7th marine regiment - 1st battalion - special action ... · concussion type grenade caused few...

7TH MARINE REGIMENT - 1ST BATTALION - SPECIAL ACTION REPORT- 28 MAY 1952 - JUNE 1952

Korean War

Korean War Project Record: USMC-2333

CD: 23

United States Marine Corps History Division

Quantico, Virginia

Records: United States Marine Corps

Unit Name: 1st Marine Division

Records Group: RG 127

Depository: National Archives and Records Administration

Location: College Park, Maryland

Editor: Hal Barker

Korean War Project

P.O. Box 180190

Dallas, TX 75218-0190

http://www.koreanwar.org

http://www.koreanwar.org/

Korean War Project USMC-08400839

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0718/102 Al6-13 Ser 0 0 4 56- 6 2

JUL 10 i952

FIRST ENDORSErviENT on 1st NarDi v sec ltr ser 0071152 of 27 Jun 1952

From: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific To: Commandant of the Marine Corps

Subj: Special Action Report, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, forwarding of

l. Forwarded.

- \: ' ',~ k,i ~...-..., ... .,...,.,.. .... SECURITY INFORI>\ATION

J. L STEWART fly direction

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DOD DIR 6200.10

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SUPPLY Place Reference Numbers to CorresP<>ndenc'e Here: ..

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR IHTERVAI.Sr. • .•·· DECI.ASSIFI£0 AFTER 12 YEARS ;

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• • Headquarters ·

1st l·tarine Division (Rein:f") FMF c/o Fleet POst Office

San Francisco, Cali:f"ornia

IN FORl·iATION

Commanding General

3/SBP:dcd A9-l.. Ser: 0 0 7 11 5 2

2 7 JUN 1952

Commandant of the Marine Corps Co~~w~ding General, Fleet Msu~1ne Force, Paciiio

Special Action Report, 1st Battalion, 7th Mar~nes: forwarding of

g~ ~h 7~~l{~n 1 ~i~0t~g2 d~~a 1~sr~I 5i;1~9~~ol. l. Enclosures (1) ana (2) are forwarded herewith.

2. The e~~ect1vsnass of enemy ar-tiller-y and mortars ~considered to be of particular interest. Enemy artillery is dug into caves in the sides o:r hills. While th1.s #i'i~EIwhat channelizes their :f"ire and limits the traverse thlt can be obtained, it also considerably reduces the e:r:rect of our co~~tsr-battery fir-e. Aircraft rockets have been found to be particularly e:r:rective against targets ot ·this type, so that aircra:rt on station tends to reduce en-.7 artillery :rire to a minimum. ~

I QS}~r ._ J. T. SELDEN ~ •

111658

DECLASS!Fllm DOD DIR 52ciO.l4

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Korean War Project USMC-08400842, '

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Se1': 66 1/.f'I.J 17 JUN \952

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ColilLl8.nC0.nt; 01'f1c¢r Oo ...... u:cling General, lst H!U'ln~ 'Division

~_:c·c:1.al Hepor~c of: Action, 1st Battalion, ~c i-~E'. i 19 52

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ser: tllfl CJ.5'CJ 1 . """' . -17 JUN1952

("' ' -'...i co lot Bn ?th l·lar sec:r'et lt:r' ser 00269-A of. 11 June 1952

( ... \ co 1st Bn ?th 1~1ar secret Special Aotlon Report -'I

of-31 l·~ay 1952

2. '•'~lc Lu'or;U11.tion, co,lllrJents, and l'ecom>:!enclil.tions contained

111 tlH:J c~lcJ.octU."~ee a1.,e bielievea to ·be of ·.1ntel-.·est ~nd value u1ci. "'"'c, i.1l general, co'bcurred in by this headquarters.

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IIOD .OlR (i:o;-~o. ,10

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; • • IIeadqu.s.rt,e:r::,

lc~~ Bt3. ttalion, 7th !~arir.es lst t:·erh" Divir;ion FIT, cio '!'PO

Ca.n Fr:J.D~-1 sco, ca:5.fornia

Fro1 C0::-.c.·.lnc1in~ C-;'.fieC":·:~ To: r,o_ ".,_ndinc; Officm·, 7th !:arines

::::nc:l: ( J.) :J-1 -r\cpol' t (2) 3-2 Heport (3) s-3 r~cport. (!,) C'-4 n.epor:; ( 5) CormmnicB.tiont· ~·~eport (C) J:ecli cal ?.epor t (7) Cbaplnir>'s Report Cn Air P~eport ( ()) /,rtiJ.lery Report

(ln) ~a:1l: P.e.p~rt ("' l) Cor.1pany ''An ~eport (12) Conpru•y ncu T:.epo)~t,

:?C}:,/gcc A9 ser: 00269-A 11 June 1952

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l. :-:ncJ 8f'Ures (l) t',rou:;h (12) m·e. foruarcled for inform,tion and evalue.tion,

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non DW o;.loo.lo

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Korean War Project USMC-08400845DECLASSIFIED

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S-1 REPORT

The battalion casualty report of: the action of: 28 Hay 1952 lists a total of l4r:3 cs.sualties. Attached tu"lits suffered eight caSualties. Tha f'ollC\ting ch~rt is a breakdown by units and disposition of casualties:

nAtt nc tl HPNS

KIA ·' 4 1 3 DOH ., l 1 .1 WIA-EVAC i < 21, 13 15

H&S TACP

1

5 2 1

GEORGE

1

ARTY

1

1ST AMTRK

viiA-NE ' .• 50 ---- 12- _6 l;v-- __..-· .1/ 1 .. . -- l •J¥ _ __..-, ---, 0 ~- '

-d ; ?-· ~

The nine KIAs were. eight Narines and one Corpsman.

The f'n 1 1 nt.r-1 ncr ;~ B. - ----·· ---.:..> --CAPT LT MSGT

1 6 2

The followine is a

0300 - 9 0301 - 3 0302 - 4 0311 50

0316 - 5 0319 - 2 0331 17 0333 8

bree.kdovn of

TSGT SSGT

2 6

bree.kdown of

0331, 7 0335 - 15 03.36 3 0337 - 4

ca{mal ties by rank:

SGT CPL PFC & PVT

14 38 80

casualties by }lOS:

0341 1 0411 2 1834 1 1871 - 1

2111 - l 2511 - 4 2531 - 2 5861 - l

_.. !

CORPSMEN

8

USN - 8

All non-evacuated casualties were returned to duty within 72 hours. Regimental Headquarters sent 13 replacements f:rom that headquarters the following ua~. Four- additional r-eplacernents wer·e sent to the lin-e from Battalion Y~ Company. A study of the nature and extent of: wounds of: evacuated would indicate thnt 75% will be returned to duty within 10 days. In view of the 21st Replacement Draft in Korea, this battalion will not- suf:fer from shortage of personnel.

During the period 29 Eay - 2 June an additional 48 minor wounds were repori:.edj none or which required evacuation~

ENCLOSURE (1)

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S-2 REPORT

The enemy opposin3 ABLE was estimated to be one in~antry compa~ o~ T/0 strength. The enemy's defense was deployed in a horseshoe raahion frvm CT 044065 to CT 046065. Papers obtained from a dead Chinese o~~icer indicated that the identi~ication o~ this unit was the 5th Com~. 2Qd Be±+el1on, ~ Regi.Jr.ent, !87th ~ivision, 6Jrd CCF Army. . ·

Tne enemy, initially aeiena~ng Hill 1041 UT 044066, were armed with amall arms, automatic weapons and organic mortars. The de~ensive strategy employed by the enemy was sound and well planned. The likely avenues of approach to Hill 104 were mined or covered by tactical wire. Tactical wire used by the enemy was in some cases booby trapped with grenades and the trench lines contained booby trapped grenades also. The trench line occupied by friendlies after securing Fill 104 was very shallow, approximately 2t feet deep and not CQ~_nectine in all cases= The enemy firing positions were such th~t they were able to deliver ef~ective cross fire upon friendlies attacking their positions and the fact that the enemy were caught totally by surprise enabled the assaultine units to avoid this threat.

Hhen friendlies began their assa.ult 7 mal".y o~ the enemy 1:1ithdre\!! in e. dieorderly fashion. However, a large portion p~ the defenders chose to ~ght until they were destroyed. The enemy who withdrew took up. positions in defilade on the north slope of·Hill 104 and called in their supporting mortar 1

and artillery ~res on ~riendlies. Due to the accuracy of enemy mortar fire, 1 it is assumed preregistration of the trench line had been ~~de before the attack. The enemy hurled grenades from protected positions on the north slope and their 60mm and 82mm mortars delivered accurate and deadly ~ire consistently upon friendly positions.

The ent~lfJ.Y employed a machine gun :fr-om the vicinity of' CT 041069 a:f.L~rHill 104 was secured, but due to the de~ensive positions of the assaulting ~orce this ~ did little dama~e. This gun was destroyed immediately upon arrival of the first ~riendly tank on Hill 104. Enemy-mortars remained-active until friendly air arrived on the scene and silenced all remaining enemy ac·c.J..v~vy. Tne enemy casualties on Hill 104 inf"licted by ABLE were a counted JO KIA and three '.ITA and an estimated 25 KIA and 40 VTIA. ~ -

As a diversionary action to draw the enemy ~rom Hill 104 and release the j ~res~ure_o~ ~LE,_a_~e~~£~:~ed ~~atoon ~r~m.?HARL~E atta~~ed e~emy ~~sitions-:Ln t.ne v:Lcl.n:LT.y o:r: 1.;'1' u;;u:H. -rne enemy ae.L:Lverea sporaaJ.c sn:Lper r:Lre as \ the ~riendlies moved up to assault the objective. The ~riendly's base of fire successfully knocked out the snipers, and t.he assault unit received little ~ire until they were within thirty yards o~ the enemy and the base o~

ENCLOSURE C2 )

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fire could no lonGer fire without endangering the friendly troops. At this tL··ne the enemy employed small al·"'Dis, automatic weapons and concussion p-enades. The enemy's method of delivering grenades was to place seve~ men in a large cave dug into the bottom of their trenches which were approximately 5~· feet deep. Several men would arm grenades and one man woUld throw, not aim, but deliver enough grenades to cover a large area. The concussion type grenade caused few casualties. .trrJ.ena.tJ.es stormea uae trench line killing 15 enemy with fragmentation grenades, small arms tire, and bayonets. As soon as the friendlie.s had secured the trench line, the enemy opened up with three machine guns firing down the trenches now occupied by the friendlies. Light enemy mortars began dropping in and around the trench line. The enemy began to launch a counterattack but the friendlies, who were by this time using enemy grenades as well as their own,. broke up this action. ·

The friendliee broke contact and withdrew to the }rLR and received an estimated 500 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar fire during the withdrawal. Enemy casualties were a counted 15 KIA and an estimated;L5 KIA. No identification or papers were foUL~d on the bodies. The enemy observed were clean, well uniformed, and very healthy in appearance. The enemy's will to ftght and defend was excellent.

I The day's operation was given invaluable assistance by radio inte~gence I

intercept action which enabled the Battalion Comrua.nder to keep abraa;;t of \ the enemy tactical situation at all times.

ENCLOSURE ~)

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• • TLt-, (l.c: ~,~ 1 ::.1 cnl<Ch.,_ct o:' tl-·c OT'cr'='-. tion, from the point of vie1t1 of unit -com

manC:c-cc .':1.:_· •:rc.:..J.. :-·c ;:·L· "f o~_:"'lct::r·::· 5.::::volved, is inc1_uded in Snclosures (2) t""rou::-sl: (12) o~ t~-(: "tar~~-c letter.

2.: "':. ?at.t·1.:::_i0~,, "7-:h L':Lr~.r~cs .=ecre t. .,speci9.l Action RepoTt o.f 31 May 1952, p"!:·ev··~::ms1_y subrittc(.

:.:::t ::attalion, ''H~, !:arincs Secre-t:. Operation Plan Eurnber 16-52, DTG 2615CCI 1:ay 1952, rrc~ri'.Jusly Gubmitted.

APP:S~I'X !\,3I.:Z - 1/7 Sequence of operations (Plannine stage) (Secret).

A~0~TJX C~~.i0'li!:: - Ene:::~r ?..adio !nt.ercept inforrr,a ti0n received by the Bat~· .. sl.ion Corru-:anCer Cvrin~: the course of the operation. This inf'ormation provpfl l:.8 'be inv·:tlU:?~blt! in th··t VH:: battalion was for-e..:arned of' eneu\T 'lntenti~nf' "''"' <cetivitiec' l'~sultinc; in iroc",ediate counter-action directives •

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E!:GHlSURE (3)

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.... 'D'UAC!.Ti' ...... ~ ...... 1

021.5:

0245:

0245i

0300t

0300:

0400:

0400:

0400:

0400:

0400:

*0500a

*0505:

(0510:)

0515:

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1/7 SEQUENCE Q1 OPERATIONS (].>1arining Stage)

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..\.VTER H-HOtlR AT.Ti; TD-1!8 DEPENDS ON S!TTJATION''J...-rm: fROGF.];§S QF ASLT UNITS.

Open Bn OP 181,

Able Co move out from MLR.

. Able cross L.D.

1 Plat Charlie cross L.D.

Able Aslt Plat 1~ psn base 104. (also base of f~re Plat).

Plat Charlie in ~nitial psn CT 040054,

Charlie Plat attack ~ fire on OPLR 5 and dhirung-dong,

(0345-Fox, 2/1 will attack 2/l•s OPilt 1 ~ fire).

(1 Plat Fox at' d·i 059072).

Arty Barrage o~ ~104 7 Sl and 4::2 Bar:rage on 104; controlled by ABLE~

Aslt Plat olose on 104 following Sup/A barrage,

Secure Obj 1 - *epa.re to move out for Obj 2 on order.

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Rocket Ripples 01'1 Tumae-ri, Obj .2. *Controlled by Bn on call from Able.

Air strike - AD's G,J?, on '!'tllll8.e-ri (Diverted if necessary) *Controlled by Bn on call from Able,

Able Co move out from 104, aelt high ground N ,'il. and Tuma.e-r:l..

!!!~ Taedok-san and high ridge N.W. Tumae-ri,

4.2 prepared to smoke Tul!lae-ri on pull out,

APmiD!X ABLE TO ENCLOSTJFJ~ (3)

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1/7 SEQUENCE OF OPERATION (CONT'D)

0520:

0525:

(0525):

nt.nr. .. ....,...., .............

0300:

0'!00:

Note 1.

Arty smoke Taedok-san and en OP' s on hill mass N .1~, Ttmlae-ri.

Arty fire counter-btry.

Dog Co 1 Tank, prepared to fire on Northeast slopes Ttmlae-ri from

psn CT 055048, on order. 1 Tank prepared to fire on OPLR 5,

Chirung-dong and Taedok-san from psn CT 05004S.

2nd Plat prepareo to move from assembly pt to 104. (On completion

road mine clearance) by Engrs with Able Co,

Plat Charlie Co prepared to close on OPLR 5, on order, continue

attack by fire,

Air Strike on Red Hill or Chirung-dong as situation requires.

· On completion of raid on Tumae-ri, pull back to high ground tU>i.

104. p-Kl!a"' ARE FOR CATK fr01u Red Rill.

APPENDIX ABIE TO ENCLOSUP..E (3)

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0245-

02.\5-

02/,.5-

0)00-

0315-

0437

043:3-

0455-

0503-

0525-

0537-

0554-

0558-

0600-

0615-

0620-

0625-

0630-

0642-

0730-

0732-

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1/7 OPERA.TIONAT SEQuENCE OF E'tEHTS

Opened Bn OP on lSl

Able Co move out from MLR.

1 Plat Charlie Co move out from J{LR.

Plat Charlie crossed LD

Able Co crossed LD

Charlie opened fire

Ch:-Lt•lie 2 obser-ved "red star- stre&.Loern near 104

Able under martA~ fire - called in Arty fire.

Charlie Plat under mortar fire.

Able 3 in psn

1st Ech Able moving up both slopes obj #1

Charlie ordered to move on OPLR #5

Charlie moved out toward OPLR #5

Able secured obj

Able requested medical supplies

Able setting up defense

2 engrs started clearing tank road from front to rear.

Charlie reports large enemy movement on Taedok-san

Charlie entering enemy trenches on OPLR h'5 - heavy fire fight

1 tank ordered out beyond COP #1 to fire on Taedok-san

Engrs started clearing mines from forward tank tow&·d 104

Tar~s pulline into firing psn in front of COP #2 = target Taedok~san

APPENDIX BAKER TO ENCLOSURE (3) •

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0733-

0745-

0752-

0753--

0800-

0818-

0830-

0833-

0905-

0905-

0930-

0945-

11.42-

1215-

1.320.-

1345-

11,05-

1412-

1455-

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Charlie Plat cor.nnenced withdrawal ,·

1 Plat Charlie ordered to be attached to Able Co

Tanks arrived 104

Duck departed l·1LR :for Able Co

Tanks on psn on 104

Plat Charlie ordered to return OPLR #5 1

,,.,

Requested rocket ripple on Tumae-ri through Wine 3 ,i\-

Bullet Proof vests transfer from George Co to Charlie Co ~gmpleted

1 tank in pan by 81' s :firing on Chirung-dong

Charlie 1 held up and ordered to move back to MLR ;;;:,"

Charlie 1 back in MLR

Charlie 2 arrived Able Co psn

Able ordered to prepare to withdraw

Air Strike ~ Army Jets

AD spotted 6 active mortars North c:r T'",J..~s .... r!, El:L--rJ.na.tad-. ~~-, 'l

Also spotted 2 mortars N.W. of Tume.e-ri with body of tro~;&rouoo mortars, Eliminated.

Able entered COP #2

Able co· closed on NLR

Closed En OP on 131

Incoming temporarily ceased.

En reported counter-attacking on 104

..- -~ ,,

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APPENDIX BAKER TO ENCLOSUafj'~(3)

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ENEMY &\PIO INTERCEPT 28 MAY 52

Unknown to Unknown: Ask the cucumber to start serving rice, At the triangle area in the valley.

25 f-rom ~j: uos many en at 12th Sqd front, The situation may cause us to move our home. The en is stopping the sa.v.inge ..

No 1 also has en. Treat the en. En arty boml:)arded the 12th Sqd,

23 from 25: Did any of the en turn to ash,

25 from 23: Nothing happened here.

23 froir. 25: How many of our fried noodles (troops) did the en turn to ash,

25 from 23: I can't tell you the correct no.

•

25 from 23: 1 of our soldiers belonging to 19 has been brought back to #8 pen from .301. As a broken noodle, Contact #S to organize the unit. Find out the reason 19 went to construct the fortification and was hit. Nuw they moved home. llhere are the rest?

2.3 fran: 25: The able ones walked back and the broken noodles taken back by

litter. The wire is out. Be secure on this net,

Fror.: 23: Obs many en in front of me request arty.

FrOir #1 !rune-Chon: Our #9 psn has retreated to #S. Did you strengthen the unit?

#1 Kung-chon from Unknown: Yes I did.

Unknown to #1 Kung-Ghon: The en is very active on our E. now,

2.3 from t2 Comrade: Rept how many en and where are they.

/12 Comrade from 2.3: The en # cannot be counted at the place where our troops are resisti.ng.

2.3 from #2 Comrade: Be quick to obs.

#2 ComrAde from 23: The CO says the soldiers cannot be clearly obs. There may be ru.or-e than 1 car-t (Plat) , btlt less tl'.Jln 2.

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APPE}!DIX CHARLIE TO ENCLOSURE ( .3 j

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• • 25 from 253: Request our winter melons and watermelons rept to our front.

253 says: Cucumbers should hit a little fUrther.

253 says: To our right flank.

lS fron- lg.2: The CO orders that we be sure to control the situa.tion on the

left, right, and even at the back of our psn.

23 from ff2 Comrade: Where are the en ndw?

#2 Coll'.rade from 23: On the ~r.anuevering ground and on the hill.

23 from #2 Comrades \ihe:re are crux vwn troops?

#2 Co~~ade from 23: Not very far off~

23 from #2 Comrade: Who and how many?

#2 Comrade from 23: The 3rd Sqd is squatting inside the trench, they were

working there when the situation started. They are still there, request the

Plat CO's instructions on how to get them out of there.

23 from #2 Comrade: Where is the spot?

#2 Comrade from 23: The spot is on the trench on the hill,

253 from 25: En is moving home. Request Melon mission hit the S.."nB.ll highway

at the foot of this hill.

25 front 253: Which side of road?

253 from 25: The opposite side.

25 from 23: More en are obs on the hill now. Request :more

25 frorn 23: Reg Nelon at the foot of O"Jr own hill~

23 from 25 : ofhy?

25 from 23: Because the en are there.

18 fron1 lfl2: Reg reinforcements.

APPENDU CHARLIE TO El'ICLOSTJRE (3)

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' - - • • 18 from 132: We lost our #2 psn. 18 says have the en arr #2 factory?

From 182: Yes they are staying there now,

From 13: How was the condition?

From 182: He did not prepare well. Tell our reserve unit to come into action at once,

From 13: ~fhere?

Frorn 182: Our new factory (psn),

From Hl: Jim; many do want?

From 132: 1 case of noodles (Plat).

~--- ~ dl"''-r J:u111 ...L.O.C::.ii The en will break Ol.tr netv pan if you don 1 t send us Reinf'.

From 13 to 182; The CO orders you to hold this psn, we cannot afford to lose it, ruoh the en off the hill, It is an order,

#1 from 101: Hill 104 foreground we discovered. 1 en old cow. Request arty take action.

13 from 182: We have reorganized and the reinforcements have arr.

182 from 18: Hold that psn.

From 1:32: The en arty is firing on us,

From 18: Begin to accuse the en,

-,:;'1.,..1"1'1'!'1 "I <!"t'J. . .. ... ~ .. .L. _ ........ Send another CO. Et!erytl:-d.ng needs to be reorg?.nized.

Fror,l 1~2: H'lny of our troops are wounded, The CO 1st Plat is wounded. Send more troops.

1:32 from 1'~: Our man has taken a bag of noodles to your psn now.

From 132: ~:e has not

APPENDIX CHARLIE TO ENCLOSURE (3)

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From l81 The ditch between {/2 al:ld #'3 is occupied by the en. Since the en is

firing smoke shells you can utilize this time to retaliate the en.

18 frorr, 182: We have prepared many flying hB.nd ~"'-erltldes to attack ~-00.1.1 .•

18 frorn 182: The grO'I.llld nut is hitting us~ Ia this our own gro~ nut? If ao please fire on #2 psn.

182 from lf\1 Tell the Political off, that we have set the signal for the attack, ,

A Black one to retaliate the attack and a White one for all melons to concen-

trate fire on #2.

From 1g2: What should we do first?

From l81 Fire first the attack,

182 from 13: Our melons are on the way now, Begin to retaliate.

From 132: \>/hose ordE,r?

From 13: From Chief of Staff Officer.

From 1321 The reinf haven't arr yet.

From 18: Theytre coming. Prepare all troops to gc into action.

From lj-2: The en is breakine our #2 psn we are ready to accuse tLem. Send

homr. !r;ade rmndles at once.

From lf\2: Tho en is at #3 psn at our back tell reinf to come this minute.

From lC:: They will arrive,

1g from 122: The en are swa..·r·ming the highw~y and at~e a.t our backs now. The

reinf are nestling there. They do not come here, Tell them to come.

18 from 1"\2: The en is now breaking down our #3 psn. Send reinf. ';le are be

sier:;ed. Scnc.l help.

132 to 13: lese mortars on them on #2 psn, we may have to rush them,

132 to 1S: Send us anot!Jer Comer. ours is wounded,

APPENDIX CHARLIE TO E!XLOSURE (.3)

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• -- ..., ·• ..

182 frorr, 18: Don!-[, be co excited.

18 f'ror" 182: Tell the CO to talk to me.

1C2 .from ln: He is very busy and is giving orclers.

13 fl"Ollt Oul: siU.e is most important side.

Fron' lg2:. rtcquost 1 more case o:r !Joodles to come at once ..

182 frm; lC: Use the North Eelon to hit the old #2 psn. Be quick, situation critical.

122 f1,or:-: lE';: He l.-IilJ send you alJ the melons now~ Organize 2 telUllS to retaliate the em.

Frorr. 1;32: !rnJ,lediately a cucumbel' msn at #2 psn. He are fading.

From 1~: Ue are coin£j to reinf you.

From 1:'2: I ar·1 carryine; the rad.io on my back now. I cam1ot walk ea~;~y in this deep trench with this radio on "-Y back.

T:" .............. , ". J._' .L Vlll ...L.') i

From lll2:

Fron: lE:::

CO said tLo me:;lons .. .: ., , l'o .J...L.I_ open at /12.

The Reoist.a11ce is becomine weaker, request more noodles :fro:gl home.

The reinf left 10 min ago~

13 f'ron: 182: CO says keep vey calm and steady. The sit seems to be vEiry very critical.

253 f'rom ?.3: Our melon hit too short the tareet is the slope on the other side o£ the road now.

23 fron: Ko-IIo: The en are approaching us send some o.f your t.roops to the front of our hill.

APPE!IDIX CHARLIE TO ENCLOSURE. (3)

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S-4 REPORT

Prior to commencen•ent of the operation the follrnoting supplies were prestacked at ABI.E supply point:

One day Charlie rations 50 filled 5-gal. water cans One filled 300-gal. water trailer Two basic fills of B~oi including pyrotechnics 150 small and 50 large battle dressings 3000 cc of Serunt Albumen 60 stretchers

.All of the abcnre t~'ere sent- :f'ol:'\-rard to Hill 104 with the exception of the water trailer. KSCs were used along the trail from the HLR through COP 2 to Hill 104.. DUKWs and tanks were used along the road from the MLR to Hill 104. Trucks, DUKitls and Jeeps with trailers were used by supply activities in rear of' the }Tit.

The DU](I.Is were invaluable in this operation, especially in that portion of' the operation where they were used to carry ammunition and supplies to Hill 104 and to evacuate casualties on the return trip. On the order to wi thdre.w 1 they were used to haul equipment back from the objective. Because o:f the racks along the inside o£ the cargo space, it was possible to l.ca.d stretchers suspended across the space easily and in an orderly manner, utilizing a maximum of soace. The DUKWs were found to be much smoother r;l.ding than tanks or trucks: Seventy-five KSCs were used to carry stretchers, al.:. bumen, and supplies to Hill 104 innnediately after the af'!sault. They were then used as stretcher bearers for evacuation ove.r the trail until the road was cles.reo. On the order to withdraw they were used to load supplies on ts~~s and DTIKWs for movement to the rear. Some were used at Hill 104 to distribute supplies to the individual platoons. The KSCs were outstanding· throughout the operation.

One engineer officer and two engineer teams of three men each were attached to the task units. One team had the mission of clearin2 the area on and around Hill 104. The second team had the mission of clearing the helicopter strip at CT 046063, near Hill 104, and the road leading back to the MLR. The air strip WlW cleared under heavy fire but never used due to continuous mortar fire on it. Clearing or the road enabled tanks and DUK\ofs to reach the objective. The engineers did an outsta.nding job~

Every }Iarine and corpsman who went i:orward of the MLR wore an armored vest. Approximately~530 were used. One hundred and sixty vests were hit or damaged to some degree. sixteen requireo survey. It is quite possible that more vests were hit tn1t probably only slightly einpe to date no more have been turned in !:or survey.

ENCLOSURE 4

DECLASSIFIED

Korean War Project USMC-08400859r DECLASSIFIED

• • ..

Cml"UNICATIONS REPORT

Each lettered company was provided with two .trunk linea before th6, :Com-

~~6/ao~~~~!~n~n !!c~~a~~:~ne~~ow~~::~ ~~~s0!~owi!~e:S~ ~i~~ these two lines. The .two lines were subjected to interruption b,y v~t~~s enemy actions, mortar and artillery. The battalion was unable to ~MI_~i)l its primary means of connnunication, wire, with ABLE during this ope:i'i'f.ll.c>n• A platoon from CHARLIE usea wire connnunications from the company OP ~· their objective. It was also subjected to interruption. Wire contact>was maintained with BAlCF.R., CH.A..F..LIE, ttnd WE..L'PONS at all ti.'llee due to ag~~.ive trouble shooting. The battalion OP was provided with two lines to t~.'battalion switchboard, one line to TACP forward, one line to a radio.inWcept platoon, and one line to observation post #1. Only the radio interc~ line was subjected to interruption.

' A total of six SCR-300 radios were employed with ABLE. One SCR-3QO ·radio was used with each plato~n, one with the company commander, one was utfd for communication with the unit on the right f'lank, and the one rell>!tining 'vas with the executive of'f'icer of' the company. The Battalion Commander b«< illetantaneous voice commtL~ications with ABLE at all times. P~dio oou~~oa~ tion within the company was interrupted due to damaged radio equipment' Most of' the damage was caused by small arms and shrapnel. Two SCR-3Qo,ra• dios were lost by ABLE. Two SCR-536 radios were also lost by this o.ny. The SCR-536 radios were employed for communica~ion between squads. O~!E had one SCR=.300 radio da.~..aeed badly. ABLE wa~n'Pr-ovided with one charin_8l.1 . the battalion tactical channel for the company operation. This net 6eoame overcrowded due to TACP and other supporting units using the same c~. BAKER, Cl{Al'\LIE, and HEAPONS shared one channel· with good results.

With the Battalion Com:ma.ndel;'" on "tone OP, two SCR-300 radios were employed. One on the battalion tactical channel on which ABLE operated, and one~n the division infantry common channel on which BAKER; O!Lt.F.LIE; and WE.'<.'PONS'·.operated. The regimental tactical net, and the regimental coxrunand nets were :guarded at the rear CP. One radio operator with CHARLIE was killed. ABLE ~d one radio operator KIA and two WIA •. The enemy employed small arms fire and mortars to knock out these operators. Enemy interception was reported on,ABLE•S channel. No~n~l security measures were practiced ~~t more operator tr$!ning in transmission security measures should be included on a battalion t~ning schedule.

No pyrotechnics were used for this company operation. One BD-72 wal!' borrowed. to handle the additional lines required :for the company operation~ Both BAKER and CHARLIE had three SCR-300 radios .assigned. to them. Sb:. SCR-536 radios were employed by ABLE, and six by CHARLIE. It is SUJ<J<ested that the table of equipment for SCR-300 radios be raised from 10 to at least''20 for an infantry battalion.

ENCLOSURE (5)

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lillDICAL REPORT

To support the company operation on 2S Hay 1952, two Fornarcl Aid Stations Yrere ex"l~blished in the vicinity of the PiLR and the :rear Battalion- Aid station was maintained in the Battalion CP area. At 0600, on order, a Forward Aid Station, with a medl.cal of:ficer e.nd four corpsmen was set uo at CT 050520. Sixty-::;even men who were t<Otmded dtu•ine the attack on Hill iol, were tr;._.,s.:. ported via J.:arine and KSC stretcher team::; to this aid station, At 0815 a ---- _'\J--.. - _ro._ro_o - --- -- -• , ,.. .., 1.-. ' - • .,_ • ""' '• .,. ' • ' • •' -meu:~..cu.t UJ..L~cer a1-r1vea Irom ;>f-t -r.o -.;.aKe cnaree or. "tone casua.Llj1es a-r. vne Hear Battalion Aid Station, This aid station fUrnished 1nedical care for the CBARI.IE ;rounded who were not evacuated via a fornard aid station. At 0045 a seconc1 ForHard Aid Station, with a medical officer and two corpsmen, was established just to the rear of ABLE's left flank along the road that had been clearea w H~J.J. J.UL,. Three D\JT,:s and one tank brought 27 casualties from Hill lOL,. to this aid station.

I During the operation 9 men were KIA, 193 were WIA, one died of wounds, and

there were noNIA. Land mine~ caused tyO KIA and four WIA. Missiles caused

I two KIA and six IUA. Shrapnel caused five KIA and 174 \HA. No wounds were

~~=~~~~~~~ni~~!~;,~~e::n:o~:~~~ ~ ;e~ ~~~:ed vests (USHC 1951) though cursory ~ ----·--·-- ---·- --. ----- ···---·J - -·· -- -·· -·-- . -~ -~.

Eighty-t;ro WIA were- evacuated from the battalion for further treatment, Twenty-neven of these evacuations were by helic~pter ft·om the Forward Aid Stations to J:eclical Companies. Fifty-five \HA were evacuated via DUKW, pcirsonnel and runbulancc jeeps anU t~~ck from the fo~ward Aid Stations directly to the Regimental Aiel Station, The morale of the casualties was good.

Hedical Supplies on hand for the operation and amount used were as follws:

Stretchers Blankets Serum Albumin, units Sa.linE;J/glucose solutio~1, liters Dressings, battle DressinY.s. vaseline Dressines; copper suly~te Morphine syrettes, g/r -,, Splints, issue, arm Splints, issue, log Tourniquets J!ydroecn peroxide, bottles, large Eert',iola te, bottles 1 largo Adhesive tape, rollc

1

,..._ '----'l VU lu:tJJU

60 65

109 ·~ .L"

390 87

/,8 ll,O •n .LV

9 unlimited

3 3 ' 0

DECLASSIFIED

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Less than 60 Less than 65

20 ' .L

225 2 0

25 ' .L

0 10

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ENCLOSURE (6)


• • .... The company corpsmen in the assault ran low at one point on the supply of

morphine syrettes, albumin units and dressines. As soon as word of the shortage reached the Battalion Aid Station, additional supplies were carri.ed to the company on Hill 10/> via the supply train. Originally, each of the eight company corpsme:n carried lO morphine syrettes, t-wo units of albutnin and 10 dressl.nes. It is recommended for future planning that the assault corpsmen should carry a few additional syrettes, albumin units and battle dressirurs in their pockets • - · -

The Aid station bunker at CT 052050 OIIered protection to personnEl!l against incoming mortar and artillery fire, although a corpsman and a meober of the air team in that area sustained minor shrapnel wounds. The bunker was not large enoueh for the entrance of stretchers or the performance of various slirg:Lcal procedures. Fortunately, however, the casualties were attended to and cleared by prompt alr and land evacuation during the lulls in enemy firing. A bunker of sufficient she in this area to offer protection to the wounded and aid station personnel v1ould have been ideal~

Although the second Fonrard Aid Station to be established depended on runners for communication with ABLE supply point, air and land evacuation to the rear was not cvrtailed, Helicopters flying loH alone the J-!SR were easily hailed to la.ncl anr1 evacuate tho scrio,_,_s1y wou.nded= DlTKl.J's e_nd jeeps· shuttled the remai:ning casualties in a prompt fashion. In the future, it is recommended that an aid team always have an air terun member with si'"nal panels and radio in order to facilitate rapid air evacuations.

ENCLOSURE (6)

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CHAPLAII1 1S REPORT

The Regimental Chaplain was aware of the operation against the en~ several days in advance. This was helpf'"ul in planning ser--vices for the men before the actual operation began. The Catholic Chaplain was given this information and he held services also. Services were held in the Comp&ny and Platoon CPs on 26 and 27 May. - ~

On 23 May the Chaplain saw vne r~rsv w~a av vne Battalion a~u Station at. 0710. He then proceeded to the Forward Aid Station. The Catholic Chaplain han heen notified and was at the Forward Aid Station. The Chaplains brought spiritual comfort to the wounded and had prayer or administered last rites for the dead. They helped where needed in the aid stations, assisti~ the doctors and corpsmen in various ways. The Chaplain's jeep was assigned the task of taking wounded personnel to the Battalion CP.

The Chaplains divided their time between Battalion Aid Station and the two Forward Aid Stations. The Tank Battalion Chaplain, who had perso~el in the area, helped bring spir:l.tual comfort to the men. He brought coffee up for his men, and the Regimental Chaplain arranged for coffee, oranges, juice and cigarettes through the }.fess and Special Ser.,..ices Officer.

The Chaplains held Divine Services at the Battalion CP after the operation. Communion Service was held at 1930 on 28 May and Catholic Mass at 1100 on 29 Hay. Chaplains visited CHARLIE, ABLE, and EASY Medi-cal Companies to check on wounded who had not been evacuated to the Hospital Ship.

A Reeiraental Memorial Service is planned when the Regiment goes into reserve.

ENCLOSURE 7

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- AIR REPORT

The air plan was set up as follows: (1) furnish an OE observatioiJ,f,i>lane !'rem 041t5 1L"'ltil sundot.:n, to asaist in controlling close air support e....,J! t-o spot enenw mortar and artillery positions; (2) furnish air support ~' neutralize enemy counter-measures after Hill 104 was taken; (3) furnish',air support to neutralize Tumae-ri before the assault; (4) furnish a smO](tt screen for the assault on TUmae-ri and air support in the general aro·· on Chirung-dong and Red Hill; and (5) provide helicopters to avacua~ ~rgency eases from two strips located at the Battalion Forward Aid Station and' the base of Hill 104.

The TACP was divided into two groups. One group consisting of an.'I)~Heer ana -r.n.rt~e men w~n"" forwarc1 with the Corr.uuand Group of" ABLE. The obje.G1;J.ve.s of this group were to provide close control over the aircraft for air ~rt> and to reestablish helicopter strip No. 28, at the base of Hill 104, ~ emer~ncy evacuations. The second TACP group,.consisting of one officer·6,nd f'ive men, remained at the Battalion OP. The objectives of the second group:were to assist in the control of the close air support and to control the 1Jf,11cop-ter evacuations from the Battalion Forward Aid Station. ''

The TACP forward set up their CP five yards from Al3LE 1 S CP on HU1.·104. The F~C workin~_; with_ ~he ~n?5.nee:s att~mp~ed_ to re«:s~!>~i!'~.h~licopt~.~trip No. 2!:1. A st.rl.p co\Ud not. oe set. up a"t "tne oase ox· HJ.J.J. J.U4 oecause :.il'.lle grouncJ was soft and the low areas were under water. Evidently the e- had . been farrning the area_ and flooded. the land= The next suitable a~a ~~:defi-

~. lade was 500 meters south of Hill 104. The engineers cleared the area'. and ,i set up .a helicopter strip which could have served as a forward. evacuation point, '· 1 however, enenw incoming mortar fire was frequent and accurate in the atea. The

~~'\J ;~~i~~n:!~~~=~c~tc~::f~;~ ~b!nB;~~a;i~;PF~~a~s1~~in~c~o~m=+ivwni-g~~dc'oul~~d-~hao~~v!t•~!be~:6rne~:th J of Hill 104, If air support had been available the ~

l'-- neutralized and the strip made serviceable. . . , .

. !t~J /{~--~c~t~=~-i~-~~~ :~:~:~.~=~~.~a~ ~;:~w"f~=~~: ro:~~~-~o:,.~~~~ !::~~~: __ _ • vation plane until H plus 6! hours. The first aircra:rt over the target area

N' ~ was the OE observation plane at approximately 1100 (H plus 8 hours). · 't't was

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difficult to establish ground to air communications. Prior to 1100 both ~ radios, which operate on a VHF networl<, became inoperative. One radi01·had a mechanica] failure; the other was dQ.l1iai9ad b-,i incmrdng mortar. One sO.R-!-300 radio, which operates on an ~!HF network, was damaged by incoming artUJ.ery. The SCR-300 was repaired and satisfactory performance was obtained. O&mnmications >rere established with· the OE through the SCR-300. Aircraft. ~.n.dot norn~lly carry this radio but the FAC requested the OE to be so equi~ · • Direct conununications were not possible with the :fighter bombers and atlU~k. bombers. All messages from the FAC to the support aircraft had to be re~ayed through t,he OE who could contact both parties. t

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(J:he first close air sup!.>Ort aircraft, eight F-S4 Air Force. jets, arrived on station at 1150 as the word was being passed to retire .from Hill 104;] ArtilJery attempted to ~ark the targets with red smoke but were unsuccessful. The FAC then requested a whtte smoke marker. Artillery put a round of·WP on the tareet. However, there was so much smoke, both enemy and fr.iendly, in the area tho.t tho aircraft war. unable to identify the correctWP. The FAC talked the lead aircra.f"t onto t!1e ta.t•get in . a durnrny rtu:l by using :prominent landmarks and directions. The direction of runs was set up in such a manner that tho FAC could tell if the Planes were on the target as they started their dives. If any plane appe;red to be in a riight~path dang;,rous to the friendlieF., the FAC was prepared to call off the attack.

Enemy incoming mortar \las still heavy as the jets started their attack to cover t.he retirement.,. The jet.s dropped their entire loa.d on enemy positions approxillllltely 200 meter<. north of the friendlies. All the ordnance hit in the target area. Two mortar positions were destroyed but the incoming was still heavy.

ThP. second group of aircraft on st~tion was a flight of seven AD att•ck bombers. The OE had spotted several mortar positions which he requested to hit. The FAC turned the control of the aircraft over to the OE and cl.ared him to hit any targets north of the first target hit. The FAG maintained a position to observe tho line of atta~k so he could break off the runs 11' neces-

j j ::r~~r ~~c t~:s t~1 ii~~~~n s:~~~!: i~~~:i~g a~;r~~;Y rf;; :a~e:~~~;~e t~0;;ro :n a The troops were able to make an orderly withdrawal and clear the area·or all combat. equipment.

m'L..- .p,..,, ..... ~..; .......... ·- a ~ ... ,..,, ..... -" .,..f_ ............. ~~, + ..... .'.J.J.O:::: J. V..J.....l.V"f ..I..Ut; ~p UGOoU.I-0:::: v~ ~~· J.VQ~UO•

JETS AD TOTAL

Hortat"s Destroyed 2 6 g }Jort..a.x·s Dwna.ged

.., .., ~ ~

Bunkers Destroyed 3 3 6 Trenches Destroyed, in yards 150 150 .50 caliber Destroyed 1 1 KIA, estimat\od 5 10-20 15-25

--c~

All air evacuation was handled from the Battalion Forward Aid Stati9n. Eleven helicopters wer~ called in to evacuate 27 wounded. The helicopter pilots did a fine job. On several occasions they landed on a road intersection, 200 meters south of the Aid Station, for pickups, while the Aid Station was r~cei vitlf~ i:neomi:ne.

ENCLOSURE (8)

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Once the air support aircraft arrived in the target area they did ·~~:·•eplendjjl_ job,. r:r e.ir hHd been available as planned, it ie believed t~t t.b,e_· caeu~ alties would have been cut in half. It would have been possible to ~ra~ a forward evacuation strip and the infantry could have moved on to ~e-ri. Under similar conditions, where air is a primary support arm, it woul,ct be advisable to have an alternate plan available to delay the ·attack unti;such time ao air can operato.

ErtCLOSlJP..E. (S)

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• • AR'l'IVEHY REPORT

The> :ini tiul barraGe scheduled for 0400 \las delayed since ABLE was .ni:>t yet :tn position;· however, t~-ic barrace renained layed on the objective. ABLE w«t:; broucht unc1er i'irc by sHtll arms and mortars at OL,l,O and \lent into the attack. This J.in,; tee the prepc.rccl artillery barrage to five minutes. FOX ONE called f'irec of' the prea.rrtmc;cd clef'ense plan. The counter-mortar plan went into ef':fect aml counter-battery fire >~an :fired until 1300. Artillery remained on ca11 until the objective \Ja~; secured at 055G. At 0600, as the infarrtry was becimd.nc to orcanize, on Eill 10/" one rocket ripple and 105 ho>~itzer :rire Hat' brouc-ht on Tumae-ri. Thereafter, all artillery remained on call. At 0800 artill8ry fired on kno;rn avenues o:f approach anc1 assembly areas behind Tumae-ri and Chirung-donc;. At 081,1 artillery received radio intelligence that the enemy ua~; preparint::; a counter-attack. Artillery Liaison registered me!litun and lic;ht artillery on approaches to _101,. f'rom the Tumae-ri sector, and layed but did not load, tuo batteries of li!edium artHlery and :rive batteries of light artillery, plus roc~tets, on these approaches. As a further precaution, !'iring data Has coraputed for the military crest and reverse slopes of OPLR 5. FOX TIIT::CE -~ . .ras coverinG the \-ti t11dra\-r of CH.A.HLIE. About 0900 it wac noted that, af'ter a preliminary barrae;e and some sr..oke si~:;nals, the Chinese attacked OPLR 5. Artillery layed Hi th t1H.~ data to hit OPLR 5 and opened fire as the enemy reached the crest., catching t),e,, in the open, Artillery continued to f'ire until the tanks >~ere in position to observe the rear of OPiu'l. 5. Batteries relayed on }tj_l] 101... About 1000 radio intelligence stated that the Chinese were pinned do'.rn on OPLR 5 by tanks e.ncl artillery and that the survivors could not escape. Artill cry \-Jas then aeai11_ brou~ht in on OPLB. 5.

At 1220 ABLE was orclered to cormrconce \·ri thdra>Tal. The ui thdrawal was covered ·oy rockets, "rhich fired one ripple, and by light and· l:lCdium artillery, which f'ired ITF. and smoke, At 11,.05 ABLF. returned to the IIT..R and artillery. ceased f'ire.

The use of prepo.recJ f'irc planf; for -these operations is urged and th~ results are e>:e:oJ.lent. These plane; simpli:fy the job of' the FO and also enableS the artillery Liaison Of':ficor to call accurate !'ires in close when the FO is out of' contact.

Counter-battery ancl counter-ntortar fire \Jere ueak ·for tHo reasons. Weather uas poor tin's keepine; air observation on the ground until noon, Once the 6E was on station tho :fires ir1provecl, Lacl: o:r t.rainine of artillery FO team and inf'antry in analyeis of cr8.tcrs' slo,ed fire considerably. Training in the companies by the FO is urged, for acct.rrate j_nforr:lfl.t.ion g.Lven rap1a.ty during an enemy barrc.e;o Hl.ll enable rapid, accurate f'ire to be brought on the enemy.

ENCLOSURE (9)

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.Scvonty-oieht missions uere :fired during the day. The mpnber o:f rounds fired \.Ias as follows:

2-11 3-11. /,-11 Art1y

2,930 rounds 550 rounds 122 :rounds

60 rounds r:ockets 23.3 rounds

4 ,.E-50 rounds to t-<tl '7 O.e>n

'--'I I,.....,...

Artillery communications >~ere set up to include three land lines to the rear, from three OPs, all of t-1hich 1<ore tied in. These lines stayr,d in operation continuously except for a one-half hour period. One land line 1<as layed.f'orward and renained in oper,,_tion except for a two hour period. Radio oommuni9ations were in all the ti.uc. Radios Here 619 t;y-pe and contact uas rr1a.inta.ined with FOX OlrE, three OPs, Artiller:/ J.iaison, 3at.t9.lion CP, and td th FDC.

The clisnosi tion ·of ~.rtillcry personnel 1<as as follolls:

a. ?tid obs. team ~~iith A Co. 1 FOrt, 1 scout Sgt., 1 619 opr., 2 wiremen

b. Arty Lno team on Dn OP 1 Lno Lt., 1 619 opr., 1 wireman

c. Shifted B Co. FO and radio opr. to A Co. on on standby. Scout set. and wiremen of this team remained in B Co. OP -2 t·Iiremen frorr. A Co. rer.1a.ined on A Co. OP

d. :Cwl obs team of C Co. remained in C Co. OP and conducted :Eire f-rom there.

e. O~:r~.. set .. : 2 Hj_re::1P.n rc)nn.inod in Bn CP" ThtlS e_l)_ land lines were covered from both ends m:ridi tine; rep9.ir of lines.

The followine com entFJ relative to artillery smoke are submitted:

a~ ~I :P ~ - excellent :for r•:arldng and harrassing eneP'.Y personnel.. For use of cover ratl-JCr poor due to billmdne effect. H.P. is extremely limited in 11th Harines.

b. E .C. - Ammunition \las old thus the effect was very poor. Recommend no u.sc o.f rr .c .. smo}:e ..

c. Color - Amnrunition old and attempts to use it were failures. Recommend ~.r.P. :for markinG.

E~TCLOSTJP~ (9)

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-- TAl!E REPORT

{I On 2r Fay, DOG T Al·lKS, while in direct support of the 7th Harines, was or

derec1. to support a company patrol of the 1st Battalion, with t-wo tank platoons. The 2nd Platoon •,1as assigned the mission of close support and the Jr£1 Platoon was assip:r,ed the mission of giving the patrol covering fire support fron, f'ixed positions.

At 2200 on 27 I-.·jay tl1e 3rd Platoon movea ~n~o IJ.Xed firing positions at CT 05101.7 and CT 054011.7, one section of tanks at· each position. This pl.li.toon sunnorted with cove1·ing f'ire f'rom 0700 to 1400. the fire beirut controlled bv th~· Company Commaniler :from the OP. The Jrtl ·Platoon expended 214 rounds of-90rm;t EE and 1:3 rounds of 90r!lln WP, destroying nine enemy bunkers, one eneiny firine point, two enerny personnel shelters and shot up and damaged twe~ve enen1y coDllllunications trenches. No estimate of enemy killed and wounded is given,. :;.

~,#"' The 2nd Platoon moved out in support of the company, on.\order of the Battalion Comroander, who was on the OP. The Platoon Leader took one section of I v~ '

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? !a1~:i~~~~~c\t~~c1 o~el~e 0~=t~!~t!~~c~n¥!:~~p~~~ila~~: !:~:;~rt~~s ~~~~d~e The support section would make its firing run at the same time carrying needed ar,nr,wli tion and supplies forward. As soon as a f'iring run was completed, a section would return to rearm and proceed forward once again. This c;ycle was continued until 1400 >!hen the platoon Waf; ordered back to the assembq area. The 2nd Platoon eA}.lended 177 row."lds of 90mm HE and t'..rc rounds of 90mm WP. Eight enemy bunkers \<ere destroyed, tl:ree enemy OPs were destroyed and eight enemy cOJmnunications trenches were shot up and damaged. An estimated .twenty enen~ personnel were killed.

The corpsxnan a.ttacbed to the 2nU Platoon, when the infantry was getting numerou~ casualties, volunteered himself and worked forward with the infantry from 0300 to l/,00 aiding wounded.

ENCLOSURE (10)

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ABLF: crossed the LD at 0300. The 1st platoon, followed by the Colllllland Group took a ro.ute leadine to the ridge left of Hill 104. The 3d platoon passed the LD and follo;:ed a route leading to a small hill mass to the· ·rear of Hill 10~.. The 1st platoon moved sl<l'•er than contemplated because of dArkness and heavy Heapons personnel, and was late in arriving in the assault pol!ition.

/} After :[ive _min1,1te artillery barrage, the 1st platoon assaulted the objective assisted by the 3d platoon fir-ing at Hill 104 and Un'-gok. A:fter- _the .1-.111 was secured, the 3d platoon moved up to Hill 10~. mopping up by-passed'ene~. During the assault casualties were sustained while crossing a mine field.. Also, a very heavy barrage of enemy mortar and artillery was brought to bear .. onHiil 104. All but one wire line was knocked out by incoming mortars and artillery fire.. Also, all but two SCR-.300s were knocked out alone wit.h the radiO operators. In the confusion the Colrumand Group became separated. Due to h~vy casualties in the 1st platoon, the 3d platoon was ordered to stand by to. continue the attack on intermediate objective 2, covered by fire from the 1st platoon.

{Enemy_ artillery and morta?" fir: i~:lCre~sed in tempo. until it. was imp?~~ible ·to

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move 1n the open except when aDso~uteLy necessary ~o evacuave casuaiu~es. Scheduled air support-and observation were not on station because of lD.clement wPAt.h,Ar.. ,\lt,honf"h f'rienillv a.rtillerv was e:f:fective to a de!lree On oounter-

1 ) ~;;t,~~ ~nc1 ;~t:ii1ery- ri;,e ,·the enemy" continued to keep the 10.4 hill ma_ .81! .. under

I heavy fire. During some~ periods th~ c?~pany wa~ su~tai?i~g ~a~ual:ie~ ~t t?e 1 11ate of 12 per 1'ive minutes. Practically every tJUnl{er naa eloher oeen aemol.

shed by friendly artil '~ery and air, or the enemy had them heavily booby-

~~~p~~; a~~~~~~~=n~~~ ~~~~~t~~~JtA: :~~~111~: ~~!~~~i; ~~n!~~~~~=r ei;~i :~!ered by a fire teru:,, was sent back '!11th the mission of clearing a trail for vehicular trt"'fic. As casualties mounted, the operation was hampered becaUI!e communication '<as heinz const.antly knocked out and because there was no air observa-

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tion to a~JiRt in brinsing effective fire on sources of enemy mortar and artil~~-xe~' Recommendation was nnde to the Battalion Commander that the company (hold and defend the position and continue the attack if and when air support ~ve5.lab1e,, ·"Permission lias granted and the company continued to defend and

1 n 1)~~~~1-~~~~~u;~~d e~~!~ t;~~~~ts o:~dpt~;~~n m~;t!;~~s~~~o~:~le~n f~~:r~£ t~h:8~!:!= I . I

nlty situation it wa~ roconm,ended that, for defense of Eill 104, or for continuation of tlw attack, a reinforcing platoon be attached as soon as possible • During the operation certain enemy intelligence infonuation was available to high~r, a;'t1'~!·~ty pef~~in~n~-~~-~~"' e~~~~~i~en~s_l'_~~, ~h~-~~:=~t~~~ as well as tHlUlll.}' .LUU.t:IJ U.LUU.S • IU.~ .L!U.U,I:Jlll:1V.LUU <::.l!_::lot!U ~~ <::1 mu~·d..Lt: UUUDlot:~· ~UU 8.150 enabled the con,c1any to prepare for additional enemy activity.

Tho company was ordered to withdraw under cover of air and supporting arms. The wi thclrawal was orderly and all known friendly supplies and equipment were returneu 1.0 T.ne !llLtt. very shortly a.fter tlle withdrawal a .concenW""ated barl"'&ge

of enemy mortar and artillery was placed on Hill 104. ·The enemy counter-attacked into e1rrpty positions and were hit hard by friendly artillery and air.

ENCLOSURE (11)

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' ' • • Supnly and ev·acuation dud.ng the operation played a major role, Jvacua

tioh and supply points were set up at the foot of the objective 1~e~1at~ly after it uas secured~ Due to the large number of initial Clj.sualtiea&·llhortage of stretcher<. resulted durine the first half hour, KSC supply I!Uld litter carriers arr:!.ved about one hour later and evacuated all wounded, ~ore

stretchers were sent up and evacuation was speeded up considerably, O.be diff'icu.l ty ex-per-ienced uas the constant enem-.f mortar and artiller"J f':l.re :~;eceived on the supply and evacuation route, Several KSCs were wounded and_ omfkilled as a resuJ.t. of thts situation. The KSCs shoulCI be conunended for the tine job they did carrying out thn wo1mded and bringing in supplies, After the DUlGls '"ere able to come up the road to the evacu>ttion and supply point, KSCs were utilized to load and unload these vehicles. Hounded were car-ried to .the evacuation point by members of the platoon and these personnel carried aDIIJI\!llition ana ~"P!>lie~ back to t'•e platoon sectors. At one time tanks were requested for evacuation; hoHever D11K\-Is arrived just as the first casualty was being loaded into the tank, It is recommended that tanks not be used for this purpose exce:~pt under extreme conditions or only for evacuation of WOWlded who are not too ~;erious, The hatch through which the casualty must be loaded is very sma.J.1 a.:rHl an extreme e.mount of man-handline is required~ Upon order to withdraw imnwdiate stepc. >rer<e taken to evacuate all supplies and to insure that none 'Hlre left on the objective. Tanks and DUKHs were used to carry much of the equipment. Platoons each brought platoon supplies and equipment from the objective and either load"d it on vehicles or carrJ.ed it back to the,MLR. The withdrawal vras ord2rJy anrl wns conducted with no casualties.

APPEJ-iDIX ABLE - Pertinent Comments

ENCLOSURE (11)

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• • Tho following comments were taken from statements prepared by members of

the company in various capad.ties, i.e., squad leaders, fire team leaders, attached unit leaders, etc. and are deemed pertinent:

Duri:ng tlte \-d.thd:ravr:-.1 of rle.toons, 1-I:t.:Gs were used as a covering fire: element.

One platoon conmtandcr observed th9.t the enemy had their hill positions, trenches and bunkers ?.eroed in with mort,.rs. Quick thinking in moving out of vnese prcre.red position~ and on to higher ground saved many lives when subsequent mort~r fire trevereed these positions.

Durln::: a small countcr-attac1: action by tho enerr,y it was noticed by the platoon sere:;ecnt that the ene::1y ;rould creep right up to the fringe of the mor.tar impact are"- to close in for the assault Hhen the fire li.fted. As the barrage lifted, :cr.mades \Jere thro·,m and then tho atwck commenced.

Im,pection of one lar::;e enemy bunker disclosed that the enemy leaves a hole in tlw I on through 1:hich [;rcnmlec can be thro>rn. Also, the bunker is constructed ':Ii.L hro horirontal bo!lrr~s clear of the deck. ~Then a grenade enters the bunl;er, tlo enemy jurr'P'' up on the planks and the grene.de drops in the bottom o.f the btl:n.kE--l~ in the slirrie ancl mud unc1 is of'tentin:es rendered relatively ineffective.

At one ti1•:e the assault platoon's f'irst squad ;ras pinned down f'or 10 minutes by fd.endly Jw.G fire. Apparently the sienal to shift fire ;ras not given or not unO_ ere tooO •

Ir1 the as~aul t platoon t.here Has a t.endency :ror BP..R and KG men to :fire s.i.~-lessly after the defense sot up. It is understandable that fire discipline will slack off in such a situation. It was noticed, however, that the first attempt at counter-attack was directed at the location where these men had been firlng. It \-las also notlced by several individuals of this platoon that heavy moi·tg_r fj re Has rcce:!_vod on the trench lines but that relatively little was receive<l on the top and fo:r-.;ard slopes higher up the objective. !-lost men observed too f11r out fro1:1 the defensive positlons, and the majority were too slov looking up after a mortar barrae;e. One additional fact ;ras noted in this platoon - that when the counter-attack struck, the area hardest hit Has a din of' confusion and yells f'or corp~men 1-rhicl;, tf t}w attack had been in for·ce, would have pinpointed the 'roa'kest p9.rt of ·the dcf'ense for the enemy.

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?r":: 1. bt!l.l of 16 reports scanned it wac noted that in five instances

cor.>c:.ent wt:· made •;hat 1.t t<as too bad the withdrawal had to be ordered be

cause tLe 1::'.11 could "easily" have been held. It ''as also noted that many.

mentions Here made of the hi;::h morale of the men.

Tl-,r'! t~.i1:·d platoon, with l D'·IG and l IiJ.~G section att:J.ched,. .f"irinr; in sup

port of the lst platoon • s att.!l.ck, expended 2il boxes of machine (,'1.m ammuni

tion 1\'1cJ ·10 bandoliers nf H-1 P...rnmunition.

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C'n~ :·qrit"e b the 3d ;r>latoon stepped on a shoe rrdne and suffered no injury.

The '"'"' fa:'_ 1. atd;1e received a minor wound in the leg. A small field of "boun

ct:~c bctt;'s" was discovered on the left slope of Hill 104. A path was cleared

t.L:conci i:.ld::: field by the simple expedient of unscrevjing the fuses sincB all

·.Jer-e m:po,.·cc:, relati1rely new and easy to dismantle•

Cor>d.derable barbed wire was booby-trapped tdth American fragmentation gre

nades.

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APPE!mU ABLB TO ENCLOSUil.E (11)

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CO!lPA~'Y 11C11 REPORT

V·-· "<~·- ... __ .... \' {',.-'?> :"he 3tl phtoon of cc•AR>:,IE moved out from the ~'lLR at 0230 in very fog;:;z

_ }-,• .:d.J;:a:tt:;:,r. Control 'l:rJ conu•mnicahions was difficult since radio silence hiicl

1_-\- c,- \' been orJArc"J and dnce the l11ying of >lire 11as difficult in the darkness and I ,

Th~ 3d pl.'J.toon established itc. base of oper.".lticns and opened !'ire on OPT.'R

5 anr1 C'TI:lm:G-DO!lG at about 0425. Due to fog it >las impossible for the Com

pany Cor.cnmcder at thA OP to determine whether the 3d platoon ;Jas neutralizing

its n2c'1.::;nN1 areas. 1To1mver, no return fire was heard from OPLR 5 for quite

ll Hb<_lc. 'J'he CCF troOpB there 'Jere obviously taken by surprise.

Th<' Company Comwmder manned the company sound p011er phone at the OP, main

t;q_inirt.: comnunications ·with the lst anc1 2ft. platoons .a.·s '..Jell as the 60rnm mor

tars <tnc tt" fll:nm r:nd 4.2 mortar FO• s. The Company Executive Officer manned

the CJ.rect line t,Ound ~hone 1.r1:J.ich connected the Company OP, compllny rear sup

ply point, company forward supply point, the 3d platoon and the base of fire

at CP !, about 700 yards from OPLR 5. This base of fire unit was manned by a

S'll'ail from the 1st pl'ltoon and two heavy machine guns, '•ith an officer in

ch:1r_:e.

At ahout 0535 the: Battalion Commander asked if the 3d platoon uas ready to

ta\t:-; OPT:R 5. The r:lntoon to.'.9.S ready and Has alerted by radio since l9.nd line

''as out teq,orarily. The code nRme for OPLR 5 was 1-CARILYl', the name of the

plotoon com:'o1mder 1 n Hife. The 3d platoon was informed that artillery Has

'\JST:UCYL\':D, tho mune of the FO. As rr.any code words as possible were used

f sbce tl.:c enemy has an SCR-300 set up on the Battalion channel. Artillery

f then l~icl clnun A. barraee of approximately 15 minutes dura+~ion. 4.2s, els

and COs '.Jere 'Jsed to cover OPLR 5 from the time artillery lifted and the time

~"e p:~r,n-, • . .ras eloce enough to s.ssa.ult the objective.. The mort.ars wer~ sl1ifted

left lmtil time to lift fires completely.

•,•;,c;n the platoo11 e_,,::3aulted the objective, incoming 60 mortar shells inter

dicted Uw for~<nlrd supply route. This fact uas not 'mown to the Company Com

mnndor until informei! by the platoon commander after return to the EL't that

tho nlP.',oon hP,d pmc tically run out of ammunition. The company W-as first

aw;:!.rc V··fl-: the platoon W'H.S in trouble vi}u;n the platoon requested permtscion to

pull back (ncine another code ''ord). Upon heine given direct instructions to

infor;:I ~-:by the request '·Tas m~de, th8 following message was received; "Enemv

/) rl::;ht, enenw eft enem rear IA ~H I 11 Permission was obtained from higher

am:lior ty for the d p a oon to ;ri thdra;r. The 3d pl.'!\toon then asked for help.

After ~l0rtine; \Jhn t men were available in the lst platoon (one squad \-las set up

as a base of fire for the 3d plllti>o,-,, one squad was helping move supplies to

the forwar·cl supply point. and the 2U. platoon was attached to .A.DIE), the .30 pl9.

toOJl WlG informed th'lt help Han on the way. In code the 3d platoon further

repo;·tef t'··::~t ccnt~ct could n0t be brol;:en wi_thout help.

m1CL0SURE (12)

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!l,bout. tH .. s time the enemy fired two red star signals, presumably calling

for artillery. The 3d platoon broke contact, bringing back all casualt5.es.

OPL'l. 5 wac: then smoked with 4.2s and gl mortars as well as artillery, cover

inc the: Jo platoons crithdrawal, Heavy mortar fire commenced to fall on the

fon:a:-d slorc of OPLR 5 as the Jd and lst platoons began to pull back to the .L'I-~-*--~--1 -··r.-,,. ---2-J- .~t-. .S-1.... ··-- ~'1- ..................... ~ .... 4 ..... --. 'h .......... -.- ~ ........ ,.......,.f.,......, T1-....,.,....,,,N"'h 1af'"t~ J.Ul"W1.~ .. .r-u ~al.:JJ-L.f }1V.LHV' W!J.lV! .. J. W•:J.i:> ::t..l..cu J.ll;a .... v.t..v •uf.:, u""''""'".J -~..u .... ....,~, ...... uo• •. ~ ....... ~·~u ·'"'-..... ~~

of an O:S the enemy mortar positions could not be located, Suspected positions

on tb8 rev''"""'' slopes o:' OPL!t 5 and the ridge behind OPLR 5 were fired on. ~Ieavy artUlery fire ,.Jas falling on the CHA.."!LIE sector at this time, apparently nJ•·Nl ~et the OP.

\>Then tb<r patrol had reached tr•e NIJt, the base 0f fire squad was pulled back.

This :Jf11,nf ',ra.s receivin[; 60 mortar- ftre at the tim.a. The squad returned to the

EL:l., h.s.vin:; to abandon some FG ammunition to save lives.

!)uring t'rc oper.•1tion Cl!'.RLIE suffered 2 KIA (1 in ABLE sectcr) and 22 ;ru (9 ir ABC.E rectcr), The patrol leader ccunted 15 enemy KIA and estimated 15 nrlc'it.bral in a huse pilcr of bodies in the network of trenches on O!'LR 5.

'1:'1"-'.6 3d r~~JLtoon could hA.ve held OPLR ; if suffictent WTlillUnition had been

avaiJob1e, immediately, to the platoon on the objective. Ammunition •,ras available at the ·fcrJard su'Or.lly point a.nd could have been t.aken to the '3d nla

toon if enemy mortar fire had been neutralized, Artillery, 4.2, 31 and 60 mer tars fi.red on all SUC'pected positions in the vicinity of OPLR 5, Chirung

dor.,; and Tncdok-san. · OE observation would have made a great deal of difference.

~,...,'1'"'\-r:o~ .. 'r\Tf'ln(<. 1\T">T"!;\ "');t ...,.1,..,-J.,..,...._.,... ..,."",...,..., .... + ~ir r .i::. .i..'l • ..... ..:.._: • .>-s.JJl...I.:.:J - _..~...~. J-'...1...': ... vvvu ... '-'.!:""'"" .... ..,

BAKB2 - Report of action on COP 4 CFJ,nLIE - 2d platoon repcrt

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ENC LOST:RE ( 12)

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• !}J.o:' (h"cra tion Orc1er , -,·,_::c: received on .26 1-:ay 1952 :tn thE: late evening. On the

mo:r·r.in0 of 27 P<i:Y a rtcc-t:.:i __ :-,~~ ~..--~H:.> eallec~ of al '- u.ni't lea.cJe;_'s. The order was read by the C:mr.p-rr,y Cor•onA.n<'!er and all phase~ explained in detail. Ammunition requircrrcnt~- for all -:-:-canors '.vere est4.r::~ted,_ and the Gunnery Sergeant_. and the Cor'y'lliJ Executive Officer cont'lctcd :Satt,.lion ?.upply to make all arrangements for e.:·o·.nriti<>n to 1,,, deliverer' t.o the Company Supply Point. All anununition, bullet-pro0~'"' vests, extra 1:Gs, il:?..tlle thro'...~ers and spare parts i..;rere carried to the ec12e of tbc rovt":rse s1 ope h:/ KSCs <lurinc the afternoon of" the 27th. A11 a.rmnunj_t.inn -r:J.n(1 8f}Uipment 1_JQT'C j_rven~.oried by the platoon euide and inSpected by the plA..toon cor,1f,IJ?_ndcr.

A r::cetin;·: of' Rll _Pire team A.rcl squad leaders, leaders of" ntta.ched units and tLc plR too:' headq1wrte,..~ '~ras held at noon on the 27th of ] :ay. The order was rcn.c: :'md ~-tll phase::: e:xplai.ned 1_n detn.il.

A site ·ns selected for a f'ol:"wat'd aid station. Arrangements ·were made f'or a e.upnly of ctretchers medical. supplies and a rein~orccd rifie squad to act as strctclJer ~·,carerr.. Tr,, cite selected uas at CT 01,1049, in a defiladed area at

team '~iere stationed there.

ArrangeJ"ents ·•ere ""'de for a workinE; party of one squad from the first and sec01cd platoons which would move all anununition and equipment forward to a supply point located at the furthest point forward of the }'LR between two rJdlls occupied by the lst platoon of CHAF..LIE. A def'iladed area was selected--~d all the ar.muni tion and equipment was moved forward tmder cover of darkness.·

\1 The t:>t'l.J. strength of the task unit was 1.35 men. A time schedule vas established. All attache<'! units were to be in their assembly areas by midnight.

The order of march was organized as follows: ~hird squad, 3d platoon - assault force.. Its ptJ.rpose was to precede the main

body, clear all enemy opposition, beware of all ambushes and guide the main body. The platoot: comma.ndcr 1-'UB with the ass-ault squad.

The lc;t rection of the light !'G platoon followed the third squad. BMGs were sub:::ti bJtcd for the T/0 u:cs and 22 boxes of a.TD.."'Tl:l.In:tticn \·rere carried by this sectior: (tLe 1st squad, 1st platoon was to be on position on COP 4 with 1.3 boxes of' FG a,cmmnition). The firct section of KGs followed the .3d squad to the LD, then rr.oved off to the lert and proceeded to COP 4, joined the 1st squad, lst pla tom: anc' set up aE a base of fire on OPLR 5.

The 2d squad, .3d Dlatoon followed next, each l!'.an carrying one box of MG arr.munition.

APPEEDIX AFLE TU ill!CLOSUnE (12)

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... The 3d section, 1m platoon :followed next, carrying two ,50 callber :MGs, 2

EEGs ar;d 22 boxes of 1~G au~..1r..iticn. · -~

'l'he 2d ~ection o:f "l:Gs f'rom ~J'EA..'DQNS came next, carrying two HMGs &Jijt 35 boxe;: of !:G ammunition.

Tne: ne::;.t unit was the 2d section of the Assa:nlt Platoon ing h;o "lrune thrm;ers and four 3.5 rocket launchers.

l'ext c5£.e the lst squad of tloe C!':fu1.LIE mortars, carrying two tubes.:.and 45 ro1mc1 s of' ':I:, ..,_,,o rounds of '.<rP were carried as the signal to open fire, The

• alternate signal for open fire ·~>1as .!.,o open fire with the • 50 caliber-;:.·

Tl:~ r.c~!~ unit ·wa.c t1:8 supply party and Forward Aid Station~ incl~ the pl.<J.toon C,OJide, co111pan;: rockets, corpsir.ar. and covering :fire teams carl'J'ing stretchers, medical stores and a telephone for forward supply. ·

LHst '•'''" the lst squad, 3d rlatoon, including a wire team and the platoon sBr£.:0D.r,t, each rne.n carrying one box of J.:G RJTllTilLnition~ One runner arulJ~CR-300 ~perator \olcre with the platoon commander and one runner Hith the platoon sergear::t. li·- r· ~ 11

:..11 unitf' began movir.g into position at 0030, 28 May. All troops were issue~ b'W.let.-proof vests and assault rations. Each me.n was inspect-ed t.o assur-e tLat he carried a mininrt.ml of three bandoliers plus a f'ull belt e~M-1 """"Ul'itioh {full belt for BAR raen), three grenades and the assigned Wltes of EG ru;Jc:utlition. All unit leaders reviewed plans and a time check was •de at 020C. .

The force moved ou~ of the asseJilbly area at 0220 and crossed the MUi. at 02:30. Eov el!lent was slow due to excessive amount of heavy weapons and IUllllUnitior;, 'risibility was ,,n, CrosseJ LD at OJOC, First section, IMG ~toon left nain body and proceeded to COP 4 to set up base of fire, Signal;:to shift base of fire Y~as a gretn1 SLI!Oke grer1ade. The main body -moved int.o po~t1on at

0415, the position having been cleareu by the assault squad between OIPO aild 0415~ A .50 caliber !·~G and one HMG were placed with the 3d squad, ltt'platoon at CT C4C1054S. :J;he two 60 tubes were set up at CT 04030540, The platoon CP was estaLlished at CT 040054, The lst squad at CT 04900539. ·The a~t isection estallished at CT 041.40520, Ammunition carriers immediately e~d a sLuttl•· be'cween tbe defellse ;:.er.ilneter and the forward supply points. ,.'

The ;:.a L<·al openeu fire on Chirung-dong and OPT.....R 5 at 0427, and at .. ~• same time 'Ll;e base of fil·e openeu up from COP 4. Intermittent fire was ~ved from ~11ipers on OPLR 5 aud fire was returned from Chirung-dong. Ene.v-,...artillel"J' zerrwd in tLe supply point at 0445; oonul!Unications \jere knocked~'tu.t. ,... __ .,f...:_ •• ~.~ ~,,.... ......... .f-= ,...r -f'-tY>a- ,~,...+:.;1 nt::;r,t::; VU11U..L.llUt:::u ;:.:>..Lv...- .&.~'-'""' '-'-'- .._...,..., .... ...;....~..--- ~..,,_,._., •

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APPE!-:DIX ABLE TO ENCLO$IBE ~) ·.r


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-Frit:-~u .. 111c:s dlunpE:ld aL artiJlt;ry barrase on OPLR 5 and p].n.-toon WHs crdcreG to

H10ve on t.L::.·~- 0bjeetive aru~ continue attack by firt-;, The platoon bass of _f':l.rt-~

~Cas moved t0 the J.oft to give ov~rhead fire on CPLR. 5 while the as~anlt force

Jnovec1 into ~ositlon. I~~o rocL0t arrunur~ition had been brought ~'Y th~-~-~.s~auJ..t

squa-:·~- ~.~o tb::·~~,. cm.1ld not"" fA:: utiliZed in tf.te attack. The rle.toon mcved forHarC.

'-!u ·,·.t;;!!cc---?:n1H.,.1Su,.t .,1\Jl· the 1~-~. aquae On the point, 2d squr.tC le~t -9.nd 3d sqt~ac

::.>l;::,l:.t. ~~i(: ]d t~ection IJ~fas brought up the rear. The two 50s, -t~ .. ~0 I)1Gs, n:;or

ta!·~· r;n·~ Y:it:f.rml t sect~.on .formed a 1::ase of fire, ThE~ Platoon Gonu;,a.nclcr n:oved

out \>.T~_'tJ: t~_;,:-~ asw:n,l t :.'ore-:! and tLe Platoon Se1·g~a.nt rettained with tbc ba:.:e of

fire. Aftn· o1ov:l-nt; t·,;o-tllirck of the ••a.r to the top of the rj_::;ht flank of

OY'lil 0 t1,- ~--l~nn.l ·.,:a;_· ~ivt:.•IJ ·L~ cease base of .fire and shift fir;;.) frorr_ COP /.;. to

t~:(; J..c "~; ~lank of OFLR 5. T' . .rc11t:l-five yard.t"'- i"urther the rlatoon wat~ stop':"1od

t:y c:~n:.J. :lr:-.-s snc1 t;rf"r '"H~e fill..~. The Jd E>quad deployed to tl_c rit)Tt.. The: 2d

cq1,~Jcl l.:nr1c~ .';. '.~'i.dc rJ.an}::i.r:s .moven1ent t0 tl:e Jc!"t anA m~ved fori.rard ,.rith tl~e Jst

:.;/l~l.~J.f~. ':.'h( '"'rdcr \.1-'!.~-D 6i.ven to f:ix bayonets anc] the let ant-=J 30. :;:quac:s moved

fordu.J'C~ ~.~sir . ...; 8-Sf;El~f~ t fire anc-:. tl:.rowing grenades e Bayonet::: 1.JC!'(:i used 3.r... the

:rj.n·J .. J. ~-~:f:!J1.~ t Lo GU.ir. t}·.e rit~ht edge of tJ:e trcr•ches. 1J:mnent~n·ily ~torred by

~.'t:cl!t :n r•::("h,'j tLrcH1.r .: crnna.des 'an.d firin~ bnrp S'11nS, the two squads rr~t.ali

a.te(1 t-.-i·St-J c:;rt:.rln.c1e!::, aPC. usir.~ a.s:?a.ult fire anc~ a 'b-.ayo:1et att.ac:, destroyed tbe

!J.O~itio:n. Fovir;li fortJ&rd again -Lhe platoon wU8 hit by u. grcvp of 20 cr.er..<y

tlll'::>',Jin:_; c;rsn:~ac,,. 8JIC fj_rine l'lachine ::;uns and burp guns. InsrirHc' ty Private

::'irc:t CJs.;:·:. :ol:n :. !~T~~, \-<!he sacrificed hit: l:tf£~, the platoon as saul ted

:;c::;cin o:·d ;;'lhwc1 rosc,ecsion nf all tl:e l :'-c;h ground en OPL"t 5 at1d qu-tc}.ly moved

int.o -l)·r- ":t'' my trenc1·e.::t. 1·!ac1"Jine guns Here set u,:r qtd~ckly and tlie f~nenty li<'?l.s

purslJf.:cl d01.:r. the rf'·ver::;;e :::lopes. In tbe rneant.ime, the 2d squad m .. rept over its

portion r;f t.! E~ object:i.\~E'; destroyed the ~unl:ers in the sector anc] one E:nen1y

1~acLir.e t;'1~.r:.. The C;IJerr.y 1.{8-S heavily dug in on t\-.'Cl reversE: slope finec-rs r',_L,....,.ninr;

ve1·ticrtl 1..") C'lPl:.P.. 5 an<~ ~-.-ere est:h.ated te- be ir~ excess of· 100 troops. The 3d

s111}a~"J 1.ntz n:ovc;d C.o~n·: t:·,f: rig~t no£e tlntil pin!1P(1 = 'F'ifteen enemy <)ead were

C0t:"Dt8c1 :tr~ t.he O.rea OCcuyded by t:~e f.latoon, but there \-Jere DO parerc Cn the

boc:~_c:_:. Or-f~ ·.~·as an officer. }J:~L_Jt_~¢l ... nea.t~J1~J-!9U~-~ . .z -~-!~l'~_.q:Qes.C-in..cl-arectcr,

WE-~1 Hr,i£'_?_!~1_!-,t::d~·~a:t?:9:.. ... ~~uipred and very Z£~~B. .. .l.Q.9.k!J,:tr'. !Tore enemy dead \lrere to

the~. l:ut al1 uer<;--;:-mJCF direcr·mach1.ne r:;m: f'fro r,nd search Has :iJrcpossible.

rue t8 n,_:'.I:lf.ralls casna.lties and shortae;e of H..Llimu.t.litio.n, a rcquctt v;c..~ maCe to

\,-ithdl'B". ':eamillile t'JC enemy h.'l.d reoreaniooed and appeared to be prAparint; a

cnt~ntc1·=ntt<::.ct to tl~e r; gtt. L~_ck of sufficient annnunition pY"evented breaking

up thh r:ove. ::;niper fire was beinz received frorr, the left rear. At this tine

-~Jl aiJtom".tl.c >rea pons cn:re cmt of rumnurli tion; all 10renades had been nsed and

t,l n ri-rlc·u<:n were lc1-: on mnrnuni tion. Some use was made of Anen·.y grenade:;. Un

successfCJl attempts. Kere made to blow tl!J enemy grenade dwr.p;:::. All enen:y oar

hir:.eD Here r-mashed where possible, Utilizing one fire team as a covering force

the nlnto<:-" ,Jithdrcw c•l-tl• '<11 casualties. In the mee.ntin:c the ener:.y regained

th:~ t.op of CPL.tl. 5 anD -pursued the platoon b.r fire. ~he platoon 1--Jas pinned c1mrn

on ~rri.val A.t tl:e far .. rm·cl supply point by a heavy mortar anc artillery concen-

trat1.cr~. ~'lto -::'<1PLt.oon. t~1cn retur~led to tl:e !::L..ll p'tLreued ~r s:pOrf:!.t,:!.c c:nct'.y mor

tm· fir« t:,o e~tirA ti.rw.

APPEKDIX ABLE TO I::'CLOCc:nE (12)

3

DECLASSIFiED

•

I


• • .........

... :"'rien,':C~· casualtieE were one r:IA and 11, WIA. Enemy casual ties were 15

counted riA, 15 estirrzted KIA and an u..~etermined number of HlA. One enemy mar.hir:e ;::tu-:, m.1.merous btlrp euns and grenn.des were destroyed. No enemy inforum ticn could be found on the dead.

APPENDIX ABLE TO ENCLOSURE (12)

4 ....... DECLASSIFIED


( (

f '

DECLASSIFIED

• • -·

-':'l'c b.".sc of fire on COP 4 was able to deliver heavy and accurate rtre f'rom

the time of: the oper. fire sicnn1 u_':1til the a.ss'iul ting force 1.-.ra.s nee..r +..he t-op of t' c cb.:e~tiv<> and tl-:e fire teas shifted. Shortly thereafter COP 4 began to n'c(,;Vf' Lc'lvy eneDJY mortar fJ.re. !castily dug shallow positions on COP 4 of'ferw' '"'"'~ nrotection but not enough to nrevent several men from receiving wouncls.

Cn tic(· vi thdrawal of tho as saul tine force the base of f'ire opened 1lp 01'1 the er.cr.:'-~ o11ce t1ore. Almost imr:"'ed:!.a tely a. heavy mortar fire was received which nece~dt'l.tr.d takine the ;:uns out o{ action and movine to m,,~ positions. Withit: an "nl•c-::.ieveably short time fire >Jas again received on the new poeitions. The GLe;;·:y had excellent observation and it is believed tha.t the mor~s ·aeliverir"Ji..: -~Le .fire were G:np1a.ccd cr. the reverse slope of OPT......R 5. The order was recei vee~ tr, .,.ri thdraw u-p()!l order after the withdrawal from OPT.'R_ 5 -laa.d been effected. ThiE was donr, on order dmm the forward slope of COP 4 in a draw. ThE• Cra·• "'· s inu:lediately hit by a 10 minute mortar barrage. The base of fire tber. rctun•ecl. to platoon position: in the MLR and set up to prepare for a possible counter-attacl:.

The ro<>itions on COP 4 are tot adequate for protection of occup,ying troops. It is r('corrJnended that thE:se rosi tions be improved to include more and deeper trer,ch-uor'c:o and bunl<8r-c., if it is to be utilized on similar missions' ln the future.

,.

.. .. APPEFDIX BAlCER TO ENCLOSUBE (12)

DECLASSIFIED


' ! DECLASSIFIED

·-- • At 07~.5 the Corr.pon;- Cor.J,·arder ordered the 2d plato"n of CF.'illLIE to rein

forct· ,AE.:,~ on Hj.ll. l.04. At 0?:15 th.e platoon lc:ft the }~ .. v .. ia the valley tra.il in A5LE sector. At 0'31,5 the platoon wo.s met by_ a guide who led the p~.atoon +.o 1011•• Fror;; C900 to 0930 rr_oved slowly up trail under heavy mortar and crt1J1 ere- fire. 'leported to ABLE at 0930 and \las ordered to protect rear md f'_e.nks of :u::c::; rodtion, tying in with the right and left platoon of .A.ETE -t,...., ~..ake ar1 aJJ 'lrOunrl C_pfense. At 1230 was order-ed to set up as a. rec,r C''':.ri! to cover vi thdrawal of ATlLE. After covering withdrawal the platoon retnrnRd to lJcR, 'lrr'.vil'cc at 1430.

DECLASSIFIED


DECLASSIFIED

• • Hea.dauarters

let Bu.tt0.1ion, 7th Harines (Reinf) .;.:.;t Harine Diviction (Reinf), FHF, _%FPO

San Francisco, Calif,

31 May

:Fr-om: Q'o:n! _,:;;n6..1ne; Off leer To: Cor.1r:;z;nc.ing Officer, 7th Nc;rines, lst Marine Division

( Rc inf) , n,F

' '

3ubj: ::•:leclal Action Heport of O:::>t:ration Conducted. on 28 !:lay 1952

l, ~h 2{ ~~Y lS32 tl.is Battalion was verba~iy dlrectod to iorLr:J.l.:..t~ ).J.., r ... 1'c:r :: n ,;;:ir, artiller;y j tank-lnf.:tntr;y- ,:::,e~aul.t a_gLinet for·tL"i<<· y:>l;ition[: ,ct CT O~oOG6, GT 044066 and CT 04{074, verUe.l or·u .. t:l"';~ \ .. ure cc;lfir::~ed bJ V~rat; Grder 27J8VOI. The .. p~~n 't'~&.S

c:;·.ecutt:: or: ':c 1·1:.:~· L'o2. Tte ::.icsion ~;as two fo.ld: t.L) une ~.>l:: .. ::;ov:l ( l'·t illf) frora Ch.:: .. r.Lie C or::,:_J;£~!1~' t·;·.;:· .. s c":.ir·ec ted t~ brinf:· CT 0350~~( ~r1der long ran~e attack by fire, to divert ~neoy att~nticn f'ror .. :;: : ... :.L• objccthe, (2) :.:ain objective, CT 044J6G ;c:1Cc c:·:c J~:-.07: t ... ·.:: ~- r:.c:it_~-!t{~ :.:J ~:~ble Go:~.pD.ny; .. to ptnetrate er:suy I'·1LR: d.e~_::tro~_._ iL_:::_:~t<~),..£...t1 anct .:..r~d ca~~e Pp1rJ 1 l.OC~te e.nd: ~~-a-·9er-:... iiiieTei;-;::t;:"ulr:e on best Ci.cfencible g-rounc:., on or neo.r llil.i 104, ·~'!1e C~tc;:·.c:.e;~. and SUoJ;JOrtinc: units >;ere to clestro~· &.11 ensmy in-8ta.Llb~J.cu~ <•.!1(, bun'·;ers on e-nd near the objectivE, and to E'-"l})Ort ti1c .: . .-c-~L.c~-.. ; ~~d 'i.·,itLdra'!i:al of infantr-y units. In ad..iition infantr~

units -,,ere to furnish s:no.11 a.rm: protection to tLe t<:cnks t:ncl en-

.iE:t Joc .. t·,;:.lion, 'ith i•iarines ( Reinf)

' .

E&J.J ComycJ_ny Dct .Let SiL Bn.

'I'ACP Al··ty Ln Ttl, ~~nc.. En, .L.Lth 1-le.r ~'i1C_ c.ao_ 2~rd P.Lat Do;:_ Tc:.nl-:e, D/C

Alne ~~~i")U1~ ( I\einf) ;~1·-~:l .. Fe Tr:1, 2nd ~3n, .. LL tt. l·Ier 'l,:,' l•iort<J.r Co FC To d.Lr:,r;t !•1orte.r F.Lat FG 'l1m ..L;~;t &ncl .:src~ :~:ec As.Lt ?.Lat lr: c; ancl 3rd :J e c HJ.IG P l<i t ~, TetH.1C :nc-r~ (6 r.Jen) ~n~ Pl1t; 5;i Tenks J. ,.'ire ~~eaul

C't"\c.\ Ca.J -.l-

DECLASSIFIED

J- 7 - 4 - ~,

- 1 ~ ... - " - . 1- ·;u/

LtCo.L DAUGH'r.RY

•

I


( I r I I

-l

DECLASSIFIED ••

• • -. .. . '

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -SPECI,C.L ACliOl-i RE:PGR:l' CF OP~"\ATIO": C0ilDUCTSD OH ::!8 MAY .L952 · (CONT 1 D)

b. c:-,c r.Lie Co rap any ( Reinf) Arty FO Tm, 2nd Bn, .L.Lth Mar 4.2 :Mortar Co FO Tr.l c.l.rr.u:a i·.i.oJ:•tar P l.a t FO Tm

(l) 3rd P.Lat, Ch8r.Lie Co 2nd Sec HMG P.Lat .L Sec LJ.;G P.Lat 2nd t-ee As.Lt P.Le_t l. :.::ec 50 ca.J. LNG .L Sqcl. 60z..n.m l-lortar

c. Eeker Com;?any ( Reinf)

(Relnf)l-44 ~-· !7

I?

'"' Sec t,

_;rty FO Tm, f:nd En, l..Lth !•~ar 4.2 hort&r Co FO To 2l.r.'~ Lorta.r P .!.at FO Tm

Capt OWENS

:Lleut Slli!RA

Capt WHITMOIE

.Lst "'nd 2nd ·;e;c 75r::r.l Recoi.uess Rif.Le P.Le.t

Lieut TEDESOHI

7.. LT .. - _""- DU A r:IT:I '-'.. J.. .L-J.n.~ - ....... ,,_. .s; ~·~·..JJ.:.I

v. ~L<; ,Jl&nnln~; phase commenced on 24 J.:lay .L952, and consisted prir.lari.L~ of a confer-ence between coe:·nizant Batta.Lion e.Lemen.ts and .Lie.isor. o:·ricers of' those units attached for the operation." The conl'crc~E' forwed a p..Lan of attaclc, a p..Lan oi' maneuverl &.nd a ·f..i.ex.ib.Le ti1:.e schedu.Le prepe.red to provide for variab.Les of weather and errors in tL .. e c.nc s~::>ace estin;ation, too;et;1er l.itll foreseeab.Le continL<'nciee.

Cor.<wen t: Ti1e t ir;,c a.L.l.Ol;l; ea I or the p.Lanning phase was -considerec'l o_c'iequnte, ho>·;ever receipt of con1'1rming Frag Order on t!J May, setti~:t_. ::. orth H-Hou_r} o-cjE.ctive anC.. .to1iss1onJ did .not a.lJ.ow BU1'r'ici~;; t tiLe to fir;~ UcJ final. p.Lc:.ns, conference and briefing of a...LJ. Du.Cor·C:.il:.o.te leaders. ·.~

~scc ... ~.cnd&tionc: ThE_t >:ritten order be slven at ear.Liest

n. :..~ecla.L trc:inine:: ;;ns not cor:oidered necessar:;, nor did tiL~e )~T·~-li t trt:,ir.int.-, f'ol-· this operation.

-2-

DECLASSIFIED


• • - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

~ - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -o. Uue to \·;e.s.~L~·r; air \·J?.s c'.:.E.l..s.~;·cc_ eevera.L 1-:ours: on arr1VaJ.

of ulr tl.s coordin&ticin of artillery an( air was eff~ctivelJ contro.J.ifoC, ·._:· ,~round. t eaus attacl".ed to the forward units.

c-.. ~·or~~--;arCc clc~ .. cr...tr: receivec~ seve.r.s..l ~iundreCl rounds o:f enemy L>ortc.r· f"lr·e, ~;Licl", was eiemina.teC. on arrival of air over the target.

b. Tl1e pull out was executed under cover· of two separate air strikee, l;l th no casuc..ltles.

Recowi...enda tione:

a, Ti1e.t future operations of this nature be preceeded by the confert.l-"lCe;; ;_·~etl;.oc1 of tr<-.inint; uti.Lizine, all .s.Vetilab..Le material on s-nE:.-,~ tcc~_.i::-s L'ED l:L:bi-cs.

b. "'ht inforr.>c..ticn vit&l "'cc tLe ouccess of en operation be pc1.s:-.E:d. C.:;'. n to [!_ll lcc,dcrE, to include sqaad leaders.

c:~ • :.'he tactical ;)lan ~;as as follows: H-Hour 0300

n-io min: Atle Oo TLe a.e :_aul t unit move out from liLR.

Chs.riie Co The sC~p_?ortint, ple.toon (re1nf) move

!.-HJ..;l· ilble Co auauit p.1.atoon crosr. Line of De.;>arture •

.:.t "' ,roxir..~.tel;, E )iUs 1 &~sault platoon Able Co \vas to be in Jsn t..t L:.::.::c of t~iJ..l J.Q--.;, c·J:.' '.)"'::4065 c:..nd cor.-lfdEnce assau.Lt on h1~~ .1.04. tupport elL t oon :rro;n Cl":&r·li e Co ,;as to be in psn vic CT 040064, bring nnr>cY• ;.:_ -.~-)y.,:::;. ,--;;.T~ ~--,.... ~~ u;,... ;""~M (lr._-::rL:.~ .,n.,,.,.,,,- ·,-,.,.,n.- n+ ("''_'h4 ...... nn,-.,_,rt,...nr.• ............... .:. ............ • ......... ""• ....... ..,,,_.. ..... y .... ...., ......... ....,._._._...., ...... 1 ............. ~ ... .1 ;;_--'L" ..... '-' ~u "'""'"...,"' -.o.•e;, --..., ... •el vic c·:· J0.::J30, wen to L-iVert eneruy s.nd prevent th~ir reinforcing object.:.. Yc ..:.. ~.rj,Q 2 in AOlE. CoL;pa_.i'"!:J. sector •

.c:.l·"'cl.~l..._l··y, O.Lr.1~-. l·.ort£:.r £,nc:. 4.2u l·~ortar barrat.;eo on ca~J. from AU..Le Co on oUjective l (Hill 104).

-3-.

DECLASSIFIED


J

DECLASSIFIED .) • •

• ',._,,;;, :;'roD 2n<i l'.LE·.toor., Doc_· Co, available on ca.Ll from Ab~e Co.

Atl~ Co after· ecizinb objective nuwber one (l) hi.L.L .1.04 move ref .• <:: J..uL;_sr· :)f Ccw_JBJL;:{ up on Lill 10-:: and hi§;h grouna. J.~or-liheaet of .1.0"' c:,o. set U.:.:J psrL,lcter c1cfense, reorganized and cou:::ence one p~atoon r;· :· f.'t..:_l_t an Cb~1 ?. ( :nF.r';V -.;r._nq on rpll.ffi.P.F:,-1"1_) - - -- --· -- --- ---.., ·- •-----"" ... ----- --- ------·- --r •

o. In ecener<•l U:s operation proceed~.c.nd l-ias executed as ,!)l&n~J.~c1- L."'"t not, .{.O't.eve::c, as cctJ.ed:Llled..-1" AGl.e Co and one p.l.atoon Cb:.r.Lie Co :.:ove<'i. out fr·o~1 Line of Departure to their respective cbj~cti1:E.::. e.t 03l6 enc1 0300 res:.)e::ctlvely. At 043? one platoon ChLrlit Co opened fire on assie.;ned targets. Ab.l.e Co at 0440 under l-lortar fire caLLed in c.)rearrant;ed a.rti.L.Lery fires and at 0503 comoenc.oG. u co:.'-<lt on objective nur:1ber l.. At 0558 Ab.l.e Co secared objective nu: .. cer (l.) E,nc' coffi.i .• c;lced reorganizc.tion, set up perimeter defer.~.se cr,ci. prep8_:red to c--:.efend. objective, {J.} pending arrival of sir, ( 2) from expecteG. ene"1;i countera.ttack, One platoon CharLie Co < t 00~;7 ordered to r.1ove up to OPLR lr5. At 0630 Charlie Co started sss['Ult on OPLR /f5 v;ith t~;o squads in a front;a.L assauLt E.ncJ. or.s sq'-<ed in s l<"f't fl&n;c envelopement. The objective was "ta.~.~En ~ ~1C ..1.v ene:nJ" 11·:ere .. u.J.J.ed. ona. .1.v wouna.ea.. .a1.. 0733 Charlie vo cor.::.cE.nc ec>. v.i thc.ra;,·s.l ·c,ecause of lack of am:.mni tion and comp.Leted \·-.. 1 t;LC~re.;,:E 1 to l·ll~H & t 0900.

Ao.Le Co continued to occ'-<PY objective artil.l:.:~r~· c_nd mortc,r f'ire on enemy positions. from 2n6 ?latoon, Dog Co arrived on objective firir:..._ on te.rbets of oy:;Jortuni ty.

:ro l. and called in At U'tbi::: three tanks

(l) and comme~ced

At ll.O.O t!:e first aircraft viere on station and at .1..150 8 Air ~ere<: F-84 jets cor-';:cenced stri~e on CT 044068, This was fo.l.l.owec. b;, 7 AD's at l.230 t:,&t hit CT 04:30?4, CT 0350?2, CT 0~6069 o.nd JT OZ4J32. At 1425 t'·;c F4U 1 s, one "\.;1 th sr.:.;.oke and the ot.her as an escort :Laid a srnoke screen from north side of Tumae-ri to· Taecok-sen. At 1405 Able Co v:ithdrew to J.iLR with all personnel. an<l equipr..e~- ._.

iJow;:.:E.-nt: It ib be.L1Gved that the operatlon as pJ.anned. and. executeo. vu:;_s tactice.l:Ly sound and operationally successful.. -.The coorG.L-,<- tion bet~;e.on ir.:f~ntry, artillery, tanks and aircraft was outst&l:C:.int_. It is si;_;nlficant that on withdrawal. from objective l.

1 there ,;ere no casual. ties what-so-ever due to friend.ly air cover.

lJinety-five p'ercent of the frier.d..Ly casualties wer-e infJ..icted by ener:.;. ~-ort&.rs and artillery which could have and woul.d have been sLLcnccC., if the weather had been operationa.L for aircraft.

-4-

DECLASSIFIED


,,

I I

I

DECLASSIFIED

• • - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -LPECIJ..L .AC:.CICE RZPCRT Cf CPc;iiJ,.':. Ici; cc::D1.JCTED o:: 28 NAY J.952 (CONT 1 D)

Recor:t>;-:.endations:

/ (.l) Ths.t a limitec\ objective attack s1.4ch as this be planned and l execute6. only -,:r-.en ideaJ. ;-re~tl:sr conditions exist so that aJ..l sup-~or-t1n2; er1"',s c.:.:n be full.y ~tilized..

6. DuE to the limited scope of the operation no specia.l problems relativs ~c the utiliz~tlon or coordination of artillery, air~ or other ur.i t s 1·1ere encountered. All sup,Jorting arL1S, communications E,nd orc,anic Battc.lion units functioned effectively and e:f'fio1ent.ly.

7. It is be.lieved that a combined tank-infantry task organization ~Q c nn~c~~ ~n~~c "n,Phl~ n~ c~~~~m~lu o~~c"~iv~ nnP~~~1nna Aa~1nAt -~ ...... ~ ............. ~ .................................. ;:' .......... _'W' ............ ~ ....... ..., .... ...,_ol .................. _ ...... _l::'.., ________ -g---~-

the e:-~cu;. Air cover is consi6.ered to be an absolute necessity in cpEr&tiorls of this t:i_:;t;. i(l order to silence the enemy mortar and art:..li~r·~· ;ire. Frl.on6.1~ cocinter-·oatter;; fire is ver~ ineffective v;itLo-.;.'c tLe t;uiCtance ~n0. <iirectlon of <.l1 AC,- due to the constant LLis~lecer..tnt o:· eneilly &rtil:..cr~' t..-cnd :~:ortars. In any future operations of t:-,is t~pe it ic very ir:iports_nt that ideal weather conC.itionr; ~xict so t!Jc.t e:;ch c:nC. t;;Very su~.Y)ortinr: arm,~ particu.J.arl.y .&:.lr, CD.n be used. - - · - -

~ (1.) C::ne;.:~- tactics includes: booby trappint,; ovcn bunk~rs, trenclcec, c.c•u. equipuent "Jrior their puJ.l ou't, e<S evi<ienced by 1'in0.in,· tLese i teur. in )Oci tions occupied by ene>r.y KIA.

(:C) Enem:· front J.inc :Jositions -were zeroed in 1-lith heavy mortar ccncentrationc, indics.tin£ their emergency barrages were lai(_ C.lrectl~- on their 01-;.n l•:LR, thus pe:r·mi tt1ne:_· a del.ayed pul.L back, heav;.- r.:tortar concentrations, then follo\;ed by a prearranged COULtt:r otta.Cl:.

b. Tl-,e ap_)earanc.o of air cover silenced al.l artiJ.J.ery and cort.Lrc.

c. _:., ;:.ini;;,;m of eiLhty-fi ve ( i::l5) per cent of aJ.J. casua.lt1es -H~'Y'P ih1~ t:n f'l"~.: .. ·r1P.ntA of' ~;rtill:'-F'.' ;::.nO nort.!=irs _ ---------- -- ----'-' ________ -- ------- -- .. -- - ----

d ~':c<.t t1:e eno:.:~- lc-.it~ mortar barrac;es on raG.io locations C:.urint__ trc-'nSL.lis.=iont., ::·:l-:.en raC'_ios c"':.isplEced,; mortarc continued on the lc.ct )Ocition until transmissions I:ere nao.e fror:J a nevi l.oca_t;.c;·,, t:·_en ti:e cone en tra tion si1ifted. to the nev; i)OSi tion of the r·.s.6.io.

~----c. ____ ._

e. ':i.'h!'.t a reocerve of enc.;ineers, ani other eleiiJents \-lere nee.G..eci..

i'. r ... 1.hc,t the ,,,;:..;.L0..c..G..

an s.r;~ored vcl-.icle was invaJ.ue.b.le in evacuating

r~~•(' /a/.~ Gscfi.E ·,;. :0:. D-'6Grjfcr

DECLASSIFIED


IU:ORI:'f SEOURU'J: liU>'O,ii~I\TlOl'

OPiCM'.i'lOti Pl.Uj

• . !IU!Lilltl\, •• 11:1-02)

11t l1at1;allon, 7th Har1nea (Relnt)

li&!S Oompan:y net let 'J1r: an

'O.CP ..

~r~n~~?~ ~~:o~lie!!~~f:e a. i· . .'ble Co:,manv (Ha1nf) Capt T!iOHPSON

trty ~'(l Tm, 2nd Bn, 11th MIU' I· I 4. 2 Y.or tar Co FO 'l'm 4 nllo<:.l t:ortar .Plat i'O 'Im ~ 19t and ~rd seo Aalt Plat ~t let 't.'ld 3rd ~~ee J:_~qG ?la t 1 'I 2 ·.·enme Eni:l"l!l (G men) r. 2nd Fl!'l t, Doc; Tanka 1 i 'ire 1'eam ·

b. {/l~~l1e 0ompa.'ly {He1r.f) -.rt;y FO To, 2nd Bn, 11th till.l' 11. :-~ Lovtrtl" FO Tu OJ.nn Po:rtar Plat J'O 'l'm

(l) Br-d FlF.t1 Oharl.1e Go (H.elnt') 2nd seo HMG ?lat l Seo LHG Plat l Bee 60 oal LUG 1 Bqd 60mm Mortar Seo

•• Baker Company (Relnt) Ca,pt lo1il'l'MORC Arty ~'0 Tr.J 1 2nd Bn, ll th Mar 4. :J l·:or tar Co I'G 'l'lll 13lmlu Hortar Plat ~'0 'fill lot AAd 2nd :~eo 71111ro neoollleu Rifl.e Plat

1. a. C'U.rl'en t enemy roroea oppo aln , the lilt hn. '1 th 1:ar1 ... aJ'e thft tont,•t1Yely nooepted 1·11·t nnd 2nd Bn ·and th~. aeeepW 3rd Bn of tha 659th Hegt, !87th D1v1 63Pd CCr ~•"l''1r8•

-1-Enclosure {2)

DECLASSIFIED

. ; . '


· . .-"'

SEORII:T SIIOURl'l'Y: lNFOHMA'l'ION ________ ...., __ OPIRAfZON PLAN NUMBER 16-&2 (COJifl J)) . -.---.--------------- ------------

l.t.ttle 1a ltnown ot the oompoat1on ot the let and 2aii.Ba wQlub are looat•H'- 1n the Tumae-r1 a.nu CtJ.i.rliiJC-&UiC arwa ••illi-!t:•~·o~?~a!4Bie0~e~~Y!~9!:~·~!! ;~~i!•!o~.!r:~.;JI: wpna oollUI.pJl1 on llne.

me bt Bn, o59t.h Hect ia believed to be elllployeO. .... tbe fwl&e-;r1 al"ea 1n depth trom 0'1' 0460'10 to 0'1' 035091. IQ 't'lw ot ~·reoen't en~ aotlrtty on Bill 10• rte 0! 044016, !.t t: !*l!eYe4 ~t the enemy pel"l!lanent11 oooup1ea that poa1t1on wU:h an _...,.. nuabor or troope.

;rtsi"t~i';~~:::::~:~~th :ffi= 4::~:::::~:;!:;~~~~!\~!":r OILR I a. VS.o 0'1' 0330M have made en.u oontaot d'urina \tle libllll•

. or 4ayl1pt and darltneaa. u 1a Jherorore probable tiid _. eaiilq pel"'l&&\ent17 oooup1ea that poaU1on with a.n unknown auabor •t woep••

'i'he oUl"Z'ont atrencth or tho D59th Roct h .. t1JU.te4 • lie 3.14, an., 'lheretore 1 t muat be aaatDad tha t:h:Paa bat td.t.liu n1.t&e Rea-t-7 weapons Battalion ·are· aieo ·'uP ··110· 'i/o-i.iZ..nat:b-or-rpor 1Btantl7 Bo.ttal1on and 589 men per Heavy weapon• Bat\al ··. a.

'l'he 18?1al D1vh1on or the 632'4 OOJ' AI'IU baa no kllOWa

~;-:~u~!eo~i,r~::rr:.~;r-rr:~ :;;ti:!:no~ri:!oi.:~1:i•~··.·~ .. -Wllo,ea\84 repaent. 1n that ~T1o1on. '!'hereto,.. the poal1 · t.r ot aoae WU.ta re1ntoro1nc the IIS9th Roct nat be oona14t~ ·

I:!w18~~r.~~ :i1~· r!:a-4 ~~r :l5~~n;:,t:.~:r::.~:~ a'a.C*fiPO_.. net aleo be oonsidered ae a re1n1'ore1nc W\1 t. ·

For current· enemy 4etene1ve 1natallat1ona ••• ...,. •• ~ •.

a. •· l/7 oon4uote oolllpi.Jl1 att&ek on 'i'lllea.-r~ (vie Cii' viW'Uli, aa4 platoon at;ta.ok on OPLR Mo tl hio O'f 01110118). \1'~ ...

1? ·,. ·

b. LD, and ob.)eot1Ye aa ahown on Opn OYorlq, aee ...... Att.s •.

Enclosure ( 2)

DECLASSIFIED

d


.... , 810Ul\I'1'!' INFOit!ol!TION

---------------------------~-----OJ>IIU.'l'l<ll\t PlAN NUMBER l&-52 (OOfti'Ot -----------------------------····· t. . 2nd Plat Doc ~anka, auembb noint. •le Q'l'. OMOfle paaoed to 110ft ~ objeot1Ye No 1, or· oi-4el". •

•· (1) aro. P1a't nos ':arlka, p:npana. w ~ me Ia ·ta 1t• xa. t. a. (1) Al)le OO!IIpUJ' (Re1nt) oonlllaot attaok on Hill 10tf (ObJeot.t.n No 1) and 'l'wila ... r1, (ob,1eeU.ve No e). ·

.-~1 t.!:f. ~t!: ;,r::O~e ·=~~ ~~::-:~. ';lt~'fol'ftc tit o.lO?O and one on d111 104 tor adn.nee4 pati'Ol ba•••

\8i ll!n..""ineer Teatll No 1 att.uhed to Atilt Plat, Mill deal' I'OU'-• ~inHr Team llo 2 attaohed to Co OP1 .ltlan oleal" OP ..... -d road fl<om :tvd OP to Ji!I.Ro

(4) 2nd Pl.at Doc Tanka mO?e out, on ora.-.

-· nil~11~-~o~(~!~~!l&40~!~~t~'!~d.o~J_(!! ~!!f~Rttnf) ::.:;• Pa. -~~Ch!N"~3o;;;·;.t;-o! .. oie068,' if~ u .;lL4t.~;,.;o:;; ua prnent their re1ntorelnc obJeotlvea 1 and a 1n Abb C<l-l!p'llt !!!ttto!'.

(B) Ut1l1ae to max111W111 3. e• roolteta, 60 oa.l LMG, lUll aa4 GOiiru JiGrtaz:. ·

' •· l'.a.k\U' oo (Re1nf) oontlnuea to 4otend Bn eeetor tl1.ftt ~ pared w aupporilru ther A.ble or Ohal"Ue. or or4el'. -

.z. (1) ln!.t!al route ot ev:eue.t!.on ~.nd =.,p1J rta 1CM :e;:! aooa4 to MLR.

(S) Prortcle eeoUI'i t.r pat.Mle to tlante, IUl4 eon-.t ,. .. 1 to pOattlble :hoiandl7 unite on r1cht.

JM••· (Z) Eatabllah nicht per1aewr 4etenee ad torw~ ,....,_

(4) Eatabllah "olo .. in• n.re team 11aten1nc poeW. (6) Deat'roy aU eD81117 1na11aUaUon• &D4 bea'f7 WNpl• o obJeot.i.Te a.

Enclosure ( 2)


UudT SI<IU!Ufi INFOHMATION ~ ~ ~ ~ - - = - ~ = - ~ - ~ - - - ------------··-OPD\U'lON PUH NUMBER 16-62 (CONTI)))

--------------------------------(6) Bend all prison•~• di~eot to Bn OP.

(7) Suppo~tinc t1~ee 1nd1oate4 on Opn Plans 13-82. Qd

(8) Air atr1kee on oall, saoke plane on station,

(9) F'wd elements dieplay .u~ Panels.

(10) AU peraonnel twd MLR wear bullet proot vet'i Qd helllleta, aarzo;y entreneh1nt; toola.

(U) Iln u-2 eetabl1ah plan or observation of eneai. Bwport all ii1G}lt1r.g to s-a 1iii.£De41at~tly.

b. 'i'wo canteens water.

o. One day •o• :ratione.

d, F'wd supply point tor J.ble Oo to be announced,

e. ·t.:stablluh Bn f'wd .Ud StaUon OT 0520601 on ordel'.

6. a. Ou:wd Bn Taot1oal Net,

·b, Able OompanJ uee 2 aCJR-5001 one on eeparate ohaanei. fo.laner OOll\P&nY oommun1oat1ona, one on Bn ta••·

•• Bn lay wll'e to Able Oo tvd OP,

d. Aaa1e;n alternate methode ot a1cna1Unt; 1n •••• ot ~ tall"".

(1) P~11111U7, wire.

Enclosure (2.)

DECLASS!Flli'D


I •

_.., .·

lldVRJ:ft DftJIMUOI

DECLASSIFIED

.. - - ... - -: ~ - ........ ..::.-- .. - .... -¥" --- - - --· ........... -- •. - ...... . oHM!l• :PLUI IVDIB .... . · (OORt• D)

-----------~·--------------~---~· (I) .Utel'lla'h, JIUla .. ,,..u ....... , ........ h ...

(a) ,ua • .. •• u lll,

('ltJ .uJ .. - ·nn n aa., """' (e) 180 - - a-.. J'll'._~ (4) 1ll .. "" . .lllMIId' Ill' J-.

(e) UP - - lt114 help •

. •· b. ... a •Altor h'-'"Pt .. ,, .,......_ t.illlle4l.atel7 a W lllfWU.W.oa "laUn • OpL · .

11 PIIR or Lti'ftQAII CJOI.OJIIL ~'*-

AIIIUUI

.ut.1 ... .. - -o,pa Oftl'laf' aU:'D • .... Inttlllclll .. Ot"Wlq

DllfJQ:IIUUONl 1 87DJULI'

arnax.u..

Enclosure (2)

.....

DECLASSIFIED

•

f·· •.. ,


SltORi:T SEOURI'l'Y l FOi\:.' 'lll:t<

------------------------------ -·----1/7 SJ:Qtn:ncm OF OPEIU.''Inl: (CONT 1 D) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -0620!

. 05201

(0525:)

Arty fire counter-btry,

Dog C_e 1 'I'11nk, pt>epr•red to 1'1re on Northeast elope•

'l'Wlvoe-r1 froL psn C'I 055048, on order, l •rank pre-

vn'eu to tire on O?Lk 5, Ohirune;-done; Pnd Taedok.-San

fro:; pAn C'I 050048,

--

0600:

08001

f~nt1. f'lr. t Pre.,ared to r.'ov ~ fro;:. ~' ose,L·bly pt to 1040 (On

oo .:·letion roqcJ. r:lne ele,.rnn"e) b'" Enp·B .-1 th Able Oo.

Pl..,_t Ohsrlle Co prepar•ed to clotw on o,_,J..R 5, on order,

0800! A1:t" Dtril~c on. Red Hill cr Chiroung..,..Uo--l[;' Ra e1 tu.B.t1on

requi.reR,

lote 1,

:Jt~iP /"tJ/l Ji'f .

.:;.II. ?12/JTT -·

/il;r;Fy Sf C tvl/bi~.Nt:P

'CR!i:T

Enclosure ( 2)

PHEPAJ{,; l''Oii CA'JK from Red 1!111.

-2-

I


i ~. i

DECLASSIFIED

CoPt

. I!OiiE'l' SIOURI'l:'t L iiY\:i\, J,.':ION

11t ••'tlllon (Re1nt) ftb. Mal'1A .. (Re1nt) 1111 Mid' J1'f (Re1nt) 1• the Plel4

PI(YI 1

oe..aa 02411

024111

0::1001

0:5001

fJiliOOt

04001

l)4001

0400;

0400:

fHU& 2

•oaoo:

•05061

' ( 0151·)1)

'

Enclosure

Open Ba OP l.Sl.

Able Co 110n ~ t · trom MLR..

l Plat Ot.arl11 lluMYe wt troa llliio

Able nose L.D.

1. Plat CharUe GJ'Oii t.. Do '

A.bl,. All t Plat in pan ban 106. (Alao bue ot tlti'~ Pld). . ' •. Pbt Ol:l!l.rl1e 1n l.nltial pen 0"1' 0400154.

CiU>J"lle Plat attaek. by ttre on O?l.R 6 and Ohll!~dD"'.

(OM5-Fox 1 2/l. will atta.ctk 2/l.• a OPLR 1 by t1re1tt L

(1 l'le.t Fox •t CIT 0690'72). ·\

Ax·ty l!l"r:·a,e on 1041 81 an4 4.2 Barrace on 104 1

oontl'olled bJ Able.

J..,;u:Pht oloae on lQ.l tollov1r11 Sv.p/A barrace. I

;Jecnll"e ObJ l• Prepare tQ move o 't tor ObJ 2 Qn

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - -

~:, . ,_.

~-ltl 'raedolt•f.San and. hllh r14r,e N. w. 'l'Uma~1. I

-4o 2• pr ep~t red to uaolr.e fwaae-rl o n pu,ll ou '·

·1-: (2) r.

DECLASSIFIED

'

I . \ ,, ' l'

., .41£· . ' -. ~' '·' tiff! !?I!~-. I . • 0:·


'·

DECLASSIFIED

·.· .. -ft' .INPORlariOJI

'

4-~ • g Q t .} 8£.!

, z•'~ ~ 1:1 • -. " 3'2 • 2. 12

l'4ta~ 2.11 2~,5 I 'l ! '1... '3,/; iJ" . 3q(.. D " -" 1 • ~~~.z~iVv1 ~- 5)-. 1 i .. ~ "1.,.,~ a\' 1 &o~ ':'1 2 • ? . · , .

,,

Q Bunker• -' a uortar 'I' A/W

'&t.- OS • Sheltezo

DISTRIB!JnON: Same as Opn Plan 16-52

OfJ'IOIA.LI

W, O, BUTW!R 2nd Lt, U3MO s-e

S.:IRU Enclosure (2)

BI Olll>P. OF l.IIUTENAlif COLONEL DWGHTRY

a. v. .rosl.lli MaJor, u. I. Mar1ne Oo:rps

lxeeu1i1"• 01't1eer ·

DECLASSIFIED

. '


' '

DECLASSIFIED - E;;:... .r' . ....,. ............. :,;.~-"

•'

hoaa '1'01

.lJubJa

C?H•t~nl AA.O-.&.J

:Jer 0 o 4 66 - 0 Z

JUL .1. u 1951:;

on lat MarDiv aec ltr aer ~71152 ot 17

C~ding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pae1tle Coms•ndant o£ the Marine Corpa

Special Action Report, lat Battalion, 7th M&rlaoa, tonre...~!ng or

lo J'orwardecl.

t:: r: r~ u '"T .J II.. "" I '>. 11. '

iiCURlTY IHPOKMATION

1. ~ SnWAf<1 ~)' dfl"f>r.tfnr

7th marine regiment - 1st battalion - special action ... · concussion type grenade caused few...

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