Combat History of theEighth Infantry Division

in World War IIPrepared and Edited by Lieutenant Marc F. Griesbach,

Historian of the Eighth Division

Normandy • Northern France • Rhineland • Central Europe

C O M B AT H I S T O RY

inWORLD WAR II

EIGHTH INFANTRY DIVISIONOf The

PREPARED AND EDITED BY LT. MARC F. GRIESBACH,HISTORIAN OF THE DIVISION

This account was written during the period of combat from official reportsand personal interviews with commanders and men of the Eighth Division.

1944–1945

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH INFANTRY DIVISIONUNITED STATES ARMY

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

To the Officers and Men of the 8th Infantry Division:

The proud record of the 8th Division in battle andservice is unsurpassed.

You won your battles in the recent war by courageany by devotion; by the bravery of the men, and bythe peerless example of the leaders.

With great pride in your accomplishments andwith humility before the heroic self-sacrifice of theofficers and men of this great Division, I subscribemyself.

Yours very respectfully,

Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo.,24 September, 1945

Major General, U.S. Army,Commanding.

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MAJOR GENERAL BRYANT E. MOORECOMMANDING GENERAL

Eight Infantry Division

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INTRODUCTIONThis is the story of the 8th Infantry Division of the American Army in

World War II. It is, however, a story which begins long before the Nazi versionof German militarism struck down the peoples of Europe, before Japaneseimperialism ravaged China and imprisoned the islands of the South Pacific—before the world was thrown into this greatest of all wars.

History records January, 1918 as the activation date of the 8th InfantryDivision.* Camp Fremont, Palo Alto, California, was its first station, and thereit remained in training until September, 1918. Units of organization were the8th, 12th, 13th and 62nd Infantry Regiments, the 2nd and 81st Field ArtilleryRegiments, the 319th Engineer Battalion, 320th Field Signal Battalion andthe 8th Supply Train.

None of the units of what was then the 8th Division saw combat service inWorld War I, for they were still enroute to France when the Armistice wassigned. One of them, the 8th Infantry Regiment, was attached to the Army ofOccupation and served on German soil until August, 1919. The other ele-ments of the Division returned to the United States in January, 1919, andduring the following month the organization was disbanded. In March, 1923,it was reconstituted as an inactive unit, and on July 1, 1940, at Fort Jackson,South Carolina, it was again brought into active service.

That day marks the beginning of the present 8th Infantry Division. MajorGeneral Philip B. Peyton was named its first commander, and from the 8thInfantry Brigade, Fort McPherson, Georgia, came the cadre for a division head-quarters. Original units of the organization were the 13th, 28th and 34th In-fantry Regiments, the 28th and 83rd Field Artillery Regiments, the 12th En-gineer Battalion, 8th Medical Battalion, 8th Reconnaissance Troop, 8th Sig-nal Company, and the Headquarters and Military Police Company. Of these,only the 13th Infantry Regiment had been a member of the 8th Division of1918.

Before relating the story of the 8th as a division, it might be well to go backinto the history of the units which make up the organization. Although theDivision is still comparatively young in American military history, its infantryunits bear traditions of long and meritorious service.

* Available records indicate that there probably were one or more divisions designated as the 8th priorto 1918, but there is no connection between them and the present organization.

C H A P T E R 1

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13th Infantry RegimentJohn Adams was President of the Nation, and George Washington had just

retired to his home in Mount Vernon, when the 13th Regiment of Infantry wasformed on July 16th, 1798. This was in accordance with the first plan for theexpansion of the United States Army after the War of the Independence. The13th was mustered out in January, 1800, but was reconstituted in the first yearof the War of 1812, and took part in a number of engagements during thatconflict.

The 13th first went into action on the Canadian border at Lewiston, NewYork, which fell to the American forces on October 10, 1812. Three days later,Queenstown Heights was also taken by the newly-formed regiment. In com-memoration of its service, the city of Buffalo raised a monument to the 13th atFort Porter, New York. The annals of the Buffalo Historical Society containthe following passage concerning the battle at Queenstown Heights: “Outsideof the casualties of war—the death of the distinguished British General Brock—it had no military significance except the introduction into history of the gal-lant 13th Regiment of U.S. Infantry, so dear to the whole frontier.”

The next engagement in which a unit of the 13th is known to have takenpart was at Black Rock, New York, where a company of the Regiment, afterconsiderable losses, captured a British battery. A few days later, the 13th, bythis time for some obscure reason known as the “Jolly Snorters,” was teamedwith Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Winfield Scott’s artillery. Attackingthe British at Fort George, New York, the Americans forced them back to“Twelve-Mile Creek.”

During the remainder of the war, the 13th was engaged almost constantlyin skirmishes along the northern frontier. Then, on September 11, 1814, camethe final battle of Plattsburg. American General Macomb with 1,500 men anda small naval detachment, defeated a mixed army and navy command com-posed of 15,000 of Wellington’s veterans—and the war was over. In May, 1815,the 13th was consolidated with the 5th Infantry Regiment, and it so no moreactive service until the Mexican War. Although a roster of officers during thatconflict is still in existence, no record is available of the Regiment’s role inbattle.

War Between the StatesReconstituted in May 3, 1861, with General W.T. Sherman as its commander,

and Philip Sheridan as one of its captains, the Regiment’s service from thatday to this is continuous. President Abraham Lincoln had issued a call for75,000 volunteers, and with the assignment of some of these men, the 13thRegiment of United States Infantry was brought to full strength. In October,1862, seven of the eight companies of the Regiment were assigned to GeneralSherman’s command at Memphis, Tennessee. On one occasion when Sherman,then a temporary Brigadier General, was asked his permanent rank, he proudlyreplied, “I am Colonel of the thirteenth Regiment of United States Infantry.”

It was under Sherman a few months later that the 13th saw its first actionin the Civil War. Ulysses S. Grant, commanding the Union forces, had decidedthat the West must be wrested from Confederate control. The Mississippi had

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already been forced, and now it became necessary to reduce the fortress atVicksburg. Grant’s plan was to hold Pemberton, while Sherman, with the 13thRegiment of the United States Infantry, crossed the Black River in rear of theConfederate forces. After much difficulty, Sherman succeeded in landing hisforces near Walnut Hills, Mississippi, on December 22, 1862. A week later,the heavy fire of the 13th assisted the 6th Missouri in crossing ChickasawBayou. The main attack failed, and Grant was driven back; but the 13th washighly commended. It was then withdrawn from this sector and, on January11, 1863, participated in the capture of the Arkansas Post, where it receiveda citation for gallantry.

Beginning with the Battle of Haynes Bluff, on May 1, 1863, the 13th tookpart in a series of engagements in Mississippi which culminated in the assaultat Vicksburg. Then on May 19, 1863, the colors of the 13th Infantry flew brieflyatop the Confederate stronghold at Vicksburg. Seven men carried the colorsthat day, and all seven lost their lives. Grant had greatly underestimated thestrength of the enemy, and the attacked was repulsed with heavy losses.

Though the price they paid was high, the officers and men of the 13th thatday won for the Regiment the motto that it still retains. Their valor so im-pressed General Grant that he directed that the 13th Regiment of United StatesInfantry be permitted to carry on its colors, from that day forward, the legend,“First at Vicksburg.”

Although hard hit by casualties, the 13th fought through the remainder ofthe campaign until July 4 when Vicksburg finally surrendered. There was an-other hard fought battle at Collierville, Mississippi, at which the Regimentearned General Sherman’s commendation. Then on November 23, 1863, the13th took part in the Battle of Missionary Ridge, its last engagement in theWar. Casualties had taken over 60 percent of its strength. Three time the thanksof Congress were bestowed upon former members of the 13th—twice to Gen-eral Sherman, and once to General Sheridan. General Sherman always re-tained his affection for the Regiment, and later, to show his esteem, he ap-pointed it the Headquarters Guard.

Post-Civil-War YearsIn the years immediately following the Civil War, the Government again

reduced the Army. In 1869, only four regiments of infantry—the 12th, 13th,20th and 23rd—remained intact. These were frequently broken up into one ortwo company units and sent to fight Indians or assist in the development of theWest.

There were, however, many colorful episodes during this period. The 13th,on one occasion, was given the mission of quelling the Mormon uprising. WithColonel De Trobriand in command, the Regiment marched into Salt Lake Cityand took over the streets. The Colonel then invited himself to lunch withBrigham Young. He dared the legendary leader of the Mormons, with his thou-sands of Nauvoo warriors, to attack. Brigham Young, seeing the men of the13th at uncomfortably close range, reconsidered. There were no more armedclashes, and the Morman uprising had been crushed.

Next stationed in New Orleans, the Regiment on January 4, 1875, pro-ceeded, under official orders, to arrest the Louisiana State Legislature. Later

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Burning of Siboney, Cuba—July 14, 1898

there came a call for volunteers to take a boatload of medicine and suppliesthrough the yellow fever-infested area between Vicksburg and Memphis. Twolieutenants of the Regiment volunteered; one died.

Companies E, F, and H had the honor of forming part of General Sherman’sfuneral escort in 1892. Company F represented the Regiment at the openingof the World’s Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893. The next year the13th was garrisoned at Fort Niagra, Fort Porter and Governor’s Island in NewYork, and there remained until the Spanish-American War.

War With SpainWhen war broke out with Spain, the 13th was assigned to the 1st Division,

V Corps. The Regiment arrived off Santiago, Cuba, on June 20, 1898, and wasengaged in battle at El Caney shortly thereafter. Advancing unexpectedly towithin 800 yards of the hostile trenches, the Regiment suddenly came underheavy fire from the Spaniards and suffered heavy casualties. It succeeded,however, in driving the Spaniards from El Caney, and then joined in the attackof San Juan Hill.

Next the regiment was given the task of guarding prisoners of war, and inSeptember, 1898, embarked for its home stations in New York. In May, 1899,it was sent to the Philippines. Until October, units of the Regiment were en-gaged in frequent minor forays against the insurrectos in the environs of Ma-nila. Later it was ordered north to San Fabian in the province of Pangarian,where it joined in the drive to cut Aquinaldo’s retreat through this district.

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Although the complete history of the Philippine campaign has never beenwritten, it is known that the 13th took part in the remainder of the action andreceived the thanks of the Commanding General of the Islands.

In July, 1900, the Regiment returned to the United States, where its unitswere sent to various West Coast stations. In May, 1903, Company I was or-dered to Fort Liscum, Alaska. From 1905 to 1907, the Regiment was again inthe Philippines. In October, 1911, after four years garrison duty at FortLeavenworth, Kansas, it made a third trip to the Islands, where it remaineduntil the outbreak of World War I.

Leaving the Philippines in July, 1917, the 13th Infantry returned to Cali-fornia and was immediately sent to Camp Fremont. In January of the followingyear, it became a part of the 8th Infantry Division. As a member of that orga-nization, it did not participate in battle during World War I.

After the war, units of the 13th Infantry were stationed at one time or an-other at Fort Devens, Massachusetts, Boston Harbor Forts, Fort Ethan Allen,Vermont and Fort Adams, Rhode Island. In October, 1939, the Regiment wasordered to the Canal Zone. There, in June, 1940, its personnel, with the ex-ception of the band, was transferred to other organizations. In July, the Regi-ment was reconstituted at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, as a member of thepresent 8th Infantry Division.

28th Infantry RegimentOrganized in 1901 at Vancouver Barracks, Washington, the 28th Infantry

Regiment earned its spurs in the Philippine jungles of Mindanao and added toits laurels during World War I in the forests of Cantigny. Shortly after its orga-nization, the Regiment was sent to the Philippines. For two years it remainedon the Island of Mindanao, building military roads through the dense jungleand suppressing the Moros, savage inhabitants of that land. Raids and am-bushes by these treacherous headhunters were a constant danger. Moros, withtheir bolos, crept up on lone sentries and small groups of soldiers in the black-ness of night, and at dawn the slashed bodies of the victims would be found.Disease followed the men of the 28th from camp to camp of the malaria-in-fested swamp. In spite of the hardships, they continued on their mission.Through Jolo, Pantar and Marahui the road was rushed to completion. TheMoros were conquered, pacified or killed, and the 28th returned to the UnitedStates.

For the next ten years, the Regiment performed ordinary garrison duties.It was stationed for a time at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, and later in Texas.Little information is available of this period. Then, in 1913, there weer seri-ous outbreaks along the Mexican border. President Taft ordered the Regimentto patrol the Rio Grande rover. The city of Vera Cruz was seized by the UnitedStates Navy in April, 1914, and later taken over by the Army. The 28th Infan-try was a member of this expedition. Until November, 1914, it remained in thecity, patrolling the streets and guarding public utilities.

Hardly had the Nation entered World War I before the 28th, as a memberof the 1st Infantry Division in General Pershing’s American ExpeditionaryForce, was on its way to France. On June 28, 1917, the Regiment arrived at

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the port of St. Nazaire, and early the next morning, the men of Company Kbecame the first American combat unit to set foot on European soil.

Immediately the Regiment entrained for the province of Lorraine, where itbegan a program of rigorous training under the famous French “Blue Devils,”the 52nd Battalion of Chasseurs. All through the following winter the 28thwas in training, and when spring came it had been moulded into a rugged,hard-hitting combat team.

CantignyThe Regiment had occupied the trenches before the city of Toul when the

Germans drove a powerful salient between the British and French forces inthe vicinity of Montdidier. To the American 1st Division was given the task ofovercoming this dangerous drive which was aimed at the all-important Chan-nel ports. The first American offensive of the war began near Cantigny on May28, 1918. Fighting was vicious, and the battle lasted three days; but aftercounter-attacking five times, the Germans withdrew.

American forces had gained their objective. No longer was there any doubtin the minds of the British and French as to the fighting ability of the Ameri-cans. Not only was their victory a military success; the psychological effectupon the Allied armies was tremendous. On that day the tide of battle turnedin favor of the Allies. The Regiment was cited for gallantry in action by Mar-shal Petain, and Colonel Hanson Ely, its commander, was rewarded by promo-tion to the rank of Brigadier General. The 28th had already made an importantcontribution to the complete victory that was to come.

SoissonsThere were more victories for the American forces—and the 28th Infantry.

On July 18, 1918, the 28th, despite heavy artillery bombardment and strongresistance, succeeded in cutting the German line of communication in theBattle of Soissons. Despite severe casualties—56 officers and 1,760 enlistedmen—the Regiment’s spirit remained unbroken. After a brief respite, it wentinto action again, taking part, on September 12, in the destruction of the St.Mihiel salient. For three years the Germans had maintained this wedge deepwithin Allied lines. Now, in spite of the enemy’s tenacity, and in the face ofbitter cold and rain, the Americans smashed through.

ArgonneThen came the Battle of the Argonne, a month of steady slugging in the

tangled underbrush and dense thicket against a stubborn enemy. Again theGermans were driven back. There was more bloody fighting before heavilyfortified Sedan; and when the Americans had fought their way into position totake the City, they stepped aside and allowed the French to march in andreclaim the prize when they had lost to the Germans in 1871.

The War had been won, and the 28th Infantry had played no small part inthe victory. To the French, no display of gratitude seemed too great, as theydecorated the members of the Regiment with the Fouragerre. More than 5,00officers and enlisted men of the regiment were war casualties.

After the Armistice was signed, the 28th began its triumphant entry into

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Germany. Marching through the Duchy of Luxembourg, the Regiment crossedthe Rhine on December 13 and entered the American bridgehead area. Thereit kept the “Watch on the Rhine” until the treaty of peace was signed.

Returning to the United States in September, 1919, the 28th paraded inNew York and Washington D.C., and then took up its station in Camp ZacharyTaylor, Kentucky. In 1920, the Regiment was transferred to Fort Dix, NewJersey, and in June, 1922, it was moved to the State of New York. There, onebattalion was stationed at Fort Niagra, another at Fort Ontario. The 1st Battal-ion garrisoned Fort Porter until it reverted to inactive status in 1933.

The 28th remained a member of the 1st Division until October, 1939, whenthe Army was reorganized, and divisions became triangular. During 1939–1940, the Regiment underwent a period of winter training in northern NewYork, testing skis, snowshoes and other equipment for use in cold climates. Inthe summer of 1940, the 1st Battalion was re-activated at Fort Niagra, and theentire Regiment was brought to peace-time strength. It then proceeded to FortJackson, where, on July 1, 1940, it was assigned to the 8th Infantry Division.

“Vincit Amor Patriae”—“Love of Country Shall Conquer” is the motto of the28th. The Regimental emblem is a shield emblazoned with the “Lion of Cantigny.”

121st Infantry RegimentAmong the Confederate forces opposing Union troops during the Civil War,

were a number of colorful units of the Georgia militia. In January, 1891, morethan twenty years after the close of the ear, a number of these small units werecombined to form the 2nd Infantry of the Georgia National Guard. It was thisorganization which, on August 5, 1917, was redesignated the 121st Infantry,and become popularly known as “The Old Gray Bonnet” Regiment.

Unraveling a few of the strings that went into the making of the Old GrayBonnent, we come again to pre-Civil War days. In May, 1810, there was orga-nized in Milledgeville, Georgia, a company of volunteers known as the BaldwinBlues. During the Civil War, this company, as part of the Confederate Army ofNorthern Virginia, participated in the battles of Malvern Hill, Sharpsburg,Spottsylvania and Gettysburg.

In September, 1841, volunteers from Macon, Georgia, organized the FloydRifles, who later fought at Tanner’s Creek, Seven Pines, Malvern Hill andGettysburg. The Barnesville Blues were organized in February, 1861, andserved as part of the Western Army of the Confederacy under Generals Braggand Johnson. It was this company which most probably was engaged in com-bat at one time or another with units of the 13th Infantry, at the Battle ofChickamauga.

Most of these units were disbanded for a time after Appomattox, and reor-ganized a few years later. Other units of the Regiment were formed shortlyafter the close of the Civil War. Among them were the Macon Hussars, TheSouthern Cadets of Macon, the Jackson (Ga.) Rifles and Albany (Ga.) Guards.

On the Rio GrandeThe 2nd Infantry of the Georgia National Guard was mobilized in June,

1915, because of the trouble with Mexico. The Regiment went into training at

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Camp Harris, Georgia, and remained there until October when it entrained forTexas. Arriving at Camp Cotton, Texas, on October 27, the Regiment was as-signed the task of patrolling the border.

Late in March, 1917, the Regiment returned to Camp Harris, Georgia, andbegan training for participation in World War I. In August, it was redesignatedthe 121st Infantry, and was assigned to the newly-formed 30th Infantry Divi-sion. Beginning in January, 1918, the Regiment received frequent calls forinfantry replacements, and by June, nearly every enlisted man who was physi-cally fit had been sent overseas with some other unit. Soon, however, a newdraft again brought the organization up to full strength.

EuropeThe long-awaited orders to sail came at last. The Regiment embarked at

Hoboken, New Jersey, on September 29,1918, and landed at Brest on October18. Colonel J.A. Thomas, the regimental commander, died aboard ship in theFrench harbor. Four days later, at Le Mans, France, the 121st was broken upand its men sent to the front as replacements. There was bitter disappoint-ment among the officers as they saw the Regiment disintegrate. Major Wildertook possession of the Regimental colors, and refused to give them up until hereturned to Atlanta where he presented them to the Governor of Georgia.

The Regiment was reorganized in 1919 as a member of the Georgia Na-tional Guard. For a brief period in 1934, it was called into active service toquell riots in the Georgia textile strike. Finally, on September 16, 1940, the121st Infantry was again inducted into Federal service at Fort Jackson, SouthCarolina, where on November 22, 1941, it replaced the 34th Infantry as amember of the 8th Division.

The Old Gray Bonnet remains to this day the emblem of the 121st, as wellas its Regimental song. “Faciendum Est”—“It Shall Be Done”— is its motto.

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C H A P T E R 28TH DIVISION RE-ACTIVATED

When the 8th Infantry Division was re-activated on July 1, 1940, two regi-ments of field artillery were also reconstituted as active units. One of them,the 28th, was reorganized as a battalion in October of that year, and in thefollowing June, furnished cadres for three more battalions—the 43rd, 45thand 56th. Headquarters Battery of the 28th became Headquarters Battery, 8thDivision Artillery. The other regiment, the 83rd, was similarly divided intobattalions, and then transferred from the Division. Some of its personnel, how-ever, was re-assigned to the remaining artillery units of the 8th Division. Theother elements of the Division, with the exception of the 208th Ordnance Com-pany, were activated at Fort Jackson during July, 1940. The 708th Ordnance(originally designated the 208th) was activated on July 1, 1942.

These are the units which were brought together at Fort Jackson, SouthCarolina, to form the 8th Infantry Division. To recount all the events in thefour years from its Day of Activation to its D-Day, July 4, 1944, would besimply to list the innumerable steps in the training routine of an Americaninfantry division. There are, however, highlights and a number of unusuallyincidents during this long period of training and preparation, and these forman essential part of the history of the 8th.

Beginning in September, 1941, the 8th Division, then under command ofMajor General James P. Marley after a brief period under Brig. General Wm.E. Shedd, and already well through its preliminary stages of training, tookpart in the Carolina Maneuvers. For more than two months, a large proportionof the Nation’s armed forces was engaged in extensive operations throughoutthe Carolinas, and the men of the 8th took a major part in them.

Atlantic Coast Patrol DutyThen came Pearl Harbor. The Japanese had crippled the American Navy,

and with packs of German submarines roaming the Atlantic, there was theconstant threat of an attack against the American mainland. The 8th Divisionwas ordered to patrol the Atlantic coast. For six weeks during the Winter of1942, units of the Division ranged along the eastern shores of the Countryfrom North Carolina to the Florida Keys.

Returning to Fort Jackson late in March, the Division resumed its training.During the following month, by an order of the War Department, it became the8th Motorized Division. The 8th Quartermaster and 208th Ordnance Compa-nies became battalions; the 8th Reconnaissance Troop became a squadron,and the 8th MP platoon, a company. Between March and July, the Division

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furnished cadres of 1280 men each to the 77th and 80th Divisions, and acadre of 200 men for activation of Headquarters Company, XII Corps. On July1, 1942, Brigadier General Paul E. Peabody succeeded Major General Marleyas Division Commander. In September of the last year, there was a motor marchto the area of the Tennessee Maneuvers. Two more months of war games fur-ther hardened the troops of the 8th. Then, after a brief stay in tents at CampForrest, Tennessee, the Division set out for its new station, Fort Leonard Wood,Missouri. From December, 1942, to March, 1943, there was another period ofcomparative calm. Again the Division changed commanders, Major GeneralWilliam C. McMahon assuming the post on January 24, 1943.

In March, 1943, the 8th moved to Camp Laguna, Arizona, for six months ofdesert training. During the latter part of this period, it was de-motorized, re-verting once more to its original status as a standard infantry division. It wasalso during this period of desert training that the 8th Division Band was orga-nized from the 13th and 121st Regimental bands. The band of the 28th Infan-try was transferred to the 65th Division at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.

THE VOYAGEUpon completion of desert training, the Division returned to Camp Forrest.

Preparations were begun immediately for an overseas movement. Late in No-vember, the 8th arrived at the staging area at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey. Then,on December 5, 1943, a convoy, bearing the 8th Infantry Division, sailed fromNew York Harbor.

Ten days later, after crossing uneventful except fro the severe Winter storms,the Division arrived in Belfast, Northern Ireland. Headquarters were estab-lished at Omagh, County Tyrone. The 13th and 28th Regiments were billetedat Ely Lodge and Drumcose estates in Enniskillen, County Fermanagh. The1st Battalion, 121st Infantry, was stationed at Shadow Camp in Fintona, andlater at Bally-Northland in Dungannon, while the remainder of the Regimentwas sent to Ashebrooke-Colebrooke, the property of the prominent NorthernIrish statesman, Sir Basil Brooke. Other elements occupied surrounding terri-tory, spreading out over an area approximately thirty miles square. This pre-sented a difficult problem for supply, training and administrative supervision.

Training in Northern IrelandTraining in Northern Ireland was as varied as the limited terrain permit-

ted. Greatest emphasis was placed on small unit tactics. There was an abun-dance of scouting and patrolling, with one third of all training conducted atnight. A rigorous physical conditioning program was put into effect. Firing ofall kinds was stressed throughout the entire period. Florence Court andCarrickawick combat ranges and the Gorton known distance range were fre-quently used. At St. John’s Point, troops fired on anti-aircraft targets, and atMayar, they were training in the assault of fortified positions.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower visited the Division in April, during one ofhis tours of inspection of Allied troops. The Supreme Commander witnessed anumber of small unit problems by members of the 13th Infantry, firing byDivision Artillery and a regimental review by the 28th Infantry at Enniskillen.Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Third Army Commander, also inspected

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troops of the 8th Division in Northern Ireland. He commented favorably on ademonstration of an attack on a fortified position staged by the 1st Battalion,121st Infantry, on Sleive Beigh range. Later, at Castle-Coole, he addressedthe assembled Division.

Every two weeks during the period in Northern Ireland, the Division sentseventy-five enlisted men and fifteen officers to the British 55th Division andreceived an equal number of United Kingdom troops for a two-week period.This was in accordance with an exchange plan worked out my military au-thorities of both nations. It proved beneficial from a training standpoint, andhelped promote better understanding among Allied soldiers.

Final PreparationAs the time for the invasion of Western Europe drew near, the training

program was expanded to include battalion and regimental combat exercise,command post problems, and the study of German tactics. Elementary am-phibious training was given to all troops. Some units began language classesin French and German. Several weeks before sailing to France, the 121st In-fantry conducted a “dry run” of the embarkation. So secret and realistic wasthe operation, that the discovery that it was only an exercise came as a tre-mendous surprise to officers and men alike.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower joins a group of men of the 28th. Infantry regimentattending a land mine school in Northern Ireland.

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C H A P T E R 3NORMANDY

On July 1, 1944, a convoy of four troop ships and twelve motor transportssteamed out of Belfast Harbor, carrying the 8th Division to the continent ofEurope. On July 4, twenty-eight days after D-Day of the Normandy invasion,the Division began debarking at Omaha Beach on the Cherbourg peninsula.Two days later, it had assembled in the vicinity of Monteburg, where finalpreparations for battle were completed.

Allied invasion armies, at this time, held only a few square miles of theterritory of France. The city of Cherbourg had recently fallen, and the Ger-mans were driven from the northern tip of the peninsula to a point a few hun-dred yards north of La Haye du Puits. From there, the enemy line stretchedwestward through Carentan and St. Lo to Caen and the Orne River estuary.German resistance in most sectors was heavy, even against already achievedair superiority.

The plan for the VIII Corps, to which the 8th Division was assigned, was toattack to the south toward La Haye du Puits. The 8th Division was to passthrough the 82nd Airborne Division, taking over the center of the Corps front.The main effort of the drive was to be made in this sector.

FIRST ATTACKEarly on the morning of July 8, the Division jumped off on its first attack

in the Battle of France. The 28th and 121st Regiments were on line, the 13thin reserve. A last-minute change in the VIII Corps order made it necessary forthe men of the 121st Infantry to make an eight-hour march and go into theattack without rest. The first objective, the Ay River, was strongly defendedby the Germans, and progress was slow. The Division had only advanced 1,000yards, when enemy resistance stiffened. A counter-attack hit the 121st Infan-try, but was repulsed with a night attack by the reserve battalion without lossof ground.

The attack began again the next morning. Again the enemy counter-at-tacked. During the afternoon of the third day the advance tempo quickened.There were indications of local withdrawals by the enemy. Troops of the 8thwere quick to take advantage of this opportunity. Infantry elements isolatedsmall pockets of Germans, by-passed them and forged ahead. Corps Cavalrythen cleaned up the disorganized enemy elements.

During the following three days, however, the enemy continued to resist allattempts to break through his lines. German machine gun fire was heavy, andmortars were accurate. During a break in communications, the 3rd Battalion,

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28th Infantry, advanced approximately 1,000 yards beyond its adjacent units,thereby exposing its flanks. Before contact could be re-established, the en-emy counterattacked in strength and badly mauled Company L. On the morn-ing of July 13, the 28th Infantry was placed in Division reserve. The 13thInfantry passed through that zone of action and went into the attack for thefirst time. Progress was still slow, but on the following day, both assaultingregiments reached the north bank of the Ay River. Here, under instructionsfrom VIII Corps, they held their positions.

Battle-TriedThe 8th Division had been through its first action of World War II. It had

reached its first objective and suffered its first casualties. The territory it hadtaken was slight; the advance had been slow. The lessons learned, however,were many. Commanders and troops had become battle-wise to the enemy’stactics. Hedgerows had become as familiar as the hills of Missouri and North-ern Ireland.

When the Division first went into action, artillery laid down a heavy bar-rage immediately before each day’s attack. Soon it was discovered that thisfire only alerted the enemy. The barrage was omitted, artillery laying downheavier harassing fires until the time of attack, and then continuing its sup-

French residents flock to streets of Sartilly, in Normandy, to welcome 8th Divisiondoughboys moving through in pursuit of fleeing Germans.

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port by neutralizing and knocking out strongpoints uncovered by attackinginfantry. It was also learned that contact between adjacent units was frequentlylost; flanks were exposed; and enemy counterattacks took a heavy toll in menand material.

Casualties throughout the action were heavy, as might be expected amongtroops in combat for the first time. The Assistant Division Commander, Briga-dier General Nelson Walker, was seriously wounded while at the front, duringthe second day of action. He died early the following morning. Maj. James P.Mallory assumed command of the 2nd Bn. 121st Infantry that spearheadedthe attack of that regiment until he was killed in action. Lt. Colonel AugustineD. Dugan, battalion commander of the 121st infantry, though seriouslywounded, refused to be evacuated until the action had ended. On July 11, theDivision Commander, Maj. General William C. McMahon was succeeded byBrig. General Donald A. Stroh. Shortly after this, Colonel John R. Jeter andKenneth B. Anderson succeeded Colonels Albert H. Peyton and Lester A.Webb as regimental commanders of the 121st and 28th Infantry respectively.

During the following eleven days, the Division continued to hold its posi-tion, waiting for the VIII Corps under which would begin a new general offen-sive. Artillery continued to shell enemy positions across the Ay River. Airbombardment leveled numerous German strongpoints. At night, Division Ar-tillery lifted its fire to allow patrols to reconnoiter south of the River and toclear gaps in enemy mine fields. The 709th Tank Battalion and the 644thTank Destroyer Battalion were attached to the Division. Members of the 8thDivision Band became combatants, serving as military police or signal com-pany linesman during the period of fighting.

Each night, shortly after darkness, the enemy sent over lone aircraft, usu-ally reconnaissance planes, which attempted to detect troop movements bydropping flares. Occasionally there were also strafing attacks. Enemy artil-lery continued to harass the troops, and on one occasion it became necessaryto shift the Division command post to avoid the nightly shelling.

THE AY RIVERFinally, after several tentative dates for the offensive had been announced

and subsequently cancelled, the attack was set for 0530, July 26. The line ofthe Ay River, from its mouth to the bridge at Lessay, was so swampy and sostrongly defended that an advance southward by the 79th Division, which heldthis sector, was impossible. The Lessay bridge had been destroyed, and theonly ford crossing the River was so heavily mined and covered by hostile ma-chine gun fire that it could not be used.

Similarly, along the eastern flank of the line, the sector of the 90th Divi-sion, the ground was swampy and strongly held by the Germans. On the entireCorps front, only a segment in the center, approximately two kilometers inwidth, was practicable for an attack. This was the front of the 8th Division.

The VII Corps plan of attack was to have the 8th Division push forward, over-come the strong enemy defenses to the south, and established a bridgehead be-tween the south bank of the Ay River and the Lessay Perier railway. The 79thDivision was to follow the 8th through this gap, fan out to the southwest, and takeout the German defenses along the western sector of the river line from the flank.

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Similarly, the 90th Division was to take advantage of the breakthrough bythe 8th Division, by-pass the German strongpoints to the east, and continue toattack to the southeast. The success of the entire Corp attack depended on theability of the 8th Division to break through the German defenses.

BreakthroughBoth assaulting regiments, the 28th and 121st, jumped off as scheduled.

The enemy established observation post in the tower of a church which af-forded observation of most of the Division sector of advance. Requests for airbombardment of the church were denied. Corps and Division Artillery firedon the tower for two days before it was finally relinquished by the enemy.

The 28th, attacking with the 1st and 2nd Battalions forward, met resis-tance immediately. As it advanced, its front lines became irregular, and it wasnecessary to halt for reorganization. A second attack penetrated the enemy’sdefensive position, and the 28th reached the Lessay-Periers road, makinguntenable the entire enemy position across the Corps front.*

The 121st Infantry reported no resistance initially, but in the afternoon itwas evident that the report was overly optimistic. One battalion had actuallybeen pushed back across the Ay River to the original line of departure. It was

* For their part in this action, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 28th Infantry have been recommendedfor the Presidential Citation. At this writing, recommendation has not yet been acted upon.

French civilians and men of the 8th Division look at the damage caused duringthe liberation of Rennes, France, from German yoke.

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planned that on the following day the 28th Infantry would hold its positionuntil the 121st came abreast. At this time both regiments were to attack again.

The plan was carried out. The 121st, meeting little resistance, came abreastof the 28th at 1400 that afternoon. At 1500, the coordinated attack began, andthe only resistance encountered was light artillery and mortar fire, and heavymine fields. This day was the beginning of the mass retreat of the GermanSeventh Army.

The mission of the 8th Division had been completely accomplished. The79th and 90th Divisions followed through the gap in the enemy lines, fannedout to the west and east respectively, and joined in the pursuit of the fleeingenemy. American Armor drove into the breakthrough area created by the in-fantry elements and began lightning thrusts through Brittany and EasternFrance, which were to sweep beyond Paris to the frontiers of Germany.

PursuitResuming the advance on the morning of July 28th, the 8th Division pro-

ceeded rapidly against light resistance, until it had taken all objectives. Inthe days immediately following, pursuit of the enemy continued. The 4th and6th Armored Divisions had passed through the VIII Corps sector. Closely fol-lowing them, in route column, was the 8th Division. South through Coutances,and Avranches the march continued, until the Division, less Combat Team 13,reached an assembly area southeast of Avranches. The 445th Anti-AircraftArtillery Battalion, attached to the Division, assisted the advance by protect-ing the advancing columns from air attack. Combat Team 13, which had beenmotorized and attached to the 4th Armored Division, was sent ahead to securethe towns of La Jourdaniere and La Mourdraquiere. It rejoined the Division inthe assembly area on August 1st.

During the following days, the Division continued to move southward, clear-ing out small pockets of resistance and securing road nets and vital installa-tions along the route of march. Combat Team 13 was again attached to the 4thArmored Division on August 2nd, and transported south to St. AubinD’Aubigne, eleven miles north of Rennes. By nightfall of August 3rd, the 8thDivision, less Combat Team 13, had reached St. James.

On the morning of August 4th, the Division continued the movement bymotor. Combat Team 13, having reached St. Aubin D’Aubigne, and discover-ing that the enemy had withdrawn from Rennes, passed through that city andoccupied the heights south of it. By 1100, the situation was so favorable thatthe Division Commander ordered the remaining elements of the Division tomove to an assembly area near Betten, slightly northeast of Rennes. By 2200,outposts were set up defending all roads and railroads leading into the city.

Until August 13th, the 8th Division, less the 121st Infantry, which remainednear St. James under VIII Corps control, continued its mission of holding anddefending Rennes. During this period, it maintained road blocks, cleared rubbleand obstacles from the streets, and engaged in extensive patrolling. Althoughsome prisoners were taken, no contact was made with organized enemy forces.On August 8th, the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, was attached to the 6th Ar-mored Division, operating in the direction of Brest.

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121ST TAKES DINARDThe 121st Infantry, under VIII Corps control, was attached, on August 6th, to

the 83rd Infantry Division, and immediately began movement by motor to Dinard.Near Tremereuc, on the following day, it encountered determined resistance. Roadblocks and heavy machine gun fire forced the Regiment to detruck and fight itsway forward. Scarcely was the attack underway when the enemy showed that hewas prepared to offer the most determined resistance. From concrete pillboxes,protected by formidable tank obstacles and numerous minefields and barbed wireentanglements, the Germans fought back. Enemy mortar and machine gun firewas severe, and several tanks were encountered.

On August 9th, the 3rd Battalion was cut off from the Regiment. For threedays it withstood almost incessant artillery bombardment and repeated attemptsby the enemy to annihilate it, suffering many casualties, but throwing the enemyback every time he attacked. Two artillery liaison planes flew over the position,successfully dropping blood plasma, and then collided in mid air, destroying bothplanes and killing all occupants. Late in the afternoon of August 12th, contactwith the “lost Battalion” was regained. The Regiment then drove through the re-maining enemy defenses, occupied Dinard on August 14th, mopped it up on the15th, and reverted again to 8th Division control.

The Division, meanwhile, had moved to an assembly area near Dinan, whereit remained until August 17th. On August 14th, a task force, composed mainlyof the 3rd Battalion, 28th Infantry, moved to the Cap Frehel peninsula, farthereast in Brittany, to take over positions held by French Forces of the Interior,and reduce the enemy. It was joined on August 15th by the remainder of Com-bat Team 28. Before noon of that day, the enemy surrendered. Three hundredprisoners were taken.

On August 17th, the remaining elements of the Division began movementto an assembly area near Brest. There, for three days, operations were con-fined to patrolling. Then, on August 21st, the Division closed into its sectorand awaited orders to attack.

BRESTAt Brest, an estimated 50,000 enemy troops were trapped within an arc

drawn tightly around the city and its port, the second largest in France. TheGerman Commander of the port, Lt. General Hermann Bernhard Ramcke, wasa ruthless soldier who had previously led the German airborne invasion of theIsland of Crete. He was under direct orders from Adolph Hitler to hold out forat least four months, and had already refused two Allied demands for his sur-render. The troops under his command included three German divisions, the266th, 343rd and 2nd Paratroop, and a number of marine units and laborbattalions. The defenses of the old city on the top of the Brittany peninsulawere as formidable a series of strongpoints and obstacles as were encounteredanywhere in France. They were bolstered by numerous heavy coast artilleryguns which had been turned around to fire inland.

The three divisions of the American VIII Corps, the 2nd, 29th and 8th,were assigned to the battle for Brest. Tremendous artillery strength was broughtin to assist in the attack. The Corps plan of attack was to use all three divi-sions to close in on the German defenders from three sides. The 2nd Division

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was to attack from the northeast; the 29th from the northwest; and the 8th wasto make the main effort with a frontal attack from the north.

AttackShortly before midnight on August 24th, elements of the 13th and 28th Regi-

ments, on line for the 8th, began infiltrating toward preliminary objectives fromwhich the attack was to jump off. The offensive began shortly after noon of thefollowing day. Before nightfall, an advance of 1200 yards had been made againstheavy resistance. The next morning, the attack was resumed. In the face of anenemy deeply entrenched and employing intense small arms automatic weapons,mortar and light artillery fire, only slight gains could be achieved.

Enemy resistance increased during the succeeding three days. After slightadvances, the 13th and 28th Infantry Regiments consolidated their gains andstrengthened their positions. They repulsed numerous counterattacks and sentout patrols to the south. On August 26th, Lt. Colonel Edmund Fry, commanderof the 12th Engineer Combat Battalion was captured by the enemy, only toescape by sea and rejoin his battalion on the Crozon peninsula nineteen dayslater. On the morning of August 29th, the enemy in the sector of the 3rd Bat-talion, 28th Infantry, called a truce to evacuate wounded. Previously, two com-panies of the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry, had advanced beyond their adja-cent units, been cut off and captured by the Germans. Following the truce, itwas found that communications with these two companies had been cut. Sev-eral weeks later, after Brest had capitulated, these two companies were freedby men of their own unit from a German prisoner of war enclosure on theCrozon peninsula, south of the harbor of Brest, and returned to their unit.

On August 30th, Brig. General Stroh was promoted to the rank of MajorGeneral. That day and the next, the 8th Division consolidated further smallgains and regrouped. The 121st Infantry, which had been in reserve, wentforward to relieve the 28th. On August 31st, the 8th prepared for a coordi-nated Corps attack which was to include also the 2nd Division. A road in thevicinity of the town of Kergroas was the objective.

Men of the 12th Combat Engineer Battalion complete a Bailey Bridge over a ravinenear Lambezellec, France, on the road to Brest.

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On the following day, when the attack was begun, this objective was quicklyseized. Besides cleaning out strong enemy pockets of resistance in the villag-ers of Kergroas and Kergaclet, this action materially assisted the 2nd Divisionin the capture of the town of Fourneuf.

Lambezellec RidgeThe next day, attacks by the 13th and 121st Infantry Regiments forced the

enemy to withdraw. A serious limitation in artillery ammunition prevented thecarrying out of any large scale offensive action. Because of this, activities forthe next three days were confined to patrolling and holding of occupied posi-tions. On September 8th, with an improvement in the supply of artillery am-munition, the 121st Infantry attacked and seized the eastern end of the stronglydefended Lambzellec ridge. The 121st then advanced toward the town ofLambzellec, and by noon was fighting in the streets. The 13th Infantry ad-vanced abreast to positions from which it supported the attack of the 121st.

On September 10th, having passed through Lambzellec, the 121st was con-fronted with Fort Bouguen. This was a formidable work of thick walls, twentyto thirty feet in height, surrounded by a dry moat, twenty feet deep. Within theDivision zone, the western extremity of those walls rested on the Penfeld River.It was pierced only by one narrow entrance. Once through this wall, it wouldstill be necessary to pass through two tunnels and across two narrow ridges.Moreover, between the river and the inside of the wall was a steep cliff.

Such an obstacle could not be assaulted by infantry without artillery fire orextensive engineer demolitions having first breached the wall. Detailed examina-tion of the plans of the fort and photographs of it indicated that engineer demoli-tions were impracticable. Therefore, on September 11th, heavy artillery fire wasdirected on the wall. This fire failed to make an appreciable breach and the VIIICorps Commander decided to suspend further operations against that portion ofthe inner defenses, and to contain the enemy within Fort Bouguen, while effortswere renewed farther east. He therefore directed that elements of the 2nd InfantryDivision relieve the 8th Division in front of the fort.

Accordingly, on September 12th, the 13th and 121st Infantry Regimentswithdrew to a temporary assembly area near Plouvien. Two days earlier, the28th Infantry, less the 2nd Battalion which remained in Division reserve, hadbeen moved toward Guilorn to relieve elements of the 29th Division, whichhad been making only limited progress in its sector. When the 29th had re-grouped, the 28th Infantry rejoined the other elements of the 8th Division.

CROZONAt this time, the 8th Division was sent to the Crozen peninsula, reportedly

a strongly-held finger of land which would menace the port of Brest even afterit had been taken. On the Crozon peninsula, Tank Force A, under command ofBrig. General Herbert L. Earnest, had been holding the Germans west of aline about fifteen miles from the four tips of the peninsula. The enemy forceshad prepared strong defenses. Crozon was expected to be a tough nut to crack,and when the Division moved into its attack positions on September 14, it hadattached, in addition to its normal attachments, Task Force A. This organiza-tion consisted of the 1st Tank Destroyer Group, the 35th Field Artillery Group,

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the 83rd Armored Field Artillery, and the 15th and 17th Cavalry.West of the line of departure, two main ridges ran parallel to the axis of the

peninsula to a point where it branched into four fingers. A stream ran betweenthe two ridges. The 28th Infantry was given the mission of advancing along thenorth ridge. An air field near Lanvenoc was expected to be stubbornly de-fended. The 121st Infantry was to take the south ridge, passing through thecity of Crozon. The 13th Infantry was in reserve. Task Force A, with a zonedown the center of the valley, was to advance as infantry elements cleared thedominating ridges, and mop up remaining pockets of resistance.

On the morning of September 15th, after a strong barrage by heavy andlight artillery and chemical mortars, the attack began. In the zone of the 28thInfantry, the 3rd Battalion led the attack. By 0930 it was approaching thehamlet of St. Eflez. The 3rd Battalion and the 1st following it were underheavy flanking fire from the south ridge. All officers of Company L becamecasualties. Tech Sergeant Charles E. Ballance reorganized the company andtook command. He was killed by a sniper the next day. In the vicinity of St.Eflez, resistance grew so fierce that it was apparent that the main line of en-emy defenses had been reached.

On the south ridge, Company G, 121st Infantry, led the column of compa-nies in which the battalion attacked. After a short advance, the attacking troopsmet small arms and automatic fire of such intensity that it left no doubt thathere the enemy intended to hold to the last. The ground was flat and open,giving the enemy good observation.

On the night of September 15th, German counterattacks on both ridgeswere repulsed. At 0700 the following morning, the attack was renewed undercover of a dense fog, which was to furnish an effective mask for each morningof the Crozon action. In the 28th Infantry sector, the 1st Battalion was movedup on the right of the 3rd. Although the advance for the day was slight, it

13th Medics—Bronze Star Awards—Normandy.

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penetrated the enemy’s line. Numerous strongpoints had been reduced and150 prisoners taken.

Two enemy documents were secured which had a far reaching effect on thecampaign. Pfc Ervin D. Lammley of the Intelligence Section, 3rd Battalion,recognized at once the importance of a map he found while searching prison-ers. It showed complete gun positions of all enemy artillery on the peninsula.Before daylight, 8th Division Artillery had laid effective fire on these posi-tions. In the opinion of senior officers of the regiment, the resulting loss to theGermans of their artillery was a decisive factor in their swift defeat.

On the evening of the same day, a complete field order, giving the enemyplan for defense of the peninsula, was taken from a captured German officer.With it went the enemy’s confidence and reliance on his defense plan.Strongpoints remained to be broken, but through bypassing them, the Divi-sion advanced at such speed that the Germans never succeeded in reforming aline of resistance. A fort which had been considered formidable fell to the fireof one machine gun. Once having broken the main line, the 121st took objec-tives with a speed that baffled and harried Germans. Before the town of Crozonwas reached, effective enemy resistance had collapsed.

By the afternoon of Sept. 17th, the shaft of the peninsula was in 8th Divi-sion hands. It was time to plan the cleaning out of the branching fingers of thewestern extremity. The ground was dominated by Hill 70, in the zone of ad-vance of Task Force A. The task force had been following up the advance ofthe two regiments, but was hampered by the nature of the terrain and the lackof a road not in its zone. Consequently it had fallen behind. The 3rd Battalion,13th Infantry, was therefore given the mission of securing this key to the lastphase of the Crozon campaign.

On the night of December 17-18, a reinforced platoon of Company L, 13thInfantry, outposted Hill 70 without finding evidence of any Germans. The firstlight of dawn, however, revealed the position of the enemy, who had believed him-self in a secure position. In their bewilderment at finding themselves infiltrated,the Germans became panicky. Sergeant Will R. Wheeler of Company L, in chargeof a combat patrol of little more than a squad, took more than a hundred prisoners,and marched them down the hill to where the main body of Company L was ad-vancing to attack. Before 0900 on the morning of September 18th, the 3rd Battal-ion had occupied the essential hill. The mop-up of the fingers of the peninsulaproceeded as planned. Later that day, Lt. General Erwin Rauch, Commander ofthe Crozon peninsula force of Germans was captured.

Four forces, acting almost as independent combat commands, accomplishedthe final phase of the campaign. Task Force A reduced the Cap du Chevresub-peninsula to the south. The 28th Infantry, driving west, cleared the CamaretPoint. On the north, the 2nd Ranger Battalion, which had been attached to theDivision on September 17th, mopped up the Le fret area, and the 13th tookover the task of smashing through the massive wall and Old Fort guarding thelarge north finger, the Point Des Espagnoles.

These are My CredentialsThe 3rd Battalion, 13th Infantry, attacked after an artillery preparation of

an hour’s duration. The doughboys caught the Germans coming out of their

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Lt. General Herman Bernhard, commander of the German garrison at Brest, isbrought before Major. General D. A. Stroh and members of the 8th Division staffafter his capture on the Crozon peninsula.

shelters and took them captive before they could reach their positions. As theassault companies drove north, the reserve company, Company I, was left toclear out a strip of beach containing pillboxes and coastal guns. A platooncommander, 1st Lieutenant James M. Dunham, leading his men through theseknolls and emplacements, saw Germans waving white flags. A German medi-cal officer announced in perfect English that General Ramcke was in a dugoutbelow, and would like to talk terms with the American Commanding Officer.Ramcke, Commander of the Port of Brest until its surrender a few days previ-ous, was rumored to have fled to the Crozon peninsula.

Brig. General Canham, Assistant Division Commander, and Colonel Rob-ert A. Griffin, 13th Infantry Commander, together with Dunham and Lt. Colo-nel Earl L. Lerette, 3rd Battalion Commander, arrived at the dugout. Theywere escorted down a concrete stairway about seventy-five feet underground,where General Ramcke was waiting.

The Nazi commander addressed General Canham through his interpreter:I am to surrender to you. Let me see your credentials.”

“These are my credentials,” Canham replied, pointing outside to doughboyscrowding the dugout entrance.

Early that evening, a truce was signed, and all German resistance on theCrozon peninsula ceased. In four days of swift advance, the units of the 8thDivision took more than seven thousand prisoners.

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C H A P T E R 4THE SIEGFRIED LINE

While the 8th Division was taking part in the fight to destroy the Germanstrapped on the Brittany peninsula, other Allied forces had exploited the break-through in Normandy to its fullest. Caught within an Allied ring of men andsteel, Von Kluge’s German Seventh Army was all but obliterated by air andartillery bombardment, its scattered remnants sent in headlong flight acrossthe Seine. The British Second Army, thrusting northward to the Dutch border,had trapped the bulk of the German Fifteenth Army along the Channel coast,where it was methodically destroyed by the Canadians.

The American First Army swept into Belgium and Luxembourg, and moppedup the stragglers from the disintegrating enemy units fleeing toward the Germanborder. American Third Army troops drove eastward to the Moselle, leaving a trailof charred enemy armor, weapons and vehicles strewn across France. From thesouth, a new landing by the American Seventh and French First Armies clearedthe Germans from most of southeastern France and developed rapidly into a driveto a junction with the Third Army near the Swiss-German border.

More than three hundred thousand prisoners had been taken in the Alliedonslaught. Most of France, Belgium and Luxembourg, and part of Holland,had been liberated. Allied armies had breached the Siegfried Line, the vauntedGerman border defense, and along a continuous front from The Netherlands toSwitzerland, American, British, French and Canadian forces were poised forthe thrust into Germany to complete the destruction of the Nazi military ma-chine. On this front, the 8th Infantry Division was now to resume its part inthe fight to crush the enemy.

LUXEMBOURGOrdered to the Ninth Army sector of the West Wall, the 8th Division began

the long move from the Crozon peninsula to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourgon September 26th. Foot troops and trucked vehicles made the journey byrail. Motorized elements drove in convoys, arriving near Ettelbruck, Luxem-bourg, on September 30th. The 3rd Battalion, 121st Infantry had been re-tained at Rennes, France, and was assigned to temporary duty with Communi-cations Zone, for the purpose of guarding Allied rail and motor supply routesfrom Cherbourg to Paris.

The front assigned to the 8th Division was a stretch of more than twenty-threemiles along the Our River, which was the German-Luxembourg boundary.

It was divided into three general sectors. In the southern sector, which wasapproximately ten thousand yards wide, troops of the 5th Armored Division

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LUXEMBOURG

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had previously penetrated the Siegfried Line, inflicting heavy losses on theGermans, and then withdrawing to a line generally along the southwest limita-tions of the enemy fortifications. Reasonable activity was expected here, butsince the Germans had regained the ground they had lost, it was believed thatthey would confine their activities to patrolling, and that there would be littledanger of serious offensive action.

In the central sector, approximately thirty thousand yards wide, no Ameri-can offensive action had been undertaken. The Siegfried Line remained intactacross its entire front, and it was anticipated that it would remain quiet, withpatrols of both sides operating rather freely in a “no man’s land.” A long north-south ridge, approximately in the center of the area commanded observationof the German lines and was the logical line of defense.

In the northern sector, a wedge had been driven half way through the Siegfrieddefenses. Because here the German doctrine of defense called for an attempt torecapture the terrain and fortifications lost, heavier enemy action was expected.

In consideration of these factors, it was decided to employ the entire 13thInfantry, reinforced by normal combat team attachments and one company oftank destroyers, along the northern front, and to support this regiment withone battalion of medium artillery.

The 28th Infantry, strongly reinforced by two companies of the 64th Tank De-stroyer Battalion, one light tank company of the 709th Tank Battalion, and the 8thReconnaissance Troop, was assigned to the central sector. An additional battalionof light artillery was to support it. The situation, it was believed, called for a seriesof small outposts, connected by foot and motor patrols, operating also to the east.The bulk of the Regiment could then be centrally located and maintained as amobile reserve in event of an enemy attack. Additional vehicles were attached tothis force for greater mobility, and the terrain was thoroughly reconnoitered formost suitable positions and routes of movement.

The 121st Combat Team, reinforced by one company of tank destroyers, wasassigned to the southern sector. It was planned to use one battalion on line, one inreserve. The bulk of the 709th Tank Battalion was to be held mobile on a goodroad, prepared to move to any portion of the Division front. This plan was lateramended to place one medium tank company in rear of each regimental position,while maintaining the Battalion under Division control. This enabled the tanks tomove more swiftly to any threatened point. Additional Corps artillery was to rein-force the Division front. Wide employment of the roving guns of the Tank Destroy-ers and, if necessary, the Tanks, was planned to give the impression of greaterartillery strength than actually existed.

Provisional Defense BattalionBy October 3rd, this plan had been put into effect. Since the Division was

essentially without a formed reserve, and because the line was so thinly held,it was decided to form a provisional battalion from the administrative units.Organization of this unit was completed on October 8th. Training began thefollowing day, with 1,538 officers and enlisted men available. They were armedfor the most part with rifles, automatic weapons and several anti-tank guns.Eight companies of approximately 200 men each compromised the battalion.Five of these were rifle companies. In addition, there was a reconnaissance

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company, a communication company and a transportation company. Trainingof this unit was continued, for two hours daily, until October 20th, under com-mand of Lt. Colonel Henry B. Kunzig. At that time, it was believed that theunits was sufficiently trained to repel any possible enemy threat to the Divi-sion command post area in Wiltz, Luxembourg.

TreacheryConsiderable enemy activity and construction of several foot bridges across

the Our River, near the towns of Roth and Bethel, led to assumption that pos-sibly the enemy was preparing to cross the Our River in force. Action wastaken at once to reinforce this area. One company of the 709th Tank Battalionwas alerted for possible utilization. Artillery fire and air bombardment wasdirected upon the bridge site. The threat failed to materialize.

The hilly, wooded terrain of Luxembourg afforded the enemy ample oppor-tunity for infiltration, ambushes and the more treacherous methods of Naziwarfare. During daylight on October 7th, a vehicle bearing Lt. ColonelsFrederick J. Bailey, Jr. and John P. Usher of the 28th Infantry, was travellingwell in rear of the front lines when it was flagged down by what appeared to bea U.S. Army captain and sergeant, standing beside a halted American FirstArmy jeep. Pulling alongside, and hearing the “captain” talking wildly inGerman although he wore an American combat jacket and helmet, the 28thInfantry officers opened fire and killed the two men.

An enemy machine gun and at least one rocket launcher opened up from

Major General Donald A. Stroh at his desk at the 8th Division Command Post inWiltz, Luxembourg.

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the edge of the forest. Realizing that they had driven into an ambush, theAmerican officers dismounted and started shooting it out with the Germans.

Lt. Colonel Usher was killed. Bailey continued to fire back until the Ger-mans withdrew. The driver of the 28th Infantry vehicle had disappeared, pre-sumably captured by the enemy.

Photographs of the American-clad Germans were taken, so that this viola-tion of international codes of warfare could be substantiated. The DivisionCommander ordered that in the future no vehicles would go forward of theDivision command post without at least two armed passengers in addition tothe driver. During the hours of darkness, no vehicle was to proceed beyondthose limits without another vehicle following it.

Also during that period, flying bombs, the Nazi “V-1” rocket propelled weapon,began to fall in the 8th Division area. There were numerous reports of these pro-jectiles flying over front line positions. Several of them landed in the regimentalinstallations and near the city of Wiltz, causing some damage, but no loss of life.

Marshall and Eisenhower Visit DivisionAmong the many high military commanders who visited the 8th Division

during this period in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg were General George C.Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, and General Dwight W. Eisenhower,Supreme Allied Commander. General Marshall, who in World War I had servedas an officer with the 28th Infantry, discussed immediate problems of the Di-vision with Major General Stroh and his staff. Later he appeared before a groupof officers and enlisted men of the 8th, explaining to them the broad picture ofworld battlefronts.

While visiting the Division, General Marshall presented the Silver StarMedal with Oak Leaf Cluster to Major Donald R. Ward of the 28th Infantry, for

8th Division men entering one of Clerveaux, Luxembourg’s cages in rest camp.

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courageous exploits on the field of battle.General Eisenhower, accompanied by Lt. General Omar S. Bradley, 12th

Army Group Command, remained withe the Division long enough to pin SilverStar Medals on seven members of the unit, join in a brief discussion withMajor General Stroh, and chat informally with a group of enlisted men.

Changes in Defense PlansFrom time to time during this relatively static period, minor changes in the

Division plan were required. In the broad central sector of the Division front,the 8th Reconnaissance Troop and the Reconnaissance Company of the 644thTank Destroyer Battalion had been, between them, outposting and patrollingan area approximately 12,000 yards wide. This required virtually all person-nel to be on continuous duty. Men were beginning to show the strain of re-peated contact with the enemy. A plan was worked out to rotate the troops.Beginning on October 19th, one platoon at a time was relieved. To accomplishthis, the Reconnaissance Platoon of the 709th Tank Battalion was attached toCombat Team 28, which was responsible for this sector.

On October 20th, the 9th Armored Division, recently assigned to the VIIICorps, closed into the area. Although the newly arrived organization was intendedprimarily as a Corps reserve, its elements, it was believed, could be given valu-able battle indoctrination by attachment to front line divisions in the VIII Corps.For this reason, the 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion and the 89th Reconnais-sance Squadron, less Troops C and D, were attached to the 8th Division.

The 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion was attached to Combat Team 121,where it was assigned to one of the front line battalion sectors. This made itpossible to move one of the battalions of the 121st to the town of Diekirch,where it was held in regimental reserve.

The four troops of the 89th Reconnaissance Squadron were attached toCombat Team 28, and assigned to the northern portion of that sector. Thismade it possible to relieve the 8th Reconnaissance Troop, the ReconnaissanceCompany of the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and elements of the 709thTank Battalion. The 8th Reconnaissance Troop was placed in Division reserve,and the 644th and 709th elements reverted to their respective units. The re-serve battalion of Combat Team 28, no longer needed in the southern sector ofthe front, was moved to the town of Alschoid and held motorized for possibleuse to reinforce the 9th Armored Division.

Elements of the 9th Armored Division remained attached to the 8th Divi-sion until November 9th. At this time, they reverted to their parent unit, andthe original plan for holding the Our River was again put into effect.

RelaxationIn the town of Clerf (or Clerveaux) in Luxembourg, the 8th Division estab-

lished a rest camp to provide relaxation for the battle-weary front line troops.To this pleasant village, which in pre-war years had been a popular touristcenter, each combat unit of the Division was permitted to send a quota of 300men every three days. Soldiers were given clean, comfortable rooms in thetown hotels, provided with adequate recreational opportunities, and grantedfreedom to spend their time as they saw fit.

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C H A P T E R

5THE HURTGEN FOREST

While the 8th Division continued its holding mission on the Luxembourg-German border, a large scale American offensive had developed in the Aachenarea. The Siegfried Line has been breached, and the fortress city of Aachenencircled by powerful First Army pincers, reduced to rubble by air and artil-lery bombardment, and taken in bitter house to house fighting.

Large scale German counterattacks were beaten back, and American strengthrapidly built up for a renewal of the assault upon Germany, Southeast of Aachen,in the V Corps sector, the 28th Infantry Division began a limited objective attackearly in November. The plan for the 28th was to take and hold the towns ofVossenack and Schmidt to the east, and to uncover the enemy defenses near Hurt-gen, in preparation for a general attack in this sector by the VII Corps.

By November 3rd, both Vossenack and Schmidt had been taken, and a line ofdeparture for the attack upon Hurtgen secured. So difficult was the terrain, how-ever, that only foot troops could get through to Schmidt. There was no road be-tween the two captured towns over which armor and anti-tank guns could move.

The enemy reacted promptly and violently, throwing one panzer and twoinfantry divisions into a counter-drive to retake the towns lost. Heavy artilleryshelled the 28th Division positions. German tanks, instead of overrunning theinfantry, who were well dug in, stopped short of the foxholes and fired pointblank at American doughboys.

Still unable to get armored units through to the foot troops, the 28th Divi-sion was forced to withdraw from Schmidt on November 7th. At one time, theGermans also recaptured half of Vossenack, but here their counterattack wasagain driven back.

Hurtgen Forest Area, Germany

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Casualties had crippled the 28th Division, and it was decided by higherauthority that the unit should be withdrawn. The 8th Division was transferredto the V Corps and ordered to relieve the 28th. The latter division took theplace of the 8th as a member of the VIII Corps on the Our River front inLuxembourg.

The ForestOn November 16th, the 13th Infantry and the 8th Reconnaissance Troop

began the motor march of the 8th Division to the V Corps front, and by night-fall, November 19th, all elements of the Division had closed into their posi-tions in the area southeast of Aachen. The 3rd Battalion, 121st Infantry, re-leased from temporary duty in France, had rejoined its parent unit. The 2ndRanger Battalion, 893rd Tank Destroyer Battalion and the firing units of the86th Chemical Battalion were attached to the Division for its new mission.

Orders had already been received from the V Corps Commander, Maj.General L. T. Gerow, to undertake an important offensive. One regiment—the121st, strongly reinforced, was to break out of the Hurtgen forest and seize theHurtgen-Kleinhau ridge, considered by the enemy the key to his defenseswest of Duren and the Cologne plain. That this was the German belief wasevident from the elaborate barriers and the strength in men and guns massedin this area. The terrain west of Hurtgen was heavily wooded, boggy and ir-regular, with numerous gullies and steep cliffs. German engineers had laid

After their truck slipped off the icy highway into a ditch in the Hurtgen ForestArea, Germany, T/5 Melburn Brodbeck, Kinsley, Kansas, and Pvt. MarionButterfield, Livermore, California, both members of the 8th Infantry Division, getbusy and reload equipment which shifted with the accident.

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anti-personnel mine fields across most of the zone of Advance. Heavy wireentanglements blocked possible routes of approach. Enemy automatic weap-ons were well situated to cover all obstacles. Mortars and artillery batterieswere zeroed in upon habitable assembly areas and possible points of penetra-tion and supply routes. Combat Team Wegelein (later Weinen) and other Ger-man elements of the 985th and 1056th Infantry Regiments, all seasoned unitsreinforced with stragglers, were committed to the enemy defense of Hurtgen.

The Division plan was to attack for with the 121st Infantry, through the sectorof the 12th Infantry, 4th Division, on the north flank, and seize the remainingwooded terrain west of Hurtgen. Since the road leading northeast into Hurtgen,and most of the regimental zone of advance were known to be heavily mined andobstructed, the entire 12th Engineer Combat Battalion was attached to the 121stInfantry for this operation. All Division Artillery units, except the 43rd Field Ar-tillery Battalion, were to support the drive of the 121st Infantry.

Combat Command “R” of the 5th Armored Division, consisting principallyof one battalion each of tanks, artillery and armored infantry, a company oftank destroyers, an engineer company and reconnaissance, ordnance and medi-cal elements, was attached to the 121st Infantry. Other organic and inorganicattachments to the 121st included Company A of the 644th Tank DestroyerBattalion and Companies B and C of the 86th Chemical Battalion.

When infantry elements, according to plan, had reached the fringe of theforest, Combat Command “R” was to move forward from the west under coverof darkness, break out of the woods at daylight, and seize Hurtgen and Kleinhauto the northeast. The 121st was then to occupy both towns and the ridge be-tween them.

These operations were to be strongly supported by air and accompanied byattacks by the 4th Division in the VII Corps zone.

HURTGENFOREST

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AttackOn the morning of November 21st, the 121st Infantry opened the drive on

Hurtgen. Attacking with three battalions abreast, the Regiment immediatelyran into strong resistance. Enemy mortar and artillery tree bursts shatteredthe forested area and hailed shrapnel down upon infantry units whenever theyattempted to advance, anti-personnel minefields further increased the peril ofmovement through the dense woods.

Progress was difficult. Only the 3rd Battalion, on the right flank, nearedits objective for the first day. The 1st Battalion, in the center, made only slightadvances, and the 2nd Battalion was held without gain. Casualties, princi-pally from mines and shrapnel, were unusually heavy.

Three times the Regiment renewed the attack the next day. Except for slightgains by the 2nd Battalion, no progress was made. A platoon of light tanks of the709th Tank Battalion was thrust into the attack the following morning. The 78thand 18th Field Artillery Battalions had been attached to Division Artillery, thebulk of which continued to support the attack of the 121st. Each day at H-hour,the 18th fired a concentration of rocket artillery, while the 56th, 28th, 45th and76th placed 105 and 155 mm. barrages on the German positions.

Enemy resistance continued to stiffen. Heavy small arms fire, added to themortar and artillery shelling, anti-personnel mines and mud, increased thehardships of the men, who had been able to get little sleep or rest during thelast four days. Medical aid men, litter-bearers, surgeons and all members ofthe 8th Medical Battalion were called upon to work almost continuously withlittle rest under the most trying conditions.

The Regimental Commander, Colonel John R. Jeter, and the 2nd BattalionCommander, Lt. Colonel James E. Casey, were transferred. Lt. Colonel RobertM. Jones, 1st Battalion Commander, was evacuated as a casualty. The 3rdBattalion had previously lost its commander, Lt. Colonel Gordon M. Eyler, byillness during the unit’s period of temporary duty in France.

Colonel Thomas J. Cross, Division Chief of Staff, took command of the 121stInfantry, and was replaced at his former position by the Division G-5, Lt. ColonelThomas B. Whitted. Lt. Colonel Henry B. Kunzig, formerly executive officer ofthe 28th Infantry, became 2nd Battalion Commander. Major Roy W. Hogan, amember of the 121st Infantry for eighteen years, had taken over the 3rd Battalionwhen Lt. Colonel Eyler became ill, and remained in command of that unit.

Attack ResumedOn November 24th, the attack of the 121st Infantry resumed. Except for

slight gains by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, no progress was possible. The bulkof the 709th Tank Battalion was thrown into the attack, but the infantry ele-ments were still unable to reach the edge of the woods.

Meanwhile, the 12th Infantry and other of the 4th Division, on the leftflank, had progressed eastward sufficiently to be in a position to support the121st. By late afternoon on November 24th, the situation was not yet satisfac-tory for an attack by Combat Command “R.” It was imperative that the edge ofthe woods be gained, so that the road leading into Hurtgen from the southwestcould be cleared of mines and obstacles at least as far as its first bend.

German reinforcements, however, were already arriving in the Hurtgen area,

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and it was necessary that the attack begin without delay. At a conference of Vand VII Corps Commanders, and with the approval of Lt. General Courtney H.Hodges, First Army Commander, it was decided to begin the armored attackon the morning of November 25th. At least three rifle companies were to ad-vance astride the road during the night, so the road could be cleared.

A strong artillery concentration was to support the attack. The 117st Engi-neer Group was directed by V Corps to assemble on two hours notice as divi-sion reserve. Elements of the 4th Division were to support the attack of Com-bat Command “R” from the south.

Since the point where the Hurtgen road emerges from the forest was undercontinuous enemy observation, the Division Commander proposed to use asmoke screen preceding the attack. Since the area was too close to the troopsto allow artillery to place a smoke concentration, it was decided to use smokepots, placed and ignited by hand. Necessary chemical equipment was pro-cured, and during the night, men of the 12th Engineer Combat Battalion placedthe smoke pots. Before dawn, the task was completed, and at 0720, the smokepots were ignited, producing a heavy screen of smoke.

Tanks of Combat Command “R” moved forward through the smoke andattempted to break out of the narrow bottleneck. Four tanks were immediatelydisabled, completely blocking the only route armor could use. The armoredinfantry battalion, attempting to advance astride the Hurtgen road, was thrownback. The attack was smashed before it could get started.

Drive on HurtgenBefore resuming the attack to capture Hurtgen, it was planned to reduce

the remaining enemy pockets in the woods in front of the 1st and 2nd Battal-ions, 121st Infantry. This terrain was taken without opposition before noon ofNovember 26th. During the morning, unconfirmed reports that the enemy had

Camouflaged 8th Division antitank gun emplacement on edge of Hurtgen Forestnear Germeter, Germany

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evacuated Hurtgen were received. Patrols were sent out that afternoon in anattempt to verify the reports. One patrol managed to work its way into thesouthwestern corner of the town, but all others met heavy resistance, indicat-ing that the town was strongly held.

Before nightfall on November 26th, Company F, 121st Infantry, had ad-vanced to a point approximately 300 yards southwest of Hurtgen. Here it wasmet be dense machine gun fire. Company F held its advanced position duringthe night, and resumed the attack with the entire regiment the next morning.

The 1st Battalion, 13th Infantry, joined the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 121st Infantryin the attack at 0700, November 27th. Division Artillery, less the 43rd Field ArtilleryBattalion, again fired prearranged concentrations in support of the infantry units. Com-pany C of the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion was also in close support.

By noon, the 3rd Battalion had broken through the remaining woods west ofHurtgen. The 121st Infantry—and Lt. Colonel Roy Hogan’s 3rd Battalion, in par-ticular—by breaking through these woods had accomplished what three regimentsof other divisions had been unable to do. The 2nd Battalion, with a platoon ofmedium tanks of the 709th Tank Battalion in support, advanced to the southernedge of the town. The 1st Battalion, 13th Infantry, advancing north of Hurtgen,drove through heavy artillery fire on open terrain to the northeast of the town.Here the attack was halted for the day, with the German strongpoint nearly en-circled. During the night, patrols of the 2nd Battalion, 121st, and the 1st Battal-ion, 13th Infantry, went through Hurtgen and again reported it unoccupied.

On the following morning, Companies A and B of the 13th, with CompanyA, 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, quickly seized the Kleinhau-Brandenberg road, east of Hurtgen, and there organized defensive positionsagainst possible counterattack.

While Pvt. Eugene Dougherty, right, of Scranton, Pennsylvania, keeps guard witha light machine gun, Pvt. Charles Barlow, left, Waynesborough, Pennsylvania,works building a log cabin near Hurtgen, Germany.

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When elements of the 121st Infantry, expecting little or no resistance, at-tempted to enter Hurtgen from the west and south, they met strong machinegun fire and were stopped. The regimental commander reorganized and plannedto take the town by storm. At 0800, the 2nd Battalion, 121st, and Company C,13th Infantry, closely supported by Company A of the 709th Tank Battalion,fought their way into Hurtgen from the northeast. The 1st Battalion closed infrom the southwest. Doughboys rode the tanks, followed by tank destroyers.They blasted the town building by building, then dug the Germans out of cel-lars and ruins in fierce hand to hand fighting.

Capture of HurtgenHurtgen fell late that afternoon. Three hundred-fifty prisoners were taken,

and the remainder of the German garrison destroyed. Bodies of the dead, bothGerman and American, were strewn along the streets.

While in Hurtgen itself, the enemy defended strongly until the town hadbeen completely taken, the Germans were evidently surprised by the rapidadvance upon the Kleinhau-Brandenberg road, to the east. Resistance waslight. The expected counterattack came late in the afternoon, and was repulsedwith heavy casualties to the enemy. The 3rd Battalion, 121st Infantry com-pleted mopping up the edge of the woods southeast of Hurtgen, and outpostedthe commanding terrain.

Combat Command “R” was alerted upon capture of Hurtgen and orderedto move through the town and be prepared, by daylight, to attack and seizeKleinhau and the high ground northeast of it. The 121st Infantry and the 3rdBattalion, 28th Infantry, on its right flank, were to continue the attack southand east of Hurtgen, in preparation for an advance upon Brandenberg. The 1stBattalion, 13th Infantry, was to relieve Combat Command “R” in Kleinhau assoon as the town had been taken.

A 121st Infantry jeep passes through a flooded street in Hurtgen, Germany, shortlyafter the town fell to the 8th Division.

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KleinhauThe attack on Kleinhau began at 0700, November 29th, and by late after-

noon, Combat Command “R” reported it taken. The enemy defended stub-bornly, holding out in cellars and wooded areas even after armored forces haddriven through the town. During the night, the 1st Battalion, 13th Infantry,took over the captured town and the high ground. On the following day, men ofthe 13th cleared out remaining enemy pockets. Company B, 121st Infantry,and elements of the 709th Tank Battalion and 644th Tank Destroyer Battalionrelieved the 13th Infantry unit the next day, and prepared to defend the townwhile the attack was resumed further south.

During the day and the next, elements of the 121st and 28th continued topush southeast. On November 30th, patrols were sent out by both regiments todetermine enemy strength around Brandenburg. Resistance was encounteredalmost immediately, and orders were issued to hold present positions untilplans for a full scale attack were completed.

Throughout this period, remaining elements of the 28th and 13th conductedextensive patrolling, while maintaining defensive positions. Several pockets ofenemy were cleared. Germans in one group between the 121st and 28th Infantrypositions, particularly, showed little will to fight, after night-long shelling by Divi-sion Artillery. Ninety-five prisoners were taken in this area on November 28th.

Strong Artillery SupportDivision Artillery, with its attachments, supported each phase of the attack.

The 56th Field Artillery Battalion fired on call missions for the 121st Infantrywhile the 43rd placed harassing fires in front of 13th Infantry positions. Remain-ing Artillery elements, including the 28th and 45th Field Artillery Battalions ofthe Division, and elements of the 18th, 76th and 987th Battalions of Corps Artil-lery, supported the Division with prearranged concentrations. Units of the 644thTank Destroyers and the assault platoon of the 709th Tank Battalion were fre-quently used as indirect fire weapons. Rocket artillery concentrations of the 18th

Blasted buildings in Hurtgen, Germany, testify to fury of 8th Division attack thatrouted Nazis from the town after a 15-day siege.

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Field Artillery Battalion and 155 mm. fire of the self-propelled guns of the 987thwere used to blast the towns of Kleinhau and Brandenburg.

Dense forests and hilly terrain made difficult the effective employment ofartillery. Good positions were too far to the rear; consequently, guns could notfire deep enough into hostile enemy territory. Continuous rain and mud inter-fered with communications and ammunition supply. In spite of these limita-tions, demands on artillery batteries were heavier than during any previousperiod of combat.

Demands upon the men of the 12th Engineer Combat Battalion were alsounusually heavy. Throughout this period, the engineers cleared minefields,road blocks and other obstacles, and made extensive repairs on the road net inthe Division area. Personnel of the 8th Signal Company encountered serioushazards, maintaining wire communications under heavy artillery shelling andover routes, thick with anti-personnel mines. The 708th Ordnance Companywas called upon to perform unusually heavy work to keep vehicles and equip-ment in condition under extremely difficult circumstances.

Attack ResumedPlans for continuation of the 8th Di-

vision offensive were embodied in FieldOrder 19, issued November 30th. SinceKleinhau and the high ground northeastof it was strategically important to theadvance, not only of the 8th Division,but also the adjacent VII Corps, it wasto be held in strength. The 121st Infan-try, with the 1st Battalion, 13th Infan-try, was ordered to continue to attackeastward, driving the enemy from thewoods east of the Kleinhau-Brandenbergroad. Elements of the 28th Infantry wereto drive southeast from Hurtgen towardBrandenberg. Combat Command “R”was to remain in Kleinhau, prepared toseize Brandenberg as soon as the roadhad been swept of mines and the adjoin-ing woods cleared of the enemy.

Attacking as ordered at 0730, Decem-ber 1st, elements of the 121st and 13thInfantry Regiments partially succeeded ingaining their objectives. The flanking ac-tion of the 1st Battalion, 13th Infantry, took

the enemy by surprise, and resistance was scant. By 1530, that unit had clearedthe enemy from the woods in its sector, southeast of Kleinhau. The 2nd and 3rdBattalions of the 121st, encountering heavy small arms fire from concrete bun-kers, made only slight advances. The 1st Battalion held Kleinhau and the sur-rounding high ground without difficulty.

The 28th Infantry, although meeting heavy resistance, made noteworthy

Brig. General William G. Weaver tookcommand of the 8th Division in theHurtgen Forest in Germany.

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progress during the day. The 3rd Battalion reached the Kleinhau-Brandenbergroad quickly, and continued to fight for the woods east of it. The 1st Battalionadvanced to the northeast end of Vossenack, clearing the enemy from remain-ing houses. Here, the Battalion was held by heavy small arms, mortar andartillery fire. The 2nd Battalion, attempting to advance to the southeast, wasstopped by an enemy strongpoint after gaining only a few hundred yards.

During the day, Colonel Numa A. Watson took command of the 13th Infan-try. Lt. Colonel Lerette reverted to his former position as Regimental Execu-tive Officer. Colonel Robert A. Griffin, former commander of the 13th, hadbeen evacuated previously.

On the following day, the attack was resumed. Strong enemy counterat-tacks near Grosshau and a setback inflicted upon Combat Command “A”, bothin the 4th Division zone, directly north of Kleinhau, forced that Division to goon the defensive. Consequently, the 8th Division flank defenses on the northhad to be strengthened sufficiently to withstand any attack which the enemymight make on this area. For this reason, elements of the 1st Battalion, 121stInfantry, were ordered to take over the remaining portion of the commandingterrain northeast of Kleinhau. This ground had been held previously by the46th Armored Infantry Battalion of Combat Command “R.” Company B of the121st was later sent to Hurtgen as a reserve.

During that day, the 2nd Battalion, 121st Infantry, advanced the remainingdistance to its objectives in the wooded area east of the Kleinhau-Brandenbergroad. The 3rd Battalion was stopped after moving forward only 150 yards.Slight gains were made by the 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, while the 2nd Bat-talion, attempting to reduce the strongpoint uncovered the previous day, failedto gain. The 3rd Battalion, already on its objective, consolidated its positionsand prepared to attack in conjunction with the 1st Battalion when that unit

In the town of Kleinhau, Germany, advancing tanks of the 709th Tank Battaliontake shelter behind buildings that they have already damaged by their shellfire.

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had come abreast.Combat Command “R” began moving down the Kleinhau-Brandenberg road

at 0730, but was stopped midway between the two towns by anti-tank guns,mines and artillery. Orders were issued to clear the road of mines under coverof darkness and complete the taking of Brandenberg the following day.

At this time, the Division front was an arc, curving to the southeast andextending nearly fourteen miles. Since the only reserve available was the in-fantry company and platoon tanks in Hurtgen, it was decided to dispatch trucksto the alerted 2nd Ranger Battalion, which could be committed in an emer-gency. The 117st Engineer Combat Battalion was also alerted for possible com-bat use on two hours notice.

Prisoner of war reports at this time indicated that the enemy was makingno preparations to booby-trap Brandenberg. Engineer units in the area, whichhad been intended for use in laying additional minefields, had been commit-ted as infantry. Other reports, however, indicated that wooden fortificationswere being constructed and buildings in Brandenberg prepared as strongpointsby enemy engineers.

Military GovernmentThe Division Military Government section operated offices at Rott, Roetgen

and Mulartshutte, in Germany. Buergermeisters had been appointed by pre-ceding units. Proclamations, ordinances and notices had been issued, cover-ing circulation, curfew and war crimes. Abrogation of Nazi law and dissolu-tion of the Nazi party had been proclaimed. Military Government authoritiesof the Division organized fire fighting units in each town. Rationing systems

Disregarding the body of a dead German, a 121st Infantrymen advances nearHurtgen, Germany.

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were augmented by an arrangement for the exchange of butter from Mulartshuttefor bread from Zweifall. Groups of civilians were organized under MilitaryPolice guard, to dig potatoes and chop wood in nearby forests. Of the civilianson the First Army blacklist, all had fled, except one man who had previouslybeen arrested. The remainder of the population was cooperative.

Maj. General Donald A. Stroh had left the 8th Division on November 29th toreturn to the United States. He was succeeded as commander by Brig. GeneralWilliam G. Weaver, former assistant commander of the 90th Infantry Division.

Brandenberg FallsResuming the attack the next morning, Combat Command “R”, before noon

had seized Brandenberg, taken approximately 300 prisoners and inflicted heavycasualties on the enemy. The German defense was found badly disorganizedafter nightlong shelling by Division Artillery. Capt. Clarence K. Hollingsworth’s3rd Battalion, the 28th Infantry quickly seized the remaining wooded terrainwest of Brandenberg, and prepared to relieve Combat Command “R” in thetown. An enemy counterattack was repulsed during the afternoon. Other ele-ments of the 28th and 121st Infantry Regiments continued to attack to the

Pfc. Lawrence B. Mihalic, 2652 Broadway, Lorain, Ohio, and Pfc. James Peterson, 20Tennent Ave., Englishtown, New Jersey, 13th Infantry men, gather materials to maketheir snow-covered dugout in the Hurtgen Forest in Germany more comfortable.

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southeast and east, making only slight advances against heavy resistance.Considerable hostile air activity occurred in the Division sector during

that afternoon. Enemy planes, taking advantage of weather which groundedAllied fighters, strafed front line positions and the Division command posts atRott and Roetgen, with little Success. Of sixty planes over the V and VIICorps front that day, eighteen were reported shot down, twelve of them by the445th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, attached to the 8th Division.

North of Kleinhau, elements of the 5th Armored and 4th Infantry Divisions,which had been in action for a considerable time, were relieved by the 83rd Divi-sion, thereby lessening concern regarding this key terrain. On December 4th, the121st and 28th Infantry Regiments were to continue their attack southeast. Com-bat Command “R” was directed to go forward, upon orders of the 8th Divisioncommand, to Bergstein, southeast of Brandenberg, and probe the ground 1,000yards east of the town. The 3rd Battalion, 28th Infantry, was to be prepared toassist Combat Command “R” in capturing this terrain.

Elimination of the remaining enemy pockets in front of the 28th and 121stInfantry elements was to be accomplished, if possible, by December 5th. Thiswould materially shorten the Division lines, since it was planned merely toblock the line of the V Corps boundary, extending from the high ground north-east of Kleinhau, southeast to the Roer River. The remaining terrain west ofthe Roer and northwest of the Kall, its tributary, could then be cleared of theenemy, making possible an advance farther southeast.

Although reinforced be elements of Combat Command “R” and the 709thTank Battalion, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 28th Infantry, were able to makeonly slight advances on December 4th. Heavy machine gun fire from enemystrongpoints, which consisted of mutually supporting, dug-in, logged emplace-ments, manned by eight to ten men, continued to impede the advance south-east of Vossenack. Mortar fire fell almost continually in this area, and smallquantities of white phosphorus artillery were used by the enemy.

Southeast of Kleinhau, satisfactory progress was made by the 1st Battal-ion, 13th Infantry. Farther south, in the 121st Infantry sector, the 2nd Battal-ion was still unable to advance. The 3rd Battalion gained its objectives beforenightfall, reorganized, and consolidated its positions against possible coun-terattacks. On the following day, the 3rd Battalion relieved the 1st of its hold-ing mission in Hurtgen and the Kleinhau area.

Bergstein TakenCombat Command “R”, aided by air action, drove southeast from Brandenberg

at 1400, December 5th, and captured the larger part of Bergstein. The armoredunit blocked the roads leading into the town from the southwest and southeast,and prepared to hold its position during the night. Attacking in conjunction withCombat Command “R”, the 1st Battalion, 121st, on the left, and the 3rd Battalion,28th, also advanced toward Bergstein. During the night, the 3rd Battalion of the28th covered by fire the bald ridge extending southwest of the town. Later, Com-pany K was sent forward to occupy the northeastern end of the ridge, protectingthe right flank of Combat Command “R”, and maintaining contact with the ar-mored unit at the edge of Bergstein. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 121st Infantry,was directed to continue its attack toward the high noses adjoining the Roer River,

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at the same time maintaining contact with Combat Command “R”.These positions having been secured, preparations were made for all-around

defense. Division Artillery was directed to furnish close-in protective fires,paying particular attention to the gap between the 1st Battalion, 121st, andCombat Command “R” in Bergstein, and to the enemy pocket still holding outin front of the 2nd Battalion, 28th, southeast of Vossenack. All units wereordered to continue the attack to seize the remaining objectives on the morn-ing of December 6th.

Presidential CitationAt 0730 the following morning, the first of three enemy counterattacks during

the day hit the 3rd Battalion of the 28th Infantry and Combat Command “R” inBergstein. The attack came first from the south, then from the southwest, thenfrom the southeast. Approximately 300 infantrymen, of Companies 1, 2 and 4 ofthe 980th German Infantry Regiment, made the attack. They were supported by atleast five self-propelled guns. Riflemen of Company K and machine gunners ofCompany M held their fire while swarms of enemy crept toward them across 300yards of open ground to within twenty-five yards of 3rd Battalion positions. Theburst of fire which hit the Germans on all sides at that moment threw them into apanic, and they started to retreat across the open ground. Artillery fire caughtthem in the open without cover, and all the way down the Battalion line the Ger-mans were beaten back and cut down. For this courageous stand and for theiroutstanding work in the Hurtgen Forest during the five preceding days, the menand officers of Captain Hollingworth’s 3rd Battalion, 28th Infantry, were awardedthe Distinguished Unit Badge, a Presidential Citation.

Shortly before noon, the enemy hurled another counterattack againstBergstein. The attacking troops were survivors of the earlier attempts to re-take the town, supplemented by another company of the German 980th Infan-try, and again supported by armored vehicles. This attack was repulsed aftertwenty minutes, without loss of terrain. At 1400, another small group of en-emy infantrymen moved against Bergstein from the northwest, and was re-pelled. Meanwhile, the enemy continued to shell the town with artillery andmortars. Most of the fire came from the Schmidt area, to the west, and from theeast side of the Roer River. Since Berstein was the most active point of thepresent Division front, the 2nd Ranger Battalion was directed to proceed tothis area, to be committed if it became necessary.

During the day, the 3rd Battalion, 28th Infantry, had secured the rightflank of Combat Command “R”, taking the enemy by surprise, and seizing thesouthern slope of the ridge southwest of Bergstein. Here it was ordered to holdduring the night. The 2nd Battalion of the 28th, despite continuous artillerysupport, was still unable to clear the pocket of Germans blocking its advancesoutheast of Vossenack. The 1st Battalion, 121st Infantry, using different tac-tics, attacked to the southeast at 2130 during the night, and advanced ap-proximately 300 yards. Remaining elements of the Division continued to holdand to strengthen their positions.

At 0330 on the morning of December 7th, 2nd Ranger Battalion attackedthrough Combat Command “R”, and seized the remainder of the ridge south-west of Bergstein. A strong counterattack, flung at the newly-won positions

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later that morning, was repelled by the Rangers. In Bergstein, enemy artilleryand mortar fire continued heavy. The enemy kept up his futile counterattackson the high ground east of the town.

Units of the 28th and 121st Infantry Regiments made limited gains during theday against the remaining enemy pockets in the area. The 1st Battalion of the 13thwas relieved from attachment to the 121st. Its positions, southeast of Kleinhau,were taken over by elements of the 12th Engineer Combat Battalion.

On the DefensiveSince most of the Division objectives had been taken, orders were issued

to make the best possible defensive use of terrain, weapons, mines, booby-traps and other obstacles, and to hold the line with as few men as possible.This would enable each regiment to keep one battalion in reserve.

Heavy shelling and counterattacks against Bergstein and the surroundingterritory continued through the following days. On December 8th, the 3rd Bat-talion, 13th Infantry, was directed to relieve elements of the 121st Infantryand the 2nd Ranger Battalion, both of which had suffered heavy casualties,and to assist the 3rd Battalion, 28th Infantry, in the defense of Bergstein.Meanwhile, the wooded area northeast of the town were to be searched forremaining enemy stragglers.

On December 8th, the 2nd Battalion, 28th Infantry, began making progressagainst the troublesome enemy pocket southeast of Vossenack. This strongpoint,it was learned, was being defended by enemy engineers, fighting as infantry.Prisoners of war explained the bitterness of the fight by stating that Germanofficers considered this a breakthrough point for a possible attack by Ameri-can armor upon Schmidt. They compelled their men to hold out, and installedminefields behind them to prevent their withdrawal. On November 9th, how-ever, a three hundred yard advance was made against the fanatically defendedpocket, and on the following day, it was wiped out by the 28th Infantry.

Elements of the 13th Infantry were relieved by Combat Team 311 of the 78thDivision, on the same day. The 78th, a newly-arrived unit, was sent into the FirstArmy line on the 8th Division right flank. The 2nd Battalion, 13th Infantry, thenrelieved the 3rd Battalion in Bergstein. On the following day, Colonel Watson,Regimental Commander of the 13th, took over the Bergstein defense. Additionalmines were laid and obstacles erected on the approaches to Bergstein, since pris-oner of war reports indicated that the Germans would try to retake the town at allcost. Nazi Field Marshall von Model, it was learned, had promised the Knight’sCross and additional rewards to the enemy unit to recapture the key town.

Elsewhere in the Division area, units continued to hold, while awaitingorders for new offensive action. Enemy patrols which had infiltrated into thearea northeast of Bergstein during the night of December 11th were quicklyrounded up the following day by Companies 1 of the 13th and L of the 28thInfantry. The 8th Reconnaissance Troop, whose positions on the right flank ofthe Division line had been taken over by 311th Infantry units, was directed topatrol the exposed north flank of the 121st Infantry southeast of Kleinhau.

On December 13th, units of the 8th Division continued to hold their posi-tions, while the remainder of the V Corps opened a new offensive. To drawopposing forces away from the 78th Division, attacking on the 8th Division

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right flank, the 1st Battalion of the 311th Infantry, now attached to the 8thDivision, was directed to make a limited objective attack against enemy-heldhigh ground north of the Kall River.

Companies A and B of the 311th attacked at 0630, quickly knocking outtwo enemy pillboxes and seizing the designated terrain. Having accomplishedthis objective of confusing the Germans, the attack was halted, and the newly-won positions organized for defense. The 78th Division’s main attack then gotunderway and made good progress.

In the 8th Division Sector, the period, December 13–17, was relativelyquiet. The 12th Engineer Combat Battalion continued to assist the infantryunits in improving defenses by laying anti-tank and anti-personnel minefieldsand constructing other obstacles. Enemy artillery was heavy, especially in theBergstein, Hurten and Vossenack areas. German patrols attempted repeatedlyto operate in the Division zone. On December 16th, three strong enemy com-bat patrols were driven off in the Bergstein-Vossenack area.

A small scale attack by Company K of the 311th Infantry, on December15th, apparently took the enemy by surprise, and quickly regained groundlost previously to an enemy counterattack. Newly organized German units hadmoved into the line north of Kommerscheidt. Everywhere, along his front op-posite the 8th Division, the enemy continued to improve his defenses.

ARDENNES BREAKTHROUGHDuring the night, December 16–17, German troops transports flew over

the Division zone and dropped between 300 and 500 paratroops in rear andadjacent areas. On the preceding day, a violent enemy counteroffensive hadcrashed through thinly held First Army lines on a fort-five mile front fromMonschau, Germany, to central Luxembourg. With American positions southof the Division over-run, and supply and communication lines periled by theswift enemy advance, it became necessary to concentrate on all-around de-fense and to postpone all plans for continuing the drive into Germany.

Units of the 8th Division were alerted, and special counterattack planswere drawn up to forestall possible German attempts to penetrate or encirclethis sector. Numerous patrols were sent out to determine whether the enemywas moving fresh troops into the area opposite this Division. The 1st Battal-ion, 13th Infantry, and the 3rd Battalion, 121st, were placed on one-hour alertfor possible use as V Corps reserves. At 0400, December 17th, the 3rd Battal-ion, 121st Infantry, moved to Roetgen, Germany, where it was attached to Com-bat Command “R” of the 5th Armored Division.

Other elements of the Division continued to improve their defensive posi-tions. Provisional organizations, both regimental and divisional, were alerted.Military Government units, assisted by Division military police and recon-naissance elements of the 644th and 817th Tank Destroyer Battalions, searchedcivilian homes and other possible hiding places for German parachutists. Sup-ply and rear installations were directed to reconnoiter locations farther northin case it became necessary to evacuate present areas.

On December 18th, the 8th Division was attached to the VII Corps, anddirected to hold all ground previously gained, as well as assisting other VIICorps units by fire and reinforcements, if called upon.

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I N T H E H U R T

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G E N F O R E S T

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The German offensive continued with increasing fury, digging deeper intoBelgium and Luxembourg. The enemy, it became apparent, had thrown his besttroops, well equipped and strongly supported by armor and airpower, into an all-out attempt to break the Allied drive into the Rhine, by cutting supply and com-munication lines. He was gambling for big stakes in men and supplies.

Hostile aircraft continued to harass units of the 8th Division, droppingflares and bombs, and strafing front lines. Increasing activity of enemy troopsand vehicles opposite the Division sector required constant watchfulness.

Limited OffensiveOn the northeast flank of the Division, Germans still held a strongly forti-

fied, well-garrisoned wedge of land west of the Roer. To shorten the frontage ofunits holding this river line, it was decided by the VII Corps Commander thatthis pocket should be cleaned out. The attack was begun December 20th byelements of the 5th Armored, 83rd Infantry Division and 4th Cavalry Group.The 121st Infantry and 8th Division Artillery supported the attack by fire.

Along the 8th Division front, the holding mission was to continue until theenemy salient in the south had been wiped out. Division boundaries were ex-tended gradually to include the 311th Infantry sector. That unit then revertedto its parent organization, the 78th Division. Meanwhile, German prisoners ofwar captured in the sector opposite the 8th Division stated that their missionwas to hold until this portion of the front had been outflanked by the southernsalient. Then they were to join in a drive to retake Aachen.

On December 21st, elements of the 121st Infantry were directed by VIICorps to take over the mission of the 4th Cavalry Group in the reduction of theremaining enemy pocket west of the Roer at Obermaubach. The Division frontwas already so wide that lines, especially in the 121st infantry sector, werethinly held. This new offensive mission made it necessary to alert the 12thEngineer Combat Battalion for use as front line infantry troops.

The 1st Battalion of the 121st relieved elements of the 4th Cavalry Group,west of the Roer River town of Obermaubach, that night. One platoon of lighttanks of Company D, 709th Tank Battalion, was attached to the infantry unit.

Enemy observers on the east bank of the Roer had full observation of anyaction taking place on the open ground southwest of the town. For this reason,Colonel Cross, 121st Infantry Commander, decided to attack from the north-west. Intelligence reports indicated that there were still approximately 500German troops in this area. Among them, were elements of the 6th Paratroopas well as the 942nd and 943rd Infantry Regiments. East of the Roer, theenemy was known to have strong artillery and mortar elements.

DRIVE ON OBERMAUBACHAttacking at 1100, December 22nd, the infantry elements advanced quickly

to the edge of Obermaubach. At the town, heavy machine gun fire and smallarms fire halted their drive. The German defenders, employing all the tricksand advantages of defensive street fighting, fought back every attempt to dis-lodge them. Enemy troops had been told, according to prisoners of war, thatthe Obermaubach bridgehead west of the Roer was important to future Ger-man operations in this area, and must be held.

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The same night, at 2300, the attack was resumed. Enemy machine guns,which had stopped the advance earlier during the day, now held their fire.Company C entered the western outskirts of the town, and was not heard fromagain. German reports later substantiated the belief that the entire attackingforce of six officers and approximately 70 men was surrounded and captured.The attack was interrupted for two days, while the Battalion reorganized andregrouped for a new assault upon the enemy bastion. Other elements of the8th Division, now attached to the XIX Corps, Ninth Army, continued to hold.

The German penetration to the south, while still a serious menace, hadlost much of its early fury. In clear weather, Allied aircraft kept up an inces-sant pounding of German supply bases and communications. First Army troopshad blunted the wedge east of the Meuse River, and held firm against all at-tempts of the enemy to fan out to the north. Elements of the Third Army hadswung around to attack the south flank of the salient.

The 101st Airborne Division, besieged in the town of Bastgone, threw backall enemy efforts to close in on it. Supplied by a huge glider fleet, the defend-ers of the surrounded Belgian city inflicted heavy losses in men and materialupon the Germans. Meanwhile, a Third Army column was driving toward thepocket from the south.

Southwest of Obermaubach, the 2nd Battalion, 121st Infantry, with Com-pany C of the 13th attached, began an attack on the morning of December24th to clear the enemy from the woods. Numerous minefields were encoun-

Wearing the new GI snow capes, 8th Division infantrymen make their way pastbarbed wire at a road block as they return from a patrolling mission somewherein Germany. They are S/Sgt. Carl Pines, Teaneck, New Jersey, left, and Pfc. Frank J.Truska, New York City, right, Hq. Co., 3rd Battalion, 28th Infantry.

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tered; enemy mortar and artillery fire was intense. Germans, from logged em-placements, poured heavy small arms and automatic fire on the attackers.Only slight progress could be made.

The attack on Obermaubach was resumed at 0800, December 25th. Com-panies A of the 13th and L of the 121st and two additional platoons of tankswere attached to the attacking force. Major Joseph D. Johnson, in command ofthis small task force, although wounded early in the battle, remained forwardwith his men, refusing to be evacuated.

As the attack got underway, a heavy volume of supporting machine gunfire hit the enemy occupied positions in the town. It was later discovered thatit came from a machine gun platoon which had not been heard from since theloss of Company C, to which it was attached. Sergeant Joseph Malenowski,Company D, had taken charge of the platoon when he learned that the platoonleader was missing. He set up an all-around defense on a ridge overlookingObermaubach, and held this forward position without rifle support for 36 hours.When the 1st Battalion attack began, Sergeant Malenowski and his men pouredfire into the town, giving valuable support to the assault troops.

Enemy resistance at Obermaubach was still well organized. The town is anarc-shaped double row of buildings, with its center along the banks of theRoer River. Company B of the 121st, and Company A of the 13th were toadvance astride the main road into the town from the northwest. Company Ahowever, immediately encountered intense small arms fire, and was stoppedat the edge of the town. An 18-man platoon of Company B, led by Tech. Ser-geant Oscar W. Dumas, forced its way into Obermaubach. Dumas and his mencleared the Germans out of the first four houses. Here 1st Lieutenant EdwinInman, Company B Commander, instructed them to hold until other troopscould join them. When next heard from, Dumas and his men had cleared an-other section of eight houses to obtain suitable quarters for the night. Theartillery, the men explained, had set fire to the first few houses.

The attack on Obermaubach was resumed once more at 1100, December26th. What had at first been considered an isolated pocket of trapped Ger-mans was now known to be a well-organized, strongly-held position. Suppliescontinued to reach the enemy at night by way of a bridge above the dam atObermaubach. This bridge and the dam were partially destroyed by the Ger-mans on December 26th, preventing the withdrawal of their own men, stillunder orders to defend the town.

Company L, 121st Infantry, entered the northeastern part of the town onthe morning of December 26th, and began clearing out the houses along theriver. When the first section was taken, Company A of the 13th was able tomove in from the northwest. Men of Company A quickly advanced to the cen-ter of the town, bypassing some of the enemy occupied buildings. Company B,121st Infantry, which already had elements in the town, moved forward, search-ing and digging enemy troops out of each house. Two medium tanks had reachedthe edge of the town, where they fired in support of the attacking infantryelements. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions, and Company A, all of the 121st Infan-try, also supported the attack with flanking fire from the southwest.

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Obermaubach SeizedIn Obermaubach itself, after the outer defenses had been penetrated, the en-

emy offered only token resistance. Mortar and artillery fire, most of it from theeast side of the Roer, fell throughout the attack. Only in the center of the town,however, was any volume of small arms fire received. Most of the enemy troopshad been withdrawn to this point of the town and ordered to finish the fight. Theythough of a better way. After a brief fire fight, they surrendered in large groups. Inall, 93 prisoners were taken in the town, the majority of them by Company B.

By 2230, the enemy had been completely cleared from Obermaubach.Shortly after that, elements of the fighting 12th Engineer Combat Battalionrelieved the infantry units and took over defense of the area. The engineerscompleted the demolition of the bridge and dam spanning the Roer atObermaubach, and began to prepare the area for all-out defense. Major Johnson,1st Battalion Commander, was finally evacuated for his wound, the next day.Captain Howard L. Bartholomew replaced him.

Meanwhile, elements of the 2nd Battalion of the 121st, with Company C ofthe 13th attached, kept up the attack to clear the enemy from positions south-west of Obermaubach. The Germans, from well-sited, sturdily-built log bun-kers, drove back every attempt to dislodge them. Heavily supported by mor-tars and artillery, the enemy inflicted many casualties on the attackers. Lateduring the night of December 27th, between 80 and 100 Germans attemptedto cross the Roer in this area. They were quickly repulsed. During the day, 24hostile planes were reported over the Division sector. Three were known de-stroyed, one by the normally peaceable 8th Quartermaster Company.

During this period, elements of the 83rd Division and attached units hadcaptured the remaining terrain west of the Roer River and north of the 8thDivision sector. The 113th Cavalry Group then relieved these units, and wasattached to the 8th Division.

By December 29th, the pocket southwest of Obermaubach was finally wipedout, and with the area west of the Roer River entirely free of the enemy, the8th Division plan for defense of this sector was put into effect. The Divisionfront now extended along the Roer from the northern edge of Kreuzau to apoint southeast of Bergstein, then southwest along the high ground south ofVossenack. The 104th Division was on the left flank, the 78th, on the right.The 113th Cavalry Group had previously gone into the Kreuzau-Winden area.During the night, December 27–28, the 8th Reconnaissance Troop took overthe sector on the right flank of the 113th Cavalry, while the 13th Infantrycompleted relief of the 121st Infantry in the Obermaubach area. Companies Band D, 709th Tank Destroyer Battalion, were attached to the 13th Infantry,and went in an assembly area on an alert status for possible deployment insupport of the 13th and the 113th Cavalry Group.

RegroupingThe 121st Infantry took over the Bergstein sector of the front, maintaining

defensive positions with the 1st and 3rd Battalions on line, and the 2nd Bat-talion in reserve. The 28th Infantry remained in its former position south ofVossenack. During the night, December 28–29, the 12th Engineer CombatBattalion was relieved of its position in the line near Obermaubach, and took

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up the task of laying mines forward of Division lines. The 295th EngineerCombat Battalion was attached to the 113th Cavalry Group, where it assistedin maintaining and improving their defensive positions.

Elements of the 817th Tank Destroyer Battalion supported units of the 8thDivision from positions along the entire sector. Division artillery, with the153rd, 280th and 25th Field Artillery Battalions attached, provided directsupport to the infantry elements. The 43rd Field Artillery Battalion supportedthe 13th Infantry; the 45th supported the 28th Infantry; the 56th Field Artil-lery Battalion supported the 121st; and the 25th Field Artillery Battalion sup-ported the 113th Cavalry Group. The 445th Anti-aircraft-Artillery protectedfield artillery gun positions from air attack.

After 40 consecutive days of offensive action, all units of the 8th Divisionand its attachments had now reverted to an all-out defensive mission. Theyhad just completed their bloodiest engagement. Rehabilitation and reequip-ping of units was urgent. This was the opportunity which had been long awaited.

Defensive MissionOccasional minor changes and additional defensive measures were under-

taken by elements of the 8th Division during the following weeks. On the night,January 3–4, the 8th Reconnaissance Troop was withdrawn from the line andrelieved of attachment to the 13th Infantry. After three days in an assemblyarea, the Division cavalry unit was attached to the 113th Cavalry Group andsent forward to relieve Troop B of that unit.

Enemy activity on the Division front, except for nightly patrols and harass-ing artillery fire, was slight. Lone reconnaissance aircraft frequently operatedover the Division area during the hours of darkness, and occasionally droppedflares on front line positions. During the night of January 14th, three enemypatrols, of approximately 20 men each, attempted to cross the Roer River.Division Artillery fires broke them up before they could reach the west bankof the stream. Three Germans, who succeeded in crossing the Roer, however,were driven off before they had reached 113th Cavalry positions in Winden.

Patrol ActionBecause of the scarcity of enemy prisoners taken during this relatively inac-

tive period, it was planned to have one regiment of the Division each week send acombat patrol into enemy territory, with the primary mission of taking prisoners.

One such patrol was sent across the Roer by the 13th Infantry during theearly morning hours of January 13th. The patrol, a 25-man raiding party un-der command of Lieutenant Haight, Company E, moved out at approximately0300. In three groups, the men of Company E waded the Roer, midway be-tween Obermaubach and Bergstein.

East of the River, the first group came upon a three-man German outpost.Attempting to maneuver into position to take the enemy by surprise, one menstepped on a booby trap, alerting the Germans. A fire fight ensued, and thethree enemy were killed.

A second group reached the east bank of the Roer, moved forward to a railroadoverpass, and were about to take a lone sentry prisoner when German machineguns opened up. The patrol withdrew after killing several more of the enemy,

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while themselves losing two men killed and two wounded. The third group alsobecame involved in a skirmish, and was unable to take a prisoner. The remainderof the patrol recrossed the Roer safely, bringing back the two wounded men.

At this time, a German counterattack hit the 3rd Battalion, 13th Infantry, inthe sector east of Bergstein. Approximately 100 enemy infantrymen emerged fromthe woods and advanced toward Company L. The Company Commander, CaptainGeorge H. Gardner ordered his men to hold their fire on call. When the enemyhad advanced almost to the barbed wire directly in front of Company L positions,rifles, machine guns and mortars opened fire, mowing down many of the Germans.While the remainder of the enemy fled back into the woods, Captain Gardnercalled for the artillery. Fleeing Germans and 8th Division Artillery hit the woodsat the same time. The counterattack was repulsed.

Another German counterattack of smaller size hit Company K, and was alsoquickly repelled. Enemy ground activity, during the following days, reverted againto patrolling. During the night, January 15–16, a 40-man German patrol, operat-ing in the 28th Infantry sector, attempted to blow gaps in a minefield. The patrolwas swiftly driven off by small arms and automatic weapons of the alert doughboys.The enemy, in his flight, left numerous articles of equipment and several weaponsbehind. Of greater value, one German prisoner of war, of the 6th Paratroop Regi-ment, was captured by the men of Company E, 28th Infantry.

During the night, January 19–20, a combat patrol of the 113th CavalryGroup crossed the Rower and attacked an enemy position held by a 9-mansquad. Of the 9 men, 6 were taken prisoner. All were members of the 81stLight Motorized Reconnaissance Company, and stated that the Niederau area,where they had been captured, was lightly held. During the raid, 1st Lieuten-ant John Wright, the patrol leader, was killed.

Another raiding party, “Grover’s Ghosts,” led by Lieutenant Lawrence D. Grover,and consisting of 38 volunteers of the 121st Infantry, operated in enemy territoryin a general southwesterly direction on the night, January 21–22. While advanc-ing astride a path in the woods, the two scouts were challenged by a Germansentry. They immediately threw grenades. Other members of the patrol also beganthrowing grenades at the Germans, who had opened fire from well concealed bun-kers. Lieutenant Grover called to them to surrender. They refused, and the skir-mish continued. He called to them again, in German. Three Germans came out oftheir bunkers and were taken prisoner. The sentry had been killed. Three mem-bers of the patrol were injured when they ran into booby traps on the way back to121st Infantry lines, but all returned without help.

Withdrawal PlansMeanwhile, upon order from higher headquarters, a complete Division with-

drawal plan was prepared for use if necessary. The plan provided for generalwithdrawal of the 8th Division elements to a main line of resistance generallyon the high ground west of the Mulartshutte-Zwiefall-Mausbach road. Eachregiment was to leave a covering force of one battalion to screen any orderedwithdrawal. Orders were issued to the regimental and field artillery battalioncommanders to reconnoiter appropriate defensive positions. Sectors were as-signed and ordered staked out to include wire, minefields, automatic weap-ons, mortar, anti-tank gun and tank destroyer positions. Routes of withdrawal

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Pfc. Michael Gileno (left), Bronx, New York, and Pfc. Mavies Van Dis, EastSaugatuck, Michigan, members of the 12th Engineer Combat Battalion, bring in asled attachment to their jeep to be used to haul ammunition to their unit oversnowy roads in Germany.

were assigned and ordered reconnoitered. Demolitions were prepared. It wasemphasized that these were merely precautions designed to thwart any pos-sible enemy counter-offensive, such as that which had now been completelysmashed in the Ardennes sector.

Holding MissionDuring the remainder of January and early February, the Division contin-

ued its holding mission along the west bank of the Roer River. Units improvedtheir defenses with additional minefields, wire and anti-tank obstacles. Therewas little enemy activity. German patrols, usually five or six men, operatedintermittently in the Division zone. Patrol activity, however, was mostly aneffort to learn Allied intentions in this area. Occasionally, small enemy groupsharassed the Division by cutting communication wires. One large patrol wasdriven off in the Bergstein sector. Division intelligence personnel indicatedthat this might have been an overly ambitious commander’s attempt to win theKnight’s Cross, offered by Model to the unit retaking Bergstein.

Enemy mortar and artillery fire, through this period, was light. There was littleair activity. Smoke was used by the Germans on several occasions, probably tocover relief of troops. The front opposite the Division was held for the most part bythe German 85th Infantry Division and the 6th Paratroop Regiment, Only 33 pris-oners of war were captured during the entire month of January.

Men of the 12th Engineer Combat Battalion were called upon to improvisesnow plows and to remove numerous mines buried underneath the snow. Mine

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detection and removal were made difficult by snow and frost, and it was foundmost practicable to destroy mines in place. Largest camouflage project wasthe erection of a mesh road screen more than a mile long along a heavilytravelled road in the open country of the Hurtgen-Vossenack area. Two thou-sand five hundred snow capes, many of them improvised from sheets requisi-tioned from German civilians, and sewed by German women in Zwiefall andsurrounding towns, were effectively used by front line infantrymen. Some ve-hicles were painted white.

For units of the Division, this period of comparative inactivity afforded oppor-tunities for necessary rehabilitation. The 8th Quartermaster Company took overthe public baths at Stolberg and accommodated approximately 45,000 men forshowers and exchange of clothing. The Division Special Service Office conducteda rest camp and beer garden at Stolberg. Shortages in tires, tubes and other ve-hicular equipment were relieved, and the 708th Ordnance Company completedthe task of fully equipping all Division vehicles. Frozen ground eased the prob-lems of supply and evacuation. Battle casualties were few, but there was a moder-ate number of trenchfoot, frostbite and combat fatigue cases in the Division. Someuse was made of “weasels” (halftrack supply vehicles) and sleds for evacuation ofcasualties during the days of heaviest snowfall and worst ice conditions.

Division Military Government personnel retained responsibility for Zwiefalland the surrounding towns during most of this period. Many of the civilianswere employed, men in the Zwiefall saw mill, women in laundering, sewingand similar occupations to assist the troops. Generally, the civilians cooper-ated fully with military government officials. Numerous articles, includingstoves, furniture, sleds and sheets were requisitioned for military use,

Support 78th Division AttackOn January 30th, the 78th Division, on the 8th’s south flank, attacked to

seize the territory west of the system of lakes and dams which contain theheadwaters of the Roer River. The 8th Division supported the attack with in-tense machine gun, mortar, rifle and cannon fire. Division fire was directed onthe Kommerscheidt area in particular and on all German troop concentrationsobserved, which might hold up the advance of 78th Division elements. Divi-sion artillery battalions reinforced the fires of 78th Division artillery. Obser-vation posts of all units were alerted so that fire could be brought immediatelyupon enemy forces revealing themselves. Patrol activity was increased to di-vert enemy attention from the 78th Division zone of action.

Progress of the 78th Division attack was rapid. All remaining towns andterrain west of the system of lakes had been seized by February 5th. The townof Schmidt, which controlled the approaches to the Schwammenauel Dam,containing the bulk of the headwaters of the Roer, and which had been theprimary objective of most Allied offensive action in this sector for the lastthree months, was captured. Infantrymen reached the massive dam itself andcontrolled it by fire. The Germans, however, had blown the sluice gates, un-leashing 152 million gallons of water contained in the lakes, and transformingthe Roer River into a swirling torrent. The normally placid, knee-deep streamrose to a depth of more than ten feet in the Duren area and overflowed itsbanks to form lakes more than a mile wide in the Julich-Linnich plain.

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C H A P T E R 6ROER TO RHINE

Meanwhile, on February 5th, the Division was transferred to the VII Corps,First Army. The 113th Cavalry Group was detached from the Division. Begin-ning on the night, February 6-7, the 1st Division relieved the 8th of its posi-tions in the Kreuzau-Bergstein sector. By February 8th, all units of the Divi-sion had been relieved and had taken up, new positions in the area formerlyheld by the 104th Division, opposite Neiderau and the south half of Duren.The 104th Division had regrouped in the north half of its former sector. Alongthe entire west bank of the Roer, from Linnich to Bergstein, infantry and ar-mored division of the Ninth and First Armies were poised to assault the lastmajor water barrier west of the Rhine.

The Roer continued to rise. On February 8th, engineers were moving bridg-ing materials to forward areas, preparing soggy roads for the heavy traffic oftrucks and tanks that was soon to roll over them. The 644th Tank DestroyerBattalion, 740th Tank Battalion and Companies C and D of the 87th ChemicalBattalion were attached to the Division for the coming offensive. The 8th and104th Divisions were to attack on the morning of February 10th, seize Durenand the VII Corps bridgehead, and draw the Germans off balance for the stron-ger assault by the Ninth Army to the north, on the following day.

On February 10th, the Roer was still rising. The attack was postponed.Units of the Division conducted training in river crossings and street fighting.The narrow front was held by the 1st Battalion of the 13th and the 3rd Battal-ion of the 28th Infantry.

By February 15th, the Roer had reached its highest point was beginning tofluctuate. Meanwhile, the attack was again postponed. Troops of the 13th and28th Infantry regiments continued training in river crossings by assault boat.Engineers utilized the time to clear the approaches to the river in preparationfor bridging operations.

Reconnaissance photographs and prisoner of war reports indicated that theenemy was utilizing the time he gained by releasing the floodwaters of the Roerto refit and regroup his forces and to improve defensive positions. Much activitywas noted in the Rhineland rail centers, notably in Cologne. Concentrations oftanks, self-propelled guns and vehicles were detected in Golzheim. Blatzheim,Modrath and numerous town between the Roer and Rhine rivers in front of theDivision. Enemy artillery during the period was comparatively light, althoughnumerous battery positions were spotted by aerial reconnaissance.

Patrol activity across the flooded Roer was particularly hazardous, sincemany of the enemy’s land mines had been inundated, making it difficult to

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land with safety on the east bank of the river. Several engineer and infantryparties did cross the river in assault boats, although most of these operationsproved more costly than practical. On the night of February 16-17, three menof the 28th Infantry were rowed across the Roer by an engineer crew. Theywere equipped with radio and enough food for the following day. It was plannedto contact them again the next night and return them to the west bank of theriver. On the following night and on two succeeding nights, attempts weremade to reach the stranded patrol. They were unsuccessful, however, and itwas presumed that the patrol had been captured.

Small enemy groups were observed intermittently improving their positionson the east bank of the river. Enemy air activity increased. Several formationsof jet propelled planes appeared over the Division sector, bombing and strafingfront lines and rear installations. The river, although receding steadily, was stillfar above its normal level; the current was still exceedingly rapid.

River CrossingD-Day for the Roer crossing was again set—this time for February 23rd.

Detailed plans were completed. Division assault elements were to cross theriver on a front of approximately 7,000 yards. The north sector, including thesouth half of Duren and 1,500 yards south of the city, was assigned to the 13thInfantry. The 28th Infantry was given a sector approximately 4,000 yards wide,

Engineers attached to the 8th Division rush to completion the first pontoon bridgein the vicinity of Duren, Germany, across the Roer River. This work was done underfierce fire from the enemy.

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including the town of Niederau. Elements of the 104th Division were to crosson the left flank of the 8th, taking that part of Duren north of the Aachen-Cologne railroad. The 1st Division, on the right flank, was not to cross theriver until the 28th had secured its bridgehead. Consequently, the Divisionsouth flank would be exposed.

Plans called for troops of the assault units to cross the river in boats pow-ered by 22 and 50 horsepower motors. One foot bridge, one infantry supportbridge, and on Treadway pontoon bridge were to be constructed in each regi-mental sector. In addition, a Bailey class 40 bridge was to be erected in the13th Infantry sector. Division engineers were to erect the foot bridges andoperate the assault boats, while VII Corps engineers constructed the remain-ing bridges. The Roer River had receded only slightly, was still approximatelyseven feet deep, and flowed at a speed of nearly ten miles an hour.

At 0245 on the morning of February 23rd, the heaviest artillery barrageever fired by the 8th Division Artillery began to pound the enemy river de-fenses and communications. All batteries of the Division, reinforced by the18th and 188th Field Artillery Battalions and the assault guns of the 644thTank Destroyer and 740th Tank Battalions, fired continuously for 45 minutes.Along the entire Roer River front, every battery of the First and Ninth Armiesjoined in the barrage which preceded H-Hour of the battle of the Rhineland.

First CrossingAt 0245—45 minutes before the scheduled jump-off of all other units—

Major Edward J. Regan and his 3rd Battalion of the 28th Infantry climbed intotheir assault boats on the extreme south flank of the Division front and pushedoff for the enemy-held east bank of the Roer. Men of the 12th Engineer Com-bat Battalion and the 3rd Battalion (28th) Ammunition and Pioneer Platoonmanned the boats. The raging 12-mile river was as hazardous a no-man’s landas the men of the 3rd Battalion ever crossed. In spite of the current and thedifficult east bank of the river, approximately 60 per cent of Regan’s menreached the opposite shore. Companies K and L crossed in the first wave,dove quickly into a system of trenches on the river bank and came out with 23German prisoners, apparently so dazed by the tremendous artillery concen-tration that they did not realize that any troops had crossed the river.

Half of the men who survived the river crossing had lost their rifles andhelmets. All mortars and three of the four machine gun sections were also lost.Grenades were redistributed, and rifles were taken from the German prison-ers. Major Regan led his men south of Niederau to a road fork at the edge of apatch of woods. The men of Companies K and L, preceded all the way by arolling barrage of white phosphorus artillery, reached the edge of the woods at0430. Here they waited for Company I to join them.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 28th, attempting to cross 1,000 and 2,000yards to the north at 0330, encountered even more serious difficulties. Six 1stBattalion assault boats were overturned in midstream. Men and equipmentwere carried far down the river, Heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire causedmany casualties. All mortars and more than 75 per cent of the boats weredestroyed in the first crossing. Only elements of Companies A, B, C and Freached the east bank of the river, north of Niederau, where they reorganized

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and prepared for offensive action.

AdvanceMeanwhile, Company I crossed the river and joined Companies K and L at

the road fork near the edge of the woods southeast of Niederau. Troops ofthese two companies had taken 19 more prisoners when they surprised a groupof Germans, capturing them while they were still in bed and seizing a 75 mm.gun intact. An enemy wire party and a supply part were also captured as theywere moving along the road from Stockheim to Niederau, completely obliviousof the presence of American troops in the area.

Troops of the 2nd Battalion, who were to clear the southern part of Niederauand then to relieve the 3rd Battalion at the road fork, had not been able tocross the river. Major Regan received instructions by radio to move his battal-ion forward to the eastern edge of the woods. Although virtually isolated, thebattalion began moving east through the woods along the Niederau-Stockheimroad. Company L, on the right, ran into an enemy strongpoint. Company Imoved around to the south of L and dug the Germans out of log bunkers. Theadvance was resumed, although to the south were several more bunkers whichhad been by-passed.

The 3rd Battalion reached the eastern edge of the woods by nightfall, meet-ing only light resistance. Here the troops dug in. Enough German weaponshad been obtained so that all the men were again armed. In on instance, whenthe enemy counterattacked, a machine gunner allowed the Germans to comewithin 20 yards of his position before mowing them down, because, as he ex-

ROER TORHINE

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plained, “then the men can get the Kraut’s weapons without exposing them-selves.” Twenty-five panzerfausts (German bazookas) were taken, and classesin their operation were conducted on the spot.

The 13th CrossesColonel Numa Watson, 13th Infantry Commander, had divided the sector

of his regiment into two zones. To the 3rd Battalion, he assigned the north1,500 yards, which included most of the ruins of Duren south of the railroad.The 2nd Battalion, on the right, was to take the remaining 1,500 yards of theregimental zone. Troops of the assault battalions were assembled in the townsof Gurzenich and Derichsweiler. Boats had been brought up under cover ofdarkness and concealed behind buildings along the riverfront streets.

When the artillery barrage began, the assault troops and a detachment ofthe 12th Engineer Combat Battalion picked up the boats and moved to theriver bank. At H-Hour, the boats were launched. Most of the motors, however,could not be started. Despite the use of trained personnel, only a small num-ber of troops succeeded in crossing the river.

One boatload of 18 Company I men, under command of 2nd LieutenantLouis DePhillipo, reached the east bank of the Roer shortly after the attackwas underway, and moved forward into a group of residential buildings alongthe river. Two other boatloads of men from Company K paddled their way acrossthe river. These men, led by 1st Lieutenant Coleman, fought their way into afactory where they took 12 prisoners. Counterattacked later by an enemy forceof at least 50 men, the group lost half of its members and all of its prisoners.When rescued by members of Company F early the next morning, only Lieu-tenant Coleman and six of his men, all wounded, remained.

Machine gun fire and the swirling currents destroyed or capsized most ofthe assault boats. Observed artillery and direct fire from well-sited self pro-pelled guns continuously harassed the troops as they attempted to cross theriver. From Aachenerstrasse, directly across from the main launching site,such a torrent of high velocity fire continued to pound the troops that theyrenamed the street “88 Boulevard.” The 1st Battalion, in reserve at Rolsdorf,suffered several casualties from artillery air bursts. Throughout the river-cross-ing operations, men of the 8th Military Police Platoon directed traffic, often inthe most exposed positions.

Company E, one of the original assault companies, had four double assaultboats with motors knocked out before they could be launched by short roundsof white phosphorous artillery from friendly batteries. Ten single assault boatswere then launched in an attempt to paddle the company across the river. Allof them were swamped and swept downstream by the current. Casualties fromartillery and the current slashed the assault platoons of the company to 18, 22and 26 men, and forced the company to withdraw to reorganize. Several of themen swept downstream later rejoined the company.

Across the river, the men of Company K and I, who had plunged into theenemy-held city, captured a machine gun nest on the river bank, came throughseveral fire fights, and approached their company objectives. Three hours af-ter the attack had begun, Company F had also succeeded in ferrying a fewmore men to the east bank of the river. The swift current and intense enemy

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artillery fire prevented construction of any foot bridges. Several attempts, bothby the 12th Engineer Combat Battalion and VII Corps engineer personnel,were made under heavy fire, but had to be abandoned.

Before daylight, two flying ferries were installed by pulling ropes and thensteel cables across the river. In this way, boats could be controlled as theyfought the current to the east bank. Two additional platoons of Company Iwere enabled to cross the river through this method.

At daylight, Division artillery and chemical mortars of the 87th Chemical Bat-talion began placing white phosphorus smoke shells on known observation points.Enemy fire slackened somewhat, but despite continuous smoking, German mortarand artillery shelling severely hampered river crossing operations throughout theday. Cables were cut repeatedly soon after they had been installed.

BridgeheadThe men of Companies I and K, who had succeeded in crossing the river,

expanded their hold on the east shore to a depth of 400 yards on a 400-yardfront during the day. This area was the original bridgehead at Duren, andthrough it all operations against the enemy-held city were forced to move.

During the night of February 23-24, the enemy made a serious effort to knockout from the air whatever river installations the Division had been able to con-struct across the Roer. Jet-propelled Me 262’s swooped down repeatedly, bombingand strafing the riverline. Except for one ferry which was destroyed in the 28thInfantry sector, enemy aircraft had small success. At darkness, engineers hadbegun work on a Bailey class 40 bridge in the 13th Infantry sector. By 0530, thebridge was opened for use of foot troops, and shortly thereafter, vehicular trafficstarted moving across it to the east side of the Roer.

Artillery SupportSounds of armored movement in the Stockheim area where heard during the

night from positions of the 3rd Battalion of the 28th. Shortly after dawn, theenemy hurled the first of six counterattacks during the day against Major Regan’sisolated battalion. Three enemy tanks supported the attacks of a company ofinfantrymen. The Germans were thrown back. They came again and again, fromall sides. It was obvious that the battalion was surrounded. Then, at 1355, theenemy began an all-out assault on the trapped battalion, charging in from allsides in an attempt to annihilate the American forces. Major Regan called downthe massed concentration of all Division and Corps artillery, which had beenplanned for such a situation as this. With perfect precision, the tremendousvolume of fire from every gun of every battery of six field artillery battalionscrashed down on all sides of the surrounded 28th Infantry troops. Some of themen described it as “the most fearsome defensive barrage ever.” Many of theenemy were killed beneath the avalanche of shrapnel which boxed in the 3rdBattalion. The counterattack was decisively broken. Only six of Major Regan’smen were hit by shell fragments, although shells dropped as close as 75 yardsfrom the battalion positions. This, on of Regan’s staff officers pointed out, wasan unmistakable indication of the accuracy with which a battalion commanderpin-pointed his unit’s position on the map. It is also a tribute to the perfectionwith which the Division artillerymen planned their massed fires.

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Troops of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 28th, meanwhile, had been trans-ported across the river. The 1st Battalion fought its way through Niederau from thenorth, clearing the town early in the day against only moderate resistance. The2nd Battalion advanced through the southern part of Niederau and began movingthrough the woods to establish contact with the 3rd Battalion. At 1905 that night,Company E, after a brisk fight, reached the weary troops of the 3rd Battalion,opening the way for supplies and ammunition to be brought up.

FIGHT FOR DURENMeanwhile, elements of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 13th Infantry

has crossed the river and were making steady progress through Duren. In thecity, itself, there was moderate small arms resistance and heavy mortar andartillery fire. So completely had some sections of the city been destroyed byAllied air and artillery bombardment, that it was often impossible to interpretmaps of the streets. Twisted steel and rubble was all that remained of thecenter section. Craters were numerous and in many of them, the enemy hadplaced booby traps. Streets as such had ceased to exist. Bulldozers were rushedacross the Roer bridge, and paths were forced through the tangled girders andmounds of brick and debris.

By mid-afternoon, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions had advanced more than1,5000 yards east of the river. The 1st Battalion moved up behind the 2nd andworked its way south. At 1700, this unit had reached the new German bar-racks on the south edge of Duren. Companies A and B seized the fourwesternmost buildings, after overcoming intense small arms and machine gun

A mine sweeping patrol of the 12th Combat Engineer Battalion in Duren, Germany,clears a path for the infantry.

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fire. Company C, driving in from the south after a wide flanking move, joinedA and B at 2300 in the final assault to clear the remaining buildings. Thisattack apparently took the enemy by surprise, and a number of Germans werestill asleep when the buildings were overrun.

At 0200 the following morning, the 2nd Battalion began an attack againstthe old barracks, 500 yards to the north. After a ten-minute massed artilleryconcentration of 1,500 rounds of 105mm and 155mm shells, Companies Gand E assaulted the buildings. Riding the armored vehicles and tanks of the644th Tank Destroyer Battalions, infantrymen stormed the buildings, with theheavy guns of the tanks and tank destroyers blasting down all obstacles. Whenthe foot troops dismounted, armored vehicles provided covering machine gunfire, while Company F supported by fire from the southwest. The buildingswere cleared by 0530.

The three battalions of the 13th then moved rapidly through to the easternoutskirts of Duren. Here, before dawn, elements of the 121st Infantry passed throughthe regiment and continued the 8th Division advance. The 13th then withdrew toassembly areas in Duren, to await attachment to the 3rd Armored Division.

121st Goes Into ActionBefore daylight on February 25th, the 121st Infantry had crossed the Roer

over the Bailey bridge, now completed in the 13th Infantry sector. Passingthrough the 13th Infantry lines in Duren, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the121st continued the Division advance. The 1st Battalion drove rapidly toward the

These men of the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, attached to the 8th Division,first Allied armored group to enter the battered German city of Duren.

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town of Binsfield, knocked out two self-propelled guns defending it, and clearedthe town of all enemy resistance before 0830. The 3rd Battalion, driving onGirbelsrath, encountered much stronger resistance. Three tanks, supporting thefoot troops, were destroyed by high velocity fire in the flat open country east ofDuren. Enemy artillery and mortar fire continued to be heavy. After knocking outtwo 88mm guns with bazooka fire, 3rd Battalion infantrymen quickly overran en-emy troops dug in along the open country, and drove on toward the town. Gilbelsrathwas taken late that night after fierce street fighting.

Stockheim FallsStockheim was the primary objective of 28th Infantry troops now massed

in the woods west of that town. At least six enemy self-propelled guns fired onthe troops as they emerged from the woods and advanced on the town acrossopen ground. The guns hastily withdrew, however, when the men of the 28thentered Stockheim. The 1st and 2nd Battalions converged on the strongly de-fended town. Street fighting continued throughout the day. The enemy had tobe dug out of cellars and trenches. By midnight, the town was cleared exceptfor a small group of buildings in the southern outskirts.

The 3rd Battalion of the 28th, meanwhile, had maneuvered to the north,relieving the 121st Infantry in Binsfeld at dusk, taking 12 additional prison-ers out of the town, and then moving east to continue the attack. The towns ofBinsfelderburg, Rommelsheim and Burg Rubenheim were taken during thenight. Attacking in a column of companies, the battalion took the three townsin quick succession. As foot troops advanced on each town, a terrific artilleryconcentration was called down. When the artillery lifted, doughboys rushedthe town before defending troops could come out of the cellars to man theirguns. By 0500, all three towns had been taken. The prisoner count was high,104 being captured in Burg Rubenheim alone. Two self-propelled guns, whichhad eluded the 3rd Battalion all night, were finally captured and destroyed inBurg Rubenheim.

Maj. General W. G. Weaver was evacuated on February 25th. Brig. Gen-eral Bryant E. Moore, former assistant commander of the 104th Division, tookcommand of the 8th Division.

On February 26th, the 8th Reconnaissance Troop took over the town ofStockheim, on the still-exposed Division right flank. A brisk skirmish tookplace in the southern section of the city during the night, when the enemyattempted to retake it. Before dawn, however, the enemy had been clearedfrom the last buildings in the town.

Advance ContinuesThe 121st Infantry continued its advance during the night of February 25-

26, and by morning had driven east from Girbelsrath to seize the town ofEschweiller. Troops of the 121st met heavy mortar, artillery and high velocityfire, when they attempted to move across the open country toward Ollesheim.It was decided to wait until nightfall before resuming the attack. At darkness,the town was quickly captured. Roadblocks were erected, and the 2nd and 3rdBattalions drove approximately three miles farther east, crossing the NeffelRiver, and attacking the town of Neider Bolheim. Here, the regiment met its

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only determined resistance of the night, encountering several enemy assaultguns and heavy small arms fire. The town was cleared before dawn, and the3rd Battalion moved north to take over the town of Blatzheim, which had beencaptured by the 3rd Armored Division.

On the following day, elements of the 121st moved east of Blatzheim tomop up the remaining resistance in Bergerhausen and the high ground to thenortheast. The 3rd Armored Division had driven swiftly beyond the town, andsome enemy stragglers still remained to be cleared out. Meanwhile, the 28thInfantry continued to move up behind the 121st, defending the exposed southflank of the Division.

Fight for KerpenThat night, the 3rd Battalion of the 121st and a task force of the 3rd Ar-

mored Division attacked in conjunction to seize the town of Kerpen. The 121stInfantry cleared the north half. The Germans were known to be defending thetown with strong infantry elements and high velocity weapons. Two attemptedcounterattacks were broken before they had a chance to get underway.

Civilians, many of them foreign workers eager to flee the town, obstructedthe troops in their advance, but once they were gotten under control, the at-tack made rapid progress. Kerpen was taken early the next morning after muchstreet fighting and sniping. Tanks and tank destroyers of the 740th and 644thassisted the advance of infantry elements through the town, blasting enemy-held buildings with their heavy guns.

Across the Erft CanalThe 1st Battalion of the 121st, passing through the 3rd Battalion in Kerpen,

attacked toward the Erft Canal, three miles to the east. Reaching the canal at0400 the next morning, the troops attempted to cross a bridge on the mainKerpen-Modrath road. They met intense enemy automatic fire. Next, they at-tempted to slip through the woods and cross the canal 1,000 yards north of theroad. This time, they ran directly into four German tanks. A severe counterat-tack cost the 1st Battalion many casualties. The unit then withdrew slightlyand prepared to cross the canal under a smoke screen.

Tanks and tank destroyers were brought up during the morning, but theenemy blew the bridge before they could cross the canal. Foot troops of the 1stBattalion crossed the canal later during the day and fought their way into thewesternmost section of Modrath. Experienced enemy troops, most of themwounded veterans of other fronts, fought savagely against the attackers. Com-panies A and B advanced slowly through the town until they were stopped ata twenty-foot railroad embankment by intense small arms fire. Here, the 1stBattalion held until the canal could be bridged and armor brought forward.

The 8th Reconnaissance Troop, with a company of tanks and a platoon oftank destroyers attached, was operating as a task force. Sent to patrol a sec-tion of high ground southeast of Kerpen, one of the attached tank destroyerscame upon two haystacks. A few shots were poured into the haystacks, andthey took off down the road. On numerous occasions, such haystacks in peace-ful German fields, upon similar action, were found to be motorized and thicklyarmored.

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28th Takes Up AdvanceThe 28th Infantry, meanwhile, had moved to Bergerhausen. The 3rd Bat-

talion was given the mission of moving through the woods north of Kerpenduring the night, and seizing a large Rhenish castle, Schloss Lorsfeld. TheBattalion, in a column of companies, moved through the woods unopposeduntil at 0100, the castle was reached. The men of Company L surrounded themoated fortress of several centuries ago, shot a guard, and stormed throughthe gates. After a brief skirmish, the enemy garrison surrendered. Thirty pris-oners were taken. Six men of Company L were left to guard the castle, whilethe remainder of the Battalion returned to Bergerhausen.

On the night of March 1st, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 28th were as-signed a more hazardous mission. The Battalions were to cross the Erft atGotzenkirchen, a village in the 104th sector which was found unoccupied by apatrol the previous afternoon. They were then to advance south against Modrathon a two battalion front, attacking the town in conjunction with the 121st Infantry.

The crossing was made without mishap shortly after darkness. The troopsswung across the water barrier on the girders of a blown bridge, and movedinto the thick woods east of the Erft. The 2nd Battalion then moved directlysouth along the east bank of the canal. The 3rd Battalion moved farther east,maneuvering to take the castle and a small group of buildings at Boisdorf,from where it would then advance southward toward Modrath.

The column of companies of the 3rd Battalion had approached within 125yards of the castle without being detected. Suddenly, several explosions brokethe silence. The entire column had walked into a dense minefield. The enemywas alerted, and heavy small arms fire from the castle and the woods hit thetrapped infantrymen. The commanders of Company K and L were killed. Sev-eral other officers and men were wounded, and the rest scattered.

Hand to HandMajor Regan reorganized as large a force as possible, rushed the castle,

battled with the enemy defenders in fierce hand to hand combat, took thecastle. The men then settled down to occupy the castle and surrounding build-ings for the remainder of the night. All communications with Company I werelost until the following day. Others of the scattered troops found their way intothe buildings now occupied by the battalion. Shortly before dawn, a group ofsoldiers was observed approaching Boisdorf. Not knowing whether they wereAmerican or German troops, Major Regan called them to halt. They continuedto advance, and the battalion commander gave the signal to open fire. Some ofthe enemy troops had come so close to the buildings occupied by the 3rdBattalion troops that a hand grenade dropped out of a window killed threeGermans. The counterattacking forces were finally driven back until they weretrapped in several buildings which they had reoccupied. At dawn, artillerywas called down upon the enemy-held buildings, causing many casualtiesbefore the last 52 Germans surrendered.

121st Takes ModrathThe 2nd Battalion, supported by elements of the 644th Tank Destroyer

Battalion, moved south against light opposition and entered the northern out-

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skirts of Modrath early on the morning of March 2nd. The 1st Battalion of the121st fired into Modrath in support of the troops of the 28th, while continuingto hold its railroad embankment positions. A tank dozer, brought up duringthe morning to clear the rubble blocking an underpass through the embank-ment, was knocked out by an enemy self-propelled gun. Another underpasswas discovered further to the south. By noon, the canal had been bridged bythe engineers, and tanks and tank destroyers moved across.

While the armor moved through the underpass, foot troops of the 1st Bat-talion, 121st Infantry, went over the embankment and began clearing the en-emy from the remainder of the town. Enemy resistance was fierce when Ger-man foot troops were bolstered by self-propelled guns, but crumbled as soonas the guns were knocked out. Artillery fire was heavy. The fight continuedduring most of the day. Elements of the 28th, now under command of Lt. Colo-nel Thomas H. Beck, moved in from the north, while the 121st cleared themajor part of the town. Before nightfall, Modrath was reported cleared.

28th Takes OverSimultaneously with the battle in Modrath, another attacking force, the 1st

Battalion of the 28th, was fighting for the town of Habblerath, to the northeast.After a wide flanking maneuver, during which enemy planes strafed the troopsrepeatedly, the battalion entered Habblerath shortly after daylight. Resistancein the town, particularly from self-propelled guns, was strong. Enemystrongpoints were marked by artillery smoke shells, and at 0900, an air bom-

German civilians being evacuated from homes have ringside seats at the battle ofKerpen. 155-mm Howitzers of the 8th Division Artillery carry on the fight as therefugees wait for transportation to a safe area behind the lines.

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bardment mission was flown against the town. The troops then moved in quicklyand cleared Habblerath by 1000. The enemy counterattacked from the south-east shortly thereafter, but it was thrown back.

That night, while the 2nd Battalion of the 28th relieved 121st Infantryelements in Modrath, the 1st and 3rd Battalions were to continue the attack tothe south. The 3rd Battalion left Boisdorf shortly after midnight, passed throughthe 2nd Battalion in Modrath, and attacked toward Bottenbroich. Company I,which had rejoined the battalion during the day, led the column of companies.At the approaches to Bottenbroich, intense enemy machine gun fire pinneddown the company. Company K maneuvered around I, hit the enemy pocketfrom the west, wiped it out. Company I then moved in to seize Bottenbroich.Company L drove beyond the town to the mines and factory southeast of it. Asthe company neared this area, a terrific artillery barrage was laid down. At0455, the artillery lifted. Companies L and K stormed the factory area, quicklyclearing the enemy from the above ground installations, and discovered a mineshaft leading down into the earth. One guard was killed; the other two quicklysurrendered. With Major Regan leading, the men of Company L climbed downseven 15-foot ladders. At the bottom, they came upon an elaborate network ofmore than two miles of underground passages. Two hundred civilian familieswere found living in the subterranean corridors. Among them were 91 mem-bers of the German army, who were quickly rounded up.

The 1st Battalion of the 28th reached the norther edge of Grefrath at ap-proximately 0300. Here the fire of enemy self-propelled guns became intense.As 1st Battalion troops moved in, enemy guns withdrew. The town was takenafter a brisk street fight. Gains were consolidated and mopping up in the areacontinued during the day.

Advance on FrechenAt 1930 that night, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 28th began an ad-

vance along a northerly route between the network of lignite mines toward thecity of Frechen, two miles south of Cologne. One hour later, the 3rd Battalionbegan a wide enveloping movement from the southwest. Frechen, largest cityin the Division zone of advance since Duren, was to be attacked from threesides. The lignite mines were a crescent-shaped chain of huge pits, approxi-mately 50 to 100 feet deep, which honeycombed the entire area over which anadvance against Frechen must move. Only routes of approach to the city weerthe narrow causeways between the pits which could easily be defended by theGermans. Along these causeways, the three attacking forces moved.

Moving into the attack, the 1st Battalion, advancing directly toward thecity from the west, immediately encountered intense mortar fire. The battal-ion continued to advance in spite of the enemy fire, and by 2200, Company Ahad reached the western edge of Benzelrath. Company C, advancing astridethe main road, also entered that town, only to find that the bridge over one ofthe pits along the route to Frechen had been blown.

The 2nd Battalion, advancing along a much longer route, met only lightresistance from enemy small arms fire, and entered Frechen shortly after mid-night. The 3rd Battalion infiltrated through two-thousand yards of enemy-heldterritory before it ran into a strongpoint, covering a 100-foot gap in the cause-

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way. Unable to move across to the other side of the gap without meeting in-tense enemy fire, the battalion spent the remainder of the night on the narrowledge, on hundred feet from the enemy.

Frechen Falls to 28thCompany L succeeded in crossing to the other side farther to the north,

shortly after daylight, and took the enemy strongpoint from the flank. Enemymachine guns were emplaced in cement bunkers and covered by a series oflogged emplacements manned by 12 to 15 riflemen. Fifty prisoners were takenby the men of Company L. Many of the enemy were killed, and the remainderfled. The battalion then drove swiftly toward Frechen.

Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion, encountering little resistance within Frechen,had cleared the entire northeastern section of the city by daybreak. Engineershad quickly constructed a bridge across the gap which was holding up the 1stBattalion at Benzelrath. The battalion then advanced through the town, closelyfollowed by the bulk of the 644th Tank Destroyer and the 740th Tank De-stroyer Battalions. Resistance was strong, particularly in the Benzelrath area.Early in the afternoon, the 1st and 3rd Battalions linked up, and by darkness,the city was completely cleared. Company B, which had been attached to the3rd Battalion during its maneuver around the southern part of the city, seizedthe town of Bacheim, southeast of Frechen. During the night, Company Kcleared the factory area, 1,000 yards east of Frechen.

Kendenich, Germany, captured by the 121st Infantry, retains some of the old worldcharm in this dog-drawn milk cart. 3-7-45.

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121st Opens DriveOn the night, March 4-5, the 121st Infantry again went into the attack.

Passing through the 28th Infantry, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 121stdrove, in two columns, toward the Rhine, now only five miles away. Attackingunder searchlights after heavy artillery preparations, the two battalions ad-vanced against the towns of Horbell and Gleuel. The 3rd Battalion hit heavyopposition from enemy automatic weapons. Tanks and tank destroyers werebrought up to knock out the enemy strongpoints. The battalion entered Gleuelshortly before dawn, rapidly cleared the enemy from the town, and continuedthe attack toward Burbach.

The 1st Battalion seized Horbell by 0630, meeting only moderate enemyresistance. One hour later, the enemy came back with a determined counterat-tack. Spearheaded by two tanks and four self-propelled guns, 100 enemy in-fantrymen moved against the 1st Battalion. The attack was quickly repulsed.Two self-propelled guns and one enemy tank were knocked out, and the foottroops fled in disorder.

Task Force Grover, a group of 121st Infantry troops of half-companystrength, seized the town of Sielsdorf after a fight later that morning. Through-out the day, enemy artillery fire continued heavy. Troops of the 3rd Battalionmet fierce resistance in their drive toward Burbach. Enemy self-propelled gunsprevented an advance across the open terrain during daylight. It was decidedto resume the attack at nightfall.

By midnight, the 3rd Battalion had cleared Burbach and had moved ontoward Alstadten. The 1st Battalion seized Stolzheim after a brisk street battle.The 2nd Battalion had also joined in the attack, driving toward Hermulheim.Here the enemy resisted fiercely, fighting from house to house. Artillery firewas heavy, and it was not until 1600 on the afternoon of March 6th that thetown was completely cleared. The 2nd Battalion then continued towardKendenich, which fell after a brief fight shortly after nightfall.

28th Joins AttackThe 2nd Battalion of the 28th attacked and cleared Kalscheuren shortly

after midnight, March 5th. The 3rd Battalion of the 28th then passed throughthe 2nd in Kalscheuren and drove forward to Konraderhof, taking that town by0130. The 3rd Battalion then advanced toward Rondorf, along the main road.Four Mark IV tanks came rolling down the road from the town, passed theforward elements of the 3rd Battalion without being recognized. Once withinthe column, the tanks began firing on the troops, disorganizing the battalion.Then the tanks withdrew again into Rondorf, from where they continued toharass the attacking forces as they attempted to reorganize.

When the 3rd Battalion assaulted Rondorf, a short time later, two bazookarounds sent the huge German tanks fleeing from the town. When foot troopsentered the town, the civilians had gathered all rifles from the German sol-diers. The town fell without a fight.

The 1st Battalion of the 28th, attacking also at midnight, quickly seizedthe towns of Berrenrath and Knapsack, in neither of which did the enemyshow much will to fight. Hurth, another town in the same area, fell to the 3rdBattalion of the 121st later that morning.

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Elements of the 28th Infantry continued the attack on the night of March 6-7. The 1st Battalion, advancing toward Meschenich, reached the town shortlyafter midnight. Resistance in the town was severe. At dawn, when the town hadfinally fallen, a strong counterattack, supported by three tanks, hit the battal-ion. Friendly artillery fire fell on the troops of the battalion, causing thirty casu-alties. The enemy counterattack was finally gotten under control and repulsed.

Driving on toward Immendorf, the 1st Battalion was again hit, this time byfour tanks. The 3rd Battalion of the 28th was ordered to take the town. Smokewas placed on the town, and at 1500 that afternoon, the men of Company I,riding tanks of the 740th Tank Battalion, stormed Immendorf and took it withinan hour at a cost of six men wounded.

28th Reaches RhineThat night, the 3rd Battalion was ordered to take Rodenkirchen on the

Rhine. Moving through the 104th Division in Cologne, the battalion hit thesuburb of Rodenkirchen from the north. At the edge of the town, a machinegun nest was silenced by a grenade throwing patrol. No further resistance wasencountered. Forty prisoners surrendered without a fight.

The 3rd Battalion continued driving down the west bank of the Rhine to-ward Weiss. That town fell at 1000 to the men of Company K on tanks whileCompany L closed in on the town from the west across open terrain.

Godorf, also on the Rhine, fell to the 1st Battalion of the 28th during thenight of March 6-7. The next morning, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 28thjoined to clear Surth. With the mopping up of enemy stragglers (including fourroving self-propelled guns) that afternoon, all organized resistance in the Di-vision sector west of the Rhine had been destroyed. First rounds to be firedacross the Rhine by troops of the Division were aimed at several barges inmidstream, which were attempting to flee with two enemy tanks. Direct hitswere scored. Tanks and barges disappeared in the Rhine.

13TH TEAMED WITH 3RD ARMOREDThe exploits of the 13th Infantry during the period of its attachment to the

3rd Armored Division comprise a colorful separate phase of the Division ad-vance to the Rhine. The regiment was attached to the Armored Division, onebattalion to each combat command, at 0600 on the morning of February 26th.Each combat command was divided into two task forces, composed of a tankbattalion each and a battalion of armored infantry with one, a battalion of the13th Infantry Regiment with the other.

Tank spearheads of the 3rd Armored Division passed through Duren onthe morning of February 26th, and thrust out along the main Duren-Colognehighway and across the Cologne plain toward the east and northeast. Thir-teenth Infantry troops rode the tanks—as many as could climb aboard. Theremainder of the foot troops followed the armor in 2 1/2 ton trucks. CombatCommand A, with Lt. Colonel Morris J. Keese’s 1st Battalion attached, movedout first along the road to Cologne. Quickly seizing Golzheim, which had al-ready been entered by troops of the 104th Division, this task force drove on toBlatzheim, and secured the town before nightfall. Resistance was slight, sincethe enemy was apparently taken by surprise by the swiftness of the advance.

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An entire German mortar company was over-run. The number of prisonerstaken was large, and approximately 1,200 civilians, many of them foreignworkers, had remained in the town.

Combat Command B, with the 2nd Battalion of the 13th, commanded byMajor Theodore Leonard, swung out behind CC“A” until Golzheim was reached.Here, CC“B” swung north on the road to Buir, an industrial town of more than5,000 people. Foot troops cleared the town after brisk street fighting, withtanks firing in close support. The armored columns then pushed through thetown and drove north to Manheim, another manufacturing town. Manheim wasquickly cleared. Many prisoners were taken, among them two full companieswhich surrendered intact. Before nightfall, CC“B” and the 2nd Battalion hadalso seized Etzweiler and Giezendorf and had reached the southern outskirtsof Elsdorf.

Combat Command “R”, with the 3rd Battalion, 13th Infantry, attached,was committed at Manheim, and drove northeast along secondary roads to seizeHeppendorf, Widdendorf and Berrendorf before halting for the night. On thefollowing day, CC“B” drove north through Paffendorf. That town was quicklycleared by the 3rd Battalion, under command of Major Francis L. Jenkins;when then drove northeast to reach the Erft Canal. A bridge was seized intactnear the town of Gleich, and troops of the 3rd Battalion crossed the canal andestablished the first bridgehead across this last water barrier west of Cologne.

Germans CounterattackViolent fighting continued in the bridgehead area east of the Erft. The

Germans threw five strong counterattacks, supported by tanks, against 3rdBattalion positions. All were beaten back. Meanwhile, engineers were rein-forcing the captured bridge so that tanks could cross the river.

During the day, CC“B” and the 2nd Battalion of the 13th fought their waythrough Elsdorf against strong resistance, and then went into reserve. CC “A”and the 1st Battalion continued their advance along the main Duren-Colognehighway through Bergerhausen and Kerpen. Kerpen was cleared in a coordi-nated night attack with the 3rd Battalion, 121st Infantry taking the south halfof the town, CC“A” and the 1st Battalion of the 13th the north half.

At this time, CC“A” swung north to join CC“R” and continue the drivetoward the Rhine. One combat team of the 99th Division crossed the Erft inthe CC“R” bridgehead area on March 2nd, with the mission of clearing thewoods east of Paffendorf. However, when troops of the 3rd Battalion attemptedto move through the supposedly cleared woods the next day, they ran into aviolent fight. Major Jenkins was wounded, and Lt. Colonel Earl L. Lerette,executive officer of the 13th, was sent down to take charge of the battaliontemporarily, while familiarizing Major Tarkington, regimental S-2 with the workof a battalion commander. Major Tarkington was then to remain in commandof the battalion.

On March 4th, CC“R” and the 3rd Battalion seized the town of Niederhausenafter brisk street fighting. CC“A”, meanwhile, had passed through Oberhausen.On the following morning, CC“A” was to take Busdorf, while CC“R” movedparallel to it, swinging around Busdorf and driving toward Stommeln. The 1stBattalion, with CC“A”, succeeded in entering Busdorf, and proceeded to clear

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the center of the town. The 3rd Battalion, moving through the outskirts of thetown, was hit from the flank by a severe German attack. The enemy, caughtbetween the two advancing spearheads, abandoned the center of the town andstruck at 3rd Battalion troops before they had a chance to detruck. Two 2 1/2ton trucks loaded with men were hit by high velocity fire. On one of them,every man was killed or wounded.

The remainder of the force continued to advance, and by 1000 that morn-ing, had taken Ingendorf, northeast of Busdorf. This placed CC“R” two mileseast of all other armored elements, and the troops were instructed to hold.Meanwhile, the enemy was defending Busdorf fiercely.

Fight for StommelnLater that day, orders were received for CC“R” and CC“B” to seize the key

communications center of Stommeln before nightfall. The 2nd Battalion of the13th was to move up from Paffendorf with CC“B” and hit Stommeln from thesoutheast, while the 3rd Battalion moved in from the southwest. The coordi-nated attack jumped off under a heavy smoke screen. The two attacking forcesmet in the center of the town and fought their way from street to street to takethe town late that afternoon. That night, 3rd Battalion troops mopped up anenemy pocket south of Stommeln, ran into a stiff fight, and knocked out fourGerman self-propelled guns before the pocket was wiped out. With that ac-tion, the mission of CC“R” and the 3rd Battalion was completed. The battal-ion went into reserve, with Major Tarkington in command. Lt. Colonel Lerettereturned to his position as executive officer of the regiment.

CC“B” and the 2nd Battalion of the 13th continued to attack, takingPulheim, Sinnersdorf and Fuhlingen that day. Driving on during the night,troops of the 2nd Battalion cleared Roggendorf before morning. Merkenichfell to these troops shortly after that. Later during that same morning, the menof the 2nd Battalion seized Rheincastle on the west bank of the Rhine, tobecome the first troops of the First Army to reach the river.

1st Battalion Enters CologneCC“A” and the 1st Battalion swept straight down into Cologne from the north.

In quick succession, they took Longenich, Pesch and Morheim, all suburbs ofCologne. Thirteenth Infantry troops overran the vast railroad yards of Germany’sthird largest city. Massing the entire battalion, they stormed the city’s majorairport with its tremendous underground installations and huge stores of sup-plies and equipment. By nightfall, troops of the 1st Battalion had penetrated theinner ring of the city. Before midnight, patrols had reached the river front.

Within the inner city, it was strictly an infantry battle. Armor remainedoutside the ring, while foot troops cleared out the remaining enemy from thetwisted wreckage. Tanks were brought up only when they were needed to knockout an enemy strongpoint. Principal resistance inside the city was from theNazi-regimented police. Well-armed and equipped, these old men (some ofthem nearly 60 years old) fought with fanatical zeal but with no concept ofmodern warfare. They rushed into machine gun fire headlong, only to be slaugh-tered in futile attempts to defend the city.

During its drive from Duren to Rhine with the 3rd Armored Division, the

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Infantrymen of the 13th Infantry walk and ride tanks as they advance to the frontnear the Erft Canal at Bergheim, Germany.

13th Infantry lost 164 officers and men killed or wounded. Along its trail ofconquest, the regiment captured approximately 4,400 prisoners. The 1st Bat-talion alone took almost 2,000 enemy troops, while the 2nd and 3rd Battalionscaptured approximately 1,200 each. Its current offensive mission completed,the 13th Infantry went into an assembly area in the outskirts of Cologne, stillunder attachment to the 3rd Armored Division.

DIVISION IN RESERVEOn March 8th, the Division was placed in Corps reserve. This was the first

time, except for brief periods of travel from one sector to another, that the Divisionwas not in contact with the enemy during the eight months since first going intoaction on July 8, 1944. On March 5th, Lt. Colonel Joseph K. Gibson, former G-2,had succeeded Colonel Thomas B. Whitted as Division Chief of Staff.

Elements of the 104th Division relieved the 28th and 121st Infantry regi-ments in position. All units of the Division, except the 13th Infantry whichremained attached to the 3rd Armored Division, then went into assembly ar-eas. Training and rehabilitation programs were set up, and troops were given arespite from constant contact with the enemy. The 8th Quartermaster Com-pany took over the public baths in the town of Hurth, recently seized by Divi-sion troops, and operated a clothing exchange and shower point for all units.It was also during this period that each infantry regiment received on platoonof colored troops, all volunteers, for frontline duty.

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Holding the Rhine River LineAfter six days in reserve, the Division received instructions to relieve the

1st Division, holding the Rhine River line directly south of the former 8thDivision sector. By March 14th, relief had been completed, and the 28th and121st Infantry regiments again faced the enemy across the Rhine from a pointnorth of Wesseling to the southern edge of Bonn.

At this time, major First Army efforts were directed toward enlargement ofthe bridgehead east of the Rhine opposite the Remagen bridge, which hadbeen captured intact on March 9th. Constant watchfulness along the Rhinewas required to frustrate any possible enemy attempts to destroy the bridge.Except for intermittent light artillery shelling and movements of individualsand small groups east of the Rhine, this was a comparatively inactive period.Small numbers of prisoners continued to be picked up, most of them strag-glers and deserters.

On March 17th, the 13th Infantry reverted to 8th Division control. Mean-while, orders were received to be prepared to relieve the 104th Division in theadjacent sector to the north. This relief was completed by March 22nd, andthe 104th joined the First Army forces in the Remagen bridgehead. The 8thDivision now held the west bank of the Rhine from a point north of Cologne tothe northern edge of Bonn. The 121st, 13th and 28th Infantry regiments ex-tended in that order from north to south.

Comparative inactivity continued. Meanwhile, First Army troops had bro-ken out of Germany. Other Rhine River crossings by the Third Army to thesouth and the Twenty-First Army Group north of the Ruhr had cracked theGerman defenses in the West.

8th Crosses RhineAt this time the 86th Infantry Division, recently arrived on the Continent,

began relieving the 8th Division. On march 28th, the 13th Infantry was re-lieved by 86th Division elements, and began the Division move across theRhine south of Bonn. By the night of March 29-30, the 28th and 121st Infan-try regiments also had been relieved, and the entire Division went into thetrans-Rhine sector, progressively relieving the 1st Division, on the right flankof the 78th Division along the south bank of the Sieg River.

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C H A P T E R 7RUHR-SIEG POCKET

The 13th began the Division’s offensive action east of the Rhine at 1000, March29, when it passed through elements of the 1st Division to attack northward. Thetowns of Zeppenfield, Salchendorf and Neukirchen all fell to the 13th Infantrywith only slight opposition. The 2nd Battalion, advancing against Herdorf andStruthutten, encountered no enemy resistance until its advance elements reachedthe outskirts of the towns. Within these two towns, the enemy fought from house tohouse until the area was cleared, shortly after midnight.

Sieg River OffensiveOn the following day, the 28th Infantry joined the 13th in the attack toward

the Sieg river. Small enemy groups scattered throughout the difficult terrainharassed attacking elements and impeded their advance. The 28th Infantry en-countered only slight resistance from small arms. Five towns were taken duringthe day by troops of the 28th, as units of the regiment moved north to reach theSieg River in several places. The captured towns were Wisen, Alsdorf,Scheuerfeld, Bruche and Betzdorf. The enemy resisted fiercely in Betzdorf andScheuerfeld with heavy small arms, mortar and artillery fire. For the most part,however, resistance was disorganized and numerous prisoners were taken.

The 13th Infantry, continuing its advance, made steady progress through-out the day. Two more towns, Sassenroth and Brachbach, were captured, andnumerous groups of isolated enemy forces were taken prisoner as elements ofthe 13th also reached the Sieg River in several places. Several self-propelledguns were encountered during the day, and one well-dug-in tank was knockedout by a 13th Infantry patrol.

On March 31st, the 121st Infantry also joined in the attack north to theSieg River. Destroying three enemy tanks, troops of the 121st seized four townsduring the day. Lanhof, Helgersdorf, Salchendorf and Griesenbach were clearedof the enemy against moderate small arms and self-propelled gun fire.

The 8th Reconnaissance Troops, given the mission of protecting the Divi-sion right flank and clearing the enemy in its sector south of the Sieg, alsomade steady progress throughout the day. At Erndtebruck, however, severalenemy tanks were encountered, one of which was knocked out.

The enemy in the 13th Infantry sector re-crossed the Sieg during the nightto occupy several isolated positions, from which he resisted strongly until drivenout during the morning. The 28th Infantry seized the towns of Bruche andLasdorf, and sent patrols across the Sieg. Reconnoitering a railroad tunnel,they discovered four cars loaded with bombs and two cars of small arms am-

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munition. Almost 400 prisoners were captured during the day, bringing thenumber taken by the Division east of the Rhine to well over 1,000.

Fight for SiegenDuring the night of March 31, orders were issued for the Division to cross

the Sieg River and establish a bridgehead sufficiently wide so that the east-west road long the river could be used. Meanwhile, reports from civilians werereceived which indicated that Siegen, major city in the Division area south ofthe Sieg River, was not strongly defended and might be induced to surrender.

Pamphlets urging the enemy troops in Siegen to surrender before 0900,April 1st, were fired into the city at dawn. Earlier, the 2nd Battalion of the28th and the 1st Battalion of the 13th had crossed the Sieg River and ad-vanced almost to the bridgehead objective. The 28th’s crossing was made atthe extreme western flank of the Division, while the 1st Battalion of the 13thcrossed the river directly west of Siegen.

At 0900, there had been no response from the enemy troops in Siegen.Final preparations were made to attack the city at 1100, after an hour’s artil-lery preparation. The 3rd Battalion of the 13th was to seize the western half ofSiegen, while the 1st Battalion of the 121st took the eastern half.

A determined enemy counterattack employing tanks and infantry hit the3rd Battalion of the 13th just as it was about to begin its attack on Siegen. Theenemy was thrown back, however, and the advance on the city began. The 1stBattalion of the 121st took advantage of the confusion caused by the enemycounterattack and fought its way into Siegen.

During the day, attacking elements advanced slowly through Siegen. Re-peated enemy counterattacks and heavy fire from small arms and tanks im-peded progress. Thirteenth Infantry elements ran into a group of SS troops,but Company L reached the river at the north edge of the city by 1800. Duringthe night, troops of the 121st also advanced to the river at several points.

Elsewhere along the Division front, varying resistance was encountered.The 3rd Battalion, 121st Infantry, attempting to seize the remaining groundsouth of the river in its sector, met strong resistance before taking the towns ofKaan, Marienborn and Burbach. The enemy defended these towns with tanks,nebelwerfers (rocket artillery) and heavy small arms fire. Numerous roadblockswere encountered, and the enemy counterattacked several times in the Netphenarea. Enemy resistance was overcome, and the town of Netphen was clearedduring the night.

In the 28th Infantry sector, 100 enemy infantrymen crossed the Sieg southof the 2nd Battalion, temporarily cutting off two companies. These enemy troopswere rounded up, and Wissen was cleared for the second time. Twenty-eightinfantry elements secured the high ground north of the Sieg River againstmoderate resistance and cleared the towns of Kirchen and Betzdorf during thenight. The 1st Battalion of the 13th, advancing in a column of companies, metonly slight opposition north of the Sieg, took the town of Rothkirchen, its finalobjective, and continued to patrol.

The 8th Reconnaissance Troop fought its way into Erndtebruck andSchamder several times during the day, but was forced to withdraw when tanksand strong infantry forces appeared.

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Fighting in Siegen continued throughout the night. Elements of both the13th and 121st Infantry regiments had reached the Sieg River which runsthrough the northern part of town. All bridges had been blown, and it wasfound that the river consisted of two separate streams in this area. The 121stInfantry’s 1st Battalion, reporting only light resistance, started across the rivershortly after 0300 on the wreckage of a railroad bridge. Three men of Com-pany B had crossed to the north bank of the river when the enemy struck,killing tow of them and wounding the other.

A few hours later, Company A succeeded in crossing the river farther up-stream. The remainder of the battalion followed Company A across the Siegand began clearing the enemy from that part of the city across the river. The3rd Battalion, 13th Infantry, also crossed both streams before daylight andcontinued its fight. Resistance was moderate; many prisoners were taken.

Throughout the day, Division elements made good progress all along theline. The stream of prisoners—1110 for the day—was reminiscent of the Crozoncampaign, eight months previous. The 1st Platoon of Company K, 13th Infan-try, captured an entire German infantry battalion of 350 men and their com-mander in the northern outskirts of Siegen. The enemy continued to counter-attack frequently. Six attempts were made by the Germans to regain their po-sitions north of the Sieg River. Tanks, and as many as 150 infantrymen werethrown into these abortive assaults by the enemy. German losses were heavy.

At 1200 that day, the Division was transferred from the VII to XVIII Corps(Airborne). It was contemplated that the Division frontage would be decreasedpreparatory to a coordinated attack to annihilate the enemy forces now trappedin a huge pocket.

By 2200, the 2nd Battalion of the 13th had relieved the 121st Infantryelements in the eastern half of Siegen. During the night, the city was clearedof remaining resistance.

The advance was continued against varying resistance on the followingday. From civilian reports it was learned that the town of Lutzel, in the 121stInfantry sector, was a collecting point for German troops. Huge stores of am-munition were reported stored in that area. During the morning of April 3rd,prisoners of war affirmed that Field Marshall von Model had been in Lutzel onthe previous day and that he had departed around midnight on the road toErndtebruck. Division artillery fired two ammunition dumps near the town.

Meanwhile, 121st Infantry units were continuing their advance throughthe difficult terrain south of the Sieg. Task Force Grover, the regiment’s rein-forced raider platoon, and the 121st Infantry I & R Platoon, working on theflanks of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, assisted in overcoming the multiple Ger-man strongpoints in this area. The enemy continued his tank and infantrycounterattacks, at times driving between and behind attacking companies.

CounterattacksThe 13th Infantry, fighting north and west of Siegen, was forced several times

to detach units to clear Germans who had infiltrated back into previously clearedpositions. The 28th Infantry, maneuvering to overcome moderate enemy resis-tance, reached the high ground north of the Sieg valley. Again the number ofprisoners taken was high, more than 800 being captured during the day.

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Enemy counterattacks increased in intensity on April 4th. Groups of 100to 150 infantrymen, often supported by as many as six heavy tanks, knifedtheir way between units all along the Division front. In the 28th Infantry sec-tor, Company A was almost completely cut off by a strong force of enemy troopswhich had infiltrated behind them during the night. The enemy counterattackwas finally beaten off later in the morning with the assistance of Company B.

The 121st Infantry received the first of a series of counterattacks in theNetphen area shortly after daylight. Five enemy tanks spearheaded the as-sault on the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. Bazooka and tank destroyer fire bouncedoff the hulls of the German Mark V’s. The attack was finally broken up byartillery. Two of the enemy tanks were destroyed.

Troops of the 13th Infantry, attempting to advance northward, discoveredthat several enemy groups had infiltrated behind them. One German force ofalmost company strength had slipped in between Companies C and K whilethey were attacking, and reoccupied a series of barracks behind the lines. The2nd Battalion continued to attack, while the 1st fought off another enemy coun-terattack, and the 3rd attempted to mop up the enemy behind its lines.

Throughout the day, the 13th Infantry fought off one counterattack afteranother. Shortly after 1700, two Mark V tanks, followed by a group of Germaninfantrymen, hit one platoon of Company I, overran a platoon of three anti-tank guns which attempted to stop them, and charged down the main roadtoward Siegen. Tank destroyers were quickly maneuvered into positions alongthe road, and artillery fire was called down upon the enemy behind 3rd Battal-ion positions. The attack was finally broken up.

At the same time, approximately 100 enemy infantrymen infiltrated throughthe dense woods and slipped behind Company L. So troublesome had the situ-ation become that the 3rd Battalion was ordered to withdraw to the northernedge of Siegen. During the night, the troops of the 3rd Battalion fought theirway back through the stubborn enemy, and formed a new line which they wereordered to hold at all cost.

The enemy lost heavily by his repeated counterattacks. Many Germanswere killed, and 1,287 prisoners were taken. Casualties among the troops ofthe Division were also heavy, particularly in the 13th Infantry.

Meanwhile, the 28th Infantry was in process of being relieved of its posi-tions on the west flank of the Division by the 310th Infantry, 78th Division.The 28th was then to relieve the 8th Reconnaissance Troop and elements ofthe 121st Infantry, on the right flank of the division. This was in preparationfor a full offensive to be opened on April 6th. The Division was to drive north-west, taking an important part in the final reduction of the pocket of an esti-mated 85,000 to 100,000 enemy troops now hopelessly trapped.

ReorganizeThe 13th Infantry held firmly throughout the following day and reorga-

nized for an attack to recapture the territory given up in the face of enemycounterattacks. Company A of the 121st Infantry, which had advanced beyondits adjacent units, received a severe counterattack during the afternoon andwas almost completely cut off. Company C fought its way through to the sur-rounded unit before nightfall. Several other smaller counterattacks were re-

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pelled during the day. More than 500 additional prisoners were captured.Lt. Colonel Earl L. Lerette, former regimental executive officer of the 13th In-

fantry, took command of the 121st Infantry on April 5th. Colonel Thomas J. Cross,former 121st Infantry commander, was evacuated through medical channels.

DRIVE TO CUT POCKETThe coordinated campaign to destroy or capture all enemy forces trapped

in the Ruhr-Sieg pocket began on the morning of April 6th. From the north,units of the Ninth U.S. Army were to apply pressure against the enemy in theheavy industrial area north of the Ruhr River. All along the southern rim ofthe pocket, units of the First U.S. Army were to drive north from the SiegRiver. Other First Army units, driving deep into central Germany, had effec-tively sealed off the enemy pocket from the east.

Maj. General Ridgeway’s XVIII Corps (Airborne), consisting at present of the8th, 78th and 86th Infantry Divisions and the 13th Armored Division, was to makethe main effort, driving swiftly northwest to cut the pocket in tow. The 78th Divi-sion, on the left, and the 8th Division were to begin the Corps assault.

With all three regiments abreast, the 8th Division began its attack on May 6th.The 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 8th Reconnaissance Troop were in

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direct support of the infantry elements. Against strong enemy resistance, the Di-vision made only slight gains. In the are north of Siegen, particularly, troops of the13th Infantry encountered heavy opposition from machine gun, mortar and artil-lery fire. The 1st Battalion was able to advance only 500 yards. Company B tookthe town of Seelbach after a fierce battle. At 1600, the enemy counterattackedwith five tanks and strong infantry forces. Before the Germans were repelled, Com-pany A lost its commander, Lt. Mathews Gregory, killed in action.

The 2nd Battalion of the 13th fought its way through the town of Weidenau,gaining approximately 1,500 yards. The 3rd Battalion, fighting to destroy in-filtrating German units which had retaken the Fischbacher barracks, north ofSiegen, two days previously, finally crushed all enemy resistance by 1955.The Germans, all young, fanatical members of the 3rd Paratroop Regiment,held out until their positions were overrun. Two hundred were taken prisoner.

Troops of the 2nd Battalion, 121st Infantry, which has been fighting inNetphen throughout the night preceding the attack, mopped up that town andalso captured Eschenbach. The 3rd Battalion attacked at 0600, and bymidafternoon had seized Lutzel. The enemy counterattacked strongly with heavytanks, one of which was hit with approximately 25 rounds of tank destroyerfire without being stopped.

The 28th Infantry had not fully completed its shift in position at the timeof the attack. The 3rd Battalion, which had gone into the line during the pre-ceding night, jumped off at 0600 and cleared the town of Erndtebruck by earlyafternoon. One Tiger tank and two other armored vehicles were destroyed.

Infantrymen of the 8th Division, enter the town of Wurdinghausen, Germany. Thepass was under enemy fire, and part of the bridge shown fell on passing soldiers.

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Advance QuickensOn the following day troops of the 13th Infantry gained up to 3,000 yards,

while the 28th and 121st Infantry elements advanced 4,000 yards. Enemyresistance, generally, was still strong. The 2nd Battalion of the 13th fought itsway into Klafeld, while the 3rd attacked Trunbach. The 1st Battalion contin-ued to fight off counterattacks in the Seelbach area.

The 3rd Battalion of the 28th continued its advance, taking Birkelbachafter a brisk fight. Troops of the 2nd Battalion joined the 3rd in the attack,advancing approximately three miles.

In the center of the Division front, elements of the 3rd Battalion, 121stInfantry, were able to make only slight progress against strong enemy smallarms and artillery fire. The 2nd Battalion of the 121st advanced approximately4,000 yards. Company E took the town of Eckmanhausen. Company F attackedHerzhausen, while Company G moved against Unglinghausen. Four other smalltowns were ordered cleared by Division units during the day. Huge stores ofenemy supplies and equipment were seized. Among them were four warehousesof French, American and German weapons and ammunition, 200 boxcars, andsix 350 mm. railroad guns fully mounted. Prisoners of war for the first twodays of the attack numbered approximately 1,000.

Substantial gains were made on April 8 in the northern and central sectors ofthe front. In the southern sector, the enemy continued his stubborn defense. Troopsof the 121st Infantry received three counterattacks after clearing the town of

An infantryman moves cautiously past burning vehicles knocked out when an 8threconnaissance column was ambushed near Oberbrug ge, Germany. Thereconnaissance troops quickly organized and returned fire with mortar, machinegun and 75-mm. anti-tank fire.

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Kredenbach, Dahlbruck and Allenbach. The 28th Infantry gained 10,000 yardsduring the day. The 1st Battalion reached Wurdinghausen; the 2nd entered Rinseke.It was in the 13th Infantry sector that resistance was most severe. The 1st Battal-ion attacked through the 3rd and advanced slightly beyond Birlenbach. The 2ndBattalion cleared four small towns north of Siegen against an enemy defense ofnumerous roadblocks and self-propelled weapons.

On April 9th, the 86th Division passed through 28th Infantry lines andwent into the attack on the Division right flank. The 28th Infantry was giventhe mission of protecting the Division left flank, since advances during theday had placed the 13th and 121st Infantry regiments in advance of adjacent78th Division units.

Enemy Defenses CrumbleOn this day, the enemy defense in

front of the Division began to crumble.Only the main roads and towns weredefended, and many of these only hap-hazardly. The 1st Battalion of the 13thadvanced nine miles during the dayagainst spotty small arms and occasionalself-propelled fire. The 2nd Battaliongained ten miles, and at the close of theperiod was entering the city of Olpe.Here an entire German infantry com-pany was captured as it was going out toman the city’s defenses. Elements of the121st Infantry also made substantialgains, advancing five to seven miles.

More than a thousand prisoners werecaptured during the day. Eight tanks andthree other armored vehicles wereknocked out. Approximately 15 enemytowns were cleared; among them: Elben,Rahrbach and Krombach. It was in thelast mentioned town that the heaviestfighting occurred. Rocket artillery andfour enemy self-propelled guns wereencountered in the city. Although his vehicle was hit by enemy fire, Brig.General Canham, assistant Division commander was uninjured.

Germans in FlightA general crumbling of enemy defenses was apparent by April 10th. The Divi-

sion made advances of eight to twelve miles. Division troops swept past numerousundefended roadblocks and scores of camouflaged vehicles parked in the woods.Among the 1,125 prisoners of war taken during the day’s operations were manyartillerymen and service troops from a conglomeration of disorganized units. Thetowns of Olpe, Rohde, Drolshagen and Wilkemberg, and many smaller towns andvillages were cleared of the enemy after brief skirmishes.

Brig. General Bryan E. Moore awardsthe Silver Star to Pfc. Lacey Cox,Jamaica, New York, for knocking outan 80-ton tank in Netphen, Germany.

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On the following day, the 28th Infantry passed through the 13th whichthen went into reserve. The 740th Tank Battalion had again joined the Divi-sion. Rapid advances continued. Principal resistance encountered was fromenemy 20 mm. anti-aircraft guns, which were being used as flat trajectoryweapons. Gains of eight to ten miles were made; 2,200 prisoners were cap-tured. Among the larger towns taken during the day were Meinerzhagen, Kierspeand Beckinghausen.

Advances up to ten miles were made on each of the following two days.Enemy forces were thoroughly disorganized, and offered only sporadic resis-tance. On April 12th alone, 5,067 prisoners passed through Division chan-nels. An additional 2,500 were captured on the day following. In a tunnel,troops discovered three carloads of ammunition, six railroad guns, thirty as-sorted railroad cars with loving accommodations, and two locomotives withsteam up. So effectively had Allied fighter planes taken command of the airthat trains did not dare risk movement during daylight hours. Halver,Oberbrugge and approximately forty smaller town and villages fell to the Divi-sion in the two day period.

13th Reaches Ruhr River: Cuts PocketOn April 14th, the 13th Infantry, which had again gone into the attack

after passing through the 121st Infantry, reached the Ruhr River. At Hattingen,troops of the 3rd Battalion shouted across the river to men of the 3rd Battal-ion, 313th Infantry, 79th Division, telling them to call off the artillery fire in

A machine crew of the 8th Infantry Division fire cover for advancing troops streetfighting their way into Schwelm.

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this area. This was the first contact between First Army and Ninth Army troopsduring this campaign. The enemy pocket had now been cut in two.

Units of the 28th Infantry, meanwhile, were encountering heavy resistancein the industrial sector north and west of Schwelm. The enemy defense con-sisted of four tanks, five self-propelled guns and a number of panzerfausts.Crossroads were defended with heavy small arms and automatic fire. In thetowns, much sniper fire was received. Despite the strong opposition, Schwelm,Milspe, Vorde and many smaller towns were cleared, and 2,224 prisoners weretaken, during advances of three to five miles.

Attack WestwardAlthough the original mission of the Division had been completed, orders

were received on April 15th, to continue offensive operations, attacking westalong the south bank of the Ruhr River. For this operation, CC“R” of the 13thArmored Division was attached to the Division. The westward advance began at1000, April 15th, when the 121st Infantry passed through rear elements of the28th. Encountering heavy opposition, particularly from enemy 20 mm. flak guns,the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 121st gained approximately three miles dur-ing the remainder of the day. The 28th Infantry, meanwhile, had continued itsdrive north to reach the Ruhr River west of the 13th Infantry positions.

Men of the 8th watch as thousands of Nazis are brought into a prisoner of warenclosure near Remscheid, Germany.

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CC“R” of the 13th Armored Division was attached to the 13th Infantry.Three task forces were formed, one consisting of the 1st Battalion of the 13thwith armored engineer and reconnaissance elements and one company of me-dium tanks attached; another, composed of the 3rd Battalion and similar ar-mored attachments; the third was comprised of the armored infantry battalionand the remainder of CC“R”. Advances of approximately three miles weremade over difficult terrain. Among the principal towns cleared wereNeidersprock, Hovel, Hasslinghausen and Linderhausen. Approximately2,5000 prisoners were captured by the Division and attached units.

Substantial gains were made on the following day against only sporadicopposition. Enemy armor provided a slight threat, but only one defended road-block was encountered during the entire day. The towns of Wulfrath, Heviges,Langemberg and Hierenhof were taken. So disorganized were the enemy forcesthat at Wulfrath, two entire regiments surrendered intact with their commandsand staffs to 121st Infantry units. A total 5,633 prisoners were taken duringthe day.

Division Offensive Mission CompletedBefore daylight on April 17th, the 13th Infantry had cleared the towns of Wenden

and Heiligenhaus to complete the Division offensive mission in this sector. Allresistance ended early that morning. Only mopping up operations and the round-ing up of remaining German soldiers, many of them in civilian clothes, remainedto be accomplished. During the day, 8,305 additional prisoners of war were pro-cessed through Division channels. Of the 317,000 prisoners officially reportedtaken in the enemy pocket by all units engaged in its destruction, the 8th Divisionaccounted for 50,192. Casualties of the Division in the campaign were approxi-mately 1,500, of which approximately 200 were killed.

Artillery support in the fast moving campaign was particularly difficult.During some days, displacements were so frequent that communication wasalmost entirely by radio. Toward nightfall each day, an effort was made toestablish wire communications so that control could be regained and ordersfor future operations disseminated.

Principal engineer operations during this period took place early in theadvance, when numerous bridges over the Sieg River were required. For atime, the Division sector was so wide that all available bridging equipmentwas in use. Mines were relatively few throughout the advance. Roads were ingood condition.

Problems of supply and signal communication in this fast-moving cam-paign were numerous. Wire crews, particularly, worked long hours to keepcommunications with Division forward elements. On days of most rapid ad-vance, only the frequent trips of liaison officers between units and the Divi-sion could keep organizations abreast of the situation.

Military GovernmentFrom April 18th to April 26th, the Division was employed in Military oc-

cupation of a section of the Ruhr-Rhine area. Principal districts under Divi-sion control were the Wuppertal, Dusseldorf, Wissen and Mulheim areas. Anumber of officers and men of Division and attached units were temporarily

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attached to the Military Government section to facilitate administration of solarge an area.

Among the chief problems of military government officials during this pe-riod was the control of displaced persons. The large cities of Ruhr, particu-larly Wuppertal, Hagen, Solingen and Dusseldorf, were heavily over-popu-lated with Russian, Polish, Italian and French slave laborers. When thesearea had been cleared of German forces, displaced persons began looting andpillaging to gain revenge against the Germans and to obtain food and clothing.Several instances of violence occurred in the Division area until the situationwas gradually brought under control. Transient displaced persons were placedin camps and provided with food for the most part from German civilian stores.

There were no serious disease epidemics in the Division area, althoughseveral cases of typhus were reported in the town os Siegburg and severalother overly-congested places.

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C H A P T E R 8TEAMED WITH BRITISH SECOND ARMY

Less than ten days after beginning on its mission of occupation and mili-tary government in the Ruhr-Rhine area, the Division received orders for an-other combat mission. Still under XVIII Corps control, the Division was totravel north by motor to the Luneberg area. The XVIII Corps, which includedat this time also the 82nd Airborne Division and the 7th Armored Division,was to attack across the Elbe, east of Hamburg, with the primary mission ofprotecting the flank of the British Second Army. British units, after crossingthe Elbe northwest of the XVIII Corps, were to drive northeast to Wismar,cutting off the Danish peninsula. Operations of the XVIII Corps were to beunder Second British Army control; administration and supply under NinthU.S. Army.

8th Crosses ElbeTroops of the 13th Infantry began movement to the new area on April 26th,

completing the move before nightfall of the following day. On April 28th, the13th was attached to the 82nd Airborne. On the day following, while troops ofthe 82nd crossed the Elbe at Bleckede, troops of the 13th held the Walmsburgsector of the Elbe River. By April 29th, remaining elements of the Divisionand attachments had arrived in the Luneberg-Bleckede area. At 1800 on thefollowing day, the 121st Infantry was attached to the 82nd Airborne Division.At 0100, May 1st, the 121st Infantry, with the 3rd Battalion of the 13th at-tached, began crossing the Elbe over the pontoon bridge previously constructedby 82nd Airborne Engineers.

Relieving elements of the 505th Parachute Regiment in the bridgeheadarea during the night, troops of the 121st attacked northeast at 0800. Theenemy resisted with scattered small arms and light artillery fire. Chief opposi-tion was encountered at Gulze, where 250 prisoners were taken after a brieffight. Sixteen towns were taken during the day. In most of them, the enemyoffered only token resistance to the powerful force of 121st infantrymen, sup-ported by the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 740th Tank Battalion.Gains up to five miles were made, and 678 prisoners were captured.

During the afternoon, the 28th Infantry also crossed the Elbe to join theattack. The 8th Reconnaissance Troop was attached to the 28th for this opera-tion.

British troops, which had crossed the Elbe at 0200 on the previous day,were advancing rapidly against light resistance. The enemy was believed in-capable of anything more than token resistance to the Allied drive. Recon-

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naissance flights detected a large-scale westward movement of German troopsand civilians north of the British and American advance, presumably fleeingfrom the Russian armies.

Task Force Canham Rolls ForwardTask Force Canham, consisting principally of the 121st Infantry, 644th

Tank Destroyer and 740th Tank Battalion, and led by the assistant divisioncommander, swung into the attack at 0600, on May 2nd. The powerful mobileforce was further supported by the 56th Field and 83rd Armored Field Artil-lery Battalions, a battery of the 445th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion, Com-pany C of the 89th Chemical Battalion, Company C of the 12th Engineer Com-bat Battalion and Company C of the 8th Medical Battalion.

With doughboys riding the tanks and tank destroyers, Task Force Canhambegan rolling at 0600. Light initial resistance was brushed aside, and the pow-erful 8th Division force swept northwestward virtually unopposed. Followedclosely as possible by the 28th Infantry and elements of the 13th, Task ForceCanham drove twenty-five miles before mid-day, halting only upon orders fromhigher headquarters, when it reached Lake Schwerin. Here contact was madewith advance elements of the Russian armies of the north.

Schwerin Falls to 8thMore than a hundred cities, towns and villages, including the large air

base and city of Hagenow and the 1,000-year-old capital city of the provinceof Mecklenburg, Schwerin, fell to Task Force Canham and other units of the8th Division that day. All along the avenues of advance, large groups of enemytroops awaited arrival of American units to which they could surrender.

German soldiers coming in to surrender as the 8th Infantry Division drives northto meet the Russians beyond Schwerin, Germany.

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Enemy Troops in Mass SurrendersRoads were jammed with columns of prisoners. On foot, on bicycles and

horseback, in all types of horse-drawn and motor vehicles, troops of the de-feated German armies were moving to the southwest. Men, with their womenand children, their animals and whatever worldly goods they could transport,surrendered at the already over-crowded prisoner of war enclosures. The Sev-enth Panzer Division drove into the 28th Infantry area in tanks to surrender.Eight German generals were among the estimated 55,000 prisoners who sur-rendered that day.

On the following day, all available troops were engaged in directing offic-ers and men of the disintegrating wehrmacht into Division prisoner of warenclosures. The convoys of motor vehicles, tractors and trailers, horse-drawncarts and foot columns brought in more than 150,000 captives on May 3rd.Among them were ten more generals, including the Third Panzer Army com-mander and his subordinates. On the following day, another 39,500 prisonerswere counted, bringing the total number taken by the Division since crossingthe Elbe to slightly more than a quarter of a million.

Captured war material reached such huge proportions that much of it wasn’teven counted. Panzer divisions obligingly delivered their tanks, armored ve-hicles and ammunition to Division areas. At the Hagenow air base, a largenumber of Luftwaffe places, some of them still crated, fell into the hands ofDivision units. Vehicles of all kinds, both army and civilian, were picked up—many of them to be later used in the transport of displaced persons and recap-tured Russian prisoners of war from the Division area toward their homes. Afew officers and men of the 8th Signal Company received the surrender of fiveGerman armored railroad trains.

German prisoners who surrendered to the 8th Infantry Division, Ninth U.S. Army,near Schwerin, Germany.

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Above: Scene in Schwerin, Germany, as German troops come in to surrender totroops of the 8th Infantry Division.

German and Polish political prisoners freed from the Nazi concentration camp atWobbelin, Germany.

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Concentration CampNear the town of Wobbelin, in the Division area, medical units uncovered

a concentration camp, where approximately 2,500 near-starved political pris-oners still remained alive. These men were evacuated and cared for undersupervision of the 8th Medical Battalion, as were the patients in numeroushospitals found in the Schwerin area. Several hundred emaciated bodies ofmen who had been starved and beaten to death in the Wobbelin concentrationcamp were unearthed and buried after funeral services in the town squares ofnearby communities. The civilian population was ordered to attend the buri-als, and many German men and women were shown through the concentrationcamp itself.

Final VictoryThe 8th Division had fought its final battle in the European Theater of

Operations. In ten months of combat, the units of the Division had captured316,187 prisoners of war and vast stores of enemy war material. The Divisionhad taken a major part in the Normandy, Northern France, Rhineland andCentral European campaigns. Enlisted men and officers of the Division killed,wounded and captured during the ten-month period of combat totaled 13,293.Non-battle casualties brought the total number of casualties above 18,000.

On May 4th, announcement was made of the final surrender of all Germantroops in Holland, Denmark and northern Germany. At 0241 on May 7th, Colo-nel General Jodl, a representative of the German High Command, signed theunconditional surrender of all German land, sea and air forces in Europe, tobecome effective at 0001, May 9th, 1945.

Brig. General Charles D.W. Canham and a party of 8th Division men link up withthe Russians east of Schwerin, Germany.

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