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Directorete ofIntelligence

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'.NOCONTRACT.

b3Terrorisrn nevief8 April 1985

Focrs-Thc Wcstcrn Hostages in Lcbanon:I-atest Dcvclopmenll a.!9 Implicstions lF b (3)

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b (3)23 The African National Ccngr.css in-Disarra

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33 Chronology of Tcrrorism, 1985 b (3)

This review ts publtshed every other wcck by thc Directoratc t Intelligence.Appropriate articles p,roduced by other eletnents of the CIA as n'cll as bt otheragencies af the US Intelligence Community will be considered for publication.Commenls ald gueries are welcome and may be directed to the Executive Editorffib3

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EH$T'JiJ'llry

The African National congres (ANC), thc naJ_9rSourh African insurgcnt groug has bcen strugglingsincc thc Mozambicans cxpcllcd is rnilitary pcrrcnnela ycsr ago.Thc grouP is suffcring from dcterioratingrclations with somc black African statcs in rcuthernAfrica and from internal divisions. A symptom of thcgioup.s ptight has bccn the drsrnstic dcclinc in ANCattacks: only two smalt bornbinSs sincc lastSeprcmbcr. Thc ANC'6 rnilitary carnpaign b likcly tocontinue tO Sputter 8s a rcsult of Prctoria's succcss inprcssingncarbystatcstoclampdownonthcS,roup.

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Rcglonal Wocs

d".n U.f-" the reccnt crackdown, thc ANC had bccnlargcly unsucccssfut in cfforts to infiltratc South

,r\fnm* frorn Botswana. Thc bordcr bctwccn thc twostat6 is long, but the terrain is not favorablc for ANCinfiltratioo:. primarily because it provides littlc coycr'if,r South Africsns havc bccn successful rccently inintcrcepting ANC gucrrillas rhortly aftcr they havecntcred the country fnom Botswana. last month. theSiuth Africsn Foreign Minister informcd Gaboronc

::1fi":,#-3"illil?i$: bJdctectcd sincc'scG

I*sotho. Thc reccnt thaw in rc_l_ations bctweenittr,o and south Africa doei ri6t augur well for theANC. South African strong'srrnFt-actics in reccntycars havc forccd thc Jonathan governmcnt toabandon is prcferred policy of turning a blind cyc,or"rrd thc ANC and to adopt instead a sornewhat

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morc activc.circumscription of thc group's opcrationsin [,csotho. The manncr in which Maseru dears withthc murdcr last rnoni,h of a l-crctho soldicr by anANC rnembcr will bc a barometcr of I esotho's

1 a,A3r3tations with thc groupJ

'b3Thc South Africaru. who we belicve are not sarisfiedwith thc l.csotho Govcrnrnent's eflorts, want Mascruto sign e sccurity pact. If thc intcnsity of SouthAfrican prcssurc incrcascs. l-csotho is likcly to followBotswana's cxamplc by cracking down on the ANC inthc hopc of satisfying Prctoria and avoiding a formalasneemertr- b1

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Spazilond, Rclations bctwecn Swaziland and theANc have detcrioratcd stcadily. fo[owing a sccurityaSracment bctwccn Mbabane and Prctoria in t 982:

' [-ast yc8r, srcurity psrsonncl cngagcd in scvcral gunbattlcs with ANC Suerrillas who poured intoSwaziland following thc crackdown inMozarnbiour,j b3

. Last Dcccmbcr, a,n ANC mcmbcr assassinated aswazi policc official suspected of collaborating withrhe Sourh Africans against his groum

G_-z-_' tn January. scvcral armed ANc gucrrif ras stormed

a jail in Mbabanc and rclcascd three membcrs oftheir group who werc bcing hcld on wcapons and

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hospccts for talls bctwccn thc ANC and Prctoria Evcn if rclations bctwcen Prctoria and Maputohavc bccn widcly publicizcd in recent months.

OutlookSouth Africa has long sought c@nornic and sccurityac@.ds with ncighboring statcs to strengthen itsrcgional bcecmony and brcak out of its diplomaticisolation. Sincc Botswana's dccision to expcl theguerrillas, Prctoria publicly has backcd awgy- from itsdcmands for a nonaggrcssion pact. Despitc suchassuranccs. Pretoria is likcly to resume prc.ssingGaborone snd other neighboring governmcnts to signformal bila.tcral ugrccmcnts, espccially it thesegoyernmcnts provc unablc or unwillinS to control theANC. South African covcrt opcrations against ANCta{gets are likcly to continuc cven whilc Pretoriamovcs forward on the diplornatic front with its policyof regional detente. flr*ANC officials havc indicated publicty that thcy

- belicve a collapsc of thc Nkornati Accord is irnmincnt.

continuc to faltcr.: wc bclievc Mozambique is not

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undoubtcdly contributing to splits in thc ranks of thc a likcly to pcrmit largc numbcrs of ANC militaryorganization.r Thc ANC has a largc contingcnt of V pcrsonncl to rcturn. bccausc this would virtuallyflHi#'ji:[,?iffiT:il#i"fi !ttrsa:,,iJTl;:".;:ffi [r:'iitrf ricancrcss'bordcrbScommunication with Prctoria a( this timc. Somc whollso arc rncmbcrs of thc outlarvcd South African Conscqucntly. thc ANC nggbably will not bc ablc toCommunist Partyjudgc, probably corrcctly, that thcy rcbound from its sctbacks list ycar and mount anwould not bc includcd in any govcrnmcnt amncsty cFcctivc military campaign any time soon. Thc 73-offcr to thc ANC in thc forcsccablc future. ycar-old ANC. howevcr. has survivcd against toughNcvcrthclcss. thc ANC lcad;rship has indicatcd odds in thc past and is likcly to condnue totiuscpublicly that it would considcr opcning a dialoguc problems for Prcloria in thc ycarc ahcad. Whfirthcwith Prctoria if tlc govcrnmcnt tak6 certain good-

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q ANC's activitics probably will rcmain lt a low lcvclfaith mcasurcs, such as tbc unconditional relcasc of D/ t Mozlmbicrn iruurgent rttacks haw continucd rt e high lcvcl

dcspitc thc rocord. lcadin8 tq sccusations by offigirls in Mrpgtothat Prctorir is ttill rugplyinl the insurgcntslh

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imprisoncd ANC President Nclson Mandela.CFp

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bccausc of thc growing rGgional constraints, thegroup's military wing will still bc capble of carrying t Aout somc headline-grabbing bombings.t. DJA change in the status of imprisoncd ANC Prcsidcnt 'Nelson Mandcla rnight alter thcse prospcclsconsidcrably. If Mandcla wcre to bc relcasedunconditionally-sorncthing wc bclicvc is unlikely butpossiblc-his ovcrwhclming popularity among SouthAfrican nonrvhites would assurc him r major role indomestic black politics. If hc wcre to lcave thecountryand activcly resume his pcition as hcad o[ thc ANC,many young blacks would follow hirn to light undcr f^ 4his lcactrrr=ip.fli OrA rcinvigoratcd ANC with Mandela at the helmmight cven cause a shift in attitudcs among lcaders r.lfncighboring black statcs. Thcy currently arc follorvinga policy of cautious dctcntc with Prctoria, but thcirhatrcd of apartheid could overcomc fcar of SouthAfrican retribution if thcy bclicvcd the ANC'smilitsry campaign had a reasonable chancc o[ , ?succcss. I;ft b2

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