3.6.2 God and Nothingness according to Ibn ‘Arabi>
3.7 Divine Darkness
3.7.1 Eriugena on Divine Self-Knowledge
3.7.1 Ibn ‘Arabi> on Divine Self-Knowledge
FOURFOURFOURFOUR
MetacosmMetacosmMetacosmMetacosm----II: The Primordial CausesII: The Primordial CausesII: The Primordial CausesII: The Primordial Causes
73737373
4.1 The Nature of Primordial Causes and their Functions in Eriugenian Cosmology
4.1.1 The Scriptural Basis of Primordial Causes
4.1.2 Causes as the Origin of Intelligible and Sensible Creatures
4.1.3 Primordial Causes and Materia Prima
4.1.4 Immutable Perfection of the Causes
4.1.5 Questions of Knowability
v
4.1.6 Primordial Causes and Evil
4.1.7 Timeless Creation of Primordial Causes
4.1.8 No Nature between God and Primordial Causes
4.1.9 Hierarchy of Primordial Causes
4.1.10 Infinity of Primordial Causes
4.1.11 Simplicity and Unity of Causes
4.1.12 Priority of Goodness and Objectivity of Hierarchy
4.2 Fixed entities in Comparison with Primordial Causes
4.2.1 Scriptural Foundation of the Concept
4.2.2 Ontological Status
4.2.3 Fixed Entities and Material Prima
4.2.4 Entities and Knowledge
4.2.5 Entities Created or Eternal?
4.2.6 Order and Hierarchy in Entities
4.2.7 Intermediate Status of Entities
4.2.8 Essence, Names and Entities
4.2.9 The Highest Fixed Entity
4.2.10 Unity and Multiplicity
4.2.11 Entities and the Word
4.2.12 Infinity of Entities
4.2.13 Fixed Entities and Evil
FIVEFIVEFIVEFIVE
MacrocosmMacrocosmMacrocosmMacrocosm----I: Participation and I: Participation and I: Participation and I: Participation and DivineDivineDivineDivine RootsRootsRootsRoots
120120120120
5.1 Eriugena on “Participation”
5.1.1 Participation: History and Context
5.1.2 Participation and All that is (omne quod est)
5.1.3 Participation: Literal and Metaphorical Explications
5.2 Ibn ‘Arabi> on the “Divine Roots.”
5.2.1 Divine Roots and omne quod est
5.2.2 Divine Roots and “Participation” Literally Understood
5.2.3 Divine Roots and Metaphors of Participation
5.3 God and Categoriae Decem
vi
5.3.1 Eriugena on God and Categories
5.3.2 Ibn ‘Arabi> on God and Categories
SIX SIX SIX SIX
MacrocosmMacrocosmMacrocosmMacrocosm----II: Theophany and II: Theophany and II: Theophany and II: Theophany and alalalal----TajalliTajalliTajalliTajalli >> >>
151151151151
6.1 Eriugena on Theophany
6.1.1 Etymology and Importance of the Concept
6.1.2 Dionysian Influences: Form-assuming, Illumination and Elitism
6.1.3 Epistemological Theophany and Unknowability
6.1.4 Ontological Theophany and Transcendence
6.1.5 Functions of “Theophany” in Eriugena’s Thought
6.2 Ibn ‘Arabi> on al-Tajalli>
6.2.1 Centrality of the Concept
6.2.2 Etymology and the Qur’a>nic usage of the term
6.2.3 Al-Tajalli>: Ontological and Epistemological
6.2.4 Form-Assuming, Illumination and Elitism
6.2.5 Al-Tajalli> and Divine Transcendence
SEVENSEVENSEVENSEVEN
Microcosm: Man, GMicrocosm: Man, GMicrocosm: Man, GMicrocosm: Man, God and Nature od and Nature od and Nature od and Nature
173173173173
7.1 Containment: Man and Nature in Eriugena
7.1.1 Theory of Universal Human Containment
7.1.2 Containment and Human Self-Knowledge
7.1.3 Containment in the Light of Holy Scripture
7.1.4 Containment and Six Days of Creation
7.1.5 Unity and Trinity: Divine and Human
7.2 Man as Microcosm in Ibn ‘Arabi>
7.2.1 The Scriptural Basis
7.2.2 How is Man a Microcosm?
7.2.3 Man as Intermediary
7.2.4 Man: the Final Creature
7.2.5 Microcosm: Problems of Labeling
vii
7.3 Deiformity: God and Man in Eriugena
7.3.1 Preliminary: Scriptural Basis
7.3.2 Body and the Divine Image
7.3.3 Which Man was Created upon Divine Image?
7.3.4 Why and How Man was Created upon Divine Image?
7.3.5 The Metaphysical Principle of Deiformity
7.4 Ibn ‘Arabi> on Al-S}u>rah al-Ila>hiyyah
7.4.1 Islamic Foundations of the Concept in Ibn ‘Arabi>
7.4.2 The Meaning of Deiformity
7.4.3 Does the Divine Image Extend to the whole of Humanity?
7.4.4 The Cosmic Deiformity
7.4.5 Human Body and Deiformity
7.4.6 The Ethical Dimensions of Deiformity
7.4.7 Why Deiformity: Metaphysical Explanations
EIGHTEIGHTEIGHTEIGHT
Conclusion: Summary, Interpretation and Implications 212
Works Cited 234
Appendix: Published Research Work 241
AbstractAbstractAbstractAbstract
In this dissertation we propose to undertake a comparative analysis of the cosmological
doctrines of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> in order to show that in spite of belonging to
different religious, historical and geographical contexts, their views show remarkable
similarities on the concept of God, nature and man and their correlation. Their
conceptions of totality and its division are similar, while Ibn ‘Arabi>’s picture is more
comprehensive in view of his accommodating absolute not-being. Both connect
ontology with intelligibility and present perspectival ontologies. Eriugena and Ibn
‘Arabi> alike extend the term “God” to include “theophanies.” They are agreed on Divine
unknowability, self-creation and they both synthesize negative and affirmative
theologies. However, in view of their different conceptions of “knowledge” they
disagree on the possibility of Divine Self-knowledge. Eriugena's “primordial causes”
which mediate God and creation, are shown to be functionally similar to Ibn ‘Arabi>’s
“fixed entities” and the ontological status of both is similar. However, the former are
contained within the Logos while the latter are not contained within the Perfect Man.
We argue that the way Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> relate the world to God is similar by
showing resonance between Eriugena’s notion of “participation” and the doctrine of
“Divine roots” we reconstruct from scattered passages of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s magnum opus.
We also show that Eriugena’s understanding of “theophany” is completely in line with
Ibn ‘Arabi>’s view of the nature of al-tajalli>. Our exposition of the Divine roots theory
also includes a discussion of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s views on the relationship between God and ten
categories which he, unlike, Eriugena, connects ontologically to the Divine nature.
Finally, we show how, on the one hand, Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> alike relate man to God
ix
via the notion of imago dei, on the other, they relate man to the created nature by
viewing nature to be contained by man. It is shown that Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> agree
not only on broader outlines but in certain important details as well, for instance, the
way they understand the meaning of human deiformity is same. On the methodological
side, the most prominent feature that is shared by these two philosophers is their
keenness to relate philosophical doctrines and notions to their respective Scriptures. We
observe, however, that whereas Eriugena’s interpretation of the Bible seems in most of
the cases to be allegorical and arbitrary, when Ibn ‘Arabi> interprets the Qur’a>n he is
extremely careful regarding its letter and offers his creative interpretation more often
than not within the interpretational space allowed by the text itself. Another
methodological insight that is common to both is that instead of aligning themselves
with extreme positions on most of the important questions, they usually prefer midway
house standpoints which enable us to see the pros and cons of all options. We conclude
by making a case for the importance and practical relevance of the results of our
comparative analysis. We argue that by considering the world to be a theophany and
contained within man who is created upon Divine image Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> give
us the conceptual keys to reconstruct a worldview that is based on perfect harmony
between God, man and created nature and it is this view that is really needed to come to
terms with the environmental crisis our world is facing. Moreover, their tendency to
take middle positions and indeed the way they situate the world between absolute
goodness and absolute evil offers us a cosmology of tolerance. This cosmology requires
that instead of having recourse to “either/or” logic of the sword we see everything as
consisting of elements of goodness and imperfection.
x
AcknowlAcknowlAcknowlAcknowledgmentsedgmentsedgmentsedgments
I am grateful first of all to my supervisor Dr. Sajid Ali for all his encouragement,
guidance and help. I would like to thank my mentor Dr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Director
Islamic Research Institute International Islamic University, for making it possible for
me to work on this dissertation by granting me study leave and supporting me in every
manner. I am grateful to my friend Syed Rizwan Zamir for making me think about the
subject of present dissertation in pragmatic terms. Finally, I would like to express my
gratitude to all those who helped me in using the Bodleian Library Oxford and John
Rylands Library University of Manchester in September 2005.
xi
AbbreviationsAbbreviationsAbbreviationsAbbreviations
Most commonly used works are abbreviated as under.Most commonly used works are abbreviated as under.Most commonly used works are abbreviated as under.Most commonly used works are abbreviated as under.
DDNDDNDDNDDN Eriugena: De Diuisione Naturae
HomHomHomHom. Eriugena: Homilia in prologum Evangelii Secundum Joannem
PraedPraedPraedPraed. Eriugena: De Divina Praedestinatione
Fut.Fut.Fut.Fut. Ibn ‘Arabi>: Al-Futu>h}a>t al-Makkiyah
FusFusFusFus. Ibn ‘Arabi>: Fus}u>s} al-H}ikam
Insha>’Insha>’Insha>’Insha>’ Ibn ‘Arabi>: Insha>’ al-Dawa>’ir
SPKSPKSPKSPK William C. Chittick: Sufi Path of Knowledge
SDGSDGSDGSDG William C. Chittick: Self Disclosure of God
RingstonesRingstonesRingstonesRingstones Caner Dagli: Ringstones of Wisdom
JMIASJMIASJMIASJMIAS Journal of the Muh}yiddi>n Ibn ‘Arabi> Society, Oxford
NoteNoteNoteNotessss: : : :
1. Except for the last title abbreviated here, we have cited all other sources within within within within
the text in the text in the text in the text in parenthesesparenthesesparenthesesparentheses. . . . The footnotes refer only to secondary material or consist
of comments.
2. The verses from the Holy Qur’a>n are cited within parentheses, number of Su>rah
followed by verse number. For example ((((2:132:132:132:13)))) means the second su>rah and the
thirteenth verse.
xii
List of Tables and FiguresList of Tables and FiguresList of Tables and FiguresList of Tables and Figures 1. Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Division of Totality: Synthesis I ……………………… Page 23
2. Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Division of Totality: Synthesis II ……………………... Page 23
3. Eriugena on Knowing God from Creatures …………………………. Page 45
4. Principle and Manifestations of Primordial Causes in hierarchy …… Page 86
5. Fixed Entities in Hierarchy ………………………………………….. Page 110
6. Ibn ‘Arabi>’s circle of Categoriae Decem ……………………………. Page 141
7. Divine Roots of Categoriae Decem …………………………………. Page 143
xiii
A Note on SourcesA Note on SourcesA Note on SourcesA Note on Sources
Editions Editions Editions Editions of the primary sources used. of the primary sources used. of the primary sources used. of the primary sources used.
For the Latin text and English translation of the first three books of Eriugena's De
Diuisione Naturae we use I.P Sheldon-William’s parallel Latin-English edition (Dublin:
Institute of Advanced Studies, 1968, 1970, 1981). For the necessary references to Latin
text of fourth and fifth books we refer to the text in volume 121 of J.P Migne’s
Patrologia Latina (CD- ROM). For the English translation of these two books we refer
to the complete translation by J O’Meara Periphyseon (Dumbarton Oaks/Montreal:
Bellarmin, 1987).
For Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Al-Futu>h}a>t al-Makkiyah we use the undated Dār S}ādir, Beirut Edition.
TranslationTranslationTranslationTranslationssss
We do not undertake to translate passages from this work until we do not find them
already translated by William Chittick or in rare occasions when we find justification to
differ from his translation.
OneOneOneOne
IntroIntroIntroIntroductionductionductionduction 1.11.11.11.1 PreliminaryPreliminaryPreliminaryPreliminary
This is a comparative analysis of textual parallels from John Scottus Eriugena (810-
870)1, the Irish philosopher and translator of the works of Greek authorities, and the
great Muslim mystic-philosopher Muh}yiddi>n Ibn ‘Arabi> (1165-1240) as far as their
cosmological doctrines are concerned. However concern with “cosmological doctrines”
does not mean that we are going to be exclusively focussed on that part of Eriugena’s
work which is related to nature and origin of the physical universe. It is not possible to
compartmentalize the work of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> into theology, cosmology and
anthropology. These two authors consider cosmos as a totality of theophanies, the
greatest of which is human being. Instead of trying to slice some cosmological part from
the work of Eriugena we focus on his De Diuisione Naturae as a whole and then consider
its textual parallels in the writings of Ibn ‘Arabi>, especially but not exclusively, in his
major work al-Futu>h}a>t al-Makkiyah. Since the world is prefigured in the Divine, man is
created upon Divine image and the world is contained within human nature it does not
matter whether we call Eriugena’s system theology, cosmology or anthropology. Thus
after comparative study of ontological foundations in the second chapter we analyze the
nature of God and primordial causes as metacosm, of the created world as macrocosm
1In addition to being the author of De Praedestinatione, De Diuisione Naturae and Homily Eriugena is the
translator of Ambigua of St. Maximus the Confessor (d. 662), De Hominis Opificio of St. Gregory of
Nyssa (d. post 394) and of works of Pseudo-Dionysius. He also wrote commentaries on St. John’s Gospel,
Consolatio Philosophiae of Boethius (d. 524/5) and on De Coelesti Hierarchia by Ps. Dionysius.
2
and the relation of man as imago dei to God and as microcosm to nature in the seven
chapters that follow. A summary is presented in the final chapter as well as some points
related to interpretation and significance.
1.21.21.21.2 Review of LiteratureReview of LiteratureReview of LiteratureReview of Literature
Studies of the thought of both Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> abound in many languages of the
world. At least two major organizations are devoted to the promotion of the study of
these two thinkers, Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies (SPES) and
Muh}yiddi>n Ibn ‘Arabi> Society (MIAS) which is also publishing a Journal. Countless
conferences have been organized on aspects of their thought. In case of Eriugena so
much work has been accomplished that numerous surveys of studies can be found. Mary
Brennan has produced a survey of 523 writings from 1930 to 19872 which presents
summaries of books and articles in various European languages by classifying them into
writings of Eriugena’s life, works and thought including his sources doctrine and
influence. Before this work Brennan had already published a bibliography of works in
the field of Eriugenian studies from 1800 to 1975.3 Brennan’s work has been
complemented by Gerd van Reel who has published bibliographical surveys of
publications ranging from 1987-19954 and from 1995-2000.5 Although many recent
studies of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s thought contain detailed bibliographies, it seems that apart from
2 A Guide to Eriugenian Studies: A Survey of Publications 1930-1987 (Fribourg: Editions du Cerf, 1989)
3 “Bibliography of Publications in the Field of Eriugenian Studies” in Studi Medievali, XVIII (1977), 401-
407. 4 “A Bibliographical Survey of Eriugenian Studies 1987-1995,” in Iohannes Scottus Eriugena: the Bible
and Hermeneutics (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), 367-400. 5 “Eriugenian Studies 1995-2000” in History and Eschatology in John Scottus Eriugena and His Time
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 611-636.
3
Martin Notcutt’s 1985 handlist of printed materials6 no full scale survey of publications
in the field of Ibn ‘Arabi> studies has been made. This is not to deny that many major
studies do contain selected bibliographies annexed to them.
Since we are concerned in the present work with the comparison of Eriugena and
Ibn ‘Arabi> we are not supposed to enumerate or discuss studies that deal with either of
them. We would like, however, to make one exception by mentioning and briefly
discussing one particular study of the thought of Eriugena in view firstly of our
numerous references to it and of our disagreement with it at certain important points of
reading and interpreting Eriugena. This is Dermot Moran’s book The Philosophy of John
Scottus Eriugena: A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages.7 The major themes that are
discussed in this book range from Eriugena’s sources, his understanding of dialectic, and
his position on meaning of nature, human knowledge and not-being. Moran interprets
Eriugena’s philosophy as a meontology (from the Greek words me on i.e. not-being)
rather than ontology, arguing that the concept of not-being is more central and
characteristic of Eriugena than “being.” Against this Deirdre Carabine has observed that
this reading of Eriugena would be anachronistic since the primacy of being was not
established until St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century.8 Some nineteenth
century German commentators saw Eriugena as a predecessor of the idealism that ruled
the German academia at that time.9 Moran agrees with these interpretations of Eriugena
6 “Ibn ‘Arabi: A Handlist of Printed Materials: Part II,” in JMIAS, IV (1985), 65-74.
7 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Henceforth abbreviated as “The Philosophy.”
8 See Carabine, John Scottus Eriugena, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 41. 9 For example G.B. Jäche, Der Pantheismus (Berlin: Reimer, 1828), Band II: 128 and J Huber Johannes
Scotus Eirgena (Munich, 1861, repr., Hildesheim: Olms, 1960), xi. Both these works are discussed by
Werner Beierwaltes, “The Revaluation of John Scottus Eriugena in German Idealism,” in Dominic J.
O’Meara, ed., The Mind of Eriugena: Papers of a Dublin Colloquium, 14-18 July 1970 (Dublin: Irish
University Press, 1973), 192-193.
4
in the main and throughout his work one finds him interpreting Eriugena as an idealist.
However, Moran claims that he has tried also to look at Eriugena in the historical
context in which the latter lived and wrote specially the intellectual resources that were
available to him and were assimilated by him. One of the reasons Moran mentions for
making an idealist out of Eriugena is that he dissolves all hierarchy into the self-
expression of subjectivity10 and that the four divisions “receive form only by being
contemplated.”11 So Eriugena is an idealist because he subjectivises. Ironically, Hegel’s
follower Baur criticized Eriugena as not being an idealist precisely because he
subjectivised notions like creation, resurrection and incarnation etc.12 It is strange that
one and same characteristic is being interpreted by two scholars as implying contrary
philosophical affiliation. Moran writes about Eriugena’s four divisions of Nature that
they receive form only by being contemplated. This is the true nature of the four
divisions of nature. They are not substances or realities but are manifestations which
appear to the perceiving mind. The word “but” indicates that the interpretation is
reductionist. Is there any justification to think that “manifestation” cannot be “reality”?
The interpreter is in fact trying to read “idealism” into a text that does not necessarily
imply it. This is one of the perils of modernist approaches to pre-modern thought that
concepts like manifestation are subjectivised and relativised.13 Inclining more to the
10 Moran, The Philosophy, 262. 11 Ibid. 266. 12 F. Ch. Baur Die Christliche Lehre van der Versöhnung (Tübingen, 1838), 132-134, quoted in
Beiewaltes, Revaluation, 196. 13 Similar reductionism is apparent in John Marenbon’s statement in connection with Eriugena’s theory of
return: “And the return to God becomes neither a moment in the metaphysical analysis of nature, nor the
mystical goal of the sage but rather – in a way which reflects the thought of Gregory of Nyssa-a physical
process, involving all things and bringing them, at the end of time, back to God.” John Marenbon, Early
Medieval Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 64. Emphasis added.
5
opinion of Miles Burnyeat that there is no possibility of idealism in ancient philosophy14
we argue in our dissertation that Eriugena cannot straightforwardly be labeled as an
Idealist since his position is a complex one with many indications of realist tendencies.
Another point where we disagree with Moran’s reading of Eriugena is the former’s
claim that the modes of distinguishing being from not-being given by Eriugena at the
beginning of his DDN are not central to the work.
Do we find any comparative studies of the thought of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>?
The only Muslim philosopher to whom Eriugena has been compared is Al-Kindi> (d.
873c.) Ibn ‘Arabi>’s thought has been studied in comparison with that of Albertus
Magnus (d. 1280),15 St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274),16 Meister Eckhart (d. 1328c.),17
Nicholas of Cusa (d. 1464),18 St. John of the Cross (d. 1591)19 and Derrida (d. 2004),20
while Peter Coates has produced a study of Ibn ‘Arabi> in context of modern Western
thought titled Ibn ‘Arabi and Modern Thought.21 To the extent of our information no
comparative study of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> has been undertaken. The only work that
might be presented as an exception to this statement is Michael Sells’ The Mystical 14 Miles Burnyeat, “Idealism in Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed,” in
Idealism: Past and Present, ed., G. Vassey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 19-50. 15 See Adam Dupré, “Muh}yiddi>n Ibn ‘Arabi> and St. Albertus Magnus of Cologne,” in JMIAS, I (1982),
12-26. 16 T.L. Suttor, “Thomas of Aquino and Ibn al-‘Arabi>,” Hamdard Islamicus, VI (1983). 17 Reza Shah Kazemi, Paths to Transcendence: According to Shankara, Ibn ‘Arabi> and Meister Eckhart
(Bloomington: World Wisdom Books, 2006). 18 A. V. Smirnov, “Nicholas of Cusa and Ibn ‘Arabi>: Two Philosophies of Mysticism,” in Philosophy East
and West, XLIII (1993) 65-85. 19 Luce López-Baralt, “Saint John of the Cross and Ibn ‘Arabi>: The Heart or Qalb as the Translucid and
Ever-Changing Mirror of God,” JMIAS, XXVIII (2000), 57-90. 20 Ian Almond, Sufism and Deconstruction: A Comparative Study of Derrida and Ibn ‘Arabi>, (London:
Routledge, 2004). 21 Peter Coates, Ibn ‘Arabi and Modern Thought: The History of Taking Metaphysics Seriously. (Oxford:
Anqa Publishing, 2002).
6
Languages of Unsaying.22 This fascinating work is a study of apophasis or negative
theology “as cross-cultural mode of discourse, emerging out of a variety of religious and
cultural traditions and sharing key semantic features.”23 In addition to Eriugena and Ibn
‘Arabi> this work is based also on readings of Plotinus (270c.), Marguerite Porete (d.
1310) and Meister Eckhart. Rather than blocking the way of further inquiry regarding
comparison of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> this work opens the way for it and is an
indication of the feasibility of such a project. Although this work provides important
insights for the task before us, its focus is not the overall cosmological doctrines of
Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> and it is not as such a comparative analysis of these two
writers. Our proposed research differs from the work of Sells in being focused only on
Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> and in not being exclusively concerned with the issue of
negative theology. Although we deal with this issue, our major concern is to see where
Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> agree or disagree in their views regarding the nature of God,
man and universe and the relation between these three.
1.31.31.31.3 Methodological ConsiderationsMethodological ConsiderationsMethodological ConsiderationsMethodological Considerations
1.3.11.3.11.3.11.3.1 The Method of Comparison The Method of Comparison The Method of Comparison The Method of Comparison
In the wake of postmodernism “comparison” as a scholarly method has come under
attack. In an important essay Jonathan Z. Smith isolated four basic models of
comparison, ethnographic, encyclopedic, morphological and evolutionary.24 He attempts
22 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 23
Ibid. 206. 24 The ethnographic approach is the one in which comparison functions primarily as a means of
overcoming strangeness.” The encyclopedic approach presents “topical arrangement of cross-cultural
material” without providing any clue as to how comparison might be undertaken. The morphological
approach “allows the arrangement of individual items in a hierarchical series of increased complexity and
organization.” The evolutionary approach is the one “which factors in the dynamics of change and
7
to show that the first two are entirely inadequate, no instance of satisfactory application
of the fourth exists while the third model inspite of being better than others is not
attractive in view of the Romantic, Neoplatonic Idealism of its presuppositions. Smith
concludes that the only option appears to be no option at all.25 Smith thinks that
comparison, like magic, is a “confusion of a subjective relationship with an objective
one.”26 According to him, from a déjà vu feeling that what the scholar is reading he has
come across already, he goes on to assert that “similarity and contiguity have causal
effects.” In the words of Simth, this is a process of working from psychological
association to a historical one.27 In the task of comparative analysis that we have set
befor us, we admit the presence of déjà vu feeling, but Smith’s objection does not apply
to our project since we are not concerned with asserting any objective association
between the ideas of two thinkers whom we are going to compare so we are not drawing
any conclusions of historical nature from a subjective feeling. This subjective feeling
provided simply a motivation for further study and investigation of the matter. The
purpose of our comparative analysis is pragmatic rather than exclusively theoretical. It
consists in an attempt to find out certain concepts that are shown to be useful to reassert
a worlview based on harmony between God, man and nature.
Barbara A. Holdrege has highlighted three objections to the method of
comparison in an essay written in response to Smith’s aforementioned work and has
persistence over time in response to adaptation to a given environment.” Jonathan Z. Smith “In
Comparison a Magic Dwells,” in A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative Religion in the Post-modern Age,
eds. Kimberley C. Patton and Benjamin C. Ray (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 27-29. 25 See ibid. 26
Ibid. 25>. 27
Ibid. 26.
8
described how her own method has been able to evade those objections.28 The first
objection is that comparison pays insufficient attention to differences. We intend the
expression “comparative analysis” in the title of our dissertation to be understood as an
exercise which reveals differences as well as similarities. In order to avoid the first
objection we pay attention to differences between the thought of Eriugena and Ibn
‘Arabi> at every step, attempting to explain them and reconcile them with reference to
underlying unity wherever such unity can be found.Where such unity cannot be
objectively found we do not attempt to invent artificial unities between the two
thinkers. Thus at one point within our comparative analysis we disagree with a reading
of Eriugena put forward by one of the most prominent contemporary Eriugena scholars
although her interpretation would have brought Eriugenian position closer to that of Ibn
‘Arabi> on an issue of central importance.29 We do not discard non-reducible gaps
between them, rather we highlight them within the chapters and also when we
summarize the results of the whole project at the end.
The second objection asserts that the comparative method neglects the
diachronic dimension and the third points out that this method pays insufficient
attention to context. In order to avoid these imperfections the first of three phases of
Barbara’s own methodology consisted in “analyzing each network of symbols
separately, within the context of its respective tradition.”30 In conducting comparative
analysis here we have followed this suggestion of Barbara Holdrege. Thus we do not
juxtapose the positions of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> but deal with them separately,
28
See “What’s beyond the Post? Comparative Analysis as Critical Method” in A Magic Still Dwells, 77-83. 29
See 6.1.5 where we discuss the function of “theophany” in relation to Eriugenian synthesis of negative
and affirmative theologies. 30
“What’s beyond the Post? 79.
9
placing each within his own context. For instance while comparing primordial causes
and fixed entities we first discuss the historical background, meaning and usage of the
former in Eriugena by connecting them to his sources which have been established
either on the basis of internal textual evidence (e.g. Eriugena’s citing some of the Greek
fathers) or on the basis of independent historical research. We then proceed to analyze
Ibn ‘Arabi>’s notion within the context of the intellectual tradition in which he worked.
However the results of comparison are not given separately in independent sections
rather they are mentioned after or alongwith our discussion of Ibn ‘Arabi>. While
explaining certain differences we also refer to the difference of contexts to which our
two philosophers belonged.
Having dicussed certain points regarding the particular method of comparison
we are employing, we proceed now to describe some of our theoretical presuppositions
and demonstrate how they relate to comparative analysis of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>.
1.3.21.3.21.3.21.3.2 Critique of SocioCritique of SocioCritique of SocioCritique of Socio----Historical MethodHistorical MethodHistorical MethodHistorical Method
In the work at hand we do not apply the historical method of comparative study which
focuses on finding out origins of ideas, something that was criticized by Smith as
confusing subjective connections with objective ones. Nor do we attempt to reduce the
meaning and worth of every intellectual phenomenon to the social context in which it is
presented. In spite of the popularity of these methods nowadays, we think that there are
serious problems with them. Instead of the socio-historical method we have chosen the
analytical method based on the careful study of textual parallels in the writings of
Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabī. The comparative philosophical studies undertaken under spell
of the historical method, especially by the European or American writers, more often
than not contain what René Guenon calls “the classical prejudice” namely, the tendency
10
on the part of occidental scholars to “find all over the world pure and simple equivalent
modes of thought that are peculiar to themselves.”31 This of course does not mean that
Orientals can legitimately find all over the world equivalent modes of thought that are
peculiar to themselves. Secondly, a research that concludes at pointing out that certain
idea originated with a certain thinker living at certain time in a particular society tells
us nothing why such person should have thought in that way at all.32 When this
objection is raised against the historical method the so called “sociology of knowledge”
comes to its aid. Having traced the origin of an idea to some thinker prior to whom none
of its traces can be found, it is claimed that this idea owes itself to the sociopolitical
context of the thinker in which he lived. This combination of historical with
sociological method can be symbolized as a (┬) the vertical part representing the tracing
of ideas from one thinker to a previous one while the horizontal part representing the
tendency to see the origin of philosophical and religious ideas in the contemporaneous
circumstances of the society. Both these methods have been convincingly criticized by
many writers. We feel affinity in particular with the argument presented by the
Mediaevalist Etienne Gilson that what is wrong with the effort to “account for the rise
of philosophical ideas by historical, sociological and economic factors” is not that it
does not work but that it always works. Gilson has argued that contrary to what should
have been the case in the light of socio-historical method, we find one and same idea,
e.g. Aristotelianism among people living in societies ranging from slavery-based society
31 Rene Guenon, Introduction to the Study of Hindu Doctrine (London: Luzac & Co., 1945), 124. 32
In the words of Frithjof Schuon, People are relieved when they recall that the usage in question dates
from the middle ages or perhaps that it is “Byzantine.”… They forget completely that there is only one
question that must always be asked, namely, why the Byzantines did such a thing; more often than not
one finds that the answer to this why is situated outside time.” Light on the Ancient Worlds (London:
Perennial Books, 1965), 125.
11
of Greece, feudal and bourgeoisie. On the other hand we find people belonging to same
socio-historical context flatly contradicting Aristotelian philosophy. He concludes by
saying that the ultimate explanation of philosophy has to be philosophy itself.” 33
Finally, with Karl R. Popper,34 it can be asserted that the sociological method of
explaining philosophical ideas away can be shown to be self-refuting. If all ideas
originate in the socio-economic conditions and this reduces their philosophical and
objective worth then this idea itself has little philosophical and objective worth to its
since it has origins itself in social settings.
1.41.41.41.4 Theoretical Framework Theoretical Framework Theoretical Framework Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical framework for comparative analysis consists of some concepts,
distinctions and principles derived from the works of Rene Guenon (d. 1951), Frithjof
Schuon (d. 1998) and Nasr (b. 1933). These principles include an emphasis upon the pre-
modern/modern break based on the loss of vertical dimension and exclusive emphasis
upon the horizontal, a distinction between revelation/intellect and reason and the one
between religion and metaphysics. Let us explain these and see some instances of their
application in our comparative analysis of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>.
1111....4444....1111 PrePrePrePre----modernmodernmodernmodern----Modern BreakModern BreakModern BreakModern Break
“The whole movement of thought in the West from Renaissance to Hegel” writes
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “is a movement toward ‘anti-metaphysics’ and an even greater
33 Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1965),
304. 34 See Sir Karl R. Popper’s devastating critique of the sociology of knowledge in his The Open Society
and its Enemies (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1950), 401-409.
12
alienation from all that constitutes the very basis of all true ‘philosophy’.”35 An
emphasis upon pre-modern/modern break gives us one additional reason for not applying
the historicist method. This method presupposes that explanation of ideas, and for that
matter, of everything, can be afforded only upon horizontal axis, it is unscientific to
appeal to vertical, meta-historical sources, metaphysical principles. Both writers whom
we seek to compare here present their own work primarily as exegesis of the Scripture
and one of them further claims that most of what he says is based on spiritual unveiling.
An attempt to locate their thought in socio-economic circumstances or historical source
would be first of all an unjustified falsification of their self-understanding. Moreover, a
consistent application of the historicist method would also demand that we assign a
horizontal origin and socio-economic explanation for the Scriptures in question,
something we are not ready to undertake. Obviously, if a method cannot be applied
consistently, it is pointless to apply it to arbitrarily isolated areas, texts, notions, beliefs
and practices. We do not endorse the attempts to compare our both thinkers to any
modern or post-modern writer. In particular we do not endorse the attempt to see in
Eriugena a predecessor of Descartes,36 of German idealism or Marxist centuries before
Marx.37 Our approach also excludes the endeavor to find in Ibn ‘Arabī germs of
Derrida’s deconstruction or anything like that.
35
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Conditions for Meaningful Comparative Philosophy,” in Philosophy East and
West, XXII (1972), 57-58. 36 Brian Stock argued with reference to DDN IV: 776B that Eriugena’s cogito was a link between
Augustine’s affirmation of individual existence and Descartes’ cogito. Stock, “Intelligo me esse:
Eriugena’s Cogito:” in Jean Scot Erigene et l’histoire de la philosophie, ed., R. Roques (Paris: CNRS,
1977), 327. 37 This opinion of J. Kabaj, from his article “Homme et nature dans la Cosmologie de Jean Scot Erigena,”
Studia Mediewistyczne 18, i (1977), 3-50 is cited here via its summary given by Mary Brennan’s Guide to
Eriugenian Studies.
13
1111....4444....2222 MetaphysicsMetaphysicsMetaphysicsMetaphysics----Religion DReligion DReligion DReligion Dichotomyichotomyichotomyichotomy
The way we distinguish between metaphysics and religion is based on the ideas of Rene
Guenon who has emphasized that while comparing Eastern and Western religious
systems attention must be paid to the difference between metaphysical and theologico-
religious elements on the one hand and metaphysical and philosophical on the other.38 A
metaphysical doctrine stands apart from the religious in the former’s being purely
intellectual, unlike the latter in which there is an additional element of sentimentality
and concern with personal salvation.39 A metaphysical doctrine is not a philosophical
doctrine because, unlike the latter, it pertains to the intellectual level and not merely to
the rational level.
The distinction between metaphysics and religion finds many interesting
applications in the comparative analysis of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>. Let us mention one
by way of example. While discussing the philosophy of Eriugena, John Marenbon has
observed about sacred history of creation which includes fall, redemption and
resurrection that “It is a counterpart on a historical level, to the scheme of permanence,
procession and return, advanced on the plane of metaphysics.”40 Here the metaphysical
plane could have been contrasted with the religious level instead of the historical one.
Similarly, Eriugena suggests at one place that the affirmative way of talking about God
is for the simple minded believers while the negative way that of spiritually more
advanced. (DDN I: 511C) Here again we can equate the former with metaphysics while
the latter with religion.
38 Guenon, Hindu Doctrine, 41. 39 Ibid. 124. 40 John Marenbon, Early Medieval Philosophy, 64.
14
In the beginning of his Al-Futu}h}a>t Ibn ‘Arabi> states his credo which is
completely in line with the orthodoxy. The modern editions of his works usually like to
cite this credo in order to prove his orthodoxy. But the credo terminates at the strange
claim, never quoted in those editions, that “this is the belief of ordinary members of
Muslim community” which implies that he professes two sets of belief, one of which is
in line with orthodoxy, while the other not necessarily so. Latter Sufism developed this
as a dichotomy between the Tawh}i>d of Ordinary Folk and Tawh}i>d of the Elect and this
eventually misled some critics to consider Sufism “as a religion parallel with Islam.” 41
Now if we identify the latter tawh}i>d with metaphysics while the former with religion
then they appear as belonging to two different levels and consequently no conflict
occurs between them. Using this terminology we can say that the Doctrine of oneness of
God is a religious Doctrine while the doctrine of Oneness of Being is a metaphysical
doctrine. A religious doctrine is to be evaluated in religious terms while a metaphysical
doctrine is to be treated as such, the religious, theological and legal, categories when
applied to metaphysics cause serious confusions. During our comparative analysis of
Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> we will find more occasions to apply this distinction.
1111....4444....3333 IntellectIntellectIntellectIntellect----Reason DReason DReason DReason Dichotomyichotomyichotomyichotomy
The difference between intellect and reason is explained by Schuon who characterizes
the former as being “contemplative power, receptivity in respect of the Uncreated Light,
the opening of the Eye of the Heart, which distinguishes transcendent intelligence from
41 A case in point of such confusion is the opinion of contemporary Pakistani scholar Javaid Ah}mad
Gha>midi>, in view of such dichotomy within Ibn ‘Arabi>, that Sufism is a religion parallel with Islam. This
opinion expresses a half truth. Sufism consists of metaphysical dimension of Islam which parallels its
purely religious dimensions.
15
reason” while the latter as “perceiving the general and proceeding by logical
operations.”42
This distinction between intellect and reason is relevant in the present context.
Apparently, Eriugena seems to be a rationalist theologian-philosopher since he always
praises and upholds reason while Ibn ‘Arabi> is more of a mystic because he is critical of
reason and attaches more value to religious experience. But when we look into this
matter a little deeper, a different picture emerges. Firstly, as Dermot Moran has noted,
“[t]he dialogue [i.e. DDN] is not merely written to instruct and impart knowledge but
also to provide a vehicle for traveling on the roads towards spiritual enlightenment and
ultimately unity with the Truth itself.”43 Secondly, and more importantly, Eriugena
seldom mentions reason alone and he often uses the expression “reason and intellect”
(ratio et intellectus) and the identification of intellect with discursive reason is a
typically modern phenomenon. Michael Sells recognizes this point:
By reason the Nutritor has in mind something other than the respect for rules of
logic and argumentation that is sometimes called discursive reason. Elsewhere
he characterizes reason as a being-in-constant-motion, a continual movement of
the mind, an infinitely deepening exploration of a reality that itself has no end.44
Likewise, Ibn ‘Arabi> differentiates discursive reason and intellectual intuition by
analyzing the etymology of ‘aql and qalb and notes that the former tends to be static and
binding but the latter is dynamic and never stopping. (Fut. II: 114) If we keep this in
mind then Eriugena’s usage of reason, as explained by Sells, is closer to Ibn ‘Arabi>’s
heart than it is to mind.
42 Schuon, “Vicissitudes of Different Spiritual Temperaments,” in Gnosis Divine Wisdom (London: John
Murray, 1959), 49. 43 That this is correct might be seen with reference to DDN IV: 784A, IV: 858B, V: 864B and V: 1010C. 44 Michael Sells, The Mystical Languages of Unsaying, 49. The reference here is to DDN III: 643 B-D.
16
In the same context, Michael Sells has also raised a pertinent and relevant
question, “Is Periphyseon (DDN) a Mystical text?” He answers that “[i]f we define
mystical writing as the autobiographical account of personal, subjective experience,
then the answer is no. Eriugena is explicit in his devotion to dialectical reason as the
method of exploring nature.”45 This is how it appears from Eriugena’s own writings
about reason but it is unlikely that Eriugena, who transforms the meaning of key terms,
when praises reason, has in mind only its discursive sense. We have just seen Sells
himself explaining that Eriugena does not use reason in sense of discursive reason which
supposedly is the key in differentiating philosophy from mysticism. But Sells does pay
attention to the other possibility by saying that the “mystery of being, of life and of
consciousness is unfathomable. Reason is led by its own reasoning beyond itself
continually without arriving at a final entity or conclusion. In that particular sense of
allowing reason to lead beyond itself, Eriugena can be considered a mystic.”46 Thus the
distinction between intellect shows that the project of comparing Eriugena and Ibn
‘Arabi> cannot be criticized by claiming that the former is rationalist philosopher while
the latter is a mystic.
45 Ibid 59. 46 Ibid. 60.
TwoTwoTwoTwo
The Ontological FoundatiThe Ontological FoundatiThe Ontological FoundatiThe Ontological Foundations ons ons ons Prior to comparing Eriugena’s first division of nature, namely God as the first cause,
with the teachings of Ibn ‘Arabi>, it seems necessary to pay attention to the prologue to
De Diuisione Naturae in which the ontological foundations of cosmology are laid down.
This comparison is purported to reveal points where the two philosophers agree or
disagree as far as their conceptions of totality and criteria of differentiating being from
not-being are concerned. This chapter consists of three sections. In the first section we
present and compare conceptions of totality. The second section discusses Eriugena’s
modes of demarcating being and not-being as he puts them forward in the prologue. This
discussion purports to demonstrate firstly that Eriugena connects being with knowing
and secondly that his ontology is a perspectival one according to which the concepts of
being and not-being are relative. In the third and final section of this chapter which
consists of two subsections, we demonstrate that like that of Eriugena Ibn ‘Arabi>’s
ontology is also connected with intelligibility and is perspectival.
2.12.12.12.1 Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> on TotalityEriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> on TotalityEriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> on TotalityEriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> on Totality
2.1.12.1.12.1.12.1.1 Eriugena’s Concept of Totality:Eriugena’s Concept of Totality:Eriugena’s Concept of Totality:Eriugena’s Concept of Totality:
Eriugena’s De Diuisione Naturae commences with presenting a division of totality. The
name Eriugena prefers to give to totality there is “nature (natura)” which is said to be
the “general name for all things, those that are (ea quae sunt) and those that are not (ea
18
quae non sunt).” (DDN I: 441A). As has been noted by Dermot Moran,47 Eriugena does
not stick to this definition of “nature” but also uses it to imply ineffable nature of God,
His creative nature, realm of incorporeal, cosmic hierarchies, and objects found in the
spatiotemporal world and laws of nature.
Now this is the most fundamental division one can make between things that can
be grasped by the mind or lie beyond its grasp. (Ibid) If we take into account the fact
that in the former division the reference point was being or not-being while now it is the
grasp of mind, we can see that Eriugena has added epistemological categorization to the
ontological one. This addition heralds the fact that Eriugena is going to connect these
two levels. It is however not obvious at this stage how these two levels correlate in the
context of division of totality.
There seem to be two ways of interpreting the preliminary division of nature.
First, there are two categories of things: those which can be grasped by the mind and
those which lie beyond its grasp. Each of these is further divided into things that are and
thing that are not. Second, things which can be grasped by the mind correspond to
things which are while those that lie beyond its grasp are not. In the light of first
interpretation the epistemic division becomes more basic than the ontological.
According to this division both knowable and unknowable are divided into things that
are and those that are not. Consequently “to be” will not be necessarily synonymous to
“to be known” since among the unknowables there is one class of things which are said
to be. While on the latter interpretation, the epistemic level is not only more basic than
the ontological but is its paradigm.48 Probably, the second interpretation will be favored
47
See The Philosophy, 249. 48 It is strange that Moran who is always anxious to prove Eriugena's idealism does not refer to this point
even where he is concentrating on the opening of De Diuisione Naturae. See Moran, “Natura
19
by those who are fond of making an Idealist out of Eriugena, while the former would go
against such attempts.
Eriugena divides nature into four species, viz., the cause of all things that are and
that are not, who is God, primordial causes, things that become manifest through
coming into being in times and places (DDN, I: 442B) and God as the end of all things.49
Nature as such is comparable to universitas, a term Eriugena has coined to denote
totality of God and creatures. (Ibid. II: 528B) However, although Eriugena has taken the
steps of joining God and creature under one head, he was careful to point out that the
God world relationship is neither that of genus-species nor that of part-whole. (See ibid.
II: 525B)
In Eriugena there is an ultimate reduction of four divisions of nature to one
division. This reduction takes place in three steps. Firstly he collapses the second and
third divisions by suggesting that cause and effect have the same meaning and thus
should be considered identical and not as two things. (See ibid. III: 693A-B.) Secondly,
first and fourth divisions are unified since they both denote God, the former as first
cause and the latter as final cause. (Ibid. II: 526C.) Hence we are left with created nature
and uncreated nature. The most drastic step is the third one where these two are reduced
to one. The reason for this reduction is that there is nothing in creature “save Him who
alone truly is –for nothing apart from Him is truly called essential since all things that
are are nothing else, in so far as they are, but the participation in Him who alone
subsists from and through Himself.” (Ibid)
Quadriformata and the beginnings of the Physiologia in the Philosophy of Johannes Scottus Eriugena,” in
Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale, XXI (1979), 41-46. 49
This explanation of the fourth division is not provided until the second book (526D) where the Nutritor
speaks in some detail about it.
20
After mentioning the four divisions of nature, Eriugena proceeds towards
describing their mutual logical connections in the light of the square of oppositions and
says that the first [uncreated creator] is opposed to the third [created-uncreating] while
the second[created creator] is opposed to the fourth [uncreated-uncreating]. (Ibid. I:
442A)
2.1.22.1.22.1.22.1.2 Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Concept of TotalityIbn ‘Arabi>’s Concept of TotalityIbn ‘Arabi>’s Concept of TotalityIbn ‘Arabi>’s Concept of Totality
Instead of using “nature” to denote totality that should include God, cosmos and non-
existence, like Eriugena has done, Ibn ‘Arabi> understands by the ‘Arabic counterpart of
this word t}abi>‘ah something that can become receptacle for Divine imprint or activity.
This understanding alludes to the inherent passivity of created nature. (See Fut. I: 94)
Though we do find in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s work divisions of totality he does not identify them
with diuisione naturae as does Eriugena. Since we can equate nature and totality, a
comparison of the opening lines of De Diuisione Naturae to this aspect of Ibn ‘Arabi> is
plausible.
In Ibn ‘Arabi>’s opinion a circle is the perfect representation of totality and he
finds in the Qur’a>n something which he takes to be a reference to the most
comprehensive of circles, one which encompasses both creator and the creature. In the
context of Prophet Muh}ammad’s proximity to the Divine that he attained during his
Night Journey (معراج) the Qur’a>n says: “Then he drew close, so He came down and he
was two bows’ length (قاب قوسين) away or closer.” (53:8-9) “Two bows” according to Ibn
‘Arabi> are two arcs of the circle which is “what he often calls the ‘totality’ (المجموع).”50
50
William Chittick, Self Disclosure of God, 233.
21
There are two divisions in Ibn ‘Arabi> that should be compared with Eriugenian
division of totality. In Al-Futu>h}a>t al-Makkiyah he presents a division of “objects of
knowledge” (المعلومات) and in Insha’> al-Dawa>’ir a division of “things.”
In Futu>h}a>t Ibn ‘Arabi> speaks of “three objects of knowledge without a fourth,”
non-delimited being (الوجود المطلق), which does not become delimited (يتقيد �) equated by
him with God, non-delimited nothingness (العدم المطلق) which is non existence in itself
and finally something which shares the characteristics of both. (Fut. III: 46)
Ibn ‘Arabi> introduces another division in Insha>’ al-Dawa>’ir :
Know that things exist solely according to three modes, and that knowledge
depends solely upon these three modes. … These three modes comprise: 1. that
which is qualified by existence itself… it is unlimited absolute being. … such is
God. 2. That which is existent through God and is limited being. The latter
includes the world… 3. that which is qualified neither by existence nor by non-
existence… call it the reality of realities, hylé, Primordial matter or the root of
roots.(15-19) 51
Notice that the former division includes “absolute non-existence” while the
latter excludes it. Also notice that the latter includes the spatio-temporal world while
the former does not mention it but gives its place to the third thing. Before we try to
synthesize these two divisions let us mention one difficulty. In the former division by
calling three categories “objects of knowledge” Ibn ‘Arabi> seems to imply that absolute
non-existence can be known. But the reason that he excludes absolute non-existence
from the second division is precisely that “that which is other than these three modes is
pure non-being, neither known, unknown nor function of another thing.” (Ibid)
51
The translation into English is by Paul Fenton and Maurice Gloton, “The Book of the Description of
Encompassing Circles,” in Muh}yiddi>n ibn ‘Arabi>: A Commemorative Volume, ed. Stephen Hirtenstein
and Michael Tiernen (Shaftsbury: Element Books, 1993), 24-27.
22
Moreover, in the former division the “third thing” is said both to be and not to be while
in the in the latter we are told that it can be said neither to be nor not to be.
Having observed these ambiguities, we can attempt to synthesize the two
divisions mentioned above. It appears that there can be two, not entirely different, ways
of accomplishing this task. Firstly, we can have one division consisting of four terms:
God, the world, absolute non-existence and the third thing. Secondly, by collapsing
second and third terms into the category of intermediary realm, isthmus (برزخ), , , , we can
have a division though consisting of three terms but still synthesizing the two divisions
Ibn ‘Arabi> gave.
Hence, we have four basic concepts: Absolute Existence, Relative existence,
third-thing and Absolute non-existence. From the viewpoint of
transcendence/immanence Ibn ‘Arabi> also calls the first and the fourth poles
respectively “He” (ھو) and “not-He” (ھو �) i.e. the former identical and the latter non-
identical with the Divine. While what comes in between accepts both properties,
existence and non-existence, and is at once identical and non-identical to the Divine.
Therefore it is called “He/Not-He” ( �ھو|ھو ). This station belongs to the cosmos and the
third thing which Ibn ‘Arabi> calls “Reality of realities” (حقيقة الحقائق) in Insha>’ al-Dawa>‘ir
and identifies with locus of the immutable entities in Al-Futu>h}a>t. This is the
comprehensive reality which comprises all the intelligible and universal realities and is
thus called reality of realities.52 It is equidistant from the other two poles. (See Fut. III:
46) The other part of barzakh, which happens to be cosmos, however, is nearer to non-
existence than to existence, that is, it is more “not-He” than “He”: “We have a reality
52
See Masataka Takeshita, “An Analysis of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Insha>’ al-dawa>’ir with Particular Reference to
the Doctrine of the ‘Third Entity’,” in Journal of Near Eastern Studies, XLI (1982), 245.
23
that receives both descriptions, but we are closer to non-existence.” (Ibid. II: 248; trans.
SPK: 87)
GodGodGodGod Pure Existence
ImpossibleImpossibleImpossibleImpossible Pure Nonexistence
The WorldThe WorldThe WorldThe World Existence/ Nonexistence
Third ThingThird ThingThird ThingThird Thing Existence
Nonexistence
TotalityTotalityTotalityTotality
Ibn 'ArabIbn 'ArabIbn 'ArabIbn 'Arabi>’i>’i>’i>’s Division of s Division of s Division of s Division of Totality: Synthesis ITotality: Synthesis ITotality: Synthesis ITotality: Synthesis I
GodGodGodGod Pure Existence
IntermediaryIntermediaryIntermediaryIntermediary Existence/Nonexistence
ImpossibleImpossibleImpossibleImpossible Pure Non-existence
Third ThingThird ThingThird ThingThird Thing The WorldThe WorldThe WorldThe World
Totality
Ibn 'ArabIbn 'ArabIbn 'ArabIbn 'Arabi>’i>’i>’i>’s Division of s Division of s Division of s Division of Totality: Totality: Totality: Totality: SynthesisSynthesisSynthesisSynthesis IIIIIIII
24
Although Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> include both esse and non esse in their
divisions of totality, we see that Ibn ‘Arabi> goes a little farther than Eriugena. Eriugena
does not understand by his quae non sunt absolute non-existents so he has not included
them in his division of nature. He asks rhetorically, “For how can that which absolutely
is not, and cannot be, and which does not surpass the intellect because of the pre-
eminence of its existence, be included in the division of things.” (DDN I: 443C) Ibn
‘Arabi>’s concept of totality is more inclusive since it encompasses absolute nothingness
and places relative existence/nonexistence between absolute being and absolute
nonexistence. Although this is a step forward, it seems that Eriugena had made room for
this step in a qualification that he inserted within the remark just quoted by granting the
possibility of awarding some sort of ontological status to absences and privations and
thus including them in the division of things (in rerum diuisionibus). At another place he
even seems ready to welcome the impossible by making an allowance for reckoning the
possible and impossible in the number of things. (See DDN II: 597B) Hence the
difference between Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> is somewhat reduced.
2222....2222 Eriugena’s Modes of Being: Ontology Eriugena’s Modes of Being: Ontology Eriugena’s Modes of Being: Ontology Eriugena’s Modes of Being: Ontology ---- IntelligiIntelligiIntelligiIntelligibility bility bility bility
Connection and Perspectival Ontology Connection and Perspectival Ontology Connection and Perspectival Ontology Connection and Perspectival Ontology
After defining totality and mentioning the four divisions of nature, Eriugena discusses
what differentiates ea quae sunt from ea quae non sunt and presents what he calls five
modes of interpretation (modos interpretationis), or perspectives.
There is some dispute regarding the place of these five modes of being and not-
being in Eriugena’s thought. Dermot Moran has tried to underestimate their importance
by pointing to the fact that Eriugena never returns again to these modes in the course of
25
De Diuisione Naturae.53 Dierdre Carabine is of the opinion that through his discussion
of the modes, Eriugena shows that “being and non-being, while being contradictory, are
dissolved, not only in God… but also at every level of reality depending on one’s
starting point.”54 At this point we think that Carabine’s opinion depicts a truer picture
of the case and we will demonstrate at various points in the following chapters that
these ontological discussions especially the modes of differentiating being from not-
being are very important for the elaboration of four divisions of nature.
Anyway the welding together of the ontological with the epistemic which was
indicated in the opening lines of Eriugena’s work is reasserted here in the first
perspective on being and nothingness.55Accordingly, things which fall within the scope
of sense perception or intellect are “truly and reasonably said to be, while those which
elude, because of the excellence of their nature, not only all sense but also all intellect
and reason” are said not to be. A number of important points are worth noticing in the
passage that discusses this perspective. First, not-being is here considered more
excellent than being and God is mentioned as instantiating things that are said not to be,
as they elude sense perception and intellect due to the excellence of their essence (per
excellentiam), not due to some lack or imperfection on their part. This concept is a
distinctive mark of Eriugena’s thought and we will say more on it in the next chapter. In
that chapter on the nature of God we shall also discuss the perspective from which God
can be said not to exist according to Ibn ‘Arabi> as well. Eriugena emphasizes
53 See The Philosophy, 226. 54
Dierdre Carabine, John Scottus Eriugena, 40. 55
This way hints at a relationship between the twofold division of natura and the first of the five modes.
The connection, thus seems to be the reference to comprehensibility. Anyway Dominic O’Meara grapples
at length with the problem of relating five modes to the concept of natura. He thinks that the former
explains and clarifies the latter. See his article “The Concept of Nature in John Scottus Eriugena,” in
Vivarium XIX(1981), 134.
26
incomprehensibility of God by intellect and instead of limiting this incomprehensibility
to “God as He is in Himself beyond every creature” extends it to God “when considered
in the innermost depths of the creature which was made by Him and which exists in
Him.” (DDN I: 443B) The second mode is based on hierarchy and differences within
created nature. Here we find two sided perspectival approach to being and non-being.
Hence each order, excluding the highest and the lowest ones can be said both to be and
not to be depending on whether we are considering it in contrast with higher orders or
the lower ones. The lowest order according to Eriugena is that of bodies while the
highest is God. God as the highest member of the order will be said not to be, since
unknown by the lower order, there being nothing above to know Him. The lowest order
will be said only to be, since known by higher orders but having no order lower than it
which could be stopped from knowing it. Just before explaining the third mode Eriugena
adds another formulation of the second mode which also hinges upon knowability
relative to orders lower or higher than a given ordo rationalis et intellectualis
creaturae.(DDN I: 444C) In its dependence upon knowability this last formulation
brings second mode close to the first one, and thus to the twofold division of natura.
Although Eriugena does not give an example of this sense it is easy to find one. For
instance the soul that is higher than the body but lower to God can be said both to be
and not to be. It can be said to be in so far as it is known to God but it is not in so far as
it does not permit itself to be known by the bodies.
According to the third perspective only those things can be said to be which have
proceeded out of their primordial causes into the spatiotemporal world. Before their
manifestation, when they are still hidden in the secret folds of nature, they are not. This
perspective is described as based on human convention (humana consuetudine).
27
Eriugena mentions as example the creation of all human beings at once in that first and
one human being whom God made in his image. They are, obviously, not brought into
the visible world simultaneously with the creation of the first man. Conventionally,
human beings can be said to be once they are brought in the visible world but before
that they are not. As Eriugena puts it, “those who have already become visibly manifest
in the world are said to be while those who are as yet hidden, though are destined to be
are said not to be.” (DDN I: 445A) Although Eriugena also mentions the more familiar
example of nature latent in seeds and manifest in form of trees and flowers, the
mentioning of first human being as one of the primordial causes is a little curious.
Firstly because this concept does not coincide with type of things that Eriugena gives as
instances of primordial causes.56 Second, it gives rise to the question regarding the
nature of creation of first human being, whether or not it was tantamount to bringing
him into the visible world. How to differentiate between making and producing in the
context of creation of human being?
According to the fourth perspective, which is said to be those of the
philosophers, things that can be said to be are those which are knowable by intellect.
Asymmetrically, Eriugena names corruptible things as those which are said not to be.
This perspective can be rendered thus: immutable and incorruptible things which are
intelligible are while the corruptible and mutable ones that are known by sense
perception are not.
The fifth perspective is applicable to the two human natures, fallen and
redeemed through Christ. Man is created upon Divine image but “through sin renounced
56 See DDN II: 616C; III: 622B-623C. The list includes only attributes like justice, truth, eternity and does
not mention persons.
28
the honour of the Divine image.” In this state man is said not to be. But he begins to be
when he is brought back to his former condition, restored by the grace of Christ.
Eriugena quotes here the words of Apostle and presents two interpretations. The
Apostle says, “[a]nd He calls things that are not as things that are.” Firstly, this would
imply God’s calling through faith, those who had fallen into a kind of non-subsistence,
to be those who are already reborn. The second possible interpretation is, unlike the first
religious one, metaphysical in character. Eriugena writes:
But this too may be understood of those whom God daily calls forth from the
secret folds of nature in which they are considered not to be, to become visibly
manifest in form and matter and in the other conditions in which hidden things
are able to become manifest. (DDN I. 445D )
Here the “secret folds of nature” clearly refer to the state of things in their
primordial causes before spatiotemporal manifestation. This is also consistent with the
third mode of being and not-being. Let us notice, in passing, a similarity between this
mode of demarcation given by Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>’s ontology. One definition of
existence Ibn ‘Arabi> gives is: “Wuju>d is the manifestation of the existent in its entity
According to this definition something can be said to be only (Fut. III: 31) \”.(في عينه)
after it has become manifest in the spatio-temporal world. As we shall discuss in the
third chapter, prior to manifestation in concreto, everything is an object of Divine
knowledge, a fixed entity (عين ثابت) and it is well known that Ibn ‘Arabi> calls these non-
existents. (See ibid. I: 702; II: 392; III: 296; IV: 136) Moreover, God’s “calling things
daily to be” resonates with Ibn ‘Arabi>’s doctrine of perpetual creation which he founds
upon the Qur’a>nic words, “Each day He is upon some task,” (55:29)
Although in Book I Eriugena mentions only five perspectives for marking off
what is from what is not, he admits that his list here is not meant to be exhaustive since
29
“keener reasoning can discover some modes besides these.” (DDN I: 446A.) Dermot
Moran has tried to extract some further modes of being and not-being from various
places of De Diuisione Naturae.57 This he does with a view to support the opinion that
these five modes are not very important in the overall scheme of DDN and Eriugena
abandons them soon after introducing them. According to him, Eriugena uses at III:
646B a sixth mode of being whereby God possesses all being and the creature is mere
nothingness.58 The way Eriugena introduces the five modes into the discussion shows
that he is concerned with the connotation or sense of existence and non existence and
not primarily with enumerating what kind of things there are, that is with the denotation
or reference of existence and nonexistence. On the other hand what Moran has
mentioned here is in fact not the mode itself (that is, connotation) but only the result of
its application (that is denotation). It is not clear what the criterion of distinction itself
would be. At III: 646 the underlying mode itself seems to depend on whether we are
considering creatures in themselves or as participating in God. They can be said not to
be in the former sense but to the extent of the latter they are said to be. All this, of
course, implies that in a complete and real sense only God can be said to possess being.59
Even if this is a criterion or mode, it would be quite unlike the previous ones, since it is
applicable to creatures only. It makes no sense to ask whether God participates in God.
We can look at the creatures from the perspective of participation
57
See Moran, The Philosophy, 226-227.
58 See ibid. 226. The exclusive attribution of being to God belongs to the early Augustinian period of
Eriugena’s thought (in his De Praedestinatione), before his embarking upon the translations of Greek
sources. See Bernard J. McGinn, “Negative Theology in John the Scot,” in Studia Patristica: Papers
Presented to the Sixth International Conference on Patristic Studies, XIII (1975), 233-234.
59 Cf. DDN I: 454A viz.: “everything which is said to exist exists not in itself but by participation in the
Nature which truly exists.”
30
or otherwise. Therefore, we cannot say that according to the sixth mode only God is but
creatures are not rather that God absolutely is while creatures can either said to be or
not to be depending upon whether we are looking upon them as participating in God or
not.
Whatever be the criterion behind the so called sixth mode of being the result of
its application is perfectly in line with the central tenet of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s doctrine of
oneness of being. Ibn ‘Arabi> writes after formulating this tenet as “there is nothing in
Being/existence but God,” (See Fut. I: 279; trans. SPK, 94) that although creatures exist
their existence is through Him and “He whose existence is through other-than-himself is
non-existent.” (See ibid.)
As the seventh mode Moran mentions Eriugena’s saying that substance alone
exists and those things which are accidents and relations do not have being and
comments that this is an Aristotelian concept of being and not-being.60 Eriugena holds
that “everything has being only in so far as it subsists essentially, but other things
understood in reference to essence or substance are not to be reckoned in the number of
the universe of things.” (DDN IV:764C) In our opinion this, although relevant to the
modes of being and not- being, does not amount to a separate mode in itself. This is just
an application of the fourth mode since substances are said to be because they are
immutable and accidents are not so because they undergo change and corruption. In
view of this analysis of additional modes it would be incorrect to say that Eriugena
abandons the five modes of being in the main body of his DDN.
60
Moran, op cit.
31
2.32.32.32.3 Ontology Ontology Ontology Ontology ---- Intelligibility Connection Intelligibility Connection Intelligibility Connection Intelligibility Connection and Perspectival and Perspectival and Perspectival and Perspectival
OntologyOntologyOntologyOntology inininin Ibn ‘Arabi>Ibn ‘Arabi>Ibn ‘Arabi>Ibn ‘Arabi>
2.3.12.3.12.3.12.3.1 Ibn ‘Arabi> on Ontology and IntelligibilityIbn ‘Arabi> on Ontology and IntelligibilityIbn ‘Arabi> on Ontology and IntelligibilityIbn ‘Arabi> on Ontology and Intelligibility
The definition of nature presented by Eriugena as well as the first and fourth modes of
demarcating being from not-being have shown us that he connects ontology with
intelligibility and the overall nature of his ontology is perspectival. Although we have
already made a couple of remarks regarding some points of comparison with Ibn ‘Arabi>,
in the present section and the subsequent ones we are going to dwell more fully on the
latter in order to see whether his ontology shares these two general characteristics with
Eriugena or not.
The Arabic word for existence/being is wuju>d. Another derivative from this same
root, w j d, is wijda>n or “finding.” Since Ibn ‘Arabi> draws philosophical conclusions
from the co-relation of various derivatives from single root he defines existence, wuju>d
as finding: “In the view of the Tribe wuju>d is finding the Real (وجدان الحق) in ecstasy.”
(Fut. II: 538; trans. SPK: 212). 61 God exists as He is found, in fact nothing is found but
Him as He is the Manifest. Other than Him exist since these are found by Him. The
elect who have reached the stage of mystical verification are given the title of “people
of unveiling and finding (ahl al-Kashf wa al-wuju>d).” This welding of existing with
finding is apparently a bringing together of the ontological with the epistemic which is
very close to the Eriugenian repeated references to things that can or cannot be grasped
by mind in the context of ontology, to the extent that it has lead certain commentators
to deem him an idealist of sorts.62
61
In view of its dual meaning William Chittick translates this word at various places as
“existence/finding.” 62
Having noted that the Arabic word for “perception” is translated into Persian also as “finding” Chittick
32
Commenting on a Qur’a>nic verse “No! I swear by what you see and by what you
do not see.” (69:38-39) Ibn ‘Arabi> says that within this swear fall all kinds of existent
things and also non-existence (العدم) and non-existents (المعدومات), which is (denoted by)
His saying “what you do not see.” (See Fut. II: 672) At another place he has further
commented upon the same words thus: “God says, No! I swear by what you see which is
what becomes manifest to us and by what you do not see (69:38-39), which is what is
hidden from us.” (Fut. III: 108; trans., SDG: 334). Here Ibn ‘Arabi> is considering the
division of totality into epistemic categories (what we see/what we do not) as more
basic and subsumes the ontological division (existent/non-existent) under it. This
corresponds to second interpretation of Eriugena’s considering natura to be a name of
things graspable and ungraspable by the mind. It should not be objected that Eriugena
refers to mind while Ibn ‘Arabi> is mentioning “seeing.” Although the Arabic word بصر
is used to denote only the outward eye and the word بصيرة is reserved for the inward eye
or insight and Ibn ‘Arabi> follows this custom (E.g. Fut. IV: 30), he does use the former
to denote both, for instance when he says that “man possesses sight (بصر) in his hidden
(Ibid. I: 405) ”.(ظاھر) as well as his manifest part (باطن)
We submit, however, that just as Eriugena does not always subjugate the
ontological to the epistemic but at times shows the opposite, realist tendency, as he
does when he implies that only that can be understood which has being, so does Ibn
‘Arabi>. Eriugena says “For everything which is not from God cannot be understood in
any way since it has no being in any way.” (DDN IV: 765A)63 Just as God is being and
writes, “the perception which takes place through the light is the finding that takes place through wuju>d.”
Sufi Path of Knowledge, 214. 63 This statement, if our reading of it is adequate, poses serious challenge to Idealist interpretation of
Eriugena. The causal dependence of epistemic upon ontological is incompatible with Idealism. See what
33
everything else mere not-being, so whatever is from God can be said to be and
consequently can be understood, while whatever is not from him is not and cannot be
understood in anyway. In one passage Ibn ‘Arabi> presents a division of totality in terms
of light, darkness and shadow according to which God is sheer light and the impossible
is sheer darkness while creation is in between these two extremes. He remarks that the
difference between light and darkness consists in the fact that the former is perceived
and through it perception takes place while the latter is perceived but through it no
perception takes place. (See Fut. III: 274; trans., SPK, 213-214) If we take into account
the identification of God with Absolute Being and of the Impossible with Absolute non-
existence we can discern here a connection between epistemic and the ontological, but
their co-relation here is not tilted towards idealism because it is implied here that what
is found is found due to existence. The metaphor of light makes this abundantly clear:
“were it not for the light, nothing whatsoever would be perceived, neither object of
knowledge nor sensory object, nor imaginal object.” (Ibid. III: 276, SPK: 214)
When Ibn ‘Arabi> attempts to solve the problem of free will and predestination,
he once again refers to the dependence of knowledge upon reality and this time extends
it to include God: “Knowledge follows the object of knowledge… And the Real does not
know except that (condition) upon which the object of knowledge itself is.” (Ibid.
IV: 18)
Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> maintain similar, though complex, position regarding
the relationship between ontology and intellectuality. In the face of this one must be as
careful in declaring Ibn ‘Arabi> a ‘firm empiricist’ with Masataka Takeshita, as one
Frederick Copleston points out against Berkeley’s analysis of existence. A History of Philosophy (New
Jersey: Paulist Press, 1950), V: 220.
34
should be in making Eriugena an Idealist with Dermot Moran and others.64
2.3.22.3.22.3.22.3.2 Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Perspectival OntoloIbn ‘Arabi>’s Perspectival OntoloIbn ‘Arabi>’s Perspectival OntoloIbn ‘Arabi>’s Perspectival Ontologygygygy
As has been noticed by many commentators, Eriugena’s five modes of demarcation give
us a “perspectival” conception of existence. The denotation and status of existence and
non-existence depend upon the perspective from which one looks at them. Depending
upon perspective, non existence may denote Divine Essence, primordial causes,
unknowability of the higher to the lower and post-fall human condition. From one
perspective non-existence is more eminent than existence while from another, opposite
is the case. The interpretational significance of such approach to ontology is that it
helps us understand the consistency of Eriugena’s view regarding Divine nothingness.
That is to say, there is no contradiction between saying that “God is non-existent” and
that “only God truly is and everything else is not” as his sixth mode provides, since
different perspectives are involved.
Though Ibn ‘Arabi>’s writings are replete with insightful comments upon the
nature of existence and non-existence, it is in his short treatise Insha>’ al-Dawa>’ir that he
treats the subject in some detail. Let us examine the salient features of his conception in
comparison with Eriugena’s.
1. According to Ibn ‘Arabi>, existence and non-existence are relative concepts and
this relativity comes from the fact that they are nothing additional to existent
and nonexistent entities.
64
Takeshita writes: “… Ibn ‘Arabi> is a firm empiricist. According to him existence in concreto is
independent from existence in knowledge, and the former is the source of the latter.” See “The Homo
Imago Dei Motif and the Anthropocentric Metaphysics of Ibn ‘Arabī in the Insha>’ al-Dawa>’ir,” in Orient:
Report of the Society for Near Eastern Studies in Japan, XVIII (1982), 113.
35
Know that existence and non-existence are not realities superadded to
an existent (موجود) ) ) ) or non-existent (معدوم) but are inherent in these.
Thought however deems that existence and non-existence are two
attributes applying to the existent or non-existent thing, like a dwelling
which the existent and non-existent enter. (Insha>‘, 6) (ظرف)
For the exclusive purpose of clarification one could compare this comment to the
opinion of those critics of ontological argument like Kant, who argued that
existence is not an attribute. It is recommended that Ibn ‘Arabi>’s views on the
nature of existence in his other works should always be read in the light of what
the above quoted passage provides. Hence whenever one finds him saying about
an existent that it ‘is qualified with existence’ or about non-existent that it ‘is
qualified with non-existence’, one should understand that Ibn ‘Arabi> is just
speaking the ordinary language the logical pitfalls of which he has already
recognized and laid bare elsewhere.
2. The identification of existence and non-existence with existent and nonexistent
things implies their relativity and mutual compatibility.
When, then, the individuality of a thing is affirmed or denied, it is
possible to qualify it simultaneously by non-existence and existence.
But this is so by virtue of relation and correlation ( سبة وا8ضافةالن ). For
example an individual named Zayd is existent at the market and non-
existent in the house. If existence and non existence were qualifications
referring to the existent like black and white it would be impossible to
attribute these qualities to Zayd simultaneously. … It is then well
established that this is absolutely a matter of relations and correlations
like east-west, right-left and front-behind. (Ibid. 7)
3. Ibn ‘Arabi> responds to the question whether it is possible for a thing to be non-
existent in itself and still qualified by existence in another world ( عالم( or by
another consideration?” in affirmative and adds that everything other than God
36
can be said to exist in one or more of four senses (or as he calls them, “degrees”)
of existence: “First, existence of a thing in its concrete essence, … second, its
existence in knowledge,… third, its existence in speech. The fourth is the
existence of a thing in script.” (Ibid.)
So these are the perspectives, additional to the spatio-temporal one mentioned
above in the example of Zayd, from which we can look at existence and non-existence.
Ibn ‘Arabi> applies this perspectival approach in the passage just cited and also in Al-
Futu>h}a>t. In the former place he says that “existence of Allah, the Real, the Exalted, with
reference to our knowledge has these degrees except that of (existence in) knowledge.”65
In Al-Futu>h}a>t he explains this: “the third mode is mental existence and it is the object of
knowledge’s being conceived as it is in itself in its reality. In case the concept is not in
accordance with the reality, which will not be its existence in mind.” (Fut. IV: 300)
However he mentions that the application of second mode depends on our understanding
of the nature of Beatific vision whether it entails positive knowledge of God (ا8ثبات),
that is attainment of a picture in mind or not. (Insha>’ 8) He also discusses the
relationship between mental existence and concrete existence and draws a boundary
between Divine and human realm in this regard. In case of human beings something has
to exist in its entity before it could become an object of knowledge while the opposite
holds in respect of God. Here knowledge is ontologically, not temporally, prior to a
thing’s existence in its entity. (See ibid.) The qualification of priority as non-temporal
allows him to consistently add what he calls “a mystery” to this view. Ibn ‘Arabi> has
65
Ibid. مووجودهللا الحق تعالى بالنظر إلى علمنا على ھذه المراتب ما عدا مرتبة العل . Fenton and Gloton have translated this
sentence as: “Our present knowledge of the existence of God the Real, may He be exalted, presents itself
according to these modes…” Encompassing Circles, 18. This translation is not entirely adequate, since it
makes the four degrees qualify “our knowledge of God’s existence” while they in fact qualify “God’s
existence,” since they are modes of existence not of knowledge, knowledge being one of them.
37
mentioned in Al-Futu>h}a>t that the third and fourth modes of existence are the most
comprehensive ones since they encompass “all objects of knowledge even impossible
and non-existence.” (Fut. IV: 300) Hence, we could speak of “existence of non-
existence” if we mean by “existent” something in the form of marks on a paper and
words spoken. We have already discussed at length that Ibn ‘Arabi>’s canvas of “what
there is” is as comprehensive as Eriugena’s. However, what gives his ontology a little
more clarity is his explication of the senses in which something can be said to be.
Thanks to these, one is saved from understanding by existence only spatio-temporal
existence (like the post-positivism epistemology does) and consequently there remains
no need to remark that Ibn ‘Arabi> seems to assign some sort of reality to thing that do
not exist, remarks that one comes across in Eriugena scholarship.66
Having compared the ontologies of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> and noticed the
common ground between them we are now about to begin with the comparative analysis
of Eriugena’s first division of nature, namely, that which is not created but creates with
Ibn ‘Arabi>’s view on similar matters.
66
For instance see Moran, The Philosophy, 231.
ThreeThreeThreeThree
MetacosmMetacosmMetacosmMetacosm----I: GodI: GodI: GodI: God The present chapter investigates similarities and dissimilarities between the way
Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> envisage Divine nature. We shall pay attention in particular to
Eriugenian view that God is created in His effects, Divine unknowability, non-existence,
darkness, affirmative, negative and superlative theologies in comparison with Ibn
‘Arabi.
It might be thought that a work devoted to analysis of cosmology should not
include discussion of Divine nature, a subject that belongs properly to theology or
philosophy of religion. This objection would have been valid had we been concerned
here with modern cosmology. It is not possible in traditional cosmologies to discuss the
nature of tangible world without reference to Divine nature. This impossibility is
reflected in the very definitions Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> provide for “God.”
3.13.13.13.1 Defining “God”Defining “God”Defining “God”Defining “God”
3.1.13.1.13.1.13.1.1 Eriugena on Eriugena on Eriugena on Eriugena on the the the the Definition of “God.”Definition of “God.”Definition of “God.”Definition of “God.”
Eriugena identifies the first division of nature with God as origin of being and the fourth
division with God as the end. He goes on however, to imply that all the four divisions
should be considered as both from God and in God, (DDN III: 690A) which means that
these are theophanies.67 Now while it is easy to consider the second and third divisions,
namely primordial causes and the world, as theophanies it is a little difficult to consider
67
Ibid. 252.
39
God Himself a theophany, i.e., revelation or manifestation of God. Perhaps this
difficulty can be removed by inquiring into the meaning of the word “God.” Eriugena
explains this while introducing the concept of theophany for the very first time in DDN.
According to this explanation not only Divine essence is indicated by “God” but “also
that mode by which God reveals himself in a certain way to intellectual and rational
creatures according to the capacity of each.” (DDN I: 446C-D) Again while
summarizing an earlier discussion Eriugena states clearly that “not only the Divine
essence which exists in itself without change [is] called God but … also the theophanies
which are reproduced out of it and by it in the intellectual nature are themselves given
the name God.” (Ibid. I. 448B)
3.1.23.1.23.1.23.1.2 Ibn ‘Arabi> on the Definition of “God.”Ibn ‘Arabi> on the Definition of “God.”Ibn ‘Arabi> on the Definition of “God.”Ibn ‘Arabi> on the Definition of “God.”
As we saw, for Eriugena “God” gives a multi-layered meaning, something by which Ibn
‘Arabi>'s understanding of Divinity is also characterized. While referring to God Ibn
Arabi> uses the word “the Divine presence” (لھيةEالحضرة ا) which he defines by saying
that “There is nothing in existence save Divine presence which is His essence (ذاته), His
attributes (صفاته) and His Actions (أفعاله). (Fut. II: 114)
The first thing to be observed here is a similarity with the so called sixth
Eriugenian mode of being discussed in the previous chapter. This definition reiterates
that real being belongs only to God. Second, obviously, the definition does not limit
divinity to Divine essence but includes Divine attributes, signified by so many Divine
names and Divine actions by which Ibn ‘Arabi> understands nothing but creatures. While
Eriugena has clearly extended the meaning of God to include Divine manifestations
what about attributes/names and actions that Ibn ‘Arabi> includes in his definition of
God? According to Ibn ‘Arabi>, Divine Essence is absolutely unknowable and
40
transcendent. The only connection creatures have with It is through attributes/names
which are declared to be so many veils ( لحجبا ) upon Divine essence, simultaneously
covering and uncovering it. Ibn ‘Arabi> adopts the Mu‘tazilite stance that attributes are
identical with the Divine essence. The creatures are manifestations of the names of God,
what Eriugena calls theophanies. Ibn ‘Arabi> has expressed this in a characteristic
manner, “there is nothing in existence but His names.” (Ibid. II: 303) It is not merely
that God has manifested Himself to human intellects in creatures, rather human being is
the greatest of Divine self-manifestations. Ibn ‘Arabi> thinks that things are
manifestations of the Real in which He revealed Himself for them, even in their own
entities… and it is His saying “We shall show them Our signs upon the horizons and
within their own souls until it is clear to them that it is the Real” (Qur’ān, 41:53).
Therefore, Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> are united in the way they define “God.”
3.23.23.23.2 God as Uncreated and CreatedGod as Uncreated and CreatedGod as Uncreated and CreatedGod as Uncreated and Created
3.2.13.2.13.2.13.2.1 Eriugena’s Standpoint Eriugena’s Standpoint Eriugena’s Standpoint Eriugena’s Standpoint
Eriugena declares that God “is understood to be anarchos i.e., “without beginning,”
because He alone is the Principle cause of all things which are made from Him and
through Him.” (DDN I: 451C-D) In addition to being the beginning and the End God is
also the Middle, “the Beginning because from Him are all things that participate in His
essence; the Middle because in Him and through him they subsist; the End, because it is
towards Him that they move in seeking rest from their movement and stability of their
perfections.” (Ibid. I: 451D)
On the other hand, Eriugena also asserts that the Divine nature not only creates
but is created. (Ibid. I: 452B) The Alumnus expresses his perplexity since Divine nature
has been maintained to be “creative and not created.” (Ibid. I: 454D) Though the
41
Nutritor recognizes that this is hard to swallow he digresses into analysis of the
etymology of the Greek word for God and comes back to the issue only after having
followed his line of thought a little farther than the etymology of theos.
Certainly the notion that “God is made in creatures” should not be taken at its
face value. At a later place in DDN Eriugena implies that he does not want God to be
included in the number of all things that are created. (Ibid. I: 468C) According to him
the statement only means that the Divine nature “is establishing the nature of things.
For the creation of itself, that is, the manifestation of itself in something is surely that
by which all things subsist.” (Ibid.I: 455B) This identification of “creation” as “self-
manifestation” is the key to resolve the perplexity. Divine nature can be understood as
being created because “that which is invisible in itself becomes manifest in all things
that are.” (Ibid. I: 454 A) Eriugena also says that it is said to be created since “nothing
except itself exists as an essence since it itself is the essence of all things.”(Ibid.) To
bring the point home he establishes an analogy with intelligence’s being created in its
effects and says that the Divine Essence is created in those things which are made by
itself, through itself and in itself just “as the intelligence of the mind or its purpose or its
intention or however this first and innermost motion of ours may be called, having
entered upon thought and received the forms of certain fantasies and having then
proceeded into the symbols of sounds or the signs of sensible motions it is not
inappropriately said to become.” (Ibid. I: 454C) The claim that God is made in all things
remains a figure of speech,68 a metaphor, although not arbitrary but grounded in reality
but still a metaphor which provides a single expressive form for the coordinate themes
of theophany, procession, division of nature and God’s essential inherence within the
68
Eriugena writes: “when … God is said to be made, this is obviously by a figure of speech” DDN I:
516C.
42
created order.69 In sum, then, to say that God makes himself in creatures is to say that
He manifests himself in them and that their subsistence is dependent upon God.
3.2.23.2.23.2.23.2.2 Ibn ‘Arabi>’s StandpointIbn ‘Arabi>’s StandpointIbn ‘Arabi>’s StandpointIbn ‘Arabi>’s Standpoint
Like Eriugena Ibn ‘Arabi> calls the Divine reality “The Middle.” “‘He is the first and the
Last’ (57:3) and He is what is between these two.” (Fut. I: 642) He also considers God
to be the intermediary between two other Divine names while explaining the degrees of
Divine presence: “there are three degrees in the Divine presence, the hidden, the
manifest and the middle.” (Ibid. II: 391) Also noteworthy is Ibn ‘Arabi>’s explication of
the Divine Name, the First and the Last:
God possesses Firstness (وليةEا) because He brings everything into existence. He
also possesses lastness (خريةEا) for He says “To Him the whole affair is
returned” (11: 123) and “To him you will be returned” (2: 245) and “Surely unto
God all affairs come home” (42:53), so He is the Last just as He is the first and
between the first and the last appear the degrees of Divine names. (Ibid. IV:
299; trans. SDG, 204)
Notice how completely this resonates with Eriugena’s statement at I: 451D cited
above. In addition to this Ibn ‘Arabi> maintains that God is the middle between
nonexistence and existence. Things pass through this middle path and are colored in His
color, which is none other than existence. (See Fut. IV: 108, trans. SDG, 46)
That Ibn ‘Arabi> can indeed agree with Eriugena in the concept of Divine self-
creation is signaled by the fact that he makes some reservations to talking about God-
world relationship in terms of cause and effect (see Fut. I: 720). Since according to Ibn
‘Arabi> all creatures are nothing but Divine manifestations, he would have no problems
with Eriugena’s “God creates himself” so long as “creates” stands for “manifests
69
See Donald F. Duclow, “Divine Nothingness and Self-Creation in John Scottus Eriugena,” in Journal of
Religion 57 (1977), 109-3.
43
Himself.” We find Ibn ‘Arabi>> explicitly saying “He made nothing manifest in
endangered existence save what He is in Himself. It is as if He were non-manifest and
became manifest through the cosmos.” (Ibid. II: 399; trans. SDG, 70). So Eriugena and
Ibn ‘Arabi> are in complete harmony as far as the former’s concept of Divine self-
creation is concerned.
As for the usage of the expression“being created” for God, we find Ibn ‘Arabi>
doing that in a different context, namely, that “the upholder of every doctrine about
God imagines in his mind a particular thing and worships it saying: “this is Allah!” and
indeed it is Allah no one else and at that particular locus only Allah has created it.”
(Ibid. IV: 211)70 Here Ibn ‘Arabi> explains the meaning of God’s creating himself in the
heart of the believer by sticking to the ordinary meaning of creating as making. But then
he attributes the act of creation to the believer rather than God, he, just like Eriugena,
equates creating with self-manifesting. There is a clear parallel between the example of
intelligence creating its object by contemplating and imagination creating God by
particularizing Him in a specific form.
In sum, Ibn ‘Arabi> does accept what Eriugena means by the expression “God
creates himself,” the expression itself with a different meaning and finally, relates both
the expression and meaning by saying that in creating Himself in the heart of a believer
God manifests Himself to the believer. This diversity of Divine manifestation for
different objects is an idea that is also dear to Eriugena who has written, speaking about
the ineffable Divine essence that it is “One and the same and remains unchanging, it will
be multiple to the sight of those whom it shall be given to dwell in it. (DDN I: 448C) He
70 The first rather long sentence is my own translation. The rest has been taken from William Chittick,
Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-‘Arabi> and the Problem of Religious Diversity, (New York: State University of
New York Press, 1994), 164.
44
shows similar spirit while expressing his views on the multiplicity of the interpretations
of Scripture which he tries to explain with the help of the image of peacock’s feather
(penna pavonis), unity and diversity all in one. (See ibid. IV: 749C)
3.33.33.33.3 DivineDivineDivineDivine KnowabilityKnowabilityKnowabilityKnowability
3.3.13.3.13.3.13.3.1 Eriugena on Eriugena on Eriugena on Eriugena on DivineDivineDivineDivine KnowabilityKnowabilityKnowabilityKnowability
The theology of self-manifestation of transcendent God includes the issue of Divine
comprehensibility. This is an issue regarding which there is remarkable correspondence
between Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>. For the former the “Divine Essence, is in itself
comprehensible to no bodily sense, to no reason, to no intellect, whether of man or of
angel.” (Ibid. I: 447C) Though this incomprehensibility is inherent in the Divine
transcendence, it is also metaphysically grounded71 in the principle propounded by the
second mode of differentiating what is from what is not. As every order of nature can be
said to be since it is known by the orders above it and it can be said not to be since it
cannot be known to the orders below it, therefore reason or intellect being on a lower
order than God, cannot understand the latter. Moreover, that which has the capacity to
define something must be greater than that something. (DDN I: 485B)
However, “the Divine essence is incomprehensible in itself but when it is joined
to an intellectual creature it becomes manifest after a wondrous fashion (mirabili modo):
so that the former, I mean the Divine essence, is seen alone in the latter, namely the
intellectual creature” (DDN I: 450B), “God who is incomprehensible in Himself is after
a certain mode comprehended in creature.” (Ibid. I: 451B) Eriugena makes it clear that
from the existence of creature what can be discovered about Divine Essence is only
71
See Deirdre Carabine, The Unknown God: Negative Theology in the Platonic Tradition: Plato to
Eriugena (Louvain: Peeters Press, 1994), 304-305.
45
“that it is” not “what it is.” (Ibid. I: 455B) Fortunately, a few facts about Divine nature
can be deduced from the nature of what exists.
Facts about CreatureFacts about CreatureFacts about CreatureFacts about Creature Facts deducible about GodFacts deducible about GodFacts deducible about GodFacts deducible about God
EssenceEssenceEssenceEssence: That the creatures exist EssenceEssenceEssenceEssence: That Divine Essence is
OrderOrderOrderOrder: That these are divided into essences,
genera, species and individuals
WisdomWisdomWisdomWisdom: That it is Wise
MotionMotionMotionMotion: That all things have stable motion
and moving rest
LifeLifeLifeLife: That It lives
While being manifest in His creatures, God remains incomprehensible at the
same time and this incomprehensibility is not the same as that of his essence as
contrasted to its manifestation rather it is His incomprehensibility in His very
manifestation. Eriugena says:
“For just as God as He is in Himself beyond every creature is comprehended by
no intellect, so is He equally incomprehensible when considered in the
innermost depths of the creature which was made by Him and which exists in
Him.” (Ibid. I: 443B)
This two-sidedness is in fact involved in the very logic of principle-manifestation
metaphysics, as is made beautifully clear by Schuon:
[T]here is always a certain element of inversion in the relationship between
subject and object, that is, the subject which reflects inverts the object reflected.
A tree reflected in water is inverted, and so is “false” in relation to the real tree,
but it is still a tree — even “this” tree — and never anything else: consequently
the reflected tree is perfectly “true,” despite its illusory character.72
72
Frithjof Schuon, “Orthodoxy and Intellectuality” in Stations of Wisdom (Lahore: Suhail Academy,
2001), 22.
46
As Deirdre Carabine has summed up Eriugena’s views in this connection, “the
reality of the Divine nature is that it both can and cannot be understood when
contemplated in its effects.”73 According to her, the whole focus of Eriugena’s thought
can be stated in terms of the Dionysian problematic of how God is understood to be
transcendent and immanent, similar and different, hidden and revealed.74 In Eriugena’s
words, “nothing is more hidden than it (i.e. Divine essence), nothing more present,
difficult as to where it is, more difficult as to where it is not.” (DDN III: 668C)
3.3.23.3.23.3.23.3.2 Ibn ‘Arabi> on Ibn ‘Arabi> on Ibn ‘Arabi> on Ibn ‘Arabi> on DivineDivineDivineDivine KnowabilityKnowabilityKnowabilityKnowability
Ibn ‘Arabi> says that that “Engendered existence has no connection whatever to
knowledge of the Essence.” (Ibid. II: 597; trans. SPK, 60) He also presents a poly-
syllogistic reductio of the knowability of Divine Essence:
Were it known It would be encompassed. Were It encompassed it would be
limited. Were it limited It would be confined. Were It confined, It would be
owned. But the Essence of the Real is High above all this. (Fut. I: 160; tans.
SPK, 62)
However this is incomplete story. The absolutely incomprehensible Divine
essence manifests itself first in Divine names, attributes and then in Divine actions in
the forms of the cosmos, and it is through these theophanies that certain things can be
known about God. Ibn ‘Arabi>’s doctrine of Divine names bestows some clarity upon the
mode in which the essence manifests itself, so here the position is more systematic and
less ambiguous than Eriugena’s “wondrous mode” (mirabilis modo): All the cosmos is a
word that has come with a meaning, and its meaning is God, so that He may make His
properties manifest within it” (Ibid. III: 148; trans. SDG, 5)
73
Deirdre Carabine¸ John Scotus Eriugena, 46. 74 Carabine, The Unknown God, 306.
47
The last sentence points out that the Divine names are transitive in nature, they
logically demand their objects, in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s terminology “loci of manifestation.”
For instance one of the Divine names is “All-Merciful” which demands an object (مظاھر)
of Divine mercy and obviously this has to be something other than God because he
cannot become object of his own mercy, hence the cosmos is created as locus of
manifestation of the Divine mercy.75 Ibn ‘Arabi>’s concept of Divine names as
constituting an intermediary realm between Essence and cosmos can be considered an
important unpacking of what Eriugena calls the “wondrous fashion” in which Essence
manifests itself.
Now Ibn ‘Arabi> explains the epistemological function of theophanic cosmos
within the framework of the Qur’a>nic concept of the signs of God within our souls and
upon the horizons and declares that these constitute the only path to the knowledge of
God: “Hence the Real turned us over to the horizons, which is everything outside of us,
and to ourselves, which is everything we are upon and in. When we come to understand
these two affairs together, we come to know Him.” (Ibid. II. 298; trans. SDG, 8)
It must be remembered that the transcendence and unknowability of the Divine
Essence is not compromised by Divine self-disclosure (theophania) within the souls and
the cosmos but is only complemented. This is again something upon which we find
Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> in perfect agreement. Eriugena has written, “The ineffable
excellence of the former (i.e. Divine Essence) surpasses (superat) every nature which
participates in it, so that in all things nothing else but itself is presented to those who
have understanding, while in itself… it is not manifest in any fashion.” (DDN I: 450B)
Ibn ‘Arabi> is more emphatic as he thinks that it is as if God is saying, “I did not bring
75
For an excellent elaboration of this doctrine see Fut. I: 322 and III: 316.
48
the cosmos into existence to signify Me … The cosmos is a mark of the realities of the
names, not of Me.” (Fut. II: 541; trans. SDG, 11) This reminds one of Eriugena’s
distinction between knowing “what He is” and “that He is.”
If for Eriugena the unknowability of Essence was a repercussion of one his
modes being and not-being, for Ibn ‘Arabi> ultimate non-manifestation of Divine essence
is implied by his parallel to Eriugena’s sixth mode of being.76Since being exclusively
belongs to God there is no possible subject for having knowledge of God: “The Real
says, “There is no thing to which I manifest Myself, because I am identical with each
thing.” (Fut. IV: 8)
Ibn ‘Arabi> believes, like Eriugena and St. Gregory of Nyssa before him (DDN III:
637C), that God is the coincidence of the opposites (coincidentia oppositorum) and one
of his favorite examples to illustrate this is the Qur’a>nic pair of Divine names
“Manifest-Nonmanifest” (الظاھر والباطن) (Qur’a>n, 54:2). He thinks that God is Manifest
to Himself and Nonmanifest with respect to His creatures. (Fut. IV: 326; trans. SDG,
206)
Hence, Divine Essence is unknowable in itself, manifests itself and remains
unknowable even in its manifestation. Thus we are taught both by Eriugena and Ibn
‘Arabi>.
76
He writes in a short poem that inaugurates chapter 402 of Fut.:
Were we to become manifest to the thing,
It would be other than We
But there is no “other than We”
So where is manifestation?
أين الظھور،لو ظھرنا للشئي كان سوانا و سوانا ما ثم Ibid. IV: 8; trans. SDG, 41.
49
3.43.43.43.4 DivineDivineDivineDivine Unity and TrinityUnity and TrinityUnity and TrinityUnity and Trinity
3.4.13.4.13.4.13.4.1 Eriugena on TrinityEriugena on TrinityEriugena on TrinityEriugena on Trinity
In the account of Trinity in the first book of De Diuisione Naturae Eriugena takes his
position appealing to the authority of Dionysius and Gregory Nazianzus. He appeals to
former to warn the readers that in view of its absolute transcendence, the Divine essence
cannot be described either by unity or by trinity and adds that the triune nature of God
was “discovered only in the light of spiritual understanding and rational investigation”
so that “the religious inclinations of pious minds may have something to think and
something to say concerning that which is ineffable and incomprehensible.” (DDN I:
456 A-B) Perhaps it was this statement that has led some scholars to maintain that for
Eriugena the Trinity has merely “a subjective-meaning” and “merely in human
consciousness.”77
There is one point where Eriugena’s understanding of Trinity seems to differ
from that of Pseudo Dionysius. Eriugena connects the three known facts about God
namely essence, wisdom and life to His triune nature and maintains that by “God” “in
its essence is understood the Father, in its wisdom the Son, in its life the Holy Ghost.”
(Ibid. I: 455C)
Referring to Gregory Nazianzus as his authority, Eriugena presents a relational
concept of Divine trinity according to which the relation or condition (habitum) of the
Unbegotten Substance to the begotten substance was called Father, the condition of
Proceeding Substance to the Unbegotten and to the Begotten Substance Holy Spirit.
77
F.C Baur. and Th. Christlieb held these positions while L. Scheffczyk and Beierwaltes have disagreed.
See Beierwaltes, “Unity and Trinity in Dionysius and Eriugena,” in Hermathena: Proceedings of the
Dublin Conference on Neoplatonism, 1992, (Dublin: University of Dublin, 1994), 10, 17 notes 46-47.
50
(DDN, I. 456 B-C.)78 Justifying the Gregorian position Eriugena makes the following
remark: “For in one and the same nature, there cannot be two names, differing the one
from the other.”(Ibid. I: 457A) As against this principle, the Alumnus points out the
counter example of the names “Abraham” and “Isaac”, which though “differing in sound
but not in sense” are both names of the same nature which is there in the father and his
son. (See ibid. I: 457B) Eriugena denies this by maintaining that the meaning of
“Abraham” is different from “Father” and the meaning of “Isaac” is different from
“son.” Hence, the names Abraham and Isaac refer to the individual substances while the
names “father” and “son” refer not to substances but to relations. (See ibid. I: 457B-C)
The conclusion, as stated by the Alumnus, is that “whether in the Divine Nature or the
human, the name of a relation cannot be applied to a substance or essence.” (Ibid. I:
457D) Anyway, Eriugena’s statement that God transcends both Unity and Trinity is
perfectly in line with his negative theology to be discussed more fully below, according
to which no positive descriptions by way of names and attributes can apply to God who
is beyond them and this concept as we shall show after comparison with Ibn ‘Arabi> goes
a long way towards bridging the Muslim and Christian theologies otherwise radically
separated due to the doctrine of Trinity. Same can be said about his relationalist or non-
substantialist remarks on the meaning of “Father” and “Son” in the Trinity.
3.4.23.4.23.4.23.4.2 Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Views on Trinity Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Views on Trinity Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Views on Trinity Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Views on Trinity
Let us now turn to Ibn ‘Arabi> and attempt to find out what implications the doctrine of
Trinity has for our comparative study of Eriugena with Ibn ‘Arabi> as the latter belongs
to a religious background which does not accept this doctrine but is based upon the
78
St. Gregory had said, in his reply to the Eunomians, regarding whether the name “Father” signified a
nature or a function, that it signified neither of these but rather “the relation of the Son.”
51
doctrine of pure oneness of God. We shall take up this issue at two levels, firstly on
theological or religious level where the Christian Trinity itself is discussed, secondly on
the metaphysical level where instead of trinity we discuss the issue in terms of
multiplicity.
Although a univeralist in his approach towards religious diversity, 79 Ibn ‘Arabi>
does not usually deal with particular dogmas of other religions. There are, however,
some exceptions and the doctrine of Holy Trinity seems to be one of these as Ibn ‘Arabi>
has applied his pluralistic principles to this particular case.
The triadic systematization is one of the structural principles of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s
thought just as it is of Eriugena’s.80 This is obvious from his reflections upon the triadic
structure of the letters of the Basmalah, (Fut. I: 103)81 three presence of three Divine
names in it (Ibid. III: 126), the triadic appearance in the first sight of Ka‘bah (Ibid. I:
696)82, triadic nature of reality behind three names of the Qur’a>n, (Ibid. III: 129)
dependence of creation upon the number three which Ibn ‘Arabi> considers to be the first
compound number,83 three dimensional nature of bodies and the bestowal of existence
79
An excellent study of this aspect of Ibn ‘Arabi> is William Chittick’s Imaginal Worlds referred to above.
The work of Frithjof Schuon, especially his Transcendent Unity of Religions can be taken as a
contemporary and practical application of principles propounded by Ibn ‘Arabi>. 80
This feature of Eriugena’s thought has been pointed out by Werner Beierwaltes, “Unity and Trinity,” 6. 81
“[E]very letter of the Basmalah is triadic corresponding to the levels of the worlds.” Also see Ibn
‘Arabi>, Fus}u>s} al-H}ikam, 115-117: “The origin of the cosmos is trinity.” 82 At Fut. IV: 32 Ibn ‘Arabi> writes that the actual structure of Ka‘bah including حجر is itself triadic, the
cube emerges only if we consider the building as it stands presently. 83
“The first of numbers is ‘two’ and nothing at all comes forth from two unless the three conjugates them
and connects them with each other and that (third) brings them together, only then comes forth from them
whatever comes forth from them. … ‘Three’ is the first of odd numbers, from this name (الفرد the odd)
became manifest whatever has become manifest from amongst the entities of the possibles. No possible
thing has become existent from the one but has become existent from plural and the smallest compound
number is three and it is the odd.” Fut. III: 126.
52
through three realities namely His He-ness (ھويّة), attentiveness (tawwajjuh) and word84,
to the triadic nature of rational arguments and repercussions for knowing God. (Fut. IV:
32)
Ibn ‘Arabi> is perhaps the only Muslim mystic-philosopher to have given Trinity
such a sympathetic treatment.85 One might become astonished at this but there is
nothing to warrant the conclusion that “he borrowed Trinity from Christianity” 86 to
weld it with his mystical doctrines, since he knew that patches from Christianity were
not going to help legitimize his views. This is moreover the case since Ibn ‘Arabi>’s
apparent source regarding trinity is the Qur’ān and Arabic language and he does not
refer to any Christian authority.
Anyway, Ibn ‘Arabi> attempts to analyze the aspects of truth and falsehood in
this doctrine and finds excuses for its upholders, even ways of ultimate salvation. The
springboard for his discussion of the Christian doctrine of Trinity is Qur’ān 5:73: “They
are unbelievers (لقد كفر) who say ‘God is the third of the three.’” The first important
move Ibn ‘Arabi> makes in his interpretation of this verse is emphasizing that the label
that the Qur’ān is applying to the Trinitarians, namely unbelievers (كافرون) and not the 84
Ibid. III: 276. Chittick explains “He-ness:” “It is God in as much as He is designated by the name ‘He’
.which is a pronoun designating absence and therefore nonmanifestation.” SPK, 964 note 15 ,(ھو)85
Frithjof Schuon, whose work can be considered an extension of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s in many respects, has
explained the Qur’ānic opposition to Christian trinity by bringing to light various shades of its meaning.
He envisages trinity according to a “vertical” perspective or according to either of two “horizontal”
perspectives, the former of them being supreme and the other not. The “vertical” perspective—Beyond-
Being, Being and Existence, the supreme horizontal perspective corresponds to the Vedantic triad Sat,
Chit and Ānanda, the non-supreme horizontal perspective is ontological and represents the three
fundamental aspects or modes of Pure Being, whence the triad: Being, Wisdom, Will (Father, Son,
Spirit). According to Schuon what is opposed to Islam is solely the ontological Trinity alone, as it is
envisaged exoterically. See his Understanding Islam (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 1999), 54. 86
This rather hasty conclusion is drawn by A.E. ‘Affi>fi> in his commentary on Fus}u>s}. See his comments,
132-133.
53
polytheists (مشركون) (See Fut. III: 126), who according to it deserve eternal damnation
in hell. Second, he interprets the word كافر literally as meaning “the one who covers” so
the Trinitarians are so since they cover the first with the second and the second with the
third. Third, he points out that something is wrong with the expression “He is third of
three” “Rather it is said that He is “the third of two…” After all He is not of the same
kind as that to which He is being ascribed in any sense for nothing is as His likeness and
He is the Hearing, the Seeing (42:11). (Fut. IV: 306; trans., SDG, 179) So what is
problematic is God’s inclusion with a group as one of its members. This last remark is
not very different from orthodox Muslim theological stance and Ibn ‘Arabi> considers
this specific formulation of Trinity a violation of Divine transcendence.
The most explicit defense of trinity Ibn ‘Arabi> presents is in its connection with
his discussion of kinds of tawh}i>d. The profession of three gods, according to Ibn ‘Arabi>,
is clearly an instance of polytheism but he does not equate trinity with polytheism.
(Ibid. III: 126) According to him, it is rather another kind of tawh}i>d, namely the
“oneness of composition.” (Ibid. III: 173)
While committing trinity to the profession of oneness of composition and
presence of oddness and thereby making room for it, Ibn ‘Arabi>> has in the corner of his
mind the Divine saying: “He is odd and He loves the odd.”87 Accordingly the profession
of oneness is also of two kinds or in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s terminology, belong to either of two
presences: the presence of oneness (حضرة الوحدانية) and the presence of oddness ( حضرة
That is to say that there are two possible ways to profess Divine oneness, pure .(الفردانية
oneness and composed oneness. The Muslim tawh}i>d, so to speak, belongs to the former
one, while the Christian Trinity belongs to the latter. Even though the latter is not the
87
Muslim, S}ah}i>h}, Kita>b al-Dhikr wa al-Du‘a>’: Ba>b fi> Asma> Alla>h.
54
pure oneness, it is still a profession of oneness, since the number three is the first odd
number (See Fut. IV: 32), a believer in Trinity has still the advantage of deviating only
one degree from pure oneness. Anyway this explanation does not exhaust the meaning
of توحيدالفردية. In one of his shorter treatises Ibn ‘Arabi> goes to the extent of identifying it
as the tawh}i>d of Moses, Muh}ammad and all the prophets while calling the other tawh}i>d
that of the disobedient followers of Muslim community.88
It is necessary to have a look at how Ibn ‘Arabi> views multiplicity and unity as
far as the nature of God is concerned because this is one of the core issues in the
Muslim-Christian discussion of unity and trinity. There is no doubt that the cornerstone
of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s thought is the Islamic doctrine of oneness of God (توحيد). His doctrine
that has become famous as “oneness of being” ((((وحدة الوجود) is but a mystical version or
the esoteric core of this same doctrine. A unique feature of Ibn ‘Arabi> is that instead of
considering multiplicity an illusion he relates it to the Divine reality. His guiding
metaphysical principle is that “nothing appears in existence that does not have a root in
the Divine reality.” (Ibid. II: 508) Since multiplicity is a feature of existence as it
appears to us it must also have a Divine root.
According to the first principle of Islam, God is one. Ibn ‘Arabi> takes the very
bold step of adding that God is One/Many (الواحد الكثير).89 He applies this term in the
framework of Essence-Attributes discourse. Essentially, God is one but He has many
88
See Ibn ‘Arabi>, Al-Tadbi>ra>t al-ila>hiyyah fi> Is}la>h} al-Mamlakah al-Insa>niyyah (Beirut: Da>r al-Kutub al-
‘Ilmiyyah, 2003), 90. Some other Sufis, before and after Ibn ‘Arabi>, also consider this as the higher level
of tawh}i>d. See Abu> Ha>mid Al-Ghaza>li, Mishka>t al-Anwa>r, Ed. Abul ‘Ala>’ al-‘Affi>fi> (Cairo: Al-Da>r al-
Qayyu>miyyah, 1964), 60 and Mah}mu>d al-Farka>wi>, Sharh} Mana>zil al-Sa>’iri>n (Cairo: Ma‘had al-‘ilmi> al-
faransi> li al-a>tha>r al-Sharqiyyah, 1953), 36. 89
Ibn ‘Arabi> applies this term in other contexts as well. In Fus}u>s}, he seems to be applying this term to
anything having organic unity like one person having many bodily organs. He also applies it to the world
as a whole and then to God in view of the endless multiplicity of His theophanies. See Fus}. 183-184.
55
names and these names require the objects in which their properties or meanings should
be manifested, hence, the plurality of created objects. “There is nothing but Allah, the
necessary of existence, the one in as much as His Essence, the Many in as much as His
names and His rulings.” (Fut. I: 703) Still, these names are not substances, but only
relations between God and the world. Therefore the entities of the created nature do not
multiply the Divine Essence, so we must not say that He is one or many but that He is
One/many. (Ibid. III: 276)
In order to separate the Divine essence from this attribution of relational
multiplicity Ibn ‘Arabi> at one place equates One/many to Manifest/non-manifest ( الظاھر
This shows again that multiplicity pertains to God inasmuch as He manifest .(والباطن
Himself and not as He remains Non-Manifest. Hence multiplicity belongs to the
names/attributes aspect of the Divine Side (الجانب ا8لھي). ). ). ).
This discussion gives us at least two features of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s thought that he
shares with Eriugena. Apart from the correspondence of the term one-many to
Eriugena’s unum multiplex, utilizing the essence-attributes apparatus also brings
Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> interestingly close. Eriugena’s identification of the three
persons of trinity as essence, life and wisdom has already been given by Wolfson an
important place in the discussion of trinity as origin of Muslim doctrine of attributes.90
In his discussion of trinity or multiplicity Ibn ‘Arabi> does not refer normally to life and
wisdom because these are intransitive so do not require objects, which makes them
irrelevant from the point of view of cosmogony. Although this particular feature moves
him a bit away from Eriugena it brings him close to the latter in another regard. From
the historical point of view, like that in which Wolfson is discussing the subject in this
90
Philosophy of Kalam, 123.
56
particular place, the former fact will seem more serious, since it would emphasize the
difference between them, while the latter fact from the thematic-analytical standpoint
that we have taken here, bridges such gap. This is because even if the attributes
mentioned by Ibn ‘Arabi> are not exactly like the members of Eriugenian, or for that
matter, of previous Platonic triads, they still are attributes. Moreover, Ibn ‘Arabi>’s
reference to the transitive attributes, unlike those mentioned by Eriugena, allows him to
introduce the concept of relation. We have seen above that Eriugena followed the Greek
fathers and presented a relational concept of the three persons of trinity. We see
presently that Ibn ‘Arabi> emphasizes time and again the relational nature of Divine
attributes and Divine names, the seedbed of multiplicity in the Divine presence and in
the world, and he does this apparently to forestall reified Divine multiplicity.
Though it is difficult to say that Ibn ‘Arabi>’s interpretation of trinity would be
acceptable to the Christian authorities, however, as far as the Muslim-Christian debate
on Trinity is concerned, there is no doubt that Ibn ‘Arabi>’s position is a breakthrough.91
3.53.53.53.5 Affirmative, Negative and Superlative TheologiesAffirmative, Negative and Superlative TheologiesAffirmative, Negative and Superlative TheologiesAffirmative, Negative and Superlative Theologies
3.5.13.5.13.5.13.5.1 Apophasis in Eriugena Apophasis in Eriugena Apophasis in Eriugena Apophasis in Eriugena
One of the major issues that Eriugena discusses in Book I of De Diuisione Naturae is
that of the applicability of Categoriae Decem to God. Eriugena believes that this
question can be discussed in terms of two theologies, that is, ways of talking about
God:92 the negative theology, via negativa (apophasis) and affirmative theology, via
91
That this indeed is the case can be seen by placing it in the debate from Mu‘tazilites through Al-Kindi>,
a debate which has been presented and studied by Wolfson. Cf. Philosophy of Kalam, Chapter IV: II-III,
310-337. 92
On the place of this discussion and the meaning of term “theology” by Eriugena see Bernard J. McGinn,
“Negative Theology in John the Scot,” in Studia Patristica: Papers Presented to the Sixth International
57
affirmativa (cataphasis). Though Eriugena takes this from Pseudo-Dionysius,93 he also
names Boethius and Augustine among those who alluded to the negative theology. Still
Eriugena is believed to be the first Latin theologian to have made it a systematic part of
his thought.94 Negative theology is defined as denying that the Divine Essence is any of
the things that are. Eriugena, after briefly presenting how Pseudo-Dionysius has
emphasized Divine transcendence, says that “Nothing can be said properly about God,
since He surpasses every intellect and all sensible and intelligible meanings, who is
better known by not knowing Him” (DDN I: 510C-D)
Affirmative theology is defined as that which predicates all the things that are,
of the Divine Essence or Substance. It does not say that It is those things but that “all
things take their being from it.” (Ibid. I: 458B)95 According to this way the Divine
Essence can be said to be not only those things “which accord with nature” like truth,
goodness, essence, light, justice, sun, star, spirit, water, lion, bear and worm but also the
things which are contrary to nature, like being drunken and mad. (See ibid.)96 Obviously
the reason for the viability of this continuity is everything’s “taking being from God.”
Eriugena makes this explicit by providing the principle: “that which is the cause can be
expressed in terms of the things that are caused,” the same principle using which he
reduces the last two divisions of nature to the first and second. He writes, “all things
Conference on Patristic Studies, XIII (1975), 234-235. 93
See Pseudo Dionysius, The Mystical Theology, in Pseudo-Dionysius: Complete Works, (Mahwah:
Paulist Press, 1987), Chapter III: 1032D-1033D. 94
See Bernard McGinn, “Negative Theology,” 237. 95
Here the connection of God-world identity with the causality is obvious. In case of Ibn ‘Arabi> this was
not so clear, so it fell upon the shoulders of his defenders to point this out. 96
At 511C-512B, Eriugena gives a more extensive list of names dividing them into “glorious and exalted
names such as life or Virtue, intermediate names such as Sun and Light, those taken from lower motions
of the visible creature like breath and Cloud and lastly those which are taken from the created nature and
applied to creative nature by a kind of metaphor like man, lion, ox etc.”
58
that are, from the highest to the lowest, can be spoken of Him…since He is the source of
all things that can be predicated of Him.” (Ibid. I: 510D) Following Saint Augustine,
Eriugena maintains that positive Divine names used in the Scripture signify the simple
and immutable Divine essence and there is no difference, as far as God is concerned,
between loving, desiring and willing etc. (Ibid. I: 518 B-C) Names like Truth, Goodness,
Essence, Light, Justice and others of the sort are said to apply to Him metaphorically,
“that is to have been transferred from creatures to the Creator.” (Ibid. I: 458C)97
To show the inadequacy of affirmative theology Eriugena appeals to the
principle that “anything which has an opposite cannot properly be predicated to God,”
and argues that all the aforesaid Divine names are confronted by other names (e.g. being
by non-being and life by death) therefore they cannot be properly predicated of God.
(Ibid. I: 459 B-C)
In view of this, properly speaking, God is neither Essence nor Goodness, nor
God,98 nor Truth, Life and Light but superessential, more-than-Goodness, more-than-
God, more-than-Truth, more-than-Life and more than-Light. The Divine names included
in this third group, called super-affirmation or hyperphatic theology,99 harmonize via
affirmativa and via negativa as “in outward expression they possess the form of the
affirmative, but in meaning the force of the negative… it is essence, affirmation; it is
non-essence, negation; it is superessential, affirmation and negation together.” (Ibid. I:
97 It seems that Ibn ‘Arabi> would not have agreed to this transference because for him such names
properly apply only to God while they apply to creatures metaphorically. This seeming difference can be
reconciled if we differentiate between the ontological and epistemological contexts of religious language
and hold that Eriugena has in view the epistemic context while Ibn ‘Arabi> speaks in the ontological
context. 98 Eriugena denies the proper applicability of “God” to Divine substance in view of Greek etymology of
the word. Hence God is more-than-seeing and more -than- running. 99
Carabine, The Unknown God, 312.
59
562C) In the final analysis however, this third way remains fully negative way since it
only tells us that God is not essences but it does not reveal “what that is which is more
than essence” (Ibid. I: 562D)
Bernard McGinn believes that it is only in these lines that an answer worthy of
the name is given to the question asked many passages ago by the Alumnus about
proper predication of these terms to God. The answer is, yes and no, depending on the
type of definition one believes to be involved in by these terms. If they provide a
diffinitio quid est, that is “what it is” then, no, since such a definition is a limitation,
inconceivable in case of God. But if the definition involved is only diffinitio quia est
that is of “that it is” then yes these terms are properly applied to God.100 Interestingly,
Ibn ‘Arabi> also denies the possibility of such definition of God in view of its limiting
character. However, according to him, separately taken both affirmative and negative
ways imply a limitation of Divine Substance. One gets rid of this delimitation only by
synthesizing both ways. (See Fus}, 68-69)
Eriugena’s final position on this issue, on the one hand, at least apparently, is
Affirmatio simul et abdicatio, the combination of two ways (with a tilt towards the
second). That is the final message of Eriugena on the issue of religious language and
also, as we shall see in a later chapter, on the question of God-world identity. It is the
negative way that he considers to be the better expression of truth of the matter. For he
says that God is “more truly and faithfully denied in all things than He is affirmed,”
“For whatever negation you make about Him will be a true negation, but not every
affirmation that you make will be a true affirmation.” (Ibid. I: 510C) There is also the
suggestion that the affirmative way is for the simple-minded followers of the religion
100
See McGinn, Negative Theology, 237. McGinn has also observed the close connection between this
question and that of the nature of definition.
60
(“those who are as yet ignorant in the simplicity of the teaching of their faith”) while
the negative way belongs to the more advanced. (Ibid. I: 511C) Still, there are ways in
which the whole negative enterprise can be rendered in positive terms. One of these is
discovered when one looks at Eriugena’s adherence to the Augustinian dictum that God
is better known by not knowing (melius nesciendo scitur). Second, in Eriugena’s
explanation of final theophany Divine essence is described as in assessable light which
blinds the eye and is thus called darkness. Here, as Dierdre Carabine has pointed out “we
find the notion of negation and deprivation linked to the positive idea of plenitude.”101
Hence affirmation points beyond itself to negation and negation, in turn, back to
affirmation. This reflects the dialectic of transcendence and immanence Michael Sells
speaks about as “an open ended process by which the original assertion of transcendence
looks critically upon itself.”102 It reiterates the metaphysical principle, which finds
expression in almost all traditions: “transcendence necessarily comprises immanence,
and immanence just as necessarily comprises transcendence.”103
3.5.23.5.23.5.23.5.2 Incomparability, Similarity and their synthesis in Ibn ‘Arabi>:Incomparability, Similarity and their synthesis in Ibn ‘Arabi>:Incomparability, Similarity and their synthesis in Ibn ‘Arabi>:Incomparability, Similarity and their synthesis in Ibn ‘Arabi>:
In Ibn ‘Arabī’s concepts of incomparability (تنزيه), similarity (تشبيه) and synthesis of both
we have parallels of what Eriugena calls negative, affirmative and superlative ways of
speaking about God. Whereas Eriugena introduces these concepts while treating the 101
Carabine, The Unknown God, 320. Emphasis added. Carabine locates the metaphysical foundation of
the application of both theologies, positive and negative, in the Plotinian dictum “the One is all and no
thing.” See ibid. 324. 102
Mystical Languages of Unsaying, 207 103
Frithjof Schuon, “The Way of Oneness,” in Esoterism as Principle and As Way (Lahore, Suhail
Academy, 2005), 236 and in his “Our Father Who art in Heaven,” in To Have a Centre (Bloomington:
World Wisdom Books, 1990) 127, Schuon says that there is no transcendence without immanence and no
immanence without transcendence which in one way is reminiscent of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s saying, “The assertion
of similarity is not capable of escaping the assertion of incomparability, nor is the assertion of
incomparability capable of escaping the assertion of similarity.” Fus}, 182 trans. Ringstones, 229.
61
question of applicability of categories to God, behind Ibn ‘Arabi>’s use of these terms
stand pre-Mu‘tazilite positions of anthropomorphists (مشبھة) who favored Qur’a>nic
verses ascribing human attributes to God and the early Muslims (السلف) who preferred
verses which emphasize Divine incomparability, as Ibn Khaldūn describes the origin of
Islamic Theology. A third position seeking to harmonize the previous two positions by
interpreting the verses conveying the message of similarity. This third position,
examplified by the saying that God is “a body unlike bodies” is only superficially similar
to Ibn ‘Arabi>’s synthesis as will be obvious from what follows.
Incomparability and similarity are two relationships as possessing which human
beings witness the Real. (Fut. II: 3. SPK, 277) Incomparability (تنزيه) having negative
formal character is the exact parallel of Eriugena’s negative theology since it is “to
describe the Real as having no connection with the attributes of temporally originated
things (المحدثات).” (Ibid. II. 672; trans. SPK, 70) The Qur’a>nic concept of تسبيح i.e.
Glorification is understood by Ibn ‘Arabi> as referring to a declaration of incomparability
and praising God not with positive attributes (Ibid. III: 148; trans. Ibid) 104 in the light of
the Qur’an> 37:180 viz. “Lord of inaccessibility above what they describe” (37:180)
(Ibid. II. 580; trans. SPK, 71) These words were ordinarily interpreted as meaning that
God is free of attributes that are not proper to Him. However Ibn ‘Arabi>’s explication of
tanzi>h goes well beyond this traditional interpretation. In accordance with his broader
concept of it, tanzi>h would demand not attributing to God anything that can also be
attributed to anyone. At one place Ibn ‘Arabi> goes to the extent of claiming that even
104 Ibn Khaldu>n points out that in view of fact that all Qur’a>nic verses speaking about incomparability are
negative in form early Muslims preferred them over the positive anthropomorphic ones. Ibn Khaldu>n, The
Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1986), III: 45.
62
the Divine names given by scripture cannot be considered to be ascribable properly since
they are ascribable to human beings. (Ibid)
The only laudation worthy of God, according to this perspective, then, is his
Glorification, which is as we have seen negative and not positive.
Ibn ‘Arabi> very clearly sees that the doctrine of similarity lies at the very heart
of incomparability attesting thus to the principle that immanence and transcendence are
interdependent. Whereas Eriugena thought that describing God by positive terms would
amount to limiting him, Ibn ‘Arabi> takes the further step of declaring that not only
positive but negative attribution also amounts to the same thing. He expresses this idea
by saying that “God possesses non-delimited being, but no delimitation (تقييد) prevents
Him from delimitation.” (Fut. III: 162)
Consequently Ibn ‘Arabi> declares that neither of these two points of view
presents complete picture of Divine reality therefore these two must be combined. Ibn
‘Arabi> asserts that “Whoever in knowing Him brings together the assertion of
incomparability and that of similarity…knows Him. (Fus}, 68-69; trans. Ringstones, 37-
38) This combination of incomparability and similarity, which is a requirement of
Divine perfection, Ibn ‘Arabi> reads in the words of the Scripture, “There is nothing like
unto Him and He is the Hearing, the Seeing” (42:11). According to Ibn ‘Arabi>, “there is
nothing like unto Him” points to incomparability while the words “He is the Hearing,
the Seeing” point toward similarity. Ibn ‘Arabi> always mentions these Qur’a>nic words
as the combination in one place of incomparability and similarity, although he does not
rule out other ways for understanding these words.
We submit that this synthesis of the formally negative incomparability and
formally affirmative similarity in Ibn ‘Arabi> is comparable to Eriugena’s superlative
63
theology, which combines both by lacking negation in form but being fully negative in
meaning. (DDN I: 462C) However there is one important difference between the two
syntheses which must not be lost sight of but explained. We noticed at closing the
discussion of Eriugena’s superlative theology that he tilts finally towards negative
theology, even though seeking to combine it with affirmative. In case of Ibn ‘Arabi> one
finds an obvious tilt towards the affirmative theology based on the perspective of
similarity. This was most evident from his words quoted above about non-delimitation
being delimitation as far as the Absolute is concerned. This difference in orientation of
the apo-cataphatic synthesis presented by Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> stands in need of
explanation.
We submit that this difference can be explained with reference to the religious
traditional background against which the syntheses were presented by Eriugena and Ibn
‘Arabi>. In regard to their views on immanence and transcendence Christianity and Islam
belong to different religious types according to Frithjof Schuon. In Schuon’s view there
are two ways of approaching the Absolute, the one is founded upon the notion of “God
as such” while the other is based on “God become man.” Christianity belongs to the
latter type while the former is represented by Islam, 105 which “brought God back, so to
speak, to His primary meaning and to His transcendent essentiality.”106 Thus the
explanation of Eriugena’s final tilt toward apophasis and Ibn ‘Arabi>’s toward cataphasis
lies in the fact that each of the two was responding to the background of his tradition.
Christian tradition titled toward affirmative theology and Islamic tradition, as reaction
to Christian over emphasis, toward negative theology.
105 Schuon, “Outline of Religious Typologies,” in Survey of Metaphysics and Esoterism (Bloomington,
Indiana: World Wisdom Books, 1986), 103. 106
Schuon, “The Mystery of the Hypostatic Face,” in ibid. 95.
64
3.63.63.63.6 The Concept of The Concept of The Concept of The Concept of DivineDivineDivineDivine NothingnessNothingnessNothingnessNothingness
3.6.13.6.13.6.13.6.1 Nihil as a Nihil as a Nihil as a Nihil as a DivineDivineDivineDivine Name in EriugenaName in EriugenaName in EriugenaName in Eriugena
Eriugena considers nihil, not-being, to be one of the names of God. Firstly, this
conclusion is entailed by the very first mode for distinguishing being from non-being. If
one starts from the said mode God must be considered amongst those things which
elude all sense, reason and intellect due to excellence of their essence (per excellentiam
suae naturae), hence represent quia non sunt. Secondly, God can also be said not to be in
view of the second mode for differentiating being from not-being. If creatures,
belonging to the lower order of hierarchy, are said to be, God must be said not to be,
since an affirmation of the lower is negation of the higher. It is obvious that this
attribution of nihil to God is relative and unlike the previous one not a requirement of
Divine transcendence. Hence, there is an opposite side to the mode as well according to
which God is said to be while and when the creatures are said not to be. Thirdly,
Eriugena returns in book three of DDN to give a fuller treatment of the concept of non-
existence. Having contested the identification of “nothing” in the phrase “creation out
of nothingness (creatio ex nihilo)” with privation, Eriugena contends that by nihil is
signified “the ineffable and incomprehensible and inaccessible brilliance of the Divine
Goodness.” (DDN, III 680D) Thus Eriugena believes that ex nihilo actually means ex
deo and thinks that this interpretation is entailed by a true understanding of Scripture.
This Eriugenian view of the nature of nihil is subject matter of the so-called Treatise on
nothingness within DDN (634A-690B).
It would be an injustice and misunderstanding to criticize this identification of
nihil as a Divine name as derogatory to the Divine substance. When we emphasize per
excellentiam suae naturae part of Eriugena’s first mode referred to above, it becomes
65
clear that Eriugena is not employing the term “not-being” in privative sense so as to
imply some imperfection or lack. Rather he is interpreting the phrase in the sense of
“more than being.”107 He writes about the Divine nature that “it does not descend
beyond the lowest effects by which it would be seen both to be created and to create.
(DDN III 689B) Therefore Willemien Otten has rightly remarked that “For God the
denial of being does not entail any consequences that should affect His existence in any
negative way” 108 and that “[t]he predication of non-being appears to be the only
appropriate figure of speech aptly to represent God’s transcendence with regard to
creation without comprehending it. Eriugena manifestly rebuts any other interpretation
of non esse.”109 The point being made here can be better understood in the light of a
distinction made by Frithjof Schuon regarding negation of nihil from God and its
ascription to Him. Like Otten, Schuon has highlighted the etymological ground of the
controversy and pointed out two ways of understanding the word nihil, firstly, according
to its proper meaning it means that which is below existence and secondly the esoteric
interpretation according to which it is that which being principial and hence non-
manifested is “above existence.” 110 It goes without saying that it is not in the former
sense that Eriugena applies this word to God. According to this opinion the difference
about the application of nihil to God is in fact a linguistic one and not metaphysical.
107
See DDN III: 634B-C: “I would not easily concede that the Divine superessentiality was nothing [or
could be called by so privative a name]. For, although it is said by theologians not to be, they do not mean
that it is nothing but that it is more than being.” 108
Willemien Otten, The Anthropology of Johannes Scottus Eriugena (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), 44. 109
Ibid. 37. 110
Schuon, “Creation as a Divine Quality” in Survey of Metaphysics and Esoterism , 51.
66
This is supported by a noted Eriugena scholar Otten’s opinion that the discussion of
nihil reflects a problem of language.111
3.6.23.6.23.6.23.6.2 God and Nothingness in Ibn ‘Arabi>God and Nothingness in Ibn ‘Arabi>God and Nothingness in Ibn ‘Arabi>God and Nothingness in Ibn ‘Arabi>
Let us turn our attention now to Ibn ‘Arabi>. It would appear from a number of texts in
Ibn “Arabi>’s works that he does not favor attribution of nihil to God. He says, for
example, “since the Real rightfully demands wuju>d by His Essence (لذاته), non existence
is impossible for Him.” (Fut. II: 99) In his Kita>b al-‘Azal Ibn ‘Arabī rejects an opinion
because it implicitly qualifies God with nothingness which “is impossible for Him.”112
He also considers nothingness incompatible with eternity and mentions the principle
“the one whose eternity has been established, his nothingness becomes impossible.”(Fut.
II. 99)113 In addition to eternity, Ibn ‘Arabi> also hesitates in applying nothingness to
God in view of his identifying existence with good and nonexistence with evil (See ibid.
I: 213) and because “God is essentially necessary of existence.”(Fut. III: 477)
However, one should consider the fact that in all these places Ibn ‘Arabi> is
talking about عدمas privation, lack or imperfection while Eriugena attributes it to God
not as lack but as super-abundance or being more than being. Eriugena, on the other
hand, while attributing nihil to God, considers it not as privation or lack but as super-
essentiality, that is to say, more than being. Besides Ibn ‘Arabi> counter-balances the
abovementioned view firstly by providing a perspective from which the chasm
between and God can be abridged and secondly, by making explicit ascription of nihil عدم
111
Otten, Anthropology, 44. Dermot Moran had claimed that Eriugena founded a tradition of negative
ontology which runs parallel to that of the primacy of being. See The Philosophy, 100. 112
Ibn ‘Arabi>, “Kitāb al-Azal” in Rasa>’il (Beirut: Da>r al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyah, 1999), 122. Ibid. II: 384. Also see III: 477 where Ibn ‘Arabi> says that since God is being (من ثبت قدمه إستحال عدمه)113
therefore He is free from non-existence.
67
to God. In one place he seems to be implying that God can be said both to be and not to
be from two different perspectives: “In the same manner He is and is not: He is the
manifest so he is but the distinction among the existents is intelligible and perceived by
the senses because of the diversity of the properties of the entities, so “He is not” (Fut.
II: 160; SPK, 95) In that particular place he is in agreement with Eriugena over the issue
of Divine nothingness.
In the second place, we find Ibn ‘Arabi> explicitly granting the application of
nothingness to God in one passage. Discussing glorification (tasbi>h}) he writes:
Glorification is to assert God’s incomparability [tanzi>h]. It is a description by
non-existence. Hence He made absolute non-existence eminent by describing
Himself by it, for He says Glory be to thy Lord, the Lord of exaltation, above
what they describe (37:180). (Ibid. II: 672; trans. SDG, 31)
In this passage Ibn ‘Arabi> comes closest to Eriugena firstly because of obviously
considering nihil to be a Divine quality, but also the context and rationale is the same.
One of the reasons for Eriugena’s doctrine of Divine nothingness is his negative
theology, emphasis upon apophasis. Ibn ‘Arabi> is also pointing to the Divine
nothingness in the very same context of Divine transcendence or as he calls it, (تنزيه).
The second resonance here is that Ibn ‘Arabi> is grounding his view in his reading of the
Qur’a>n just as Eriugena thinks that his identification of nihil with God is implied by the
Scripture itself. (DDN III: 684C-685A)
A third similarity between Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> on the point under discussion
becomes manifest by the latter’s remark that “nothing other-than-God makes God
known with greater knowledge than does absolute non-existence.” (Fut. II: 672) Here
the description of nonexistence as being the best signifier or God in a manner
68
reminiscent of Eriugena’s declaration that God is better known through negation than
through affirmation.
Finally, a comparative remark about Eriugena’s identification of Deus with nihil
in the context of creation out of nothingness is in order. Ibn ‘Arabi> shares Eriugena’s
view that creation out of nothingness does not mean creation out of absolute
nothingness and furthermore interprets creation as Divine self-disclosure just as
Eriugena does. Moreover, in the elliptical opening sentence of his Al-Futu>h}a>t (Fut. I:1)
Ibn ‘Arabi> writes: “Praise belongs to Alla>h who created things from non-existence and
its non-existence. (عن عدم و عدمه)” The words ‘an ‘adam wa ‘adamihi” can be interpreted
to mean that God did not create the world out of pure nonexistence but from
nonexistence plus the non-existence of none existence (‘adam wa ‘adam al-‘adam) i.e.
being. And the identification of being with God is one of the axioms of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s
thought. All this implies that the world was created out of nothingness plus the
existence that belongs to God.
Anyway, the doctrine of Divine nothingness has some important doctrinal
implications. One of these is that since God is nothing, that is “no-thing,” He does not
know Himself. To a consideration of this we turn now.
3.73.73.73.7 DivineDivineDivineDivine Darkness: Darkness: Darkness: Darkness:
3.7.13.7.13.7.13.7.1 Eriugena on Eriugena on Eriugena on Eriugena on DivineDivineDivineDivine SelfSelfSelfSelf----KnowledgeKnowledgeKnowledgeKnowledge
In our opinion, one of the strangest dimensions of Eriugena’s thought is his denial of
Divine self-knowledge: “So God does not know of Himself what He is because He is not
a ‘what’.” (DDN II: 589B-C)
69
An attempt to make Eriugena’s statement plausible by emphasizing, as Carabine
does, God’s knowledge, in His very ignorance of Himself, that he is not at all any of the
things or that he is more than all things. Such approach would be perfectly in line with
Eriugena’s own argument. What seems problematic, however, in this account is that in
discussing Divine self-knowledge a reference to “things” seems to be a projection of
human point of view upon God. It is human knowledge (or pseudo-knowledge or
whatever) of God that has to depend upon God and God while thinking about His
essence does not have to contrast him with things other than Himself.
At one place in book II Eriugena argues again that God does not know of
Himself what He is. Here the argument presupposes that when we ask regarding the
quiddity of anything we in fact make a demand for its definition, hence to know
something is to define it “in terms of circumstances which circumscribe it, so to speak,
within limits.” (Ibid. II: 586D) From this general observation about human knowledge
Eriugena leaps to Divine Knowledge: “If, then, God knows of himself what He is, doe
He not define Himself? --- for everything which is understood by itself or by another as
to what it is can be defined and therefore is not infinite.” (Ibid. II: 587B)
What we find questionable in this argument is the leap from finite sphere of
human knowledge to the infinite sphere of Divine knowledge and the presupposition
that since our knowledge of what something is amounts to having a definition of it; this
must also be the case with God.114 Where is the argument for this transition? Is not this
a violation of via negativa of which Eriugena is so fond?
114
Augustine says in another context “that which specially leads these men astray to refer their own
circles to the straight path of truth, is, that they measure by their own human, changeable, and narrow
intellect the Divine mind, which is absolutely unchangeable, infinitely capacious, and without succession
of thought, counting all things without number,” The City of God and the Christian Doctrine, ed. Phillip
70
Moreover, if one is really to construe Divine infinity spatially and push it to its
farthest logical limits then the only option is to say nothing at all about God, not even
that He is infinite, unknowable, absolute etc., and there remains no room for talking
about God either in affirmative or negative or superlative manner. We submit that
human beings, since they are finite beings cannot know the Infinite however the Infinite
can know Himself since He does not fall short of His own Infinity, if such way of
expressing the point be permissible.115 The correct entailments of Divine infinity and
simplicity seem to be, not that God does not know what He is, but that the question
whether or not He knows what he is, is misplaced. Divine Simplicity is already
compromised the moment this question is put before giving an affirmative answer to it.
3.7.23.7.23.7.23.7.2 Ibn ‘Arabi> and Ibn ‘Arabi> and Ibn ‘Arabi> and Ibn ‘Arabi> and DivineDivineDivineDivine SelfSelfSelfSelf----KnowledgeKnowledgeKnowledgeKnowledge
As far as Ibn ‘Arabi> is concerned, one of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s most favorite aphorisms,
attributed to al-Ghaza>li> (d. 1111) and Abu> Sa‘i>d al-Kharrāz (d. 890) is: “None knows
God but God.” (e.g. Fut. I: 271; II: 69) Although Ibn ‘Arabi> quotes this mostly in order
to emphasize its negative part regarding unknowability of Divine essence, but the
saying explicitly affirms God’s knowledge of Himself.
He differentiates between knowing quiddity of something and defining
something in his commentary upon an argument that took place between Pharaoh and
Schaff (New York: The Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1890), 238. The City of God also contains a
detailed refutation of the claim that God does not know infinite. See Book XII chapter 18. 115 The concept of Divine infinity has been used by Beierwaltes in a defense of Eriugena’s attempt to see
the self-unfolding of Tri-unity in the light of causality against the objection that it subordinates second
and third persons to the first person who is the cause. Beierwaltes holds: “it (i.e. the principle) sets a
second cause which is begotten but in the infinite realm not less than the first, but indeed necessarily
equal.” Beierwaltes, Unity and Trinity, 11 (emphasis added).
71
the Prophet Moses regarding the nature of God. (See Fus}. 208-209) Toshihiko Izutsu
comments:
Strictly speaking, asking about the ma>hiyyah of something is not exactly the
same as asking for its logical definition. To ask about the ma>hiyyah of a thing,
as understood by Ibn ‘Arabi>, is to ask about the reality of that object which is
unique and not shared by anything else. Definition in the logical sense is
different from this.116
On this account if question about the whatness of definable creatures is not a question
about their definition then the question as to what He is a fortiori is not about His
definition, since He cannot be defined. As Ibn ‘Arabi> has put it succinctly “the
knowledge of the infinite that it is infinite is without encompassing.” 117 Hence on the
question of Divine Self-Knowledge Ibn ‘Arabi>’s standpoint differs from that of
Eriugena.
An alternate interpretation of Eriugena’s position on Divine Darkness can be
made in the light of his saying 1) “Divine Nature… willing to emerge from the most
hidden recesses of its nature in which it is unknown even to itself, it knows itself in
nothing because it is infinite… [ in nullo se cognoscit quia infinita est]. (DDN III.689B)
If we emphasize in nullo instead off quia infinita est we can see the meaning of the
claim that God does not know himself in a new light. The meaning of saying that God
does not know Himself will simply be that there is nothing other than Him in which He
could know Himself. This interpretation fits in nicely with his claim that from His
ineffable nothingness God emerges and knows Himself in theophanies.
116
Toshihiko Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, 29. 117 Ibn ‘Arabi>, Kita>b al-‘Aba>dilah (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qa>hirah, 1994), 122.
72
The interpretation of Eriugena suggested here bridges the gap between him and
Ibn ‘Arabi>.
Let us conclude by pointing out something upon which Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>
seem to be in complete agreement. This concerns Eriugena’s assertion that God is not a
“what.” We find that Ibn ‘Arabi> negates, unlike other classical Muslim philosophers and
exegetes118, that God could be a called a “thing” since the traditional Islamic sources, in
his opinion do not warrant the application of this name to God. (Fut. II: 99; trans. SPK,
88)
118
Fakhruddi>n al-Ra>zi>, Ibn ‘Arabi>’s famous contemporary theologian, philosopher and exegete, with
whom he also corresponded, takes the position that God can be called a thing since the Qur'a>n says: “Say,
‘what thing is most weighty in evidence?’ Say: “Alla>h, witness between me and you.’” (6:19). He has
mentioned that Jaham ibn Safwan is the only one who denied that God is “thing” and adds that this is just
a verbal disagreement. See al-Tafsi>r al-Kabi>r relevant verses.
FourFourFourFour
MetaMetaMetaMetacosmcosmcosmcosm----II: Causes and Entities II: Causes and Entities II: Causes and Entities II: Causes and Entities According to Saint Augustine119 God did not create the material world directly but
creation took place in two phases. In the first phase the seminal reasons (rationes
seminales) of everything were created simultaneously. These are, to quote Copleston,
“germs of things or invisible powers or potentialities, created by God in the beginning in
the humid element and developing into the objects of various species by their temporal
unfolding.”120 The second phase consisted of successive creation of the effects of those
seminal reasons. Eriugena’s second division of nature termed by him as “primordial
causes” can be seen as continuation of Augustine’s seminal reasons. In Ibn ‘Arabi> we
also find a concept that channels the creation of material world and this is his famous
concept of عيا ن الثابتةEا, variously translated as “fixed entities,”121 “permanent
archetypes”122 or “immutable identities”123 etc. In the present chapter we undertake a
comparative analysis of Eriugena’s primordial causes and Ibn ‘Arabi>’s fixed entities.
The first section deals with the nature, functions and characteristics of primordial causes
in Eriugenian Cosmology while the second section investigates whether or not those
characteristics are shared by Ibn ‘Arabi>’s concept of fixed entities.
119
Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis, volume I (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1982) Book V chapters
7, 20 and 23. 120
Frederick Copleston, A History of Western Philosophy, Vol. II Medieval Philosophy, 76. 121
William Chittick in Self Disclosure of God. 122
Toshihiko Izutsu in Sufism and Taoism: A Comparison of Key Philosophical Terms (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984). 123
Caner Dagli’s translation in The Ring-stones.
74
4.14.14.14.1 The Nature The Nature The Nature The Nature of Primordial Causes of Primordial Causes of Primordial Causes of Primordial Causes and and and and their their their their Functions in Functions in Functions in Functions in
EriugenianEriugenianEriugenianEriugenian CosmologyCosmologyCosmologyCosmology
4.1.14.1.14.1.14.1.1 Meaning and Scriptural Basis of the Primordial Causes Meaning and Scriptural Basis of the Primordial Causes Meaning and Scriptural Basis of the Primordial Causes Meaning and Scriptural Basis of the Primordial Causes
We have already met with the concept in Book One where Eriugena discusses the modes
of being. We have seen that in accordance with the third mode, “whatever of the
primordial causes through generation is known as to matter and form, as to times and
places is said to be” while “whatsoever is still held in those folds of nature and is not
manifest as to as to form or matter, place or time, and the other accidents,” is said not to
be.124 Hence the primordial causes are the secret folds of nature for things which have
not yet emerged in the spatio-temporal boundaries. Also, they are “the principles of all
things because all things whatsoever that are perceived or understood, whether in the
visible or the invisible creation, subsist by participation in them.” (DDN II: 616B).
Eriugena identifies the primordial causes with a myriad of concepts from traditional
philosophy and his own original ones. These identifications, given below, encapsulate
the nature and function of the primordial causes:
1. He reminds us that they are what the wise men of the Greeks call
prototypa, that is, “the principal exemplars which the Father made in the
Son and divides through the Holy Spirit.”
2. They are also called poorismata or “predestinations” or “predefinitions,”
“for in them whatever is being and has been and shall be made by the
Divine Providence is at one and the same time and immutably
predestined. For nothing naturally arises in the visible and invisible
except what is pre-defined and pre-ordained in them before all times and
places.” As we shall see below, the primordial causes are the connection
between the superessential God and the world. Since “there is not found
124
See supra chapter II, section 2.2.
75
in the nature of things any power, whether general or specific which does
not proceed by an ineffable participation from the primordial causes,”
whatever things are good, alive, wise, true, just, powerful, healthy,
eternal or subsist or understand or practice reason are so and do so by
participation in primordial causes. (See DDN II: 616 C-D)
3. Eriugena identifies them with what the philosophers customarily call
“Divine volitions” (theia thelemata) because everything that God wished
to make He made in them primordially and causally; and things that are
to be have been made in them before all ages.
4. They are what the Greeks call ideas ideae that is the eternal species or
forms and the immutable reasons after which the visible and the invisible
world is formed and governed.125
5. At one place the primordial causes are simply spoken of as the “origins of
things (occasiones rerum)” (See DDN II: 562B) and at another as
primordial essences which were created before all things. (See ibid, II.
528D)
6. In his translations of the works of Pseudo Dionysius Eriugena calls the
primordial causes paradigms (paradigmata). In a long quotation from
Pseudo Dionysius’ De Divina Nominibus given at the very end of DDN II
an explanation of paradigmata can be found: “the reasons in God which
substantiate existing things and were preformed after a unitary mode
which the Divine word calls “predestinations” and “Divine and good
volitions” which determine and make the existents and after the pattern
of which the Superessential has both predestined and brought forth all
things.” (Ibid. II: 619A-620A)126
125 The first four labels are provided in DDN II:529B while their explanation is taken from II. 615D-616B. 126
Pseudo Dionysius also writes that “the Cause of the earth, of it (i.e. the Sun) and of all things
preformed on high in itself the exemplars (paradigmata) of all existents in one superessential unity, and it
then brings forth the essences by an emanation from Essence.” De Divina Nominibus 824C This passage
is quoted by Eriugena at DDN II. 618D-619A.
76
These labels gathered from various places of the second book of DDN give us a fair idea
of what primordial causes are and what function they are meant to play. Their
discussion properly starts at 545B and after another long digression continues from
615D to 618 and then in Book 3 from 619A-630A. Let us turn now to the question of
their scriptural basis.
According to Thomas Duddy Eriugena reveals his Neo-Platonic sympathies
while trying to characterize the second division of nature and he does so by slipping a
Neo-Platonic element into the relationship between creator and creation. The question
of Neo-platonic influence aside, Eriugena attempts to establish himself before anything
else upon the authority of Holy Scripture itself. In the beginning and by way of
preamble the Nutritor says that “the text of present book makes no further demand than
that to the best of our ability we discuss whatever the light of minds shall have granted
concerning the primordial causes” and that “ we take the beginning of our discussion
from the Divine Oracles”, i.e. the Holy Scriptures. (Ibid. II: 545B) The passages that
follow take the opening verses of Genesis as springboard for the introduction of the
primordial causes. Eriugena offers his symbolic commentary on “In the beginning God
made heaven and earth (in principio creavit Deus caelum et terram).” Without naming
or contradicting anyone, he mentions some interpretations of the words “heaven and
earth” mentioned in Genesis I: 1. The first opinion, identified by Sheldon-Williams as
that of Philo and the Alexandrines, is that these two words constitute “a compendious
expression comprehending the whole [perfecte d] creature.” According to this
opinion, by the creation of “heaven” the creation and formation of the whole of spiritual
and intelligible creatures is intended while making of “earth” means “the constitution of
the whole corporeal and sensible creatures.” According to the second opinion, attributed
77
to St. Gregory of Nyssa, what is signified is “the formlessness of each creature, the
inception of the spiritual by the name “heaven” and that of this corporeal world by the
appellation of earth.” This opinion is soon going to confuse the Alumnus with the
laudable effect of furthering the clarification of the relation between primordial causes
and prime matter. Two more opinions, of St. Basil and St. Maximus the Confessor, are
mentioned but the Nutritor considers it “tedious and irrelevant to the subject of the
present work to prolong the discussion.” This reluctance to contradict the opinions of
the fathers bespeaks, of course, of Eriugena’s reverence for them. It also points to the
arbitrariness of his interpretation of the words without any hermeneutic necessity. This
fact would become clearer when we contrast the scriptural basis of primordial causes to
that of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s immutable identities in the second section of the present chapter.
4.1.24.1.24.1.24.1.2 Causes as the origin of intelliCauses as the origin of intelliCauses as the origin of intelliCauses as the origin of intelligible and sensible creaturesgible and sensible creaturesgible and sensible creaturesgible and sensible creatures
Without intending to refute these opinions Eriugena solemnly offers his own
interpretation: “I think that in the aforementioned words of the Scripture, we should
understand the primordial causes of the whole creature, which the father created in his
only begotten son, who is given the name of ‘beginning.’” According to Eriugena
“heaven signifies the primordial causes of the intelligible and celestial essences while
earth points to those of the sensible things by which the universe of this corporeal world
is made up.” Sheldon-Williams has noted that here “primordial causes” are not identical
with the intelligibles, but the common cause of intelligibles and sensibles. This apt
observation serves to distinguish Eriugena’s causes from Plato’s ideas which are
normally understood to be the intelligible archetype of the sensible objects. We can add
that Eriugena’s interpretation can be considered a combination of the opinions of
Philo/Alexandrines and St. Gregory of Nyssa and not a complete contradiction thereof.
78
4.1.34.1.34.1.34.1.3 Primordial Causes and Primordial Causes and Primordial Causes and Primordial Causes and materia primamateria primamateria primamateria prima
Now, although Eriugena had refused to enter into controversy with competing
interpretations of Genesis, the Alumnus expresses his “slight trouble” over seeing how
Eriugena’s interpretation differs from the one which identified heaven and earth with
the formlessness of things because “we say that the formless matter and its formlessness
are a kind of cause of things.” In reply the Nutritor shows that prime matter cannot be
called “cause” in a proper sense and that there is a world of difference between his
interpretation and that of St. Gregory of Nyssa. First, the difference cannot be slight
between “formlessness of things” and “cause” of things since nothing is closer to true
non-being than the former while nothing is closer to true being than the created causes
of created things. He then refers to the principle that “the cause, if it truly be the cause,
most perfectly pre-encompasses in itself all things of which it is the cause and perfects
in itself its effects before they become manifest in anything.” Therefore, we cannot call
formless matter a “cause” of essence and form and perfection of things but rather it is
privation of the essence, form and perfection of things. After listening to these
arguments the Alumnus suddenly gets wiser and not only concedes to them but tries to
elaborate the distinction further than his teacher. As he puts it, the formlessness of
things is nothing else but a certain motion which is departing from absolute non-being
and seeking its rest in that which truly is. The primordial causes, on the other hand, are
so created in the Beginning, that is in the word of God which is truly said to be and is,
that they do not by any motion seek their perfection in anything.” Since the causes of
place and time are in them they have nowhere to depart but they themselves by no
means look toward the things that are below them, but eternally contemplate their Form
which is above them. (Ibid. II: 547B-D) He also adds that the primordial causes have a
79
cause of everything and this includes prime matter itself so the latter cannot be identical
to the former. (See ibid. II: 548A)
4.1.44.1.44.1.44.1.4 Immutable perfection of the causesImmutable perfection of the causesImmutable perfection of the causesImmutable perfection of the causes
The Nutritor then comments on Genesis I.2-3: “But the earth was waste and void and
darkness was over the face of the abyss (terra autem erat inanis et vacua et tenebrae
super faciem abyssi).” He mentions that the earlier commentators have identified “waste
and void” with the formlessness of visible creatures and “dark abyss” with the
formlessness of invisible essence and “earth.” He also talks about those who pointed to
“this hulk of earthly body” to be intended by the aforementioned words. Like before, he
announces his reluctance to adjudicate between the opinions of the Holy fathers and his
interest in selecting out of these the one which seems after rational consideration to
accord the better with the Divine Oracles. (See ibid. II: 549A) As one would expect,
these words “refer to nothing other than the primordial causes.” (Ibid.) The words
“waste and void” “signify rather the most complete and immutable perfection of the
primordial nature that was created before all things in the Word than the mutable and
imperfect and as yet formless procession of this sensible world extended in places and
times and coming into being through generation and seeking to be formed in the diverse
individuals of the sensible creatures.” (Ibid. II: 549B) After giving some examples from
classical literature of the usage of these words, Eriugena concludes that there is no
wonder that if the primordial causes of visible things are figuratively signified by “waste
and void earth” on account of their excessive subtlety and the ineffable simplicity of
their intelligible nature before they flowed forth through generation into species and
sensible individuals.
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4.1.54.1.54.1.54.1.5 Questions of Knowability: Questions of Knowability: Questions of Knowability: Questions of Knowability:
Darkness of the primordial causesDarkness of the primordial causesDarkness of the primordial causesDarkness of the primordial causes
As for the word “abyss” it is applied by the scripture to the primordial causes of
intelligible essence on account of its unfathomable depth. Likewise they earn the name
of darkness because of their purity. (See ibid. II: 550C) In his explanation of “darkness”
Eriugena points out that the sun often brings darkness upon those who look into it since
they are unable to face its excessive brilliance, “thus there was darkness over the abyss
of the primordial causes. For before they entered into the plurality of the spiritual
essences no created intellect could know of them what they were, and darkness is still
over this abyss because it is perceived by no intellect except that which formed it in the
beginning. (See ibid. II: 550D-551A) Here Eriugena has maintained that the primordial
causes are unknowable, hence an inquiry into this issue ensues. Eriugena asks whether
this unknowability is permanent or pertains only to this visible world. He thinks that the
causes are always invisible and dark. (Ibid. II: 551C)
The Nutritor likes this answer and adds that the causes both proceed into the
things of which they are the causes and at the same time do not depart from their
Principle that is, the wisdom of the father in which they are created, remaining
themselves eternally concealed in the darkness of their excellence, they do not cease to
appear by being brought forth into light as it were of knowledge in their effects. (See
ibid. II: 552A) As far as their unknowability is concerned, the primordial causes are just
like the uncreated creator we dealt with in the previous chapter.
SelfSelfSelfSelf----KnowledgeKnowledgeKnowledgeKnowledge
The Nutritor next attends to the question about the self-knowledge of the primordial
causes. Since it is not to be believed that anything was created in the Divine Wisdom
81
which is not wise and does not know itself “all things that were made in Wisdom, as
wisdom knows herself and the things that are made in her, so not only know themselves
but also do not lack knowledge of the things of which they are the principles.” (See ibid.
II: 552B)
Creation of the primordial causes took place through the Holy Spirit. In order to
establish this dimension of the causes, Eriugena refers to a slightly different version of
Genesis I: 2 viz., Et spiritus dei fouebat acquas, “and the Spirit of God fermented the
waters.” This means in Eriugena’s understanding that the Holy Spirit nourished the
primordial causes in the fermentation of the Divine Love so that they might proceed
into their effects, like the eggs are fermented by the birds. (See DDN II: 554B). In
addition to bringing out the function of Holy Spirit, this passage also reminds us that
the causes were made in the Son of God. Hence the creation of primordial causes
involves God the father, God the Holy Spirit and God the Son, all three persons of
Trinity. In view of this a long digression starts into the nature of this trinity.127 Eriugena
resumes the discussion of primordial causes at DDN II: 615D by identifying them with
some Greek philosophical concepts.128
Primordial Causes Known to GodPrimordial Causes Known to GodPrimordial Causes Known to GodPrimordial Causes Known to God
In order to show that the primordial causes, unknowable to every intellect, are after all
known to God, Eriugena offers his symbolic interpretation of Genesis I.2, “And the
spirit of God was borne above the waters (et [spiritus Dei] superferebatur super aquas).”
God comprehends them in His super-eminent (and) infinite Gnostic power since He
127 Since we have treated the subject of trinity in Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabī in the previous chapter, we will
not touch upon it in the present chapter. 128
We have mentioned these in the beginning of this section.
82
made them in the beginning as a kind of foundations and principles of all the natures
which are from Him. (See ibid. II: 553A)
One of the reasons for the aforementioned words of the Genesis Eriugena thinks
is that in their absence one could have thought that “the primordial causes of all (things)
are of such excellence that no higher cause precedes them so as to surpass them. For
there is one and the same cause of all things out of which, through which and in which
and for which the causes and preceding origins of all things were first created.” (Ibid)
Again, a further meaning of the superferebatur super acquas is given, viz.: “it is borne
above all things because it precedes the order of the universal creature which takes the
beginning of its being from it and in it finds its end.” (Ibid. II: 553B. Emphasis added)
Obviously the former explanation was epistemological one while this latter is
ontological since it involves the existence of primordial causes rather than the question
of their knowability. While summing up his interpretation Eriugena combines both in
this way: “Only the Creator Spirit is super-eminent over created causes in the excellence
of His knowledge and is the one and only cause which precedes and excels over all the
causes.” (Ibid. II: 553C)
4.1.64.1.64.1.64.1.6 Primordial Causes and the EvilPrimordial Causes and the EvilPrimordial Causes and the EvilPrimordial Causes and the Evil
The notion of primordial causes being made in Wisdom gives rise to an interesting
question: “If the primordial causes have wisdom of themselves because they are created
in wisdom and subsist eternally in that which admits nothing unwise in itself, how is it
that from the wise causes many unwise things proceed?”(DDN II: 554B) Eriugena
suggests an answer with the help of an analogy: “It is not strange that the causes of
unwise things subsist in wise exemplars when we see that the origins of darkness
83
naturally inhere in the rays of the sun and that while these allow no darkness in
themselves, yet they produce it as opposite.” (See ibid. II: 552C)
Thus he admits that the responsibility for things thought to be evil exists in
primordial causes he is not ready to believe that this implies that these causes
themselves are evil. However, this very example shows that the relation he is willingly
admitting between primordial causes and evil in not a direct relation but an indirect one.
The sun is directly responsible for light while darkness is inevitable but indirect result of
a ray from the sun. Those who are fond of making connections with Neo-Platonism
might discern behind this explanation an identification of evil with non-existence, in our
opinion the most valuable implication of this proposed solution is that evil can be
considered as the logically necessary counterpart of the good.
4.1.74.1.74.1.74.1.7 Timeless creation of the primordial causes: Timeless creation of the primordial causes: Timeless creation of the primordial causes: Timeless creation of the primordial causes:
In connection with there being a cause of primordial causes two caveats must be made.
First, since Eriugena has mentioned the precedence of the spiritus dei over the
primordial causes, he is quick to add that it is not implied that one thing is created
sooner or later than another in a temporal sense, for “all things are eternally in it and
were created by it at the same time.” (Ibid. II: 553B) The second caveat is that the
timeless creation of primordial causes should not be taken to mean “being made out of
nonexistence” but “they are participations of the one cause of all things, namely the
most high and holy trinity.” (Ibid. II: 616B)
4.1.84.1.84.1.84.1.8 No creature between God and the primordial causes.No creature between God and the primordial causes.No creature between God and the primordial causes.No creature between God and the primordial causes.
Although the primordial causes are intermediary between God and the spatio-temporal
world there is nothing between them and God. The Scripture mentions the spirit being
borne above the water because, Eriugena says, “the Divine providence brought forth
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from non-existence into existence the universe of created nature in an order (which is)
ineffable and incomprehensible to every intellect” and because they are in the immediate
and proximate presence of God without the interposition of any higher creature (See
DDN II: 553B-C) This notion of the direct relation of primordial causes to God has its
merits and demerits. On the one hand it makes Eriugena safe from susceptibility to
third-man like arguments. On the other hand it gives rise to confusion. One might
wonder how it is possible to say that there is nothing between God and primordial
causes once it is admitted with Eriugena that these causes were made by the Father in
the Son.
4.1.94.1.94.1.94.1.9 Hierarchy of Primordial Causes:Hierarchy of Primordial Causes:Hierarchy of Primordial Causes:Hierarchy of Primordial Causes:
Eriugena has already enumerated some of the primordial causes in Book II, but, as the
Alumnus complains, “in an confused and indiscriminate sequence:” Goodness-through-
itself, being -through-itself, Life-through-itself, Wisdom-through-itself, Truth-through-
itself, Intellect-through-itself, Reason-through-itself, Power-through-itself, Justice-
through-itself, Health-through-itself, Magnitude -through-itself, Omnipotence-through-
itself, Eternity -through-itself and Peace-through-itself. (See ibid. II: 616C) Urged by
the Alumnus to explain the natural order of the causes and by appealing to the authority
of Pseudo Dionysius, Eriugena presents ten primordial causes in an order of hierarchy.
The first is goodness-through-itself by participation in which whatsoever things are
good are good. (See ibid. III. 622 B-C) The highest primordial cause is followed by
Essence (being), Life, Reason, Intellect,129 Wisdom, Power, Blessedness, Truth, Eternity
and Infinity. Important questions arise regarding the specific ordering of the primordial
129
On the difference between reason and intellect see DDN, II.577B-C and section 1.4.3.
85
causes but before addressing them let us first analyze the passage referred to above in
order to map the place of primordial causes within the cosmic hierarchy.
Eriugena tells us in that passage that the creatures forming the external world
participate in primordial causes which in turn participate in God. But God in whom each
specific primordial cause participates will be mentioned by a specific name. In the
passage at hand the primordial cause being discussed is goodness-through-itself and God
is mentioned as Supreme Goodness or Goodness-through-itself. Same will be the case
with all primordial causes. For instance, we will say that whatever has being in this
world is so by participation in being- in- itself which participates in nothing but is
participation of being which is Super-essential Goodness. Hence in order for a specific
primordial cause to be a participation of super-essential Good it must participate
specifically in Super-essential Good. What is the nature and what are the principles of
this specification? Eriugena seems to be silent so we have to place a question mark in
the following table of Eriugena’s cosmic hierarchy. We are pressing this point since we
hope to find a clearer position in this regard in our discussion of a similar notion in Ibn
‘Arabi>. The hierarchy of the causes themselves within a wider cosmic hierarchy is
presented diagrammatically on the next page.
87
4.1.104.1.104.1.104.1.10 Infinity of Primordial CausesInfinity of Primordial CausesInfinity of Primordial CausesInfinity of Primordial Causes
The above table on the previous page gives us three divisions of nature, God, causes and
the world shown in the three rows and these can be reduced to just the first one, as we
have already seen in a previous chapter.130 Let us notice here that the ten causes that
Eriugena mentions here are only the first ten out of infinite number of them. Since the
causes can be reduced to their principle which is none other than God, Eriugena sees no
problem in calling them infinite: “For as the First Cause of all things, from which and in
which and through which they are created, is infinite so neither do they know any end to
limit them…” (Ibid. III: 623D) The presumption seems to be that the effect must
resemble its cause.
4.1.114.1.114.1.114.1.11Simplicity and Unity of Primordial CausesSimplicity and Unity of Primordial CausesSimplicity and Unity of Primordial CausesSimplicity and Unity of Primordial Causes
About the hierarchy Eriugena observes that it “is constituted not in themselves but in
the aspects, that is, in the concept of the mind which investigates them and which
conceives in itself such knowledge of them as is permitted…” (Ibid. III: 624A) A little
latter he says, “The order of the primordial causes is constituted in the judgment of the
mind which contemplates them… a devout and pure-minded philosopher may start from
any one of them at will.” (Ibid. III: 624 C) The real intention of Eriugena in emphasizing
role of mind is not to deny their objective status as much as to emphasize their unity,
first with their principle and then among themselves. Thus he writes, explaining the
above quoted passage III: 624A, “For in themselves these first causes are one and simple
and none knows the order in which they are placed or distinguished one from another.
For, this is something that happens to them in their effects. “(Ibid. III: 624A-B) Second,
130
See chapter 2 section 2.1.
88
near the end of discussion of hierarchy Eriugena makes the Alumnus exclaim, “who
would reasonably look for order or number in those things which are created by the
Creator of all things because of the loftiness of their nature beyond every order and
every number, seeing that the beginnings of all number and all order are in themselves
united with one another and cannot be seen apart in the eyes of any lower nature.” (Ibid.
III: 626C) Eriugena also says, “For they are one and a simple one and not a one that is
composite of many.”(Ibid. III: 624B) There is no way to distinguish the primordial
causes from one another accept through looking at their effects. Hence, in themselves
they are one but they are multiplied by proceeding into their effects. Eriugena provides
his readers with two models to illustrate the simplicity of primordial causes, firstly
subsistence of all numbers in the monad (Ibid. III: 624 A-B) and secondly, the unity of
all lines at the centre point. (Ibid. III: 625A)
These two facts, namely their simplicity/ unity and their containing the cause of
order, provide the basic rationale for the claim that there is no order among the
primordial causes in themselves but only in the mind that contemplates them. Eriugena
is not consciously putting forward an idealistic view of nature, as Moran and others
think.131 He is not absolutely denying the objective existence of order but denying it
only from a certain perspective. Moreover, the existence of order only in the judgment
of contemplating mind does not prevent primordial causes from creating order within
their effects. Thus, Eriugena asserts that every ordered thing is ordered through
participation in its primordial cause which is order-through-itself and which in turn
participates in Order which is the Cause of all things. (See DDN, III: 624B) If the
provision of hierarchy leads someone to suppose that there is real multiplicity within the
131
Cf. Dermot Moran, The Philosophy, 261.
89
causes, it would be said that hierarchy exists only in mind. Hence even though the order
of causes is in mind, it is not an illusion.
4.1.124.1.124.1.124.1.12 Priority of “Goodness” and ObjectivityPriority of “Goodness” and ObjectivityPriority of “Goodness” and ObjectivityPriority of “Goodness” and Objectivity of Hierarchy of Hierarchy of Hierarchy of Hierarchy
The idealistic implications of above discussed passages are further jeopardized when
Eriugena explains why he started with a particular primordial cause by giving an
objective criterion. The Alumnus expresses the desire to know why his dialogue partner
started with a particular cause, goodness-through-itself rather than any other since “it is
not the way of those who dispute in an orderly manner to waste time in saying anything
without reason.” (Ibid. III: 627A) The question presupposes that although every mind is
free to order the causes as it likes, there is no room for arbitrariness, solid reasons must
be there for the order particularly envisaged. After making an esoteric confession of his
humility, the Nutritor gives two reasons. First, he had learnt from the authority of holy
fathers, especially Pseudo Dionysius that goodness-through-itself is the most general of
the Divine gifts and in some manner precedes others. (See ibid. III: 627C) He asserts
emphatically that goodness must be prior to and considered more basic than being, for
“all things that are, are insofar as they are good, but in so far as they are not good, or
rather they are less good, to that extent they are not, and so if goodness is removed, no
essence remains.” (Ibid. III: 628A) This assertion is bound to seem a little curious in the
first sight. Eriugena grants that one could object that in order for there being goodness,
there first must be something which is good, so it would seem more appropriate to say
that if being is removed no goodness remains. He takes the bold step of including
nothingness within goodness and indeed the bolder one of saying that non-existent
things are better than those which are, “for the further they transcend essence by reason
of their excellence, the nearer they approach the Superessential Good, namely God,
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whereas the more they participate in essence the further they are separated from the
Superessential good.” (Ibid. III: 628 B)132
Eriugena proceeds to establish goodness as the highest genus (summum genus)
that has as species two groups, things that are and things that are not. Hence the second
primordial cause is one species of genus goodness. Likewise, being is the genus which
includes things that live and things that do not; life includes reason, reason wisdom, so
on and so forth. The Alumnus quickly formulates the rule underlying the ordering, or as
Eriugena calls it, the division of primordial causes: “Everyone who employs the method
of division correctly ought to begin from the most general and proceed through more
general, and so… arrive at the most specific.” No arguments need to be mustered in
order to show that the original apparent idealism of the hierarchy of primordial causes
loses its strength by the time we arrive at this point in argument.
4.24.24.24.2 Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Fixed Entities in Comparison with Primordial Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Fixed Entities in Comparison with Primordial Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Fixed Entities in Comparison with Primordial Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Fixed Entities in Comparison with Primordial
CausesCausesCausesCauses
The concept of primordial causes implies that Eriugena does not believe in a single and
direct act of creation but in a sort of double creation because God creates first the
primordial causes and then their effects are brought about. Will there be a place for this
or a parallel concept in Muslim religious cosmology? It would seem that the Qur’a>n
precludes any such view by saying that “His command, when He desires a thing, is to
say to it ‘Be!’ and it is.” (36:82). Hence all that the Creative act involves is Divine will,
a Divine command (Be!) and things come to be. Nothing lies between Divine command
and the coming into existence of a thing. Ibn ‘Arabi>, however, does not read the Qur’a>n
132
Cf. Schuon viz., “To speak of the world is to speak of separation from the Principle and to speak of
separation is to speak of the possibility –and necessity – of evil.” See his “The Problem of Theodicies,” in
Islam and the Perennial Philosophy (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 1984), 165.
91
36:82 in that way and puts forward the concept of fixed entities (عيان الثابتةEا) that
interpolates, in a way, between Divine command and the thing that comes into
existence.
4.2.14.2.14.2.14.2.1 The Scriptural Foundation of the ConceptThe Scriptural Foundation of the ConceptThe Scriptural Foundation of the ConceptThe Scriptural Foundation of the Concept
Just as Eriugena introduced his concept of primordial causes through his understanding
of Scripture, Ibn ‘Arabi> comes up with the concept of fixed entities by his reading of the
Qur’a>n, interestingly, of the very passage referred to above as implying direct creation
through Divine will and command. He requires from us to pay closer attention to the
letter of those Qur’a>nic words. As if he is asking that if creation takes place out of
absolute nothingness, so that the desired thing does not exist in any sense of the word,
then to whom is God’s command is addressed? In his discussion of Divine nothingness
in Eriugena this very question is raised by Michael Sells in connection with what he
aptly calls the problem of “ontological shadow,” a problem that according to him haunts
Eriugenian doctrine of participation.133 As we have seen, participatio is the relation
between primordial causes and their creator on the one hand134 and between them and
their spatio-temporal effects on the other and both these sides raise this problem. As for
the participation of primordial causes in being, “‘how can being flow into primordial
causes and ‘make them to be?’ They would have to ‘be’ in order to act as vessels
receiving the flow of being.”135 Regarding the participation of the effects in their
primordial causes, we can ask, “What were they before they received their being?”
133
See his Mystical Languages of Unsaying, 38. 134
At DDN III: 632B-C Eriugena also expresses this particular relation with the help of “an emanation
metaphor” according to which, in Sell’s summary, “After welling up within the source… everything
“which is in the source of all things” then “flow out first into the primordial causes” and then “make them
be”. Mystical Languages, 40. 135
Ibid.
92
When Ibn ‘Arabi> asks “Whom is God addressing with His command “Be!” at the
moment of creation, supposedly, out of absolute nothingness?” he is obviously raising
this very ontological shadow problem. However when he comes up with his concept of
fixed entities, it is a result of accepting the logical requirement of this very problem.136
To provide further scriptural foundation to his concept of fixed entities, Ibn
‘Arabi> refers to another Qur’a>nic verse, “There is nothing whose treasuries are not with
us (15: 21)”:
But treasuries are nothing but the fixed objects of knowledge, which, then, are
fixed with Him, he sees them and sees what is in them so He brings out from
them whatever he likes and he keeps whose being in them he desires. (Fut.
IV: 295)
The identification of Divine treasuries as the container of fixed entities reminds us of an
expression Eriugena used to talk about things when before coming into spatio-temporal
existence, they are still in their primordial causes. According to the third mode of
demarcation, things which are still held in those secret folds of nature and are not as yet
manifest are said not to be. The “secret folds of nature” at this point without doubt is
the Eriugenian counterpart of the “treasuries of everything” of which Ibn ‘Arabi> talks.
Hence before existence attaches to them, things are in the treasuries of God, as
fixed objects of His knowledge. These fixed objects of Divine knowledge are called
“fixed entities” and these are addressed by the Divine Command “Be!” Creation
therefore consists in bringing them out, in the sense of bestowing spatio-temporal
existence upon them. Thus Ibn ‘Arabi> talks about two phases of creation separated by
the Divine command, first, the creation of determination (خلق تقدير) and second which is
136
Cf. the Kantian view that something must exist first in order to become predicated with perfection or
any other such attribute.
93
coextensive with the Divine command, the creation of existence giving (خلق إيجاد) (Ibid.
IV: 210; trans. SDG, 50) The first creation consists, not in making (facere), but in
determining the nature of what is to be created. Once the nature is determined, Divine
command is directed to the object determined in the Divine knowledge, so the “thing”
mentioned in Qur’a>n 36:82 is the fixed entity.
Does this mean that the entities are mutable? Ibn ‘Arabi> likens fixed entities
with the pole around which a round millstone revolves, while the pole itself neither
revolves nor moves from one point to another. (Fut. IV: 416) Izutsu observes about
these entities that “they have been fixed once and for all in the eternal past, and are
therefore absolutely unalterable and immovable. “There is no altering in the words of
God.”(10:64)137 However, Ibn ‘Arabi> himself has also allowed mutability in the fixed
entities by saying, “Each entity receives changes of state, qualities, accidents, and the
like, for it becomes clothed in the affair that is off to its side and toward which it
changes.” (Fut. IV: 210; trans. SDG, 51) To understand this conflict between
immutability and mutability a distinction must be made. It will be observed that the
change which Ibn ‘Arabi> allows does not include change of essence but only of accidents
and states etc. Hence one entity never changes into another; it might change its state.
The above discussion shows that, just like Eriugena’s primordial causes, Ibn
‘Arabi>’s concept of fixed entities is based on his understanding of Scripture. However,
unlike Eriugena, here Ibn ‘Arabi>’s interpretation does not seem arbitrary and allegorical
rather it is literal and necessitated by logic. Ibn ‘Arabi> does not simply identify a word
in the Scripture with a philosophical concept but raises a hermeneutical question on the
text and then suggests his solution relying upon other Qur’a>nic verses. His
137
Toshihiko Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, 168.
94
interpretation is in line with the basic principles of Qur’a>n interpretation stressing the
necessity of honesty to language and taking into account different passages of the
Scripture itself.
Although Ibn ‘Arabi> tries to show that his concept has scriptural foundations and
he develops it to its farthest limits, he frankly admits its historical roots in Muslim
theology. (See Fut. IV: 210) These roots lie in the controversy over whether or not the
nonexistent (المعدوم) is a thing, a controversy which in Wolfson’s opinion, hid the
question of ex nihilo creation, behind it.138 Ibn ‘Arabi> takes sides with the Mu‘tazilites
and thinks that their position can be supported by evidence from the Islamic sources:
It has been narrated from the prophet who narrated it from God the Exalted that
He said: I was a treasure but was not known so I loved to be known and I
created the creatures and made myself known to them. In the words, “I was a
treasure,” one finds an affirmation of the immutable entities which were upheld
by the Mu‘tazilites. (Ibid. II: 232; trans. SPK, 294)
Hence, the fixed entities are the objects of Divine knowledge which under
Divine command come into engendered existence.
4.2.24.2.24.2.24.2.2 Ontological StatusOntological StatusOntological StatusOntological Status
An important issue in the comparison of primordial causes and fixed entities is that of
their ontological status. As far as the primordial causes are concerned we have to
synthesize two Eriugenian positions. On the one hand we see Eriugena, in book III,
assigning them a place “closest to the true being” in contrast to the prime matter which
is said to be next to nothing. He considers them so perfect in all respects that they do
not seek perfection in anything, including existence. According to this standpoint,
primordial causes really are. On the contrary when we recall the third mode of being, in
138
See The Philosophy of Kalam, 359 passim.
95
Book I, we remember Eriugena saying that “whatever of these (i.e. primordial) causes
through generation is known as to matter and form, as to times and places,” is said to be
while “whatsoever is still held in those folds of nature and is not manifest as to form or
matter, place or time, and the other accidents” is said not to be. According to this mode
primordial causes belong to the category of non-existent things whike their spatio-
temporal effects are among things which exist. Eriugena comes back to this mode in a
latter place. When the alumnus questions him about things “being made and being
eternal at the same time,” Eriugena tells him that “they were always; they were not
always.” “They “were always” as causes in the word of God, in potentiality, beyond
every quality and quantity.” They “were not always because before they flowed out
throught generation into the forms… they were not in generation.” (DDN III: 665B)139
This shows that it would be closer to the intentions of Eriugena to say that primordial
causes both are and are not.
Ibn ‘Arabi> frequently emphasizes that the fixed entities are called “fixed” since
they are fixed “in nonexistence:” “The identities (=entities) which have an immutable
non-existence within Him, have not sensed the odor of any existent.” (Fus}. 76; trans.
Ringstones, 53) This view of non-existence of fixed entities can be seen as a response to
a difficulty raised by the Qur’a>nic declaration that a thing is nonexistent before
creation: “Will not man remember that we created him aforetime, when he was
nothing.” (19:67) While Ibn ‘Arabi>’s interpretation of Qur’a>n 36:82 was that things in
some way do exist before creation. Therefore Ibn ‘Arabi> divides what he calls
“thingness” (شئيئة) into two sorts which give us two phases in the history of anything
namely, thingness of fixity and thingness of existence. ( شئيئة الثبوت ) and “thingness of
139
Some important problems in this passage are discussed by Sells, Mystical Languages, 54-55.
96
existence” (شئيئة الوجود). Before coming into spatio-temporal world of existence the thing
is in the former state. Ibn ‘Arabi> does not contrast immutability with mutability but
with existence and consequently a fixed entity “remains fixed in its non-existence.”
(Fut. III: 566; trans. SPK, 29-30) They come to be once God, The Exalted Light,
discloses Himself to them “while they are in the state of their non-existence.” (See Fut.
I: 732)
It is certainly very odd to consider non-existent something which has been
posited as the listener of “Be!” before emergence in spatiotemporal existence. The
whole point of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s interpretation of Divine command was to show that the
addressee must exist before existing (ref. ontological shadow), hence labeling of fixed
entities as nonexistence must not be the whole story and we have to look for the other
half of it.
On the other hand we find in Ibn ‘Arabi> several indications that one must not
press the non-existence of fixed entities too far. Firstly, he clarifies that by the non-
existence of the fixed entities he does not mean absolute nonexistence. He connects the
ontological sense of non-existence (i.e. not-being) to the epistemological one (i.e. not
being known or found) by identifying it as an existence which we do not perceive. “So
things are never in sheer nonexistence, on the contrary, the apparent situation is that
their nonexistence is a relative nonexistence, the things are witnessed by God.” (Ibid.
III: 193; trans. SPK-87)140 Secondly, Ibn ‘Arabi> also allows a specific sort of existence to
the fixed entities which he calls “imaginalized existence” (Ibid. IV: 210; trans. SDG, 51)
and it is well known that the “imaginal” with Ibn ‘Arabi> is not the “imaginary” or
“unreal.”
140
“What is with you comes to an end but what is with God remains.” (16:96)
97
One of the reasons behind Eriugena’s claim that primordial causes are closest to
the real Being is revealed by his assertion that no creature interpolates between the
Creator and the primordial causes. Now, even if Ibn ‘Arabi> does assign non-existence to
his fixed entities he is at one with Eriugena at this point. He writes, speaking about the
fixed entity he has in the Divine knowledge, “I am nearer to the Real in the state of my
being qualified with nonexistence than in the state of my being qualified with existence
due to the claim (الدعوى) that is found in it.” (Ibid. II: 528) He means that since real
existence is God’s but in some sense creature also exists and seeing that there is certain
continuity between two sorts of existence the creature might become proud and claim
existence vis. a vis. God. Since nonexistents lack this continuity they are immune from
making such proud claim so they are in a better position than the existents. In section
4.1.12 we found Eriugena elevating the non-existents over the existents on account of
their similarity to Divine nothingness. Ibn ‘Arabi> thinks that it is on account of their
dissimilarity with Divine being that nonexistents are better than the existent. At this
point the final conclusion of our both writers is identical although they are assigning
different reasons for reaching that conclusion.
In the second chapter we discussed Ibn ‘Arabi>’s division of totality and came
across the “third thing.” We mentioned there that Ibn ‘Arabi> identifies this with the
locus of fixed entities. This makes it possible to synthesize the apparently conflicting
standpoints that fixed entities are both existent and nonexistent. Ibn ‘Arabi> writes about
the locus of fixed entities:
This is the Supreme Barzakh, or the Barzakh of Barzakhs. It possesses a face
toward being and a face toward nothingness. It stands opposite each of these
two known things in its very essence. It is the third known thing in its very
essence. (Ibid. III: 46; trans. SPK, 204)
98
Hence Ibn ‘Arabi>’s position on the ontological status of fixed entities contains
two contrary claims which are synthesized in a third claim. If our reading of Eriugena on
the same question was accurate then his view of the status of the primordial causes was
the same. This synthetic view is the only inevitable one on account of the ontological
shadow, present in Eriugena as a problem but in Ibn ‘Arabi> as a way to a new concept
which demands that certain things exist before they are (priusquam essent).
In a context like the present one, where existence is not considered to be limited
to spatio-temporal existence only, it can be more helpful to set apart the word
“existence” for things that exist in space and/or time and use the word “reality” for
things that although non-existent in the specific sense are not unreal. If this
terminological suggestion is accepted then we can say that although both primordial
causes of Eriugena and the fixed entities of Ibn ‘Arabi> do not exist, they are real.
4.2.34.2.34.2.34.2.3 Fixed Entities and Fixed Entities and Fixed Entities and Fixed Entities and Materia PrimaMateria PrimaMateria PrimaMateria Prima
Another point can be briefly mentioned at this juncture is with reference to the relation
of primordial causes and fixed entities with materia prima. Eriugena is not ready to
identify primordial causes with prime matter since the former are perfect beings while
the latter is “next “to nothing.” Ibn ‘Arabi> is more positive to the concept of prime
matter and uses it to elaborate the relation between fixed entity and existent entity. In
his shorter work Insha>’ al-Dawa>’ir, having identified the presence of fixed entities with
the “third thing” he likens the relation of the realm of fixed entities to the world to the
relation between a chair or any wooden piece of furniture with wood and explicitly
permits labeling the third thing as hylé (ھيولى) or prime matter. (Insha>’, 19) 141 However,
it must be observed that the basic purpose of mentioning prime matter here is not to
141
The translation has been taken with modification from Izutsu’s Sufism and Taoism, 162.
99
identify it literally with one of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s concepts but only that of analogically
elaborating one of his doctrines.
4.2.44.2.44.2.44.2.4 The Questions of Knowability The Questions of Knowability The Questions of Knowability The Questions of Knowability
An important and multidimensional issue in Eriugena’s discussion of primordial causes
was that of knowability. First, does God know them? Second, do the causes know God?
Third, are they accessible to human knowledge? Here we raise these very questions,
again, but with respect to Ibn ‘Arabi>’s concept of the fixed entities, in order to shed
some more light on their nature in comparison with Eriugena’s primordial causes.
DivineDivineDivineDivine knowledge and the Fixed Entities:knowledge and the Fixed Entities:knowledge and the Fixed Entities:knowledge and the Fixed Entities: Ibn ‘Arabi> subjects his fixed entities to Divine
power and knowledge in a fashion similar to Eriugena since the latter tried to infer from
the Scripture (i.e. et spiritus dei superferebatur super acquas) that primordial causes are
under the power of their creator. Ibn ‘Arabi> writes, interpreting a Qur’a>nic verse “And
He is powerful over everything” (5: 120) that here the Qur’a>n is speaking about the
thingness of fixed entities, and telling that they are under the authority of God.... (Fut. II:
95) The fixed entities also do not escape Divine knowledge rather their very essence
consists in being objects of Divine knowledge. As always, at this point too, Ibn ‘Arabi>
appeals to the Qur’a>n. He writes, taking advantage of the word “thing” in a Qur’a>nic
verse “And He knows everything” (2:29) and interpreting the word “everything” as
“thingness of entities and thingness of existence in so far as its genera, species and
individuals” (Ibid. II: 95) Since there is nothing “hidden” for God “He sees us in the
state of our non-existence in the thingness of our fixity as He does in the state of our
existence.” (Ibid. I: 732)
Do Entities know God?Do Entities know God?Do Entities know God?Do Entities know God? Thus, God knows the entities that are fixed in nonexistence, but
do the entities know Him? “Absolutely not”, answers Ibn ‘Arabi> interpreting
100
symbolically a h}adi>th saying, “Majesty is His cloak and tremendousness His shawl.”142
He tells us that when God addressed the fixed entities with His word “The Cosmos was
witnessed by Him but He was not witnessed by it. Upon the eyes of the possible things
was the veil of non-existence, no other.” (Ibid. II: 303; trans. SPK, 93-94)
Are they knowable to us?Are they knowable to us?Are they knowable to us?Are they knowable to us? The third question in this discussion is: Can we know things
in the state of their fixity of nonexistence or is our knowledge limited to the objects that
exist in spatio-temporal terms? The answer is that the entities are not absolutely
inaccessible to human knowledge. When God wills, some of His servants can know them
through spiritual unveiling: “…there are servants of God whom God gives to see,
through unveiling, the fixed entities. Then they see them in the form of the adjacency
that we have mentioned. But rational consideration does not see that the entities have
either state or locus.” (Ibid. IV: 81; trans. SDG, 34) Ibn ‘Arabi> also thinks that the
workings of human imagination are grounded in knowledge of the fixed entities. Thus
he writes, “When any human being who possesses an imagination and the power to
imagine imagines something, his gaze extends into this Barzakh, though he does not
know that he is looking upon that thing in this presence.” (Ibid. III: 47; trans. SPK, 205)
Here Ibn ‘Arabi> adds a limitation to the imaginal knowledge of the entities, one knows
them without being conscious of them. He tells us in his Fus}u>s} that knowledge of fixed
entities is bestowed upon some individuals and this bestowal is not permanent but is
made at certain times. (Fus.} 99; trans. Ringstones, 94)143 Mus}t}afa> Ba>li> Za>deh, a
commentator on Fus}u>s}, tells us that these individuals are the Prophets and Friends of
142
Muslim, S}ah}i>h}, Kita>b al-Birr wa al-S}ilah, ba>b tah}ri>m al-Kibr 143
We do not agree with Dagli’s translation of the italicized three words. See the note below.
101
God.144 The limitation is that even these individuals do not always know the fixed
entities but, as Da>wu>d al-Qays}ari>, another great Fus}u>s} commentator, puts it “This
unveiling is not permanent but is at certain moments and not at others as He said to his
Prophet “Say ‘… I do not know what shall be done with me or you (46:9)’.” All this
applies to the knowability of entities in general and Ibn ‘Arabi> marks an area as
unknowable mystery by maintaining that the form of existentiation or acceptance of
existence of the entities always remains beyond the knowledge of creatures. Only God
knows these modalities. (See Fut. II: 103)
Thus, the fixed entities are partially knowable to some human beings and that
too through special acts of Divine grace and not through rational understanding but by a
spiritual unveiling.
In summing up the issue, it can carefully be maintained that like the primordial
causes the fixed entities do not escape Divine knowledge but unlike the former they are
partially knowable to human beings under certain conditions. Just like for Eriugena God
is unknowable to all creatures, whether these belong to the second division of nature or
to the third one, in Ibn ‘Arabi> God remains unknown to the entities fixed in their non-
existence.
144
This second limitation is unfortunately misunderstood by some English translations but is fortunately
discerned by major Arabic and Persian commentaries on the work. Both R.W Austen and Caner Dagli
have understood the words يكون مستصحبا � to mean that an individual is granted the unveiling when he is
not in the company of others but in his solitude, which does not make much sense. Arabic commentaries
of Qays}ari> (Tehran: Sharikat Intisha>ra>t e ‘Ilmi, 1375), 681, Mus}t}afa> Ba>li> Za>deh, Sharh} Fus}u>s} al-H}ikam
(Beirut: Da>r al-Kutub al-‘ilmiyyah, 2002), 121 and the Persian commentaries by H}asan Za>deh Amooli,
Mumidd al Himam (Tehran: Waza>rat e Farhang e Isla>mi, 1378 A.H), 227; Ta>j al-Di>n Khawa>rzami>
(Tehran: Intisha>ra>t e Mawla>, 1368) I: 331 all understand that the unveiling is not permanent but is
bestowed some time or the other.
102
4.2.54.2.54.2.54.2.5 Entities Created or Eternal?Entities Created or Eternal?Entities Created or Eternal?Entities Created or Eternal?
It is abundantly clear that Eriugena’s primordial causes are creatures which God has
created in His Word. Are the fixed entities which we are comparing with these are also
created? On the face of it, the fixed entities are not the creatures. Since the fixed
entities are primarily the objects of Divine knowledge it is not possible to maintain that
they are created as Divine knowledge is eternal (ref. in deo nihil accidit). The doctrine
of fixed entities does not mean that God makes the world twice, but that he makes what
he knows already and the object of knowledge is already there, God did not make it in
Him but eternally knew it. Ibn ‘Arabi> expresses the fact that fixed entities were not
created by saying that “He invented us actually not that He created in himself our
exemplar” and “there is no existentiation in exemplar.” (إختراع في المثال �) (Fut. I: 91)
This means that that the exemplar which is the fixed entity does not itself originate
through an act of existentiation, only spatio-temporal objects, or “effects” in Eriugenian
language. This interpretation fits in with Ibn ‘Arabi>’s statement about the entities that
“these did not attain existence from Him.” (Ibid. II: 246) Ibn ‘Arabi> also characterizes
fixed entity as the eternal relationship of eternity “which has no beginning” (أول لھا �).
(Ibid. II: 55) In order to preclude the inference that creation took place in the state of
fixity or nonexistence Ibn ‘Arabī interprets the Qur’a>nic verse, “Will not man remember
that we created him aforetime, when he was nothing (19:67) by saying, “That is, ‘we
determined it in its state of thingness’, toward which was directed His command, ‘to
another thingness’ for the Divine dictum, ‘Our only speech to a thing, when we desire it,
is to say to it “Be!” and it is.’” (Ibid. II. 62) So creation in nothingness does not mean
the creation of fixed entities but determination of the object about to be created in the
spatio-temporal world. We have already seen him extending the meaning of creation to
103
include pre-creation Divine determination. All this shows that fixed entities are not
created according to Ibn ‘Arabi>.
Now this characterization of fixed entities creates a gap between them and the
primordial causes, a gap which can make the comparison less plausible. We submit that
this gap is bridged by bringing out the meaning Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> assign to the
word “creation” or the phrase “being created.” Ibn ‘Arabi> is not denying the createdness
of fixed entities in the sense in which Eriugena affirms the createdness of his primordial
causes. If the meaning of Eriugenian “creation” is made explicit then an express
affirmation of the creation of fixed entities in that sense can be found in Ibn ‘Arabi>.
It is well known among Eriugena scholars that when he uses the term “creation”
in the context of God’s creation of the creatures, he does not understand by it “temporal
making out of nonexistence” but “self-manifestation and moving from incorporeal to
corporeal.”145 At DDN III 689A Eriugena himself tells us that the Divine nature creates
itself that is, allows itself to appear in its theophany. Hence creation for Eriugena is
theophany and by “theophany” Eriugena understands, primarily, “the appearance of
God,” (DDN I: 446C-D) or “ineffable descent of the Supreme Goodness … into the
things that are, so as to make them to be.” (Ibid. 678: D)146 Therefore, when he says that
something is created by God what he actually means is that it is a theophany.
145
Dermot Moran, The Philosophy, 177. Moran has admitted that Eriugena considers primordial causes as
theophanies and this position Eriugena adopts, in Moran’s view to get round a difficulty regarding their
status. In Moran’s words, “What kinds of beings have the primary causes? If they are real beings they
would seem to impose an intermediate ontological level between God and the created effects, if they are
not fully real and are merely Divine appearances then it is difficult to speak of creation.” Ibid. 262. 146
A detailed comparison of “theophany” with some terms used by Ibn ‘Arabi> will be undertaken in
chapter 7.
104
It can be argued that in all instances where Ibn ‘Arabi> negates the creation of
fixed entities he only negates that in the sense of “making out of nonexistence” and that
his fixed entities, like primordial causes are theophanies. Ibn ‘Arabi> writes at one place
that “the fixed entities, being مظاھر, relate to the Divinity in same relationship.” (Fut. II:
95) Speaking about a fifth universal reality identified with “the manifestation of Divine
realities and lordly (ربانية) forms in the fixed entities” Ibn ‘Arabi> says that these latter
are مظاھرالحق . (Ibid. II: 103) With reference to the fixed entity of a human being he says
that it is what “God took as a مظھر and manifested Himself in it.” (Ibid. II: 513) The
word مظھر with which Ibn ‘Arabi> is identifying the fixed entities is grammatically a
noun of place derived fromظھور, which means “manifestation, outwardness,
appearance.”147 Notice how close this term is to “theophany” which, as Michael Sells
explains, is derived from two Greek words, theos (god) and phanio (bringing to light,
make appear) and it is “an appearance or manifestation of deity.”148
Thus it is clear that the fixed entities although not created in the sense of “being
made” they are created in the sense of being “theophanies” that is to say the loci of self-
disclosure of God ( مجالى. مظاھر ). In this way the apparent gap between Eriugena’s
primordial causes and Ibn ‘Arabi>’s fixed entities, vanishes.
4.2.64.2.64.2.64.2.6 Order and Hierarchy within the Fixed Entities Order and Hierarchy within the Fixed Entities Order and Hierarchy within the Fixed Entities Order and Hierarchy within the Fixed Entities
We saw that the primordial causes are arranged in a hierarchical order, a hierarchy
which some writers argue is not objective but only in mind. Is there any order within the
fixed entities and if there is, what is the principle of this order, hierarchy or something
147
See William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 89. 148 See Mystical Languages of Unsaying, 43.
105
else? We shall try to answer these questions presently. Let us begin by trying to
understand the following obscure passage from Al-Futu>h}a>t al-Makkiyah:
… order in the entities of possible things in the state of their fixity became
manifest with the wisdom of the Wise, as there is no possible thing attributed to
a possible thing but that it can be attributed to another possible thing for itself.
However Wisdom required arranging it with its decree as it is according to its
time and state in the state of its fixity. This is the knowledge which has become
specific to the Real, the Most Exalted and which from Him was not known (by
anyone). With it the decree appeared in the order of entities of possible things in
the state of their fixity before their existence. Hence the Divine knowledge
became connected to them according to that at which the Wise One had ordered
it, so wisdom bestowed the possible thing what it was in the fixity, the contrary
of which is permissible and the order gave the knower the knowledge that the
affair is like this so he does not give existence except in accordance with what it
is at in fixity which is the order of the Wise one according to decree of Wisdom.
(Fut. IV: 258)
This passage implies that there is order within the fixed entities. The primary
intent is not to claim the existence of order but it is to show that order is based on
Divine wisdom and the difference and relation between Divine wisdom (الحكمة) and
Divine knowledge (العلم) and the order of fixed entities is being discussed as an instance
or playground of these two qualities. According to Ibn ‘Arabī, every possible thing that
is related to one thing can be or could have been related to another possible thing. This
means that the actual order between the entities is not necessary, it could have been
otherwise. But still it is one specific order, that is to say, for instance, that entity x
actually is related to y and not to z although it could have been related to z. That is why
Ibn ‘Arabī says about this order near the end that its “contrary is permissible ( يجوز
The next point that needs to be clearly understood before making sense of the ”.(خ\فه
106
full passage is the subordination of Divine knowledge to Divine wisdom149 and to reality
as it is created by the latter. It is well known principle of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s metaphysics that
knowledge, Divine or human, does not determine but is determined by the thing known
as it is in itself (العلم يتبع المعلوم). In the present case Ibn ‘Arabī is telling us that the reality
of the order of fixed entities is created by wisdom upon which Divine knowledge is
based as much as He is the Knower. Now we can understand his words: “Hence the
Divine knowledge became connected … according to decree of Wisdom.” One final
thing remains to be clarified. If knowledge is subordinate to wisdom then why does Ibn
‘Arabi> identify both by saying in the beginning, “this is the knowledge which…”? The
answer is that the word knowledge (العلم) does not mean the relation between knower and
the known but is to be understood as “the known”, that is to say, knowledge here means
“an item of knowledge.” So Ibn ‘Arabi> is trying to tell us that the wisdom behind a
particular order is known only to God.
There is one particular type of order which Ibn ‘Arabi> is careful enough to negate
within the fixed entities. This negation is so emphatic that it might give the impression
that he is negating any order and hence contradicting himself. Ibn ‘Arabi> has written:
Entrance into the thingness of wuju>d happens only in order. The affair of the
things in the thingness of fixity is otherwise, because none of them is ordered.
After all their fixity is described by eternity without beginning, and there is no
order in eternity without beginning, no priority, no posteriority. (Ibid. III: 280;
trans. SDG. 194)
Despite appearance Ibn ‘Arabi> here is not negating order per se in fixity but only
temporal order and the reason he gives is quite obvious. Since fixed entities are objects
149 This is the case only from this particular point of view, otherwise Ibn ‘Arabi> also provides for the
priority and generality of knowledge as compared to wisdom. For more see Fut. II: 237, 243 etc.
107
of Divine knowledge they are eternal and eternal things cannot be arranged in temporal
order. So Chittick’s remark on this passage that “Although the entities follow an order
in wuju>d, they have no order inasmuch as they are fixed entities in God’s knowledge”150
is not adequate. It would have been more appropriate for Chittick to include the passage
from Fut. IV: 258 and present a synthetic view of order within the fixed entities.
Unfortunately, he does not take this passage into account, so his view remains one-
sided.
The order about which Ibn ‘Arabi> speaks is the network of particular relations in
which fixed entities and their existent counterparts are found. This general concept of
order as relation implicitly contains the concept of hierarchy.151 We find Ibn ‘Arabi>
providing for the hierarchical order within the fixed entities in the Fus}u>s} by providing
that
What is first encompassed by God’s Mercy is the thingness of that entity which
existentiates Mercy through Mercy. So the first thing encompassed by Mercy is
itself; then the thingness indicated; then the thingness of all existents that exist,
which have no end… (Fus}. 177; trans. Ringstones, 219)
As the final sentence of this passage implies, the Divine names demand the
existence of entities existentiating them and that the highest entity is the one that
existentiates the name “Merciful” or the attribute Mercy. Then come all other fixed
entities which are existentiated through Divine command “Be!” Our reading of the
above passage differs from Izutsu’s since he thinks that “the thingness of that entity…”
150
William Chittick, The Self Disclosure of God, 194. 151
It is significant that the Arabic word ترتيب which is used by Ibn ‘Arabi> is translated by Chittick in his
Self Disclosure as order and in Sufi Path of Knowledge as hierarchy. He explains that this is because the
Arabic word for level (رتبة) is derived from the same root as the term (ترتيب). See his Self Disclosure of
God, 194.
108
refers to Divine Essence. He thinks that this sentence implies that “by the very first
manifestation of its own Mercy, the absolutely Unknown-Unknowable turns into a
‘thing’ (شئ).” 152 We think that this reading involves certain difficulties. For one thing, it
makes Divine Essence subject to and manifestation of an attribute or a Divine name and
it is well known that according to Ibn ‘Arabi> names and attributes belong to a level
below that of Essence. In his technical terminology the level of absolute Divine essence
is called “unity (أحدية)” while that of names and attributes is called “oneness (واحدية)”
Furthermore to make the Essence locus of manifestation is itself problematic. The
difficulty can be seen clearly if we take into account what has been said even by Izutsu
himself in the same work. At one place he has admitted that the Absolute in its Essence
is completely independent of the world which also implies that it has no need of the
names.153 Secondly, he has related to us that there is no manifestation at the level of
unity (أحدية)154, so how can something belonging to the next level convert the Essence
into a thing?
In our opinion the reading of Caner Dagli is more plausible and his reasons for
understanding thingness as the fixed identity of the name “Merciful” are sound.
According to him Ibn ‘Arabi>’s saying that the first thing encompassed by Mercy is itself
means that “The All-Merciful is given an immutable identity over which it is Lord.” 155
His interpretation should be understood in the light of the fact that fixed entities
themselves are manifestations of the Divine names just like Eriugena’s world does not
152Sufism and Taoism, 119-120.
153 See Ibid. 101.
154 See Ibid. 24: “The tajalli of the Absolute begins to occur only at the next stage, that of the oneness
(wa>hidiyyah) which means unity of the Many.”
155 Dagli, Ringstones, 220n.3.
109
directly participate in the superessential good but in its participation, i.e. primordial
cause.156 Hence there is hierarchy within the immutable identities and the climax is
constituted by the entity that is governed by the Name al-Rah}ma>n. Entities of other
Divine names come next to it, which then have their existent entities in the
spatiotemporal world.
Having seen that there is order and hierarchy within the fixed entities we are in a
position to construct a table of hierarchy of fixed entities and compare it to that of the
primordial causes and see what we can learn from this comparison. We submit that the
former hierarchy can help us understand a dark area within the latter. It will be
remembered that we had to place a question mark on the relation between the supreme
Good and its first participation, by participation in which good-through-itself has its
being. This confusion in Eriugenian hierarchy can be removed by learning a lesson from
the parallel hierarchy within the fixed identities, since, here the logic of first (Divine
names), second (fixed entities) and third (existent things) participations is clear. This
logic consists in the fact that Divine names and attributes require the existence of their
subjects, just as being “father” requires the existence of “son.”
156 “Each existent has an identity which is itself the form of a Divine Name that determines what it is. It
is this name which is the lord of that specific existent.” This comes as a comment on Ibn ‘Arabi>’s saying
“Every existent has a specific lord in God.” Caner Dagli, Ringstones, 79n.1.
110
Table: Fixed Entities in HierarchyTable: Fixed Entities in HierarchyTable: Fixed Entities in HierarchyTable: Fixed Entities in Hierarchy
4444....2.72.72.72.7 The Intermediary Status of Entities The Intermediary Status of Entities The Intermediary Status of Entities The Intermediary Status of Entities
As it is obvious from the diagrammatic presentation of the hierarchy, and as Professor
Izutsu and others have elaborated,157 the fixed entities occupy an intermediary status
between God and the world. This fact is very important from the comparative
perspective which concerns us here. We can compare the intermediary ontological status
of fixed entities with Eriugena’s primordial causes on this particular juncture from two
points of view. As it will appear, from one standpoint two concepts stand apart but from
the second the gap between them is reduced. On the one hand Eriugena claimed that
nothing interpolates between the Creator and the Creatures which implies that the
primordial causes are not to be considered intermediary between these two poles.
Comparing the fixed entities to primordial causes from this point of view it might be
concluded that the former’s explicit intermediary character marks them off from the
latter, but if we look at the fact that the fixed entities according to Ibn ‘Arabi> are firstly,
not existent and secondly, not outside Divine principle but exist within Divine
consciousness as objects of knowledge the difference between the two is reduced.
Fortunately however, we also possess another Eriugenian perspective on the primordial
157
See Sufism and Taoism, 158-163.
DIV
INITY
DIV
INITY
DIV
INITY
DIV
INITY
Level ILevel ILevel ILevel I Ah}adiyyah| Absolute Divine Essence
God
Barzakh
Level IILevel IILevel IILevel II Wa>h}idiyyah | Names and Attributes Determining Determining Determining Determining the
Essence
FIXITY
FIXITY
FIXITY
FIXITY
Level ILevel ILevel ILevel I Supreme Fixed Entity ManifestingManifestingManifestingManifesting the “Merciful”
Level IILevel IILevel IILevel II Fixed Entities ManifestingManifestingManifestingManifesting all other Divine Names
EXISTENCEEXISTENCEEXISTENCEEXISTENCE
الوجود
Existent Entities in this World ManifestingManifestingManifestingManifesting the fixed
entities
World
111
causes according to which they are intermediaries between the Creator and creature.
This perspective becomes clear when we understand the latter as referring to “effects of
the primordial causes” and excluding the causes themselves. From this perspective
Eriugena says that “the other goods do not through themselves participate in the
supreme and substantial Good but that which is through-itself the first participation of
the Supreme Good. And this rule is uniformly observed in the case of all primordial
causes.” (DDN III: 622 B-C) From this perspective there is no difference between the
primordial causes and the fixed entities, the intermediary status of which has been
described by Izutsu thus: “[b]riefly stated the plane of archetypes (=entities)158 occupies
a middle position between the Absolute in its absoluteness and the world of sensible
things. As a result of this peculiar ontological position, the archetypes have the double
nature of being active and passive, that is, passive in relation to what is higher and
active in relation to things that stand lower than themselves.”159 Note that the
simultaneous activity and passivity of the entities is parallel to the primordial causes
which on the one hand participate in (to be more exact, “are participations of”) what is
higher than them and on the other hand are participated in by what is lower than them,
that is to say their effects.
158
Izutsu translates عيان الثابتةEاas “permanent archetypes” which is based in his view, I think unjustified
view, that the entities are universals and as such “remind us of the Ideas of Plato”. See Sufism and
Taoism, 164. We think that none of the texts which Izutsu presents as evidence in favor of his position
deals with fixed entities, rather all of them talk about “Divine attributes”, which, as we have seen and as
Izutsu himself asserts, are one level above the entities. Besides, inter-relation among the Platonic ideas is
that of “one over many” but for Ibn ‘Arabi> each particular existent has one particular fixed entity which is
not shared by or participated in by other individuals. So there is a “one-to-one” relationship between
fixed entities and existent ones. There is no difference between a fixed entity and existent entity except
that the latter has existence while the former does not have it, as Ibn ‘Arabi> has written, “the thing in the
state of its immutability is identical to the thing in the state of its existence, except that God has clothed
it in the robe of existence through Himself.” Fut. IV: 320. 159 Sufism and Taoism, 159.
112
4.2.84.2.84.2.84.2.8 Essence, Names and EntitiesEssence, Names and EntitiesEssence, Names and EntitiesEssence, Names and Entities
It will be recalled that in the diagrammatic presentation of Eriugenian hierarchy we
highlighted an unanswered question. Since the table representing cosmic hierarchy
conceived by Ibn ‘Arabi> also consists of parallel levels, two levels of divinity and two of
fixed entities, same question arises as to the relation between the first two levels of
divinity namely, that of essence and names. We saw that the fixed entities are forms of
Divine names160 while things existing in this world of space and time are manifestations
of the fixed entities. At one place Ibn ‘Arabi> uses the shadow metaphor to describe the
relation of fixed entities to the existent entities and tells us that the existent entities are
shadows of fixed entities, and as a shadow cannot exist in the absence of light, the light
that illuminates the fixed entity giving rise to its shadow in the form of existent entity
is Divine name Al-Nu>r (the Light). (Fut. III: 47) Thus Ibn ‘Arabi> enlightens us here
about all the members of hierarchy, and what is more, explains the relationship between
first two levels with a clarity that was missing in Eriugena. Hence we get here, firstly,
non-delimited being, the name Al-Nu>r, the fixed entities and existent entities. Ibn
‘Arabi> tells us that the fixed entities are shadows of Non-Delimited Being in respect of
the Name Al-Nu>r. This expression “من” which we translate as “in respect of” is the key
to solution. It indicates that there are many respects from which the non-delimited being
can be related to creatures at the level of delimitation or determination ( مرتبة
تقييدال\التعيين ). So the relation of Divine names to the Absolute is that of perspectives or
relations. They are, as Izutsu has aptly described them, the channels through which the
Absolute articulates itself at the first state of manifestation.161 The notion of “aspects”
or “perspectives”, which Ibn ‘Arabi> himself uses, makes an implied reference to the
160
See footnote 157 above. 161
Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, 160.
113
existent entities, from whose point of view the Absolute can be seen through these
aspects.
4.2.94.2.94.2.94.2.9 The Highest fixed entityThe Highest fixed entityThe Highest fixed entityThe Highest fixed entity
Eriugenian cosmic hierarchy gives priority to Supreme Goodness while the highest fixed
entity according to Ibn ‘Arabi>’s hierarchy is the one that is essential form of the Name
“All-Merciful.” In other words, the fixed entity of Mercy is the foremost and all other
entities are found through and due to it.
Although for Eriugena the specific order of primordial causes is not the only one
and we have just seen that from one point of view Ibn ‘Arabi> assigns fundamental
cosmogonic role to Divine name Al-Nu>r, it is pertinent to compare goodness with Mercy
spoken by Ibn ‘Arabi>.
Eriugena said that “it is a property of the Divine goodness to call things that
were not into existence.” (DDN III: 627C-D) We can compare this to Ibn ‘Arabi> when
he says that “Every identity has an existence that it seeks from God, His Mercy applies
universally to each identity. Through his Mercy, by which He shows mercy upon each
He accepts their desire for existence so existentiates them.” (Fus}. 177; trans.
Ringstones, 219)162 This comparison reveals that the function of Goodness for Eriugena
and that of Mercy for Ibn ‘Arabi> is one and the same since it consists in bestowing
existence upon the non-existents. We can conclude that although for Eriugena it is
goodness-through itself that is the highest primordial cause and for Ibn ‘Arabi> this place
162 Note that the Arabic word for existence is derived from the root و ج د while that for “munificence” is
from ج و د though these are different roots but they contain same letters in different order. As Titus
Burkhardt has explained, between such roots there is sometimes certain continuity. See his essay “The
Impact of the Arab Language” published in Mirrors of the Intellect: Essays on Traditional Science and
Sacred Art (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2001), 240 n.6.
114
is given to Divine mercy, the function of these respective concepts are in both cases
ontological and not passional or ethical.
4.2.104.2.104.2.104.2.10 Unity and Multiplicity Unity and Multiplicity Unity and Multiplicity Unity and Multiplicity
Eriugena showed that the multiplicity of primordial causes is only from the perspective
of their effects and as far as their principle i.e. God is concerned they are one and simple
and not multiple. Since oneness of God (التوحيد) is one of axioms for Ibn ‘Arabi> and since
fixed entities are forms of Divine names and Divine names are multiple in contrast to
the absolutely one Divine Essence, the problem of the multiplicity is also important one
for Ibn ‘Arabi>. Interestingly, his solution is not very different from Eriugenian in which
a reference is made to the “effects.” Ibn ‘Arabi> maintains that “the entity of Being is
One, while the properties (أحكام) are diverse in accordance with the diversity of the
immutable (=fixed) entities, which are the “others” without doubt, though in the
immutability, not in existence, so understand.” (Fut., II: 519; trans. SPK, 91) The
concept of properties plays here the same function that is played by “effects” in
Eriugena’s response to the issue of multiplicity of primordial causes. The difference
however is that, for Ibn ‘Arabi>, this multiplicity is not absolutely isolated from Being,
but relates to it at a certain level. Thus he says speaking from a specific perspective that
Being becomes manifest only in accordance with the properties of the fixed entities.
(Ibid) Fundamentally, the entity of Being is one, and we know that Being is God, hence
God is one. However, unlike Eriugena, Ibn ‘Arabi> does not try to make unity latently
include multiplicity, with references to monad or the circle’s centre, but makes the latter
dependent upon the effects of the perspectives through which to look at Being. He
seems to be less afraid of multiplicity than is Eriugena. So he admits the multiplicity of
the entities in the state of fixity and for the person who contemplates God through the
115
entities God becomes manifest through the different colors, so to speak, of those
entities.163
There is yet another facet of the fixed entities, mentioned already, which gives
us an additional clue. Pointing out that fixed entities are non-existent, William Chittick
has explained the above-quoted passage by saying, “Being is one and Manifest. Hence
multiplicity and distinction arise from the properties of the nonexistent things, which
are many and non-manifest.”(Ibid.) Ibn ‘Arabi> simultaneously makes use of both clues,
that the Divine essence, “He-ness” is beyond relations and thus multiplicity, and that it
is the fixity, i.e. non-existence, of the entities which makes the Essence into multiple
relations. (See Fut. II: 94; trans. SPK, 313)
4.2.114.2.114.2.114.2.11 Entities and the WordEntities and the WordEntities and the WordEntities and the Word
According to Eriugena’s allegorical interpretation of Genesis, creation of primordial
causes “in the beginning” and “in Divine wisdom” means that these were created in the
Word of God, personified in the person of Christ. A comparison of primordial causes
with fixed entities must take into account this particular characteristic of the former.
Can we get over this issue by simply saying that personified word of God is peculiar to
Christianity so no parallels can be found in non-Christian, especially Muslim thought? It
seems that this is not the case since the Christian conception of word of God (logos) can
plausibly be compared with the concept of Perfect Man (ا8نسان الكامل) or Muh}ammadan
Reality (الحقيقة المحمدية), but in the present context this comparison is not very helpful,
since the plane of fixed entities is not contained by this since Ibn ‘Arabi> speaks of an
entity of the perfect man as well. (Ibid. II: 642) Hence there is no possibility of claiming
163 This is an epistemological interpretation of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s saying that “such a person observes in the very
being of the Real the properties of the fixed entities.” Fut. II: 519.
116
that Muh}ammadan Reality contains the fixed entities of everything. So at this point the
fixed entities are unlike the primordial causes and this is an important non-reducible
difference between the two conceptions.
4.2.124.2.124.2.124.2.12 Infinity of EntitiesInfinity of EntitiesInfinity of EntitiesInfinity of Entities
Although Eriugena’s primordial causes are creatures (in the sense of being theophanies)
they are infinite. The fixed entities are also infinite. One obvious reason for the infinity
of fixed entities is that they are “objects of Divine knowledge” and Divine knowledge is
infinite. Another more philosophical reason is presented by Ibn ‘Arabi>. According to it,
immutable entities are the form of Infinite Being which It sees in the mirror of Non-
Delimited nothingness and consequently the form is as infinite as the Infinite Being
whose form it is. (Ibid. III: 47; trans. SPK, 205)164 Accordingly, fixed entities are infinite
since they exist because of coming of two infinites face to face, absolute existence and
absolute non-existence. In addition to being quantitatively infinite and “eternal without
beginning” (أزلية), Ibn ‘Arabi> points out at various places, the fixed entities are also
“eternal without end” (أبدية): “Subsistence is the permanent state of a servant which does
not end because non-existence of his fixed entity is one of the impossible things.”(Ibid.
II: 516)
4.2.134.2.134.2.134.2.13 Fixed Entities and EvilFixed Entities and EvilFixed Entities and EvilFixed Entities and Evil
As the creation of primordial causes in wisdom raises the question of evil for Eriugena
so does the notion of fixed entities for Ibn ‘Arabi>. In the context of creation of the world
out of the fixed entities he makes an important remark in the twenty-first chapter of the
Fus}u>s} (Ringstones). Although he shares Eriugenian adherence to the principle that evil 164 Also see ibid. III: 46 where Ibn ‘Arabi> talks about infinity of the Supreme Barzakh which is the
presence of fixed entities and IV: 295 where he writes about them that “limitation and finitude is
imagined regarding them while they are infinite.”
117
is non-existence and thus privation,165 he does not appeal to it when talking about evil in
the context of fixed entities and he could not have, as we shall see at present. Let us see
how the problem arises for him in this specific context. Fixed entities are eternal objects
of Divine knowledge. However creation takes place when spatio-temporal existence is
bestowed upon a particular fixed entity. Now since there are existent entities which can
be considered evil, the question is why God bestows existence on fixed entities of evil
things since this makes Him directly responsible for these evil existents. To respond that
evil is nonexistent will not do since the nonexistence that is evil is absolute non-
existence166 and not the relative non-existence that is the world and we are talking about
the existence of evil in this world. So why does God clothe the fixed entities of things
having evil accidents with the robe of existence? Let us first note how Ibn ‘Arabi>
defines “evil.” Evil according to him is “failure to reach one’s desire (غرض) and what is
agreeable (م\ئم) to one’s nature.”(Ibid. III: 389) This definition clearly brings out that
something is evil with reference to someone who looks at it with a specific desire or
having a specific nature. Now Ibn ‘Arabi> simply states that all fixed entities request
existence and since Divine mercy applies universally to each identity: “Through His
Mercy, by which he shows mercy upon each, He accepts their desire for the existence of
their identities, and so existentiates them….The attainment of some purpose or the
agreeability with one’s nature are not taken into account as far as it is concerned; indeed
what is agreeable and what is not are all encompassed by the Divine Mercy in
165
For instance see Fut. III: 373: “evil is only the nonexistence of good.” 166
Ibn ‘Arabi> has written, “The Real possesses non-delimited being (إط\ق الوجود) without any
delimitation. He is sheer good without any evil. He stands opposite non-delimited nothingness (إط\ق العدم),
which is sheer evil without any good.” Ibid. trans. SPK-290. Ibn ‘Arabi> also recognizes that although the
world is good in its essence evil occurs to it as an accident since it does not stand in the level of Necessary
Being which is sheer good. See Fut. III: 389.
118
existence.” (Fus}. 177; trans. Ringstones, 219-220) This is tantamount to accepting that
God is indirectly responsible for the existence of accidentally evil things. Thus at
another place in the same work Ibn ‘Arabi> writes: “To Him the whole affair shall be
returned (XI: 123), thus applying to the blameworthy as well as the praiseworthy.
Naught is there but the praiseworthy and the blameworthy.” (Fus}. 60)167 Now, does this
solve the problem of evil? It endorses one horn of the dilemma that constitutes the
problem of evil but at the same time relativizes and subjectivises the concept of evil
itself.
In the light of the above conducted comparative analysis, it can be safely
concluded that Eriugena’s concept of primordial causes and Ibn ‘Arabi>’s concept of
fixed ideas share most of their characteristic features and perform almost identical role
in their respective cosmologies, that of mediating Divine Self and spatio-temporal world
in the context of creation. Hence, one is presented as “the secret folds of nature” from
which things that are said to be proceed and the other is described, alluding to the
Scriptural expression, as “the treasuries of everything with God” wherefrom God
“reveals” things in accordance with His knowledge and wisdom. In some way, both pre-
determine the nature and scope of spatio-temporally existing things. This is clear from
Eriugena’s calling his causes “predestinations” and “foundations and principles of all
nature and it parallels in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s arguing for the absolute power of the fixed entities
and with comparing them with materia prima. Moreover, both concepts are
167 Ibn ‘Arabi> cannot be taken to contradict what he himself says in many places commenting on the
saying of the Prophet “The good, all of it is in Thy hands, while evil does not go back to Thee!” that evil
becomes manifest from the side of a possible thing not from the direction of God (Fut. III: 289) since
there is difference between good/evil and praiseworthy/blameworthy similar to the one between the good
and the right.
119
ontologically rooted in Divine wisdom, since Eriugena talks about the causes as being
comprehended by God in “his super-eminent” wisdom and Ibn ‘Arabi> defines his fixed
entities as the objects of Divine knowledge. This, however, is not to deny that there are
differences, apparent and real, between two doctrines.
FiveFiveFiveFive
MacrocosmMacrocosmMacrocosmMacrocosm----IIII:::: Participation Participation Participation Participation and and and and DivineDivineDivineDivine RootsRootsRootsRoots
In the present chapter we wish to raise the following question: How does Eriugena
conceive the spatiotemporal world (his third division) and relates it to God (the first
division of nature) and are there any interesting parallels between him and Ibn ‘Arabī?
We intend to show that our both thinkers conceive the world and its relationship
to the Divine in remarkably similar, if not identical, manner. Eriugena is not primarily
interested in physics, that is to say, nature of the world. He is more interested in relating
it to its principle and Ibn ‘Arabī’s cosmology shares this spirit. Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>
agree that the world is symbolic of the Divine. Eriugena says “For it is in my opinion
that there is no visible or corporeal thing which is not the symbol of (significet)
something incorporeal and intelligible. (DDN V: 865D-866A) Similar remarks are
scattered here and there in the works of Ibn ‘Arabi>, according to whom the Arabic word
for the world العالَم derives from the same root as “ع\مة” which means that the world is a
signpost for God. (See Fut. II: 473; trans. SDG, 3). The scriptural basis of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s
teaching that the entities of the cosmos are signs of God is the Qur’a>n 41: 53 which
reads “We shall show them Our signs upon the horizons and in themselves until it is
clear the them that He is the Real,” (Fut. II: 151; trans. SPK, 93). Moreover, he
comments on the Qur’a>n 22: 32, viz., “Whoever magnifies God’s waymarks, (شعائر هللا)
that is of God weariness of the hearts” by saying that “there is no entity in the cosmos
121
that is not one of God’s waymarks (شعائر)168 inasmuch as the Real has put there to
signify Him.” (Fut. III: 527; SDG, 10). It goes without saying that these words of Ibn
‘Arabi> resonate completely what we saw Eriugena saying above.
We can understand Eriugena’s position on God-World relationship through an
analysis of his two terms, participatio and theophania. The present chapter deals with
the former while we address the latter in the following chapter. If we look at God-World
relationship from the world’s side, it participates in Him but if we view from God’s side,
He manifests Himself in the world. These two ways can be symbolized respectively as
the upward way “from world to God” and the downward one “from God to the world. It
can be shown that the Eriugenian concepts “participation”and “theophany” correspond
respectively in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s thought to “Divine Roots doctrine” and “al-tajalli>.”
Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabī alike diverge from usual views regarding creation and are not
ready to accept that the world was created out of absolute nothingness. An investigation
of this question is bound to lead into questions of the nature of nothingness and the
discussion of Six Divine Days of creation (Hexaemeron) according to Eriugena and Ibn
‘Arabi>. We however would not discuss these issues here. We have already made some
comments on the former question in the first and the third chapters. As for the
Hexaemeron, Eriugena presents his more or less allegorical exegesis of Genesis and
168 The word sha‘a>’ir (sing. Sha‘i>rah) is one of the Qur’a>nic terms the basic meaning of which is “a place
[of the performance] of religious rites and ceremonies of the pilgrimage,” and “all those services which
God has appointed to us as signs; as the halting (wuqu>f) [at Mount ‘Arafa>t]…” Edward William Lane, An
Arabic English Lexicon, (Beirut: Librarie Du Liban, 1863), part IV: 1561. Although Chittick has rendered
this word plausibly as “waymark” in many translations of the Qur’a>n it has been translated as “symbol.” It
is also very important to notice that the word comes from the same root as that of shu‘u>r meaning “to
know, understand, be cognizant of something.” Since derivatives from a single root share some element of
the meaning, sha‘i>rah or sha‘a>r is an object which lets one “know of” another thing. Hence, the word
sha‘a>’ir is equivalent of “symbols.”
122
concentrates on what was created on each day. Ibn ‘Arabī seems to be more interested in
the container rather than the content, that is to say, he has to say more on the nature of a
“Divine day” than what God did during that day. One of the reasons for this difference
is that although both Genesis and the Qur’a>n mention creation in six days, the latter
does not give details of the Divine work of each day. However, it provides that “Each
day He is in some affair” and this interests Ibn ‘Arabī more than the contents of the
Hexaemeron. Moreover, the views of the latter have been competently analyzed and
discussed in a recent work by Mohamed Haj Yousef.169
One of the important themes that Eriugena discusses in the first book of his
DDN and which should have been discussed in our third chapter is the relationship
between God and ten categories (Categoriae Decem). We however are going to analyze
this subject in the present chapter since it cannot be understood without elaborating Ibn
‘Arabi>’s doctrine of Divine roots first.
5.15.15.15.1 Eriugena Eriugena Eriugena Eriugena on on on on ParticipationParticipationParticipationParticipation
5.1.15.1.15.1.15.1.1 Participation: History and Context Participation: History and Context Participation: History and Context Participation: History and Context
Eriugena properly inaugurates discussion of the third division of nature in Book III
630A-634 with an account of “participation.” This concept of participation links the
first division of nature (God) to the second (Primordial Causes) and the second to the
third (the world). In view of this function we do not see any reason to agree with
169
See his book Ibn ‘Arabi>: Time and Cosmology (London: Routledge, 2008), chapter 3, 73-100.
123
Dermot Moran’s view that Eriugena’s “more complex relations of being and non-being
make the concept of participation less relevant.”170
Eriugena is neither the first nor the last thinker to use the term “participation.” It
already was used by Plato to explain the relationship between intelligible forms and
their sensible instances.171 In spite of being critical of Platonic forms, Aristotle himself
used the concept while referring to human participation in the essential life.172 The
concept was popular with Neo-Platonism inherited by the Alexandrines, latter Christian
Platonists like Saint Augustine and his Franciscan followers. It also lurks behind the
medieval proofs for the existence of God from the degrees of being, truth, goodness and
perfection. This fact is epitomized by Augustine who advises: “Look at what you see
and seek Him, Whom you do not see.”173 After Eriugena it was also used by Saint
Anselm in his lesser known a posteriori proofs for the existence of God and by Saint
Thomas Aquinas “who held that things participate in Divine perfections by an imitation
according to an ordered proportion corresponding to their respective modes of being.”174
The contemporary ears are also not completely unfamiliar with this term since Paul
170 Dermot Moran, The Philosophy, 234 n. 23. The way Michael Sells has used the notion in his recent
study for understanding negative theology also shows importance of this concept for Eriugena. See
Mystical Languages, 34-63. 171
Sr. M. Annice, “Historical Sketch of the Theory of Participation,” New Scholasticism, 26 (1952): 49-
79. She concludes the sketch by remarking that “Participation by the diminished and imperfect in the
whole and perfect is held by all outstanding philosophers from Plato to St. Thomas.” Platonic Caveat
(Phaedo 100d) is emphasized by David C Schindler, “What’s the difference? On the Metaphysics of
participation in a Christian Context,” Saint Anselm Journal, 3(2005), 46. 172
“Historical Sketch,” p. 56. The reference is to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book XII, chapter 7, 1072a. 173
Quoted in Ibid. 60 from the Saint’s Sermo CXXVI. Available online at mb-
soft.com/believe/txuf/august7d.htm (last visited on 12-03-2009.) 174
“What’s the difference?” 46.
124
Tillich used it to differentiate between “sign” and “symbol.”175
The concept of participation, however, has been criticized by some Christian
theologians as well. David Schindler thinks, that while being suitable to Christian
thinking, participation also leads away from the Christian Weltanschauung, firstly since
its implied reference to the “beyond” twists participation to pantheism and secondly it
seems to deprive the finite, temporal, and physical world of any reality of its own.176
These two problems have not forced any major dissent within Christian tradition, since
the only dissenting voice we hear is that of Søren Kierkegaard in 19th century. In our
opinion, out of the two issues raised by Schindler only the former posits a serious
question, but can be answered satisfactorily from the standpoints of both Eriugena and
Ibn ‘Arabī. As for the second problem, it seems to be begging the question. One has to
show first why it is necessary for “the finite, temporal, and physical world” to have “any
reality of its own” especially in the context of Christian worldview. If participation
means metaphysically, as Schindler himself says, “that one thing has what it is with and
indeed after and in pursuit of, another: it has its reality by virtue of something other
than itself” then precisely this is the intent of “impassibility,” recognized by Christian
philosophical tradition as one of the metaphysical Divine attributes. Impassibility also
implies “the ontological dependence of the world on spiritual/intellectual realities and
ultimately on God” something which is expressed by participation, as Schindler himself
admits.177
175 Paul Tillich, “The Nature of Religious Language,” in Theology of Culture (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1964), 54-55. 176
Schindler, “What’s the difference?” 2. 177
Ibid. 1.
125
5.1.25.1.25.1.25.1.2 Participation and “All that is (Participation and “All that is (Participation and “All that is (Participation and “All that is (omne quod estomne quod estomne quod estomne quod est))))”
Eriugena uses “participation” in order to divide “everything that is” (omne quod est)
into the following three categories: God, the primordial causes and the world. He
divides everything that is into four categories, participant, participated in (i.e. object of
participation), participation and that which is both participated and participant
simultaneously. The Supreme principle of all things is only participated since it
participates in nothing above itself while the first member of this division, created
nature, is participant only since there is nothing below it which should participate in it.
Naturally the realm of primordial causes is what simultaneously participates in the first
division of nature while it is participated by the third division. (See DDN III: 630A-
630D)
Thus Eriugena gives three levels of being, the highest, the lowest and the
intermediary. It goes without saying that there is nothing above the highest to be
participated in and below the lowest to participate in it. Hence it is only the
intermediate region that can both be participated and participant. It is difficult,
however, to see the point of including “Participation” as a member of this division.
Sheldon-Williams remarks that it is rather general name for things “which are” since
things which are neither participants nor participated nor both would not fall under
“things which are” 178 However, this remark is not of much help since it interprets
Eriugena as having included the whole as one of its parts.
178
See Sheldon-William’s note 5 to the text of DDN.
126
5.1.35.1.35.1.35.1.3 Participation: Literal and metaphorical explication Participation: Literal and metaphorical explication Participation: Literal and metaphorical explication Participation: Literal and metaphorical explication
Eriugena understands that the Latin term particpatio has a reference to “taking parts”
(partem capere) which would imply the existence of “parts” in the thing participated.179
Therefore he not only makes it explicit that “participation is not the taking of some
part, but the distribution of the Divine gifts and graces from the highest to the lowest
through high orders to the lower” (DDN III.631A) but also prefers its Greek
counterparts metoxe and metoxia for its explication. These Greek terms have the
advantage of being free from any reference at all to “parts.” He reads metoxe as if it
were “meta ex ousia” as meaning “having after” or “having second” while metoxia as
simply “meta-ousia”, that is, “after-essence” and concludes that participation means
nothing but “the derivation from a superior essence of the essence that follows [after it]
(ex superiori essentia secundae… deriuationem) and the distribution from that which
first possesses being to that which follows it in order that it may be.” Moreover, his
understanding of participation as something’s coming after another is close to the literal
sense the prefix met gives in compositional words, “after” or “behind.”180 Eriugena’s
exposition, therefore, falls somewhere between literalism and metaphor. Although he
rules out the “partem capere” element he does accept the “having after” sense which is
implied by the Greek met.
Eriugena also resorts to metaphors in order to elaborate the meaning of
participation. He first presents an arithmetical metaphor and says that “between all the
natural orders from the highest to the lowest the participations by which they are related
are similar, just like as the proportions between the terms of numbers, that is, among the
179
See Schindler, “What is the Difference?” 180 See ibid. 1.
127
numbers when they are constituted under one principle, are similar. (DDN III: 631A) He
characterizes “participation” with the distribution of “gifts by which every nature
subsists and graces by which every subsisting nature is adorned.” So the distribution of
these gifts and graces “flows down by degrees from the Supreme Source of all good gifts
and graces through the higher orders to the lower as far as the lowest of all.” (DDN III:
631A-B) This flowing to all orders is important since Eriugena emphasizes that “none of
the nature not even the lowest must be thought to be denied participation in a Divine
grace proportionate to itself.”(Ibid) However, Divine gifts and graces other than being
and well being, like sense, reason, wisdom, “do not descend to the lowest” since, for
instance “life does not extend to the lowest order.” (DDN III: 631C)
Eriugena then draws our attention to the way all radii are already present and
united within the central point of a circle and it is only when they approach toward the
circumference that they become separated. Thirdly, we are given the example of a river
which first flows forth from its source, and through its channel the water which first
wells up in the source continues to flow always without any break to whatever distance
it extends. In the light of these metaphors, the concept of participation can be
considered tantamount to being included in something and then having come out of it.
Out of these three metaphors the last mentioned is most physical of all and reveals this
meaning most clearly. The number and centre metaphors also point in this same
direction since the lines that connect the central point to circumference are contained by
the point itself and all the numbers greater than the unit are nothing but aggregates of
the self-same unit. Therefore, to say that the relationship between the world, primordial
causes and God is that of participation would mean that the world is “derived from” a
higher essence, i.e. the primordial causes, which in turn derive from God. We can also
128
say that whatever the world is, it is with or after the primordial causes and God and
whatever the primordial causes are they are with and after God. As for God Himself
whatever He is or has, is with Himself and in Himself. As Eriugena says, God is God per
essentiam, whereas man is God per participationem. (DDN III: 145C) Similarly, he
states later that the human nature is not the Light but only participates in light. God
alone is the Light per se; we are light per participationem. (Hom. 0292C-D) Moreover
participation implies existence of participant in God and in grace and Eriugena explains
that the participation of effects in the causes means that the causes are nothing but the
essence of all things. (DDN III: 145C)
5.25.25.25.2 Ibn ‘ArabIbn ‘ArabIbn ‘ArabIbn ‘Arabī on “on “on “on “DivineDivineDivineDivine Roots”Roots”Roots”Roots”
5.2.15.2.15.2.15.2.1 DivineDivineDivineDivine Roots and Roots and Roots and Roots and Omne quod estOmne quod estOmne quod estOmne quod est
Ibn ‘Arabī states: “There is nothing (ما ثم) but the Divine presence (الحضرة ا8لھية)
comprising of the Essence (الذات), Attributes (الصفات) and actions (فعالEا).” (Fut. II:
173)181 The essence is God as He is in Himself without reference to anything else. The
attributes/ Divine names, being identical to the Divine Essence, do not have substantial
existence but simply are relations between Divine Self and creatures. Ibn ‘Arabi> equates
“Divine actions” with the created world. The first two constituents of the Divine
presence, essence and attributes, to the exclusion of the world, may be called in Ibn
‘Arabī’s language “the Divine side” (الجانب ا8لھي).
181 See Frithjof Schuon, “The Five Divine Presences”, in Form and Substance in the Religions (New
Delhi: Third Eye, 2005), 51. At page 55 Schuon identifies “God as creator” i.e. Being with “the degree of
Divine qualities” which obviously is a reference to “Attributes” mentioned by Ibn ‘Arabi>. For more on
five presences also see William Chittick, “The Five Divine Presences: From al-Qu>nawi> to al-Qays}ari>” The
Muslim World, 72(1982), 107-128.
129
We can now formulate our question concerning God-world relationship more
precisely: What relationship the world (Divine actions) has to the Divine Side (Divine
Essence + Names/Attributes), according to Ibn ‘Arabi>? Ibn ‘Arabi> states that “no
property (حكم) becomes manifest in existence except that it has a root (أصل) in the
“Divine side” by which it (i.e. the property) is supported.” (Fut. II: 508) At another
place he writes that “There is no existent possible thing in everything-other-than-God182
that is not connected to the Divine relationships and lordly realities (الحقائق الربانية) which
are known as “the most beautiful names.” Therefore every possible thing (ممكن) is in
grasp of a Divine reality.” (Fut. II: 115; trans. SPK, 37)
Before exploring the doctrine of Divine roots we need to make a few
observations by way of clarification and comparison regarding what has just been
mentioned.
Firstly, it can be observed that Eriugena’s participation and Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Divine
roots theory are both set in the context of a classification of totality. Eriugena talks
about omne quod est while Ibn ‘Arabi> uses the negative expression for the same thing
namely, “there is nothing but…” However, there is certain divergence between the two
which must not be lost sight of. Whereas the three members of Eriugenian division
stand in same relation to each other, namely participation, in Ibn ‘Arabi> a participation-
like relationship holds only between the Attributes/Names and the World. As far as the
Essence and Attributes/Names are concerned the question of relation does not arise for a
relation would necessitate substantial distinction which in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s theology does
not appear. Since Ibn ‘Arabi> believes in Essence-Attributes identity and moreover, to
182
ماسوى هللا This is the name Ibn ‘Arabi> gives to cosmos.
130
ask “what relation there is between something and a relationship” would be susceptible
to the third-man argument and will thus lead into infinite regress.
Secondly, the tripartite division of Divine presence (totality) can be considered
to contain origins of the broader doctrine of five Divine presences which came to be
generally accepted in the Sufi circles. Five Divine presences are, in ascending order:
human realm (الناسوت), realm of royalty (ملكوت), realm of power (جبروت), Realm of the
Divine (ھوت�) and Ipseity (ھاھوت).183 The reduction of five to three presences can be
made more conveniently if we have before us Schuon’s description of these, in an
ascending order, as 1) material states, 2) animistic states, 3) angelic states, 4) qualified
being and 5) Beyond-being. Here the first three presences can be reduced to one, namely
the cosmos, or as Schuon himself would have preferred, “existence.” We would thus
acquire three presences namely Existence, Being and Beyond-Being which correspond to
Ibn ‘Arabī’s Actions, Attributes and Essence.
Thirdly, the identification of one component of the Divine presence (viz. actions)
with the world seems to imply that the latter is included in God, an apparently
pantheistic position. However, this inclusion need not necessarily be interpreted as
pantheism. For one thing, Ibn ‘Arabi> does not go for out and out God-world identity but
assigns to the world the mid-way-house of being He/not-He ( � ھو| ھو ( . (Fut. II: 379) He
relates deiform world184 to God via his doctrine of Divine roots. Moreover, the orthodox
teachings of Islamic tradition leave ample room for maintaining the inclusion thesis
without verging on pantheism. Schuon has excellently related the idea with Qur’ānic
183
The translation of the terms is taken from Schuon “Five Divine Presences,” 53 184
Ibn ‘Arabi> believes that God created the world upon His image. See Fut. II: 557. Further details are
discussed in the seventh chapter.
131
teachings. He writes, encapsulating Ibn ‘Arabi>’s spirit185 “But in reality it is the
Principle which envelops everything; the material world is only an infinitesimal and
eminently contingent content of the invisible Universe. In the first case, God is—in the
language of the Qoran—the ‘Inward’ or the ‘Hidden’ (الباطن), and in the second, He is
the ‘Vast’ or ‘He who contains’ (الواسع), or ‘He who surrounds’ (المحيط).” 186 In the third
chapter we have noticed that Eriugena himself extends the definition of God to include
Divine manifestations and the world187 and we have seen that he always attempts to
retain a distinction between God and the world.
Fourthly, when Ibn ‘Arabi> says that “Nothing becomes manifest in existence ( في
,he wants us to take the expression “in existence” quite seriously. Therefore ”…(الوجود
only positive realities are rooted and not privations like darkness and ignorance. This is
why he refuses to connect ignorance to some Divine root as it “is a quality pertaining to
non existence while the names only bestow existence they do not bestow nonexistence.”
(Fut. II: 592; tr. SPK 55) Talking about the Divine roots of levels he writes that levels
themselves do not have Divine roots since they are only “relations” only their
“designation” is so rooted in divinity. (Fut. II: 468-469)188
Now, if there is a Divine root for every manifestation, contemplation can
proceed in two ways. One can start from a specific Divine name or attribute and
185
Ibn ‘Arabi> writes: “‘Surely He encompasses everything’ (41:54) in the cosmos. ‘Encompassing’ (إحاطة)
a thing conceals that thing. Hence the Manifest is the Encomapsser (المحيط)… Hence within the
Encompasser that thing—that is, the cosmos—is like the spirit within the body…” Fut: II: 151; trans.
SPK, 93). 186
Schuon, “Five Divine Presences,” 51. 187
See chapter 3 section 1 with reference to DDN I: 448B. 188
It is somewhat perplexing, though, to find out the ontological criterion under which “designation”
pertains to existence but “relation” does not.
132
contemplate what stems from that root in the world. Or one could proceed the other way
round. Ibn ‘Arabi> seems to have elaborated his doctrine of Divine roots in both ways.
From the World to the Names From the World to the Names From the World to the Names From the World to the Names
Throughout his al-Futu>h}a>t Ibn ‘Arabi> tries to discover the Divine roots of various
phenomena. He starts by some of the microcosmic or macrocosmic features and tells us
what their Divine roots are. Two basic features of the world, plurality (الكثرة) and
polarity (الزوجية) have roots in the Divine side. Multiplicity is a manifestation of the
diversity of Divine names and attributes while polarity is rooted in the fact the all
attributes submerge under two basic ones namely, mercy (الرحمة) and wrath (الغضب).
Divine names are either names of beauty (الجمال) or those of majesty (الج\ل). The former
imply the similarity or proximity of the Divine to the cosmos while the latter show
Divine transcendence. This division is ultimately reducible to “God’s two Hands”
spoken of in the Qur’a>n.189 It is not difficult to see that the cosmic polarities especially
the male-female polarity, are rooted in this fact about the Divine nature.
Multiplicity and polarity respectively imply two further features, hierarchy
and these are also rooted in the Divine nature. Ibn ‘Arabī (منازعة) and contention (مفاضلة)
writes: “The Divine Names that are attributed to the Real have various levels in
attribution. Some of them depend upon others, some of them supervise others and some
have a more inclusive connection to the cosmos and more effects within it than the
189
Sachiko Murata summarizes this as follows: “In brief, they (i.e. Ibn ‘Arabi> and his followers)
understand the “two hands” to indicate a polar relationship in God Himself. That He should create Adam
with these two hands indicates that He employed this polarity to bring the microcosm into existence. The
microcosm itself, made in the image of God, must have “two hands” in the same qualitative sense that
God has them, not only physically. And so also must the macrocosm, which is the microcosm’s mirror
image.” Sachiko Murata, The Tao of Islam: A Sourcebook on Gender relations in Islamic Thought (New
York: SUNY, 1992), 82
133
others.” (Fut. II: 34) For example the Divine name “Alive (الحي)” has the “most
tremendous degree” among the names since it is the precondition of the other names. 190
(Fut. IV: 228; trans. SPK, 49) This hierarchy is the Divine root of cosmic hierarchy. The
Divine root of the cosmic conflict is the fact that Divine names having diverse
properties demand diverse effects within the cosmos. The name “Avenger” )المنتقم (
demands the occurrence of vengeance in its object, while the name the Compassionate
demands its removal. (Fut. II: 93; trans. SPK, 55) Hence, the cosmic plurality, polarity
hierarchy and contention between various levels are all rooted in the divinity.
Other cosmic realities whose Divine roots Ibn ‘Arabī mentions include
prophethood (النبوة) which is rooted in the Divine name “The All-Hearing (السميع)” (Fut.
II: 252), all human character traits rooted, especially love, in Divine character traits
(Fut. II: 241),191 possibility of human transmutation in different forms rooted in Divine
transmutation(Fut. III: 44), changes of states (حوالEتغير ا) (Fut. II: 385), days (يامEا)192
and the present moment (الوقت) (Fut. II: 539) rooted in God’s being “upon a task
everyday (Qur’a>n: 55:29), productivity of and receptivity towards effects in Divine
responsiveness (إجابة) (Fut. II: 453), feeling of inner sweetness (Fut. II: 507) and spiritual
movement rooted in God’s rejoicing and joyfully receiving his repenting servant (Fut. II:
366) and cosmic contraction (القبض) which is rooted in God’s describing himself with
attributes of the creatures especially in being embraced by a believer’s heart. (Fut. II:
509)
190
This means that God has other essential attributes (like Hearing, Speaking, Will, Power etc.) because
He has Life. 191Vide Fut. II: 241 viz.: “For God is the Necessary Being through Himself while man exists through his
Lord, so he acquire s existence and character traits from Him.” Trans. SPK, 287. 192 For discussion of relationship between solar days and Divine days in Ibn ‘Arabi> see Mohammed Haj
Yousef, Ibn ‘Arabi> time and Cosmology , 73-77.
134
From the Names to the WorldFrom the Names to the WorldFrom the Names to the WorldFrom the Names to the World
In the long 198th chapter of al-Futu>h}a>t Ibn ‘Arabī starts with specific Divine names and
tells us what originated within the cosmos through their particular attentiveness )التوجه( .
In the main he mentions 28 Divine names but some further names occur within the
discussion of the first name البديع. Heterogeneous phenomena manifest from these Divine
names: principles, levels of reality, letters of Arabic alphabet, heavenly spheres and
bodies, days of the week, prophets and genera etc. Through the attentiveness of the
name “The Life-Giver (الحي)” originated “what appeared in water, the letter (س) and the
stars included in the Sagitta.” The angels were created through attentiveness of the
Overpowering (القوي) (Fut. II. 466) while man was created through that of the Uniter
It is easy to see the connection between these Divine names and (Fut. II: 468) .(الجامع)
feature of things which originate through their attentiveness. Water is the principle of
life, as the Qur’a>n says that “From water we made everything alive.”(21:23) hence its
connection with “The Alive”; the Jinn are subtle creatures hence their connection with
“The Subtle”; the angels are the most powerful of God’s creatures hence they originate
through the attentiveness of “The Overpowering” and it is only man who unites within
him the Divine image and the cosmic image hence his origin is from the name “The
Uniter.” However, it is less clear how certain names, particular days, Arabic alphabets,
heavens, and heavenly bodies, spiritual states can be connected with specific Divine
names. Ibn ‘Arabī remarks that all Divine names related to cosmos have effect in
everything and he specifies one of these only because it has more powerful and effective
rule over it. (Fut. II: 468) This implies that understanding the “sense” of Divine names is
not sufficient for understanding its cosmological connection since the affair is not
entirely amenable to rational investigation but is based on spiritual unveiling.
135
Ibn ‘Arabi> maintains that more than one Divine name concurs in an individual
substance. For example, he provides two Divine names “الغنى” and “الدھر” which jointly
attend to the manifestation of days etc. He has explained earlier that in it there are
numerous aspects requiring a corresponding number of Divine Names. For the reality of
its creation (إيجاده) requires the Name, the Powerful ; while the aspect of its perfection
[ظھوره] requires the Name, the Purposer; and the aspect of its manifestation [إحكامه]
requires the Name, the Seer[البصير], the Observer [الرائي] and other [such Names]. (Fut.
I: 100)193 The first two aspects i.e. existence and perfection remind one of Eriugena’s
distinction between Divine gifts and graces in terms of some-things’ being and well-
being. Thus the relationship between a Divine root and its manifestation is not one-to-
one relation like the one between Platonic forms and objects. This qualifies William
Chittick’s view that what corresponds to the Platonic Ideas in Ibn al-‘Arabi> is the
Divine names. 194 (SPK 84)
5.2.25.2.25.2.25.2.2 DivineDivineDivineDivine Roots and “participation” literally understoodRoots and “participation” literally understoodRoots and “participation” literally understoodRoots and “participation” literally understood
Like Eriugena Ibn ‘Arabi> would certainly have ruled out the world’s literal taking part
in God since the Divine names which relate the world to God as Divine roots are not
parts of divinity but aspects and relationships. However, as stemming from their Divine
roots, existents might be considered to participate in Divine side in the sense of “being
derived from higher essences.” Things can be considered to “participate” in the sense of
“having with” and “coming after,” not only in the sense of temporal succession but also
of ontological dependence. The world’s “coming after” Divine roots is explicit from the
way Ibn ‘Arabī understands the Qur’a>n 15:21: “There is nothing whose treasuries are
193
The relevant text has been translated by Gerald Elmore, “Four Texts of Ibn al-‘Arabi> on the Creative
Self-Manifestation of the Divine Names.” JMIAS, XXIX(2001), 23. 194
See SPK, 84. In as much as their archetypal function the Divine names do correspond to Platonic ideas.
136
not with us but We only send down thereof in due and ascertainable measures.” This
demands, according to him, that “He bring them out from treasuries which are with him,
that is, from an existence which we do not perceive to an existence which we do
perceive.” (Fut. II>: 587) 195 In one of his prayers Ibn ‘Arabi> says, “From Him (عنه) and
with Him (به) is the existence of everything.”196 This expression of world’s being
brought and, especially, sustained into existence by God is given a characteristic
metaphysical touch by Ibn ‘Arabī in his commentary upon the cosmology of alphabet.
He uses the first letter ا to symbolize Divine Essence and ب to symbolize attributes.197
This is very apt since ا, whose numerical value is 1, is the only letter which never
attaches itself to another, something designating the absolute transcendence of the
Essence. Commenting on Abu Madyan’s saying “I have never observed anything except
that I observed ب written over it” Ibn ‘Arabī says that this letter accompanies all
existents which points to the fact that everything appeared “with Him” (به). (Fut. I: 102)
One of the meanings of saying that the cosmos is rooted in divinity is to say that it
appear within it, an apparent parallelism with participation.
5.2.35.2.35.2.35.2.3 DivineDivineDivineDivine Roots and Metaphors of “Participation”Roots and Metaphors of “Participation”Roots and Metaphors of “Participation”Roots and Metaphors of “Participation”
The metaphors Eriugena presented for explication of “participation” are also relevant
for the comparison. His first metaphor highlights the principle that all orders of reality
are identical in being participants but differ from each other in other respects. His view
that “none of the orders of nature how-low-so-ever can be denied participation in Divine
195 Although treasuries do not directly refer to Divine names but to the fixed entities, they do so indirectly
as the entities are nothing but manifestations of Divine names as we saw in the previous chapter. 196
Ibn ‘Arabi>, Awra>d al-Ayya>m wa al-Laya>li> (Oman: Da>r al-Fath}: 2003), 46. Trans. Pablo Beneito and
Stephen Hirtenstein, The Seven Days of the Heart (Oxford: Anqa Publishers, 2008), 28 (with slight
modification). 197
Souad Hakim, Al-Mu‘jam al-S}u>fi (Beirut: Dandarah, 1981), 181.
137
gift or grace appropriate to itself” reiterates the same principle. This principle finds its
application in Ibn ‘Arabī’s cosmology at two levels. First, the Divine names are one in
referring to Essence and in determining it but they are different in view of their specific
meanings. Second, in the created world everything is different and separate from others
in respect of its quiddity but identical to them in being a manifestation of God. Likewise
Ibn ‘Arabī considers all existence “Divine symbols” (شعائر) and says that nothing of the
world can be discarded or held in contempt. (Fut. III: 527) He, however, would have
corrected Eriugena’s claim that graces like sense and life do not descend to the lowest
levels of existence since in his view there is nothing in the world which is not alive and
glorifying its Lord with an eloquent tongue. (Fut. II: 504)
Having discussed Ibn ‘Arabi>’s doctrine of Divine roots in general and having
looked at some of its specific examples we now turn to an important issue that is very
dear to Eriugena and which Ibn ‘Arabi> solves in the light of his Divine roots theory,
namely the question of applicability or non applicability of ten categories to God.
5.35.35.35.3 God and God and God and God and Categoriae DecemCategoriae DecemCategoriae DecemCategoriae Decem
5.3.15.3.15.3.15.3.1 Eriugena on God and CategoriesEriugena on God and CategoriesEriugena on God and CategoriesEriugena on God and Categories
After many digressions Eriugena comes at last to treat the question of applicability of
ten categories to God in I: 562 which was asked many passages ago. His position is
clearly stated at the beginning of the long dialogue that ensues. The Alumnus declares
that the categories cannot apply to God since God is neither genus nor species nor an
accident while the application of categories would have implied God’s being a genus.
(See DDN I: 463C) The Nutritor happily accepts this as being in line with the
requirements of via negativa he has propounded in preceding passages, but the Alumnus
himself starts wavering in the assertion he has made. Hence he asks that the category of
138
relation should be allowed to be properly predicated to God. This request is not granted
since it is contrary to an assertion already made and agreed upon, namely, that “nothing
can properly be predicted of God.” So this category is also predicated of God
metaphorically. But after discussing the nature of various categories the alumnus again
shows hesitation in accepting that action and affection are not properly predicated of
God, who according to Scripture and patristic writings is said to have made the world,
to love and be loved etc. One of the examples that the Alumnus cites is the saying of
Christ: “Whoso loves me shall be loved by my father and I shall love him and shall
reveal myself to him.” In response Eriugena implies that although “he loves” seems to
be an active verb in fact it is in fact not so since “he who loves or desires suffers himself
while he who is loved or desired acts” therefore we cannot take “God loves” literally
since that would imply that He is moved by His love and God’s loving someone is a
metaphorical expression for His being loved. (DDN I: 505A)198
As is shown by this specific example the categories do not really apply to God
and whenever they are found to be applied in the Scripture they should be taken as
metaphors. However, there is one limitation in the analysis Eriugena presents for God’s
loving; although it shows that “action” cannot apply to God properly it anyway applies
the category of “affection” to God understood in the sense of “being object of an action”
since it replaces “loving” with “being loved.”
198
Interestingly, Ibn ‘Arabi> looks at this issue from a quite different angle and makes a point contrary to
Eriugena’s. He claims that God can love creatures but creatures cannot love Him. Since “love is related to
the non-existent, so no love is conceivable from the creature to God.” (Fut. II: 113) The point being made
is that since love for something or someone implies lover’s lack of that thing or distance from that person
and since it is God who truly is and the creature never was, only God can love the creature by bringing it
from nonexistence to existence.
139
5.3.25.3.25.3.25.3.2 Ibn ‘Arabi> on God and CategoriesIbn ‘Arabi> on God and CategoriesIbn ‘Arabi> on God and CategoriesIbn ‘Arabi> on God and Categories
Ibn ‘Arabi> gives the initial impression that he dislikes the whole discussion as a part of
which the question arises. In his discussion of the combination between the standpoints
of incomparability and similarity Ibn ‘Arabi> observes regarding the debate among
Muslim theologians on the applicability of Categoriae Decem to God that it feels like
the proverb says “I hear the grinding, but I do not see any flour.” (Fut. II: 116; trans.
SPK, 75) At another place he combines this distaste for the discussion of categories and
God with the practical demands of Sufi piety. Indulging into such discussion is not
recommended since it distracts one from focusing on “one thing needful” that is,
“knowing oneself” and makes one do something God has prohibited to do, namely
contemplation upon Divine Essence. The Qur’a>n says, “God warns you regarding His
self.” (Ibid. III: 81-82)
However, many interesting and insightful comments are scattered on the
question of God’s relation to the categories throughout his major as well as some shorter
works. To begin with Ibn ‘Arabi> does not hold a substantial view of the nature of
categories but considers them to “appear with the appearance of substance for itself
when the Real brings it out from its hiddenness.”(See ibid. III: 11)
Quite contrary to Eriugena who holds that the categories apply really to
creatures and metaphorically to God Ibn ‘Arabi> is of the opinion that all are attributes of
God’s perfection and only secondarily apply to other things. (See ibid. II: 473; trans.
SPK, 75–76) Hence Ibn ‘Arabi>’s position regarding the applicability of specific
categories to God is different from Eriugena’s but, interestingly, his understanding of
the nature of these categories and their correlation is same as Eriugena’s. Thus the
140
relational status that he awards to all the categories is indirectly comparable to
Eriugena’s considering the categories to be incorporeal. (DDN I: 478D-479A)
Secondly, as John Marenbon has observed, Eriugena’s was not a pure
Aristotelian version of categories since according to it the first category substance
(ousia) was not an individual of such and such a kind but the most inclusive of all
classes and is conceived as substrate to which accidents are attached.199 That Ibn ‘Arabi>
also understands ousia as a substrate is obvious from the diagrammatical presentation of
the ten categories in his Insha>.200 It appears that for Ibn ‘Arabi> too this category is the
most basic of all and relates to them like a substrate does. This presentation consists of
a circle representing Primordial Matter which comprises all knowable realities, existent,
nonexistent and those which are beyond existence/non-existence. In that diagram ousia
is given the central position while the rest of ten categories form a circumferential circle
around it:
199
John Marenbon, “John Scottus and the Categoriae Decem” in W. Beierwaltes, ed., Eriugena: Studien
zu seinen Quellen, (Berlin: Carl Winter Universitäts Verlag, 1980), 122. At DDN I: 492C Eriugena says
concerning ousia that “it subsists in its subdivisions eternally and immutably as a whole that is always
together and all its subdivisions are always together as an inseparable unity in it.” 200
See Insha>’ al-Dawa>’ir, 24-25. The diagram given here is scanned from Fenton-Gloton translation of
Insha>’ cited earlier from Ibn ‘Arabi>: A Commemorative Volume.
141
Ibn Ibn Ibn Ibn ‘‘‘‘AraAraAraArabi>bi>bi>bi>’s Circle of s Circle of s Circle of s Circle of Categoriae DecemCategoriae DecemCategoriae DecemCategoriae Decem
Coming to the question of the applicability of categories to the Divine nature, as
a point of departure we could consider Ibn ‘Arabi>’s negative response that in view of the
fact that nothing makes God known in positive terms, “there is nothing of the ten
categories, except for a verified passivity and a definite activity.” (Fut. II: 211; trans.
SPK, 349) Hence none of the ten categories can be really applicable to Divine reality
except for the fact that from the passivity observable in the nature one is able to infer
the existence of an agent. But this agent himself remains beyond knowledge. At another
place Ibn ‘Arabi> indicates that he does not construe Divine agency in the sense of first
cause. While discussing the ritual of stoning the Satans, which Ibn ‘Arabi> symbolically
interprets as a dialogue between the pilgrim and Satan, he negates applicability of the
142
word “cause” to divinity since whenever there is cause, effect must be there, while God
was there and there was nothing beside Him, at least in the sense of spatio-temporal
existence. (See ibid. I: 720). Ibn ‘Arabi>, however does not stop at this negative
standpoint but recognizes a correspondence between God and the world characterized by
the categories. We submit that this is an application of one of his Divine roots
doctrine.201 The correspondence between categories and the nature of God is established
in at least two places in al-Futu>h}a>t, at I: 180 and III:11.
At III: 11 after providing that the world consists of the entities of substances and
the relation that follows them, i.e. the remaining nine categories, Ibn ‘Arabi> provides the
principle that since the world is a copy of its archetype in Divine knowledge and Divine
knowledge of the world is identical with Divine self-knowledge the world must be upon
the image of the creator. Then he immediately mentions Divine qualities that
correspond to the ten categories by which the spatio-temporal world is characterized and
crowns this enumeration by commenting that the categories constitute the form of the
world.
If we combine this list of correspondence with the one mentioned at Fut. I: 180
we might see the former as explaining latter and bringing out certain important
differences. This can be seen from the table given below.
201
This can also be seen as an implication of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s commitment to principle-manifestation
continuity along with a discontinuity, which finds its expression in his synthesis of incomparability and
similarity.
143
Table: Table: Table: Table: DivineDivineDivineDivine Roots of Roots of Roots of Roots of Categoriae DecemCategoriae DecemCategoriae DecemCategoriae Decem
CategoriesCategoriesCategoriesCategories
المقو�ت
The Roots in the The Roots in the The Roots in the The Roots in the DivineDivineDivineDivine SideSideSideSide 8صول في الجانب اEلھيا
I.I.I.I.180180180180 III. III. III. III. 11111111
SubstanceSubstanceSubstanceSubstance Essence Essence
QuantityQuantityQuantityQuantity Names Number of His Names
QualityQualityQualityQuality Self-
Disclosures
“Each day He is upon some task”(55:29)
“We will finish with you, O mankind and
jinn.”(55:31) “The All-merciful sat upon the throne.”
(20:5).
PlacePlacePlacePlace Sitting upon “He came to be in a Cloud” (h}adi}th) “And
He is God in the Heavens.”
TimeTimeTimeTime Eternity He is God in the Eternity
PosturePosturePosturePosture Al-
fahwa>niyah
Allah spoke directly to Moses
(4:164)
RelationRelationRelationRelation Relation “Master of the Kingdom”
(3:26); Creator of Creatures
ActionActionActionAction Munificence A Balance in His Hand, lifts it and lowers it
AffectionAffectionAffectionAffection Manifestation
in forms of
beliefs
He is called upon and Responds; Asked and gives; Is
asked forgiveness and forgives
144
Some Observations on the Correspondence between Some Observations on the Correspondence between Some Observations on the Correspondence between Some Observations on the Correspondence between DivineDivineDivineDivine Nature and Ten Nature and Ten Nature and Ten Nature and Ten
CategoriesCategoriesCategoriesCategories
Posture:Posture:Posture:Posture: The root mentioned for posture at I: 180 is الفھوانية which is a term used by Ibn
‘Arabi> to denote “Face to face address of the Real in the imaginal world.” ( م المثالعال )
(Ibid. II: 128) God’s direct address to Moses is mentioned at III.11 as an instance.
Quality and PlaceQuality and PlaceQuality and PlaceQuality and Place:::: The table reveals that one root is assigned to different categories.
Hence “sitting upon” (ا8ستواء) is assigned to quality202 in the first list and to “place” in
the second one. It seems that istawa>’ itself does not answer the question regarding qua
as is obvious from the question placed before Ma>lik b. Anas regarding the quality (كيف)
of istawa>’.203 It is possible to take istawa>’ in the text quoted from Ibn ‘Arabi> not as a
single word but as an abbreviation for the whole statement in which it occurs.204 In that
case the Divine root of istawa>’ not necessary the quality denoted by istawa>’ but some
other fact meant by the words “The All-Merciful sat upon the throne.” From some of his
comments upon these words we do get an idea of the quality to which the word istiwa>’
points. In this case, by mentioning istawa>’ as the Divine root of quality, Ibn ‘Arabi> can
be taken to be pointing to mercy, which clearly corresponds to quality.
StateStateStateState: : : : The category of state is missing from both lists. It is worth our while to try to
complete this list by finding out what Divine root “state” could have. In the circle of
202
At another place Ibn ‘Arabi> has explicitly claimed that istawa>’ is an attribute of God. See Fut. III: 162.
A quality according to Aristotle’s Categories (8a:25), is “that in virtue of which people are said to be such
and such.” The Works of Aristotle (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.) II. 13. 203
See Abd al-Kari>m al-Shahrista>ni>, Al-Milal wa al-Niùal (Beirut: Da>r al-Ma‘rifah, 1975), chapter 3, Al-
úifa>tiyyah. Certainly “sitting,” even though it is not a very accurate translation of istawa>’, is mentioned
by Aristotle himself as instantiating the category of position. See Categories, 2a. 204
This strategy can be justified by invoking analogy with Ibn ‘Arabi>’s treatment of the category of
quantity in the two lists given in the table. Although at I: I80 the root for quantity is just “names” we
know from III: 11 that this word is just an abbreviation for “number of names.”
145
categories that we came across in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Insha>’ al-Dawa>’ir, he uses the word حال
for the category in question. This word is introduced from philosophy and Kala>m into
Sufism to denote a spiritual state, corresponding to theophany or Divine self-
manifestation. Normally, Ibn ‘Arabi> uses this word in its original linguistic meaning and
at other times as a technical Sufi term. Since a term retains some of its original meaning
even when it is taken over by some specific discipline, we hope to learn something about
the relationship between Divine nature and “state” as one of the ten Aristotelian
categories. We hypothesize that we could find the Divine root of “state” in the Qur’a>nic
words quoted by Ibn ‘Arabi> at III.11 as providing Divine root for the category of
quality. Before we attempt to find textual evidence for our hypothesis from Ibn ‘Arabi>
let us recall that Ibn ‘Arabi> has derived roots of two categories from a single Qur’a>nic
text in the parallel lists of Divine roots shown in the table above. Secondly, Ibn ‘Arabi>
has mentioned the Qur’a>nic verse against the category “quality” and according to him,
“the qualities are states.” (Fut. I: 195)205 At another place while discussing love he
considers the states as subordinate to quality and speaks of one quality’s having
multiple states. (Fut. II: 337) 206 Although at a number of places Ibn ‘Arabi> mentions
that the fact that there are Divine roots of “state,” and for that matter all other
categories, in “Divine states (أحوال إلھية)”, this does not mean that the predicate can be
applied directly to God, but that there is something about God which causes the
characterization of spatio-temporal world with “state.” In the Eriugenian language of
negative theology we can say that God is beyond states or creator of states. This can be
205 At Fut. II: 305 Ibn ‘Arabi> identifies this term just after quoting Qur’a>nic verse on Divine tasks. At II:
368 he relates the Divine states with certain characteristics mentioned in some traditions like God’s
joyfully receiving His servants and happiness upon repenting servant. 206 Ibn ‘Arabi> writes about the Sixth Pole (القطب السادس) that “he does not take any of his states except
from his Lord, so his states are the states of his Lord.” Ibid. IV: 82.
146
seen from what Ibn ‘Arabi> expresses by connecting difference in human states and
Divine relations.
If it is asked why Divine relations have become different we would reply, “due
to difference in states!” … so the one whose state is hunger prays, “O All-
Provider” and the one whose state is drowning prays “O Helper.” (Fut. I: 265)
In this passage it is apparent that states characterize engendered existence but are
connected to Divine nature. Here we also find Ibn ‘Arabi> referring to the Qur’a>nic verse
about Divine tasks in the context of states, which encourages us to use it as a source of
their Divine root.
In view of these textual sources, we can finally submit that that the root in the
Divine side of the appearance and existence of “state” is the fact the God is upon some
task every day. This “being upon” is the archetype for the symbol of “state.”
TimeTimeTimeTime: : : : The primary consideration within God-time problematic is the fact that time is
taken to essentially imply movement, mutability, corruption, finitude and death207 while
God has to be free of all these imperfections. On the one hand this consideration entails
that God is beyond time, on the other hand, it necessitates spiritual attempts to
overcome temporality. As far as Eriugena himself is concerned, since he recognizes that
time implies mutability 208 and since he has maintained that the categories do not
properly apply to God, he had to conclude that “time and place are to be counted among
the things that have been created” and since God is not to be counted among the created
things He cannot properly be called time and place. (See DDN I: 468C) In view of its
supra-temporality Eriugena frequently uses the words “now and always” (nunc et
207
See Dermot Moran, “Time and Eternity in the Periphyseon,” in History and Eschatology in John
Scottus Eriugena and his Time, ed. James McEvoy and Michael Dunne, (Leuven, University Press, 2002),
489. 208
Eriugena writes, “Time is the exact and natural measure of movement and pauses.” DDN V: 890.
147
semper) to denote Divine eternity. (See ibid. IV: 860) However, Eriugena identifies
creation of the world with Divine self-creation and his superlative theology demands
that we transcend this positive attribution. As Moran expresses it, “For Eriugena, time
belongs to the self-expression, self-externalization, self-manifestation or self-creation of
the creator God and also to the self-articulation of nous in sensibility.”209 In a famous
passage Eriugena mentions the supratemporal’s making himself temporal
(supertemporalis temporalem). (See DDN III: 678C) Therefore while creating the spatio
temporal world God makes Himself temporal. Moreover, since one must proceed from
affirmative to negative to superlative theology, one must say that God is, is not and is
more than eternal.210
A number of scholars have focused on Ibn ‘Arabi>’s concept of time.211 In the
light of these studies Ibn ‘Arabi>’s relevant views can be discussed conveniently by
dividing time into Principial time and theophanic time. The latter can further be divided
into microcosmic time and macrocosmic time. The Arabic word الدھر is taken to mean
Principial time or time with which God has identified himself, while the word الوقت is
considered to be the counterpart of time as it relates to theophany, whether microcosmic
or macrocosmic.
Thus when Ibn ‘Arabi> relates the Prophetic saying “Do not curse Al-Dahr
because Al-Dahr is God” he considers it to be about the Principial time, which “stands
209
Dermot Moran, “Time and Eternity,” 488. 210
Ibid. 497-8. 211
Particularly mention-worthy are Gerhard BÞwering’s “Ibn al-‘Arabi>’s concept of Time,” in Gott ist
Schon und Er liebt die Schonheit: Fetschrift Annemarie Schimmel, eds. A Giese and J.C. Burgel (Zurich:
Lang Verlag, 1994)71-91 and Ibrahim Kalin “From the Temporal Time to the Eternal Now: Ibn al-‘Arabi>
and Mulla Sadra> on Time” in JMIAS, LXI (2007), 31-63 inter alia.
148
above temporal time and thus presents permanence against transience.”212 Therefore,
since this Divine time is eternal time, identifying God with it does not necessarily entail
the implausible consequence of attributing mutability or corruption to God, since time
spoken of here is different from time as we experience it.213
The first subdivision of theophanic time is microcosmic time i.e. time as we
experience it and is called “the moment”(الوقت)by Ibn ‘Arabi> and other Sufis. An
important principle of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s theory of theophany, as we shall see in the next
chapter, is that the Principle manifests Himself in accordance with the disposition or
preparedness (ا8ستعداد) of the locus of manifestation (مجلى). “Moment,” according to Ibn
‘Arabi> is “what you are with and upon” and “what is decreed by and passed onto
you.”214 This definition which connects time to the category of “state” also refers to
Divine manifestation by mentioning Divine decree. As Kalin has summed it up, “The
moment designates a state of being in which individual acquires God’s decree in tandem
with his disposition.”215 By the macrocosmic moment “every natural event is an
emergence or appearance. Just like the disposition of the individual the universe also has
a disposition according to which God’s decrees emerge in different degrees of
212
Ibrahim Kalin, Ibid. 50. 213
A further step can be taken in the light of Iqbal’s discussion of God and time, according to which even
change can be ascribed to God without thereby implying any imperfection to Him, since one can
understand change in connection with God just like one understands Divine time different from human or
cosmic time. Iqbal writes, for instance, that “The Ultimate Ego exists in pure duration wherein change
ceases to be a succession of varying attitudes, and reveals its true character as continuous creation,
‘untouched by weariness’ and unseizable by “slumber or sleep.” To conceive the Ultimate Ego as
changeless in this sense is to conceive Him as utter inaction, a motiveless, stagnant neutrality, an absolute
nothing. To the creative Self change cannot mean imperfection.” Muhammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of
Religious Thought in Islam, Ed. M. Saeed Sheikh (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1986), 48. 214
Ibrahim Kalin, “From the Temporal Time,” 47. The first definition of moment is given at Fut. II: 539. 215 Ibid. 48.
149
ontological intensity.”216 Theophanic time of both kinds is rooted in the divinity, as Ibn
‘Arabi> writes that “The support of the present moment in the Divine things is the fact
that He describes himself with the words, “Each day He is upon some task.” (Fut. II:
539; trans. SPK, 38) Hence the category of time (of course theophanic time) is rooted in
the same facet of divinity in which the category of state is rooted.
What we have been calling “Principial time” is called “Eternal time” by Kalin,
“Eternity” by Böwering, who has concluded his article by remarking that “Eternity
belongs to God alone, but God’s creature has the present moment.”217 It would be wrong
to get the impression from these terms that just like we/the world are in time, God is in
eternity. This is a conclusion that Ibn ‘Arabi> tries hard to contest in his Kita>b al-Azal.
With the help of a complex argument Ibn ‘Arabi> seeks to show that azal (eternity-
without-beginning) conceived after likeness of time or as extension leads to absurd
conclusions like attribution of God with nothingness, negation of Divine unity by
positing another eternal existent, naming God illegitimately and finally, of circular
reasoning (تسلسل) by posing eternity as one of his attributes, since He has his attributes
eternally and having eternity eternally is circular. After negating this concept Ibn ‘Arabi>
recommends that instead of saying “God spoke in eternity” we should say “Divine
Speech is a beginningless attribute of Allah, without qualification (kayf).218We can
conclude from this that on the one hand we have Principial time which is God, not
216
Ibid. 217
Bowering, “Ibn al-‘Arabi>’s Concept of Time,” 91. 218
Ibn ‘Arabi>, “Kita>b al-Azal” in Rasa>’il Ibn ‘Arabi>, 121-122. Compare Paul Helm: “it is better to think
of timelessness not as separate attribute but as a mode of possessing attributes. It is not that God is both
omniscient and timeless but that He is timelessly omniscient.” Eternal God: A Study of God without
Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 17.
150
something that encompasses Him and on the other hand theophanic time which has its
root in God’s being upon some task each day.
To sum up the discussion of God’s relation to Categoriae Decem, Eriugena and
Ibn ‘Arabi> agree on the main features of the nature of categories and on the view that in
consideration of Divine transcendence none of these categories should apply literally to
God. However Ibn ‘Arabi> connects Divine nature and the existence of these categories
since they constitute the form of the world and in the opinion of latter form of the world
is ontologically connected to Divine Nature. This fact sets him apart from Eriugena’s
position only to a certain extent, because he is drawing implications of a metaphysical
principle of his which is found in Eriugena as well. So the difference is only that one of
these writers is applying his principle to the full while the other keeps it to a certain
limit.
It can safely be concluded from the preceding analysis that Ibn ‘Arabi>’s doctrine
of Divine roots squares fairly with Eriugena’s concept of participation. However, he is
more elaborate than the latter since he not only provides a general principle but also
endeavors to relate particular existential realities to Divine realities. Eriugena, in
contrast, was more elaborate in explaining the meaning of “participation” while Ibn
‘Arabi> gave us more specific information while leaving the task of defining and
discovering principles to his readers.
In the next chapter we turn to the concept of theophany and its counterpart in
Ibn ‘Arabi>’s cosmology.
SixSixSixSix
MacrocosmMacrocosmMacrocosmMacrocosm----2222: Theophany and : Theophany and : Theophany and : Theophany and AlAlAlAl----tajallitajallitajallitajalli >> >> In the present chapter we complete our comparative analysis of the views of Eriugena
and Ibn ‘Arabi> on metacosm-macrocosm relation by addressing the second of two key
Eriugenian terms, namely “theophany.” We compare the meaning, nature and functions
of this concept in Eriugena’s philosophy with “al-tajalli>” as it is understood and put to
work by Ibn ‘Arabi>.
6.16.16.16.1 Eriugena on TheophanyEriugena on TheophanyEriugena on TheophanyEriugena on Theophany
6.1.16.1.16.1.16.1.1 Etymology and Importance of the ConceptEtymology and Importance of the ConceptEtymology and Importance of the ConceptEtymology and Importance of the Concept
The word “theophany” is derived from the Greek theos (god) and phanio (to come/bring
to light, make appear, appear). A theophany is an appearance or manifestation of
deity.219 Professor Nasr has claimed that “[t]heophany, literally ‘to show God’ does not
mean the incarnation but the reflection of Divinity in the mirror of created forms.”220
However, it seems that historically there has been some connection between the concept
of theophany and the idea of incarnation since Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea (c.263-
c339) penned a book called Peri-Theophania in which he treated of the incarnation of
219 See Michael Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying, 43.
220 Knowledge and the Sacred, (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1989), 215 n. 6.
Professor Nasr has also noted the correspondence between theophany and al-tajalli>. See his book Religion
and the Order of Nature (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2004), 229 n. 63.
152
Jesus Christ.221 This latter idea is sometimes described as “Christophany.”
To realize the importance of “theophany” for Eriugena one has merely to observe
that he wants us to understand the four divisions of nature as theophanies: They are
from God and in God.” (DDN III: 690A) He exclaims that “no deeper thing there can be
for human inquiry than theophany.” (DDN I: 449A)
6.1.26.1.26.1.26.1.2 Dionysian Influences: FormDionysian Influences: FormDionysian Influences: FormDionysian Influences: Form----Assuming, IlluminatiAssuming, IlluminatiAssuming, IlluminatiAssuming, Illumination and Elitismon and Elitismon and Elitismon and Elitism
Pseudo-Dionysius is one of Eriugena’s most important sources, and the concept of
theophany is one of those areas where this influence is most apparent. Dionysius applies
the name theophany to “that beholding of God which shows the Divine Likeness,
figured in Itself as a likeness in form of That which is formless, through the uplifting of
those who contemplate the Divine; inasmuch as a Divine Light is shed upon the seers
through it, and they are initiated into some participation of Divine things.”222 This
definition can be analyzed into following components:
Theophany (is)…
1. Beholding of God
2. Shows Divine likeness
3. Is figured… in the form of that which is formless
4. Through the uplifting
5. Of those who contemplate
221
Translated by Samuel Lee as Eusebeus on Theophania or Divine Manifestation of Our Lord and
Saviour Jesus Christ (Cambridge University Press, 1843) available at http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/
last visited on 25/3/2010. 222
Pseudo Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy. Chapter IV., 161 at http://www.esoteric.msu.edu, last visited
on 28th March 2009.
153
6. Inasmuch as a Divine light is shed
7. And they are initiated into some participation of Divine things
The first component is a succinct expression of the etymology of the word
theophania. Although this expression is compatible with basic Greek etymology of the
term as “appearance or manifestation of deity” it must be noticed that by using the word
“beholding” it assigns primary role to man who beholds God rather than God who
becomes manifest or appears. This is only to say that as far as this component is
concerned agency belongs to man and not to God. However this is significantly qualified
by the components 4, 6 and 7. A combined reading of these three shows that a double
agency is involved in the phenomenon of theophany. One part is played by human being
and another by Deity. Man contemplates while God uplifts and initiates. Hence agency
belongs partially to man and partially to God.
The fifth component signifies that Dionysian concept of theophany is elitist.
Beholding of God is a privilege of those who contemplate not others. Again, this
dimension is completely in line with the general elitism of Dionysius, for he has written:
“These things thou must not disclose to any of the uninitiated, by whom I mean those
who cling to the objects of human thought, and imagine there is no super-essential
reality beyond.”223
Furthermore, in the light of what was just said, among those who contemplate,
theophany belongs only to those upon whom Divine light is shed. That is to say
theophany belongs to those contemplatives who are illuminated. Hence, Dionysian
theophany, in addition to being elitist, is illuminationist.
223
The Mystical Theology, 192.
154
If we emphasize the italicized word “likeness” then it gives us an important
feature of the concept. In the light of the doctrine of Uknowability of God, to which
Pseudo Dionysius adheres,224 it can be interpreted as ruling out the appearance of
Divinity in itself in theophany and emphasizing the appearance of its likeness only. This
characteristic shows that Dionysian theophany does not compromise Divine
transcendence.
A look at the way Eriugena uses and explicates the term “theophany” reveals
deep Dionysian influences. In fact most of the components into which we analyzed
Dionysian articulation of theophany find an expression in Eriugena. We “say most of”
since Eriugena seems to be more honest to the Greek etymology of the word since he
identifies theophanies with Divine manifestation (DDN I: 446). He seems to have taken
and developed the other strands from Dionysian definition of theophany. Thus we find
in Eriugena theophany’s characterization as “form-adopting of the Formless,” double
agency, elitist illuminationism and the essential unknowability of Deity. In the famous
negati affirmatio passage where Eriugena introduces theophany for the first time, he
typifies it as “the form of the formless (forma informis). (DDN III 633B) As for the
elitist-illuminationist dimension, Eriugena says that
… it is for very few, wholly detached from earthly thoughts and purged by
virtue and knowledge to know God in these visible creatures as the patriarch
Abraham knew Him from the revolutions of the stars, with natural law for his
guide… and as Moses in the Bush and on the summit of the mountain. (DDN
III. 689B-D)
The illuminationist dimension of Eriugena’s concept of theophany was recognized by
E.C McCue, S.J., who devoted a whole chapter to it in his doctoral dissertation as early
224
See the first chapters of two Dionysian treatises The Divine Names and The Mystical Theology.
155
as 1939. Commenting on the word “vehitur” (i.e. “is carried.”) in Eriugena’s explanation
of intellect-reason relation (DDN IV: 745D) McCue wrote that it signifies that to be
moved or carried the soul must receive some impetus from the one to which it is
drawn.225 Interestingly, at one place Eriugena himself gives the impression that he is
speaking as someone who has been illuminated by a theophany.226 He adds this
dimension to the Eschatological theophanies, i.e. the Beatific Vision in the After-life.
Referring to the saying of Christ “There are many mansions in my Father’s House,”
Eriugena writes that “…each shall receive a form according to the degree of his own
sanctity and wisdom.” (DDN I: 448C) He also maintains that each man shall have his
proper place according to his conduct in this life. (Ibid. V: 983A) Those who have gone
beyond human nature (“transcended their selves” in Schuon’s terminology227) in their
holiness will not only be granted a theophany of God but will actually enter into the
cloud surrounding God, to experience what Eriugena describes as “theophany of
theophanies.”(See ibid. I: 450B; V: 905C, 963C-964A)
6.1.36.1.36.1.36.1.3 Epistemological Theophany and Unknowability Epistemological Theophany and Unknowability Epistemological Theophany and Unknowability Epistemological Theophany and Unknowability
In the above mentioned settings, both mundane and eschatological, “theophany”
signifies a mode of knowing God. This implies that theophany is an alternate for
knowing something as it is in itself. So Eriugena contrasts “theophany” with objective
reality. Indeed, he uses the term for the first time in DDN while negating the possibility
225
Theophany: A Study of God and His Manifestations in the work of the ninth Century Irish Philosopher
John Scottus Eriugena, Dissertation by E.C. McCue (St. Louis University), 146. 226
This is inferred by Dermot Moran from DDN III: 656D-657A: “you assign to me the things that are
harder to seek and find and demonstrate. However it is my part to seek, but to find is His alone who
illumines the hidden places of Darkness. His alone is the Demonstration because He [alone] can open the
senses of those who seek and the intellect. For of what use is a demonstration from without if there is no
illumination within.” See The Philosophy, 76. 227
See Frithjof Schuon, “Survey of Integral Anthropology,” in his To Have a Centre.
156
of comprehending primordial causes in themselves, saying that “in the intellect of the
angels there are certain theophanies of those reasons and not reasons themselves.” (DDN
I: 446C) If primordial causes cannot be known as they are in themselves, then a fortiori
the essence of God cannot be seen or known either. (See DDN I: 448) Beatific vision is
mediated through theophanies even for the elect (See DDN I: 450C; V: 926C, 988C).228
It seems that here Eriugena is doing nothing more than developing the Dionysian
element of theophany according to which it shows likeness of God.
The contrast of theophany with knowing the essence of God serves a very
important role, namely, that of retaining the God-World duality. Dierdre Carabine
thinks that in view of this contrast “Eriugena always retains a basic distinction between
the self-manifestation of God and God’s self. Even in the final theophany when all
things will have returned to God and God shall be all in all Eriugena never “conflates”
God and creature.”229 Since God is found only in theophany to a certain extent, and not
found as to what He is in himself, the quest for God will be endless (DDN V: 919A-
D).230 The final word on this question is that God is both found and not found. He is
found through theophanies, but not found through contemplations of Divine nature
itself. (DDN V: 919C)
228
Eriugena also writes “But because they cannot behold the most high and holy Trinity in itself, for it is
incomprehensible and transcends the intelligible vision and all the faculties of mind and can only
contemplate It in comprehensible Theophanies which are of like nature with themselves, therefore they
are called the clouds of heaven. DDN V: 1000C. 229
John Scottus Eriugena, 33. 230
Carabine has pointed out the presence of this strand of thought in St Gregory of Nyssa, according to
whom the search for God will be infinite since the Divine nature is infinite. See John Scottus Eriugena,
125 n. 11.
157
6.1.46.1.46.1.46.1.4 Ontological Theophany and TranscendenceOntological Theophany and TranscendenceOntological Theophany and TranscendenceOntological Theophany and Transcendence
In addition to considering theophany a “mode of knowing” Eriugena mentions that
“every visible and invisible creature can be called a theophany, that is, a Divine
apparition” since “the ineffable and incomprehensible brilliance of the Divine Goodness
begins to appear in its theophanies” and it can be said to be “known in all essence.”
(DDN III: 681A) As “manifestation of the hidden” and “becoming visible of the
invisible” theophany is the “ineffable descent of the Supreme Goodness, which is Unity
and Trinity, into the things that are so as to make them to be, indeed so as itself to be in
all things…” (DDN III: 678D, emphasis added). This requires that the understanding of
theophany as a mode of knowing be complemented by its understanding as a mode of
being. Should this descent into the things be taken to mean that Eriugena is
propounding pantheism? Many Eriugena scholars are now agreed that it does not. Otten
has pointed out that this does not mean an act of audacious pantheism since being
Divine apparitions theophanies cannot be put upon a par with the underlying essence of
God,”231 adding that “on the level of the text the comparison between God and his
theophanies leads us to declare them identical, although in the final analysis they cannot
be ranked on the same level, since one is ranked on the level of creative and the other on
the level of created nature.”232 Hence, everything’s being theophany lands us somewhere
between immanence and transcendence and is not a plain denial of Divine
transcendence. It should be recalled here that according to its epistemic understanding
theophany has given us a similar middle position on the question of finding God.
231
Otten, Anthropology, 88. 232
Ibid. 89 n. 12.
158
6.1.56.1.56.1.56.1.5 Functions of “Theophany” in Eriugena’s ThoughtFunctions of “Theophany” in Eriugena’s ThoughtFunctions of “Theophany” in Eriugena’s ThoughtFunctions of “Theophany” in Eriugena’s Thought
Let us briefly outline the functions of “theophany” in general and its ontological
understanding in particular in the cosmology of Eriugena. A brief discussion of the
functions of theophany in Eriugena will shed more light on its centrality and
importance. Otten has come up with insightful remarks regarding the role played by
“theophany.” According to her theophany counterbalances Eriugena’s negative theology
by permitting the description of God in terms deriving from the realm of creation, while
guaranteeing the natural, hierarchical distance between God and creation.233 Although
this contention of Otten’s seems to be corroborated by Eriugena’s famous
characterization of theophany as negati affirmatio, that is to say, “affirmation of the
negated,” it loses its weight when seen in the light of Eriugena’s emphatic
negativization of his synthesis of affirmative and negative theologies as we pointed out
and explained in the third chapter. Secondly, it is through theophany that Eriugena
could associate scripture with the natural order of the cosmos.234 Eriugena believes
firmly in analogy between scriptura and creatura which he says are “two garments of
Chirst” indicating that under the difference of apparel the same contents can be found.
(See DDN III: 690A).235
To these two proposed functions of theophany we can add some other. In an
earlier chapter we witnessed Eriugena claiming that in creating the universe God creates
Himself. This problematic saying can be explained with the help of theophany,
understood ontologically. Hence if the universe is nothing but theophany then when God
creates it He creates only His theophany or appearance. Moreover, the fact that God is
233
See ibid. 83. 234
See Ibid 84 n. 3 235
See ibid. 102-3.
159
the Middle as well as the Beginning and the End can be understood in this very light.
Eriugena describes two modes under which God appears as the Middle to its observers.
First “when the Divine Nature is seen to be created and to create—for it is created by
itself in the primordial causes, and therefore creates itself, that is allows itself to appear
in its theophanies” and second “when it is seen in the lowest effects of the primordial
causes” (DDN III: 689A-B). The italicized expressions indicate that what is at stake
here primarily is not “knowing God” but God’s appearing first in primordial causes and
then in the spatio-temporal effects of these causes. This is to say that this function as
well as the previous one is played by theophany in its ontological sense.
Before analyzing Ibn ‘Arabi>’s notion of “al-tajalli>,” let us summarize salient
features of Eriugena’s doctrine of theophany discussed above. This will help us find out
the extent to which both notions correspond to each other.
We brought out centrality of the notion in overall cosmology of Eriugena and its
Greek etymology gave us the meaning of “appearance of God.” We discussed the
Pseudo-Dionysian concept of theophany and noticed that Eriugenian elaboration of the
notion is predominantly Dionysian. In the light of an analysis of Dionysian definition of
“theophany” and its usage by Eriugena, the following features of Eriugenian doctrine
were brought out: first, theophany is appearing into form of a being who is formless;
second, Divine self-manifestation is not open to all, but to the spiritually self-disciplined
elite and in accordance with piety. Finally, it was maintained that Eriugena’s use of the
notion renders it analyzable into two kinds. Understood epistemologically, theophany
means “knowing God” while understood ontologically, it implies “being God.” Contrary
to their appearance these two ways do not compromise Divine transcendence but rather
help preserve it. The former point of view establishes an appearance-reality dichotomy
160
as far as our knowledge of God is concerned. It also connects nature to the scripture and
serves to explain the meaning of theologically strange Eriugenian idea of Divine Self
Creation and God’s being the Middle.
6.26.26.26.2 Ibn ‘Arabi> on “Ibn ‘Arabi> on “Ibn ‘Arabi> on “Ibn ‘Arabi> on “alalalal----TajalliTajalliTajalliTajalli> > > > ””””
6.26.26.26.2....1111 Centrality of the ConceptCentrality of the ConceptCentrality of the ConceptCentrality of the Concept
If Eriugena knows nothing deeper for the human inquiry than theophany, ‘the term self-
disclosure (tajalli)236—often translated as ‘theophany’ – plays such a central role in Ibn
‘Arab�’s teachings that … he has been called one of the “companions of Self-
Disclosure” (as}h}a>b al-tajalli>).’237 Indeed Chittick, the maker of this remark, has found no
word to title his book on Principles of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Cosmology better than Self
Disclosure of God.
Since Ibn ‘Arabi> has to say many things on this subject and in the space of one
subsection we cannot analyze all his ideas, we stick to the main features of Eriugena’s
doctrine of theophany, outlined at the end of last subsection and see where does Ibn
‘Arabi> stand and why. However, we would discuss those of his other views which either
explain or add important dimensions to what was said by Eriugena.
Having seen that these two notions occupy central place in the cosmologies both
of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>, let us begin with comparing the etymologies of these terms.
236 Self-disclosure is not satisfactory translation of تجلي. The Arabic word does not have a reference to
Divine self. If we take the word “self” seriously it would denote Divine essence which does not have
disclosures. In the Qur’a>n itself tajalli> never occurs with the Divine Name Allah but al-Rabb which
pertains to the level of divinity not of Ipseity. It is better to translate the word simply as “disclosure”. 237
William C. Chittick, The Self Disclosure of God, 52.
161
6.2.26.2.26.2.26.2.2 Etymology and Qur’a>nic usage of the term. Etymology and Qur’a>nic usage of the term. Etymology and Qur’a>nic usage of the term. Etymology and Qur’a>nic usage of the term.
Tajalli> is a noun derived from the root j-l-w. The verb jala> from this root means “to be or
become clear, un-obscured, exposed to view, displayed, laid open, disclosed or
uncovered.”238 Ra>ghib al-Isfaha>ni> (d. 1108), the famous lexicographer of the Qur’a>n,
maintained that disclosure is either essential or through an action or imperative.239 This
means that either something is essentially manifest or else, it has to do something in
addition to merely “being there” in order to become manifest.240 Day appears with the
simple appearance of the Sun and the Sun does not have to do anything in addition to
just being there in order to make the day manifest. Al-Is}faha>ni> thinks that the Divine
disclosure is not like appearance of the day. God is manifest only when He wills and to
whosoever He wills.
Ibn ‘Arabi> derives almost all of his technical vocabulary from the Qur’a>n itself
and an examination of the Qur’a>nic usage of the term reveals that the basic
etymological meaning of “appearance” is retained by it. Ibn ‘Arabi> has connected the
idea that God is witnessed in the creation to the already quoted Qur’a>nic verse, “We
shall show them…” (41:53). (See Fut. II: 305). He also mentions in this context the
prophetic tradition to the effect that “God transmutes (يتحول) in the forms.” However
these are only indirect references in addition to which the word itself occurs twice in the
Qur’a>n. At one place we read
والنھار إذا تجلى
By the day, as it appears in glory. (92:2)
238
See Edward William Lane, An Arabic English Lexicon, II: 82. 239
See Al-Mufrada>t fi> Ghari>b al-Qur’a>n, Karachi: As}ah}h} al-Mat}a>bi‘,1961), 94-95. 240 See Ibid.
162
Then while narrating the famous Mount Sinai event when Moses requested that he must
see God, the verb is ascribed to the Lord:
...فلما تجلى ربه للجبل
When his Lord revealed Himself to the mountain … (7:143)
Most of the Qur’a>n interpreters render تجلى here simply as ظھر i.e. “appeared.”241
Some, however, find it necessary to qualify and explain that God’s appearing means a
manifestation of His power and Glory etc. One of these is the Mu‘tazilite al-
Zamakhshari> (d.1144)242 and the other is the anti-Sufi Burha>n al-Di>n al-Biqa>‘i> (d.
1480).243 Both occurrences of the latter word in the Qur’a>n connote “appearance or
disclosure” which parallels the Greek phanio and in one of these the word is applied to
God which makes a correspondence with the Greek theo-phania. All this manifests that
as Ibn ‘Arabi>’s understanding of tajalli> is rooted in the sources of Muslim orthodoxy as
is Eriugena’s notion of theophany immersed in the Christian tradition and that as far as
their etymology is concerned theophany and al-tajalli> are synonymous.
6.2.36.2.36.2.36.2.3 AlAlAlAl----Tajalli>Tajalli>Tajalli>Tajalli>: Ontol: Ontol: Ontol: Ontological and Epistemological ogical and Epistemological ogical and Epistemological ogical and Epistemological
We mentioned two modes of looking at Eriugena’s concept of theophany, ontological
and epistemological. According to the former theophany is a mode of God’s appearing
in the forms of the entities while in the light of the latter it is God’s making Himself
known. Now in case of Ibn ‘Arabi> this distinction is more clearly present within the
doctrine itself and we do not have to introduce it from outside, as many followers of Ibn
‘Arabi> have noticed its presence in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s understanding and use of the term
241
For example ‘Abdulla>h b. Ah}mad al-Nasafi>, Mada>rik al- Tanzi>l, (Beirut: Da>r al-Nafa>’is, 2005) , II: 108. 242
See his al-Kashsha>f ‘an H} aqa>’iq al-Tanzi>l (Beirut: Da>r Ih}ya>’ al-Tura>th al-‘Arabi>, n.d.), II: 146. 243
See his Naz}m al-Durar fi> Tana>sub al-A>ya>t wa- al-Suwar (Beirut: Da>r al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyah, 2002), III:
173.
163
tajalli>. ‘Abd al-Kari>m al-Ji>li> (d. 832) set apart the term tajalli> for the epistemological
theophany while used the word تعيين to capture the ontological dimension of the
notion.244 In the writings of Ibn ‘Arabi> himself if one wanted to have a term for
exclusive reference to the ontological theophany one could refer to ظھور manifestation
which is the name given to the Absolute’s stepping, so to speak, out of Its sheer
Absoluteness. According to Chittick, “the term tajalli> may be employed in the context
of ontology, epistemology or—as more commonly happens, without any distinction
being employed between these two domains.”245 Those who prefer to use single term
tajalli> and maintain at the same time the distinction follow ‘Abd al-Rah}ma>n Ja>mi>
(d.1492) in dividing it into التجلي الوجودي and التجلي الشھودي.
Ibn ‘Arabi> has in his mind an ontological sense of the word tajalli> when he says:
“So He, the Exalted One, has a general tajalli> perpetually in the world and the degrees of
the world in it vary in accordance the intrinsic differences in the degrees of the world, so
He manifests according to their preparedness.” (Fut. II: 556) Or when he says: “The
world is naught but His self-Disclosure in the forms of their immutable identities, whose
existence would be impossible without it…” (Fus. 81; Ringstones, 61). As far as the
epistemological tajalli> is concerned it is obviously intended when Ibn ‘Arabi> says that
“Perfect knowledge only abides in Divine self-disclosure and in what the Real
unveils in removing the coverings from the eyes of discernment and vision. One
will then perceive things—the eternal among them and those which come to be,
their non-existence and existence, their impossible, necessary and contingent—
as they are in their realities and identities. (Fus. 133; trans. Ringstones, 150.)
244
Abu>’l-‘ala> al-‘Affi>fi>, “Ibn ‘Arabi> fi> Dira>sa>ti>,”> in Al-Kita>b al-tidhka>ri> li Muh}yiddi>n Ibn ‘Arabi> (Cairo:
Da>r al-Ka>tib al-‘Arabi>, 1969), 28-31. 245
SPK, 91.
164
Here Ibn ‘Arabi> is obviously referring to tajalli> as a mode of attaining the highest degree
of knowledge. So in its epistemological sense the term can be considered synonymous
with famous Sufi terms كشف and فتح that are normally translated as intuition, unveiling,
illumination or opening, although in one place (see Fut. IV: 32) Ibn ‘Arabi> does seem to
be differentiating between tajalli> and kashf.246 However the above quoted passage and
others are explicit in indentifying both these terms and the final sentence of the passage
quoted above takes us to the next level of the comparative analysis of the terms
theophany and tajalli>.
Does the claim that one can perceive things as they are in their realities and
identities means that tajalli> based knowledge is knowledge of things as they are in
themselves? An affirmative answer to this question would imply that Ibn ‘Arabi>’s
concept of tajalli> differs from Eriugena’s theophany as sources of knowledge. We
have seen that Eriugena contrasts knowledge through theophany to objective
246 Ibn ‘Arabi> writes: “The first One-third of Divine knowledge is what can be known of/from/about Him
through arguments/signs; the second one-third is what is known of/from/about Him, may He be (منه)
Exalted, through witnessing on the occasion of tajalli> and the final one-third is what is known
of/from/about Him through His informing, may He be Exalted, and this is the truest of categories as far as
knowledge of God is concerned.” This passage is not explicitly establishing a semantic dichotomy
between al-tajalli> and al-kashf, though one of many possible readings might suggest so. We should read it
in combination with Fut. I: 39: “The first way is that of unveiling. ... This kind of knowledge may also be
actualized through a self-disclosure given to its possessors…” In this way we can get the more consistent
view according to which in Fut. IV: 32 Ibn ‘Arabi> is not dividing knowledge into that through tajalli> and
that through kashf but is giving us two sub classes, [witnessing (musha>hadah) and unveiling (muka>shafah
or kashf)] of the epistemic tajalli> itself. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that Ibn ‘Arabi>
not only differentiates between witnessing and unveiling but considers the latter as more excellent and
perfect than the former. For more on Ibn ‘Arabi>’s usage of these terms see al- Mu‘jam al-S}u>fi>, 664-665.
165
knowledge.247 However, the above quoted passage from Ibn ‘Arabi> does not imply that
tajalli> based knowledge is that of things as they are in themselves. This is because by
“eternal things,” he understands nothing but the eternal objects of Divine knowledge, so
that in the sentence quoted above “eternal things” and “realities and identities” refer to
a single reality. Hence both Eriugena’s theophany and Ibn ‘Arabi>’s tajalli> constitute an
epistemological isthmus (برزخ) or veil (حجاب) between the knower and the known, and as
such simultaneously manifesting and concealing the veiled object. The agreement on
this point becomes clearer when it comes to the theophanic knowledge of God Himself.
Ibn ‘Arabi> is of the opinion that the Divine Self (الذات ا8لھية) can never become manifest,
so no tajalli> makes It known. As usual his opinion is based on an extraordinarily careful
reading of the Qur’a>n. He directs our attention to the Divine name al-Rabb (the Lord)
that accompanies tajjali> in the Qur’a>nic words fa lamma> tajalla> rabbuhu> and says that
tajalli> belongs only to the God [al-ila>h] and the Lord (al-rabb), never to Allah for He is
the Independent. (Fut. III: 178; trans. SDG, 54). We also find him expressing this idea in
clear terms by saying that, “The inmost centre of His majesty is not perceived by any
rational faculty, nor is the inmost center of His Essence perceived by eyesight when He
discloses Himself, wherever He should disclose Himself to His servants.” (Fut. III: 371;
trans. SDG, 55)
In spite of the resonance between our two thinkers it must be emphasized once
again that the way Ibn ‘Arabi> analyzes Divine Reality into Essence, Attributes/Names
and Actions makes his views on Divine nature more precise and detailed than those of
Eriugena.
247 We saw that according to Eriugena the Angels do not know the primordial causes themselves but only
certain of their theophanies.
166
6.2.46.2.46.2.46.2.4 FormFormFormForm----Assuming, Illumination and ElitismAssuming, Illumination and ElitismAssuming, Illumination and ElitismAssuming, Illumination and Elitism
Finally, the same ontological understanding of the concept is involved in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s
countless references to God’s appearing in forms (تجلي في الصور).248 He discusses this
notion in various contexts and in order to explain a number of different things. For
instance, he explains through it the “entification of everything” (شياءEظھور شيئية ا) (Fut. I:
188) and the existence of religious diversity (Fut. IV: 166). He also mentions the
opinion that different theological sects share single belief concerning the nature of God
because God appears in same form to all of them. Although he seems to disagree with
this opinion in view of his principle that a particular theophany does not repeat itself for
two or more individuals, this disagreement still includes a reference to theophany in
forms. (Fut. III: 384) He writes at one place, “So it is the Real who is Being and the
things are forms of Being, thus the affair is interconnected like form and matter are
interconnected.” (Fut. IV: 100) This notion of Divine disclosure “in forms” parallels
Eriugena’s characterization of theophany as form-assuming of the formless (forma
informis). At the end of this subsection, we come once again to theophany and Divine
form assuming in the discussion of “loci of manifestation.” Let us have a look for the
moment at the questions of elitism and illumination.
As for elitism in Ibn ‘Arabi>, obviously, it is only the knowledge or understanding
of the true nature of some fact that can be privilege of some intellectual or spiritual elite
and not the fact itself. Otherwise one would end up endorsing sheer Sophism. Therefore
the question of elitism arises in connection with epistemic tajalli>/kashf and not with
ontological one. The fact that God appears in the forms of the world remains a fact
whether it is known to all or some. At a number of places in his al-Futu>h}a>t Ibn ‘Arabi>
248
Also see Fut. III: 95 and IV: 101.
167
explicitly states that knowledge acquisition through theophany or unveiling is specific
to some. At least at two place he mentions Prophets and Friends of God as those who
are exclusively bestowed with theophanic knowledge. (See Fut. I: 31 and I: 319) In this
context Ibn ‘Arabi> speaks of God’s singling out any of his servants whom He wills to be
granted access to this knowledge. (See Fut. I: 218)
These few examples are sufficient to show that epistemic theophany as
understood by Ibn ‘Arabi> is elitist in a general manner. Some more specific dimensions
emerge by taking into account a few distinctions he makes. First, there is a distinction
between theophany in a dream and while one is awake. Second, we have to differentiate
between the fact of theophany and knowledge of its real nature. Third, an important
distinction is made between exoteric and esoteric scholars of Islam. In the light of first
distinction, Ibn ‘Arabi>’s concept of theophany is elitist in the sense that although
ordinary folk may have a theophanic dream it is the privilege only of the Prophets and
Friends of God to have theophanic vision while they are awake. (Fut. IV: 200). In the
light of second distinction, “For many of the folk of the Path of God, even if they
witness the Real’s self-disclosure (tajalli>), have no knowledge of that, nor of what they
see, nor of the form of the actual situation.” (Ibid. III: 516; SDG, 56). Finally, it is in the
light of the third distinction that we find Ibn ‘Arabi> saying, “The Gnostics witness Him
in the forms of the created things while the veiled ones from amongst the exoteric
scholars (علماء الرسوم) do not recognize Him, so for the former He is named al-Z}a>hir
while for the latter He is named al-Ba>t}in.” (Fut. III: 541). The real and objective nature
of theophany is grasped by, to use Chittick’s expression, only a tiny minority even of
the esoteric scholars.
168
However, to this elitist strand an important qualification must be added. The
unknowability or obscurity of theophany for the majority has as its cause a subjective
element also. As Ibn ‘Arabi> himself maintains, “Know that God discloses himself
perpetually (متجٍل على الدوام) and the veils are only lifted from our eyes. He, the Exalted
One said, ‘Now have We removed thy veil’ (50: 22) and He said ‘We are nearer to him
than ye, and ye see not (56: 85).’” (Fut. I: 706, emphasis added). This shows that unlike
Eriugena and Pseudo Dionysius, Ibn ‘Arabi>’s conception of theophany is not completely
elitist but he has brought out the subjective cause of its accessibility to the chosen few.
The word “subjective” can be confusing here so let us make it clear that we are not
using it in the sense of “relative” or “illusory.”
According to prevailing analysis, also followed by Chittick, there are two
components of theophany (tajalli): the Self-Discloser (المتجلي) and the locus of
manifestation ( مجلى or متجلى له ). While this is true in most of the cases, there are
certain cases where there is a human recipient of theophany in addition to the locus of
manifestation. In the case Burning Bush, God is the Manifest, the mount is locus of
manifestation and Moses is spectator. The mount itself was both the locus and
spectator. Now what we meant by saying that the veils are subjective rather than
objective was that it is not God who is veiled rather it is the recipient that is veiled. As
Schuon has put it, “Grace surrounds us infinitely and it is only our hardness that makes
us impervious to its radiation, in itself omnipresent. It is the soul which is absent, not
grace.”249 We must not forget however, that in one sense of the word “subject” God is
the subject of theophany and man is its “object.”
249 Echoes of Perennial Wisdom (Bloomington: World Wisdom Books, 1992), 37.
169
The second component of theophany mentioned here, namely, the locus of
manifestation or recipient corresponds to the “forma” in Eriugena’s forma informis. A
locus of manifestation is the form in which God becomes manifest. According to Ibn
‘Arabi> the whole cosmos is nothing but “loci of Divine self-manifestation” and
consequently “anyone who loves the cosmos in this regard has loved it with God’s love
and has loved nothing but God’s beauty…” (Fut. II: 345; SDG, 28) A locus is not simply
passive receiver of theophany but exercises a certain influence over it by determining its
nature and channelizing it: “Hence in the image the ruling property (حكم) of the presence
of locus of manifestation is greater than that of the Discloser.” (Fut. III: 109) The
relationship between the Manifest and the locus of manifestation is not one sided but
dialectical one. This is one of the most significant aspects of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s doctrine of
theophany. In this regard he has formulated a general principle (“the principle of
preparedness”) that a theophany is always according to preparedness of the locus of
manifestation. (Fus}. 62; Ringstones, 25). Ibn ‘Arabi> explains the principle by referring
to many examples, of a single ray from the Sun having contrary effects on a person of
cold temperament and the one with a hot temperament and then on the washer-man and
the clothing. He therefore says that the theophanies of the One are diverse in accordance
with the diversity of the preparedness of loci of manifestation. (Fut. I: 287; SPK, 92)
This shows that the nature and limitations of the object condition the nature of
theophany itself. For Ibn ‘Arabi> this explains, inter alia, “the relationship between Being
and the existent things. Each entity is a receptacle of theophany.”
One other aspect of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s views on tajalli> closely related to the elitist
strand which is, moreover, comparable to Pseudo Dionysian and Eriugenian view is
illuminationism. Theophany as mystical source of knowledge is identified with light
170
thrown by God in the believer’s heart: “Sound knowledge is only that which God throws
into the heart of the knower. It is a Divine light for which God singles out any of his
servants whom He wills, whether angel, messenger, prophet, friend, or person of faith.”
(Fut. I: 218)
6.2.56.2.56.2.56.2.5 AlAlAlAl----TajalliTajalliTajalliTajalli > and > and > and > and DivineDivineDivineDivine Transcendence Transcendence Transcendence Transcendence
In our discussion of Eriugenian view above scholarly consensus was mentioned on the
opinion that Eriugena’s concept of theophany does not compromise Divine
transcendence. We saw that in spite of using seemingly pantheistic terminology
Eriugena always retains a distinction between God and the world. Although Ibn ‘Arabi>
sees the world as Divine theophany and also considers theophany one of the modes of
knowing God, he is careful not to compromise Divine transcendence in maintaining all
this. His ultimate response to the question of God-world relationship remains
somewhere in between transcendence and identity. Just like Eriugena who maintained
that God both is and is not found in the theophanies, Ibn ‘Arabi> says, in more
ontological way, that the world both is and is not Him. In his terminology the world is
He/notHe. (Fut. II: 501). Moreover, Ibn ‘Arabi> agrees with Eriugena in subscribing to
the view that there is no end to the journey of knowing God. In his thought this belief
follows as a conclusion from a cluster of concepts like those of infinite theophanies,
perpetual creation and non-repetition of Divine self-disclosures. Ibn ‘Arabi> has
expressed this view by saying that on the Path to God’s knowledge there is no
“quenching of thirst,” so that a seeker of theophanic knowledge remains always thirsty.
Hence Divine transcendence is compromised neither by Eriugenian theophany nor by
Ibn ‘Arabi>’s al-tajalli>.
171
With the comparative analysis of participation and Divine roots in the previous
chapter and that of theophany and tajalli> in the present we have shown that there is
remarkable correspondence in the way Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> understand the
relationship between God and the macrocosmic world. In the final chapter of this study
we are going to compare the thought of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> regarding the nature of
man vis. a vis. God and created nature in terms of the concepts of containment and
Divine image.
SevenSevenSevenSeven
ManManManMan,,,, God and NatureGod and NatureGod and NatureGod and Nature After discussing the concepts of totality and ontology in the second chapter we have
presented in the three chapters that followed, a comparative analysis of the nature of
God, of the primordial causes and spatio-temporal world in relationship with God in
terms of participation and theophany. A discussion of the world without a substantial
account of the nature of man and his place vis a vis God and created nature would be
wanting. In the present chapter we discuss man according to Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>.
However, we are not going to, and cannot possibly within the scope of this short
chapter, present all anthropological views of these two thinkers. We shall remain
content, rather, with their views on man in relation on the one hand to God, and on the
other to cosmos.
7.17.17.17.1 Man and Nature in Eriugena Man and Nature in Eriugena Man and Nature in Eriugena Man and Nature in Eriugena
7.1.17.1.17.1.17.1.1 Theory of Universal Human ContainmentTheory of Universal Human ContainmentTheory of Universal Human ContainmentTheory of Universal Human Containment
Eriugena presents man not as one isolated being among others but in relation, on the one
hand, to God and on the other to the created nature. This is shown first and foremost by
the very definition that Eriugena offers us for man, namely, notio in mente divina, i.e. “a
notion in the mind of God.” (DDN IV: 768B) It is shown secondly, by Eriugena’s
adherence to and use of the traditional concept of human deiformity, i.e. creation upon
Divine image or form. On the other hand the keyword for the Man-Cosmos relation in
Eriugena is “containment,” the doctrine that man contains all the created nature.
173
It would have been appropriate from the point of view of systematic treatment to
discuss first man-God relationship in terms of deiformity and proceed then to man-world
relationship. However this strategy is unfortunately difficult to follow since in Eriugena
human deiformity and containment are interconnected in a complex explanatory relation
to each other. In view of this difficulty let us take up the discussion from the side of
containment. The strategy of treating man-nature relationship before man-God relation
although a result of a difficulty is nonetheless justified since nature mediates God and
man in the sense that man reaches God through himself and through Nature, as we are
taught both by Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>.
The leading question in the discussion of containment is related to its modality,
i.e. how everything is contained in man? Throughout his discourse on the doctrine of
containment Eriugena attempts to remain grounded in the Scripture in addition to
reason and tradition (i.e. the Church Fathers). Thus he refers to Scriptural text to the
interpretation of Six Divine Days of creation, God’s creating Adam last of all creature
and inviting him to name all the things. At one occasion he refers to the commandment
“Preach the Gospel to every creature.” (DDN IV: 760A) If preaching to man is
considered tantamount to preaching to every creature by the Scripture then it is implied
that every creature is in man. Now, although he would provide a detailed discourse into
the question of modality of containment later on, Eriugena does attempt to make sense
of the doctrine in its very first statement. This attempt is made with reference to the
obvious fact that man shares some of his characteristics with each of two fundamental
categories of creation. On the authority of Saint Maximus the Confessor Eriugena says
that in as much as his body man possesses the characteristics of sensible creatures but
inasmuch as his soul, those of the intelligible creatures “thus, he contains within him all
174
creation.” (See DDN II: 530C) Commenting on the same masters’ words he has written
that human nature supplies a middle term between the sensible and intelligible creatures
which are opposed to one another as the extreme terms of created natures, for in it they
are joined to one another and from being many become one. (See ibid.) According to the
Homily also, man represents medietas between matter and spirit and is posited as the
third world (Tertius mundus) which brings in itself (unum facit lit. “unifies”) soul
(anima) and the body (corpus), the former from the spiritual world while latter from the
corporeal world. (Hom. XIX: 0294B)
Since in man every creature from the highest to the lowest is found, he is called
“agent of (continuity of) all things.” (See DDN II: 530C-531A) For the same reason he
is termed “the conjunction of the extremities of all creation” and “the workshop of
everything” (DDN IV: 893C) Eriugena, however, does not like to use the term
“microcosm” for man (DDN IV: 793C). This he does following Gregory of Nyssa who
did not want to use that term since that would downplay human deiformity. At 793C
Eriugena has quoted from Gregory of Nyssay’s De Hominis Opificio where the latter
has criticized the usage of microcosmos for man. It seems that Gregory is against this
usage not because he thinks that man is not a microcosm, rather he is against
considering man’s greatness to lie in his likeness to the created world rather than having
been “created according to the image of the Creator of Nature” (IV: 794A). Therefore,
using microcosm for human being will not be disapproved of by Gregory, and following
him by Eriugena, if it is placed beneath the concept of imago dei and is not made the
principal reason for human dignity. This also shows that an overemphasis on the
continuity of the theme of containment from middle ages to Renaissance, as is done by
175
Dermot Moran,`250 is somewhat misplaced. It disregards the break between the medieval
conception of containment that was connected to homo imago dei motif and the
Renaissance appropriation of the idea that was humanistic and sought to make man
master of the universe in isolation from his Divine roots.
Now a more sophisticated explanation, or what Gracia calls “ontological
characterization”251 of the precise nature of containment is called for since man is also
part of the created nature himself. Thus we find the Alumnus confused as to how to
make sense of this doctrine of containment: “In what way are all things created in man,
and how do they subsist in him? Are they in him simply as essence, or simply as
accidents, or do they play in him all the roles which we observe in universal creation,
that is, essence, species, difference, property and everything which is understood to
relate to them? (DDN IV: 764C) Eriugena finds it difficult to give a rational answer to
this question since if one responds that everything was created in man simply as
essence, this leads to the dilemma of either leaving “things which are understood to
relate to essence or substance” out of the universe of things (Ibid.) or contradict the
basic claim that nothing whatsoever among created things is excluded from containment
in human being. (DDN 536B) The second option, that “not only the essences but all
things which are understood to naturally relate to them are from God and to be
numbered among parts of the whole” leads likewise to unacceptable consequence of
man’s containing “bestiality, quadrupidality, volatility … and all the other innumerable
attributes which seem to be so far removed from human nature” (DDN IV: 765B) So
how is it that everything is created in man after all?
250
See The Philosophy , 173-174. 251 G.J. E Gracia, “Ontological Characterization of the Relation between Man and Created Nature in
Eriugena,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, XVI (1978), 155-166.
176
At this crucial point in the argument Eriugena turns away from the external
world of essences and properties to the internal world of knowledge and imagination.
The argument is founded on a statement made by alumnus himself to the effect that
“everything which is known by the intellect or the reason or imagined by the senses can
somehow be created in the knower and perceiver” (DDN IV: 765C). It is agreed in the
subsequent steps of the argument that “knowledge of things made in the soul” is not
only of a different ontological order than the “objects of knowledge themselves” (Ibid)
but of higher one as well, inasmuch as they are “in a better nature, namely the minds
that understands, … but the relation between this knowledge and the things themselves
which are its objects I do not fully grasp.” (DDN IV: 766A-766B) At this point the
Nutritor suddenly embarks upon the discussion of the relation between man and arts.
This digression is related firstly in an indirect way to the confession made by the
Alumnus in his initial statement at DDN 765C since the relationship between man and
art is equivalent to that between objects and their notions. Secondly, as the discussion
below shows, through the discussion of arts-minds relationship Eriugena will give us his
final answer to the basic question under debate, namely, the way everything was created
in man.
Now, as Eriugena proceeds to explain in the discussion that follows that art is
nothing other than the notions of things”252 the relation of art to man is presented as
that of a substantial part to a whole.” (DDN IV: 767D) Consequently a conception of
human nature emerges according to which it consists of human mind, its art and the skill
that it needs to acquire the latter (Ibid). 253 It has been stated that this is a “trinity of
Mind” of co-essential and co-substantial members “in the same way that God the
252
Gracia, “Ontological Characterization,” 161. 253 See ibid. 162
177
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are coequal members of the Trinity.”254 This
interpretation, which is justified by the reference to Catholic Faith made in the passage
immediately following those words (DDN IV: 768A), has the additional merit of
showing how Eriugena considers the nature of human mind a theophanic reflection of
Divine nature, in accordance with the God-world relationship discussed in the previous
chapter.255 The “trinity of mind” is identified with the notion of man possessed by God
and eventually man is defined as “certain intellectual notion formed eternally in the
Divine mind.” (768B)
7.1.27.1.27.1.27.1.2 Containment and Human SelfContainment and Human SelfContainment and Human SelfContainment and Human Self----KnowledgeKnowledgeKnowledgeKnowledge
Now Gracia has made a problematic out of this definition of man by considering it to
imply “a most curious but at the same time important” consequence namely that,
“because he is a notion, man cannot know himself, for to do so would necessitate that he
contain the notion of man, that is himself, and that would be contradictory.”256 Gracia
thinks that Eriugena himself has put this point clearly at the end of 767D, as quoted by
him with certain words omitted, “the human mind understands through… its … art and
it is understood … in its art not in terms of what it is , but that it is; otherwise it would
not be a coessential and coequal trinity.” Now we would like to disagree with Gracia’s
reading of Eriugena. It seems that he has unnecessarily interpreted Eriugena as denying
the possibility of human self-knowledge as such. For, a milder conclusion can be drawn
which both does justice to the text of what Eriugena says and saves from any
contradiction as well. Eriugena has said in clearer statement on the issue at hand that “It
is only the Mind of God which possesses in Itself the true knowledge (notitiam veram)
254
Ibid. 255
This theme in Eriugena is briefly discussed below under the subject of Six days of creation. 256
Ibid. 163.
178
of man.” (DDN IV: 768 A) Now the knowledge of man that is exclusively possessed by
Divine mind according to this statement of Eriugena is “perfect” knowledge of human
nature and this does not exclude the possibility of human self-knowledge as such. This is
implied by the italicized word “true” in the statement just quoted. This interpretation is
vindicated; moreover, by Eriugena’s explicit provision that although “there was in
human nature the potency of possessing the fullest knowledge of itself had it not
sinned,” the desire for bliss that remains in post-fall human nature would not have been
there “if she had lost all knowledge of herself and her God.” (See DDN IV: 777C-D)
Anyway the impossibility of true self-knowledge does not imply any
imperfection on the part of human being. It rather is a requirement of human deiformity,
“It is this which reveals most clearly the Image of God to be in man. For just as God is
comprehensible in the sense that He can be deduced from His creation that He is, and
incomprehensible because it cannot be comprehended by any intellect … what He is…
so to the human mind it is given to know one thing only, that it is—but as to what it is
no sort of notion is permitted it.” (DDN IV: 771B-C) Again, “Nor is this unreasonable.
For if it were known to be something, then at once it would be limited by some
definition and thereby cease to be a complete expression of the Image of its Creator”
(DDN IV: 771D) Hence Brian Stock’s conclusion257 that inasmuch as it bears the image
of God, human mind does not know itself and inasmuch as it does not bear that image, it
has self-knowledge, makes more sense in the light of our reading of Eriugena. On the
one hand it shows the connection of human self-knowledge with human deiformity and
257 See Brian Stock, “The Philosophical Anthropology of Johannes Scottus Eriugena,” Studi Medievali,
ser. 3a 8 (1967), 22.
179
on the other hand tells us that the lack of self-knowledge does not imply imperfection
but dignity.
Besides, if one grants the conclusion drawn by Gracia, namely that according to
Eriugena man cannot know himself, it would seem curious that Eriugena himself is
trying to define man and at the same time saying that man cannot be known. Be that as
it may, this discussion of mind and art has established the essential relation between
man (i.e. human mind) and his knowledge of the things.
7.1.37.1.37.1.37.1.3 Containment in the Light of Holy ScriptureContainment in the Light of Holy ScriptureContainment in the Light of Holy ScriptureContainment in the Light of Holy Scripture
Let us now go back to the original question regarding the modality of containment in
the light of above discussion. The reasoning from 768 C onwards starts by showing that
“there is a kind of concept in man of all the sensible and intelligible things the human
mind understands.” This premise is based on an interpretation of the Holy Scripture
according to which man has been given dominion over everything. The Scriptural
passage referred to is Genesis: 2: 19 which reads, “Therefore having formed out of the
earth every beast of the field and every bird of the heavens The Lord God brought them
unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever he called every living soul
that is its name.” According to Eriugena’s own commentary, firstly, being able to name
the things implies a prior understanding of them (IV: 768D); secondly, whatever name
man gave to an object is the very notion of that object (name = notion); thirdly, the
notion of an object may be called its substance, for “where they are comprehended, there
they are; and they are nothing other than the understanding of themselves.” Hence,
“every creature is created as substance in man.” (DDN IV: 772A) The argument thus
constructed gives us Eriugena’s final answer as to how does man contain everything.
One logical gap, however, must be pointed out in this scripturally reasoned argument.
180
What Eriugena seeks to show is a universal proposition, namely, “every creature is
created/contained in/by man” and the scriptural text seems not to warranty this
universal containment even granted the interpretation Eriugena offers for it. For, the
Genesis text does not talk about every creature but only about beasts and birds and at
the end explicitly limits its import to “the living.” It seems that Eriugena was aware of
this logical gap in his argument to a certain degree since in the next passage he claims
that the scope of human knowledge extends from animals to similar things “such as the
elements of the world, the genera and species of grasses and trees, quantities and
qualities and all the innumerable multitude of differentiations.” (DDN IV: 769B)
Although this statement bespeaks of an awareness of a logical gap in the argument from
Genesis 2: 19 to universal containment theory, it does nothing to fill it. Eriugena might
have filled the gap if, for instance, he held, like Ibn ‘Arabi,258 that there is nothing
among the creatures which is not alive.
Anyhow, the argument is recast at 774A, this time with an emphasis upon
hierarchy of mind, notions and things: “Furthermore, if the things themselves subsist
more truly in the notions of them than in themselves, and the notions of them are
naturally present to man, therefore in man are they universally created.” This passage
also points to another possible argument from the fact that everything Returns to its
Creator via man which implies that everything must already be in man.
Eriugena then tries to clarify a confusion regarding what has been said so far.
The alumnus inquires “in what way every creature is created in man seeing that man
258
Ibn ‘Arabi> says basing himself as usual upon the Qur’a>n that since everything sings glory of God, there
is nothing that is not alive. Fus}u>s}, 69 consequently he refuses to consider rationality (in the sense of being
able to speak) a defining characteristic of humanity since in the universe there is nothing which is not
alive and rational.
181
himself was created last of all?” This question is especially interesting since Eriugena
wanted the fact that man was created last of all to imply that all was created in man.
The Alumnus, however, is pitching the very premise against the conclusion Eriugena
wants to draw from it (vide e.g., DDN IV: 782 C-D). The Nutritor starts a lengthy
discourse in response to the question raised, but what we are interested in here is the
way we can make sense of Eriugena’s position on the temporal sequence of creation of
everything. For in addition to accepting the Scriptural assertion of man’s creation being
the last as it is, he also says that “there was, then, no creature, either visible or invisible
before the creation of man—neither in place nor in time nor in rank nor in birth nor in
eternity nor, in a word, in any order of precedence.” (IV: 779D) Does Eriugena
contradict himself at this point? There is a way in which we can reconcile these two
positions.
It would appear from a careful reading of DDN IV: 781D to 786B that Eriugena
does not divide creation-process into two phases, one consisting of creation of
everything other than man and the other of creation of man himself. On the other hand,
he simply takes the whole work of six days to be the process of creation of man himself
in two phases. The work of first five days was in fact non-manifest creation of man
while the sixth day was the day of manifest creation of man. Speaking of the Sixth Day
Eriugena writes, “Thus man himself, whose creation is detail by detail mystically
foreshadowed in the contemplations of the Divine Act referred to before, seeing that all
the foregoing were created in him and with him, not in chronological order but the order
in which causes flow forth into their effects, is at last manifestly formed as the climax of
the whole universe…” (785D: emphasis added) In this light it can safely be said that
Eriugena’s position on the sequence of creation is not inconsistent.
182
7.1.47.1.47.1.47.1.4 Containment and Six Days of CreationContainment and Six Days of CreationContainment and Six Days of CreationContainment and Six Days of Creation
Now the final point worth discussing under the subject of universal human containment
is to show in detail how everything mentioned to have been created on each of the Six
Days can be seen to exist in man. Eriugena introduces this detailed discussion as part of
response to a question asked by the Alumnus as to “why is man not introduced at the
very beginning of the contemplative Act of the whole creation, instead of at the
conclusion of all…?” (DDN IV: 782A). Now according to Eriugena’s interpretation of
Genesis, creation of Light on the First day means creation of “the principal part of man,
the most sublime light that is to say, intellect and reason together with the angelic
nature.” (DDN IV: 783C). Creation of the firmament on the Second Day is not
specifically interpreted to be in human nature but simply a rhetorical question is asked,
“Do we not recognize that the firmament … is established in the essence of man?”
(DDN IV: 783A-B) On the Third Day two elements of human nature namely “stability
of substance” and “instability of accidents” are signified to be created by two words
respectively, “Dry Land” and “Waters.” The Sun, Moon and Stars reported to have been
created on the Fourth Day are declared to be metaphorical expressions for three modes
of sensation which are established in human nature. The first mode likened to the Sun is
that which “without danger of error announces to the mind the species of the sensibles”
since “it does not deceive the mind but with all brightness of the sun uncovers every
sensible species.” (DDN IV: 783C-D) The second mode, likened to the Moon, is “one
through which the mind is often deceived” and “consequently it cannot easily form true
judgments upon objects it receives through sense.” (DDN IV: 783D) The third mode of
sensation “admits to the mind, in multiplicity and accumulation, numbers of sensible
forms” and “attempts by means of certain logical processes, to make statements which
will to some extent resemble the truth.” (784B). This mode is likened to the stars since
183
it offers sometimes opinions “which like bright stars, show a degree of clarity and
proximity to the truth; sometimes opinions that are more obscure and farther from truth,
like dimmer stars.” (Ibid) Since these modes of sensation have been classed according to
the degree of certainty and clarity of data achieved through them, they can be seen to
form a spectrum the one extreme of which is the first mode that always gives certain
and true knowledge and on the other is the second mode which always deceives while
the third mode comes in the middle since sometimes it gives true knowledge and
sometimes it deceives. Eriugena thinks that the fact that the bodily senses are “signified
by the greater things of the world, namely the celestial bodies” implies human dignity
since the unity of man is greater than the whole universe. (DDN IV: 784D) The creation
of creeping things of the sea and birds of the air on the fifth day signifies a further
distribution within sensation since it is not confined to man but is shared by other
animals too.
We have already seen the way creation of man on sixth day fits in with the
preceding five days. We also find a numeric symbolism in Eriugena’s attempt to relate
the creation of everything to that of man. The creation of exterior sense of man,
symbolized by creation of sun, moon and stars, was mentioned by the Scripture to have
taken place on the fourth day since human body to which sense is attached is composed
out of four elements. (DDN IV: 783C) Likewise, the creation of sense common to all
nature was on the fifth day since the sense itself is fivefold. (Ibid. IV: 785C)
7.1.57.1.57.1.57.1.5 Unity and Trinity: Unity and Trinity: Unity and Trinity: Unity and Trinity: DivineDivineDivineDivine and Hand Hand Hand Humanumanumanuman
We observed in our discussion of “trinity of mind” that Eriugena impliedly asserts a
parallel between Divine trinity and human nature. In fact Eriugena addresses Divine
trinity in connection with human nature a bit more explicitly after treating of the Six
184
Divine Days of Creation and tries to infer unequalled human dignity. He notes that the
reference to Holy Trinity in the account of creation of all things before that of man is
only implicit and can be read between the lines. In the words “In the beginning God
created Heaven and Earth”, God the Father is implied by “God”, Son by “the beginning”
while Holy Spirit is mentioned a little latter in the words, “And the Spirit of God
brooded over the waters.” However when it comes to the creation of man on the sixth
day “both the Unity and the Trinity of the Divine Nature are stated most explicitly, the
unity in the words and “He said” … while in the plural verb “Let Us make” are
expressed the three substances of the One Essence.” (786B-C)
It is not clear how one could differentiate the references in these texts to Trinity
by calling one implied and the other “most explicit.” However the reading of trinity in
verses relating story of creation of other beings is allegorical with a certain amount of
arbitrariness while it is symbolic in the case of verse relating the story of man’s creation
and required by an interpretational exigency.
Gracia’s paper on the ontological characterization of containment concluded that
according to Eriugena “What is created in man is not things (i.e. what Aristotle called
individuals or primary substances) or their characteristics, but the notions of things”
therefore, “rather the notions (notitiae) of things and their accidents find a place in the
human mind.”259 While this cannot be dismissed as invalid conclusion it must be pointed
out that in Eriugena’s philosophy there is no hard dichotomy between “notions” and
“primary substances” as is implied by Gracia’s conclusion. Eriugena identifies
“substance” with “notion” therefore when he predicates notion to something that does
not necessarily exclude the application of “substance” to it. Thus, while it is true that
259
Gracia, “Ontological Characterization,” 160.
185
man contains everything in the sense of having their notion, it does not prevent
Eriugena to state that “every creature is created as substance in man.”(DDN IV: 722A)
Keeping in view this Eriugenian understanding of substance if we are asked whether
creatures are found in man in the sense of notions or substances, the answer would be,
“in both senses.” Moreover, Eriugena’s identification of creatures created in the five
days with things in human nature gives a third category to characterize containment,
namely, metaphor. When Eriugena likens, for example, the Sun, moon and stars with
three modes of human sensations and claims that these three celestial bodies are created
in human nature this means that it has their notions neither directly nor indirectly (i.e.
through saying that they substantially exist in human nature) rather a characteristic of
human nature is just being likened to something non-human. Therefore, if we are to take
the treatment of Six Days in book four of DDN seriously, Eriugena’s position on how
every creature is contained in man is much more complex.
Whatever analysis anyway is given to the doctrine of containment, its
importance in Eriugenian system cannot be denied. It is this doctrine, for one thing,
which explains why the function of bringing everything back to its creator should be
assigned to man. (vide DDN IV: 900D) It seems, however, that the logical relation
between containment and return via man is presented from both sides, that is, as
implying and being implied by each other. Same circularity of argument can be observed
in the attempts to relate containment to human deiformity. One reason as to “why he
wished to create all creation in him?” is that “He wished to make him in His image and
likeness, so that, just as the Primal Archetype transcends everything by the excellence of
His essence so His image should transcend all created things in dignity and grace.”
(DDN IV: 764B; Also see IV: 795). Earlier in book II, however, Eriugena has already
186
said “man was made among primordial causes in the image of God that in him every
creature both intelligible and sensible of which he is composed as of various extremes
should become an inseparable unity, and that he should be the mediating term and
unification of all creatures.” (536B) Obviously, in the former text containment is the
means for human deiformity while in the latter it is the other way round.
7.27.27.27.2 IbnIbnIbnIbn ‘Arabi> on Man as Microcosm‘Arabi> on Man as Microcosm‘Arabi> on Man as Microcosm‘Arabi> on Man as Microcosm
Three concepts are central to Ibn ‘Arabi>’s view on the relationship between God, man
and the world: firstly, that man was created upon Divine image, secondly, that he is
God’s vicegerent upon earth and finally that he is microcosm. Here there is considerable
resonance between the thought of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> not only in broader outlines
but in certain important details as well, for instance, the scriptural groundedness of
these concepts, explanation of their meaning and their implications. Although, Eriugena
does mention occasionally the concept of human ‘‘dominion over all creatures’’ he does
not seem to make too much of it in his philosophical anthropology. However, this is a
negligible difference since, as we shall see, in Ibn ‘Arabi> the concept of human
vicegerency is given the same explanation as that of human deiformity and consequently
these two can be submerged. Accordingly, we will not discuss this topic separately but
will refer to it in our discussion of human deiformity. Although he is able to infer the
containment doctrine from some of the Qur’a>nic passages and Prophetic traditions, it is
the concept of human deiformity that is more explicitly grounded in the Islamic sources.
7.2.17.2.17.2.17.2.1 The Scriptural BasisThe Scriptural BasisThe Scriptural BasisThe Scriptural Basis
“The Human being that is Adam comprises of the World as a whole since He is the
small man and a summary of the Macrocosm,” writes Ibn ‘Arabi>. (Fut. II: 124; Also see
Fus}. 49-50) As usual he takes care to ground himself in the Revelation and refers to the
187
Qur’a>n 41:53 “We shall show them Our signs in the Horizons and within their own
souls” and comments “… so that they know that human being is a summary (وجيز) of the
World consisting of the signs that are in the World.” (Ibid. II: 150) He also invites us to
note that this Qur’a>nic verse mentions the horizons, that is, the external world, prior to
the souls, that is, the inner world which is to show the precedence of the world over
human being. (See ibid. II: 151) Another Qur’a>nic teaching that Ibn ‘Arabi> appropriates
to shed light on the microcosm theory is that which states that God created Adam with
His two Hands. God asked Ibli>s, “What prevented you from prostrating yourself to him
whom I created with My two hands?” (38:75) Ibn ‘Arabi> thinks that creation with two
hands implies that God gave human nature all realities of the world and manifested
Himself for it through all the Divine Names. Consequently human nature possesses both
the Divine image and the Worldly image. He also thinks that man is to the world like
the human soul is to the human body. “Thus if Man departs the world, the world dies.”
(Fut. II: 468; Also see Fus}: 54-55) Apart from being a clue to the scriptural ground of
the notion, here we come across some other important points relevant from the
standpoint of comparison with Eriugenian anthropology. Firstly, by referring to the
Divine names, Ibn ‘Arabi> points towards an explanation of the meaning of man’s being a
microcosm. Secondly, he also points towards the intermediary status occupied by man
which is one of the reasons for human configuration to be the most universal of all
configurations. Thirdly, and finally, here there is also a hint toward the eschatological
significance of human micro-cosmic status, although Ibn ‘Arabi> does not seem to
provide further theoretical elaboration of that point. This parallels the Eriugenian view
that everything in this world returns to God through man since man contains everything.
188
7.2.27.2.27.2.27.2.2 How is Man a Microcosm?How is Man a Microcosm?How is Man a Microcosm?How is Man a Microcosm?
Ibn ‘Arabi> writes at one place, “When God created the World as the Great Man and
made Adam and his progeny a summary of this world and for this reason gave him “All
the Names”, that is, all the names attending to existtiation (ايجاد) of the world ... The
world, therefore, as a whole is Great Man (ا8نسان الكبير).” (Fut. 3: 74) “All the Names,”
refer, of course, to the words of the Qur’a>n, “He taught Adam the Names, all of them.”
(2:31) These words echo, with certain important differences, Genesis 2:19 viz. “The
Lord God brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever he
called every living soul that is its name.” Hence it is interesting to notice that parallel
scriptural passages are being interpreted identically by Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>. We
have described in the previous chapter how Ibn ‘Arabi> considers everything in the world
to be a theophany, i.e. manifestation of one or more of the Divine Names. Man’s being
microcosm or the world’s being Great Man is to be understood as man’s uniquely and
absolutely having share in all Divine names or being the locus of manifestation of all of
them.260 Ibn ‘Arabi> makes the point sometimes by drawing our attention to the
particular Divine Name, Alla>h, which occurs in the h}adi>th about Adam’s creation upon
Divine image. This name is the most comprehensive names and all other Divine names
are included in it and attributed to it.
7.2.37.2.37.2.37.2.3 Man as IntermediaryMan as IntermediaryMan as IntermediaryMan as Intermediary
Let us dwell a little more on the consequences of the facet of human nature just alluded
to. Human being’s having share in all Divine names make the human configuration the
most perfect of configurations (اكمل النشآت) (Fut. II: 103). Like Eriugena Ibn ‘Arabi>
260
Since the same explanation holds for the concept of human deiformity we will have the occasion to
further elaborate these points in the next subsection.
189
emphasizes at a number of occasions man’s intermediary status ̀ by calling him an
Isthmus (برزخ). For instance he considers the Perfect Man as the middle (وسط) that
separates within the Divine Presence, the Manifest (الظاھر) and the Non-Manifest
hence, being a barzakh whose one face is turned towards the Manifest and the ,(الباطن)
other towards the Non-Manifest, he is the Real since he appears with the Divine Names
and he is creature since he appears with the reality of contingency. (See Fut. II: 391)
This double nature of human being according to Ibn ‘Arabi> can be considered to parallel
Eriugena’s notion of double nature of man as both an animal and not an animal with
noticing the difference that Ibn ‘Arabi> is presenting both aspects of human nature within
the Divine presence, leaving no room for disparaging the creaturely aspect. He also
writes that since God has taught man all the names and gave him the All-
Comprehensive words (جوامع الكلم) man brought-together-in-himself image of the Real
and image of the World. In this way he constitutes an intermediary between God and the
World. (See Fut. III: 298) Here Ibn ‘Arabi> can be seen as taking one step ahead of
Eriugena who maintained that man, being intermediary, combines in himself two sorts
of creatures, intellectual and material while Ibn ‘Arabi> is proposing for human nature a
more comprehensive status by considering it to be combining within itself both Divine
and cosmic images.
7.2.47.2.47.2.47.2.4 Man: the Final CreatureMan: the Final CreatureMan: the Final CreatureMan: the Final Creature
We saw Eriugena repeatedly referring to the fact that Man was created after everything
else in support of his notion of universal human containment. Likewise Ibn ‘Arabi>
repeatedly points out the fact that man is the final of creatures and connects this to the
doctrine of microcosm. Thus he says, “Man, therefore, is the Small world, while the
world is Great Man … so Man is the last begotten in the world that God has created as
190
bringing together the realities of the whole world.” (Fut. II: 150; Also see II: 396) One
favorite phrase used by Ibn ‘Arabi> to express the idea that everything of the created
world is contained within human being is that “man was created upon the image of
World” or vice versa: “… He originally is upon the image of the World whose image is
after that of the Exalted One, so everything is upon His image.” (Ibid. III: 343; See also
II: 512 and II: 652) In the context of six days of creation Ibn ‘Arabi> says about Friday
that “the reason for its eminence is that it is the day on which this human configuration
was created for the sake of which the creatures were created from Sunday to Thursday.”
(Fut. I: 466) It goes without saying that here Ibn ‘Arabi> comes closest to Eriugenian
interpretation of the Six days of creation. Moreover, we saw Eriugena referring to the
words of Bible “Preach the Gospel to every creature.” (760A) impliedly taking them to
mean that every creature is in man. Interestingly Ibn ‘Arabi> has said something so
relevant that it seems almost a gloss on Eriugena’s use of these Biblical words in the
context of containment. Ibn ‘Arabi> writes about man that “certainly he is the sum total
of all realities of the world so he who addresses man addresses the whole world.” (Fut.
II: 95)
7.2.57.2.57.2.57.2.5 Microcosm: Problems of labeling Microcosm: Problems of labeling Microcosm: Problems of labeling Microcosm: Problems of labeling
Finally we have to deal with a critical issue of this comparative analysis of Eriugena and
Ibn ‘Arabi> on the containment doctrine. This issue concerns Eriugena’s and before him
St. Gregory of Nyssa’s refusal to call man microcosm and Ibn ‘Arabi>’s applying this
label to man. Ibn ‘Arabi> would not disagree with the claim that the principal reason for
human excellence is not the fact that man contains everything but that this eminence
consists rather in human deiformity: “You must know next that certainly Allah has
created man upon the best of moulds by virtue of the image (s}u>rah) with which He has
191
distinguished him, and it is this (image) which has bestowed upon him this rank.” (Fut.
II: 616) He would however have disagreed with Gregory of Nyssa’s disparaging attitude
towards the world vis. a vis. man. We find him very careful about man’s being apex of
all creation that it should not lead him to disparage, enslave and exploit the world. He
therefore points out at one place the perspective from which the world has a rank higher
than that of the human beings: “Man, therefore, has no eminence over the world as a
whole, rather the world is more eminent than man since it is a degree above man that is
(the fact that) man was created out of the Macrocosm so it is a degree of causality above
him because he was begotten from it. … So it is mandatory for man to exalt his parents
and the world, all of it, is its mother.” (Fut. III: 11). For the sake of explanation of this
point one can use the whole-part symbolism and point out that although a whole is
greater than its parts nonetheless it is a whole thanks to its parts. Hence although “man
is a world apart and everything other than him is (not the whole world but) a part of the
world.” (Fut. I: 67) Although “the world is created due to man upon Divine image and if
the world is deprived of man, it would not be upon the image.” (Fut. III: 107), there is
no reason for holding the cosmos in contempt.
7.37.37.37.3 Human Deiformity: Eriugena on God and ManHuman Deiformity: Eriugena on God and ManHuman Deiformity: Eriugena on God and ManHuman Deiformity: Eriugena on God and Man
7.3.17.3.17.3.17.3.1 Preliminary: Scriptural BasisPreliminary: Scriptural BasisPreliminary: Scriptural BasisPreliminary: Scriptural Basis
The Bible tells us that God said “Let us make man in our image and likeness.” (Genesis
1: 26) Eriugena makes this concept an important part of his philosophical anthropology
since he logically connects, as we saw above, the containment of every creature in man
to this very doctrine. The central critical issue of Eriugena’s treatment of imago dei
from the standpoint of our present interest is the precise meaning of human creation
upon Divine image with a number of questions to which this gives rise, for instance,
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whether or not the whole human nature participates in it, why was man so created, does
deiformity extend to the whole humanity or simply to Christ and what metaphysical
principles are involved in the notion. Many other peculiar Eriugenian doctrines emerge
as episodes of the attempt to make sense of his position, for instance, interpretation of
the original sin, the fall, spiritual body, the nature of paradise etc. We, however, cannot
discuss these in this subsection and will be content with the questions just mentioned.
7.3.27.3.27.3.27.3.2 Human Body and DeiformityHuman Body and DeiformityHuman Body and DeiformityHuman Body and Deiformity
Just as man mediates intelligible and sensible creatures he combines within his nature
the characteristics of animals and those of celestial essences. Hence he both is and is not
an animal (animal est, animal non est). There is, thus, a double nature261 to man.
For when consideration is given to his body, his nutritive Life Force, to his
senses, and to his memory of sensible and to all his irrational appetites such as
rage and covetousness, he is altogether an animal... but in his nature which
consists of reason and mind, and the interior sense, with all their rational
motions which are called virtues and with the memory of the eternal and Divine
things, he is altogether other than animal. (DDN IV: 752C-D)
These two aspects of human nature Eriugena terms “Outer man/Animal Man”
and “Inner Man/Spiritual Man” referring to St. Paul who uses the words “animalis
homo” and “spiritualis homo” at 1 Cor. 2:14-16. (DDN IV: 753A-B) To the double
nature of man corresponds his double creation: “That in him which resembles the
animals was created with the animals and that which resembles spiritual creatures was
created with the spiritual creatures. (Ibid. IV: 753C)
Thus emerges Eriugena’s answer to one of the important questions raised above:
it is only man’s interior and intellectual nature which is made in the image of God, as far
261
On this point see Brian Stock, “The Philosophical Anthropology of Johannes Scottus Eriugena,” 13-14.
193
as his exterior, his body, is concerned, it is “external to human nature which is made in
the image of God” and is “superimposed upon it because of our sin.” (Ibid. IV: 799D)
Moreover, the division of human beings into male and female is also not part of
deiformity but a consequence of Sin. (See ibid. IV: 827A) Gregory of Nyssa, whom we
shall find Eriugena quoting at length, has in fact said that the qualities of being male
and female are “alien from the properties of God.” (Ibid. IV: 795B) The correspondence
between inner/ outer dichotomy and male/female one is worthy of notice since it
becomes the foundation of an allegory that Eriugena presents while interpreting the
Scriptural passages about Adam, Eve and the Serpent. Eriugena writes: “And the
ancient enemy would not have access to the male part of the soul that is the mind which
is created in the image of God, unless first he had seduced the corporeal sense, which is,
so to speak, a woman.” (DDN IV: 847C) Hence in the story of the fall inner man/ outer
man dichotomy is synonymous with male/female dichotomy. Hence it is not complete
human being, “the complete workshop” that is created upon Divine image according to
Eriugena but only one aspect of it.
What about the fact that Man committed the sin after a body was attached to
him and was divided into sexes? Eriugena has to reply first with the doctrine that “all
things …were created at one and the same time.” (DDN IV: 807B) The two creations,
therefore, took place simultaneously. Secondly, he has to tell us that in view of His
foreknowledge at the same time that God created man He created the consequences of
his sin even before he sinned. (See ibid. IV: 807C). Thirdly, in an implied contradiction
to Augustine, and perhaps to himself as well, Eriugena is not ready to believe that the
body that was attached originally to Adam was this very material and earthly body
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rather it was a spiritual body. He speaks of this body in an eloquent passage consisting
of contrasts between pre-fall and post-fall human bodies. (See ibid. IV: 760A-C)
Since Eriugena has provided for man being “everywhere a whole in himself” the
Alumnus thinks that it follows that “the whole image must subsist in the whole animal
and the whole animal in the whole Image throughout the whole man.” (Ibid. IV: 759A)
In response Eriugena claims that it is here precisely that “the image and likeness of God
in human nature can be recognized” and seeking help of the superlative theology
attempts to show that just as by being “whole in all things He does not cease to be
whole beyond all things” in the same way human nature is in its own world. “For even
the lowest and least valuable part, the body is according to its own principles whole in
whole man, for the body, insofar as it is truly body, subsists in its own principles which
were made at the beginning of creation.” (Ibid. IV: 759B) Hence, to the question
whether man was created upon Divine image in his whole being (body as well as higher
intellectual nature) Eriugena would like to give a Yes and No answer just like he gives
in response to questions about predicating attributes to the Divine Essence. This last
mentioned fact mitigates Eriugena’s otherwise disparaging attitude towards human
body. He moreover is careful not to seem “attacking wedlock and the procreation of
children” in his maintaining that the division of human nature into male and female
were the penalties for transgression. He explains that not only he does not attack these
institutions rather praises them since “they are permitted and ordained by God.” (See
ibid IV: 846D-847 B)
7.3.37.3.37.3.37.3.3 Which man was made upon Which man was made upon Which man was made upon Which man was made upon DivineDivineDivineDivine Image?Image?Image?Image?
Eriugena gives a rather long quotation from Saint Gregory of Nyssa’s De Hominis
Opificio (On the making of Man) (DDN IV: 793C-797D) and it is through this quotation
195
that one can see most clearly how Eriugena would characterize human deiformity, since
the latter does not disagree on any point with what he cites.
St. Gregory poses the question “how an unhappy thing can be called by Holy
Scripture a similitude of what is Divine and blessed?” (Ibid. IV: 794D) and answers,
“That which was made in the image is one thing and that which is shown now to be in
unhappiness another” (Ibid. IV: 795A). It is implied by the explanation that he gives for
this in the light of a careful analysis of Genesis 1:26-27, that it was Jesus Christ, the
Logos, which was made upon the Image of God and not the fallen human beings, the
creation of whom, he thinks is intended in particular by Genesis 1: 27, “Male and
Female created He Them” (Ibid), “While in Christ Jesus there is neither male nor
female.” (Ibid) Strangely, contrary to the point made here, we find Gregory going on to
show that Divine image does extend to whole of humanity. He first of all draws
attention to the fact that “man” instead of “Adam” is mentioned in the Genesis (Ibid.
IV: 797A) and secondly that mind is allotted to all men alike” (Ibid. IV: 797B-C) and
concludes that “the man who was revealed in the first constitution of the world and the
man who is to come after the consummation of all things both equally bear within them
the Divine Image.” (DDN IV: 797C). There seems to be considerable ambivalence as to
who precisely was made upon the Divine image in the passages quoted by Eriugena
although the latter does not take any notice of it and proceeds to cite another passage
from the same book on the issue of male-female differentiation.
The considerations made until this point in the present subsection were mainly
of a negative nature in the sense that they purported to show that according to Eriugena
human deiformity does not extend to certain elements of human nature. It is necessary
now to attend to the positive side of the subject and attempt to understand what it really
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means for the human being to have been created upon Divine image in positive terms in
addition to the fact that the higher reaches of human nature participate in the imago dei.
7.3.47.3.47.3.47.3.4 WhyWhyWhyWhy and and and and howhowhowhow man was made upon the man was made upon the man was made upon the man was made upon the DivineDivineDivineDivine Image?Image?Image?Image?
The real attempt at explaining the meaning of human deiformity is made by Gregory
with reference to Divine Nature in general and Divine Goodness in particular. Since
“God creates human life for no other reason than that well-being should be its property”
and since God is free of stinginess and envy, He implied a perfect power of goodness and
He did not withhold full participation of man in all that He contains.” This statement
can become a compact answer to the question as to why God created man upon Divine if
it is interpreted, as it must be, in the light of traditional principle that “Good tends to
communicate itself.”262 In this light the meaning of saying that God created man upon
His image means that “He bestowed upon man all of His goodness, withholding
nothing.” The Scriptural passage informing us of human deiformity can be taken as
summary of all good qualities that were given to human being. Thus,
“The catalogue of individual goods is long and not easy to enumerate, Scripture
indicates them all comprehensively by saying that man was made in the image
of God. For by this is meant that he made human nature a participant in every
good. For if God is the plenitude of good things and man is an image of God the
image must resemble the Primal Exemplar in this respect also, that it is the
plenitude of all good. (DDN IV: 795C-796A)
In chapter V of De Hominis Opificio Gregory has given some examples of the
Divine qualities as they manifest themselves in us. God is mind and word and “you see
in yourself word and understanding, an imitation of the very Mind and word.” God is
love and “the Fashioner of our nature has made this to be our feature too.” Finally, “the
262
We take this formulation of the principle from Frithjof Schuon.
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Deity beholds and hears all things and searches all things out; you too have the power of
apprehension of things by means of sight and hearing…”263 In this citation too Gregory
is taking the view that Divine image is not the privilege of Logos only but extends to
the whole genus of humanity, as the words “in yourself,” “our feature” and “you too”
indicate.
7.3.57.3.57.3.57.3.5 The Metaphysical Principle of DeiformityThe Metaphysical Principle of DeiformityThe Metaphysical Principle of DeiformityThe Metaphysical Principle of Deiformity
One metaphysical principle, namely, that the Good tends to communicate itself, has
already been referred to supra in our comment on the first sentence of quotation from
Gregory of Nyssa. Another related principle is firstly presupposed by his question “how
an unhappy thing can be called by Holy Scripture a similitude of what is Divine and
blessed?” and eventually is brought out at the end of the lines we quoted above. This is
the principle that the image must resemble the Exemplar perfectly. Perfect image is
defined as one which has all features common with the archetype (DDN IV: 822A)
Eriugena asks, “How would [the soul] be an image if in some aspect she differed from
that of which she is the image? Except of course in relation of the subject about which
we spoke in earlier books when we were discussing the Prototype or Principle-exemplar
and its image.” (DDN IV: 778A)
As the ending of this rhetorical question indicates, the universal resemblance of
image to its Archetype does not exclude difference between the two. Eriugena has
stated that the Exemplar is “subsisting through, by and in Himself, neither created nor
formed nor changed by anything” while the image is, “created by Him Whose image it
is, it has received being in accordance with its nature…” (Ibid) This fact must not be
taken as a self-contradiction since firstly, both Gregory of Nyssa and Eriugena are
263
Gregory of Nyssa: Dogmatic Treatises etc.: On the Making of Man, (Grand Rapids, CCEL) p. 534
198
speaking simultaneously of “all but two” and not firstly of “all” and then of “not the two
differences.” Secondly, it must be remembered as was said in a former chapter that this
exception is not made arbitrarily but is required by the very nature of things. Although
the image is image of the Exemplar, it still is image and not the Exemplar. In the
language of superlative theology it would be more appropriate to say that the image
both is and is not the Exemplar, the affirmation applies from the perspective of its being
an image while the negation does from its not being the Exemplar.
7.47.47.47.4 Ibn ‘Arabi> on Ibn ‘Arabi> on Ibn ‘Arabi> on Ibn ‘Arabi> on alalalal----S}u>rah alS}u>rah alS}u>rah alS}u>rah al----Ila>hiyyahIla>hiyyahIla>hiyyahIla>hiyyah
The central place of human deiformity in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s epistemology with special
reference to his short treatise Insha> al-Dawa>’ir has already been studied at length by
Mastaka Takeshita.264 Our focus here, as in the previous chapters, will be on Ibn
‘Arabi>’s Futu>h}a>t with occasional references to Fus}u>s }. In this section we make an
attempt to find out responses to issues raised by its Eriugenian form. These include the
scriptural foundations of the concept, its meaning, the question whether or not
deiformity extends to the whole human race, the status of human body and the division
of sexes, the metaphysical explanation of the deiformity and implications for the ethical
realm. We begin our investigation of this topic with discussing Islamic foundations of
the concept of human deiformity.
7.4.17.4.17.4.17.4.1 The The The The Islamic FoundatiIslamic FoundatiIslamic FoundatiIslamic Foundations of the Concept in Ibn ‘Arabi>ons of the Concept in Ibn ‘Arabi>ons of the Concept in Ibn ‘Arabi>ons of the Concept in Ibn ‘Arabi>
Although the exact parallel of the Biblical homo imago dei is not found in the Qur’a>n
Ibn ‘Arabi> thinks it can be inferred from one of its verses. He therefore writes, “He (i.e.
God) said about man that He has ‘created man in the best of moulds (أحسن تقويم)’ (95:4), 264
See his paper “The Homo Imago Dei Motif and the Anthropocentric Metaphysics of Ibn ‘Arabi> in the
Insha>’ al-Dawa>’ir,” in Orient: Report of the Society for Near Eastern Studies in Japan, XVIII (1982), 111-
129.
199
i.e. the mould upon which He has created man is more excellent than every other mould
and this quality, due to which man was given excellence over others, would not become
true except for Allah’s creating him upon His form.” (Fut. II: 683) Although the words
“more excellent than every other mould” express “comparative degree” they really
should be taken in the sense of superlative degree, above which no other degree exists
since this is what is required by the grammatical form of the noun “ah}san” in the
Qur’a>nic verse. This point is of importance because it makes possible the identification
of “Divine form” to “best of moulds.” Ibn ‘Arabi> himself has paid attention to this point
by stating, “So he (i.e. man) was upon the best of moulds not by (way of) comparison
(mufa>d}alah) … rather it is the absolute goodness for the perfect servant like the absolute
majesty that is the Real’s, so he is best of moulds not compared to this or that like the
Real is Great (akbar) not in comparison with this or that.” (Fut. II: 616)
A more direct foundation for the concept of human deiformity, however, is a
h}adi>th according to which Prophet Muh}ammad (peace be upon him) forbade slapping
someone on his face saying “Certainly Allah has created Adam upon His form.”265 The
context of this Prophetic text signals one important implication of human deiformity in
Islam different from the Christian thought, especially Eriugena. That is, it implies the
inclusion of human body in creation upon Divine form. Were it not for this fact it would
have not been possible to extend the ethical repercussion to physical punishment.
A comparison of the above quoted h}adi>th text with the Biblical text about
creation on Divine image reveals another important difference which enables Ibn ‘Arabi>
to add an interpretational nicety. According to the Bible God spoke in the first person
(our image) but in the h}adi>th we have the third person “his.” Ibn ‘Arabi> thinks that this
265
Muslim, Al- Ja>mi‘ al- S}ah}i>h}, Kita>b al- birr wa al-s}ilah, ba>b al-Nahy ‘an d}arb al-wajh.
200
statement can be read and understood in two ways depending upon which noun one
thinks is being qualified by the pronoun “his” in “his form.” In addition to the prevalent
imago dei reading one can interpret these words as “God has created Adam upon
Adam’s Form,” since grammatically a pronoun refers to a noun that is closest to it in a
sentence. Although the context of the h}adi>th makes this interpretation a little odd Ibn
‘Arabi>’s explanation of it makes a lot of sense given the fact that Adam was the first
human being directly created by God: “he did not pass from one stage of creation to
another like semen passes stage by stage from being water to being man, rather God
created him as he appeared.” (Fut. II: 124) One could add another interpretation of this
second reading of the h}adi>th by saying that God created Adam into the spatio-temporal
world according to the form Adam eternally had in Divine knowledge. Although Ibn
‘Arabi> does not give this interpretation, it is based on his general doctrine of creation as
bestowal of existence upon the fixed entities which are objects of Divine knowledge. In
Eriugenian terminology, to say that God created Adam upon his image would mean that
he created him firstly as a primordial cause and then he was created in this spatio-
temporal world. Be that as it may, apart from the short passage just cited Ibn ‘Arabi>
always takes the h}adi>th to mean that Adam was created upon Divine form.
7.4.27.4.27.4.27.4.2 The Meaning of Deiformity The Meaning of Deiformity The Meaning of Deiformity The Meaning of Deiformity
What does Ibn ‘Arabi> understand by man’s creation upon the image/form of God? His
understanding of human deiformity is similar to the one cited by Eriugena from Saint
Gregory of Nyssa according to which it means that God gave man all of his goodness.
Ibn ‘Arabi> asks us first of all to notice the particular Divine name that is mentioned in
the h}adi>th informing us of human deiformity, that is “Allah” rather than “Al-Qayyu>m”
or “Al- Jabba>r” etc. He therefore says, “So Adam appeared upon the image of the name
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“Allah” since that name encompasses all Divine names.” (Fut. II: 124). Although
everything in the world manifests some particular Divine quality, it is only the “human
configuration” in which all Divine names manifest themselves since ‘Allah taught Adam
the Names, all of them,’ “that is the Divine Names from which all the objects were
created.” (Fut. I: 216) As he understands it, one thing cannot be said to be upon the
image of another unless it is identical to it in all respects. (See Fut. III: 344) Hence Ibn
‘Arabi> shares with Eriugena, in general terms, the principle of image exemplar identity.
In this context Ibn ‘Arabi> builds upon another important Qur’a>nic concept i.e. human
vicegerency (خ\فة). Before creating Adam God said to the Angels “I will create a
vicegerent on earth.” (II: 30) A vicegerent (خليفة) cannot be properly so called unless he
is given the qualities of the one whose vicegerent he is made: “Vicegerency was for
Adam over against other genera of the world in view of Allah’s having created him upon
his image as the vicegerent appears to what he has made vicegerent on, in the image of
the one who made him vicegerent otherwise he would not be a vicegerent in them.”
(Fut. I: 263) In response to the question “What characterizes Adam?” he explains “His
characteristic attribute is the Divine Presence if you will or the totality of Divine names
if you will.” (Fut. I: 67) At another place we find him saying “‘God created Adam upon
His image’ that is, everything that applies to the Divine Presence applies both to the
Small Man and the Great Man.” (Fut. 2: 139) The Divine names obviously connote
some qualities and man’s manifesting the names means being able to realize those
qualities. This fact becomes the foundation of an ethics based upon the concept of
human deiformity. Ibn ‘Arabi> has written, “He, the Exalted One, did not name Himself
with any of the Names except that He made a share from it for human being to assume
its character trait (تخلق) (Fut. I: 124). We would say more about the ethical implications
of this doctrine below.
202
7.4.37.4.37.4.37.4.3 Does the Does the Does the Does the DivineDivineDivineDivine image extend to all human beings? image extend to all human beings? image extend to all human beings? image extend to all human beings?
With reference to a passage quoted by Eriugena from Saint Gregory we observed that
although it was Christ and not the fallen human being that was made upon the Divine
image the whole of humanity is included in the Divine image in a manner explained
neither by Gregory nor by Eriugena. We have to see now who precisely was made upon
the Divine image according to Ibn ‘Arabi>. Unfortunately, his position on this question is
as ambivalent as that of Eriugena since he seems to limit Divine image to the primordial
Perfect Man and at the same time not only extends it to what he calls “the Animal Man”
(al-insa>n al-haywa>n) but to the whole world. After looking at a few texts from Al-
Futu>h}a>t which underscore these two positions we would attempt to interpret the
ambivalence and see if that interpretation can be helpful in making sense of the
viewpoint of St. Gregory/Eriugena as well. The assertion that Divine image is the
privilege of the Perfect man in Ibn ‘Arabi> is made possible in the first place by the
Islamic textual foundation of the concept of human deiformity, i.e. the h}adi>th which,
unlike the Bible, does not say that “Man” was created upon Divine image but uses the
word “Adam.” This point is important for our comparative analysis because we have
seen St. Gregory emphasizing and utilizing the fact that Biblical text uses the word
“man” instead of “Adam.” It is also important since it would make it possible for Ibn
‘Arabi> to be more explicit in limiting the Divine image to the Perfect Man which he
identifies at Fut. II: 468 with Adam. Hence he says about the Perfect Man that “no one
contains the Divine image other than him.” (Ibid. III: 282) Again, “Certainly not every
human being is upon the Image since there is the Animal Man as well as the Vicegerent
Man.” (Ibid. IV: 56) Animal man resembles the Perfect man in his external form but not
otherwise “just as a monkey resembles man in respect of all his external organs” (Ibid.
III: 266)
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On the other hand we find Ibn ‘Arabi> saying in so many words that “the Divine
image has a governing property (h}ukm)266 in every individual.” (Ibid. III: 184) He also
says in passing that not only the Perfect Man but his vicegerents (khulafa>’uh) were also
created upon the Divine image. (See ibid. III: 280) Even more interesting is the fact that
he does not see any discrepancy between fallen man’s ability to sin and the share he has
out of deiformity. In Ibn ‘Arabi>’s opinion man is able to disobey his Lord only because
he was created upon the Divine image.
Is there any way to reconcile the two seemingly contradictory positions, holding
on the one hand that a particular human being, whether Adam, Christ, Inner Man or
Perfect man was created upon the Divine image and on the other hand that the image
extends to the whole of humanity? One way to this reconciliation could be to opine that
the primordial man enjoyed the Divine image to its absolute perfection while the rest of
humanity has merely some share from it. On the basis of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s explication of
deiformity in terms of the doctrine of Divine names, one could say that every human
being including the primordial man has a share in some basic Divine attributes like Life,
Knowledge, Power etc. while it is only the primordial man who has actualized all the
rest of attributes as well. Other human beings have to struggle in order to realize those
attributes. This interpretation is made plausible by reference to the final return of
everything to the Divine Goodness according to Eriugenian thought and to the ethics of
Divine names in Ibn ‘Arabi> which we shall discuss below in section 7.4.8.
266
We have translated the word h}ukm here as “governing property” following William Chittick. For
various possible translations of this word see his Sufi Path of Knowledge, 48.
204
7.4.47.4.47.4.47.4.4 The Cosmic DeiformityThe Cosmic DeiformityThe Cosmic DeiformityThe Cosmic Deiformity
Ibn ‘Arabi> stretches his doctrine of creation upon Divine image beyond humanity and
states that the whole world was created upon God’s image (See Fut. II: 403; IV: 231) in
the sense of manifesting the realities of the Divine Names (See ibid. II: 139).
Lest it be thought that the concept of macrocosmic deiformity contradicts what
Ibn ‘Arabi> said elsewhere (i.e. Ibid. III: 8) about man being more perfect than
everything, we would like to add Ibn ‘Arabi>’s argument that the World becomes perfect
only when man is included in it and without Man it is imperfect. (Ibid. III: 343) The fact
that there is no clash between human and cosmic deiformity can be seen through
observing that Ibn ‘Arabi> infers the former from the latter through the concept of
containment. (See ibid.)
The concept of macrocosmic deiformity is one of those important points where
Ibn ‘Arabi>’s position diverges from that of Eriugena and his Cappadocian predecessor
Gregory. As we noticed that Gregory’s refusal to apply the term microcosm to man was
based on contempt for the world as compared to man who is believed to be exclusively
created upon Divine image. Ibn ‘Arabi> however extends deiformity to include cosmos
itself and this has profound ethical implication for the human behavior towards the
world that surrounds us. Thus he goes beyond Eriugena on this point although both
agree on the identification of creation with Divine self-manifestation and the general
concept of theophany.
7.4.57.4.57.4.57.4.5 Human Body and deiformity Human Body and deiformity Human Body and deiformity Human Body and deiformity
On the question of body’s participation in the Divine image Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>
represent differing standpoints and this can easily be explained with reference to their
different traditional backgrounds. We have seen that Eriugena does not think that
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human deiformity extends to human body but holds that man was created upon the
Divine image in his soul only, that body was attached to the soul as punishment for the
Sin, although we also observed him making a comment which somewhat mitigates his
negative attitude towards human body. We observed in the beginning of this section on
Ibn ‘Arabi> that the context of the h}adi>th about imago dei refers primarily to the physical
part of human being. This fact coupled with the general non-disparaging view towards
human body in Islam leaves no room for the exclusion of human body from deiformity.
For Ibn ‘Arabi> one factor adding to this difficulty is his doctrine, explored in the
previous chapter, that whatever appears in this spatio-temporal world is rooted in the
Divine Nature. Likewise there is nothing in the world without a share from the Divine
form. (See ibid. II: 431) The existence of bodies is ontologically rooted in the Divine
Name al-Z}a>hir (the Manifest).(See ibid. II: 433) Far from being punishment and
debasement it was out of Divine mercy that bodies were attached to the souls. (See ibid.
III: 171) Ibn ‘Arabi> would also differ on Eriugena’s exclusion of bodily senses from
deiformity. Referring to a h}adi>th in which God is reported to have said about the servant
He loves that He becomes “his hearing through which he hears and his eyesight through
which he sees” Ibn ‘Arabi> draws our attention to the fact that God Almighty has
mentioned the sensory form but did not describe Himself as rational, reflecting or
imagining. (Ibid. III: 189). More particularly, he thinks that the human sensory faculties
are rooted in the Divine nature just like everything else that exists. (Ibid.)
There is one place where it might seem that Ibn ‘Arabi> does hold the view that
human body is excluded from deiformity.267 Speaking about the Angels’ objection to
creation of Adam as vicegerent upon earth as mentioned in the Qur’a>n Ibn ‘Arabi> writes,
267
We have analyzed Ibn ‘Arabi>’s views on body more fully in “Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Metaphysics of Human
Body,” in Islamic Studies, 46 (2007), 499-525.
206
“(man) is not called khali>fah except through the perfection of Divine image … that is
why the Angels saw nothing of Adam except his dense, elemental, dark bodily and
physical appearance and said what they said but when God informed them of perfection
of image in it and asked them to prostrate before him, they hurried in prostrating before
him.” (Ibid. III: 156) However, the concern of this passage is the perfection of Divine
form and not its existence or non-existence. Therefore, what this passage shows is not
that the soul is deiform over against the body but that in the former Divine form is
perfect while in the latter it is not.
Another issue related to that of the human body vis. a vis. human deiformity is
that of the division of mankind between male and female which Eriugena thinks was an
addition to the pristine humanity as a consequence of the Sin. At this point too Ibn
‘Arabi> does not agree with Eriugena and the difference in the present case too is
understandable in terms of traditional background of these two writers. For one thing
the Qur’a>n mentions repeatedly the phenomenon of male-female divide, although not
exclusively human but cosmic as well, as one of the signs of Allah and His blessings.
(See e.g. 16: 72; 30:21 and 78:8) Although the h}adi>th about Divine image mentions
Adam this should not be taken to mean the exclusion of Eve from deiformity since
“Man includes woman because Eve is a part of Adam.” (Ibid. I: 541) Ibn ‘Arabi> also tells
us that Adam was created upon Divine image while Eve was created upon Adam’s
image which logically implies that Eve was also created upon Divine image. (See ibid. I:
679)
7.4.67.4.67.4.67.4.6 ThThThThe Ethical e Ethical e Ethical e Ethical Dimensions Dimensions Dimensions Dimensions of Deiformity of Deiformity of Deiformity of Deiformity
Ibn ‘Arabi> points out that by being informed of creation upon Divine image humanity is
put to one of the greatest trials. The purpose of this trial is to see whether man “stands
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by his servanthood and contingency or becomes conceited due to the status of his
image.” (See ibid. II: 189) The success in this trial consists of never losing sight of
servanthood, contingency, poverty and needfulness. (Ibid.) Those human beings who
forgot these essential qualities and claimed divinity for themselves actually failed this
trial. (See ibid. II: 642) In this respect, as well as in some others, deiformity is likened to
human vicegerency. The office of caliphate brings with it enormous responsibilities and
as was said in one h}adi>th Ibn ‘Arabi> refers to, it will be an occasion of regret for those
who failed to fulfill these responsibilities. (See ibid. III: 183-4) Ibn ‘Arabi> advises that it
might help us abstain from taking pride in our deiformity if we look at the world around
us, which although was created for our sake, still its creation is greater than ours. (See
ibid. III: 9) In addition to these guidelines Ibn ‘Arabi> makes the fact that man was
created upon Divine image in the sense that Divine names and qualities manifest
through man a basis for an ethics of Divine names. Deiformity, as we repeatedly
noticed, implies that the Divine qualities, connoted by the Divine Names, were
bestowed upon man. Now some of these qualities, like Life and Vision were bestowed
upon each and everyone while we are ethically obliged to realize in our personalities all
the rest of qualities. Divine Mercy, for example, requires human being to be merciful
and so on.268
7.4.77.4.77.4.77.4.7 Why Human Deiformity?Why Human Deiformity?Why Human Deiformity?Why Human Deiformity? Metaphysical Explanations Metaphysical Explanations Metaphysical Explanations Metaphysical Explanations
Gregory of Nyssa, as quoted by Eriugena, explained human deiformity by referring to
Divine quality of Goodness. What explanation do we find in Ibn ‘Arabi>? Well, he tells
us that “Certainly Allah has not created the creature for the sake of creation but as an
268
See Qaiser Shahzad, “Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Contribution to the Ethics of Divine Names” in Islamic Studies
XLIII (2004), 5-39.
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example for Him … For this reason He made him upon His image.” (Ibid. IV: 252) Since
God willed to be known and He could not be known except by someone who is upon His
image he created man upon His image. (See Fut. III: 266) This explanation is of course
based on a saying oft quoted by Ibn ‘Arabi> and other Sufis as raison d’être of the
creation namely, “I was a hidden treasure and I loved to be known so I created the
creature.” In the very beginning of Fus}u>s} al- H}ikam Ibn ‘Arabi> put this idea as under:
The Real willed, glorified be He, in virtue of His Beautiful Names, which are
innumerable, to see their identities -- if you so wish you can say: to see His
Identity—in a comprehensive being (kawn ja>mi‘) that comprises the whole
affair… For the vision a thing has of itself in itself is not like the vision a thing
has of itself in another thing, which will be like a mirror for it. (Fus. 48 Trans.
Ringstones, 3)
Hence the deiform man is a mirror created by God for Himself. The explanation
given by Gregory/Eriugena for deiformity is similar to the one provided by Ibn ‘Arabi> in
respect of the fact that both refer to God, but more precisely, whereas the former takes
into account the Divine Nature, the latter revolves around Divine Will. Divine Nature is
concerned with the way Divinity is and the Divine Will obviously concerns what It
wants or desires.269
The metaphysical explanation also includes an exploration of the relation that
exists between the Divine Exemplar and its human image, whether it implies complete
identity or allows some ontological gap between the two. It was observed in the
discussion of imago dei in Eriugena that in spite of being grounded in the principle of
complete exemplar-image resemblance, he does retain the basic creator-creature
269
This important distinction we take from Frithjof Schuon who has shown how losing sight of it leads to
theological mistakes in his essay “Dilemmas Within Ash‘arite Theology” in Islam and the Perennial
Philosophy.
209
difference. Let us now look at the way Ibn ‘Arabi> conceives this issue. Like Gregory and
Eriugena Ibn ‘Arabi> does firmly believe that the image must resemble the exemplar in
all respects and he is likewise careful to emphasize that this principle does not imply a
collapse of Creator-creature distinction.270 His position is, further, a little more
elaborate than the other two writers’. He writes that “It cannot be said about one thing
that it is upon the image (‘ala> s}u>rah) of something unless it be that thing in all respects
except that which cannot be said to be (identical to) it.” (Fut. III: 343) However this
does not collapse all the distinctions, so after all “The Real is The Real, human being is
human being and the world is the world.” (Ibid.) Therefore being upon image of the
exemplar means that most of what can be said about the latter can also be said about the
former but this does not imply that we have one entity instead of two or that the
essential defining characteristics of both are same. We find further explanatory remarks
on this point in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s writings. At one place he says drawing our attention to the
word “created” in the hadi>th that “Allah created Adam upon His image” that it lets man
know that even though he is upon the image of God, he still is creature and consequently
he does not become haughty. (See ibid. IV: 210). This distinction between exemplar and
image with reference to createdness was recognized by Eriugena as we saw above.
Human deiformity, as Ibn ‘Arabi> views it, is just like weighing a gold bar with iron-
weights, just as the latter does not equal the former so “nothing can be weighed by the
human form except what it requires from amongst the Divine Names of the sum of
which it consists and the ones that attended to its creation and which manifested their
effects within it.” (Fut. III: 8) Image exemplar identity is thus to be understood with
reference to creatures’ being loci of manifestation of Divine Names, however on this
270 See 7.4.2 supra.
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point too Ibn ‘Arabi> is careful to emphasize the creator-creature boundary. Thus he says
that although all the Divine names can apply to the Perfect Man who was created upon
Divine image, nevertheless these names apply to him individually ( ًفرداً فردا) and one by
one ( ًبعضاً بعضا) and the totality of Divine names does not apply to him in one word so
that the Lord be distinguished from the perfect servant. (See Fut. III: 409) What he
means in fact is that although man can be addressed with all the Divine names, unlike
God himself whose essential name is “Allah” which contains all other Divine names,
man does not possess any such all-comprehensive name in which other names should be
included.
By making these qualifications Ibn ‘Arabi> is concerned as much with ethical
dimensions of human deiformity as he is with the metaphysical truth. He continues to
say after giving the iron-weight example, “So know that you are (as if) an iron-weight
with which an unparalleled corundum, has been weighed even though you equal it in
quantity you do not equal its worth or its essence or its characteristic, exalted is Allah,
so stick to your servanthood and know your worth.” (Ibid. III: 8-9)
Why there should be ontological gap between image and exemplar and why
exceptions should be made to the principle that “an image must resemble the exemplar
in absolutely all respects”? One answer can be seen in the afore-cited lines from Fut. IV:
210 to the fact that an image is after all a creature which must be different from the
Creator. However, the categories of creator and creature pertain to the religious level
and we are interested here in having an explanation on the metaphysical level. In Ibn
‘Arabi> metaphysical explanation takes into account the doctrine discussed in the
previous chapter271 that a Divine self-manifestation takes place subject to the nature and
271
See the subsection titled “Form-assuming, Illumination and Elitism.
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limitations of the locus (مجلى). With this doctrine in mind we can read Ibn ‘Arabi>’s
words: “Likewise when the human form accepted the Divine Image in the presence of
Contingency (إمكان) it did not appear upon the property of the Discloser (المتجلي) in all
respects since the presence of the locus of manifestation, that is the contingency, held
sway over it rather than the presence of the Necessary of Existence.” (Ibid. III: 109)
This means that the Divine image, both microcosmic and macrocosmic cannot be
absolutely equal to the Divine Exemplar since it is as it were composed of
characteristics borrowed from both extremes of the totality of Being namely
contingency and necessity. The former is termed “presence of the locus of
manifestation” while the latter as “the Discloser” by Ibn ‘Arabi> in the citation just
made. Referring to the intermediary status of Macro/microcosm between the Higher and
Lower realms one could say that the Divine Image must necessarily manifest
characteristics of both instead of just being absolutely identical to the Higher.
EightEightEightEight
Conclusion: Conclusion: Conclusion: Conclusion: Summary,Summary,Summary,Summary, InterpretationInterpretationInterpretationInterpretation and and and and ImplicationImplicationImplicationImplicationssss
Having presented in the preceding seven chapters a comparative analysis of the
cosmological doctrines of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> in terms of ontology, metacosm,
macrocosm and microcosm we are ready now to bring the dissertation to a close. It is
time therefore, firstly, to put the results of comparison and contrast succinctly and
reiterate remarkable similarities and significant differences and see whether these latter
are reconcilable or not; secondly, to interpret certain points that emerge out of this
summary and thirdly, to tell what the difference or differences our conclusion is
supposed to make and what are its implications. These, therefore, are the tasks we set
before ourselves in this final chapter of our dissertation.
8.18.18.18.1 Summary Summary Summary Summary
Out of Eriugena’s four divisions of nature we presented a comparative analysis of three
divisions with the cosmological thought of Ibn ‘Arabi>, in addition to focusing on the
ontological discussions of the prologue to DDN. We did not touch upon the fourth
division of nature since it concerns eschatology and requires separate treatment. What
follows is a chapter by chapter summary.
8.1.18.1.18.1.18.1.1
A division of totality is central to the cosmologies of both Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>.
Whereas both include not-being side by side with being under this division Ibn ‘Arabi>’s
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division of totality seems to be more comprehensive. This is in view of the fact that the
not-being Ibn ‘Arabi> talks about in the context of totality is not relative not-being but
non-delimited or absolute non-being. Moreover instead of dichotomizing totality into
these two categories like Eriugena, Ibn ‘Arabi> comes up with a “third-thing” which he
identifies at times with the spatio-temporal world and at others with the eternal objects
of Divine knowledge that at any rate are the origin of the world. Anyhow this totality
which consists of being and not-being is coextensive with Eriugena’s universitas which
combines both creator and creature.
There are two more facets of the ontologies of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> where
considerable resonances are discernible. These two facets come to the light when we
focus on Eriugena’s famous modes of distinguishing being from not-being in the light of
Ibn ‘Arabi>’s thought. Out of these modes it is the so called sixth mode which has
greatest affinity with the thought of Ibn ‘Arabi>. Thus, as far as this perspective of
differentiating being form not-being is concerned, true being belongs to God while
everything the existence of which depends upon or derives from Divine Being is
properly speaking non-existent. Moreover, according to his third mode things that are
still hidden in the secret folds of nature are considered non-existents while they are
considered to be once they appear in the spatio-temporal world. Ibn ‘Arabi>’s
cosmological doctrine contains the scripturally grounded concept of “treasuries” of
things from which they are created and manifested in the spatio-temporal world. But so
long as things are still in those treasuries they are considered not to be. However one
important difference here is that a thing never really escapes the treasuries since Ibn
‘Arabi> identifies them with the objects Divine knowledge from which nothing can
escape. Eriugena’s first mode implied the application of not-being to God in view of His
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super-abundant excellence and being to the things that do not escape intellect, reason or
sense, thus this mode has an implication that is totally opposed to that of the sixth
mode. This fact instead of being an inconsistency in Eriugenian ontology, is actually one
of the two facets we just spoke of, namely, that differentiating being from not-being for
Eriugena depends upon the perspective from which one is contemplating. That this
perspectival nature of ontology is definitely shared by Ibn ‘Arabi> can be seen firstly
from the fact that he does not consider existence something additional to the existents
themselves and secondly through his differentiating various meanings of the word
“exists” i.e. verbal, mental and external etc. So one thing might exist in one of these
meanings and not exist from another one.
The second facet reflected in Eriugena’s modes of being is the subordination of
ontology to intelligibility or that of “being” to “being known.” This parallels Ibn
‘Arabi>’s very identification of “being” (وجود) with “finding” (وجدان) and also his
interpreting the Qur’a>nic dichotomy of “what you see and what you do not see” as
“what exists and what does not exist.” As far as the former parallelism is concerned,
unlike Eriugena, the point made by Ibn ‘Arabi> is facilitated by a linguistic fact rather
than being a philosophical innovation.
8.1.28.1.28.1.28.1.2
As a Christian Eriugena believes in triune God but as a representative of the negative
theology he declares God to be beyond unity and trinity. Ibn ‘Arabi> in spite of holding a
doctrine of radical unity as a Muslim, is still amenable to comparison with Eriugena in
view of two facts. Firstly, he is one of the few Muslim thinkers who are ready to
accommodate trinity as specific form of declaration of unity. Secondly, on the
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metaphysical level, Ibn ‘Arabi> does not assign multiplicity to the realm of illusion but
considers it to be rooted in the Divine side in the multiplicity of Divine names.
Instead of limiting the meaning of “God” just to the Divine Essence, both
Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> conceive it as multi-layered term denoting in addition to the
Divine Essence its manifestation as well. This is reflected in Eriugena’s express
statement to the effect that theophanies are also to be understood by the word “God”
and Ibn ‘Arabi>’s definition of the Divine Presence which includes Essence, Attributes
and Actions and the these latter are identified with the world. Eriugena’s “primordial
causes” and Ibn ‘Arabi>’s “fixed entities”, if our argument in the fourth chapter regarding
their parallelism are convincing, can be interpreted as philosophical elaborations of this
inclusion of theophanies within Divine nature. Since Ibn ‘Arabi> shares with Eriugena
the identification of “creating” with God’s “manifesting himself” we can reconcile Ibn
‘Arabi>’s thought with otherwise confusing Eriugenian assertion that God creates
Himself. Moreover there is in Ibn ‘Arabi> an application of the notion of Divine self-
creation in the context of explaining diversity of religious beliefs and practices in
accordance with God’s manifesting Himself (“creating Himself”) differently to each
believer.
Eriugena’s equally startling step from theological point of view is the application
of “nihil” to God, however, this notion does not imply “lack of being” but God’s being
“more-than-being.” Since Ibn ‘Arabi> equates God with Being and explicitly rejects
application of “nihil” to God it seems difficult to reconcile him with Eriugena at this
point. However, this difficulty is overcome by understanding that while rejecting that
application Ibn ‘Arabi> has a different understanding of “nihil” in mind so there is no
contradiction between him and Eriugena. It is as “lack” or “privation” that Ibn ‘Arabi>
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denies application of “nihil” to God. Besides, there is no difference between Eriugena
and Ibn ‘Arabi> as far as the understanding of creation ex nihilo as creation ex deo is
concerned and the latter has pointed at one place to a perspective from which God can
be said not be.
Consequent upon characterizing God as nihil are questions of knowability. As for
God’s being unknowable to us in as much as His Essence and being knowable from
certain features of existents, Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> absolutely agree. They disagree,
however, and this time the disagreement seems to be irresolvable, regarding the
possibility of Divine self-knowledge. Eriugena thinks that since God is not a “what” i.e.
“thing” and since knowing is equal to defining and God cannot be defined, He cannot
know Himself. Although Ibn ‘Arabi> agrees that God cannot be defined he emphasizes
that God’s knowing “what He is” has nothing to do with definition. Unlike Eriugena,
instead of taking infinity to imply impossibility of Divine self knowledge Ibn ‘Arabi>
thinks that it is only as infinite that God can know Himself the infinite and that this
knowledge is without encompassing. As we said here we stumble upon an irresolvable
difference between Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>. However emphasizing “in nullo” part of
Eriugena’s in nullo se cognoscit quia infinita est we offer a new interpretation according
to which what Eriugena is denying is God’s knowing Himself “in anything” and there is
nothing in which He could know himself except Himself. If this interpretation is
accepted then we can resolve the difference between Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> at this
point.
On the plane of the theological side of metacosm, the final important arena of
comparing Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> is that of religious language. Following the Greek
authorities especially Pseudo Dionysius Eriugena first presents two opposite
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perspectives and then a third one which combines both. According to affirmative
theology everything can be spoken of God since everything takes its being from Him;
according to negative theology none of the Divine names refer to God since they are
opposed by other names and no opposition can be in Him and finally the hyperphatic
theology which is affirmative in form but negative in intent since it ascribes to God
things like “more-than-Goodness” and “more-than Essence” etc., without giving their
precise meaning. In Ibn ‘Arabi> we have obvious parallels of these three modes of talking
about God. He inherited the concepts of tanzi>h and tashbi>h respectively corresponding
to the negative and affirmative theologies but observing that separately taken these two
modes are inadequate, he added the third perspective which combined both i.e. tanzi>h
ma‘ al-tashbi>h. This perspective is epitomized by the Qur’a>nic words “There is nothing
like unto Him and He is the Hearing, the Seeing” as Ibn ‘Arabi> understands them.
However, although both Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> synthesize negative and affirmative
theologies the final flavor of their syntheses is different. Whereas Eriugena tilts towards
negative theology in the final analysis the emphasis in Ibn ‘Arabi> seems to be upon the
affirmative side. This is a fact that stands in need of interpretation and we shall reiterate
its interpretation in the following section.
8.1.38.1.38.1.38.1.3
We alluded above to the fact that Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> alike consider the
manifestation already included in the principle. Eriugena’s positing primordial causes as
“the secretes folds of nature” out of which things are brought into spatio temporal world
and Ibn ‘Arabi>’s fixed entities as “treasuries of everything with God” out of which He
brings the things, can be taken as a cosmological commentary on their respective
definitions of God or Divine presence. Thus if Eriugena gives us primordial causes as
218
prototypes, predestinations, predefinitions and origins of things before their arising in
the visible and invisible, Ibn ‘Arabi> introduces fixed entities as determinations of
objects in Divine knowledge before they are existentiated in the spatio-temporal world.
Thus the fixed entities are functionally identical to the primordial causes. As far as the
specific characteristics of these two notions are concerned, Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>
cannot straightforwardly be reconciled on all of them.
It is well known that Ibn ‘Arabi> held that the fixed entities are non-existent and
this position parallels Eriugena’s third mode of being according to which things still in
their primordial causes are said not be. However, Eriugena has also remarked that the
causes are closest to being and this in addition to creating gap between them and fixed
entities also requires being reconciled with his own former position. Our conclusion
answering to both these difficulties involved synthesizing these two conflicting
positions into the statement that primordial causes both are and are not just like
Eriugena himself said about the things that they were always and were not always. What
helps bring this synthesized position on the ontological status of primordial causes close
to that of fixed entities is that it is not absolute non-existence that Ibn ‘Arabi> claims for
them but only relative one and that he identifies the realm of fixed entities with the
third thing which both is and is not.
Unlike Eriugena who refuses to identify primordial causes with prime matter Ibn
‘Arabi> does allow identifying the realm of fixed entities with prime matter in one place,
however, he does that only for the purpose of analogy.
On the questions related to the knowability Ibn ‘Arabi> is in complete accord
with Eriugena in making it clear that like the latter’s primordial causes, the fixed
entities do not escape Divine knowledge, rather their very nature consists in being
219
objects of Divine knowledge. However whereas Eriugena holds that primordial causes
are absolutely inaccessible to human intellect Ibn ‘Arabi> is not so strict regarding the
knowability of his fixed entities and allows that they can be partially known by some
human beings through Divine grace and holds that the workings of human imagination
proceed through a knowledge of those entities. However, this knowledge does not
include the manner of existentiation of fixed entities.
Another important difference between the primordial causes and fixed entities
that needs to be commented on is that the former are said to be “created” while the
latter are “not existentiated” that is, not created. However, in Eriugena “creation”
amounts to “self-disclosure” and not to “making out of non-existence.” Hence the gap
between Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> is bridged once we consider that the latter only denies
that fixed entities are made out of non-existence and admits that they are theophanies.
The fixed entities resemble primordial causes in being hierarchically ordered
within a wider hierarchy of totality consisting of God, causes and spatio temporal world
in Eriugena’s case and of Divinity, fixed entities and the world in case of Ibn ‘Arabi>.
Fixed entities share with the primordial causes the characteristic of being intermediary
between Divinity and the world. However Ibn ‘Arabi> believes in two levels of Divinity,
its pure unity and its being subject of multiple names and attributes. This second level
contributes towards making Ibn ‘Arabi>’s hierarchical picture of totality more
transparent than that of Eriugena. Although Eriugena teaches that everything in the
spatio-temporal world that has some specific characteristic (say, life), has it through
participation in a specific primordial cause (life-in-itself) and through it in the Supreme
Life, he does not make it clear how the last category is related to the Divinity. Is it its
attribute, name, theophany, creation or what? In Ibn ‘Arabi> however, one can find a
220
clear answer as to the way Divinity is related through Divine Names and Attributes to
the Fixed entities which then are existentiated into spatio-temporal world. Fixed entities
are the forms of the Divine Names. This also solves the issue of unity versus
multiplicity of primordial causes and fixed entities. If the multiplicity of primordial
causes poses a challenge for Eriugena which he solves by observing that this multiplicity
is not intrinsic to the causes but arises out of their “effects,” Ibn ‘Arabi> is concerned
about showing that the multiplicity of fixed entities does not multiply the Absolute
Being or Divinity but only its “properties.” An important difference here between two
thinkers is that Ibn ‘Arabi> is more welcoming to multiplicity than Eriugena since he
attempts to metaphysically relate it one of the levels of Divinity.
Now whereas in Eriugena’s hierarchy of primordial causes it is Goodness that
takes the pride of priority, Ibn ‘Arabi> assigns this place to Mercy. However, it is worth
noting that the way Eriugena understands Goodness as the highest and foremost
primordial cause is the same as the one in which Ibn ‘Arabi> explicates his notion of
Mercy since both are characterized by “existence-giving.”
Both primordial causes and the fixed entities are infinite. Similar reasons for
their infinity are given by Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>. It amounts for both of them to the
fact that God is infinite so they should also be so. Likewise both primordial causes and
fixed entities give rise to the problem of justifying evil. Although Eriugena and Ibn
‘Arabi> share the belief that evil is not a positive entity but pertains to non-existence,
their solutions are slightly different. Eriugena admits that evil indirectly results from the
primordial causes they do not thereby become evil just as the sun does not become
blameworthy for the darkness that inevitably results from the shadow of its ray. For Ibn
‘Arabi> God cannot be held responsible for evil since evil is something subjective and
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relative to particular desires and creation consists in bestowal of existence upon fixed
entities irrelevant of individual likes and dislikes.
However, on one account fixed entities differ from primordial causes. Whereas
according to Eriugena the latter subsist in the Word, in Ibn ‘Arabi> fixed entities and do
not relate in this manner to what might look like a parallel of the Word/Logos namely
Perfect Man. This is so because there is a fixed entity in Divine Knowledge even of the
Perfect Man.
8.1.48.1.48.1.48.1.4
Having compared the views of Eriugena on the nature of divinity and primordial causes
with similar views in Ibn ‘Arabi> we proceeded to investigate the way they relate the
world to God. Both of them hold that the essential nature of the world consists in
symbolizing or signifying God. Eriugena expresses this idea by saying that the world
participates in the Divine and that it is a theophany or appearance of God while Ibn
‘Arabi> expresses this very idea by saying on the one hand that whatever appears in the
spatio-temporal world has a root in the Divine side and on the other that the world is a
tajalli> of God. Our comparative analysis showed that Eriugena’s concept of participation
resembles Divine roots theory in Ibn ‘Arabi> while his theophany is the exact parallel of
al-tajalli>. Both Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> introduced their concepts, respectively, of
participation and Divine roots in the context of division of totality. However, whereas
all three members of Eriugena’s totality (God, the primordial causes and the world)
relate to each other in the relation of participation, in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s totality (Essence,
Names and Actions/World) a participation like relation exists only between the last two
members for reasons we explained. According to Eriugena’s understanding of the word
“participation” it does not mean “taking of some part” but “derivation from some higher
222
essence” or “being/having after something else.” Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Divine root doctrine is
parallel to the concept of participation in both senses given to the word by Eriugena.
When Ibn ‘Arabi> says that a particular phenomenon is rooted in the Divine Side he
means nothing but that it is ontologically derived from one of the Divine names or
attributes. Once again, his notion of the “levels” of Divine Presence makes his Divine
roots theory more clear and elaborate than that of Eriugena. Thus we discern countless
instances of relating existent entities to Divine roots in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s writings. This
process of “relating” proceeds in either of two directions, from existents to names and
from names to existents. However, in addition to relating these specific existents to
their Divine roots Ibn ‘Arabi> also relates the ten categories to specific Divine qualities
and attributes. It might seem that on the question of ten categories Eriugena and Ibn
‘Arabi> are taking totally different positions since the former denies that they apply to
God while the latter is trying to find Divine roots for them. In spite of providing Divine
roots for the categories Ibn ‘Arabi> expressly rules out their application to God except of
action and affection since, among other things, God hears our prayers and responds to
them. Thus unless one wants to accuse Ibn ‘Arabi> of flatly contradicting himself, one
has to differentiate between finding Divine roots for the categories and their direct
application to Divine Essence. Saying that “God is time” is different from saying that
“God is in Time.” the former implies that there is something about God which is
responsible for the existence of time in the phenomenal world, not necessarily His
Himself being in time which would be a direct application of the category to God. Of
course Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> remain different in view of the fact that the former does
not make room for any ontological connection between God and categories. The
difference we alluded to above in the final orientation of apophasis-cataphasis synthesis
proposed by these two philosophers explains the present difference. Thus, since
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Eriugena remains inclined towards negative theology and Ibn ‘Arabi> towards
affirmative, the former refuses to connect the categories to Divine Reality while the
latter is ready to do that. However, one must not neglect the similar non-Aristotelian
way in which both Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> conceive ousia, the first category, as a
substrate for all the rest.
8.18.18.18.1....5555
The comparison of participation with Divine roots doctrine has revealed the resonances
between Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> on one side of the question about God-World
relationship, that is from the side of the world. When we look at this relation from
God’s side it is analyzable in terms of the concept of “theophany” to which Ibn ‘Arabi>’s
“al-tajalli >” corresponds. These two concepts which are equally central to the
cosmologies of both Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> also deliver same meaning, namely
“manifestation of the Divine.” Both these notions in turn are understandable either
ontologically, i.e. the world is a theophany, or epistemologically, i.e. a mode of knowing
God. However, in Ibn ‘Arabi> this distinction is more clearly discerned than it is in
Eriugena, since the former sometimes gives specific terms to denote two perspectives.
Theophany/tajalli> understood ontologically does not imply collapse of Creature-Creator
boundary and it does not compromise Divine unknowability when understood
epistemologically. Eriugena’s contrasting theophany with knowledge of Divine realities
as they are in themselves and Ibn ‘Arabi>’s principle that there is no tajalli> at the level of
Divine Essence make this point clear.
The way Eriugena understands his notion of theophany is deeply Dionysian and
consequently he elaborates it as form-assuming of the formless, maintains that only the
spiritual elite has access to it and there is an element of illuminationism to it according
224
to which spiritual self-discipline is not sufficient for access to theophany rather God
must will and become manifest. Of these characteristics that of “form-assuming” has its
parallel in Ibn ‘Arabi> identification of tajalli > with “God’s transmutation in forms”
(tah}awwul fi> al-s}uwar) and of the world as “locus of manifestation” (majla>) as a “form”
in which God becomes manifest. Ibn ‘Arabi>’s explication of tajalli> as a mode of knowing
God contains many indications of elitism as it is available to Prophets and saints and not
to people of an exoteric bend of mind. He adds an illuminationist dimension by
describing tajalli> based knowledge as a Divine light bestowed upon some of the chosen
ones.
8.1.68.1.68.1.68.1.6
Coming to the final arena for the comparative analysis of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> we
have to look at the way they envisage Man’s place within the universe and in relation to
his creator. Both present man as Divine image and as containing the whole of universe
within himself. Eriugena relies upon Gregory of Nyssa for elaborating his doctrine of
Divine image. Since Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> share the principle that an image must
resemble its exemplar, they both understand human deiformity to mean that man was
bestowed with the plenitude of all good, while Ibn ‘Arabi> founds on the concept of
human deiformity an ethical system as well. Emphasis upon the Divine names once
again makes Ibn ‘Arabi>’s explication of human deiformity a little more elaborate than
that of Eriugena. Both make it clear that image-exemplar resemblance does not alter the
fact that the image belongs after all to creaturely sphere and on that account there must
be ontological gap between it and its exemplar. On the question whether deiformity
characterizes whole humanity or was it the privilege of primordial perfect man both
Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> take ambiguous positions of saying “yes” to both these
225
questions but this ambiguity can be removed by explaining that the deiformity of the
perfect man is actualized and perfect whereas in the rest of humanity it is imperfect and
needs to be realized to its full. In addition to these similarities between Eriugena and Ibn
‘Arabi> there are some differences between their doctrines of Divine image which must
not be ignored. Being honest to the Christian tradition Eriugena ousts human body from
deiformity and limits it to human soul while Ibn ‘Arabi> is exceptionally positive to
human body in line with general positive Islamic attitude to human body and a special
reference to body in the h}adi>th mentioning creation upon Divine image. Unlike Eriugena
who does not want to call man “microcosm” since that would give the impression that
human dignity is based on man’s containing the world in himself while the world is too
low to dignify human being, Ibn ‘Arabi> extends the Divine image to the whole world,
thus in him we find a macrocosmic deiformity in addition to human deiformity.
Man’s relation to the created nature is explained in terms of containment theory
and the final Eriugenian position on the precise meaning of this concept is, in our
opinion, that everything is created in man in substance however by this he simply means
that in human mind there are notions of everything and he identifies “notions” with
“substance.” On the other hand in view of his concept of cosmic deiformity, Ibn ‘Arabi>
does not hesitate from calling man “small world” and labelling the world as the “great
man.” He explains his version of containment doctrine by referring to his view that
human configuration is the most all-encompassing of all since God taught Adam the
Names all of them, which implies that microcosmic status of man as the created nature
is nothing but manifestation of Divine Names according to Ibn ‘Arabi>. In view of this
all-encompassing status man is an intermediary not only between material and spiritual
226
creatures, as he is seen to be by Eriugena, but he brings together in himself creaturely
qualities as well as Divine qualities.
Thus, except for their divergence on human body’s participation in deiformity,
Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>’s view regarding the relation of man to God and to nature
present remarkable similarities.
8.28.28.28.2 InterpretationInterpretationInterpretationInterpretation
A number of important questions were raised in connection with interpretation or
explanation of certain characteristics of the cosmological doctrines of Eriugena and Ibn
‘Arabi> or differences between them and we attempted to respond to them. Here we are
recapitulating with bit more elaboration three of these.
8.2.18.2.18.2.18.2.1
Dermot Moran and many other Eriugena scholars see in Eriugena a precursor of German
idealists. In our opinion this view oversimplifies Eriugena’s complex positions and
neglects certain important indications of realism in his thought. Likewise Ibn ‘Arabi> has
been classified as a firm empiricist by Mastaka Takeshita. We submit that due to an
important methodological feature they share, these thinkers defy classification into
pigeon holes of the “isms” of modern and post-modern philosophy.
We do not consider the fact that Eriugena subdues ontology to epistemology
enough to make possible his characterization as an Idealist in the sense attached to this
word by Post-Cartesian (modern) western philosophy. First of all the very possibility of
there being an idealism in pre-modern philosophy is controversial and at least,
anachronistic. Secondly, ironically in Eriugena literature one finds scholars declaring
Eriugena to be and not to be an idealist on account of his holding to one and the same
227
notion. Thirdly and most importantly, such characterization neglects certain important
textual evidences from Eriugena where he appears to be implying realism instead of
idealism, for instance, his statement that things which do not have being cannot be
understood. At one place he subdues knowability to existence and at another place gives
an objective explanation for starting the enumeration of primordial causes from
goodness. The fact is that the thought of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>, and for that matter of
many other great pre-modern philosophers and metaphysicians, cannot be justifiably
encapsulated in well defined and mutually exclusive schools that typify modern
philosophy.
8.2.28.2.28.2.28.2.2
One further point where our reading of Eriugena differed from that of Moran was his
claim that the modes of being mentioned in the prologue to DDN are not central to this
work. Contrary to this claim we attempted to show that at various points in the main
body of DDN applications of one or other of those modes of being. We found that
Eriugena’s doctrine of Divine nothingness and ontological status of the primordial
causes can be seen to result from an unfolding, respectively of the first and third mode
of demarcating being from not-being.
8.2.38.2.38.2.38.2.3
It was observed that although both Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> synthesize negative and
affirmative theologies synthesis presented by the former remains negative in the final
analysis while that of the latter tilts towards affirmation. Using Frithjof Schuon’s
typology of religions we explained this difference by referring to the fact that Eriugena,
following the Greek authorities, was re-acting to a tradition that belonged to “God-
become-man” type while Ibn ‘Arabi> had to counterbalance a tradition that contained an
228
emphasis upon “God as such.” In case of Eriugena, our interpretation implied a
disagreement with Willemien Otten who suggests that Eriugena’s concept of theophany
counterbalances his negative theology. If one agrees with Otten’s view then the
difference between orientation of syntheses presented by Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> would
disappear.
8.2.48.2.48.2.48.2.4
What are we to make of the remarkable similarities between the work of Eriugena and
Ibn ‘Arabi>, writers belonging to different times, places and religious backgrounds?
Presumably, the most expected response to the results of our comparative analysis
would consist in uttering that those similarities owe themselves to a shared
philosophical heritage, Neo-Platonism! Though Eriugena’s connection with Neo-
Platonic heritage is incontestable in view of his translations of Maximus the Confessor,
Pseudo Dionysius and other Greek fathers, connections between Ibn ‘Arabi>> and Greek
philosophical heritage are not that transparent and all such judgments are based simply
on the the argument from similarities of terminology to borrowing without establishing
historical connections and discarding a number of important differences between Ibn
‘Arabi> and Plato/Plotinus. Thirdly, Unlike the Muslim Peripetetic philosophers who
were not really interested in grounding the philosophical ideas they were transmitting
into their own tradition, whatever external influences Ibn ‘Arabi> might have accepted,
he was never a passive recipient of foreign doctrines and their transmitter to the coming
generations. Thus we always find him referring to some of the Qur’a>nic verses to ground
his philosophical doctrines and notions. This point can be brought home by borrowing
an image from Ibn ‘Arabi> himself. He gave us the principle that the nature of receptacle
(locus of manifestation) colors the nature of theophany. This cosmological principle can
229
be transplanted to the plane of intellectual interaction between different human
societies. It provides us an excellent model for positively interacting with intellectual
environment while remaining grounding in our own Scripture. However, this does not
mean that every philosophical idea can be legitimized through artificially reading it into
our scripture. We notice that Ibn ‘Arabi>’s interpretations in most of the cases are neither
allegorical nor arbitrary but are within the genuine interpretational space allowed or in
some cases even dictated by the literal meaning of the texts. This is not the case with
Eriugena and this can be seen, for instance, in the way Eriugena grounds his “primordial
causes in the Bible and the way Ibn ‘Arabi> grounds his notion of “fixed entities” in the
Qur’a>n. Whereas the former simply identifies dogmatically and arbitrarily his primordial
causes with “waste and void” mentioned in the Genesis, the latter puts forward his
notion as development of an implication of the Qur’a>nic verse about the treasuries of
everything with God out of which they are brought.
8.38.38.38.3 ImplicationsImplicationsImplicationsImplications
Why should someone living in today’s world care about the teachings of Eriugena and
Ibn ‘Arabi> and the common ground shared by them? Is there anything of relevance to
the situation we are living that we can learn from them? Let us see if we could find a
worthy answer in the conclusions that we drew from our comparative analysis.
8.3.18.3.18.3.18.3.1 Yes and No:Yes and No:Yes and No:Yes and No: A Cosmology of ToleranceA Cosmology of ToleranceA Cosmology of ToleranceA Cosmology of Tolerance272
Ibn ‘Arabi> relates (See Fut. I: 153-4) his encounter with the great Muslim philosopher
Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 1198) when he was just a young boy. The philosopher had
272 “Tolerance or intolerance,” to quote Nasr, “are not only moral issues but have a cosmic dimension.” S.
H. Nasr, “Metaphysical Roots of Tolerance and Intolerance: An Islamic Interpretation,” in Philosophy,
Religion and the Question of Intolerance, ed. Mahdi Amin Razavi and David Ambuel (Albany: SUNY,
1997)
230
already heard of the young mystic and showed great respect towards him. When asked
by Ibn Rushd what kind of solution he had found through illumination and Divine
inspiration and whether that was same as what philosophers receive through speculative
thought, Ibn ‘Arabi> replied, “Yes and no!” In our opinion this combination of negation
and affirmation is the characteristic answer Ibn ‘Arabi> gives to most of the important
questions he treats in his writings. In addition to his combination of similarity and
incomparability, unity and multiplicity, bodily senses and Divine inspiration, this
characteristic of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s thought lurks behind the emphasis he attaches to the
concept of barzakh (intermediary). He is always positing intermediaries between
extremities: the third thing a barzakh between being and not-being, Divine Names
barzakh between Divine Essence and the World, Man as barzakh between God and the
world, imagination a barzakh between bodily senses and the intellect, so on and so forth.
Eriugena also does not give straightforward yes or no answers to most of his central
questions. Thus he tells us, for example, that the primordial causes both flow into their
effects and do not flow into them, that things always were and always were not and that
God is both found and is not found in His theophanies. This, in our opinion is the
greatest methodological insight that we are afforded by Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>. In the
light of latter’s picture of totality it is God as absolute Being that deserves an absolute
“yes” and Absolute non-existence that being absolute evil deserves absolute “no” while
everything in our world lies in between these two poles and consequently is combination
of goodness and imperfection and the only proper response to it is nothing but “yes and
no.”
No arguments need be mustered in order to show what our world is going
through due to prevalence of the “logic of the sword” which slices the world into black
and white and makes certain people declare “either with us or against us” and the
231
millions of people suffer from this tabloid thinking. Hence the greatest practical lesson
to be learnt from Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> is that reality does not consist of pure black
and pure white. It is not only that there is a grey area between the two but something
black lies at the heart of white and something white lies at the heart of the black, as the
Far Eastern symbol of yin and yang marvelously represents. Hence both Eriugena and
Ibn ‘Arabi> teach us to discern a grain of goodness in every single existent, whatever be
its nature. Indeed Ibn ‘Arabi> goes to the extent of finding some value even in absolute
not-being. Likewise for Eriugena Divine gifts and graces flow to all orders of reality
even to the lowest of them.
8.3.28.3.28.3.28.3.2 Green Cosmologies: Green Cosmologies: Green Cosmologies: Green Cosmologies: Restoring Restoring Restoring Restoring Harmony between God, Man and Harmony between God, Man and Harmony between God, Man and Harmony between God, Man and
NatureNatureNatureNature
Amongst the problems our world is facing today there is one which is the most urgent.
This urgency arises from the fact that this problem concerns the very existence of this
world, as has been marvelously shown by former US Vice President Al-Gore’s
documentary An Inconvenient Truth. A few decades have passed since we first realized
this problem. Since that moment many voices have been raised and many attempts to
analyze the causes and suggest solutions have been made. As has been argued in
numerous studies the real nature of the crisis we are facing, and the worst part of which
is to come is intellectual and the first step of solution is therefore intellectual. As Nasr
has argued, the environmental crisis has much deeper causes than mere mishandling of
technology. 273 Modernity detached the world from God and consequently made man the
sole master of the universe whose mandate it was to exploit his slave to the utmost. As
Nasr has put it “The earth is bleeding from wounds inflicted upon it by a humanity no
273
Man and Nature (London: Harper Collins, 1989)
232
longer in harmony with Heaven and therefore in constant strife with the terrestrial
environment.”274 We will have to reassert the proper harmony between God, man and
Nature. Fortunately we do not have to start from ground zero since the traditional
worldview, of all great religions of the world, affords us many keys.
The comparative analysis of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> gave us three keys for
rediscovering a worldview based on harmony between God, man and nature: first, the
world as theophany, second, man as image of God and third, man as containing the
whole world within himself. These three concepts are pillars for establishing the edifice
of a theo-anthropo-cosmic vision. The first key opens the door to “resacralization” of
our desacralized world, the second relates man to God and the third harmonizes him to
the rest of nature in a manner in which harming nature becomes harming oneself, a
suicide! According to Deirdre Carabine Eriugena’s more holistic and perspectival
approach to the whole of created reality which perceives all things as bound together in
an ineffable harmony can be understood to imply the sanctification of all created
things.275 Dierdre Carabine has expressed her belief that Eriugena’s thought could be
appealing today as a further source for a sound Christian environmental ethic.276
Although we agree with Carabine on this point we would like to argue that if Eriugena
can be a foundation for a sound environmental ethic in spite of the fact that he does not
like to apply the title “microcosm” to man since the world is unworthy to become a
cause of dignity for man and that he refuses to extend the imago dei status to human
bodies, then an even more sound environmental ethic can be based on the thought of Ibn
‘Arabi> who not only does not hesitate from calling man a microcosm and extends imago
274
Religion and the Order of Nature, 3. 275 See Dierdre Carabine, John Scottus Eriugena, 109. 276 Ibid. 55.
233
dei to human body but goes to the extent of declaring that the whole cosmos is made
upon Divine image and deserves from man same respect that his parents deserve from
him.
In view of these practical implications we can confidently assert that the
comparison of Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi> we conducted is not mere “exercise in dialectic”
but affords us the key elements of restoring the harmony of God, man and nature, a
restoration that many people now see as the only way to cope with the difficult time our
world is going through.
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